The war in Afghanistan lasted almost 10 years, more than 15,000 of our soldiers and officers died. The number of Afghans killed in the war, according to various sources, reaches two million. It all started with palace coups and mysterious poisonings.

On the eve of the war

A "narrow circle" of members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, who make decisions on particularly important issues, gathered in the office Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev on the morning of December 8, 1979. Among those especially close to the secretary general were the chairman of the KGB of the USSR Yuri Andropov, the country's foreign minister Andrei Gromyko, the main ideologist of the party Mikhail Suslov and Defense Minister Dmitry Ustinov. This time the situation in Afghanistan, the situation in and around the revolutionary republic were discussed, the arguments for bringing Soviet troops into the DRA were considered.

It is worth recalling that by that time Leonid Ilyich had reached the highest earthly honors on 1/6 of the planet, as they say, "I reached the highest power." Five golden stars shone on his chest. Four of them are stars of the Hero of the Soviet Union and one of Socialist Labor. Here is the Order of Victory - the highest military award of the USSR, the diamond symbol of Victory. In 1978, he became the last, seventeenth cavalier of those awarded this honor, for organizing a radical change in World War II. Among the owners of such an order are Stalin and Zhukov. In total there were 20 awards and seventeen gentlemen (three were awarded twice, Leonid Ilyich managed to surpass everyone here - in 1989 he was posthumously deprived of the award). The marshal's baton, a golden saber, was preparing a project for an equestrian statue. These attributes gave him an undeniable right to make decisions at any level. Moreover, the advisers reported that in terms of loyalty to socialist ideals and manageability, Afghanistan could be made into a “second Mongolia”. To assert his talent as a commander, his party comrades advised the general secretary to get involved in a small victorious war. It was said among the people that dear Leonid Ilyich was aiming for the title of Generalissimo. But on the other hand, it was really not calm in Afghanistan.

The fruits of the April Revolution

On April 27-28, 1978, the April Revolution took place in Afghanistan (from the Dari language, this palace coup is also called the Saur Revolution). (True, since 1992, the anniversary of the April Revolution has been canceled, instead of it, the Day of the Victory of the Afghan people in jihad against the USSR is now celebrated.)

The reason for the opposition to act against the regime of President Mohammed Daoud was the assassination of a communist figure, a newspaper editor named Mir Akbar Khaibar. Daoud's secret police were blamed for the murder. The funeral of an opposition editor turned into a demonstration against the regime. Among the organizers of the riots were the leaders of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, Nur Mohamed Taraki and Babrak Karmal, who were arrested on the same day. Another leader of the party, Hafizullah Amin, was placed under house arrest for subversive work even before these events.

So, the three leaders are still together and they do not have much disagreement, all three are under arrest. Amin, with the help of his son, gave the then loyal PDPA (People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan) troops an order to start an armed uprising. There was a change of government. The President and his entire family were killed. Taraki and Karmal were released from prison. As you can see, the revolution, or what we call revolution, came easy. The military took the palace, liquidated the head of state, Daud, along with his family. That's all - power is in the hands of the "people". Afghanistan was declared a Democratic Republic (DRA). Nur Muhammad Taraki became the head of state and prime minister, Babrak Karmal became his deputy, the post of first deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs was offered to the organizer of the uprising, Hafizullah Amin. While there are three of them. But the semi-feudal country was in no hurry to imbue Marxism and introduce the Soviet model of socialism on Afghan soil with dispossession, expropriation of land from landowners, planting committees of the poor and party cells. Specialists from the Soviet Union were met with hostility by the local population. On the ground, unrest began, turning into riots. The situation worsened, the country seemed to go into a tailspin. The triumvirate began to crumble.

Babrak Karmal was the first to be cleared out. In July 1978, he was removed from his post and sent as ambassador to Czechoslovakia, from where, knowing the complexity of the situation at home, he was in no hurry to return. A conflict of interest has begun, a war of ambitions is already between the two leaders. Soon Hafizullah Amin began to demand that Taraki renounce power, although he had already visited Havana, Moscow, was warmly welcomed by Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, and enlisted his support. While Taraki was traveling, Amin prepared to seize power, changed officers loyal to Taraki, brought troops subordinate to his clan into the city, and then, by decision of an extraordinary meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the PDPA, Taraki and his associates were removed from all posts and expelled from the party. 12 thousand supporters of Taraki were shot. The case was put like this: in the evening arrest, at night - interrogation, in the morning - execution. All in oriental traditions. Moscow respected traditions until it came to the removal of Taraki, who did not agree with the decision of the Central Committee to remove him from power. Failing to persuade him to abdicate, again in the best traditions of the East, Amin ordered his personal guard to strangle the president. It happened on October 2, 1979. It was only on October 9 that the people of Afghanistan were officially announced that “Nur Mohammed Taraki died in Kabul after a short and serious illness.”

Bad-good Amin

The murder of Taraki plunged Leonid Ilyich into sadness. Nevertheless, he was informed that his new friend died suddenly, not as a result of a short illness, but was insidiously strangled by Amin. According to the memoirs of the then Head of the First Main Directorate of the KGB of the USSR (foreign intelligence) Vladimir Kryuchkov- “Brezhnev, being a man devoted to friendship, was very upset by the death of Taraki, to some extent perceived it as a personal tragedy. He retained a sense of guilt for the fact that it was he who, allegedly, did not save Taraki from imminent death, without dissuading him from returning to Kabul. Therefore, after everything that happened, he did not perceive Amin at all.

Once, during the preparation of documents for a meeting of the Politburo Commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU on Afghanistan, Leonid Ilyich told the staff: "Amin is a dishonest person." This remark was enough to start looking for options to remove Amin from power in Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, Moscow received conflicting information from Afghanistan. This is explained by the fact that it was mined by competing departments (the KGB, the GRU, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, various ministries).

Commander of the Ground Forces, General of the Army Ivan Pavlovsky and chief military adviser in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan Lev Gorelov, using data from the GRU and information obtained during personal meetings with Amin, reported to the Politburo the opinion of the leader of the Afghan people as "a true friend and reliable ally of Moscow in turning Afghanistan into an unshakable friend of the USSR. "Hafizullah Amin is a strong personality and should remain at the head of the state."

Completely opposite information was reported through the KGB foreign intelligence channels: “Amin is a tyrant who unleashed terror and repression against his own people in the country, betrayed the ideals of the April Revolution, colluded with the Americans, is pursuing a treacherous line to reorient foreign policy from Moscow to Washington, that he simply a CIA agent. Although no one from the KGB foreign intelligence leadership has ever provided real evidence of the anti-Soviet, treacherous activities of "the first and most faithful student of Taraki", "the leader of the April Revolution." By the way, after the murder of Amin and his two young sons during the storming of the Taj Beck Palace, the widow of the leader of the revolution with her daughter and youngest son went to live in the Soviet Union, although she was offered any country to choose from. She said then: "My husband loved the Soviet Union."

But let us return to the meeting on December 8, 1979, which brought together a narrow circle of the Politburo of the Central Committee. Brezhnev listens. Comrades Andropov and Ustinov are arguing for the necessity of bringing Soviet troops into Afghanistan. The first of them is the protection of the southern borders of the country from encroachments by the United States, which plans to include the Central Asian republics in the zone of its interests, the deployment of American Pershing missiles on the territory of Afghanistan, which endangers the Baikonur cosmodrome and other vital facilities, the danger of separation from Afghanistan of the northern provinces and joining Pakistan. As a result, they decided to consider two options for action: eliminate Amin and transfer power to Karmal, send part of the troops to Afghanistan to complete this task. Summoned to a meeting with the "small circle of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU" Chief of the General Staff Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov for an hour trying to convince the leaders of the country of the perniciousness of the very idea of ​​​​sending Soviet troops into Afghanistan. Marshall failed to do so. The next day, December 9, Ogarkov was again summoned to the General Secretary. In the office this time were Brezhnev, Suslov, Andropov, Gromyko, Ustinov, Chernenko, who was instructed to keep minutes of the meeting. Marshal Ogarkov persistently repeated his arguments against the introduction of troops. He referred to the traditions of the Afghans, who did not tolerate foreigners on their territory, and warned about the likelihood of our troops being drawn into hostilities, but everything turned out to be in vain.

Andropov rebuked the marshal: "You were not invited to hear your opinion, but to write down the instructions of the Politburo and organize their implementation." Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev put an end to the dispute: "You should support Yuri Vladimirovich."

Thus, a decision was made that had a grandiose result, which would lead to the final straight the collapse of the USSR. None of the leaders who made the decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan will see the tragedy of the Soviet Union. The terminally ill Suslov, Andropov, Ustinov, Chernenko, having unleashed a war, left us in the first half of the 80s, not regretting what they had done. In 1989 Andrei Andreevich Gromyko dies.

Western politicians also influenced the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. On December 12, 1979, the NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers decided in Brussels to adopt a plan for deploying new American cruise and Pershing-2 medium-range missiles in Western Europe. These missiles could hit almost the entire European part of the USSR, and we had to defend ourselves.

final decision

It was on that day - December 12 - that the final decision was made on the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. In the Special Folder of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the protocol of this meeting of the Politburo, written by the secretary of the Central Committee K.U. Chernenko. It can be seen from the protocol that the initiators of the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan were Yu.V. Andropov, D.F. Ustinov and A.A. Gromyko. At the same time, the most important fact was hushed up that the first task that our troops would have to solve would be the overthrow and elimination of Hafizullah Amin and his replacement by the Soviet protege Babrak Karmal. Therefore, the reference to the fact that the entry of Soviet troops into Afghan territory was carried out at the request of the legitimate government of the DRA is hardly justified. All members of the Politburo voted unanimously for the introduction of troops. However, noteworthy is the absence at the meeting of the Politburo of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Alexei Kosygin, who, knowing the state of the country's economy, being a man of high morals, categorically spoke out against the introduction of troops into Afghanistan. It is believed that from that moment on he had a complete break with Brezhnev and his entourage.

Twice Poisoned Amin

On December 13, an agent of the illegal intelligence service of the KGB, headed by Major General Yuri Drozdov, a certain "Misha", who speaks fluent Farsi, entered into a local special operation to eliminate Amin. His surname Talibov is found in special literature. He was introduced into Amin's residence as a chef, which speaks of the brilliant work of illegal agents in Kabul and of General Drozdov himself, a former resident in the United States. For the Afghan operation, he will be awarded the Order of Lenin. A glass of poisoned Coca-Cola prepared by "Misha" and destined for Amin was accidentally handed over to his nephew, counterintelligence chief Asadulla Amin. First aid in case of poisoning was provided by Soviet military doctors. Then, in a critical condition, he was sent to Moscow. And after the cure, he was returned to Kabul, where he was shot by order of Babrak Karmal. By that time the government had changed.

The second attempt of the cook "Misha" will be more successful. This time, he did not spare the poison for the entire team of guests. This bowl passed only Amin's security service, since she ate separately and the ubiquitous "Misha" with his ladle did not get there. On December 27, Hafizullah Amin, on the occasion of receiving information about the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, arranged a magnificent dinner. He was assured that the Soviet leadership was satisfied with the version presented about the sudden death of Taraki and the change of the country's leadership. The USSR extended a helping hand to Amin in the form of troops. The military and civilian leaders of Afghanistan were invited to dinner. However, during dinner, many guests felt unwell. Some lost consciousness. Amin also passed out. The President's wife immediately called the Central Military Hospital and the clinic of the Soviet embassy. The first to arrive were military doctors, colonel general practitioner Viktor Kuznechenkov and surgeon Anatoly Alekseev. Having determined the mass poisoning, they began resuscitation to save Hafizullah Amin, who was in a coma. They did drag the president out of the other world.

One can imagine the reaction of the chief of foreign intelligence, Vladimir Kryuchkov, to this message. And in the evening, the famous operation "Storm-333" began - the assault on Amin's palace "Taj Beck", which lasted 43 minutes. This assault entered the textbooks of the military academies of the world. For the sake of changing Amin to Karmal, the KGB special groups "Grom" - division "A", or, according to journalists, "Alpha" (30 people) and "Zenith" - "Vympel" (100 people), as well as the brainchild of military intelligence GRU - Muslim battalion "(530 people) - the 154th special forces detachment, consisting of soldiers, sergeants and officers of three nationalities: Uzbeks, Turkmens and Tajiks. Each company had an interpreter with Farsi, they were cadets of the Military Institute of Foreign Languages. But by the way, and without translators, Tajiks, Uzbeks and part of the Turkmens were fluent in Farsi, one of the main languages ​​of Afghanistan. Major Khabib Khalbaev commanded the Soviet Muslim battalion. Losses during the storming of the palace in the KGB special groups amounted to only five people. Six were killed in the “Muslim battalion.” Among the paratroopers - nine people. Military doctor Viktor Kuznechenkov, who saved Amin from poisoning, died. By a closed Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, about 400 people were awarded orders and medals. Four became Heroes of the Soviet Union. The Order of the Red Banner of War (posthumously) was awarded to Colonel Viktor Kuznechenkov.

The Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR or any other government document on the introduction of troops never appeared. All orders were given verbally. Only in June 1980, the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU approved the decision to send troops to Afghanistan. The fact of the assassination of the head of state began to be interpreted by the West as evidence of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. This strongly influenced our relations with the USA and Europe at that time. Meanwhile, the United States nevertheless sent its troops into Afghanistan and the war there has continued to this day - 35 years.

Snapshot at the opening of the article: on the Afghan border / Photo: Sergey Zhukov / TASS

| The participation of the USSR in the conflicts of the Cold War. War in Afghanistan (1979-1989)

Brief summary of the war in Afghanistan
(1979-1989)

Colonel General B.V. Gromov, the last commander of the 40th Army, in his book “Limited Contingent”, expressed the following opinion about the results of the actions of the Soviet Army in Afghanistan:

“I am deeply convinced that there are no grounds for asserting that the 40th Army was defeated, as well as that we won a military victory in Afghanistan. At the end of 1979, Soviet troops entered the country without hindrance, carried out - in contrast from the Americans in Vietnam - their tasks and returned home in an organized manner.If we consider the armed opposition detachments as the main enemy of the Limited Contingent, then the difference between us lies in the fact that the 40th Army did what it considered necessary, and the dushmans only what they could."

Until the start of the withdrawal of Soviet troops in May 1988, the Mujahideen never managed to carry out a single major operation and failed to occupy a single large city. At the same time, Gromov's opinion that the 40th Army was not faced with the task of military victory does not agree with the assessments of some other authors. In particular, Major General Yevgeny Nikitenko, who in 1985-1987 was the deputy chief of the operational department of the headquarters of the 40th army, believes that throughout the war the USSR pursued the same goals - to suppress the resistance of the armed opposition and strengthen the power of the Afghan government. Despite all efforts, the number of opposition formations only grew from year to year, and in 1986 (at the peak of the Soviet military presence), the Mujahideen controlled more than 70% of the territory of Afghanistan. According to Colonel General Viktor Merimsky, former deputy. head of the Operational Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, the leadership of Afghanistan actually lost the fight against the rebels for its people, could not stabilize the situation in the country, although it had 300,000 military units (army, police, state security).

After the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the situation on the Soviet-Afghan border became significantly more complicated: there were shelling of the territory of the USSR, attempts to penetrate the territory of the USSR (only in 1989 there were about 250 attempts to penetrate the territory of the USSR), armed attacks on Soviet border guards, mining of the Soviet territory (in the period up to May 9, 1990, border guards removed 17 mines: British Mk.3, American M-19, Italian TS-2.5 and TS-6.0).

Side losses

Afghanistan casualties

On June 7, 1988, in his speech at a meeting of the UN General Assembly, Afghan President M. Najibullah said that "from the beginning of hostilities in 1978 to the present" (that is, until 06/07/1988), 243.9 thousand people have died in the country. military personnel of government troops, security agencies, civil servants and civilians, including 208.2 thousand men, 35.7 thousand women and 20.7 thousand children under the age of 10; another 77 thousand people were injured, including 17.1 thousand women and 900 children under the age of 10 years. According to other sources, 18,000 servicemen were killed.

The exact number of Afghans killed in the war is unknown. The most common figure is 1 million dead; available estimates range from 670,000 civilians to 2 million in total. According to the researcher of the Afghan war from the USA, Professor M. Kramer: “During the nine years of the war, more than 2.7 million Afghans (mostly civilians) were killed or maimed, several million more became refugees, many of whom left the country” . Apparently, there is no exact division of victims into government army soldiers, Mujahideen and civilians.

Ahmad Shah Massoud, in his letter to the Soviet Ambassador in Afghanistan Y. Vorontsov dated September 2, 1989, wrote that the support of the PDPA by the Soviet Union led to the death of more than 1.5 million Afghans, and 5 million people became refugees.

According to UN statistics on the demographic situation in Afghanistan, between 1980 and 1990, the total mortality of the population of Afghanistan was 614,000 people. At the same time, during this period, there was a decrease in the mortality of the population of Afghanistan in comparison with previous and subsequent periods.

The result of hostilities from 1978 to 1992 was the flow of Afghan refugees to Iran and Pakistan. Sharbat Gula's photograph, featured on the cover of National Geographic magazine in 1985 under the title "Afghan Girl", has become a symbol of the Afghan conflict and the problem of refugees around the world.

The army of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in 1979-1989 suffered losses in military equipment, in particular, 362 tanks, 804 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, 120 aircraft, 169 helicopters were lost.

USSR losses

1979 86 people 1980 1484 people 1981 1298 people 1982 1948 people 1983 1448 people 1984 2343 people 1985 1868 people 1986 1333 people 1987 1215 people 1988 759 people 1989 year 53 people

Total - 13 835 people. These data first appeared in the Pravda newspaper on August 17, 1989. Subsequently, the total figure increased slightly. As of January 1, 1999, irretrievable losses in the Afghan war (killed, died from wounds, diseases and in accidents, missing) were estimated as follows:

Soviet Army - 14,427
KGB - 576 (including 514 border troops)
Ministry of Internal Affairs - 28

Total - 15,031 people.

Sanitary losses - 53,753 wounded, shell-shocked, injured; 415,932 cases. Of the sick - infectious hepatitis - 115,308 people, typhoid fever - 31,080, other infectious diseases - 140,665 people.

Out of 11,294 people 10,751 people discharged from military service for health reasons remained disabled, of which - 1st group - 672, 2nd group - 4216, 3rd group - 5863 people.

According to official statistics, during the fighting in Afghanistan, 417 servicemen were captured and went missing (130 of them were released before the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan). In the Geneva Accords of 1988, the conditions for the release of Soviet prisoners were not fixed. After the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, negotiations on the release of Soviet prisoners continued through the mediation of the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Losses in equipment, according to widely disseminated official data, amounted to 147 tanks, 1314 armored vehicles (armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, BMD, BRDM-2), 510 engineering vehicles, 11,369 trucks and fuel trucks, 433 artillery systems, 118 aircraft, 333 helicopters (helicopter losses only 40th Army, excluding helicopters of the border troops and the Central Asian Military District). At the same time, these figures were not specified in any way - in particular, information was not published on the number of combat and non-combat losses of aviation, on the losses of aircraft and helicopters by type, etc. It should be noted that the former deputy commander of the 40th Army for armaments, General Lieutenant V. S. Korolev gives other, higher figures for losses in equipment. In particular, according to him, in 1980-1989, the Soviet troops irretrievably lost 385 tanks and 2530 units of armored personnel carriers, BRDM, BMP, BMD (rounded figures).

Soviet war in Afghanistan 1979-1989

Completed by: Bukov G.E.

Introduction

Afghan war 1979-1989 - An armed conflict between the Afghan government and allied forces of the USSR, who sought to maintain a pro-communist regime in Afghanistan, on the one hand, and the Muslim Afghan resistance, on the other.

Of course, this period is not the most positive in the history of the USSR, but I wanted to open a little curtain in this war, namely, the causes and main tasks for the USSR to eliminate the military conflict in Afghanistan.

1. Reason for hostilities

The main reason for the war was foreign intervention in the Afghan domestic political crisis, which was the result of a struggle for power between the government of Afghanistan and numerous armed formations of the Afghan Mujahideen (“dushmans”), who enjoy the political and financial support of the leading NATO states and the Islamic world, on the other hand.

The internal political crisis in Afghanistan was the "April Revolution" - the events in Afghanistan on April 27, 1978, which resulted in the establishment of a Marxist pro-Soviet government in the country.

As a result of the April Revolution, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) came to power, the leader of which was in 1978. Nur Mohammad Taraki (was killed on the orders of Hafizullah Amin), and then Hafizullah Amin until December 1979, who proclaimed the country the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA).

Attempts by the country's leadership to carry out new reforms that would make it possible to overcome the backlog of Afghanistan ran into resistance from the Islamic opposition. In 1978, even before the introduction of Soviet troops, a civil war broke out in Afghanistan.

Lacking strong popular support, the new government brutally suppressed internal opposition. The unrest in the country and the strife between the supporters of Khalq and Parcham (the PDPA was divided into these two parts), taking into account geopolitical considerations (preventing the strengthening of US influence in Central Asia and protecting the Central Asian republics), pushed the Soviet leadership to enter in December 1979 troops to Afghanistan under the pretext of providing international assistance. The entry of Soviet troops into the territory of Afghanistan began on the basis of a resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, without a formal decision on this by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan

In March 1979, during a mutiny in the city of Herat, the first request from the Afghan leadership for direct Soviet military intervention followed. But the commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU for Afghanistan reported to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU about the obvious negative consequences of direct Soviet intervention, and the request was rejected.

However, the Herat rebellion forced the strengthening of Soviet troops near the Soviet-Afghan border, and by order of the Minister of Defense D.F. Ustinov, preparations began for a possible landing in Afghanistan by the landing method of the 105th Guards Airborne Division. The number of Soviet advisers (including military ones) in Afghanistan was sharply increased: from 409 in January to 4,500 by the end of June 1979.

The impetus for the intervention of the USSR was US assistance to the Mujahideen. According to the official version of history, CIA assistance to the Mujahideen began during 1980, that is, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan on December 24, 1979. But the reality, kept secret until today, is different: in fact, President Carter signed the first directive on covert assistance to opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul on July 3, 1979.

In December 1979, the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan began in three directions: Kushka - Shindand - Kandahar, Termez - Kunduz - Kabul, Khorog - Faizabad.

The directive did not provide for the participation of Soviet troops in hostilities on the territory of Afghanistan, and the procedure for using weapons even for self-defense purposes was not determined. True, already on December 27, D. F. Ustinov issued an order to suppress the resistance of the rebels in cases of attack. It was assumed that the Soviet troops would become garrisons and guard important industrial and other facilities, thereby freeing up parts of the Afghan army for active operations against opposition groups, as well as against possible external interference. The border with Afghanistan was ordered to be crossed at 15:00 Moscow time (17:00 Kabul time) on December 27, 1979. But on the morning of December 25, the 4th battalion of the 56th Guards Airborne Assault Brigade crossed over the pontoon bridge over the Amu Darya border river, which was tasked with capturing the Salang high mountain pass on the Termez-Kabul road to ensure unhindered passage of Soviet troops. On the same day, the transfer of units of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division to the airfields of Kabul and Bagram began. Paratroopers of the 350th Guards Airborne Regiment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel G.I. were the first to land on the Kabul airfield. Shpak.

The troops landed at the airfields of Kabul, Bagram, Kandahar. Entering troops is not easy; During the capture of the presidential palace in Kabul, Afghan President Hafizullah Amin was killed. The Muslim population did not accept the Soviet presence, and an uprising broke out in the northeastern provinces, spreading throughout the country.

Operation STORM-333

The general plan of the operation in Kabul, carried out on December 27, was developed by the dishonest efforts of representatives of the Ministry of Defense and the KGB of the USSR, headed by Major Y. Semenov. The plan of the operation, which received the code name "Baikal-79", provided for the capture of the most important objects in the Afghan capital: the Taj-Bek Palace, the buildings of the Central Committee of the PDPA, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Communications of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, the General Staff, the headquarters of the military air forces and the headquarters of the Central Army Corps, military counterintelligence (KAM), a prison for political prisoners in Puli-Charkhi, a radio and television center, a post office and a telegraph office, an air force and air defense headquarters ... At the same time, it was planned to block the military units and formations of the Armed Forces located in the Afghan capital DRA forces of paratroopers of motorized rifle troops arriving in Kabul. In total, 17 objects were to be captured. Appropriate forces and means were assigned to each object, the order of interaction and control was determined.

In fact, by the beginning of the operation in Kabul there were special units of the KGB of the USSR ("Thunder" - a little more than 30 people, "Zenith" - 150 people, a company of border guards - 50 people), as well as quite significant forces from the USSR Ministry of Defense: air airborne division, 154th special-purpose detachment of the GRU General Staff (“Muslim” battalion), units of the 345th separate airborne regiment, military advisers (a total of more than 10 thousand people). All of them performed their tasks, worked for the final result of the operation.

The most difficult and important object to capture was the Taj Beck Palace, where the residence of H. Amin was located and he himself was located. Of all the officers and soldiers who took part in the storming of the Taj Beck Palace, almost no one fully knew the plan of the operation and did not own the general situation, and each acted in his own narrow area, in fact, in the role of a simple fighter.

Therefore, for most of them, the events in Kabul focused only on their object, and for many fighters, the operation is still a mystery. For most of them, it was a "baptism of fire" - the first real battle in their lives. Hence the overlap of emotions in the memories, the "thickening" of colors. Finding themselves in an extreme situation, each of them showed what he was worth and what he had achieved. The vast majority honorably completed their combat mission showing heroism and courage. Many officers and soldiers were wounded, some died.

On the evening of December 25, General Drozdov, based on the results of reconnaissance of objects, held a meeting with the commanders of reconnaissance and sabotage groups of the KGB of the USSR, determined the place of each in mastering the Taj Beck. Everyone was ready, the situation was missing only the plan of the palace.

The officers of "Thunder" and "Zenith" M. Romanov, Y. Semenov, V. Fedoseev and E. Mazaev carried out reconnaissance of the area, reconnaissance of firing points located nearby. Not far from the palace, on a high-rise, there was a restaurant (casino), where the highest officers of the Afghan army usually gathered. Under the pretext that it is required to order places for our officers to celebrate the New Year, the commandos also visited there. From there, the Taj Beck was visible at a glance, all the approaches to it and the location of the storage posts were clearly visible. True, this initiative almost ended tragically for them.

By the beginning of Operation Storm-333, special forces from the KGB groups of the USSR thoroughly knew the object of capturing Hadj-Bek: the most convenient approach routes; sentry mode services; the total number of guards and bodyguards of Amin; the location of machine-gun "nests", armored vehicles and tanks; the internal structure of the rooms of the labyrinths of the palace; placement of radiotelephone communication equipment.

The signals for the start of the general operation "Baikal-79" were supposed to be a powerful explosion in the center of Kabul. The special group of the KGB of the USSR "Zenith" headed by B.A. Pleshkunov was supposed to blow up the so-called "well" - in fact, a neutral node for secret communications with the most important military and civilian facilities of the DRA.

Assault ladders, equipment, weapons and ammunition were being prepared. Under the leadership of the deputy battalion commander for the technical part, senior lieutenant Eduard Ibragimov, Glaznoye's military equipment was carefully checked and prepared - secrecy and secrecy.

The Taj Beck Palace was located on a high, steep hill overgrown with trees and shrubs, all approaches to it were mined. There was only one road, guarded around the clock. The palace itself was also an inaccessible structure. Its thick walls are able to hold back an artillery strike. If we add to this that the area around was shot through from tanks and heavy machine guns, it becomes clear that it was very difficult to master it.

At about six o'clock in the evening, Kolesnik was called by Colonel General Magomedov and said, "Due to unforeseen circumstances, the time of the assault has been postponed, it is necessary to start as soon as possible" and the operation began ahead of schedule. Literally fifteen or twenty minutes later, the capture group, led by Captain M. Sakhatov, drove off in the direction of the height where the tanks were buried. Among them were two officers of "Thunder" and "Zenith", as well as the head of intelligence of the battalion, Senior Lieutenant A. Jamolov. The tanks were guarded by sentries, and their crews were in the barracks, located at a distance of 150-200 meters from them.

When the car of M. Sakhatov's group drove up to the location of the third battalion, they suddenly heard shooting, which suddenly intensified. Colonel Kolesnik for soldiers and officers of the "Muslim" battalion and special groups of the KGB of the USSR immediately put the command "Fire!" and "Forward!" Red rockets flew into the air. It was 19:15 on the clock. The signal "Storm-333" was sent over the radio networks.

First, on the command of Senior Lieutenant Vasily Praut, two self-propelled anti-aircraft guns ZSU-23-4 "Shilki" opened fire on the palace, bringing down a sea of ​​​​shells on it. Two other installations hit the location of the infantry battalion, supporting a company of paratroopers. Automatic grenade launchers AGS-17 began to fire at the location of the tank battalion, preventing the crews from approaching the vehicles.

Subdivisions of the "Muslim" battalion began to advance to the areas of destination. The 3rd company of senior lieutenant Vladimir Sharipov was supposed to advance to the Taj-bek palace, on its five infantry fighting vehicles, several subgroups of special forces officers from Grom were stationed along with the soldiers Major Ya. Semenov with the Zenit group on four armored personnel carriers of the platoon The 1st company of Lieutenant Rustam Tursunkulov was supposed to advance to the western part of the hill. Then, on a pedestrian staircase, jump up to the end of the Taj Beck, and at the facade of the building, both groups were to connect and act together. But at the last moment everything was mixed up. As soon as the first armored personnel carrier passed the turn and drove up to the stairs leading to the end of the Taj Beck, heavy machine guns fired from the building. The armored personnel carrier, where there was a subgroup of Boris Suvorov, was immediately knocked out, it caught fire. The personnel immediately began to parachute, some were injured. The commander of the subgroup himself was hit in the groin, just below the bulletproof vest. It was not possible to save him - he bled to death. Having jumped out of the armored personnel carriers, the "Zenit" and the soldiers of Tursunkulov's platoon were forced to lie down and shoot at the windows of the palace, with the help of assault ladders they began to climb up the mountain.

At this time, the subgroups of "Thunder" also began to advance towards the Taj Beck.

When the machine gunners of the group jumped out onto the platform in front of the Taj Beck, they came under heavy fire from heavy machine guns. It seemed like they were shooting from everywhere. Grom employees rushed to the palace building, and the soldiers of Sharipov's company lay down and began to cover them with machine gun and machine gun fire, as well as repel the attack of Afghan soldiers in the guardroom. The commander of the platoon, Lieutenant Abdullayev, supervised their actions. Something unimaginable happened. Hell picture. "Shilki" after all "beautifully" shoot. Everything was mixed up. But everyone acted in unison, there was not a single one who would try to evade or sit in a shelter, waiting out the assault. The number of assault groups was dwindling before our eyes. With incredible efforts, the special forces still managed to overcome the resistance of the Afghans and break through to the palace building. The fighters of the “Muslim” battalion rendered them great help in this. All groups and fighters mixed up, and everyone was already acting on their own. There was no single team. The only goal was to run faster to the walls of the palace, somehow hide behind them and complete the task. The commandos were in a foreign country, in a foreign uniform, without documents, without any identification marks, except for white bandages on their sleeves, there was nothing. The density of fire was such that the triplexes on all BMPs were broken, the bulwarks were pierced on every square centimeter, that is, they looked like a colander. The special forces were saved only by the fact that they were all in bulletproof vests, although almost all of them were wounded. The soldiers from the "Muslim" battalion were without bulletproof vests, as at the command of Koslesnik they handed over their bulletproof vests to the fighters of the assault groups. Of the thirty "Zenit" and twenty-two fighters from the "Thunder" in the Taj Beck, no more than twenty-five people managed to break through, and many of them were injured. These forces were clearly not enough to guarantee the elimination of Amin. According to Alexander Ivashchenko, who was next to Colonel Boyarinov during the battle, when they broke into the palace and met the stubborn resistance of the guards, they realized that they could not complete the task with small forces. By the time the special forces entered the Shilki palace, they were supposed to cease fire, but contact with them was lost. Colonel V. Kolesnik sent a messenger, and “Shilki transferred the fire to other objects. The infantry fighting vehicles left the area in front of the palace, blocking the only road. Another company and a platoon of AGS-17 grenade launchers and ATGMs fired at the tank battalion, then the soldiers captured the tanks, disarming the tankers at the same time. The special group of the "Muslim" battalion took possession of the weapons of the anti-aircraft regiment, and captured its personnel. In the palace, officers and soldiers of Amin's personal guard, his bodyguards (about 100-150 people) resisted staunchly, not surrendering. They were killed by the fact that they were all armed mainly with MG-5 submachine guns, and they did not penetrate our body armor.

"Shilki" again shifted the fire, starting to hit the Taj-Bek, on the site in front of him. A fire broke out on the second floor of the palace, which had a strong impact on the defending guards. As the special forces moved to the second floor, the shooting and explosions intensified. The soldiers from Amin's guard, who mistook the commandos for their own rebellious unit, heard Russian speech and surrendered to them. There were lights everywhere in the palace. All attempts by Nikolai Shvachko to turn it off ended in vain. The power supply was autonomous. Somewhere in the depths of the building, perhaps in the basement, electric generators were working, but there was no time to look for them. Some fighters fired at the light bulbs in order to somehow hide, because they were in full view of the defenders of the palace. By the end of the assault, only a few of the anti-aircraft devices remained intact, but they were on fire. The battle in the palace did not last long (43 minutes). Having received information about the death of Amin, the company commander, Senior Lieutenant V. Sharipov, also began to call Colonel V. Kolesnik on the radio station to report on the completion of the task, but there was no connection. He nevertheless managed to contact the battalion's chief of staff, Ashurov, and allegorically report that Amin had been killed. The chief of staff informed the battalion commander Major Khalbaev and Colonel Kolesnik about this. Major Khalbaev reported on the capture of the palace and the liquidation of Amin to Lieutenant General N.N. Guskov, and he - to the Chief of the General Staff Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov. After Assadul Sarvari, who arrived at the palace (he did not participate in the assault), was convinced and confirmed that Amin was really dead, the corpse of the head of state and the leader of the PDPA was wrapped in a carpet ... The main task was completed. Success in this operation was ensured not so much by strength as by surprise, audacity and swiftness of pressure. Immediately after the capture of the Taj-Bek, Drozdov reported to Ivanov on the completion of the task, and then handed over the radio station to Evald Kozlov and ordered the results of the battle to be reported to the leadership. When Kozlov, who had not yet retired from the battle, began to report to General Ivanov, he interrupted him with the question “What oak ? Ewald began to choose words to covertly say about the death of Amin, but Ivanov again asked: "Is he killed?" Kozlov replied: "Yes, he was killed." And the general immediately interrupted the connection. Yu.V. had to be urgently reported to Moscow. Andropov about the fulfillment of the main task, and a group of captain M. Sakhatov arrived at the palace building in two tanks captured from the Afghans. He reported to Kolesnik about the accomplishment of the combat mission, said: when they drove past the third battalion of the security brigade, they saw that an alarm had been declared there. Afghan soldiers received ammunition. The battalion commander and two more officers were standing next to the road along which the special forces were passing. The decision came quickly. Having jumped out of the car, they captured the Afghan battalion commander and both officers, threw them into the car, and drove on. Some of the soldiers, who managed to get the cartridges, opened fire on them. Then the whole battalion rushed in pursuit - to free their commander. Then the commandos dismounted, began to shoot from machine guns and machine guns at the fleeing infantry. The fighters of Kurban Amangeldiyev's company, which provided the actions of the Sakhatov group, also opened fire. During the night, the special forces guarded the palace, as they feared that the divisions stationed in Kabul and the tank brigade would storm it. But this did not happen. Soviet military advisers who worked in parts of the Afghan army, and parts of the airborne troops deployed to the capital, did not allow them to do this. In addition, the special services paralyzed the control of the Afghan forces in advance. Some units of the Afghan Guard Brigade continued to resist. In particular, they had to fight with the remnants of the third battalion for another day, after which the Afghans went to the mountains. Probably, some of the compatriots also suffered from their own: in the dark, the personnel of the "Muslim" battalion and the special group of the KGB of the USSR recognized each other by white bandages on their sleeves, the password "Misha - Yasha" and by obscene language. But after all, everyone was dressed in Afghan uniforms, and they had to shoot and throw grenades from a decent distance. So try to keep track here in the dark, confusion - who has a bandage on his sleeve, and who does not ?! Moreover, when they began to withdraw the captured Afghans, they also had white armbands on their sleeves. After the battle, the losses were counted. In total, five people died in the special groups of the KGB of the USSR during the storming of the palace. Almost everyone was wounded, but those who could hold weapons in their hands continued to fight. In the "Muslim" battalion and the 9th airborne company, 14 people were killed, more than 50 were injured. Moreover, 23 people who were injured remained in the ranks. The seriously wounded soldiers of the battalion were taken to the BMP, first to the first-aid post, and then to various medical institutions deployed at that time in Kabul. In the evening, the seriously wounded were transported to the Soviet embassy, ​​and in the morning of the next day they were sent by plane to Tashkent. On the same day, December 27, the airborne units of the 103rd division and units of the 345th regiment, as well as the forces allocated to help them from the border guards, the KGB groups of the USSR "Zenith" and "Thunder" went to the location of military units and formations , important administrative and special facilities in the capital and established their control over them. The capture of these key objects was organized, with minimal losses.

The course of the war

The Soviet command expected to entrust the suppression of the uprising to the Kabul troops, which, however, were greatly weakened by mass desertion and failed to cope with this task. A "limited contingent" controlled the situation in the main cities for a number of years, while the rebels felt relatively free in the countryside. Changing tactics, the Soviet troops tried to crack down on the rebels with tanks, helicopters and planes, but the highly mobile Mujahideen groups easily avoided attacks. The bombing of settlements and the destruction of crops also failed, but by 1982, about 4 million Afghans fled to Pakistan and Iran. The supply of weapons from other countries allowed the partisans to hold out until 1989, when the new Soviet leadership withdrew troops from Afghanistan.

The stay of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and their combat activities are conditionally divided into four stages: stage: December 1979 - February 1980. The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, placing them in garrisons, organizing the protection of deployment points and various objects. stage: March 1980 - April 1985 Conducting active hostilities, including large-scale ones, together with Afghan formations and units. Work on the reorganization and strengthening of the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. stage: May 1985 - December 1986. The transition from active hostilities mainly to supporting the actions of the Afghan troops with Soviet aviation, artillery and sapper units. Special Forces units fought to prevent the delivery of weapons and ammunition from abroad. The withdrawal of 6 Soviet regiments to their homeland took place. Stage: January 1987 - February 1989 Participation of Soviet troops in the Afghan leadership's policy of national reconciliation. Continued support for the combat activities of Afghan troops. Preparation of Soviet troops for their return to their homeland and the implementation of their complete withdrawal.

afghanistan war soviet contingent

5. The withdrawal of Soviet wars from Afghanistan

Changes in the foreign policy of the Soviet leadership during the period of "perestroika" contributed to the political settlement of the situation. The situation in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Western forecasts that the Kabul regime would fall immediately after the end of the Soviet military presence due to its complete unviability, and the coalition government of the Mujahideen groups would lead the country to peace after the "communist plague" was expelled, turned out to be untenable. On April 14, 1988, with the mediation of the UN in Switzerland, the USSR, the USA, Pakistan and Afghanistan signed the Geneva Accords on a phased peaceful solution of the Afghan problem. The Soviet government undertook to withdraw troops from Afghanistan by February 15, 1989. The US and Pakistan, for their part, had to stop supporting the Mujahideen.

In accordance with the agreements, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan began on May 15, 1988. On February 15, 1989, Soviet troops were completely withdrawn from Afghanistan. The withdrawal of the troops of the 40th Army was led by the last commander of the limited contingent, Lieutenant General Boris Gromov. This event did not bring peace, as the various factions of the Mujahideen continued to fight for power among themselves.

According to updated official data, the irretrievable losses of the personnel of the Soviet army in the Afghan war amounted to 14,427 people, the KGB - 576 people, the Ministry of Internal Affairs - 28 people dead and missing. During the war, there were 49,984 wounded, 312 prisoners, and 18 internees. Injuries and contusions were received by St. 53 thousand people. A significant number of people who were admitted to hospitals on the territory of the USSR died from the consequences of severe wounds and injuries. These persons, who died in hospitals, were not among the officially announced casualties. The exact number of Afghans killed in the war is unknown. Available estimates range from 1 to 2 million people.

Consequences of the war

After the withdrawal of the Soviet army from the territory of Afghanistan, the pro-Soviet regime of Najibullah (1986-1992) existed for another 3 years and, having lost the support of Russia, was overthrown in April 1992 by a coalition of Mujahideen field commanders. During the war years, the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda appeared in Afghanistan and groups of Islamic radicals became stronger.

Political implications:

In general, Soviet troops did not experience any particular difficulties in conducting military operations on the territory of Afghanistan - the main problem was that military victories were not supported by the political and economic actions of the ruling regime. Assessing the consequences of the Afghan war, it can be noted that the benefits of the intervention turned out to be negligible in comparison with the damage inflicted on the national interests of the USSR and Russia. The intervention of Soviet troops in Afghanistan provoked sharp condemnation from most of the international community (including the United States, China, member countries of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, including Pakistan and Iran, and even some socialist countries), weakened the influence of the USSR on the Non-Aligned Movement, marked the end of the "era of detente The 1970s led to increased economic and technological pressure on the USSR from the West and even to some extent exacerbated the crisis in the USSR itself.

The war in Afghanistan led to numerous casualties, squandered huge material resources, destabilized the situation in Central Asia, contributed to the strengthening of Islam in politics, the intensification of Islamic fundamentalism and international terrorism. In fact, this war was one of the factors behind the defeat of the Soviet Union in the Cold War. If we talk about a lesson, then the Afghan people really taught us a lesson of courage and valor in the struggle for their age-old traditions, culture, religion, and Motherland. And every valor should be glorified and admired even by the enemy. The main conclusion drawn from the Afghan war is that fundamentally political problems cannot be solved by military means.

Information sources

1. ru.wikipedia.org - article "Afghan war 1979-1989" in Wikipedia;

History.org.ua - article "The Afghan War 1979-1989" in the Encyclopedia of the History of Ukraine (Ukrainian);

Mirslovarei.com - article "Afghan War" in the Historical Dictionary on the site "World of Dictionaries";

Rian.ru - "War in Afghanistan 1979-1989" (RIAN reference);

Rian.ru - "Statistics of the losses of the Soviet Army in Afghanistan do not include those who died from wounds in hospitals in the USSR" (RIAN report).

Alexander Lyakhovsky - The tragedy and valor of Afghanistan

Psi.ece.jhu.edu - secret documents of the Politburo and the Central Committee of the CPSU related to the entry of Soviet troops and their stay in Afghanistan;

Ruswar.com - archive of military photography and video chronicles;

Fergananews.com - "The full truth about the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan has not yet been revealed" (B. Yamshanov).

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About the author: Nikita Mendkovich is an expert at the Center for the Study of Modern Afghanistan (CISA).

The problems of armed confrontation in Afghanistan are still actively discussed in the scientific literature. In particular, losses in the armed confrontation involving Soviet troops from December 25, 1979 to February 15, 1989 are still a subject of discussion. The following text is an attempt to review estimates of existing data on the losses of the parties to the conflict.

To begin with, it can be stated that the statistics of the losses of Soviet troops fighting on the side of the Kabul government are somewhat better. The level of initial accounting for losses was quite high: this was facilitated by the order in the armed forces of the USSR, the norms for accounting for the movement and loss of personnel. In addition, despite the political changes that have affected the post-Soviet space, the level of preservation of military archives is relatively good, which allowed specialists from the Ministry of Defense to accurately assess the losses of the past war.

In total, 620,000 military personnel, including 525,500 soldiers and officers of the Soviet Army, 21,000 civil servants, 95,000 representatives of the KGB (including border troops), internal troops and militia, completed military service in the troops stationed in Afghanistan during the period.

The total number of deaths during the period of more than nine years of military presence amounted to 15,051 people, of which 14,427 members of the armed forces, who died as a result of combat wounds, as well as from accidents and diseases. The percentage of combat losses is 82.5%. The number of irretrievable combat and non-combat losses includes both those who died in hospitals and those who died from the consequences of illnesses after their dismissal from the armed forces. Therefore, apparently, these data on the dead are almost complete, and the higher estimates found in Western literature should be disregarded: the statistics presented here do not include only people who died before being discharged from the army while being treated in hospitals outside the territory of the DRA.

The statistics of irretrievable losses also do not include 417 people who went missing or were captured during the hostilities. As of 1999, 287 people had not been returned to their homeland.

Significant harm to the Soviet group was also caused by the so-called. sanitary losses, including persons who dropped out of the war for health reasons. They include both the wounded during the period of hostilities and those who fell ill for reasons not related to wounds and concussions. For the Afghan war, the level of losses associated with "non-combat" factors was extremely high: they accounted for 89% of sanitary losses.

According to American researchers in the 1990s, 56.6% of non-combat losses were due to infectious diseases, 15.1% to domestic injuries, 9.9% to dermatological diseases, and 4.1% to lung diseases. According to Grau and Jorgensen, throughout the war, up to 1/4 of the personnel of the Soviet Army grouping was unfit for combat. As the authors write: “In October-December 1981, the entire 5th motorized rifle division became incapacitated when more than 3 thousand people fell ill with hepatitis at the same time.” Apparently, the high incidence is associated with a lack of clean drinking water, interruptions in the supply of new clothes, which created problems with washing uniforms, atypical for European Russia, where most of the fighters came from, infectious diseases. Due to the radical climate change, almost all the new fighters who arrived in the country after a certain time developed symptoms of indigestion. There were frequent cases of dysentery, hepatitis and typhoid fever.

In total, during the presence of the armed forces in the country, 466,000 servicemen sought medical help. Of these, due to illness, 11,284 people were dismissed from the armed forces, of which 10,751 people received a disability.

The highest irretrievable losses of the Soviet Army refer to the period from March 1980 to April 1985. It is to this time that the highest average monthly irretrievable losses also belong. The highest average monthly sanitary losses (and, apparently, the peak of morbidity) refer to May 1985 - December 1986.

The situation with the losses of the DRA armed forces, anti-government armed formations and civilians is more complicated. The losses of the armed forces subordinate to Kabul are known according to A.A. Lyakhovsky and amounted from 1979 to 1988: 26,595 people - irretrievable combat losses, 28,002 - missing, 285,541 - deserters. The abnormally high level of desertion is reflected in many memoirs and is explained by the chaotic mobilization policy of the DRA government and the low level of ideological work among the personnel. The peak of combat irretrievable losses occurred in 1981, when the Afghan armed forces lost 6,721 people killed. The peaks of losses from desertion (more than 30 thousand people a year) occurred in 1982 and 1988.

On the one hand, this level of losses is much higher than that of the Soviet side, which indicates a greater involvement in hostilities, but it is important to take into account the difference in technical equipment and the quantity and quality of work of medical personnel, which led to large lethal losses.

With regard to the losses of "mujahideen" and the civilian population, the situation is even more complicated. Accurate statistics are almost non-existent. During the period from 1980 to 1990, the UN registered 640,000 deaths of the inhabitants of Afghanistan, of which 327,000 people were accounted for by the male population of the country. However, these data are obviously incomplete and can only be considered the lower limit of population losses.

First of all, the question of the number of opposition detachments is confused. The most common estimate in the literature is from 20 to 50 thousand people of a permanent composition, and 70-350 thousand people who participated in their activities on an irregular basis. Crile's assessment seems to be the most substantiated, citing the memoirs of CIA officers, who claimed that the United States financed detachments of approximately 150,000 fighters out of 400,000 operating in the country.

How many of them died? The author did not find any reliable estimates in the literature on military history. Their appearance seems unlikely, if only because of the problems of identifying the affiliation of "irregular Mujahideen", documenting the current losses of individual detachments and centralized accounting of these data, which was hardly carried out at all during the war.

Apparently, the losses of the opposition detachments can only be taken into account in the total mass of the population, the estimates of the losses of which vary greatly. So, as of 1987, in Afghanistan, according to USAID, 875 thousand people died, according to the Gallup study - 1.2 million people. The highest estimate of the total irretrievable losses of the population found in the literature is 1.5-2 million people, but the author considers them too high. The number of refugees is traditionally estimated at 5.7 million people in 1987 and 6.2 million in 1990 in Pakistan, Iran and some other states. However, it is important to note that a significant part of the persons registered as "refugees" were Afghan migrant workers who sought to legalize themselves abroad in this way and hoped to receive humanitarian assistance. Their numbers were also large in the pre-war period, so in the early 1970s, up to 1 million people left Afghanistan in search of work. Therefore, it is not easy to estimate the real percentage of those who were forced to leave Afghanistan during the war.

The given data on the number of parties and losses in the 1979-1989 conflict may be incomplete, however, in the author's opinion, they are at least well-reasoned, in contrast to a number of clearly overestimated estimates that are used in political speculations around the history of this war.

Of course, any military losses, especially those of the irresponsible participants in the conflict, and the population living in the territory where it unfolded, are terrible and cannot be justified from the point of view of simple ethics, and the war itself cannot be justified as the most terrible manifestation of human violence against man. However, as can be seen from today's events, the level of development of society and international relations still does not exclude the use of this tool to resolve conflicts between states. And that means new losses and new human tragedies.

1. Hereinafter, the statistics of Soviet losses are given according to: Russia in the wars of the 20th century. Losses of the armed forces. Under the general editorship of G. F. Krivosheev. Moscow: Olma-Press, 2001.
2. Message from the professor of the Department of Thermal Injuries of the Military Medical Academy of St. Petersburg Vladimir Sidelnikov // RIA Novosti, February 15, 2007.
3. L. W. Grau, W. A. ​​Jorgensen Medical support in counter-guerrilla war: epidemiologic lesson learned in Soviet-Afghan war
4. A. A. Lyakhovsky The tragedy and valor of Afghanistan
5. United Nations Statistics Division
6. J. B. Amstutz Afghanistan. The first five ears of soviet occupation. Washington D.C., 1986. P. 155-156.
7. D. Crile Charlie Wilson's War. Translation from English by K. Saveliev. M., 2008. S. 205.
8. D. C. Isby War in a Distant Country: Afghanistan, Invasion and Resistance. London, 1989.
9. M. F. Slinkin Afghanistan: pages of history (80-90s of the XX century). Simferopol, 2003. S. 119-120.

Twenty-six years have already passed since the last Soviet soldier left the territory of Afghanistan. But many participants in those long-standing events have left a spiritual wound that still aches and hurts. How many of our Soviet children, still very young boys, died in the Afghan war! How many mothers shed tears at zinc coffins! How much blood of innocent people has been shed! And all human grief lies in one small word - "war" ...

How many people died in the Afghan war?

According to official data, about 15 thousand Soviet soldiers did not return home to the USSR from Afghanistan. So far, 273 people are listed as missing. More than 53 thousand soldiers were wounded and shell-shocked. The losses in the Afghan war for our country are colossal. Many veterans believe that the Soviet leadership made a big mistake by getting involved in this conflict. How many lives could have been saved if their decision had been different.

Until now, disputes have not ceased on the topic of how many people died in the Afghan war. After all, the official figure does not take into account the pilots who died in the sky, who were transporting cargo, soldiers returning home and came under fire, nurses and nurses who cared for the wounded.

Afghan war 1979-1989

On December 12, 1979, at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, it was decided to send Russian troops to Afghanistan. They were located on the territory of the country since December 25, 1979 and were supporters of the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Troops were brought in to prevent the threat of military intervention from other states. The decision to help Afghanistan from the USSR was made after numerous requests from the leadership of the republic.

The conflict broke out between the opposition (dushmans, or Mujahideen) and the armed forces of the government of Afghanistan. The parties could not share political control over the territory of the republic. A number of European countries, Pakistani intelligence services and the US military provided support to the Mujahideen during the hostilities. They also provided them with the supply of ammunition.

The entry of Soviet troops was carried out in three directions: Khorog - Faizabad, Kushka - Shindad - Kandahar and Termez - Kunduz - Kabul. The airfields of Kandahar, Bagram and Kabul received Russian troops.

Main stages of the war

On December 12, after coordinating his actions with the commission of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Brezhnev decided to provide military assistance to Afghanistan. On December 25, 1979, at 15:00 Moscow time, the entry of our troops into the republic began. It should be noted that the role of the USSR in the Afghan war is enormous, since Soviet units provided all possible support to the Afghan army.

The main reasons for the failures of the Russian army

At the beginning of the war, luck was on the side of the Soviet troops, proof of this is the operation in Panjshir. The main misfortune for our units was the moment when Stinger missiles were delivered to the Mujahideen, which easily hit the target from a considerable distance. The Soviet military did not have the equipment capable of hitting these missiles in flight. As a result of the use of the Stinger by the Mujahideen, several of our military and transport aircraft were shot down. The situation changed only when the Russian army managed to get a few missiles in their hands.

Change of power

In March 1985, power in the USSR changed, the post of president passed to M. S. Gorbachev. His appointment significantly changed the situation in Afghanistan. The question immediately arose of the Soviet troops leaving the country in the near future, and some steps were even taken to implement this.

A change of power also took place in Afghanistan: B. Karmal was replaced by M. Najibullah. The gradual withdrawal of Soviet units began. But even after that, the struggle between the Republicans and Islamists did not stop and continues to this day. However, for the USSR, the history of the Afghan war ended there.

The main reasons for the outbreak of hostilities in Afghanistan

The situation in Afghanistan has never been considered calm due to the fact that the republic is located in a geopolitical region. The main rivals who wanted to have influence in this country were at one time the Russian Empire and Great Britain. In 1919, the Afghan authorities declared independence from England. Russia, in turn, was one of the first to recognize the new country.

In 1978, Afghanistan received the status of a democratic republic, after which new reforms followed, but not everyone wanted to accept them. This is how the conflict between the Islamists and the Republicans developed, which as a result led to a civil war. When the leadership of the republic realized that they could not cope on their own, they began to ask for help from their ally - the USSR. After some hesitation, the Soviet Union decided to send its troops to Afghanistan.

Book of Memory

Farther and farther away from us is the day when the last units of the USSR left the lands of Afghanistan. This war left a deep, indelible mark, covered in blood, in the history of our country. Thousands of young people who had not yet had time to see the life of the guys did not return home. How scary and painful to remember. What were all these sacrifices for?

Hundreds of thousands of Afghan soldiers went through serious trials in this war, and not only did not break, but also showed such qualities as courage, heroism, devotion and love for the Motherland. Their fighting spirit was unshakable, and they went through this cruel war with dignity. Many were wounded and treated in military hospitals, but the main wounds that remained in the soul and are still bleeding cannot be cured by even the most experienced doctor. Before the eyes of these people, their comrades bled and died, dying a painful death from wounds. The Afghan soldiers have only the eternal memory of their dead friends.

The Book of Memory of the Afghan War has been created in Russia. It immortalizes the names of the heroes who fell on the territory of the republic. In each region there are separate Books of Memory of the soldiers who served in Afghanistan, in which the names of the heroes who died in the Afghan war are entered by name. The pictures from which young handsome guys look at us make the heart shrink from pain. After all, none of these boys are already alive. “In vain, the old woman is waiting for her son to go home ...”, - these words have been etched into the memory of every Russian since the Second World War and make the heart shrink. So let the eternal memory of the heroes of the Afghan war remain, which will be refreshed by these truly sacred Books of Memory.

The outcome of the Afghan war for the people is not the result that the state has achieved to resolve the conflict, but the number of human casualties, which is in the thousands.