The site of the most important battle that took place in the summer of 1943. Kursk Bulge (Battle of Kursk) briefly

The Battle of Kursk, which lasted from 07/05/1943 to 08/23/1943, is a turning point in the Great Patriotic War and a giant historical tank battle. The Battle of Kursk lasted 49 days.

Hitler had high hopes for this major offensive battle called the Citadel, he needed a victory to raise the spirit of the army after a series of failures. August 1943 was fatal for Hitler, as the countdown to the war began, the Soviet army confidently marched to victory.

Intelligence service

Intelligence played an important role in the outcome of the battle. In the winter of 1943, the intercepted encrypted information constantly mentioned the "Citadel". Anastas Mikoyan (a member of the Politburo of the CPSU) claims that on April 12, Stalin received information about the Citadel project.

Back in 1942, British intelligence managed to crack the Lorenz code, which encrypted the messages of the 3rd Reich. As a result, the project of the summer offensive was intercepted, and information about the general plan "Citadel", the location and structure of forces. This information was immediately transferred to the leadership of the USSR.

Thanks to the work of the Dora reconnaissance group, the deployment of German troops on the Eastern Front became known to the Soviet command, and the work of other intelligence agencies provided information on other areas of the fronts.

Confrontation

The Soviet command was aware of the exact time of the start of the German operation. Therefore, the necessary counter-preparation was carried out. The Nazis began the assault on the Kursk Bulge on July 5 - this is the date the battle began. The main offensive attack of the Germans was in the direction of Olkhovatka, Maloarkhangelsk and Gnilets.

The command of the German troops sought to get to Kursk along the shortest path. However, the Russian commanders: N. Vatutin - the Voronezh direction, K. Rokossovsky - the Central direction, I. Konev - the Steppe direction of the front, adequately responded to the German offensive.

The Kursk Bulge was supervised by the enemy by talented generals - these are General Erich von Manstein and Field Marshal von Kluge. Having been rebuffed at Olkhovatka, the Nazis tried to break through at Ponyri, using the Ferdinand self-propelled guns. But here, too, they failed to break through the defensive might of the Red Army.

Since July 11, a fierce battle has been going on near Prokhorovka. The Germans suffered significant losses of equipment and people. It was near Prokhorovka that the turning point in the war took place, and July 12 became a turning point in this battle for the 3rd Reich. The Germans struck immediately from the southern and western fronts.

One of the global tank battles took place. The Nazi army advanced 300 tanks into the battle from the south, and 4 tank and 1 infantry divisions from the west. According to other sources, the tank battle consisted of about 1200 tanks from 2 sides. The defeat of the Germans overtook by the end of the day, the movement of the SS corps was suspended, and their tactics turned into a defensive one.

During the Battle of Prokhorovka, according to Soviet data, on July 11-12, the German army lost more than 3,500 men and 400 tanks. The Germans themselves estimated the losses of the Soviet army at 244 tanks. Only 6 days lasted the operation "Citadel", in which the Germans tried to attack.

Used technique

Soviet medium tanks T-34 (about 70%), heavy - KV-1S, KV-1, light - T-70, self-propelled artillery mounts, nicknamed "St. SU-122, met in confrontation with German tanks Panther, Tigr, Pz.I, Pz.II, Pz.III, Pz.IV, which were supported by Elefant self-propelled guns (we have Ferdinand).

The Soviet guns were practically incapable of penetrating the frontal armor of the Ferdinands in 200 mm, they were destroyed with the help of mines and aircraft.

Also, the German assault guns were tank destroyers StuG III and JagdPz IV. Hitler strongly counted on new equipment in the battle, so the Germans postponed the offensive for 2 months in order to release 240 Panthers to the Citadel.

During the battle, Soviet troops received captured German "Panthers" and "Tigers", abandoned by the crew or broken. After the elimination of breakdowns, the tanks fought on the side of the Soviet troops.

List of forces of the USSR Army (according to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation):

• 3444 tanks;
• 2172 aircraft;
• 1.3 million people;
• 19100 mortars and guns.

As a reserve force was the Steppe Front, numbering: 1.5 thousand tanks, 580 thousand people, 700 aircraft, 7.4 thousand mortars and guns.

List of enemy forces:

• 2733 tanks;
• 2500 aircraft;
• 900 thousand people;
• 10,000 mortars and guns.

The Red Army had a numerical superiority by the beginning of the Battle of Kursk. However, the military potential was on the side of the Nazis, not in terms of quantity, but in terms of the technical level of military equipment.

Offensive

On July 13, the German army went on the defensive. The Red Army attacked, pushing the Germans further and further, and by July 14 the front line had moved up to 25 km. Having battered the German defensive capabilities, on July 18 the Soviet army launched a counterattack in order to defeat the Kharkov-Belgorod group of Germans. The Soviet front of offensive operations exceeded 600 km. On July 23, they reached the line of the German positions that they occupied before the offensive.

By August 3, the Soviet army consisted of: 50 rifle divisions, 2.4 thousand tanks, more than 12 thousand guns. On August 5 at 18 o'clock Belgorod was liberated from the Germans. From the beginning of August, a battle was fought for the city of Orel, on August 6 it was liberated. On August 10, the soldiers of the Soviet army cut the Kharkiv-Poltava railway line during the offensive Belgorod-Kharkov operation. On August 11, the Germans attacked in the vicinity of Bogodukhov, slowing down the pace of fighting on both fronts.

Heavy fighting lasted until 14 August. On August 17, Soviet troops approached Kharkov, starting a battle on its outskirts. The German troops carried out the final offensive in Akhtyrka, but this breakthrough did not affect the outcome of the battle. On August 23, an intensive assault on Kharkov began.

This day itself is considered the day of the liberation of Kharkov and the end of the Battle of Kursk. Despite the actual fights with the remnants of the German resistance, which lasted until 30 August.

Losses

According to various historical reports, the losses in the Battle of Kursk vary. Academician Samsonov A.M. claims that the losses in the Battle of Kursk: more than 500 thousand wounded, killed and captured, 3.7 thousand aircraft and 1.5 thousand tanks.

Losses in the heavy battle on the Kursk Bulge, according to information from the research of G.F. Krivosheev, in the Red Army amounted to:

• Killed, disappeared, were captured - 254,470 people,
• Wounded - 608833 people.

Those. in total, human losses amounted to 863303 people, with average daily losses - 32843 people.

Losses of military equipment:

• Tanks - 6064 units;
• Aircraft - 1626 pieces,
• Mortars and guns - 5244 pcs.

The German historian Overmans Rüdiger claims that the losses of the German army were killed - 130429 people. The losses of military equipment amounted to: tanks - 1500 units; aircraft - 1696 pcs. According to Soviet information, from July 5 to September 5, 1943, more than 420 thousand Germans were destroyed, as well as 38.6 thousand prisoners.

Outcome

Irritated Hitler put the blame for the failure in the Battle of Kursk on the generals and field marshals, whom he demoted, replacing them with more capable ones. However, in the future, the major offensives "Watch on the Rhine" in 1944 and the operation at Balaton in 1945 also failed. After the defeat in the battle on the Kursk Bulge, the Nazis did not achieve a single victory in the war.

The front line at the beginning of the summer-autumn campaign of 1943 ran from the Barents Sea to Lake Ladoga, further along the Svir River to Leningrad and further south; at Velikie Luki, it turned to the southeast and in the Kursk region formed a huge ledge, deeply protruding into the disposition of enemy troops; further from the Belgrade region, it ran east of Kharkov and along the Seversky Donets and Mius rivers stretched to the eastern coast of the Sea of ​​\u200b\u200bAzov; on the Taman Peninsula, it passed east of Timryuk and Novorossiysk.

The largest forces were concentrated in the southwestern direction, in the area from Novorossiysk to Taganrog. In the maritime theaters, the balance of power also began to take shape in favor of the Soviet Union, primarily due to the quantitative and qualitative growth of naval aviation.

The fascist German command came to the conclusion that the most convenient site for delivering a decisive blow was the ledge in the Kursk region, which received the name of the Kursk salient. From the north, the troops of the Army Group "Center" hung over it, creating a heavily fortified Oryol bridgehead here. From the south, the ledge was covered by the troops of the Army Group "South". The enemy hoped to cut off the ledge under the base and defeat the formations of the Central and Voronezh fronts operating there. The fascist German command also took into account the exceptionally great strategic importance of the salient for the Red Army. Occupying it, Soviet troops could strike at the rear of the flags of both the Oryol and Belgrade-Kharkov enemy groups.

The development of the offensive operation plan was completed by the Nazi command already in the first half of April. It received the conditional name "Citadel". The general plan of the operation boiled down to the following: with two simultaneous counter strikes in the general direction to Kursk - from the Orel region to the south and from the Kharkov region to the north - to encircle and destroy the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts on the Kursk ledge. The subsequent offensive operations of the Wehrmacht were made dependent on the results of the battle on the Kursk Bulge. The success of these operations was to serve as a signal for an attack on Leningrad.

The enemy prepared carefully for the operation. Taking advantage of the absence of a second front in Europe, the fascist German command transferred 5 infantry divisions from France and Germany to the area south of Orel and north of Kharkov. It paid particular attention to the concentration of tank formations. Large aviation forces were also drawn up. As a result, the enemy managed to create strong strike groups. One of them, consisting of the 9th German Army of the Center group, was located in the area south of Orel. The other, which included the 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf Task Force of the Army Group South, was located in the area north of Kharkov. The German 2nd Army, which was part of Army Group Center, was deployed against the western front of the Kursk salient.

The former chief of staff of the 48th tank corps, which participated in the operation, General F. Mellenthin, testifies that "not a single offensive was as carefully prepared as this."

Soviet troops were also actively preparing for offensive operations. The headquarters planned in the summer-autumn campaign to defeat the Army Groups "Center" and "South", liberate the Left-Bank Ukraine, Donbass, eastern regions of Belarus and reach the Smolensk line, the Sozh river, the middle and lower reaches of the Dnieper. The troops of the Bryansk, Central, Voronezh, Steppe fronts, the left wing of the Western Front and part of the forces of the Southwestern Front were to participate in this large offensive. At the same time, it was supposed to concentrate the main efforts on the southwestern direction in order to defeat the enemy armies in the areas of Orel and Kharkov, on the Kursk Bulge. The operation was prepared by the Headquarters of the General Staff, the military councils of the dandies and their headquarters with the utmost care.

On April 8, G.K. Zhukov, who was at that time on the instructions of the Headquarters in the area of ​​​​the Kursk salient, outlined his thoughts on the plan for the upcoming actions of the Soviet troops to the Supreme Commander. “It will be better,” he reported, “if we exhaust the enemy on our defense, knock out his tanks, and then, introducing fresh reserves, we will finally finish off the main enemy grouping by going on a general offensive.” A. M. Vasilevsky shared this point of view.

On April 12, a meeting was held at Headquarters, at which a preliminary decision was made on a deliberate defense. The final decision on deliberate defense was made by Stalin in early June. The Soviet High Command, realizing the importance of the Kursk ledge, took appropriate measures.

The repulse of an enemy strike from the area south of Orel was assigned to the Central Front, which defended the northern and northwestern parts of the Kursk ledge, and the enemy’s offensive from the Belgorod region was supposed to disrupt the Voronezh Front, which defended the southern and southwestern parts of the arc.

The coordination of the actions of the fronts on the spot was entrusted to the representatives of the Stavka marshals G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky.

Never before during the war did Soviet troops create such a powerful and grandiose defense.

By the beginning of July, the Soviet troops were fully prepared to repel the enemy offensive.

The fascist German command kept postponing the start of the operation. The reason for this was the preparation of the enemy to attack the Soviet troops with a powerful tank avalanche. On July 1, Hitler summoned the main leaders of the operation and announced the final decision to start it on July 5.

The fascist command was especially concerned about achieving surprise and devastating impact. However, the enemy's plan failed: the Soviet command promptly revealed the intentions of the Nazis and the arrival of his new technical means to the front, and set the exact date for the start of Operation Citadel. Based on the data received, the commanders of the Central and Voronezh Fronts decided to carry out a pre-planned artillery counter-training, to launch a fire attack on the areas of concentration of the main enemy groupings in order to stop his initial onslaught, to inflict heavy damage on him even before he rushes to the attack.

Before the attack, Hitler issued two orders to keep the spirit of his soldiers: one, on July 1, for the officers, the other, on July 4, for the entire personnel of the troops participating in the operation.

On July 5, at dawn, the troops of the 13th Army, the 6th and 7th Guards Armies of the Voronezh and Central Fronts launched a powerful artillery strike on its battle formations, artillery firing positions, command and observation posts. One of the largest battles of the Great Patriotic War began. During the artillery counter-preparation, serious losses were inflicted on the enemy, especially in artillery. The battle formations of the Nazi units and subunits were largely disorganized. There was confusion in the camp of the enemy. The German fascist command, in order to restore the disturbed command and control of troops, was forced to postpone the start of the offensive for 2.5-3 hours.

At 0530 hours, after artillery preparation, the enemy went over to the offensive in the zone of the central front and at 0600 in the zone of Voronezh. Under cover of the fire of thousands of guns, with the support of many aircraft, a mass of fascist tanks and assault guns rushed into the attack. The infantry followed them. Fierce battles began. The Nazis delivered three blows to the troops of the Central Front in the 40 km zone.

The enemy was sure that he would be able to quickly join the battle formations of the Soviet troops. But his main blow fell on the strongest sector of the defense of the Soviet troops, and therefore, from the very first minutes of the battle, it began to unfold not as the Nazis had planned. The enemy was met with a flurry of fire from all types of weapons. From the air, enemy manpower and equipment were destroyed by pilots. Four times during the day, the Nazi troops tried to break through the defenses of the Soviet troops and each time they were forced to roll back.

The number of wrecked and burned enemy vehicles grew rapidly, the fields were covered with thousands of corpses of the Nazis. The Soviet troops also suffered losses. The fascist command threw more and more tank and infantry units into battle. Up to 4 infantry divisions and 250 tanks were advancing against two Soviet divisions operating in the main direction (the left flank of the 13th Army) (81st Generals Barinova A.B. and 15th Colonel V.N. Dzhandzhgov). They were supported by about 100 aircraft. Only by the end of the day did the Nazis manage to penetrate into the defense of the Soviet troops for 6-8 km in a very narrow area and reach the second defensive zone. This was achieved at the cost of huge losses.

At night, the troops of the 13th Army consolidated their positions and prepared for the next battle.

In the early morning of July 6, the 17th Guards Rifle Corps of the 13th Army, the 16th Tank Corps of the 2nd Tank Army, and the 19th Separate Tank Corps, supported by aviation, counterattacked the main enemy grouping. Both sides fought with extraordinary tenacity. Enemy aviation, despite heavy losses, continuously bombed the battle formations of Soviet units. As a result of a two-hour battle, the enemy was pushed back to the north by 1.5 -2 km.

Unable to break through to the second line of defense through Olkhovatka, the enemy decided to concentrate his main efforts on another sector. At dawn on July 7, 200 tanks and 2 infantry divisions, supported by artillery and aircraft, attacked in the direction of Ponyri. The Soviet command urgently transferred here large forces of anti-tank artillery and rocket launchers.

Five times during the day the Nazis made violent attacks, and they all ended unsuccessfully. Only at the end of the day the enemy, having brought up fresh forces, broke into the northern part of Ponyri. But the next day he was knocked out of there.

On July 8, after a powerful artillery and aviation preparation, the enemy resumed the attack on Olkhovatka. In a small area of ​​10 km, he brought into battle two more tank divisions. Now almost all the forces of the shock German fascist group advancing on Kursk from the north took part in the battle.

The fierceness of the fighting grew with every passing hour. The onslaught of the enemy was especially strong at the junction of the 13th and 70th armies in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe settlement of Samodurovka. But the Soviet soldiers survived. The enemy, although he advanced another 3-4 km at the cost of exceptional losses, could not break through the Soviet defenses. This was his last push.

During four days of bloody fighting in the area of ​​Ponyri and Olkhovatka, the fascist German group managed to engage in the defense of the troops of the Central Front in just a zone up to 10 km wide and up to 12 km deep. On the fifth day of the battle, she could no longer advance. The Nazis were forced to go on the defensive at the line reached.

Towards this grouping, which was trying to pass to Kursk from the north, enemy troops sought to break through from the south.

The enemy delivered the main blow from the area west of Belgorod in the general direction to Kursk. In this grouping, the enemy included the bulk of tanks and aircraft.

The battles in the Oboyan direction resulted in the largest tank battle, which had a significant impact on the entire course and outcome of events on the southern face of the Kursk salient. The Nazis intended to ram the first and second lanes of defense operating in this direction of the 6th Guards Army of General I. M. Chistyakov on the move. Ensuring the main attack from the east, the enemy's 3rd Panzer Corps advanced from the Belgorod region to Korocha. Here the defense was occupied by the troops of the 7th Guards Army of General M.S. Shumilov.

From the morning of July 5, when the enemy went on the offensive, the Soviet troops had to withstand an exceptional onslaught of the enemy. Hundreds of planes and bombs were thrown at Soviet positions. But the soldiers fought back the enemy.

Pilots and sappers inflicted great damage on the enemy. But the Nazis, despite huge losses, continued to attack. The most fierce battles broke out in the area of ​​​​the settlement of Cherkesskoye. By evening, the enemy succeeded in penetrating the division's main defense line and encircling the 196th Guards Rifle Regiment. Having chained significant enemy forces to themselves, they slowed down his advance. On the night of July 6, the regiment received an order to break out of encirclement and retreat to a new line. But the regiment survived, providing an organized retreat to a new defensive line.

On the second day, the battle continued with unrelenting tension. The enemy threw more and more forces into the attack. In an effort to break through the defense, he did not reckon with huge losses. Soviet soldiers fought to the death.

The pilots provided great assistance to the ground troops.

By the end of the second day of the battle, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, advancing on the right flank of the shock group, wedged itself into the second line of defense on a very narrow section of the front. On July 7 and 8, the Nazis made desperate attempts to expand the breakthrough towards the flanks and deepen in the direction of Prokhorovka.

No less fierce battles flared up in the Korochan direction. Up to 300 enemy tanks advanced from the Belgorod region to the northeast. In four days of fighting, the enemy's 3rd Panzer Corps managed to advance only 8-10 km in a very narrow area.

On July 9-10-11, in the direction of the main attack, the Nazis continued to make desperate efforts to break through to Kursk through Oboyan. They brought into battle all six tank divisions of both corps operating here. Intense fighting went on in the strip between the railway and the highway leading from Belgorod to Kursk. The Nazi command expected to make a march to Kursk in two days. The seventh day was already running out, and the enemy advanced only 35 km. Having met such stubborn opposition, he was forced to turn to Prokhorovka, bypassing Oboyan.

By July 11, the enemy, having advanced only 30-35 km, reached the Gostishchevo-Rzhavets line, but he was still far from the goal.

Having assessed the situation, Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky, the representative of the Headquarters, and the command of the Voronezh Front decided to launch a powerful counterattack. The 5th Guards Tank Army of General P.A. Rotmistrov, the 5th Guards Army of General A.S. Zhadov, who arrived at the disposal of the front, was involved in its application, as well as the 1st Tank, 6th Guards Armies and part of the forces 40.69 and 7th Guards Army. On July 12, these troops launched a counteroffensive. The struggle flared up on all fronts. On both sides, a huge mass of tanks participated in it. Particularly heavy fighting was fought in the Prokhorovka area. The troops stumbled upon exceptional, stubborn resistance from units of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which continuously launched counterattacks. A large oncoming tank battle took place here. A fierce fight lasted until late in the evening. Both sides suffered heavy losses. July 12 came a turning point in the Battle of Kursk. On this day, by order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the Bryansk and Western fronts went on the offensive. On the very first day, with strong blows, they broke the defenses of the 2nd Panzer Army in a number of sectors of the Oryol grouping of the enemy and began to develop the offensive in depth. July 15 launched an offensive and the central front. As a result, the Nazi command was forced to finally abandon its plan to destroy the Soviet troops on the Kursk ledge and began to take urgent measures to organize defense. On July 16, the fascist German command began to withdraw its troops on the southern face of the ledge. The Voronezh Front and the troops of the Steppe Front, brought into battle on July 18, proceeded to pursue the enemy. By the end of July 23, they had basically restored the position they had occupied before the start of the battle.

Thus, the third summer offensive of the enemy on the eastern front completely failed. It bogged down within a week. But the Nazis claimed that the summer is their time, that in the summer they can really use their huge opportunities and achieve victory. This turned out to be far from the case.

Hitler's generals considered the Red Army incapable of broad offensive operations in the summer. Incorrectly assessing the experience of previous companies, they believed that Soviet troops could only advance in “alliance” with a fierce winter. Fascist propaganda persistently created myths about the “seasonality” of the Soviet strategy. However, reality has refuted these claims.

The Soviet command, having the strategic initiative, dictated its will to the enemy in the Battle of Kursk. The defeat of the advancing enemy groupings created a favorable situation for launching a decisive counteroffensive here, which was prepared in advance by the Headquarters. Its plan was developed and approved by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief back in May. After that, it was discussed more than once in the Headquarters and corrected. Two groups of fronts were involved in the operation. The defeat of the Oryol grouping of the enemy was entrusted to the troops of Bryansk, the left wing of the Western and the right wing of the central fronts. The troops of the Voronezh and Stepnovsky fronts were to strike at the Belgorod-Kharkov grouping. Partisan formations of the Bryansk region, the Oryol and Smolensk regions, Belarus, as well as the regions of the Left-Bank Ukraine were given the task of disabling railway communications in order to disrupt the supply and regroup the enemy forces.

The tasks of the Soviet troops in the counteroffensive were very complex and difficult. Both on the Oryol and on the Belgorod-Kharkov bridgehead the enemy created a strong defense. The Nazis fortified the first of them for almost two years and considered it as a starting area for striking at Moscow, and they considered the second "a bastion of German defense in the east, a gate that blocked the paths for Russian armies to Ukraine."

The enemy defense had a developed system of field fortifications. Its main strip, 5-7 km deep, and in some places up to 9 km, consisted of heavily fortified strongholds, which were connected by trenches and communications. In the depths of the defense there were intermediate and rear lines. Its main nodes were the cities of Orel, Bolkhov, Muensk, Belgorod, Kharkov, Merefa - large nodes of railways and highways, which allowed the enemy to maneuver with forces and means.

It was decided to start the counteroffensive with the defeat of the 2nd Panzer and 9th German armies defending the Oryol bridgehead. Significant forces and means were involved in the Oryol operation. Its general plan, which received the code name "Kutuzov", consisted in the simultaneous delivery by troops of three fronts of attacks from the north, east and south to the eagle in order to capture the enemy grouping here, cut it and destroy it piece by piece. The troops of the left wing of the Western Front, operating from the north, were to first, together with the troops of the Bryansk Front, defeat the enemy's Bolkhov grouping, and then, advancing on Khotynets, intercept the enemy's retreat from the Orel region to the west and, together with the troops of the Bryansk and Central Fronts, destroy it.

To the southeast of the Western Front, the troops of the Bryansk Front prepared for the offensive. They were supposed to break through the enemy defenses from the east. The troops of the right wing of the central front were preparing for an offensive in the general direction of Kromy. They were ordered to break through to Orel from the south and, together with the troops of the Bryansk and Western fronts, defeat the enemy grouping on the Oryol bridgehead.

On the morning of July 12, powerful artillery and air preparations began in the offensive zone of the shock groups of the Western and Bryansk fronts.

The Nazis, after powerful artillery and air strikes, at first could not offer any serious resistance. As a result of two days of fierce fighting, the defense of the 2nd Panzer Army was broken through to a depth of 25 km. The fascist German command, in order to strengthen the army, hastily began to transfer units and formations here from other sectors of the front. This favored the transition to the offensive of the troops of the Central Front. On July 15, they attacked the Oryol grouping of the enemy from the south. Having broken the resistance of the Nazis, these troops in three days completely restored the position that they occupied before the start of the defensive battle. Meanwhile, the 11th Army of the Western Front advanced south to 70 km. Its main forces were now 15-20 km from the village of Khotynets. Over the most important communication of the enemy - railway. Orel-Bryansk highway is under serious threat. The Nazi command hastily began to pull additional forces to the breakthrough site. This somewhat slowed down the advance of the Soviet troops. In order to break the increased resistance of the enemy, new forces were thrown into the battle. As a result, the pace of advance increased again.

The troops of the Bryansk Front were successfully advancing towards Orel. The troops of the Central Front, advancing on Kromy, interacted with them. Aviation actively interacted with the ground forces.

The position of the Nazis on the Oryol bridgehead became more and more critical every day. Divisions transferred here from other sectors of the front also suffered heavy losses. The stability of the soldiers in the defense has declined sharply. Increasingly frequent were the facts when the commanders of regiments and divisions lost command of the troops.

In the midst of the Battle of Kursk, the partisans of Belarus, Leningrad, Kalinin, Smolensk, Oryol regions, according to a single plan “Rail War”, began a massive decommissioning of the railway. enemy communications. They also attacked enemy garrisons, convoys, intercepted railways and highways.

The Nazi command, irritated by the failures at the front, demanded that the troops hold their positions to the last man.

The Nazi command failed to stabilize the front. The Nazis retreated. The Soviet troops increased the strength of their blows and did not give a break day or night. On July 29, the city of Bolkhov was liberated. On the night of August 4, Soviet troops broke into Orel. At dawn on August 5, the Eagle was completely cleared of the enemy.

Following Orel, the cities of Krom, Dmitrovsk-Orlovsky, Karachaev, as well as hundreds of villages and villages were liberated. By August 18, the Oryol bridgehead of the Nazis ceased to exist. For 37 days of the counteroffensive, Soviet troops advanced westward up to 150 km.

Another offensive operation was being prepared on the southern front - Belgorod-Kharkovskaya, which received the code name "Commander Rumyantsev".

In accordance with the concept of the operation, the Voronezh Front delivered the main blow on its left wing. The task was to break through the enemy defenses, and then develop the offensive with mobile formations in the general direction of Bogodukhov, Valki. Before the counteroffensive, intense preparations were going on in the troops day and night.

Early in the morning of August 3, artillery preparation for the attack began on both fronts. At 8 o'clock, on a general signal, the artillery moved its fire into the depths of the enemy's battle formations. Clinging to its fire shaft, the tanks and infantry of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts went on the attack.

On the Voronezh Front, the troops of the 5th Guards Army advanced up to 4 km by noon. They cut off the enemy's retreat to the west of his Belgorod grouping.

The troops of the Steppe Front, breaking the resistance of the enemy, went to Belgorod and on the morning of August 5 started fighting for the city. On the same day, August 5, two ancient Russian cities, Orel and Belgorod, were liberated.

The offensive breakthrough of the Soviet troops increased day by day. On August 7-8, the armies of the Voronezh Front captured the cities of Bogodukhov, Zolochev and the village of Cossack Lopan.

The Belgorod-Kharkov enemy grouping was cut into two parts. The gap between them was 55 km. The enemy was moving fresh forces here.

Fierce battles took place from 11 to 17 August. By August 20, the enemy grouping was drained of blood. The troops of the steppe front successfully advanced on Kharkov. From August 18 to 22, the troops of the Steppe Front had to fight heavy battles. On the night of August 23, the assault on the city began. In the morning, after stubborn fighting, Kharkov was liberated.

During the successful offensives of the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts, the tasks of the counteroffensive were fully completed. The general counter-offensive after the Battle of Kursk led to the liberation of the Left-Bank Ukraine, Donbass, and southeastern regions of Belarus. Soon Italy withdrew from the war.

Fifty days lasted the Battle of Kursk - one of the greatest battles of the Second World War. It is divided into two periods. The first - a defensive battle of the Soviet troops on the southern and northern faces of the Kursk ledge - began on July 5. The second - a counteroffensive of five fronts (Western, Bryansk, Central, Voronezh and Steppe) - began on July 12 in the Oryol direction and on August 3 - in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction. On August 23, the Battle of Kursk ended.

After the Battle of Kursk, the power and glory of Russian weapons increased. Its result was the insolvency and fragmentation of the Wehrmacht in the satellite countries of Germany.

After the battle for the Dnieper, the war entered its final stage.

The Battle of Kursk (Battle of the Kursk Bulge), which lasted from July 5 to August 23, 1943, is one of the key battles of the Great Patriotic War. In Soviet and Russian historiography, it is customary to divide the battle into three parts: the Kursk defensive operation (July 5-23); Orel (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3-23) offensive.

During the winter offensive of the Red Army and the subsequent counter-offensive of the Wehrmacht in Eastern Ukraine, a ledge up to 150 km deep and up to 200 km wide was formed in the center of the Soviet-German front, facing the west (the so-called "Kursk Bulge"). The German command decided to conduct a strategic operation on the Kursk salient. For this, a military operation was developed and approved in April 1943 under the code name "Citadel". Having information about the preparation of the Nazi troops for the offensive, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to temporarily go on the defensive on the Kursk Bulge and, during the defensive battle, bleed the enemy’s strike groups and thereby create favorable conditions for the transition of Soviet troops to a counteroffensive, and then to a general strategic offensive. .

To carry out Operation Citadel, the German command concentrated 50 divisions in the area, including 18 tank and motorized divisions. The enemy grouping, according to Soviet sources, consisted of about 900 thousand people, up to 10 thousand guns and mortars, about 2.7 thousand tanks and more than 2 thousand aircraft. Air support for the German troops was provided by the forces of the 4th and 6th air fleets.

By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command had created a grouping (Central and Voronezh fronts), which had more than 1.3 million people, up to 20 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3300 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2650 aircraft. The troops of the Central Front (commander - General of the Army Konstantin Rokossovsky) defended the northern front of the Kursk ledge, and the troops of the Voronezh Front (commander - General of the Army Nikolai Vatutin) - the southern front. The troops that occupied the ledge relied on the Steppe Front as part of the rifle, 3 tank, 3 motorized and 3 cavalry corps (commanded by Colonel General Ivan Konev). The fronts were coordinated by representatives of the Headquarters Marshals of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky.

On July 5, 1943, according to the plan of Operation Citadel, German strike groups launched an attack on Kursk from the Orel and Belgorod regions. From the side of Orel, a grouping under the command of Field Marshal Günther Hans von Kluge (Army Group Center) was advancing, from Belgorod, a grouping under the command of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein (operational group Kempf of the Army Group South).

The task of repelling the offensive from the side of Orel was entrusted to the troops of the Central Front, from the side of Belgorod - the Voronezh Front.

On July 12, in the area of ​​​​the Prokhorovka railway station, 56 kilometers north of Belgorod, the largest oncoming tank battle of the Second World War took place - a battle between the advancing enemy tank group (Task Force Kempf) and the counterattacking Soviet troops. On both sides, up to 1200 tanks and self-propelled guns took part in the battle. The fierce battle lasted all day, by the evening the tank crews, together with the infantry, fought hand to hand. In one day, the enemy lost about 10 thousand people and 400 tanks and was forced to go on the defensive.

On the same day, the troops of the Bryansk, Central and left wing of the Western Fronts launched Operation Kutuzov, which had the goal of crushing the Oryol grouping of the enemy. On July 13, the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts broke through the enemy defenses in the Bolkhov, Khotynets and Oryol directions and advanced to a depth of 8 to 25 km. On July 16, the troops of the Bryansk Front reached the line of the Oleshnya River, after which the German command began to withdraw its main forces to their original positions. By July 18, the troops of the right wing of the Central Front completely eliminated the enemy's wedge in the Kursk direction. On the same day, the troops of the Steppe Front were introduced into the battle, which began to pursue the retreating enemy.

Developing the offensive, the Soviet ground forces, supported from the air by the strikes of the forces of the 2nd and 17th air armies, as well as long-range aviation, by August 23, 1943, pushed the enemy back to the west by 140-150 km, liberated Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov. According to Soviet sources, the Wehrmacht lost 30 selected divisions in the Battle of Kursk, including 7 tank divisions, over 500 thousand soldiers and officers, 1.5 thousand tanks, more than 3.7 thousand aircraft, 3 thousand guns. The losses of the Soviet troops surpassed the German ones; they amounted to 863 thousand people. Near Kursk, the Red Army lost about 6,000 tanks.

The Battle of Kursk is a turning point in the course of the entire Second World War, when the Soviet troops inflicted such damage on Germany and its satellites, from which they could no longer recover and lost their strategic initiative until the end of the war. Although before the defeat of the enemy there were many sleepless nights and thousands of kilometers of battles, but after this battle in the hearts of every Soviet citizen, private and general, there was confidence in victory over the enemy. In addition, the battle on the Oryol-Kursk ledge became an example of the courage of ordinary soldiers and the brilliant genius of Russian commanders.

The radical change in the course of the Great Patriotic War began with the victory of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad, when a large enemy grouping was liquidated during Operation Uranus. The battle on the Kursk ledge became the final stage of a radical change. After the defeat at Kursk and Orel, the strategic initiative finally passed into the hands of the Soviet command. After the failure, the German troops were already mostly on the defensive until the end of the war, and ours were mainly engaged in offensive operations, freeing Europe from the Nazis.

On June 5, 1943, German troops went on the offensive in two directions: on the northern and southern faces of the Kursk salient. Thus began Operation Citadel and the Battle of Kursk itself. After the offensive onslaught of the Germans subsided, and its divisions were significantly bled, the command of the USSR launched a counteroffensive against the troops of the Army Groups "Center" and "South". On August 23, 1943, Kharkov was liberated, which marked the end of one of the largest battles of World War II.

History of the battle

After the victory at Stalingrad in the course of the successful Operation Uranus, the Soviet troops managed to carry out a good offensive along the entire front and push the enemy back for many miles to the West. But after the counter-offensive of the German troops in the area of ​​Kursk and Orel, a ledge arose, which was directed towards the West, up to 200 kilometers wide and up to 150 kilometers deep, formed by the Soviet group.

From April to June, a relative calm reigned on the fronts. It became clear that after the defeat at Stalingrad, Germany would try to take revenge. The Kursk ledge was considered the most suitable place, striking which in the direction of Orel and Kursk from the North and South, respectively, it was possible to create a cauldron on a larger scale than near Kyiv, Kharkov at the beginning of the war.

As early as April 8, 1943, Marshal G.K. Zhukov. sent his report on the spring-summer military campaign, where he expressed his thoughts about Germany's actions on the Eastern Front, where it was assumed that the Kursk Bulge would become the site of the main enemy strike. At the same time, Zhukov expressed his plan of countermeasures, which included exhausting the enemy in defensive battles, and then inflicting a counterattack and his complete destruction. Already on April 12, Stalin listened to General Antonov A.I., Marshal Zhukov G.K. and Marshal Vasilevsky A.M. on this occasion.

Representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief unanimously spoke in favor of the impossibility and futility of delivering a preventive strike in the spring and summer. Indeed, based on the experience of past years, an offensive against large enemy groupings preparing to strike does not bring significant results, but only contributes to losses in the ranks of their troops. Also, the formation of forces for the main strike was supposed to weaken the groupings of Soviet troops in the directions of the main German strike, which would also inevitably lead to defeat. Therefore, it was decided to conduct a defensive operation in the area of ​​the Kursk ledge, where the main blow of the Wehrmacht forces was expected. Thus, the Headquarters hoped to wear down the enemy in defensive battles, knock out his tanks and deliver a decisive blow to the enemy. This was facilitated by the creation of a powerful defensive system in this direction, in contrast to the first two years of the war.

In the spring of 1943, the word "Citadel" appeared more and more often in the intercepted radio data. On April 12, intelligence put a plan code-named "Citadel" on Stalin's table, which was developed by the General Staff of the Wehrmacht, but had not yet been signed by Hitler. This plan confirmed that Germany was preparing the main attack, where the Soviet command expected it. Three days later, Hitler signed the plan for the operation.

In order to destroy the plans of the Wehrmacht, it was decided to create a defense in depth in the direction of the predicted strike and create a powerful grouping capable of withstanding the pressure of the German units and carrying out counterattacks at the moment of the climax of the battle.

Composition of armies, commanders

To strike at the Soviet troops in the area of ​​the Kursk-Oryol ledge, it was planned to attract forces Army Group Center commanded by Field Marshal Kluge and Army Group South commanded by Field Marshal Manstein.

The German forces included 50 divisions, including 16 motorized and tank divisions, 8 assault gun divisions, 2 tank brigades, and 3 separate tank battalions. In addition, the SS Panzer Divisions Das Reich, Totenkopf and Adolf Hitler, considered elite, were brought up to attack in the direction of Kursk.

Thus, the grouping amounted to 900 thousand personnel, 10 thousand guns, 2700 tanks and assault guns, and more than 2 thousand aircraft, which were part of two Luftwaffe air fleets.

One of the key trump cards in the hands of Germany was to be the use of heavy tanks "Tiger" and "Panther", assault guns "Ferdinand". It was precisely because the new tanks did not have time to get to the front, were in the process of being finalized, that the start of the operation was constantly postponed. Also in service with the Wehrmacht were obsolete tanks Pz.Kpfw. I, Pz.Kpfw. I I, Pz.Kpfw. I I I, having undergone some modification.

The main blow was to be delivered by the 2nd and 9th armies, the 9th tank army of the Army Group Center under the command of Field Marshal Model, as well as the Kempf task force, the tank 4th army and the 24th corps of the group armies "South", which were entrusted to command General Goth.

In defensive battles, the USSR involved three fronts - Voronezh, Stepnoy, Central.

General of the Army Rokossovsky K.K. commanded the Central Front. The task of the front was to defend the northern face of the ledge. The Voronezh Front, the command of which was entrusted to General of the Army Vatutin N.F., was to defend the southern front. Colonel General Konev I.S. was appointed commander of the Steppe Front, the reserve of the USSR during the battle. In total, about 1.3 million people, 3,444 tanks and self-propelled guns, almost 20,000 guns and 2,100 aircraft were involved in the area of ​​the Kursk salient. Data may differ from some sources.

Armament (tanks)

During the preparation of the Citadel plan, the German command did not look for new ways to achieve success. The main offensive power of the Wehrmacht troops during the operation on the Kursk Bulge was to be carried out by tanks: light, heavy and medium. To strengthen the strike groups before the start of the operation, several hundred of the latest Panther and Tiger tanks were delivered to the front.

Medium tank "Panther" was developed by MAN for Germany in 1941-1942. According to the German classification, it was considered heavy. For the first time he participated in the battles on the Kursk Bulge. After the fighting in the summer of 1943 on the Eastern Front, the Wehrmacht began to actively use it in other directions. It is considered the best German tank in World War II, despite a number of shortcomings.

"Tiger I"- heavy tanks of the German armed forces during the Second World War. At long distances, the battle was slightly vulnerable to the firepower of Soviet tanks. It is considered the most expensive tank of its time, because the German treasury spent 1 million Reichsmarks to create one combat unit.

Panzerkampfwagen III Until 1943, it was the main medium tank of the Wehrmacht. The captured combat units were used by the Soviet troops, self-propelled guns were created on their basis.

Panzerkampfwagen II produced from 1934 to 1943. Since 1938, it has been used in armed conflicts, but it turned out to be weaker than similar models of equipment from the enemy, not only in terms of armor, but even in terms of weapons. In 1942, it was completely withdrawn from the Wehrmacht tank units, however, it remained in service and was used by assault groups.

Light tank Panzerkampfwagen I - the brainchild of "Krupp" and "Daimler Benz", discontinued in 1937, was produced in the amount of 1574 units.

In the Soviet army, the most massive tank of the Second World War was supposed to resist the bulk of the German armored armada. Medium tank T-34 had many modifications, one of which T-34-85 is in service with some countries to this day.

The course of the battle

Calm reigned on the fronts. Stalin had doubts about the correctness of the calculations of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander. Also, the thought of competent disinformation did not leave him until the last moment. Nevertheless, at 23.20 on July 4 and 02.20 on July 5, the artillery of the two Soviet fronts dealt a massive blow to the alleged positions of the enemy. In addition, bombers and attack aircraft of the two air armies carried out an air raid on enemy positions in the Kharkov and Belgorod regions. However, this did not bring much result. According to the reports of the Germans, only communication communications were damaged. Losses in manpower and equipment were not serious.

Exactly at 06.00 on July 5, after a powerful artillery preparation, significant forces of the Wehrmacht went on the offensive. However, unexpectedly for themselves, they received a powerful rebuff. This was facilitated by the presence of numerous tank barriers, minefields with a high frequency of mining. Due to significant damage to communication communications, the Germans failed to achieve clear interaction between units, which led to disagreements in actions: the infantry was often left without the support of tanks. On the northern face, the blow was directed at Olkhovatka. After minor success and serious losses, the Germans directed their attack at Ponyri. But even there it was not possible to wedge into the Soviet defense. Thus, on July 10, less than a third of all German tanks remained in service.

* After the Germans went on the attack, Rokossovsky called Stalin and announced with joy in his voice that the offensive had begun. Perplexed, Stalin asked Rokossovsky about the reason for his joy. The general replied that now the victory in the Battle of Kursk would not go anywhere.

To inflict defeat on the Russians in the South was the task of the 4th Panzer Corps, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps and the Kempf Army Group, which was part of the 4th Army. Here events unfolded more successfully than in the North, although the planned result was not achieved. The 48th Panzer Corps suffered heavy losses in the attack on Cherkasskoye, without moving significantly forward.

The defense of Cherkassky is one of the brightest pages of the Battle of Kursk, which for some reason is practically not remembered. The 2nd SS Panzer Corps was more successful. He was given the task of reaching the Prokhorovka area, where, on a tactically advantageous terrain, to fight the Soviet reserve. Thanks to the presence of companies consisting of heavy "Tigers", the divisions "Leibstandarte" and "Das Reich" managed to quickly break through the defenses of the Voronezh Front. The command of the Voronezh Front decided to strengthen the defensive lines and sent the 5th Stalingrad Tank Corps to carry out this task. In fact, Soviet tankers received an order to occupy a line already captured by the Germans, but threats of a tribunal and execution forced them to go on the offensive. Hitting the Das Reich on the forehead, the 5th Stk failed and was thrown back. The Das Reich tanks went on the attack, trying to surround the forces of the corps. They partially succeeded, but thanks to the commanders of the units that were outside the ring, communications were not cut. However, during these battles, the Soviet troops lost 119 tanks, which is undeniably the largest loss of the Soviet troops in one day. Thus, already on July 6, the Germans reached the third line of defense of the Voronezh Front, which made the situation difficult.

On July 12, in the Prokhorovka area, after mutual artillery preparation and massive air strikes, 850 tanks of the 5th Guards Army under the command of General Rotmistrov and 700 tanks from the side of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps collided in a head-on battle. The fight lasted all day. The initiative changed hands. The opponents suffered enormous losses. The entire battlefield was covered with thick smoke from fires. However, the victory remained with us, the enemy was forced to retreat.

On this day, the Western and Bryansk Fronts went on the offensive on the Northern Front. The very next day, the German defenses were broken through, and by August 5, Soviet troops managed to liberate Orel. The Oryol operation, during which the Germans lost 90 thousand soldiers killed, was called Kutuzov in the plans of the General Staff.

Operation "Rumyantsev" was supposed to defeat the German forces in the Kharkov and Belgorod region. On August 3, the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe Front launched an offensive. By August 5, Belgorod was liberated. On August 23, Kharkov was liberated by Soviet troops on the third attempt, which marked the end of Operation Rumyantsev, and with it the Battle of Kursk.

* On August 5, the first salute in the entire war was given in Moscow in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod from the Nazi invaders.

Side losses

Until now, the losses of Germany and the USSR during the Battle of Kursk are not exactly known. To date, the data diverge dramatically. In 1943, the Germans in the battle on the Kursk ledge lost more than 500 thousand people killed and wounded. 1000-1500 enemy tanks were destroyed by Soviet soldiers. And the Soviet aces and air defense forces destroyed 1696 aircraft.

As for the USSR, the irretrievable losses amounted to more than a quarter of a million people. 6024 tanks and self-propelled guns were burned out, out of action for technical reasons. 1626 aircraft were shot down in the sky over Kursk and Orel.

Results, meaning

Guderian and Manstein in their memoirs say that the Battle of Kursk was the turning point of the War on the Eastern Front. Soviet troops inflicted heavy damage on the Germans, who forever missed the strategic advantage. In addition, the armored power of the Nazis could no longer be restored to its former scale. The days of Hitler's Germany were numbered. The victory on the Kursk Bulge became an excellent tool for raising the morale of the fighters on all fronts, the population in the rear of the country and in the occupied territories.

Day of Military Glory of Russia

The day of the defeat of the Nazi troops by the Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk in accordance with the Federal Law of March 13, 1995 is celebrated annually. This is a day of remembrance for all those who in 1943 in July-August, during the defensive operation of the Soviet troops, as well as the offensive operations "Kutuzov" and "Rumyantsev" on the Kursk ledge, managed to break the back of a powerful enemy, predetermining the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War. Large-scale celebrations are expected in 2013 to mark the 70th anniversary of the victory at the Fiery Arc.

Video about the Kursk Bulge, the key moments of the battle, we definitely recommend viewing:

Participants: Central Front, Voronezh Front, Steppe Front (not all)
Irrevocable - 70 330
Sanitary - 107 517
Operation Kutuzov: Participants: Western Front (left wing), Bryansk Front, Central Front
Irrevocable - 112 529
Sanitary - 317 361
Operation Rumyantsev: Participants: Voronezh Front, Steppe Front
Irrevocable - 71 611
Sanitary - 183 955
General in the battle for the Kursk salient:
Irrevocable - 189 652
Sanitary - 406 743
In the Battle of Kursk in general
~ 254 470 killed, captured, missing
608 833 the wounded, sick
153 thousand small arms
6064 tanks and self-propelled guns
5245 guns and mortars
1626 combat aircraft

1000 tanks according to German data, 1500 - according to Soviet
less 1696 aircraft

The Soviet command decided to conduct a defensive battle, wear down the enemy troops and inflict defeat on them, inflicting counterattacks on the attackers at a critical moment. To this end, a defense in depth was created on both faces of the Kursk salient. A total of 8 defensive lines were created. The average density of mining in the direction of the expected enemy strikes was 1,500 anti-tank and 1,700 anti-personnel mines per kilometer of the front.

In the assessment of the forces of the parties in the sources, there are strong discrepancies associated with the different definitions of the scale of the battle by different historians, as well as the difference in the methods of accounting and classification of military equipment. When assessing the forces of the Red Army, the main discrepancy is associated with the inclusion or exclusion from the calculations of the reserve - the Steppe Front (about 500 thousand personnel and 1500 tanks). The following table contains some estimates:

The role of intelligence

However, it should be noted that back on April 8, 1943, G.K. Zhukov, relying on data from the intelligence agencies of the fronts of the Kursk direction, very accurately predicted the strength and direction of German attacks on the Kursk salient:

... I believe that the enemy will deploy the main offensive operations against these three fronts in order to defeat our troops in this direction and gain freedom of maneuver to bypass Moscow in the shortest direction.
2. Apparently, at the first stage, the enemy, having gathered the maximum of his forces, including up to 13-15 tank divisions, with the support of a large number of aircraft, will strike with his Oryol-Krom group around Kursk from the northeast and the Belgorod-Kharkov group around Kursk from the southeast.

Thus, although the exact text of The Citadel lay on Stalin's desk three days before it was signed by Hitler, the German plan became apparent to the highest Soviet military command four days before.

Kursk defensive operation

The German offensive began on the morning of July 5, 1943. Since the Soviet command knew exactly the start time of the operation, at 3 a.m. (the German army fought according to Berlin time - translated into Moscow 5 a.m.), artillery and air counter-training was carried out 30-40 minutes before it began.

Before the start of the ground operation, at 6 o'clock in the morning our time, the Germans also inflicted bombing and artillery strikes on the Soviet defensive lines. The tanks that went on the offensive immediately encountered serious resistance. The main blow on the northern face was inflicted in the direction of Olkhovatka. Having not achieved success, the Germans suffered a blow in the direction of Ponyri, but they were unable to break through the Soviet defenses here either. The Wehrmacht was able to advance only 10-12 km, after which, from July 10, having lost up to two-thirds of the tanks, the 9th German Army went on the defensive. On the southern front, the main blows of the Germans were directed to the areas of Korocha and Oboyan.

July 5, 1943 Day one. Defense of Cherkassky.

To accomplish the task, the units of the 48th TC on the first day of the offensive (Day "X") needed to crack the defenses of the 6th Guards. A (Lieutenant General I.M. Chistyakov) at the junction of the 71st Guards Rifle Division (Colonel I.P. Sivakov) and the 67th Guards Rifle Division (Colonel A.I. Baksov), capture the large village of Cherkasskoye and carry out a breakthrough with armored units in towards the village of Yakovlevo. The offensive plan of the 48th shopping mall determined that the village of Cherkasskoye was to be captured by 10:00 on July 5. And already on July 6, part 48 of shopping mall. were supposed to reach the city of Oboyan.

However, as a result of the actions of the Soviet units and formations, their courage and steadfastness, as well as the preparation of defensive lines they carried out in advance, the plans of the Wehrmacht were “significantly adjusted” in this direction - 48 shopping mall did not reach Oboyan at all.

The factors that determined the unacceptably slow rate of advance of the 48th mk on the first day of the offensive were the good engineering preparation of the terrain by the Soviet units (starting from anti-tank ditches almost throughout the entire defense and ending with radio-controlled minefields), the fire of divisional artillery, guards mortars and the actions of assault aircraft on the accumulated front engineering obstacles to enemy tanks, competent location of anti-tank strongholds (No. 6 south of Korovin in the lane of the 71st Guards Rifle Division, No. 7 southwest of Cherkassky and No. 8 southeast of Cherkassky in the lane of the 67th Guards Rifle Division), rapid reorganization of the combat formations of battalions of the 196th Guards Rifle Division .sp (Colonel V. I. Bazhanov) in the direction of the enemy’s main attack south of Cherkassky, timely maneuver by divisional (245 otp, 1440 sap) and army (493 iptap, as well as 27 oiptabr colonel N. D. Chevola) anti-tank reserve, relatively successful counterattacks on the flank of the wedged units 3 TD and 11 TD with the involvement of forces 245 otp ( lieutenant colonel M.K. Akopov, 39 tanks) and 1440 glanders (lieutenant colonel Shapshinsky, 8 SU-76 and 12 SU-122), as well as the not completely suppressed resistance of the remnants of the outposts in the southern part of the village of Butovo (3 battalions. 199th guards regiment, captain V.L. Vakhidov) and in the area of ​​workers' barracks southwest of the village. Korovino, which were the starting positions for the offensive of 48 TC (the capture of these starting positions was planned to be carried out by specially allocated forces of 11 TD and 332 PD before the end of the day on July 4, that is, on the day "X-1", however, the resistance of the combat guard was not completely suppressed by dawn on July 5). All of the above factors affected both the speed of concentration of units in their original positions before the main attack, and their advancement during the offensive itself.

Machine-gun crew firing at the advancing German units

Also, the shortcomings of the German command in planning the operation and the poorly developed interaction between tank and infantry units affected the pace of the corps' offensive. In particular, the Great Germany division (W. Heierlein, 129 tanks (of which 15 Pz.VI tanks), 73 self-propelled guns) and 10 tank brigade attached to it (K. Decker, 192 combat and 8 command tanks Pz.V) under the current conditions battles turned out to be clumsy and unbalanced formations. As a result, throughout the first half of the day, the bulk of the tanks were crowded in narrow “corridors” in front of engineering barriers (overcoming the swampy anti-tank ditch south of Cherkassky caused especially great difficulties), came under a combined attack by Soviet aviation (2nd VA) and artillery - from PTOP No. 6 and No. 7, 138 Guards Ap (Lieutenant Colonel M. I. Kirdyanov) and two regiments 33 from Pabr (Colonel Stein), suffered losses (especially in the officer corps), and could not deploy in accordance with the offensive schedule on tank-accessible terrain at the turn Korovino - Cherkasskoe for a further strike in the direction of the northern outskirts of Cherkassy. At the same time, infantry units that overcame anti-tank barriers in the first half of the day had to rely mainly on their own fire weapons. So, for example, the battle group of the 3rd Battalion of the Fusiliers Regiment, which was at the forefront of the strike of the VG division, at the time of the first attack, found itself without tank support at all and suffered significant losses. Possessing huge armored forces, the VG division could not actually bring them into battle for a long time.

The result of the resulting congestion on the routes of advance was also the untimely concentration of artillery units of the 48th tank corps in firing positions, which affected the results of the artillery preparation before the start of the attack.

It should be noted that the commander of the 48th TC became a hostage to a number of erroneous decisions of the higher authorities. Knobelsdorff's lack of an operational reserve had a particularly negative effect - all divisions of the corps were put into battle almost simultaneously on the morning of July 5, after which they were drawn into active hostilities for a long time.

The development of the offensive of 48 mk on the afternoon of July 5 was most facilitated by: active operations of sapper-assault units, aviation support (more than 830 sorties) and an overwhelming quantitative superiority in armored vehicles. It is also necessary to note the initiative actions of units 11 TD (I. Mikl) and 911 TD. division of assault guns (overcoming the strip of engineering obstacles and access to the eastern outskirts of Cherkassy by a mechanized group of infantry and sappers with the support of assault guns).

An important factor in the success of the German tank units was the qualitative leap that had taken place by the summer in the combat characteristics of German armored vehicles. Already during the first day of the defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge, the insufficient power of the anti-tank weapons in service with the Soviet units manifested itself in the fight against both the new German tanks Pz.V and Pz.VI, and with modernized tanks of older brands (about half of the Soviet Iptap were armed with 45-mm guns, the power of 76-mm Soviet field and American tank guns made it possible to effectively destroy modern or modernized enemy tanks at distances two to three times less than the effective range of fire of the latter, heavy tank and self-propelled units at that time were practically absent not only in combined arms 6 Guards A, but also in the 1st Tank Army of M.E. Katukov, which occupied the second line of defense behind it).

Only after overcoming in the second half of the day the main mass of tanks of anti-tank barriers south of Cherkassky, having repelled a number of counterattacks of the Soviet units, the units of the VG division and 11 TD were able to cling to the southeastern and southwestern outskirts of the village, after which the fighting moved into the street phase. At about 21:00 division commander A. I. Baksov ordered the withdrawal of units of the 196th Guards Rifle Regiment to new positions to the north and northeast of Cherkassky, as well as to the center of the village. During the withdrawal of units of 196 Guards Rifles, minefields were set up. At about 21:20, a battle group of grenadiers of the VG division, with the support of the Panthers of the 10th brigade, broke into the Yarki farm (north of Cherkassky). A little later, the 3rd TD of the Wehrmacht managed to capture the Krasny Pochinok farm (north of Korovino). Thus, the result of the day for the 48th TC of the Wehrmacht was the wedging into the first line of defense of the 6th Guards. And at 6 km, which can actually be considered a failure, especially against the background of the results achieved by the evening of July 5 by the troops of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (operating east in parallel with 48th Tank Corps), which was less saturated with armored vehicles, which managed to break through the first line of defense of the 6th Guards. BUT.

Organized resistance in the village of Cherkasskoe was suppressed around midnight on July 5 . However, the German units were able to establish full control over the village only by the morning of July 6, that is, when, according to the offensive plan, the corps was already supposed to approach Oboyan.

Thus, the 71st Guards Rifle Division and the 67th Guards Rifle Division, not possessing large tank formations (they had only 39 American tanks of various modifications and 20 self-propelled guns from the 245 otp and 1440 sap) for about a day held five enemy divisions (of which three are armored). In the battle on July 5 in the Cherkassky region, the fighters and commanders of the 196th and 199th Guards especially distinguished themselves. rifle regiments 67 guards. divisions. The competent and truly heroic actions of the fighters and commanders of the 71st Guards Rifle Division and the 67th Guards Rifle Division allowed the command of the 6th Guards. And in a timely manner to pull up the army reserves to the place where the units of the 48th TC were wedged in at the junction of the 71st Guards Rifle Division and the 67th Guards Rifle Division and prevent a general collapse of the defense of the Soviet troops in this sector in the following days of the defensive operation.

As a result of the hostilities described above, the village of Cherkasskoye actually ceased to exist (according to post-war eyewitness accounts: “it was a lunar landscape”).

The heroic defense of the village of Cherkasskoe on July 5 - one of the most successful moments for the Soviet troops of the Battle of Kursk - unfortunately, is one of the undeservedly forgotten episodes of the Great Patriotic War.

July 6, 1943 Day two. First counterattacks.

By the end of the first day of the offensive, 4 TA wedged into the defense of 6 Guards. And to a depth of 5-6 km in the area of ​​​​offensive 48 TC (near the village of Cherkasskoe) and 12-13 km in the area of ​​​​2 TC SS (in the area of ​​​​Bykovka - Kozmo-Demyanovka). At the same time, the divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (Obergruppenführer P. Hausser) managed to break through the first line of defense of the Soviet troops to the full depth, pushing back units of the 52nd Guards Rifle Division (Colonel I. M. Nekrasov), and approached the 5-6 km front directly to the second the line of defense occupied by the 51st Guards Rifle Division (Major General N. T. Tavartkeladze), engaging in battle with its advanced units.

However, the right neighbor of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps - AG "Kempf" (W. Kempf) - did not complete the task of the day on July 5, encountering stubborn resistance from units of the 7th Guards. And, thereby exposing the right flank of the advancing 4th tank army. As a result, Hausser was forced to use a third of the forces of his corps from July 6 to 8, namely MD "Dead Head", to cover his right flank against the 375th Rifle Division (Colonel P. D. Govorunenko), whose units brilliantly proved themselves in the battles of July 5 .

Nevertheless, the success achieved by the divisions "Leibstandarte" and in particular "Das Reich" forced the command of the Voronezh Front, in conditions of not complete clarity of the situation, to take hasty retaliatory measures to plug the breakthrough formed in the second line of defense of the front. After the report of the commander of the 6th Guards. And Chistyakov on the state of affairs on the left flank of the army, Vatutin, by his order, transfers the 5th Guards. Stalingrad shopping mall (Major General A. G. Kravchenko, 213 tanks, of which 106 are T-34s and 21 are Churchill Mk.IVs) and 2 Guards. Tatsinsky Tank Corps (Colonel A.S. Burdeyny, 166 combat-ready tanks, of which 90 are T-34s and 17 are Mk.IV Churchills) under the command of the commander of the 6th Guards. And he approves his proposal to launch counterattacks on the German tanks that broke through the positions of the 51st Guards Rifle Division with the forces of the 5th Guards Rifle Division. Stk and under the base of the entire advancing wedge 2 TC SS with the forces of 2 Guards. TTK (straight through the battle formations of 375 rifle divisions). In particular, on the afternoon of July 6, I. M. Chistyakov puts the commander of the 5th Guards. Stk to Major General A. G. Kravchenko, the task of withdrawing from the defensive area he occupied (in which the corps was already ready to meet the enemy, using the tactics of ambushes and anti-tank strongholds) of the main part of the corps (two of the three brigades and a heavy tank breakthrough regiment), and the infliction of a counterattack by these forces on the flank of the Leibstandarte MD. Having received the order, the commander and headquarters of the 5th Guards. Stk, already knowing about the capture with. Luchki tanks of the Das Reich division, and more correctly assessing the situation, tried to challenge the implementation of this order. However, under the threat of arrests and execution, they were forced to proceed with its implementation. The attack of the corps brigades was launched at 15:10.

Sufficient own artillery means of the 5th Guards. Stk did not have, and the order did not leave time to link the actions of the corps with neighbors or aviation. Therefore, the attack of tank brigades was carried out without artillery preparation, without air support, on level ground and with practically open flanks. The blow fell directly on the forehead of MD Das Reich, which regrouped, setting up tanks as an anti-tank barrier and, calling in aviation, inflicted significant fire damage on the brigades of the Stalingrad Corps, forcing them to stop the attack and go on the defensive. After that, pulling up the anti-tank artillery and organizing flank maneuvers, between 17 and 19 hours, units of the Das Reich MD managed to reach the communications of the defending tank brigades in the area of ​​the Kalinin farm, which was defended by 1696 zenap (Major Savchenko) and 464 guards artillery that had withdrawn from the village of Luchki .division and 460 guards. mortar battalion of the 6th guards msbr. By 19:00, units of MD "Das Reich" actually managed to surround most of the 5th Guards. Stk between s. Luchki and Kalinin farm, after which, building on success, the command of the German division of part of the forces, acting in the direction of Art. Prokhorovka, tried to seize the Belenikhino junction. However, thanks to the initiative actions of the commander and battalion commanders of the 20 brigade (lieutenant colonel P.F. Okhrimenko) of the 5th Guards, which remained outside the encirclement ring. Stk, who managed to quickly create a tough defense around Belenikhino from various parts of the corps that were at hand, managed to stop the offensive of MD Das Reich, and even force the German units to return back to x. Kalinin. Being without communication with the headquarters of the corps, on the night of July 7, the encircled units of the 5th Guards. Stk organized a breakthrough, as a result of which part of the forces managed to escape from the encirclement and connected with parts of the 20 brigade. During July 6, units of the 5th Guards. Stk for combat reasons, 119 tanks were irretrievably lost, another 9 tanks were lost for technical or unexplained reasons, and 19 were sent for repair. Not a single tank corps had such significant losses in one day during the entire defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge (the losses of the 5th Guards Stk on July 6 exceeded even the losses of the 29th Tank Corps during the attack on July 12 at the Oktyabrsky temporary storage warehouse).

After the encirclement of the 5th Guards. Stk, continuing to develop success in the northern direction, another detachment of the tank regiment MD "Das Reich", using the confusion during the withdrawal of Soviet units, managed to reach the third (rear) line of army defense occupied by units 69A (Lieutenant General V. D. Kryuchenkon) , near the Teterevino farm, and for a short time wedged into the defense of the 285th joint venture of the 183rd rifle division, however, due to a clear lack of strength, having lost several tanks, he was forced to retreat. The exit of German tanks to the third line of defense of the Voronezh Front already on the second day of the offensive was regarded by the Soviet command as an emergency.

Battle of Prokhorovka

Belfry in memory of those who died on the Prokhorovsky field

Results of the defensive phase of the battle

The central front involved in the battle in the north of the arc, for July 5-11, 1943, suffered losses of 33,897 people, of which 15,336 were irretrievable, its enemy, the 9th Army of the Model, lost 20,720 people over the same period, which gives a loss ratio of 1.64:1. The Voronezh and Steppe fronts, which participated in the battle on the southern face of the arc, lost on July 5-23, 1943, according to modern official estimates (2002), 143,950 people, of which 54,996 were irrevocable. Including only the Voronezh Front - 73,892 total losses. However, the chief of staff of the Voronezh Front, Lieutenant General Ivanov, and the head of the operational department of the front headquarters, Major General Teteshkin, thought differently: they believed the losses of their front to be 100,932 people, of which 46,500 were irretrievable. If, contrary to Soviet documents of the war period, the official numbers are considered correct, then taking into account German losses on the southern front of 29,102 people, the ratio of the losses of the Soviet and German sides is 4.95: 1 here.

During the period from July 5 to 12, 1943, the Central Front used up 1079 wagons of ammunition, and the Voronezh - 417 wagons, almost two and a half times less.

The reason that the losses of the Voronezh Front so sharply exceeded the losses of the Central Front was the smaller massing of forces and means in the direction of the German attack, which allowed the Germans to actually achieve an operational breakthrough on the southern face of the Kursk salient. Although the breakthrough was closed by the forces of the Steppe Front, it allowed the attackers to achieve favorable tactical conditions for their troops. It should be noted that only the absence of homogeneous independent tank formations did not give the German command the opportunity to concentrate their armored forces in the direction of the breakthrough and develop it in depth.

On the southern front, the counteroffensive by the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began on August 3. On August 5, at about 18-00, Belgorod was liberated, on August 7 - Bogodukhov. Developing the offensive, on August 11, Soviet troops cut the Kharkov-Poltava railroad, and on August 23 captured Kharkov. The German counterattacks were not successful.

After the end of the battle on the Kursk Bulge, the German command lost the opportunity to conduct strategic offensive operations. Local massive offensives, such as " Watch on the Rhine" () or the operation at Balaton () were also not successful.