The terrorist attack in the theater on Dubrovka. Nord-Ost: a unique operation or a failed evacuation 

Date of Birth

Place of Birth

Education

In 1982 he graduated from the Moscow Institute of Management with a degree in cybernetic economics.
The main stages of the biography

In 1992 - Head of the Department of the Ministry of Economy and Finance of the Russian Federation.
From October 1992 - First Deputy Minister of Finance of the Russian Federation.
From October 13, 1994 to November 5, 1994 - Acting Minister of Finance.
From November 5, 1994 to April 1997 - First Deputy Minister of Finance of the Russian Federation.




In April 2000, he was elected chairman of the board of directors of the Severnaya Neft oil company.
On May 28, 2001, he was summoned to the Prosecutor General's Office, where the investigators informed Vavilov that a criminal case could be initiated against him.

Origin, marital status

* Family status

* Spouse

Maryana - works in Sberbank and in the firm "OLBI-International" ("Obshchaya Gazeta", June 20, 1996).
One of the scandals of the summer of 1996 was the publication of a transcript of a conversation between the former chairman of the National Sports Fund, Boris Fedorov, and Boris Berezovsky, Tatyana Dyachenko, and Valentin Yumashev. From the conversation it followed that the wife of the head of the State Committee for Physical Culture and Sports, Shamil Tarpishchev, Angela, is connected with the Russian mafia in the United States. Six months later, Tarpishchev said that Fedorov simply made a mistake and confused his wife with the wife of Andrei Vavilov.
On the cover of the first issue of the magazine "Profile" for 1997, a photograph of the Vavilov spouses was printed, after which the journalists noted: "Even an amateur could understand that Maryana's jewelry is worth a very tidy sum" ("Nezavisimaya Gazeta", February 4, 1997 ).

life path

In 1982 he graduated from the Moscow Institute of Management.
In 1985 - graduate school.

In 1982-1984 - Software Engineer at the Computing Center under the Ministry of Health of the USSR.

Since 1985 - engineer, junior researcher at the Central Economics and Mathematics Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Participated in the work on the program "500 days".

Since 1988 - Senior Researcher at the Institute of Economics and Forecasting of Scientific and Technological Progress.

Since 1991 - and. about. head Laboratory of the Institute of Market Problems of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

In 1992 - Head of the Department of the Ministry of Economy and Finance of the Russian Federation (proposed to this position by Yegor Gaidar).

From October 1992 - First Deputy Minister of Finance of the Russian Federation. In this position, he worked under three heads of this department - Vasily Barchuk, Boris Fedorov and Sergey Dubinin. Supervised the currency department, the public relations department. He was the chairman of the intergovernmental commission on external debt and assets, the secretary of state of the ministry, a member of the representative office of the Russian government in the Federal Assembly. The action to unfreeze Vnesheconombank's accounts is associated with the name of Andrey Vavilov.

From October 13, 1994 to November 5, 1994 - Acting Minister of Finance. Appointed by order of Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. Vavilov's appointment to the post of acting officer was interpreted by some observers as "the president's unwillingness to leave the Ministry of Finance to Vavilov in the long term" (Izvestia, October 14, 1994).

On November 4, 1994, by order of the Government of the Russian Federation, Vavilov was severely reprimanded "for the critical situation in the financial market that occurred in October 1994, which posed a threat to the economic security of the Russian Federation" (meaning the sharp depreciation of the ruble at the MICEX auction on October 11, 1994 - so-called "Black Tuesday").

From November 5, 1994 to April 1997 - First Deputy Minister of Finance of the Russian Federation. Again he supervised the currency department, the department of public relations and the intergovernmental commission on external debt and assets. Since 1996, he dealt only with foreign economic issues.

In the fall of 1995, Andrei Vavilov, on behalf of the Ministry of Finance, endorsed documents on loans-for-shares auctions, which, according to Nezavisimaya Gazeta (February 4, 1997), were "the largest transfer of state property into private hands." When asked by the newspaper (October 17, 1996) why he was engaged in loans-for-shares auctions, Vavilov replied: “Actually, Kazmin (Andrei Kazmin - former Deputy Minister of Finance) was engaged in auctions, I only signed contracts. And I signed only because Panskov (former Minister of Finance), and Vladimir Petrov (First Deputy Minister of Finance) and I "shared" the contracts equally. But these contracts were endorsed by the government apparatus and agreed with the State Property Committee."

On February 3, 1997, Vavilov's car was blown up near the building of the Ministry of Finance. A number of media outlets expressed confidence that the explosion was an assassination attempt on the deputy minister.

Many experts expressed the opinion that the cause of the explosion should be sought in the activities of the first deputy minister of finance: "The purpose of the high-profile action is to push, if not the prime minister, then the president, to examine Vavilov's activities under a magnifying glass and eventually replace him. The argument is simple - Vavilov is confused in dubious connections. He smelled of criminality - look, the whole country knows about it, having seen his car damaged by the explosion "(" Kommersant-Daily ", February 5, 1997).

In 1997-1998 - President of the bank "International Financial Initiative".

In 1998-1999 - Advisor to the Chairman of the Board of RAO "Gazprom".

Since 1998 director of the Institute for Financial Studies.

In April 2000, he was elected chairman of the board of directors of the Severnaya Neft oil company. On May 28, 2001, he was summoned to the Prosecutor General's Office, where the investigators informed Vavilov that a criminal case could be initiated against him.

In Severnaya Neft, the interest of the prosecutor's office in Vavilov is connected not with his work in the government, but with the situation that has developed around Sibneft, writes Kommersant-Daily. In particular, he was suspected of placing a large amount of budgetary funds in the banks that financed the winners of the tender on the eve of the tender for the privatization of Sibneft.

After interrogation, he was hospitalized in one of the capital's hospitals.

Political views, position

Participated in the work on the program "500 days".

"Today" (February 5, 1997): "According to many government liberals, it is the authorship of Andrei Vavilov that explains the fact that the budget-95 was prepared much better than the budget-96, both in terms of the forecast for collecting revenues and in detailing the expenditure side Andrei Vavilov also played an important role in the formation of the first non-inflationary budget-96 in the years of reforms at the end of 1995 (although he had nothing to do with the development of the budget structure proper in 1996). on liberal economic values".

Personal qualities, characteristics

Hobbies, hobbies, tastes, style, image

“Thanks to the specific role he occupies in the government, Andrei Vavilov today can be safely called a model of the “new Russian” official (by analogy with the “new Russians” as such). He clearly perceived the values ​​of Russian business and behaves in strict accordance with them. their form of communication with businessmen and officials, the manner of dressing in suits from Hugo Boss and Pierre Cardin, using two mobile phones in everyday work (according to stories, one of the phones plays the role of a "turntable") is easily guessed "new Russian" "(" Today " February 5, 1997).
Third party ratings, characteristics
The newspaper "Segodnya" (October 14, 1994): "Vavilov has a reputation as a cautious professional economist, professing moderate-liberal views, but not inclined to defend them with rational methods."

Nezavisimaya Gazeta (February 4, 1997): "Informed people have long known about the real powers of one of the deputy finance ministers - powers that go far beyond his formally outlined functions. The criminals knew exactly who was "number one" in the Ministry of Finance." The first, of course, is the one who distributes the money, and does not speak beautifully from the podium or draw arrows on the country's pension map.Its nominal head Alexander Livshits does an excellent job with representative and political functions in the Ministry of Finance, and the real head of this department Andrei Vavilov".

The newspaper "Segodnya" (February 5, 1997): "The richest official in Russia. At the mention of this name, the expression on the faces of ordinary employees of the ministries acquires a characteristic dreamy shade. The amount of Mr. Vavilov's savings, which is called officials with quiet and envious gloating, is in the hundreds million dollars." According to the newspaper, Vavilov was at the top of the "shadow rating of influence."

Kommersant-Daily (February 5, 1997): "Vavilov is one of the last Mohicans of Gaidar's team. But he cannot be considered a radical reformer."

Permanent contacts, relationships, connections

State. apparatus

In 1992, he moved to the Ministry of Finance at the suggestion of Yegor Gaidar, Prime Minister.
Later he enjoyed the support of Viktor Chernomyrdin.
In the spring of 1996, Vavilov was the treasurer of the election campaign of Russian President Boris Yeltsin.
According to the newspaper Segodnya (February 5, 1997): "The Ministry of Finance's favorite tale about ministers and vice-premiers making appointments with Vavilov two or three weeks in advance (not to mention various governors) is close to the truth."

business community

Member of the Board of Directors of RAO Gazprom.
"At my main job, they perceive me as a person lobbying Gazprom, in Gazprom they are perceived as a person sent to control the company" (from Vavilov's interview with Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 17, 1996).

Nezavisimaya Gazeta (February 4, 1997): "He can dramatically increase the assets of a commercial bank with a simple stroke of a pen. He can 'punish' bankers he doesn't like and, conversely, help businessmen close to him. If we analyze the most significant changes in the ratings of Russian banks, it turns out that Mr. Vavilov was involved in all these changes to one degree or another."

"Komsomolskaya Pravda" (February 5, 1997): "Andrey Vavilov oversees<...>intergovernmental commission on external debt and assets. It is the debts and assets of the former USSR, inherited by Russia, that are the tasty morsel around the division of which there is a fierce struggle between commercial banks. In addition to the 130 billion foreign debt (in dollars), Russia remains one of the largest creditors. Third world countries owe us about 150 billion. and not all credits and loans to former friends and allies can be considered irretrievably lost. The list of Russian debtors also includes quite solvent India, Libya and Iraq. It was on Andrey Vavilov's signature that it depended which of the commercial banks would be authorized by the government to service the external debt.

The Interfax-AiF newspaper (February 10, 1997): “For a long time, the institution of selecting authorized banks made it possible to keep financially dubious banks afloat. In the end, programs that received money with long delays suffered, the budget suffered, and the Vavilov, in the words of one ill-wisher, "bought a jacket from Cardin for the Ministry of Finance's salary."

According to the newspaper Segodnya (February 5, 1997), Vavilov was supported by: Menatep, Imperial, Alfa-Bank, Sberbank, National Credit, National Reserve Bank, Capital Savings Bank, Moscow National Bank, Vnesheconombank, Strategy ".
The same publication notes: "The distribution of preferential deposits, the state's purchase of shares in individual banks (for example, the acquisition of 16 percent of the authorized capital of the National Credit Bank in the summer of 1995), the allocation of funds by Vnesheconombank on a gratuitous basis, the imposition of illiquid securities on recipients of budget financing instead of " live" money with their subsequent cashing out in banks friendly to the First Deputy Minister at a big discount, the famous "bill scam" of Oleg Boyko - the exchange of bills of the Savings Bank in the summer of 1995 for obligations of the then already insolvent National Credit Bank, "extortion" from banks of donations for parliamentary and the presidential campaign - all this is imputed to Andrey Vavilov."
mass media
Member of the Board of Directors of Public Russian Television (ORT).

In May 1996, a fax was sent from the Central Telegraph to the media and deputies of the State Duma, describing violations of the law in Vavilov's activities and signed "Association of Independent Journalists "Consent". Subsequently, Vavilov denied the allegations contained in this document.

"Interfax-AiF" (February 10, 1997): "Eminence Gray" of the Ministry of Finance, who spent four ministers in this department, like the ancient King Midas, seemed to have the ability to turn everything into gold with his touch.

Additional Information

In May 1996, a multi-page fax was sent from the Central Telegraph to the media and deputies of the State Duma, telling about the activities of Vavilov and signed "Association of Independent Journalists "Consent".
According to the magazine "Faces" (March 15, 1997), "when Vavilov was shown this anonymous fax dated May 29, he, like a person with a rather lively perception, laughed at every page."
The magazine outlined the contents of the fax, providing it with a subtitle: "Just in case, we warn you that all the events described seem to us fictitious, and the coincidence of names is accidental":

“So, according to the writers, five years ago, from a distant foreign business trip, full of romance of a cloak and dagger, a young man named Lebedev returned to Moscow. Here he meets no less young and witty people - the owner of the National Credit Bank, Boyko and First Deputy Minister of Finance Vavilov. Three comrades. A little later, the friends decide to engage in large-scale financial fraud in the field of exporting budgetary capital abroad and for this they create the National Reserve Bank (NRB). and Boyko and Lebedev are packed up. In short, a stable criminal group with bad intentions. And Vavilov is their brain trust. Like Professor Moriarty is with Conan Doyle.
For example, on February 17, 1995, Vavilov signed an agreement with Boyko on the transfer of 92 million dollars to National Credit "for lending to foreign economic organizations." Or, from the accounts of Vnesheconombank, he sends 45 million dollars to Boyko's bank without obligations of ruble coverage, sort of like for the construction of a residential area in Moscow. And in return, the cunning deputy minister, according to operational data, receives a house in Los Angeles and a two-story penthouse in New York's Trump Tower skyscraper (in this place, reading a fax, Andrei Vavilov especially laughed). And so are we. Because if anyone lived in a New York skyscraper, it was Boyko himself.

And then things didn’t work out for Boyko, he got into a fight with Gusinsky’s “Bridge”. And Vavilov became more friendly with the former intelligence officer Lebedev. Began to help him. Withdrew Boykin's Olbi and Natscredit from shareholders of the National Reserve Bank and lured Gazprom and Gazexport into shareholders. And he himself became a member of the board of directors of Gazprom. Why was it more profitable to contact Lebedev - he is in comrades with Dubinin and even with his wife, they all worked together back in Imperial. On this basis, the senders of faxes make a literal conclusion: "With the advent of the chairman of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, Sergei Dubinin, scams on transferring budget money abroad have become even more widespread." According to their slanderous data, in 1995 alone more than 600 million dollars were pumped through the young NRB of Lebedev, the Central Bank of Dubinin and the Ministry of Finance of Vavilov.
With particular cynicism, the senders described in their fax the operation for the Ministry of Finance to transfer 8 billion 420 million Indian rupees (about 300 million dollars) to the NRB - again very profitable - without ruble coverage. And the following are the documents:

"Chairman of Vnesheconombank of the Russian Federation Nosko A.P.
In accordance with the decision of the Government of the Russian Federation of 04.08.95, we ask you to instruct us to transfer 3 billion ind. rupees to the account of the "National Reserve Bank" without charging ruble coverage. First Deputy Minister of Finance of the Russian Federation
A.P. Vavilov 07.08.95 N26-3-2/718 ".

And the reaction three months later: "Urgent report.
We would like to inform you that in accordance with the Ministry's instructions /letter N26-3-2/718 dated 07.08.95/ Vnesheconombank credited 3 billion ind. rupees from centralized foreign exchange funds. However, to date, Vnesheconombank has not received a formalized government instruction or decision to allocate the said amount... Chairman of Vnesheconombank.
Nosko A.P. 10/31/96 N625/33"

Such pettiness and manic suspicion were not forgiven to the compiler of the urgent report. Vavilov and Dubinin persuaded Chernomyrdin to sign Anatoly Nosko's resignation from the president.
If you believe the fax authors, Vavilov honestly deserved the head of the harmful chairman of Vnesheconombank, since he was raising funds for the elections of the Our Home - Russia bloc to the State Duma: "Vavilov personally forced R. Vyakhirev to contribute funds to the NRB, allegedly to compensate for the expenses that the bank incurred on the election campaign of V. Chernomyrdin and his bloc ... The amount of the contribution of Gazprom organizations amounted to over 12 million dollars, and the amount of funding for the prime minister's campaign by this bank was about 8 million dollars.
They say that the phrase "personally forced Vyakhirev" greatly amused both Vyakhirev and Vavilov. Again, the latter was called the organizer of fundraising for Yeltsin's election campaign. Directly not a deputy minister, but some kind of tax collector.
And, of course, the fax ends with a sacramental phrase: "According to operational data, A. Vavilov's personal fortune has now exceeded 120 million dollars."

EXPLOSIVE WRITERS.

In general, these writers from the group "Consent" unknown to the world turned out to be unpleasant people. They tried to bring discord into the ranks of the government right in the midst of the elections. As we were told, while reading this fax message, Andrei Vavilov, of course, laughed, but at the same time he understood: this is the first warning.
The second warning, as you might guess, followed ten months later - on February 3rd. They blew up the car. Moreover, in fact, it is not yet completely clear - did they warn or seriously wanted to blow it up? In his only after the explosion and more than avaricious interview with the Vremya program, Andrei Vavilov noted that anyone who has anything to do with finance, especially the Ministry of Finance, has enough enemies.
And indeed, if a bottle falls on your head from the window of a high-rise building, go figure out who threw it. Although over time, the flight path, of course, is calculated. So here. It seems to us quite logical to assume that the one who on May 29 so informed Vavilov gave the FIRST warning, also made the SECOND - on February 3.

WE ALL LOVED THE BLEND.

Our generation of thirty-year-olds, which includes the cybernetic economist Andrey Vavilov, had its own cult writer Julio Cortazar, not a single self-respecting student company went without mentioning him. Cortazar has a story "We all loved Blenda very much." It describes a certain society of fans of the famous actress Blenda, who watched and discussed all her films with admiration. But at some point, the fans felt that with each new film, Blenda plays worse and vulgar, betrays their ideal ideas about "their Blenda." They tried to write letters to her. She didn't react. And then they killed her.
And now let's imagine a conditional group of Perm teachers who managed to raise Andryusha Vavilov as a diligent and inquisitive boy, or a group of professors from the Moscow Institute of Management who developed his cybereconomic abilities. And what is left of the former excellent student? What did the professors do when they released cyber-Vavilov from their laboratories? Instead of safe experiments on the preparation of economic matter in a closed institute, Vavilov broke into a big life. To warm up, he joined the development team of the famous 500 Days program. Then he was invited to the government by Gaidar. Since then, the cybereconomist has fulfilled his personal program: he is the first deputy minister of finance, a member of the board of directors of Gazprom and Norilsk Nickel. Sberbank and even ORT. And most importantly, he is a "gray" cardinal, a strategist of the Russian economy, distributing the country's foreign exchange flows. He decides nothing, but ingeniously invents everything: bill transactions, loans-for-shares auctions, banking consortiums.
That is why Vavilov is practically the only one of the members of the cabinet of ministers, the "head of the laboratories", who managed to retain one of the most key posts in the Russian government. He was able to keep Chernomyrdin's trust. He managed to maintain balance during a long confrontation between the Soskovets - Korzhakov and Chernomyrdin - Chubais groups. And after the fall of the first group, Vavilov again shows miracles, maneuvering between the interests of the prime minister, the head of the presidential administration and banks. This calm, intelligent person has mastered the art of survival in the modern financial jungle. At least two deals are known that, under certain circumstances, could cost Vavilov his career.

WHY THEY BEAT PAUL VOSCHANOV.

At the end of October, some tough guys blocked the car of former presidential press secretary Pavel Voshchanov on a night road. Without saying anything, Voshchanov's sides were rumpled, and the car was thrown into a ditch. The day before, Voshchanov submitted to the editors of Komsomolskaya Pravda an article about the Swiss company NOGA, with which, at the dawn of the reforms, inexperienced lab ministers made a barter deal: their food loans in exchange for our oil. Three years later, Vavilov's colleague, Deputy Minister (now former) A. Golovaty, in a letter addressed to the head of the secretariat, Prime Minister Petelin, admitted: "According to the results of the audit, it was found that the NOGA company significantly overestimated the amount of goods supplied by it and significantly underestimated the cost of goods supplied to it from Russia oil volumes..." And where did the difference between real and contract prices go?
The former first and disgraced press secretary of the president, Pavel Voshchanov, wrote in an article that after the signing of the contract with Noga in April 1991, "personal accounts were opened for twelve Russian officials in one of the Western banks." The amounts "from 300 thousand dollars to several tens of millions" were also named. Moreover, Voshchanov claimed that the list of these accounts is in the certificate of the Control Department of the presidential administration, sent in early 1996 to the Kremlin. Voshchanov just asked: "Who are these twelve and what positions do they currently occupy in the Russian government?" And he was given the first warning.
Now they say that this list of accounts was bought from the executor for a million dollars by one minister in our government. Like it or not, this deal and the circles from it are interesting in their own right.
On January 18, 1993, paper No. 10-09/184 came to the name of the Deputy Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation Alexander Shokhin from the MVEC: “The Swiss company NOGA has provided loans in the amount of more than 3 billion US dollars over the past three years. As of 15.01. 93 the total amount of our liabilities to NOGA is about 1.5 billion US dollars."
There is nothing interesting in the very fact of debt. The proposal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on this occasion is curious: "To pay off, by March 31, 1993, the overdue
Anyone who is familiar with the scrupulousness of Western businessmen knows that even the amount of 100 thousand dollars in cash evokes associations in a decent society with the mafia and "dirty" money. And here we are talking about three hundred million!
But Shokhin is not embarrassed by this amount. He personally imposes a resolution on the letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "To A.P. Vavilov. I ask you to confirm the readiness of the Ministry of Finance to pay the debt to the NOGA company in the first half of 1993 (date, signature)". And in order to avoid doubts, Shokhin confirms his own resolution with a separate order (ASh-P-2-02109 of 03/21/93).
By the way, a trial in the Stockholm International Court of Justice recently ended in Sweden, where our lawyers managed to fight off the multibillion-dollar claims of NOGI without any cash.
Meanwhile, the ominous shadow of the notorious list of accounts of the "12 Apostles" hovers over the roofs of the ministries. In this regard, Alexander Shokhin's answer to Voshchanov's material is curious: "There were no accounts in the name of the government, the Central Bank and their leaders." Further, Shokhin writes that the first contract with NOGA was signed by the 1st Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR G. Kulik in April 1991. Then there were two additions and another agreement in 1992. Mr. Shokhin complains that "now it is already difficult to restore the reasons for which foreign banks and Vnesheconombank “dropped out” of the deal, while agreements were concluded directly with the government. Apparently, the former deputy chairman considers this a sufficient justification, and then he begins to "juggle" the names, one way or another involved in transactions with the NOGA company.
Shokhin's article mentions Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, Deputy Minister of Finance Vavilov, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Economic Relations Davydov, Deputy Prime Minister Soskovets, senior officials of the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Affairs Olkhovikov and Shibaev. Shokhin is modestly silent about his merits. But Nessim D. Gaon, chairman of the board of the NOGA company, eloquently wrote about them in his appeal to MK: “I remember how passionately Mr. Shokhin in 1992 pleaded with the NOGA company for help, asking it to save Russian crops from catastrophe, and the people of Russia - from hunger. Even more eloquent is Alexander Shokhin's order ASh-P-2-09475 dated March 12, 1993, on the allocation of US$ 30 million to NOGA. dollars, provided that the Gaon does not go to court with a claim.
In his letter, Mr. Gaon names three more names: the then First Deputy Prime Minister Shumeiko, the Chairman of the Central Bank, Gerashchenko, and the head of the state legal department under the President of the Russian Federation, Orekhov. In total, together with Shokhin, 11 surnames are obtained. Another name was mentioned in Komsomolskaya Pravda - the chief of the government apparatus Babichev.

A GAME OF Pledge Thimbles.

Without the epic with loans-for-shares auctions, the portrait of Andrei Vavilov would be incomplete.
On March 30, 1995, the leaders of ONEXIMbank, Menatep and Stolichny, who were present at the government meeting, offered the government, on behalf of the banking consortium, a loan of 9 trillion rubles secured by shares of privatized enterprises. The proposal was voiced by the head of ONEXIM, now First Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Potanin. The presence of heads of commercial banks at government meetings is not a mandatory practice. But this case is extraordinary.
When Potanin's proposal was made, Viktor Chernomyrdin grimly asked if the matter had been discussed with anyone in the government. Two nodded in the affirmative: Oleg Soskovets and Anatoly Chubais. At that time, this allowed journalists to speculate about the diplomatic abilities of ONEXIMbank, which managed to win over such irreconcilable deputy prime ministers. Subsequent events have refuted these idle arguments.
It is difficult to say why Potanin's proposal did not pass. Perhaps Viktor Stepanovich, who has repeatedly acted as the commander of such "generals", opposed the transfer of shares of oil companies to banks that have nothing to do with the fuel and energy complex. Or maybe the bankers decided that retail would be cheaper than wholesale.
After the end of the pledge epic, it became clear that both assumptions were true. All past auctions for oil giants were marked by the extraordinary activity of the banks - participants in the government meeting on March 30 and the inexplicable apathy of the banks raised on petrodollars. And the proceeds were three times lower than the originally offered price. The Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation gave an explanation for this phenomenon in August 1996.
The audit showed that the largest Russian oil companies and RAO Norilsk Nickel were bought out by commercial banks from federal property at the expense of the federal budget and at a bargain price.
From the conclusions of the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation: "For the period of loans-for-shares auctions in November-December 1995, the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation placed on deposit accounts in Russian commercial banks 603.739 million dollars of "temporarily free funds of the federal budget", which is practically equivalent to the total amount of the loan, actually received by the state treasury in 1995 from loans-for-shares auctions (2.859 trillion rubles).“Temporarily free funds of the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation” were also placed in three commercial banks, which became winners in five loans-for-shares auctions. All funds were transferred on the orders of one person - Andrei Vavilov. (Of course, the Deputy Minister can easily prove that he did not violate any instructions. How can you violate what you yourself invent?)
Where did the "temporarily free funds" in Russia's leaky budget come from, which were given to private banks at only 8 percent per annum? Andrey Vavilov answered this question rather frankly in his letter No. 3-G-4-04/54 dated June 5, 1996. The money was transferred to commercial banks "in order to create a sufficient margin of safety."
Before the eyes of all honest people, an amazing mystery was played out in no time. Something like this: the boy went up to his aunt, the cashier in the bakery, asked for money, and then paid for the bun with the same money. The laurels of this simple, like all ingenious, ideas in the Ministry of Finance are attributed to the cyber-mind of Andrei Vavilov.
By the way, for some reason, the materials of this sensational August audit of the Accounts Chamber have not yet been published in any major Russian publication. Rather, the auditors tried to print - it did not work.

FAVORITE WOMEN OF THE FINANCIST VAVILOV.

Let's just say that Oleg Boyko always acted as a kind of Mephistopheles in the life of the Deputy Minister, accustomed to the silence of the offices. Women did not contribute anything to the life of the recluse, except for stunning expenses (according to Shamil Tarpishchev) and theatrical escapades. In any case, the version that a woman was to blame for the explosion of the car, according to our data, is in last place at the investigation.
Another thing is Deputy Minister Vavilov's favorite banks. Bankers are much more jealous and unbalanced than women. They don't forgive change.

ACCOUNTANT, MY DEAR ACCOUNTANT.

Few people know that the head of Gazprom, Rem Vyakhirev, treats Andrey Vavilov like a son. But after the story with loans-for-shares auctions, Vavilov urgently needed rehabilitation before the prime minister. Around this time is the rapid rise of the "National Reserve Bank".
The rise of the NRB in terms of dynamics resembles the fate of ONEXIM, with the only difference that the latter is considered a bank close to the Chubais group, and the NRB is considered to be close to Gazprom and, accordingly, to Chernomyrdin (we now do not take into account the differences between Chernomyrdin and Vyakhirev). The technology for turning NRB, which was a spinoff from Imperial and National Credit, into one of the country's leading banks is practically no different from the miraculous transformation of ONEKSIM. Confidential relations with the Ministry of Finance (read - with Vavilov) plus Gazprom's accounts.
The rise of the NRB began after it received the status of an authorized bank for dealing with Russia's external debt.
Very soon NRB became the main player in this market and the main authorized bank in this area. Among the largest projects of the NRB is work with Ukrainian government bonds issued against Kyiv's debts to Gazprom for a total of $1.4 billion.
The explosion at Ilyinka was preceded by a number of curious events. In November last year, it turned out that ONEXIMbank and IFC managed to buy about 40 percent of Ukrainian bonds. The plans of the NRB to create a secondary market for these securities and to rule them monopoly suffered a crushing blow.
Observers agreed that without the participation of the Ministry of Finance it was impossible.
At the same time, the Ministry of Finance removed the NRB from the list of participants in the placement of Eurobonds for a total amount of $1 billion without explanation. Instead of NRB, this list includes Alfa Bank (P. Aven) and Unicombank (A. Yeghiazaryan). By the way, immediately after the explosion of Vavilov's car, his formal head Livshits said that Alfa-Bank and Unikombank would most likely not be included in the list of participants in the placement of Eurobonds of the 2nd tranche (1 billion Deutschmarks). In the office of First Deputy Prime Minister Potanin, commenting on this statement by Livshits, they advised to divide the words of the Minister of Finance in half. I wonder which half to separate?
After the assassination attempt on Andrey Vavilov, we turned to many banks and special services for comments. Officially, no one wanted to speak. But informally shared information willingly. At the same time, each banker pointed to Vavilov's connections with competing firms. And only the press service of "Unicombank" loudly expressed "indignation at the lawlessness reigning in the country, including in relation to the first persons of the state."
According to the most popular version, the explosion is just a way to once again draw attention to the person of Vavilov, and at the same time to the "presumptuous" NRB, "burn Vavilov by publicly gargling versions of his connections with criminal circles. Remember the old anecdote about the robbed official: "Either his fur coat was stolen, or he stole it - in general, a suspicious person ... "? If this assumption is correct, then the organizers of the explosion could have been NRB competitors - banks gravitating towards the group opposing Chernomyrdin, i.e., the winners of loans-for-shares auctions.
Recently, B. Yeltsin found the strength to sign a decree on the transfer to trust management of the shares of enterprises fixed in state ownership. Another redistribution of property is coming. This time Viktor Stepanovich and Anatoly Borisovich will meet face to face. And Vavilov, who suited everyone for so long, is likely to become a bargaining chip in this game. Cyber ​​has done its job - and must retire."

Member of the Federation Council from the Penza region, former First Deputy Minister of Finance of the Russian Federation Andrei Vavilov resigned his senatorial powers ahead of schedule. The decision to terminate Vavilov's powers was made by the Federation Council at a meeting on Wednesday, March 17. Nikolai Tulaev, chairman of the Federation Council commission, told RIA Novosti the day before that Vavilov had written a letter of resignation from the upper chamber in connection with a transfer to another job.

In 1983 he graduated from the Moscow Institute of Management with a degree in cybernetic economist.

In 1985 he defended his dissertation for the degree of candidate of economic sciences at the Central Economics and Mathematics Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

In 2002 he defended his dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Economic Sciences at the Central Economics and Mathematics Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

Scientific interests: public finance and public debt management; open economy; the problem of local government.

At the end of 1996 A.P. Vavilov with colleagues. The main part of the Institute's staff consists of highly qualified economists and financiers who previously worked at the Central Economics and Mathematics Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences and MFC Bank, including the head of the MFC analytical department. Soon the IFI became one of the well-known Russian think tanks, conducting extensive research work in the field of macroeconomics, budgeting, monetary policy, and so on. for corporate clients and the Russian government, including the Ministry of Finance, the Central Bank, the FCSM.

Since 1985, A. Vavilov has been an engineer, junior researcher at the Central Economics and Mathematics Institute (CEMI). In 1988, he moved to the Institute of Economics and Forecasting of Scientific and Technological Progress as a senior researcher.

In 1991, A. Vavilov headed the laboratory of the newly created Institute for Market Problems of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

In 1991 - 1992 He was a Research Fellow at the Institute for International Economics, Washington.

In September 1992, he was appointed head of the Macroeconomics Department of the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation.

In 1995 - 1997 he was the representative of the Government in the Federation Council of the Russian Federation.

Since 1992 A.P. Vavilov is actively involved in Russian economic policy. From November 1992 to 1997 he was First Deputy Minister of Finance. Vavilov was responsible for developing and implementing effective macroeconomic policies, solving federal budget problems, and building relationships with international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank.

From 1998 to 2002 A.P. Vavilov was the director of the Institute for Financial Studies, and since 2002 - the chairman of the scientific council of the Institute.
Public Finance and Public Debt Management

From 1992 to 1997 A.P. Vavilov was a member of the Intergovernmental Commission on External Debt and Property of the Russian Federation.

A.P. Vavilov was also one of the founders of the Russian government debt market, first domestic (GKO) and then foreign (Eurobonds). As First Deputy Minister of Finance, he was responsible for organizing the issuance of the first Russian Eurobonds in 1996-1997. and the so-called bonds of the Ministry of Finance. After the launch of this market, the management of public debt was one of the priorities of A.P. Vavilov as First Deputy Minister.
Other professional activities

In 1997, he served as President of the International Financial Company (IFC) bank.

In 1998-99 was an adviser to the board of RAO Gazprom on financial matters.

In 2000 A.P. Vavilov acquired a controlling stake in the small Russian oil company Severnaya Neft. As Chairman of the Board of Directors, in less than four years he made this company one of the leading independent Russian oil producers (among companies not owned by Russian oil holdings).

Eight years ago, on October 23, 2002, the first Russian musical Nord-Ost was staged at the Theater Center on Dubrovka. There were over 900 people in the auditorium. Almost all of them were taken hostage by forty Chechen terrorists who carried out one of the largest terrorist attacks in the history of Russia in the center of Moscow.

On the night of October 25-26, a decision was made to storm. The operational headquarters included the deputy head of the FSB, General Viktor Pronichev, and the head of the presidential administration, Alexander Voloshin. From the operational headquarters, a command was received to storm the units of the Central Security Service of the FSB, commanded by another deputy head of the FSB, General Alexander Tikhonov.

The military operation began with the supply of gas through the ventilation system. It is known that the composition of the gas included heavy opiates based on fentanyl (used in medicine for anesthesia). This substance is also known to be lethal if administered in small doses and rapidly, and is especially dangerous when exposed to people in a seated position.

On September 20, 2003, Russian President V.V. Putin stated at a meeting with journalists that "these people did not die as a result of the action of the gas", which, according to him, was harmless, but became victims of "a number of circumstances: dehydration, chronic diseases, the fact that they had to stay in that building.” In the death certificates issued to the relatives of the victims, a dash was placed in the column “cause of death”.

The Ministry of Health officially refused to release data on the gas used during the operation, citing it as a state secret. The State Duma Committee on Security refused to examine the legitimacy of classifying the gas. The formula of the gas is still classified.

The first official report on isolated cases of hostage deaths was made at about 08:00, but Deputy Chief of Staff Vladimir Vasilyev said that there were no children among the dead. As it became known from the materials of the criminal case, by that time the death of 5 children had already been ascertained.

In total, according to official figures, 130 people, including 10 children, died as a result of the terrorist act.

The exact time of the start of the military operation to destroy the terrorists is not known. Part of the employees of the Central Security Service of the FSB entered the hall through a gay club that functioned on the territory of the theater center. Video cameras recorded only the appearance of special forces in the lobby of the theater center at 6.22 am. It is known that during the assault, the special forces also received poisoning, but none of them died under the influence of gas.

The operational headquarters thought out the special operation to destroy the terrorists to the smallest detail. The operational headquarters did not have a plan to rescue the hostages.

Explanations of medical workers who took part in the evacuation of victims on October 26, 2002 (from the materials of the criminal case).

From the explanation of Belyakova O.V. (volume 120, file sheet 130):

We arrived at Melnikova Street at about 7:15…

Upon arrival at the Palace of Culture of Moscow Bearing JSC, two victims were loaded into our car. The loading was carried out by employees of the Ministry of Emergency Situations ... Literally a minute later, an employee of the Ministry of Emergency Situations told me to go to the bus and provide assistance to the victims who were on it.

When I got on the bus, the doors closed, and the EMERCOM officer ordered the driver to go to City Clinical Hospital No. 1. There were no medicines or instruments on the bus. Along the way, the bus stopped at traffic lights, upon arrival at City Clinical Hospital No. 1, at first the guards did not let us into the territory. There were 22 victims on the bus, one of whom had died by now ... The victims were located randomly on the bus, some were sitting on chairs, some were lying on the floor.

I do not know who was in charge of the evacuation, who carried the victims, I also do not know.

... There was no sorting yard, and this played a negative role. The fact that the victims were hospitalized on buses, without the appropriate number of medical personnel, medicines, instruments, played a negative role.

... The name of the antidote would help us in our work ...

From the explanation of Nedoseikina A.V. (volume 120 sheet of case 115):

... I was not warned in advance that I could be used to deliver former hostages from the Moscow Bearing House.

Order number 784548, was taken to the Botkin hospital in a state of biological death.

The work on the evacuation of the former hostages from the recreation center of JSC "Moscow Bearing" was organized insufficiently qualified. In particular, there was a poor sorting of patients, the corpses were loaded into ambulances, and live hostages were interspersed with the corpses of dead hostages in buses ...

Buses with the victims mostly followed without medical staff, which played a negative role in their rescue.

... The lack of information about the name of the substance used during the special operation played a negative role in the provision of medical care.

It is also known that the terrorists recorded the flow of gas for at least twenty minutes, identified it as an attempted assault, but did not detonate explosive devices and martyrs' belts, and there was no attempt to mass execution of hostages. The hostages saw that some terrorists (shahids) lost consciousness from the effects of the gas.

As a result of the special operation, all the terrorists, even those who were unconscious, were shot (including control shots to the head).

The authorities called the assault on the Theater Center on Dubrovka a "brilliant special operation." The rescue operation was considered effective, despite the fact that the case file recorded the failure to provide any medical assistance to 73 of the 129 dead hostages. The entire FSB archive on Nord-Ost was destroyed shortly after the special operation.

After the "Nord-Ost" secret orders of President Putin were awarded to the security forces. Among them, FSB General Pronichev, FSB General Tikhonov, as well as an unidentified creator of the chemical formula of an unidentified gas, also an FSB officer, became Heroes of Russia.

Svobodnaya Pressa contacted a law enforcement officer who, as part of a group of investigators, carried out investigative measures in the theater center on Dubrovka immediately after the assault.

"SP": - What are your most important impressions and conclusions on the attack?

The main conclusion is that the Chechens were not going to die there. To a large extent, their threats to blow up the hostages were a bluff.

"SP": - Why do you think so?

According to witnesses. These were conditional suicide bombers. And most importantly, this can be seen from the final fact: they had the opportunity to blow up the hostages, but they did not.

"SP": - But the official version - they were prevented by gas ...

- "Gas" heroism is quite far-fetched. The gas was visible - from the moment it was released to the moment it began to act, mainly on the hostages - up to five minutes passed. It could be seen that there was white smoke - gas. It was obvious to the terrorists. It was not even hidden, obviously in the literal sense of the word, that is, "seen with the eyes." The terrorists, as far as I remember, had gas masks with them. So if they really wanted to blow everything up there, and were ready to die, they could do it without any problems. But they didn't want it.

Another important point: the goals - true, real - with which the terrorists arrived there have not yet been disclosed.

"SP": - And what were they, these true goals?

And this is unknown. But in the first minutes after the capture, information was broadcast on central television that Movsar Baraev (the leader of the terrorist group - approx. "SP") wants to announce the perpetrators of the explosions of houses in Moscow, removing the blame from the Chechens. It was a single message, then this information disappeared.

Then, a negative emotional impression is caused by the fact that not a single terrorist was captured, while such an opportunity, apparently, was - starting with gas and ending with Alpha, which probably could have taken someone. And so we see a complete disregard for any information that could be obtained from terrorists. At least the names of the accomplices. If only in the interest of preventing terrorists from bringing such a quantity of explosives into Moscow in the future, one might ask: how did they smuggle it? Suddenly they have accomplices in the special services? After all, no one, but the special services missed this circumstance.

With these goals, some of the terrorists could try to take. No, they didn't take anyone. And it was presented not as a defeat, but as an achievement - and this is incomprehensible.

"SP": - According to rumors, the assault special forces on Dubrovka literally carried out the threat of Vladimir Putin - "wet in the toilet." Were the terrorists really “soaked” in the toilet?

I personally saw a toilet with booths shot through, with numerous holes. Someone was "wet" there, for sure. "Soaked" or not - another question ...

"SP": - Is this some kind of necrophilic humor?

I dont know. Perhaps they simply drove some kind of “rat” with a machine gun from among the terrorists there, and it fired back. Humor has nothing to do with it, it's too serious.

"SP": - And what are your impressions of the dead?

The impression was made by the number of dead, and the reason for their death. According to some reports, most of them simply choked on vomit. Vomit masses. The main cause of death is the untimely provision of medical care. This gas produces an effect similar to heroin: in case of an overdose, the respiratory center fails, there is a delay in breathing, vomiting. And the injured soldiers from the internal troops were taken out of the hall and put face up in the buses. Stacks, without the participation of physicians.

They were taken to hospitals, but due to the secrecy of data on the composition of the poisonous substance, and the lack of disclosure of this information to doctors, the buses traveled from hospital to hospital for a long time. There was confusion and disorganization. Time passed, during which the victims suffocated - choked with vomit. This is about 130 people.

"SP": "But some of the hostages died from bullets, didn't they?"

Only three or four people from the hostages died from bullets, they were shot by terrorists. One of the hostages lost their nerve, he freaked out, jumped up and ran, almost along the backs of the chairs - they shot him. Another hostage was shot because they decided that she was a provocateur. Someone else was shot, but everyone else seemed to have suffocated and choked on their vomit.

And this is given out as an achievement of our special services.

I was also impressed by one girl from among the hostages, a student of the Faculty of Journalism of Moscow State University, who said that after the experience she would no longer be a journalist. She, freed from the hostages, watched TV, and something happened inside her from the lies of TV, which covered the terrorist attack. The TV reports then broadcast a picture with the location of snipers and power groups, which the terrorists also watched on TV, but while inside the building.

"SP": - What general conclusions can be drawn from the terrorist attack on Dubrovka?

I will not take responsibility for the conclusions.

My general impression is that the terrorist attack on Dubrovka took place in exact, canonical accordance with the ideas of Antonio Gramsci (the founder and theorist of the Italian Communist Party in 1920-1930, approx. "SP") about the society-spectacle. It is striking that this whole performance broke out of the stage and the theater, and swept the whole country, mixing the audience with the participants, and making them participants in the performance. And the big question is who are the audience in this performance, and who are the directors.

This observation is strengthened by the interrogation of the first witnesses. They said that they did not immediately understand that there were terrorists on the stage. Until they began aggressive actions towards the audience, the audience thought that this was an element of the performance. The line between the beginning of the play "Nord-Ost" and the terrorist attack was blurred. In this sense, the performance is still not over.

"SP": What is Gramsci's theory?

He says that the events taking place in society can be controlled by controlling the spectacle that depicts these events. In "Nord-Ost" the main thing is to capture the viewer's attention, and it doesn't matter by what means. In this case, attention was captured, but in the end it is not clear who captured it: the terrorists, the freshly minted Heroes of Russia from the FSB, the government ... All this reduced the event to the level of a spectacle. According to the plan of those who planned it, the spectacle should obscure the causes - and so it happened. So far, no one has voiced or investigated any reasons. This is a theatrical substitution, because you need to look for reasons. Without finding them, it is impossible to draw conclusions.

Igor Trunov, lawyer for the victims: Gold rings from corpses were torn with meat

"SP": - Igor Leonidovich, at what stage is the Nord-Ost case in the European Court?

In November - early December, we expect the final consideration of the case. All this time we have been communicating with Strasbourg. But we must understand: the correspondence is not with the European courts, but with the Russian Federation. We write - the Russian Federation answers, what was answered, the European Court forwards to us, we object, the court forwards the objections of the Russian Federation, etc. This has been going on for the second year, and during this time, initially separate complaints from two groups of victims in Nord-Ost (I represent the interests of 60 people, Karina Moskalenko represents five people) have been combined into one case.

"SP": - This is good?

Our side categorically objected to the association: we believe that, in addition to the resuscitation of the criminal case on Nord-Ost, civil cases should also be reanimated. The victims still have not received proper compensation for harm, compensation for moral damage, many orphans have not been paid what was regulated by the law at that time. Our complaint, let me explain, consists of two components: criminal proceedings plus civil. But Moskalenko has only criminal proceedings: she emphasized that the investigation was of poor quality and incomplete. In the last paragraph, our arguments are the same.

One way or another, now the consideration of the case in Strasbourg is coming to an end. The only thing we added to our complaint this year is the situation with looting by law enforcement officers. They stole everything they could, plus they managed to plunder what was recorded in the presence of attesting witnesses and handed over to the investigator for safekeeping.

"SP": - And what exactly was stolen?

Money, values. We won in court on two episodes of looting, which do not climb into any gates. Let me remind you that our investigator bears personal responsibility for the valuables handed over to him in the presence of attesting witnesses and duly recorded. So, the former hostage Dolgaya handed over her handbag, which was about two thousand dollars, and the Mikhailov family of journalists from Kaliningrad - money and valuables. All this is gone. We went to court with a lawsuit against the Moscow prosecutor's office, and won the case. Do you understand? The prosecutor's office was ordered to pay the embezzled funds to these two families.

"SP": - Were they paid?

Long already received the money, they were paid by the federal budget. That is, we take the rap: investigators steal, and taxpayers pay. I note that none of the investigators was brought to justice, although, according to the law, a criminal case should have been initiated against the perpetrator.

"SP": - Was it an isolated case?

We proved only those episodes for which we had just reinforced concrete evidence: protocols signed in the presence of witnesses, including the investigator, and filed with the case file. And there were dozens of cases, looting was a mass phenomenon. After all, the corpses were given out naked, even cowards were removed from the corpses - this is a disgrace! I'm not talking about gold rings - they were torn with meat, removing earrings, tore the ears of women. But where there were no protocols, it was almost impossible to prove anything...

"SP": - How do you think, how will the consideration of the case in the European Court end?

Judging by our correspondence, the Russian Federation indirectly recognizes some of the requirements. The materials of the correspondence, by the way, were classified at the request of the Russian Federation. There is nothing secret there, but it is clear from the correspondence that the Russian Federation often tells lies.

I am not completely sure that it will be possible to achieve a second criminal investigation into Nord-Ost: the statute of limitations has expired, and no one will be held accountable. But in civil proceedings, there are good chances to achieve justice, and to insist on the payment of proper compensation: they will never hurt.

Operational lie

“Tragedies can happen in any state. Nobody is safe. The main thing is how power comes out of them. What lessons does she draw from the cruel truth about what happened, how does she relate to the victims who continue their lives next to her, and to the memory of the dead? - considers the victim V. Kurbatov, who lost a child on Dubrovka.

But just after the terrorist attack, the authorities behaved in the strangest way. There was disinformation, the investigation was stalled, and then it was completely stopped. The victims were even forced to create a public organization "Nord-Ost", which conducted a parallel investigation into the tragedy, sending its results to the government and law enforcement agencies.

Below we present data from this report.

“According to the mother of the hostage, T. Karpova, about an hour after the explosions, Valentina Matvienko, Oleg Bocharov and other representatives of the headquarters entered the relatives of the hostages. “They were all extremely excited and cheerful. They stood at the microphone. The hall is frozen. And then the words of a sweet lie sounded: “The assault was brilliant! The terrorists have all been killed! There are no victims among the hostages!” The audience applauded and shouted with joy. Everyone thanked the authorities, officials for saving the lives of relatives and friends.” And at that time, as it later became known from the materials of the criminal case, the bodies of the dead hostages were piled into two buses that stood near the recreation center ...

The first official report on isolated cases of hostage deaths was made around 09:00, however, Deputy Chief of Staff Vladimir Vasilyev (now a deputy of the State Duma of the Russian Federation - SP note) reports that there are no children among the dead. As it turned out later, by that time, doctors had already declared the death of 5 children.

All this time, the authorities have been silent about the use of special equipment during the assault.

At 13:00, at a press conference, Deputy Chief of Staff Vasiliev announced the death of 67 people, but the death of children was still hidden. According to him, he is authorized to declare the use of special equipment and several terrorists captured alive.

13:45 - the operational headquarters stopped its work. At the same time, the relatives of the hostages were given “information telephones”, by which they allegedly could find out information about which hospital their relatives were taken to. However, the "dispatchers" did not have any information about the former hostages. The federal media reported an unreliable list of hospitals where the former hostages were admitted.

The admission of relatives of former hostages to hospitals was prohibited. There were many unidentified victims, and relatives offered photographs for identification of individuals, but they were categorically refused. Despite the promise of the authorities, the lists did not appear in many hospitals, which caused suffering for people who could not find their loved ones either among the living or among the dead.

Former hostages continued to die on the 26th, 27th, and 28th October. Finally, only a week later, more or less real information about the dead was reported - more than 120 people.

According to the Prosecutor's Office of November 1, 2002, all the former hostages who were previously listed as missing were found in the morgues. Some of them were found in the Lefortovo morgue - initially their bodies were classified as the bodies of terrorists. However, only in June 2003, the family of G. Vlah was informed that his corpse had been cremated along with the bodies of the terrorists. The family did not receive any explanation or apology in this regard.

The official version about the harmlessness of the "special equipment" used during the assault was widely used in the media. Even before receiving the results of the examinations, leading health officials stated on television that the cause of the death of the hostages was a "complex of unfavorable factors" and the presence of chronic diseases.

Cases of defeat by "special means" of employees of special services who carried out a rescue operation were also concealed. But on 11/06/2002, the president of the association of veterans of the Alpha unit, a deputy of the Moscow City Duma, Sergei Goncharov, said that 9 officers of the Alpha unit were in hospitals, who were poisoned by gas during the release of the hostages.

As is known today, as a result of the operation, at least 130 hostages died, ten of them were children; about 700 hostages were poisoned, some of them became invalids of II and III groups, 12 people partially or completely lost their hearing; 69 children, having lost their parents, remained orphans.”

Who is guilty? What is a gay club?

Until now, it has not been possible to establish the true picture of what happened in the theater center. The investigation into the case was closed in 2007.

Only two "switchmen" were brought to trial. Zaurbek Talkhigov, who spoke on the phone with Baraev, received 8.5 years for aiding terrorists. Policeman Alyamkin received 7 years for the fact that in the fall of 2002, for a bribe, he issued a temporary registration for a citizen of the Russian Federation L. Bakueva. Subsequently, Bakueva was among the participants in the seizure of the Theater Center on Dubrovka. That's all organizational conclusions.

In the report of the public organization Nord-Ost, on this occasion it is said: “The situation is unacceptable when the responsibility of an ordinary employee exceeds the responsibility of the heads of departments who could not prevent the tragedy at Dubrovka. High-ranking officials of the FSB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs received awards for the operation to eliminate terrorists, during which more than a hundred hostages die, and the only one who was punished was Alyamkin, an ordinary employee of the passport department. Alyamkin's harsh sentence is intended to demonstrate the decisiveness and uncompromisingness of the authorities in the fight against terrorism. However, the public has not been presented with any real results of the investigation into the causes of the incident. Until now, no explanation has been given why during the operation to rescue the hostages so many people died not at the hands of terrorists. Instead, we are offered to be satisfied with the punishment of the "switchman". The sentence handed down to Alyamkin is disproportionately harsh, and the punishment of an ordinary law enforcement officer cannot exhaust the responsibility of the authorities for the Dubrovka tragedy.”

And here is a statement from the materials of the investigation (volume 1, sheet 93): “There was a gay club in the basement of the Palace of Culture. There was a renovation going on at the time. Among the workers, the personnel of the Palace of Culture noted the presence of Caucasians and, according to one of the watchmen, Caucasians lived in the premises of this club for the entire period of repair. The watchman was taken hostage and among the terrorists he recognized one of the gayclub workers. Since the members and visitors of the club are many influential representatives of commercial and government structures, incl. and among the deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation, Archon and Co LLC has a powerful cover in case of inspections by law enforcement agencies. It is possible that a database of clients was maintained in the gay club in order to collect information for blackmailing interested parties. In connection with the above, the gay club was the most ideal base for the preparation and implementation of a terrorist act.

However, whether the gay club where “influential representatives of commercial and government structures hung out” became the base for those who prepared one of the most terrible terrorist attacks of our time remained unknown. Apparently, the "extra details" turned out to be very unnecessary for someone.

As a result, many white spots remain in the history of Nord-Ost. The investigation is closed in such a way that it is impossible even to establish how, in collusion with which structures, the militants with a large amount of weapons and explosives managed to get into the center of Moscow and seize hostages without hindrance.

Repeated appeals of the victims to the then President of the country, Vladimir Putin, demanding an objective investigation into the circumstances of the tragedy and its consequences were inconclusive.

Nord-Ost and the European Court

After the "Nord-Ost" secret orders of President Putin were awarded to the security forces. FSB General Pronichev, FSB General Tikhonov, and also the creator of the chemical formula of the gas, an FSB officer, became heroes of Russia.

Former hostages and relatives of the victims found lawyers. The interests of one group are represented by Karinna Moskalenko and Olga Mikhailova, the other by Igor Trunov and Lyudmila Aivar.

In early 2003, having received decisions not to initiate criminal proceedings against members of the operational headquarters, rescuers and doctors and having challenged them in the Russian courts, applicants Moskalenko and Mikhailova decided to apply to the European Court.

The same decision was taken in August 2003 by 57 applicants Igor Trunov and Lyudmila Aivar.

The criminal case on Nord-Ost was conducted by investigator Kalchuk for a long time alone. The case did not reach the Russian court. The investigation did not find a single culprit (except for the killed terrorists) in the death of the hostages.

Until 2007, the European Court was silent. In 2007, Igor Trunov's complaint was communicated. Moreover, the European Court itself invited Trunov's applicants to declare a violation of Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention. These articles are considered the most "heavy": Strasbourg, already at the initial stages, saw in the Nord-Ost case signs of a violation by the state of the most important right - the right to life.

At the beginning of November of this year, the last - competitive - stage of the consideration of the complaint against Nord-Ost will end, and the European Court will start writing a decision.

Fifteen years ago, on October 26, 2002, a special operation to rescue hostages taken by Chechen fighters in the Theater Center on Dubrovka ended.

Terrorists broke into the building on October 23 during the musical "Nord-Ost", 916 people were taken hostage. The tragedy killed 130 people, including 10 children.

Commemorative events dedicated to the 15th anniversary of the tragedy took place in Moscow today. In the morning, 130 white balloons were released near the theater center. The number corresponding to the victims of the terrorist attack. People brought flowers to the building, candles were lit near the wall with photographs of the dead.

Chronology of events

22.00 “The police are receiving information that the Theater Center on Dubrovka has been seized by Chechen fighters led by Movsar Baraev. There are women among the terrorists. Reinforced police squads are drawn to the building.

23.00 - Five actors who were locked in the dressing room manage to escape from the occupied building.

23:30 Military vehicles are arriving. At this time, 7 employees of the technical group of the musical, who have closed in the editing room, run out of the building.

00:00 - The building is completely locked down. The operatives are negotiating with the terrorists, after which the militants release 15 children and several dozen more people, including women, foreigners and Muslims.

00:30 - The terrorists put forward the main demand - the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of troops from Chechnya.

03:50 - The militants release two schoolchildren.

05:30 - 26-year-old Olga Romanova enters the hall of the Theater Center. The girl enters into a skirmish with Movsar Baraev. According to witnesses, she was under the influence of drugs. How the girl got into the building cordoned off by three rows of law enforcement officers is unknown. Romanova is taken into the corridor and killed with three machine gun shots.

08:00 By this time, the terrorists had released 41 people.

18:31 - Two hostages escape from the building - Elena Zinovieva and Svetlana Kononova. During a trip to the toilet, they get out through the window to the street and run. The bullets of the militants fired after them do not reach their targets.

19:00 — The Qatari TV channel shows the appeal of the militant Movsar Barayev, which was recorded a few days before the capture of the Palace of Culture. In the video, the militant says that his group belongs to the "sabotage and reconnaissance brigade of righteous martyrs." The terrorist demands the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya.

01:30 —Leonid Roshal brings two boxes of medicines and a bag of hygiene products that the terrorists allowed to bring for the hostages. NTV correspondent Sergei Dedukh and operator Anton Peredelsky enter the building. They stay in the building for about 40 minutes, where they communicate with the terrorists and six hostages.

12:34 - Representatives of the Red Cross take out eight children from the building seized by terrorists.

00:30—02:00 — One of the hostages starts hysterical. He rushes with a bottle at a terrorist sitting next to an explosive device. The militants open fire on the man, but miss. Two other hostages were wounded - Tamara Starkova (in the stomach) and Pavel Zakharov (in the head). The victims are taken to the first floor of the building and the ambulance staff is called. Pavel Zakharov later died in the hospital.

Storm

5:00 - Operation begins. Sleeping gas was let into the building through ventilation. Militants and hostages mistake it for smoke from a fire.

5:30 “Three explosions near the DK building. Automatic queues. There is unconfirmed information about the beginning of the operation to storm the building.

5:45 - Message from representatives of the headquarters: two hostages were killed. Two others are wounded.

Image copyright RIA Novosti

For all mankind, "north-east" is the direction of the compass needle or the northeast wind. For Russians, this is one of the most tragic events in modern history.

On October 23, 2002, a drama began with the capture by Chechen fighters of the audience and actors of the popular musical "Nord-Ost", also known as the "terrorist attack on Dubrovka".

912 people were in the hands of the attackers. 130 were killed, including 10 children and eight foreigners.

There were fewer victims in Nord-Ost than in Budennovsk, Kizlyar and Beslan, but in terms of the number of deaths, this tragedy is second only to the Beslan nightmare.

119 people died in hospitals after being released. According to many, most of them could have been saved if the operation had been carried out more competently and the safety of people had not been sacrificed for total secrecy.

So far, it has not been possible to put an end to militant attacks in Russia, although in recent years their activity has been mainly limited to the North Caucasus region and is directed against local authorities.

56 hours under the gun

According to Russian intelligence services, in the summer of 2002 a meeting of field commanders was held in Chechnya, at which it was decided to "transfer the war to enemy territory" and carry out a major attack in the Russian capital.

Official Moscow claims that the meeting was chaired by the leader of "independent Ichkeria" Aslan Maskhadov.

Indirect confirmation of Maskhadov's involvement is an interview given by him five days before the attack to the Agence France Presse, in which he explained the reasons for his cooperation with Shamil Basayev and other persons recognized as terrorists by the world community.

“Western leaders are forced to flirt with Russia to resolve their global problems such as the Balkans, Afghanistan, Georgia, and now Iraq. Now that the war is on, I have nothing to lose by associating with people like Basayev, Udugov or Yandarbiev - the main radical leaders," Maskhadov said, hinting at some kind of "exceptional operation" that his supporters are preparing.

According to representatives of the Russian special services, the attack on Dubrovka was coordinated by telephone from abroad by the "vice-president of Ichkeria" Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev.

On February 13, 2004, he died in a car explosion in Dubai, allegedly arranged by agents of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian General Staff.

The 23-year-old field commander Movsar Baraev was appointed the direct leader of the action. In order to divert attention from his personality, the militants spread a rumor that he either died or went abroad for treatment after being seriously wounded. Yielding to misinformation, Boris Podoprigora, Deputy Commander of the Joint Grouping of Federal Forces in Chechnya, officially announced on October 12 that Baraev had died as a result of an air raid.

Initially, the strike was planned for the Day of National Accord and Reconciliation on November 7 in order to spoil Russia's holiday, but then they decided not to risk it and not play for time.

21 men and 19 women, mostly aged 20-23, were selected to participate in the attack. It was after "Nord-Ost" in Russia that people started talking about "shahids" widely.

They arrived in Moscow in small groups by different means of transport and were accommodated in pre-rented private apartments. Baraev, accompanied by two other people, arrived by train on 14 October.

Cars loaded with apples and watermelons delivered more than a centner of plastite for making bombs and suicide belts, three powerful explosive devices converted from 152-mm artillery shells, over a hundred grenades, 18 Kalashnikov assault rifles, 20 Stechkin and Makarov pistols.

The media and the public subsequently wondered how the militants managed to smuggle so many weapons across Russia without hindrance, and hinted at the possibility of bribing policemen at road checkpoints.

The most convenient places for capturing and keeping a large number of people indoors were concert halls and theaters. Three points were considered: the Moscow Youth Palace near the Frunzenskaya metro station, the Theater Center on Dubrovka (the former Palace of Culture of the 1st State Bearing Plant on Melnikova Street, 7) and the Moscow State Variety Theater on the Moskva River embankment opposite the Kremlin.

The choice fell on the center on Dubrovka, which had a large auditorium and a small number of other rooms and exits.

To divert the attention of the special services, on October 19 Barayev's group staged an explosion near the McDonald's restaurant on Pokryshkin Street. At 13.10, a Tavria car parked at the entrance exploded, killing a 17-year-old teenager.

At 21:05 on October 23, when the first act of the musical ended in the Theater Center, three minibuses with armed men drove up to the building.

On the stage, where at that moment there were eight artists in flight uniforms of the 1940s, a man in camouflage and with a machine gun ran out, fired several shots into the air and ordered the audience to stay where they were, and the actors to go down to the hall. Part of the audience took this as an element of the performance.

Other militants combed the building, herding into the hall everyone who came to hand, including 20 teenagers from the Irish dance studio. Five artists and seven technicians were able to escape in the confusion. The next day, two more young spectators managed to escape, who got out into the street through the toilet window. The militants fired at them from machine guns and an underbarrel grenade launcher, easily injuring Major Konstantin Zhuravlev, who was covering the girls.

The militants placed explosive devices in the stalls and on the balconies and allowed the audience to call their relatives on mobile phones, demanding to be informed that 10 people would be shot for each killed or wounded among the attackers.

By 22:00 the building was cordoned off by riot police, by 23:30 armored vehicles pulled up.

Negotiations began around midnight. The authorities promised the militants life in exchange for the release of the hostages, but they refused, demanding the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya.

At 19:00 on October 24, the Al-Jazeera TV channel in Qatar showed a pre-recorded video in which Movsar Barayev, surrounded by five women in black capes and veils, called his group a "sabotage and reconnaissance brigade of righteous martyrs" and demanded recognition of Chechnya's independence.

At the risk of themselves, for negotiations with Baraev and his people and the delivery of water and medicines to the victims, a pediatric surgeon Leonid Roshal, singer Iosif Kobzon, politicians Irina Khakamada, Grigory Yavlinsky, Evgeny Primakov, Ruslan Aushev and Aslambek Aslakhanov, a Jordanian doctor, associate professor of the Moscow Medical Sechenov Academy Anvar Said, Russian journalists Anna Politkovskaya, Dmitry Belovetsky, Sergei Dedukh and Anton Peredelsky, director Stanislav Govorukhin's son Sergei, British correspondent Mark Franchetti and two Swiss Red Cross officers.

Largely due to their efforts, the militants released a total of 60 people - women, children, foreigners and Muslims.

Baraev demanded a meeting with the head of the administration of Chechnya, Akhmad Kadyrov, promising in this case to release 50 hostages, but he did not come.

During the siege, militants killed five people in the building and wounded three.

Around 5 am on October 26, the besiegers began pumping sleeping gas into the hall through the ventilation pipes and broke into the building half an hour later. At 07:25, presidential aide Sergei Yastrzhembsky officially announced the end of the operation.

All forty militants were killed - presumably unconscious. The public subsequently wondered why at least some of them did not save their lives for the investigation and open trial.

Russian TV channels showed the corpses of women with "suicide belts" and Movsar Baraev, near which stood an open bottle of cognac. Some commentators emphasized this circumstance, accusing the deceased of hypocrisy and violating the canons of Islam.

Motherland will forgive?

According to experts, the special forces acted competently, but the evacuation and medical assistance to the released hostages were poorly organized.

For reasons of secrecy, doctors and rescuers were not warned in advance, and the police did not clear the surrounding streets. The ambulances arrived at the Theater Center only at about 06:30.

The evacuation of the victims lasted for an hour and a half, and the sleeping people were carried out mainly not by qualified doctors, but by policemen and special forces. Due to the incorrect position of the bodies, many had asphyxia.

The use of the gas was reported only at 13:00, so the doctors did not know what, in fact, people should be treated for.

On October 27, Andrey Seltsovsky, chief doctor of Moscow, said that "one does not die from the use of such special equipment in its pure form."

At a press conference on September 20, 2003, Vladimir Putin also claimed that "these people died not as a result of the gas", but from "dehydration, chronic diseases, the very fact that they had to stay in that building."

However, the name and formula of the gas used by the Russian authorities are still hidden. According to indirect evidence, it could be some kind of fentanyl-based compound.

There was no investigation into the actions of the authorities. No one was questioned either for the mass death of the hostages after the liberation, or for the fact that the special services did not know in advance about the preparation of such a major attack from their agents and overlooked the large-scale transfer of militants and weapons to the capital.

State Duma deputy Sergei Yushenkov suggested that his colleagues consider the issue, but the pro-Kremlin majority did not support the initiative.

The deputy director of the FSB, Vladimir Pronichev, who led the operation, was awarded the title of Hero of Russia by a secret decree. According to observers, Vladimir Putin sent an unambiguous signal to the "siloviki": act in the same spirit in the future, there will be victims - the Motherland will forgive.

Court and business

The only defendant in the Dubrovka hostage-taking case was a Chechen, Zaurbek Talkhigov, who was accused of complicity. On June 20, 2003, the Moscow City Court sentenced him to 8.5 years in prison.

According to a survey conducted in 2010 by the Levada Center, 74% of Russians do not fully or partially trust official information about the tragedy.

Some of the victims and relatives of the victims filed a lawsuit against the state, seeking to disclose all the information on the case and bring the leaders of the operation to justice under the article "infliction of death by negligence."

On January 23, 2003, the Tverskoy Court of Moscow rejected their claims. In August of the same year, 64 people filed a complaint with the European Court of Human Rights.

The consideration of the case in Strasbourg lasted seven and a half years. On December 20, 2011, the ECtHR ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding the Russian state to pay them compensation from 9,000 to 66,000 euros each, depending on the extent of the damage suffered.

Recognizing the decision to conduct the assault as the competence of the Russian authorities, the court considered that the officials responsible for its conduct violated the second article of the European Convention, which guarantees the right to life.

"The rescue operation was not properly prepared, in particular, due to insufficient information exchange between various services, the late start of the evacuation, the lack of proper coordination between the various services, the lack of proper medical care and medical equipment at the scene, as well as poor logistics," the statement said. in the judgment of the ECtHR.

In addition, the judges pointed out that the Russian authorities violated the rights of the victims by failing to conduct an effective investigation into the actions of law enforcement agencies during the storming of the building.

In July 2012, the lawyer of the victims, Igor Trunov, filed a petition with the Investigative Committee of Russia to open a criminal case and conduct a new investigation. No response has been received yet.

One of the indirect consequences of the Nord-Ost drama was the expulsion from the NTV channel of the leadership headed by Boris Yordan.

After the sinking of the Kursk submarine, the Paris newspaper Figaro called Vladimir Putin's reputation and political future "another victim of the crash."

French journalists were judged by the standards of the society in which they live. In Russia, crises and catastrophes did not weaken, but strengthened Putin's power, providing a pretext for further "tightening the screws." Kursk was followed by the restoration of state control on Channel One, Beslan by the abolition of gubernatorial elections.

The rumor that NTV showed live the preparations for the assault at night, which could play into the hands of the militants, turned out to be false. But Jordan didn't stop journalists from telling what they thought about what was going on, showing desperate relatives of the hostages, quoting critical foreign comments and discussing alleged divisions in the corridors of power.

As in other similar cases, his resignation in January 2003 was officially explained by disagreements with shareholders on business issues, but observers did not doubt that the President's instructions were the reason.

In 2001, Jordan participated in the destruction of the "old NTV" headed by Vladimir Gusinsky and Yevgeny Kiselev, but soon he was also considered insufficiently controlled.

After Jordan left, the channel lost the remnants of independence, and series about bandits and "cops" and "journalistic investigations" about the Russian opposition, which are ambiguously perceived by society, became its trademark.

Unlucky project

"Nord-Ost" was considered the first Russian world-class musical and a major event in the cultural life of the country.

Preparation of the performance based on the novel by Veniamin Kaverin "Two Captains" began in 1998. Directors Georgy Vasiliev and Alexei Ivashchenko trained in the company of Cameron Mackintosh, who directed Les Misérables, Cats and The Phantom of the Opera in London.

For the scenery, unique in complexity, created by the artist Zinovy ​​Margolin (a life-size plane landing on the stage and a turning circle opening up with ice hummocks, in the center of which the bow of a sunken schooner appeared), the Dubrovka Theater Center underwent a special reconstruction, which turned it into a theater of one performance.

The creators of "Nord-Ost" counted on its long life and great commercial success (London and New York musicals often live for 20-30 years), but the tragedy in October 2002 put an end to the project.

After the repair of the hall, the performance resumed. The organizers called it a symbol of the triumph of life and the victory over terror, but many Muscovites said that they could not have fun "on the bones" or felt unaccountable fear in the building. May 10, 2003 was the last performance. Attempts to transfer the production to St. Petersburg or to create a touring version with simplified scenery and a smaller number of actors were not successful.

bloody chronicle

November 9: three Chechen militants, including Shamil Basayev, took 178 hostages aboard a Tu-154 passenger plane at the Mineralnye Vody airport and hijacked the liner to Turkey.

June 14-20: a detachment of 195 militants led by Basayev took more than 1,600 hostages in a hospital in the city of Budennovsk (Stavropol Territory). 129 people died, 415 were injured.

January 9-15: a group of militants led by Salman Raduev captured about 2,000 people in a hospital and maternity hospital in the city of Kizlyar (Dagestan). 78 Russian servicemen, employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and civilians were killed.

January 16-19: Three Turkish citizens and two Russian citizens captured over 220 people on the Avrasiya ferry in the Turkish port of Trabzon. The attackers surrendered to the local authorities without a fight.

June 11th: As a result of an explosion on the stretch between the stations "Tulskaya" and "Nagatinskaya" of the Moscow metro, four people were killed and 12 were injured.

June 26: the explosion of a passenger bus at the bus station in Nalchik. Six people were killed and over forty injured.

July 11-12: Explosions in trolleybuses on Pushkinskaya Square and Prospekt Mira in Moscow. 34 people were injured.

November 16: explosion of a residential building for officers and ensigns in Kaspiysk (Dagestan). 69 people died, including 21 children.

April 23: explosion at the railway station in Armavir (Krasnodar Territory). Three people were killed and 12 injured.

April 28: explosion in the waiting room of the railway station in Pyatigorsk. Two people were killed and 22 people were injured.

August 31: Explosion at the Okhotny Ryad shopping complex on Manezhnaya Square in Moscow. One woman died, 40 people were injured.

4 September: explosion of a five-story residential building in Buynaksk (Dagestan). 64 people were killed, 146 injured.

September 9 and 13: explosions of residential buildings in Moscow on Guryanov Street and on Kashirskoye Highway. 100 and 124 people died respectively.

16 of September: explosion of a nine-story residential building in Volgodonsk (Rostov region). 19 people died, 1045 people were injured and injured.

June 6: explosion of a car loaded with explosives near the building of the police department in the Chechen village of Alkhan-Yurt. Two policemen were killed and five were wounded.

July 2: a series of truck bomb explosions in Chechnya. 30 policemen and servicemen were killed. The seconded employees of the Main Internal Affairs Directorate of the Chelyabinsk region in Argun suffered the greatest losses.

8 August: explosion in the underground passage on Pushkinskaya Square in Moscow. 13 people were killed, 61 injured.

October 6: four explosions in Pyatigorsk and Nevinnomyssk (Stavropol Territory). Four people were killed and 20 injured.

February 5th: explosion at the Moscow metro station Belorusskaya-Koltsevaya. 20 people were injured, including two children.

March 24: explosions at the entrance to the Central Market in Mineralnye Vody and at the traffic police building in Essentuki. 21 people died, 122 were injured.

April 28: explosion at the Central Market of Vladikavkaz. Nine people died and 46 were injured.

9th May: explosion during a military parade in Kaspiysk. 45 people were killed, including 12 children, more than 170 were injured.

October 19: Explosion of a car bomb near a McDonald's restaurant on Pokryshkina Street in Moscow. One person died and eight were injured.

October 23-26: hostage-taking in the Moscow theater on Dubrovka during the play "Nord-Ost". 130 people died.

27th of December: explosion of the government building of the Chechen Republic in Grozny. Two cars loaded with explosives broke into the territory of the protected complex. 46 people were killed and 76 injured.

May 2: A KamAZ truck loaded with explosives, driven by a female suicide bomber, exploded near the building of the FSB administration of the Nadterechny district of Chechnya. 60 people were killed, more than 200 were injured.

May 14: explosion at a religious holiday in the village of Iliskhan-Yurt, Gudermes region of Chechnya. 30 people died, more than 150 were injured.

5'th of July: explosion at the rock festival "Wings" in Tushino. 16 people died, about 50 were injured.

25-th of August: three explosions at public transport stops in Krasnodar. Four people were killed and 15 injured.

September 3: undermining the electric train Kislovodsk - Mineralnye Vody. Seven people died and about 80 were injured.

5th of December: the explosion of the Kislovodsk-Mineralnye Vody electric train at the entrance to the Essentuki station. 44 people died, 156 were injured.

February 6: explosion in the Moscow metro train on the stretch between the stations "Avtozavodskaya" and "Paveletskaya". 42 people died, about 250 were injured.

9th May: A bomb explosion at the Grozny stadium during the celebration of Victory Day killed Chechen President Akhmat Kadyrov and Chairman of the State Council of the Republic Khusein Isaev.

24 August: explosions of passenger planes in the air over the Tula and Rostov regions. 90 people died.

August 31: explosion at the Moscow metro station "Rizhskaya". 10 people died, 50 were injured.

September 1-3: the capture of over 1,300 hostages in the building of School No. 1 in Beslan. 335 people died, about half of them were children, more than 500 people were injured.

August 13: Undermining the railway track, which led to the accident of the Nevsky Express train. 60 people were injured.

November 22: explosion of a passenger bus "Pyatigorsk-Vladikavkaz". Five people died and 13 were injured.

August 17: militant attack on Nazran. 25 people died and 136 were injured.

November 27: the crash of the Nevsky Express train, classified by the investigation as a terrorist attack. 28 people were killed, 95 people were injured.

January 6: an attempt by a suicide bomber on a mined "Niva" to the territory of the traffic police base in Makhachkala, where at that time the morning divorce of employees was taking place. Five people were killed and 24 were injured.

March 29: explosions at the Moscow metro stations "Lubyanka" and "Park Kultury". 40 people died, 85 were injured.

April 5: a double explosion near the building of the Karabulak District Department of Internal Affairs in Ingushetia. Two policemen were killed and four wounded.

may 13: night shelling of a mobile communication station and a TV tower in the Sergokalinsky district of Dagestan. Eight people died.

26 of May: explosion on the square in front of the house of culture in Stavropol. Eight people were killed and 42 people were injured.

June 4: explosion in a store in the village of Sagopshi, Malgobek district of Ingushetia. One person died, 17 were injured.

21 July: explosions at the Baksan hydroelectric power station in Kabardino-Balkaria. Two people were killed, two were injured, and the station suffered significant damage.

August 17: explosion of a car bomb in Pyatigorsk. More than 40 people were injured.

August 29: attack on the residence of Ramzan Kadyrov in his native village of Tsentoroy. 12 alleged militants were killed, four local residents were injured, including two minors.

4 September: A suicide bomber blew up a car on the territory of the tent camp of the 136th motorized rifle brigade in Buynaksk. Five people died and 26 were injured.

9th of September: bomb explosion near the market in Vladikavkaz. 17 people died, 158 people were injured.

January 24: explosion at Moscow's Domodedovo airport. 37 people were killed and 130 injured.

18th of Febuary: an attack on a bus with tourists in the Baksansky district of Karachay-Cherkessia. Three are killed.

25 February: militant attack on the FSB headquarters and police posts in Nalchik. Policeman wounded.

March, 6: explosion at the checkpoint at the entrance to the village of Karabudakhkent, Dagestan. Five police officers were killed and two injured.

May 3: explosion of two car bombs in Makhachkala. 13 police officers, firefighters and bystanders were killed, about 90 people were taken to hospitals.

August 6: an explosion at the entrance to the Voentorg store in Grozny. Four dead, three wounded.

August 19: A suicide bomber blew himself up during a funeral procession in the Malgobek district of Ingushetia. Seven people were killed, 15 were injured, all police officers.

August 28: in the village of Chirkey, Dagestan, Muslim spiritual leader Said Afandi Chirkeysky was blown up in his own house. In addition to him, six more people died, one was injured.