20. Civil war in Russia. The history of homeland

20. Russian Civil War

The first historiographers of the civil war were its participants. A civil war inevitably divides people into “us” and “them”. A kind of barricade lay both in understanding and in explaining the causes, nature and course of the civil war. Day by day we understand more and more that only an objective view of the civil war on both sides will make it possible to approach historical truth. But at a time when the civil war was not history, but reality, it was looked at differently.

Recently (80-90s) the following problems of the history of the civil war have been at the center of scientific discussions: the causes of the civil war; classes and political parties in the civil war; white and red terror; ideology and social essence of “war communism”. We will try to highlight some of these issues.

An inevitable companion of almost every revolution is armed clashes. Researchers have two approaches to this problem. Some consider civil war as a process of armed struggle between citizens of one country, between different parts of society, while others see civil war as only a period in the history of a country when armed conflicts determine its entire life.

As for modern armed conflicts, social, political, economic, national and religious reasons are closely intertwined in their occurrence. Pure conflicts, where there would be only one of them, are rare. Conflicts predominate, where there are many such reasons, but one dominates.

20.1. Causes and the beginning of the civil war in Russia

The dominant feature of the armed struggle in Russia in 1917-1922. there was a socio-political confrontation. But the civil war of 1917-1922. cannot be understood from the class side alone. It was a tightly woven ball of social, political, national, religious, personal interests and contradictions.

How did the civil war in Russia start? According to Pitirim Sorokin, usually the fall of a regime is not so much the result of the efforts of the revolutionaries, but rather the decrepitude, impotence and inability of the regime itself to carry out creative work. To prevent a revolution, the government must make certain reforms that would remove social tension. Neither the government of Imperial Russia nor the Provisional Government found the strength to carry out reforms. And since the escalation of events required action, they were expressed in attempts at armed violence against the people in February 1917. Civil wars do not begin in an atmosphere of social peace. The law of all revolutions is such that after the overthrow of the ruling classes, their striving and attempts to restore their position are inevitable, while the classes that have come to power try by all means to preserve it. There is a connection between revolution and civil war, in the conditions of our country the latter after October 1917 was almost inevitable. The causes of the civil war are the extreme intensification of class hatred, the exhausting First World War. The deep roots of the civil war must also be seen in the character of the October Revolution, which proclaimed the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The dissolution of the Constituent Assembly stimulated the unleashing of the civil war. The all-Russian power was usurped, and in a society already split, torn apart by the revolution, the ideas of the Constituent Assembly, the parliament could no longer find understanding.

It should also be recognized that the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk offended the patriotic feelings of the broad sections of the population, primarily the officers and the intelligentsia. It was after the conclusion of peace in Brest that the White Guard volunteer armies began to actively form.

The political and economic crisis in Russia was accompanied by a crisis of national relations. The white and red governments were forced to fight for the return of the lost territories: Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia in 1918-1919; Poland, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia and Central Asia in 1920-1922 The Russian Civil War went through several phases. If we consider the civil war in Russia as a process, then it becomes

it is clear that its first act was the events in Petrograd at the end of February 1917. In the same series, there are armed clashes on the streets of the capital in April and July, the Kornilov uprising in August, the peasant uprising in September, the October events in Petrograd, Moscow and a number of others places.

After the abdication of the emperor, the country was seized by the euphoria of the “red-bow” unity. Despite all this, February marked the beginning of an immeasurably deeper upheaval, as well as an escalation of violence. In Petrograd and other areas, the persecution of officers began. Admirals Nepenin, Butakov, Viren, General Stronsky and other officers were killed in the Baltic Fleet. Already in the first days of the February Revolution, the anger that arose in people's souls spilled onto the streets. So, February marked the beginning of the civil war in Russia,

By the beginning of 1918, this stage had largely exhausted itself. It was precisely this position that the Socialist-Revolutionary leader V. Chernov stated when, speaking at the Constituent Assembly on January 5, 1918, he expressed hope for an early end to the civil war. It seemed to many that a turbulent period was being replaced by a more peaceful one. However, contrary to these expectations, new centers of struggle continued to emerge, and from the middle of 1918 the next period of the civil war began, ending only in November 1920 with the defeat of the army of P.N. Wrangel. However, the civil war continued after that. Its episodes were the Kronstadt uprising of the sailors and Antonovshchina in 1921, military operations in the Far East, which ended in 1922, Basmachism in Central Asia, which was mostly liquidated by 1926.

20.2. White and red movement. Red and white terror

At present, we have come to understand that a civil war is a fratricidal war. However, the question of what forces opposed each other in this struggle is still controversial.

The question of the class structure and the main class forces in Russia during the civil war is quite complicated and needs serious research. The fact is that in Russia classes and social strata, their relationships were intertwined in the most complex way. Nevertheless, in our opinion, there were three major forces in the country that differed in relation to the new government.

The Soviet government was actively supported by part of the industrial proletariat, the urban and rural poor, some of the officers and the intelligentsia. In 1917, the Bolshevik Party emerged as a freely organized, radical, revolutionary party of workers-oriented intellectuals. By mid-1918 it had become a minority party, ready to ensure its survival through mass terror. By this time, the Bolshevik Party was no longer a political party in the sense in which it used to be, since it no longer expressed the interests of any social group, it recruited its members from many social groups. Former soldiers, peasants or officials, having become communists, represented a new social group with their own rights. The Communist Party has become a military-industrial and administrative apparatus.

The effect of the civil war on the Bolshevik Party was twofold. First, there was a militarization of Bolshevism, which was reflected primarily in the way of thinking. Communists have learned to think in terms of military campaigns. The idea of ​​building socialism turned into a struggle - on the industrial front, the collectivization front, and so on. The second important consequence of the civil war was the Communist Party's fear of the peasants. The Communists have always been aware that they are a minority party in a hostile peasant environment.

Intellectual dogmatism, militarization, combined with hostility towards the peasants, created in the Leninist party all the necessary preconditions for Stalinist totalitarianism.

The forces that opposed the Soviet regime included the big industrial and financial bourgeoisie, landowners, a significant part of the officers, members of the former police and gendarmerie, and part of the highly qualified intelligentsia. However, the white movement began only as a rush of convinced and brave officers who fought against the communists, often without any hope of victory. White officers called themselves volunteers, driven by the ideas of patriotism. But in the midst of the civil war, the white movement became much more intolerant, chauvinistic, than at the beginning.

The main weakness of the white movement was that it failed to become a unifying national force. It remained almost exclusively a movement of officers. The White movement was unable to establish effective cooperation with the liberal and socialist intelligentsia. Whites were suspicious of workers and peasants. They did not have a state apparatus, administration, police, banks. Personifying themselves as a state, they tried to make up for their practical weakness by cruelly imposing their own rules.

If the White movement failed to rally the anti-Bolshevik forces, then the Kadet Party failed to lead the White movement. The Cadets were a party of professors, lawyers and entrepreneurs. There were enough people in their ranks who were able to establish a workable administration in the territory liberated from the Bolsheviks. And yet the role of the Cadets in national politics during the civil war was insignificant. Between the workers and peasants, on the one hand, and the Cadets, on the other, there was a huge cultural gap, and the Russian Revolution was presented to the majority of the Cadets as chaos, rebellion. Only the white movement, in the opinion of the Cadets, could restore Russia.

Finally, the most numerous group of the population of Russia is the vacillating part, and often just passive, who observed the events. She looked for opportunities to do without the class struggle, but was constantly drawn into it by the active actions of the first two forces. These are the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie, the peasantry, the proletarian strata who wanted "civil peace", part of the officers and a significant number of intellectuals.

But the division of forces proposed to readers should be considered conditional. In fact, they were closely intertwined, mixed with each other and scattered throughout the vast territory of the country. This situation was observed in any region, in any province, regardless of who held power. The decisive force, which largely determined the outcome of the revolutionary events, was the peasantry.

Analyzing the beginning of the war, only with great convention can we talk about the Bolshevik government of Russia. Nadele in 1918, it controlled only part of the country's territory. However, it announced its readiness to rule the whole country after it dissolved the Constituent Assembly. In 1918, the main opponents of the Bolsheviks were not whites or greens, but socialists. The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries opposed the Bolsheviks under the banner of the Constituent Assembly.

Immediately after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party began preparations for the overthrow of Soviet power. However, the Social Revolutionary leaders soon became convinced that there were very few who wanted to fight with weapons under the banner of the Constituent Assembly.

A very sensitive blow to attempts to unite the anti-Bolshevik forces was dealt from the right, by supporters of the military dictatorship of the generals. The main role among them was played by the Cadets, who resolutely opposed the use of the demand for the convocation of the Constituent Assembly of the 1917 model as the main slogan of the anti-Bolshevik movement. The Cadets headed for a one-man military dictatorship, which the Social Revolutionaries dubbed right-wing Bolshevism.

The moderate socialists, who rejected the military dictatorship, nevertheless compromised with the supporters of the general dictatorship. In order not to alienate the Cadets, the all-democratic bloc "Union of the Revival of Russia" adopted a plan to create a collective dictatorship - the Directory. To govern the country of the Directory, it was necessary to create a business ministry. The Directory was obliged to relinquish its powers of all-Russian power only before the Constituent Assembly after the end of the struggle against the Bolsheviks. At the same time, the "Union of the Revival of Russia" set the following tasks: 1) the continuation of the war with the Germans; 2) the creation of a single firm government; 3) the revival of the army; 4) restoration of scattered parts of Russia.

The summer defeat of the Bolsheviks as a result of the armed action of the Czechoslovak corps created favorable conditions. Thus, an anti-Bolshevik front arose in the Volga region and Siberia, and two anti-Bolshevik governments immediately formed - Samara and Omsk. Having received power from the hands of the Czechoslovaks, five members of the Constituent Assembly - V.K. Volsky, I.M. Brushvit, I.P. Nesterov, P.D. Klimushkin and B.K. Fortunatov - formed the Committee of Members of the Constituent Assembly (Komuch) - the highest state body. Komuch handed over the executive power to the Board of Governors. The birth of Komuch, contrary to the plan to create the Directory, led to a split in the Socialist-Revolutionary leadership. Its right-wing leaders, led by N.D. Avksentiev, ignoring Samara, went to Omsk to prepare the formation of an all-Russian coalition government from there.

Declaring himself a temporary supreme power until the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, Komuch called on other governments to recognize him as a state center. However, other regional governments refused to recognize the rights of the national center for Komuch, regarding him as a party SR power.

Socialist-Revolutionary politicians did not have a specific program of democratic reforms. The issues of the grain monopoly, nationalization and municipalization, and the principles of organizing the army were not resolved. In the field of agrarian policy, Komuch limited himself to a statement about the inviolability of ten points of the land law adopted by the Constituent Assembly.

The main goal of foreign policy was declared to be the continuation of the war in the ranks of the Entente. The reliance on Western military assistance was one of Komuch's biggest strategic miscalculations. The Bolsheviks used foreign intervention to depict the struggle of the Soviet power as patriotic, and the actions of the Socialist-Revolutionaries as anti-national. Komuch's broadcast statements about the continuation of the war with Germany to a victorious end came into conflict with the mood of the masses. Komuch, who did not understand the psychology of the masses, could rely only on the bayonets of the allies.

The confrontation between the Samara and Omsk governments especially weakened the anti-Bolshevik camp. Unlike the one-party Komuch, the Provisional Siberian government was coalition. It was headed by P.V. Vologda. The left wing in the government was the Socialist-Revolutionaries B.M. Shatilov, G.B. Patushinsky, V.M. Krutovsky. The right side of the government - I.A. Mikhailov, I.N. Serebrennikov, N.N. Petrov ~ occupied cadet and promotional positions.

The government's program was shaped under considerable pressure from its right wing. Already at the beginning of July 1918, the government announced the abolition of all decrees issued by the Council of People's Commissars and the liquidation of the Soviets, the return to the owners of their estates with all inventory. The Siberian government pursued a policy of repression against dissidents, the press, meetings, etc. Komuch protested against such a policy.

Despite sharp differences, the two rival governments had to negotiate. At the Ufa State Conference, a “temporary all-Russian government” was created. The meeting ended its work with the election of the Directory. N.D. Avksentiev, N.I. Astrov, V.G. Boldyrev, P.V. Vologodsky, N.V. Chaikovsky.

In its political program, the Directory declared the struggle to overthrow the power of the Bolsheviks, annul the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and continue the war with Germany as the main tasks. The short-term nature of the new government was emphasized by the point that the Constituent Assembly was to meet in the near future - January 1 or February 1, 1919, after which the Directory would resign.

The Directory, having abolished the Siberian government, now seemed to be able to implement an alternative program to the Bolshevik one. However, the balance between democracy and dictatorship was upset. The Samara Komuch, which represented democracy, was dissolved. The attempt made by the Socialist-Revolutionaries to restore the Constituent Assembly failed. On the night of November 17-18, 1918, the leaders of the Directory were arrested. The directory was replaced by the dictatorship of A.V. Kolchak. In 1918, the civil war was a war of ephemeral governments whose claims to power remained only on paper. In August 1918, when the Social Revolutionaries and Czechs took Kazan, the Bolsheviks were unable to recruit more than 20 thousand people into the Red Army. The Socialist-Revolutionary People's Army numbered only 30,000. During this period, the peasants, having divided the land, ignored the political struggle waged between parties and governments. However, the establishment of the Kombeds by the Bolsheviks caused the first outbreaks of resistance. From that moment on, there was a direct correlation between the Bolshevik attempts to dominate the countryside and peasant resistance. The harder the Bolsheviks tried to plant "communist relations" in the countryside, the tougher the resistance of the peasants was.

White, having in 1918. several regiments were not contenders for national power. Nevertheless, the white army of A.I. Denikin, who originally numbered 10 thousand people, was able to occupy the territory with a population of 50 million people. This was facilitated by the development of peasant uprisings in the areas held by the Bolsheviks. N. Makhno did not want to help the Whites, but his actions against the Bolsheviks contributed to the breakthrough of the Whites. The Don Cossacks rebelled against the communists and cleared the way for the advancing army of A. Denikin.

It seemed that with the promotion to the role of dictator A.V. Kolchak, the Whites had a leader who would lead the entire anti-Bolshevik movement. In the provision on the temporary structure of state power, approved on the day of the coup, the Council of Ministers, the supreme state power was temporarily transferred to the Supreme Ruler, and all the Armed Forces of the Russian state were subordinate to him. A.V. Kolchak was soon recognized as the Supreme Ruler by the leaders of the other white fronts, and the Western allies recognized him de facto.

The political and ideological ideas of the leaders and ordinary members of the white movement were as diverse as the socially heterogeneous movement itself. Of course, some part sought to restore the monarchy, the old, pre-revolutionary regime in general. But the leaders of the white movement refused to raise the monarchist banner and put forward a monarchist program. This also applies to A.V. Kolchak.

What did the Kolchak government promise positively? Kolchak agreed to convene a new Constituent Assembly after the restoration of order. He assured Western governments that there could be no "return to the regime that existed in Russia before February 1917", the broad masses of the population would be given land, and differences on religious and national grounds would be eliminated. Having confirmed the complete independence of Poland and the limited independence of Finland, Kolchak agreed to "prepare decisions" on the fate of the Baltic states, the Caucasian and Transcaspian peoples. Judging by the statements, the Kolchak government was in the position of democratic construction. But in reality, everything was different.

The most difficult for the anti-Bolshevik movement was the agrarian question. Kolchak did not succeed in solving it. The war with the Bolsheviks, as long as Kolchak waged it, could not guarantee the transfer of the landlords' land to the peasants. The national policy of the Kolchak government was marked by the same profound internal contradiction. Acting under the slogan of "one and indivisible" Russia, it did not reject "self-determination of peoples" as an ideal.

The demands of the delegations of Azerbaijan, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, the North Caucasus, Belarus and Ukraine put forward at the Versailles Conference were actually rejected by Kolchak. Having refused to create an anti-Bolshevik conference in the regions liberated from the Bolsheviks, Kolchak pursued a policy doomed to failure.

Complex and contradictory were Kolchak's relations with the allies, who had their own interests in the Far East and Siberia and pursued their own policies. This made the position of the Kolchak government very difficult. A particularly tight knot was tied in relations with Japan. Kolchak made no secret of his antipathy towards Japan. The Japanese command responded with active support for the chieftain, which flourished in Siberia. Petty ambitious people like Semyonov and Kalmykov, with the support of the Japanese, managed to create a constant threat to the Omsk government in the deep rear of Kolchak, which weakened him. Semyonov actually cut off Kolchak from the Far East and blocked the supply of weapons, ammunition, provisions.

Strategic miscalculations in the field of domestic and foreign policy of the Kolchak government were aggravated by mistakes in the military field. The military command (generals V.N. Lebedev, K.N. Sakharov, P.P. Ivanov-Rinov) led the Siberian army to defeat. Betrayed by all, and associates and allies,

Kolchak resigned the title of Supreme Ruler and transferred it to General A.I. Denikin. Not justifying the hopes placed on him, A.V. Kolchak died courageously, like a Russian patriot. The most powerful wave of the anti-Bolshevik movement was raised in the south of the country by Generals M.V. Alekseev, L.G. Kornilov, A.I. Denikin. Unlike the little-known Kolchak, they all had big names. The conditions under which they had to operate were desperately difficult. The volunteer army, which Alekseev began to form in November 1917 in Rostov, did not have its own territory. In terms of food supplies and recruitment of troops, it was dependent on the Don and Kuban governments. The volunteer army had only the Stavropol province and the coast with Novorossiysk, only by the summer of 1919 did it conquer a vast area of ​​the southern provinces for several months.

The weak point of the anti-Bolshevik movement in general and in the south especially was the personal ambitions and contradictions of the leaders M.V. Alekseev and L.G. Kornilov. After their death, all power passed to Denikin. The unity of all forces in the struggle against the Bolsheviks, the unity of the country and the authorities, the broadest autonomy of the border regions, fidelity to agreements with the allies in the war - these are the main principles of Denikin's platform. The entire ideological and political program of Denikin was based on the idea of ​​preserving a united and indivisible Russia. The leaders of the white movement rejected any significant concessions to the supporters of national independence. All this was in contrast to the Bolshevik promises of unlimited national self-determination. The reckless recognition of the right to secede gave Lenin the opportunity to curb destructive nationalism and raised his prestige far above that of the leaders of the white movement.

The government of General Denikin was divided into two groups - right and liberal. Right - a group of generals with A.M. Drago-mirov and A.S. Lukomsky at the head. The liberal group consisted of the Cadets. A.I. Denikin took the position of the center. The reactionary line in the policy of the Denikin regime manifested itself most clearly on the agrarian question. On the territory controlled by Denikin, it was supposed: to create and strengthen small and medium-sized peasant farms, to destroy latifundia, to leave small estates to the landowners, on which cultural farming could be conducted. But instead of immediately proceeding with the transfer of the landlords' land to the peasants, an endless discussion of draft laws on land began in the commission on the agrarian question. The result was a compromise law. The transfer of part of the land to the peasants was to begin only after the civil war and end after 7 years. In the meantime, the order for the third sheaf was put into effect, according to which a third of the harvested grain went to the landowner. Denikin's land policy was one of the main reasons for his defeat. Of the two evils - Lenin's requisitioning or Denikin's requisition - the peasants preferred the lesser.

A.I. Denikin understood that without the help of the allies, defeat awaited him. Therefore, he himself prepared the text of the political declaration of the commander of the armed forces of the south of Russia, sent on April 10, 1919 to the heads of the British, American and French missions. It spoke about the convocation of a people's assembly on the basis of universal suffrage, the establishment of regional autonomy and broad local self-government, and the implementation of land reform. However, things did not go beyond broadcast promises. All attention was turned to the front, where the fate of the regime was being decided.

In the autumn of 1919, a difficult situation developed for Denikin's army at the front. This was largely due to a change in the mood of the broad peasant masses. The peasants, who rebelled in the territory subject to the whites, paved the way for the reds. The peasants were the third force and acted against both in their own interests.

In the territories occupied by both the Bolsheviks and the Whites, the peasants were at war with the authorities. The peasants did not want to fight either for the Bolsheviks, or for the Whites, or for anyone else. Many of them fled into the forests. During this period, the green movement was defensive. Since 1920, there has been less and less of a threat from the Whites, and the Bolsheviks have been asserting their power in the countryside with greater determination. The peasant war against state power engulfed the whole of Ukraine, the Chernozem region, the Cossack regions of the Don and Kuban, the Volga and Ural basins, and large regions of Siberia. In fact, all the grain-producing regions of Russia and Ukraine were a huge Vendee (in a figurative sense - a counter-revolution. - Note. ed.).

In terms of the number of people participating in the peasant war and its impact on the country, this war eclipsed the war of the Bolsheviks with the Whites and surpassed it in its duration. The Green Movement was the decisive third force in the civil war,

but it did not become an independent center claiming power more than on a regional scale.

Why did not the movement of the majority of the people prevail? The reason lies in the way of thinking of Russian peasants. The Greens defended their villages from outsiders. The peasants could not win because they never aspired to take over the state. The European concepts of a democratic republic, law and order, equality and parliamentarism, which the Social Revolutionaries brought to the peasant environment, were beyond the understanding of the peasants.

The mass of peasants participating in the war was heterogeneous. From the peasant milieu, both rebels, carried away by the idea of ​​“rob the loot,” and leaders who longed to become new “kings and masters” emerged. Those who acted on behalf of the Bolsheviks, and those who fought under the command of A.S. Antonova, N.I. Makhno, adhered to similar norms in behavior. Those who robbed and raped as part of the Bolshevik expeditions were not much different from the Antonov and Makhno rebels. The essence of the peasant war was the liberation from all power.

The peasant movement put forward its own leaders, people from the people (suffice it to name Makhno, Antonov, Kolesnikov, Sapozhkov and Vakhulin). These leaders were guided by the concepts of peasant justice and vague echoes of the platform of political parties. However, any party of peasants was associated with statehood, programs and governments, while these concepts were alien to local peasant leaders. The parties pursued a nationwide policy, and the peasants did not rise to the realization of nationwide interests.

One of the reasons why the peasant movement did not win, despite its scope, was the political life characteristic of each province, which was at odds with the rest of the country. While in one province the Greens were already defeated, in another the uprising was just beginning. None of the leaders of the Greens took action outside the immediate areas. This spontaneity, scale and breadth contained not only the strength of the movement, but also helplessness in the face of a systematic onslaught. The Bolsheviks, who had great power and had a huge army, militarily had an overwhelming superiority over the peasant movement.

Russian peasants lacked political consciousness - they did not care what form of government was in Russia. They did not understand the importance of parliament, freedom of the press and assembly. The fact that the Bolshevik dictatorship withstood the test of the civil war can be seen not as an expression of popular support, but as a manifestation of the still unformed national consciousness and the political backwardness of the majority. The tragedy of Russian society was the lack of interconnectedness between its various layers.

One of the main features of the civil war was that all the armies participating in it, red and white, Cossacks and greens, went through the same path of degradation from serving a cause based on ideals to looting and excesses.

What are the causes of the Red and White Terrors? IN AND. Lenin stated that the Red Terror during the years of the civil war in Russia was forced and became a response to the actions of the White Guards and interventionists. According to the Russian emigration (S.P. Melgunov), for example, the Red Terror had an official theoretical justification, was of a systemic, governmental nature, the White Terror was characterized “as excesses on the basis of unbridled power and revenge.” For this reason, the red terror surpassed the white terror in its scope and cruelty. At the same time, a third point of view arose, according to which any terror is inhuman and should have been abandoned as a method of fighting for power. The very comparison “one terror is worse (better) than another” is incorrect. No terror has a right to exist. The call of General L.G. is very similar to each other. Kornilov to the officers (January 1918) “do not take prisoners in battles with the Reds” and the confession of Chekist M.I. Latsis that similar orders were resorted to in relation to the Whites in the Red Army.

The desire to understand the origins of the tragedy has given rise to several exploratory explanations. R. Conquest, for example, wrote that in 1918-1820. terror was carried out by fanatics, idealists - "people in whom one can find some features of a peculiar perverted nobility." Among them, according to the researcher, can be attributed to Lenin.

Terror during the war years was carried out not so much by fanatics as by people deprived of any nobility. Let us name only some of the instructions written by V.I. Lenin. In a note to the Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic E.M. Sklyansky (August 1920) V.I. Lenin, evaluating the plan born in the depths of this department, instructed: “A wonderful plan! Finish it with Dzerzhinsky. Under the guise of "greens" (we'll blame them later), we'll go 10-20 versts and hang kulaks, priests, landlords. Prize: 100,000 rubles for a hanged man.

In a secret letter to members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) dated March 19, 1922, V.I. Lenin proposed to take advantage of the famine in the Volga region and confiscate church valuables. This action, in his opinion, “should be carried out with merciless determination, without stopping at anything and in the shortest possible time. The more representatives of the reactionary clergy and the reactionary bourgeoisie we manage to shoot on this occasion, the better. It is necessary now to teach this public a lesson in such a way that for several decades they will not even dare to think about any resistance. Stalin perceived Lenin's recognition of state terror as a matter of high government, a power based on force, and not on law.

It is difficult to name the first acts of red and white terror. Usually they are associated with the beginning of the civil war in the country. Everyone committed terror: officers - participants in the ice campaign of General Kornilov; security officers who received the right to extrajudicial reprisals; revolutionary courts and tribunals.

It is characteristic that the right of the Cheka to extrajudicial reprisals, composed by L.D. Trotsky, signed by V.I. Lenin; granted unlimited rights to the tribunals by the people's commissar of justice; the decree on the red terror was endorsed by the people's commissars of justice, internal affairs and the manager of the affairs of the Council of People's Commissars (D. Kursky, G. Petrovsky, V. Bonch-Bruevich). The leadership of the Soviet Republic officially recognized the creation of a non-legal state, where arbitrariness became the norm, and terror became the most important tool for maintaining power. Lawlessness was beneficial to the belligerents, as it allowed any actions with references to the enemy.

The commanders of all the armies, apparently, never submitted to any control. We are talking about the general savagery of society. The reality of the civil war shows that the distinction between good and evil has faded. Human life has been devalued. The refusal to see the enemy as a human being encouraged violence on an unprecedented scale. Settling scores with real and imagined enemies has become the essence of politics. The civil war meant the extreme exasperation of society and especially of its new ruling class.

Litvin A.L. Red and White Terror in Russia 1917-1922//0Russian History. 1993. No. 6. S. 47-48. There. pp. 47-48.

Murder of M.S. Uritsky and the assassination attempt on Lenin on August 30, 1918, provoked an unusually violent response. In retaliation for the murder of Uritsky, up to 900 innocent hostages were shot in Petrograd.

A much larger number of victims is associated with the attempt on Lenin's life. In the first days of September 1918, 6,185 people were shot, 14,829 were imprisoned, 6,407 were sent to concentration camps, and 4,068 people became hostages. Thus, assassination attempts on the Bolshevik leaders contributed to rampant mass terror in the country.

Simultaneously with the red in the country, the white terror rampaged. And if the Red Terror is considered to be the implementation of state policy, then, probably, one should also take into account the fact that the Whites in 1918-1919. also occupied vast territories and declared themselves as sovereign governments and state entities. The forms and methods of terror were different. But they were also used by adherents of the Constituent Assembly (Komuch in Samara, the Provisional Regional Government in the Urals), and especially the white movement.

The coming to power of the founders in the Volga region in the summer of 1918 was characterized by reprisals against many Soviet workers. One of the first departments created by Komuch were state guards, courts-martial, trains and "death barges". On September 3, 1918, they brutally suppressed the uprising of the workers in Kazan.

The political regimes that were established in Russia in 1918 are quite comparable, primarily in terms of predominantly violent methods of solving questions of the organization of power. In November 1918 A. V. Kolchak, who came to power in Siberia, began with the expulsion and murder of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. It is hardly possible to speak of support for his policy in Siberia in the Urals, if out of about 400 thousand Red partisans of that time, 150 thousand acted against him. The government of A.I. Denikin. On the territory captured by the general, the police were called state guards. By September 1919, its number reached almost 78 thousand people. Osvag's reports informed Denikin about robberies, looting, it was under his command that 226 Jewish pogroms took place, as a result of which several thousand people died. The White Terror turned out to be just as senseless to achieve the set goal as any other. Soviet historians have calculated that in 1917-1922. 15-16 million Russians died, of which 1.3 million became victims of terror, banditry, and pogroms. The civil, fratricidal war with millions of human victims turned into a national tragedy. Red and white terror became the most barbaric method of struggle for power. Its results for the progress of the country are truly disastrous.

20.3. Causes of the defeat of the white movement. The results of the civil war

Let us single out the most important reasons for the defeat of the white movement. The reliance on Western military assistance was one of the miscalculations of the Whites. The Bolsheviks used foreign interference to present the struggle of Soviet power as patriotic. The policy of the Allies was self-serving: they needed an anti-German Russia.

A deep contradiction marked the national policy of whites. Thus, Yudenich's non-recognition of the already independent Finland and Estonia may have been the main reason for the failure of the Whites on the Western Front. The non-recognition of Poland by Denikin made her a constant opponent of the Whites. All this was in contrast to the Bolshevik promises of unlimited national self-determination.

In terms of military training, combat experience and technical knowledge, the Whites had every advantage. But time was working against them. The situation was changing: in order to replenish the melting ranks, the whites also had to resort to mobilization.

The white movement did not have broad social support. The White army was not supplied with everything necessary, so it was forced to take carts, horses, supplies from the population. Local residents were drafted into the ranks of the army. All this restored the population against the whites. During the war, mass repressions and terror were closely intertwined with the dreams of millions of people who believed in new revolutionary ideals, and tens of millions lived nearby, preoccupied with purely everyday problems. The fluctuations of the peasantry played a decisive role in the dynamics of the civil war, as did various national movements. Some ethnic groups during the civil war restored their previously lost statehood (Poland, Lithuania), and Finland, Estonia and Latvia acquired it for the first time.

For Russia, the consequences of the civil war were catastrophic: a huge social upheaval, the disappearance of entire estates; huge demographic losses; rupture of economic ties and colossal economic ruin;

The conditions and experience of the civil war had a decisive influence on the political culture of Bolshevism: the curtailment of inner-party democracy, the perception by the broad party mass of the installation on the methods of coercion and violence in achieving political goals - the Bolsheviks are looking for support in the lumpenized sections of the population. All this paved the way for the strengthening of repressive elements in public policy. The Civil War is the greatest tragedy in the history of Russia.

The civil war that took place in Russia from 1917 to 1922 was a bloody event, where in a brutal massacre brother went against brother, and relatives took up positions on opposite sides of the barricades. In this armed class clash on the vast territory of the former Russian Empire, the interests of opposing political structures intersected, conditionally divided into “reds” and “whites”. This struggle for power took place with the active support of foreign states that tried to extract their interests from this situation: Japan, Poland, Turkey, Romania wanted to annex part of the Russian territories, while other countries - the USA, France, Canada, Great Britain expected to receive tangible economic preferences.

As a result of such a bloody civil war, Russia turned into a weakened state, the economy and industry of which were in a state of complete ruin. But after the end of the war, the country adhered to the socialist course of development, and this influenced the course of history throughout the world.

Causes of the civil war in Russia

A civil war in any country is always caused by aggravated political, national, religious, economic and, of course, social contradictions. The territory of the former Russian Empire was no exception.

• Social inequality in Russian society has been accumulating for centuries, and at the beginning of the 20th century it reached its apogee, since the workers and peasants found themselves in an absolutely powerless position, and their working and living conditions were simply unbearable. The autocracy did not want to smooth out social contradictions and carry out any significant reforms. It was during this period that the revolutionary movement grew, which managed to lead the Bolshevik parties.
• Against the backdrop of the protracted First World War, all these contradictions became noticeably aggravated, which resulted in the February and October revolutions.
• As a result of the revolution in October 1917, the political system in the state changed, and the Bolsheviks came to power in Russia. But the overthrown classes could not reconcile themselves to the situation and made attempts to restore their former dominance.
• The establishment of Bolshevik power led to the rejection of the ideas of parliamentarism and the creation of a one-party system, which prompted the parties of the Cadets, Socialist-Revolutionaries, and Mensheviks to fight Bolshevism, that is, the struggle between the “Whites” and the “Reds” began.
• In the fight against the enemies of the revolution, the Bolsheviks used non-democratic measures - the establishment of a dictatorship, repression, the persecution of the opposition, the creation of emergency bodies. This, of course, caused discontent in society, and among those dissatisfied with the actions of the authorities were not only the intelligentsia, but also workers and peasants.
• The nationalization of land and industry caused resistance from the former owners, which led to terrorist actions on both sides.
• Despite the fact that Russia ceased its participation in the First World War in 1918, a powerful interventionist group was present on its territory, which actively supported the White Guard movement.

The course of the civil war in Russia

Before the start of the civil war, there were loosely interconnected regions on the territory of Russia: in some of them, Soviet power was firmly established, while others (south of Russia, the Chita region) were under the rule of independent governments. On the territory of Siberia, in general, one could count up to two dozen local governments, not only not recognizing the power of the Bolsheviks, but also at enmity with each other.

When the civil war began, then all the inhabitants had to decide, that is, to join the “whites” or “reds”.

The course of the civil war in Russia can be divided into several periods.

First period: October 1917 to May 1918

At the very beginning of the fratricidal war, the Bolsheviks had to suppress local armed rebellions in Petrograd, Moscow, Transbaikalia and the Don. It was at this time that a white movement was formed from those dissatisfied with the new government. In March, the young republic, after an unsuccessful war, concluded the shameful Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

Second period: June to November 1918

At this time, a full-scale civil war began: the Soviet Republic was forced to fight not only with internal enemies, but also with interventionists. As a result, most of the Russian territory was captured by enemies, and this threatened the existence of the young state. In the east of the country, Kolchak dominated, in the south Denikin, in the north Miller, and their armies tried to close the ring around the capital. The Bolsheviks, in turn, created the Red Army, which achieved its first military successes.

Third period: November 1918 to spring 1919

In November 1918, the First World War ended. Soviet power was established in the Ukrainian, Belarusian and Baltic territories. But already at the end of autumn, the Entente troops landed in the Crimea, Odessa, Batumi and Baku. But this military operation was not crowned with success, since revolutionary anti-war sentiments reigned in the troops of the interventionists. During this period of the struggle against Bolshevism, the leading role belonged to the armies of Kolchak, Yudenich and Denikin.

Fourth Period: Spring 1919 to Spring 1920

During this period, the main forces of the interventionists left Russia. In the spring and autumn of 1919, the Red Army won major victories in the East, South and North-West of the country, defeating the armies of Kolchak, Denikin and Yudenich.

Fifth period: spring-autumn 1920

The internal counter-revolution was completely destroyed. And in the spring the Soviet-Polish war began, which ended in complete failure for Russia. According to the Riga Peace Treaty, part of the Ukrainian and Belarusian lands went to Poland.

Sixth period:: 1921-1922

During these years, all the remaining centers of the civil war were liquidated: the rebellion in Kronstadt was suppressed, the Makhnovist detachments were destroyed, the Far East was liberated, the struggle against the Basmachi in Central Asia was completed.

The results of the civil war

• As a result of hostilities and terror, more than 8 million people died from hunger and disease.
• Industry, transport and agriculture were on the verge of disaster.

• The main result of this terrible war was the final assertion of Soviet power.

Chronology

• 1918 I stage of the civil war - "democratic"
• 1918 June Nationalization Decree
• January 1919 Introduction of the surplus appraisal
• 1919 Fight against A.V. Kolchak, A.I. Denikin, Yudenich
• 1920 Soviet-Polish war
• 1920 Fight against P.N. Wrangel
• 1920 November End of the civil war in European territory
• 1922 October End of the civil war in the Far East

Civil war and military intervention

Civil War- “the armed struggle between different groups of the population, which was based on deep social, national and political contradictions, took place with the active intervention of foreign forces at various stages and stages ...” (Academician Yu.A. Polyakov).

In modern historical science there is no single definition of the concept of "civil war". In the encyclopedic dictionary we read: "Civil war is an organized armed struggle for power between classes, social groups, the most acute form of class struggle." This definition actually repeats Lenin's well-known saying that civil war is the most acute form of class struggle.

Currently, various definitions are given, but their essence basically boils down to the definition of the Civil War as a large-scale armed confrontation, in which, of course, the issue of power was decided. The seizure of state power by the Bolsheviks in Russia and the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly that followed soon after can be considered the beginning of an armed confrontation in Russia. The first shots are heard in the South of Russia, in the Cossack regions, already in the autumn of 1917.

General Alekseev, the last chief of staff of the tsarist army, begins to form a Volunteer Army on the Don, but by the beginning of 1918 it is no more than 3,000 officers and cadets.

As A.I. Denikin in "Essays on Russian Troubles", "the white movement grew spontaneously and inevitably."

During the first months of the victory of Soviet power, armed clashes were local in nature, all opponents of the new government gradually determined their strategy and tactics.

This confrontation took on a truly front-line, large-scale character in the spring of 1918. Let us single out three main stages in the development of armed confrontation in Russia, proceeding primarily from taking into account the alignment of political forces and the specifics of the formation of fronts.

The first stage begins in the spring of 1918 when the military-political confrontation acquires a global character, large-scale military operations begin. The defining feature of this stage is its so-called "democratic" character, when representatives of the socialist parties came out as an independent anti-Bolshevik camp with slogans for the return of political power to the Constituent Assembly and the restoration of the gains of the February Revolution. It is this camp that chronologically outstrips the White Guard camp in its organizational design.

At the end of 1918, the second stage begins- confrontation between whites and reds. Until the beginning of 1920, one of the main political opponents of the Bolsheviks was the white movement with the slogans of "non-decision of the state system" and the elimination of Soviet power. This direction threatened not only the October, but also the February conquests. Their main political force was the Cadet Party, and the base for the formation of the army was the generals and officers of the former tsarist army. The Whites were united by their hatred of the Soviet regime and the Bolsheviks, the desire to preserve a united and indivisible Russia.

The final stage of the Civil War begins in 1920. the events of the Soviet-Polish war and the fight against P. N. Wrangel. The defeat of Wrangel at the end of 1920 marked the end of the Civil War, but anti-Soviet armed uprisings continued in many regions of Soviet Russia even during the years of the new economic policy.

nationwide scope armed struggle has acquired since the spring of 1918 and turned into the greatest disaster, the tragedy of the entire Russian people. In this war there were no right and wrong, winners and losers. 1918 - 1920 - in these years the military question was of decisive importance for the fate of the Soviet power and the bloc of anti-Bolshevik forces opposing it. This period ended with the liquidation in November 1920 of the last white front in the European part of Russia (in the Crimea). On the whole, the country emerged from the state of civil war in the autumn of 1922 after the remnants of white formations and foreign (Japanese) military units were expelled from the territory of the Russian Far East.

A feature of the civil war in Russia was its close interweaving with anti-Soviet military intervention powers of the Entente. It acted as the main factor in prolonging and exacerbating the bloody "Russian turmoil".

So, in the periodization of the civil war and intervention, three stages are quite clearly distinguished. The first of them covers the time from spring to autumn 1918; the second - from the autumn of 1918 to the end of 1919; and the third - from the spring of 1920 to the end of 1920.

The first stage of the civil war (spring - autumn 1918)

In the first months of the establishment of Soviet power in Russia, armed clashes were local in nature, all opponents of the new government gradually determined their strategy and tactics. Armed struggle acquired a nationwide scale in the spring of 1918. Back in January 1918, Romania, taking advantage of the weakness of the Soviet government, captured Bessarabia. In March-April 1918, the first contingents of troops from England, France, the USA and Japan appeared on Russian territory (in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk, in Vladivostok, in Central Asia). They were small and could not noticeably influence the military and political situation in the country. "War Communism"

At the same time, the enemy of the Entente - Germany - occupied the Baltic states, part of Belarus, Transcaucasia and the North Caucasus. The Germans actually dominated Ukraine: they overthrew the bourgeois-democratic Verkhovna Rada, which they used during the occupation of Ukrainian lands, and in April 1918 put Hetman P.P. Skoropadsky.

Under these conditions, the Supreme Council of the Entente decided to use the 45,000th Czechoslovak Corps, who was (in agreement with Moscow) subordinate to him. It consisted of captured Slavic soldiers of the Austro-Hungarian army and followed the railroad to Vladivostok for subsequent transfer to France.

According to an agreement concluded on March 26, 1918 with the Soviet government, the Czechoslovak legionnaires were to advance "not as a combat unit, but as a group of citizens with weapons in order to repel the armed attacks of counter-revolutionaries." However, during the movement, their conflicts with local authorities became more frequent. Since the Czechs and Slovaks had more military weapons than provided for in the agreement, the authorities decided to confiscate them. On May 26, in Chelyabinsk, conflicts escalated into real battles, and the legionnaires occupied the city. Their armed action was immediately supported by the military missions of the Entente in Russia and the anti-Bolshevik forces. As a result, in the Volga region, in the Urals, in Siberia and in the Far East - wherever there were echelons with Czechoslovak legionnaires - Soviet power was overthrown. At the same time, in many provinces of Russia, the peasants, dissatisfied with the food policy of the Bolsheviks, revolted (according to official data, there were at least 130 major anti-Soviet peasant uprisings alone).

Socialist parties(mainly right SRs), relying on interventionist landings, the Czechoslovak Corps and peasant rebel detachments, formed a number of governments Komuch (Committee of members of the Constituent Assembly) in Samara, the Supreme Administration of the Northern Region in Arkhangelsk, the West Siberian Commissariat in Novonikolaevsk (now Novosibirsk), The Provisional Siberian Government in Tomsk, the Trans-Caspian Provisional Government in Ashgabat, etc. In their activities, they tried to compose “ democratic alternative”both the Bolshevik dictatorship and the bourgeois-monarchist counter-revolution. Their programs included demands for the convocation of a Constituent Assembly, the restoration of the political rights of all citizens without exception, freedom of trade and the rejection of strict state regulation of the economic activities of peasants while maintaining a number of important provisions of the Soviet Decree on Land, the establishment of a “social partnership” between workers and capitalists during the denationalization of industrial enterprises and etc.

Thus, the performance of the Czechoslovak corps gave impetus to the formation of the front, which bore the so-called "democratic coloring" and was mainly Socialist-Revolutionary. It was this front, and not the white movement, that was decisive at the initial stage of the Civil War.

In the summer of 1918, all opposition forces became a real threat to the Bolshevik government, which controlled only the territory of the center of Russia. The territory controlled by Komuch included the Volga region and part of the Urals. Bolshevik power was also overthrown in Siberia, where a regional government of the Siberian Duma was formed. The breakaway parts of the empire - Transcaucasia, Central Asia, the Baltic States - had their own national governments. The Germans captured the Ukraine, the Don and Kuban were captured by Krasnov and Denikin.

On August 30, 1918, a terrorist group killed the chairman of the Petrograd Cheka, Uritsky, and the right-wing Socialist-Revolutionary Kaplan seriously wounded Lenin. The threat of losing political power to the ruling Bolshevik Party became catastrophically real.

In September 1918, a meeting of representatives of a number of anti-Bolshevik governments of democratic and social orientation was held in Ufa. Under pressure from the Czechoslovaks, who threatened to open the front to the Bolsheviks, they established a single All-Russian government - the Ufa Directory, headed by the Socialist-Revolutionary leaders N.D. Avksentiev and V.M. Zenzinov. Soon the directory settled in Omsk, where the well-known polar explorer and scientist, the former commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral A.V., was invited to the post of Minister of War. Kolchak.

The right, bourgeois-monarchist wing of the camp opposing the Bolsheviks as a whole had not yet recovered at that time from the defeat of its first post-October armed onslaught on them (which largely explained the “democratic coloring” of the initial stage of the civil war on the part of anti-Soviet forces). The White Volunteer Army, which, after the death of General L.G. Kornilov in April 1918 was headed by General A.I. Denikin, operated on a limited territory of the Don and Kuban. Only the Cossack army of ataman P.N. Krasnov managed to advance to Tsaritsyn and cut off the grain regions of the North Caucasus from the central regions of Russia, and Ataman A.I. Dutov - to capture Orenburg.

The position of Soviet power by the end of the summer of 1918 became critical. Almost three-quarters of the territory of the former Russian Empire was under the control of various anti-Bolshevik forces, as well as the occupying Austro-German troops.

Soon, however, a turning point occurs on the main front (Eastern). Soviet troops under the command of I.I. Vatsetis and S.S. Kamenev in September 1918 went on the offensive there. Kazan fell first, then Simbirsk, and Samara in October. By winter, the Reds approached the Urals. The attempts of General P.N. Krasnov to capture Tsaritsyn, undertaken in July and September 1918.

From October 1918, the Southern Front became the main one. In the South of Russia, the Volunteer Army of General A.I. Denikin captured the Kuban, and the Don Cossack army of Ataman P.N. Krasnova tried to take Tsaritsyn and cut the Volga.

The Soviet government launched active actions to protect its power. In 1918, a transition was made to universal conscription, a broad mobilization was launched. The constitution, adopted in July 1918, established discipline in the army and introduced the institution of military commissars.

You signed up as a volunteer poster

As part of the Central Committee, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) was allocated for the prompt solution of problems of a military and political nature. It included: V.I. Lenin --Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars; L.B. Krestinsky - Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party; I.V. Stalin - People's Commissar for Nationalities; L.D. Trotsky - Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs. Candidate members were N.I. Bukharin - editor of the newspaper Pravda, G.E. Zinoviev - Chairman of the Petrograd Soviet, M.I. Kalinin - Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.

Under the direct control of the Central Committee of the party, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, headed by L.D. Trotsky. The institute of military commissars was introduced in the spring of 1918, one of its important tasks was to control the activities of military specialists - former officers. By the end of 1918, there were about 7,000 commissars in the Soviet armed forces. About 30% of the former generals and officers of the old army during the Civil War came out on the side of the Red Army.

This was determined by two main factors:

• speaking on the side of the Bolshevik government for ideological reasons;
• the policy of attracting "military specialists" to the Red Army - former tsarist officers - was carried out by L.D. Trotsky using repressive methods.

war communism

In 1918, the Bolsheviks introduced a system of emergency measures, economic and political, known as “ war communism policy”. Basic acts this policy became Decree of May 13, 1918 g., giving broad powers to the People's Commissariat for Food (People's Commissariat for Food), and Decree of 28 June 1918 on nationalization.

The main provisions of this policy:

• nationalization of all industry;
• centralization of economic management;
• prohibition of private trade;
• curtailment of commodity-money relations;
• food allocation;
• an equalizing system of wages for workers and employees;
• wages in kind for workers and employees;
• free public services;
• universal labor service.

June 11, 1918 were created combos(committees of the poor), which were supposed to seize surplus agricultural products from wealthy peasants. Their actions were supported by parts of the prodarmiya (food army), consisting of Bolsheviks and workers. From January 1919, the search for surpluses was replaced by a centralized and planned system of surplus appropriations (Reader T8 No. 5).

Each region and county had to hand over a fixed amount of grain and other products (potatoes, honey, butter, eggs, milk). When the rate of change was met, the villagers received a receipt for the right to purchase manufactured goods (cloth, sugar, salt, matches, kerosene).

June 28, 1918 the state has started nationalization of enterprises with a capital of more than 500 rubles. Back in December 1917, when the Supreme Economic Council (Supreme Council of the National Economy) was created, he took up nationalization. But the nationalization of labor was not massive (by March 1918 no more than 80 enterprises had been nationalized). It was primarily a repressive measure against entrepreneurs who resisted workers' control. Now it was government policy. By November 1, 1919, 2,500 enterprises had been nationalized. In November 1920, a decree was issued extending the nationalization to all enterprises with more than 10 or 5 workers, but using a mechanical engine.

Decree of November 21, 1918 was established monopoly on internal trade. The Soviet government replaced trade with state distribution. Citizens received food through the system of the People's Commissariat for Food on cards, of which, for example, in Petrograd in 1919 there were 33 types: bread, dairy, shoe, etc. The population was divided into three categories:
workers and scientists and artists equated to them;
employees;
former exploiters.

Due to the lack of food, even the wealthiest received only ¼ of the prescribed ration.

Under such conditions, the “black market” flourished. The government fought the "pouchers" by forbidding them to travel by train.

In the social sphere, the policy of "war communism" was based on the principle "who does not work, he does not eat." In 1918, labor service was introduced for representatives of the former exploiting classes, and in 1920, universal labor service.

In the political sphere"war communism" meant the undivided dictatorship of the RCP (b). The activities of other parties (the Cadets, Mensheviks, Right and Left Socialist-Revolutionaries) were banned.

The consequences of the policy of "war communism" were the deepening of economic ruin, the reduction of production in industry and agriculture. However, it was precisely this policy that in many ways allowed the Bolsheviks to mobilize all the resources and win the Civil War.

The Bolsheviks assigned a special role in the victory over the class enemy to mass terror. On September 2, 1918, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee adopted a resolution proclaiming the beginning of "mass terror against the bourgeoisie and its agents." Head of the Cheka F.E. Dzherzhinsky said: "We are terrorizing the enemies of Soviet power." The policy of mass terror assumed a state character. Shooting on the spot became commonplace.

The second stage of the civil war (autumn 1918 - late 1919)

From November 1918, the front-line war entered the stage of confrontation between the Reds and the Whites. The year 1919 became decisive for the Bolsheviks, a reliable and constantly growing Red Army was created. But their opponents, actively supported by former allies, united among themselves. The international situation has also changed drastically. Germany and her allies in the world war laid down their arms before the Entente in November. Revolutions took place in Germany and Austria-Hungary. Leadership of the RSFSR November 13, 1918 annulled, and the new governments of these countries were forced to evacuate their troops from Russia. Bourgeois-national governments arose in Poland, the Baltic States, Belarus, and the Ukraine, which immediately took the side of the Entente.

The defeat of Germany freed up significant combat contingents of the Entente and at the same time opened up for her a convenient and short road to Moscow from the southern regions. Under these conditions, the intention to crush Soviet Russia with the forces of its own armies prevailed in the Entente leadership.

In the spring of 1919, the Supreme Council of the Entente developed a plan for the next military campaign. (Reader T8 No. 8) As noted in one of his secret documents, the intervention was to be "expressed in the combined military operations of the Russian anti-Bolshevik forces and the armies of neighboring allied states." At the end of November 1918, a combined Anglo-French squadron of 32 pennants (12 battleships, 10 cruisers and 10 destroyers) appeared off the Black Sea coast of Russia. British troops landed in Batum and Novorossiysk, and French troops landed in Odessa and Sevastopol. The total number of interventionist combat forces concentrated in the south of Russia was increased by February 1919 to 130 thousand people. Entente contingents increased significantly in the Far East and Siberia (up to 150,000 men) and also in the North (up to 20,000 men).

Start of foreign military intervention and civil war (February 1918 - March 1919)

In Siberia, on November 18, 1918, Admiral A.V. came to power. Kolchak. . He put an end to the disorderly actions of the anti-Bolshevik coalition.

Having dispersed the Directory, he proclaimed himself the Supreme Ruler of Russia (the rest of the leaders of the white movement soon declared subordination to him). Admiral Kolchak in March 1919 began to advance on a broad front from the Urals to the Volga. The main bases of his army were Siberia, the Urals, the Orenburg province and the Ural region. In the north, from January 1919, General E.K. began to play the leading role. Miller, in the northwest - General N.N. Yudenich. In the south, the dictatorship of the commander of the Volunteer Army A.I. Denikin, who in January 1919 subjugated the Don Army of General P.N. Krasnov and created the united Armed Forces of the South of Russia.

The second stage of the civil war (autumn 1918 - late 1919)

In March 1919, the well-armed 300,000-strong army of A.V. Kolchak launched an offensive from the east, intending to unite with Denikin for a joint attack on Moscow. Having captured Ufa, the Kolchakites fought their way to Simbirsk, Samara, Votkinsk, but were soon stopped by the Red Army. At the end of April, Soviet troops under the command of S.S. Kamenev and M.V. The Frunze went on the offensive and in the summer advanced deep into Siberia. By the beginning of 1920, the Kolchakites were finally defeated, and the admiral himself was arrested and shot by the verdict of the Irkutsk Revolutionary Committee.

In the summer of 1919, the center of the armed struggle moved to the Southern Front. (Reader T8 No. 7) On July 3, General A.I. Denikin issued his famous "Moscow Directive", and his army of 150,000 men launched an offensive along the entire 700-kilometer front from Kyiv to Tsaritsyn. The White Front included such important centers as Voronezh, Orel, Kyiv. In this space of 1 million square meters. km with a population of up to 50 million people located 18 provinces and regions. By mid-autumn, Denikin's army captured Kursk and Orel. But by the end of October, the troops of the Southern Front (commander A.I. Yegorov) defeated the white regiments, and then began to push them along the entire front line. The remnants of Denikin's army, headed by General P.N. Wrangel, strengthened in the Crimea.

The final stage of the civil war (spring-autumn 1920)

At the beginning of 1920, as a result of hostilities, the outcome of the front-line Civil War was actually decided in favor of the Bolshevik government. At the final stage, the main hostilities were associated with the Soviet-Polish war and the fight against Wrangel's army.

Significantly aggravated the nature of the civil war Soviet-Polish war. Head of the Polish State Marshal Y. Pilsudsky hatched a plan to create " Greater Poland within the borders of 1772” from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, including a large part of the Lithuanian, Belarusian and Ukrainian lands, including those never controlled by Warsaw. The Polish national government was supported by the Entente countries, which sought to create a "sanitary bloc" of Eastern European countries between Bolshevik Russia and Western countries. On April 17, Pilsudski ordered an attack on Kiev and signed an agreement with Ataman Petliura, Poland recognized the Directory headed by Petliura as the supreme power of Ukraine. May 7 Kyiv was taken. The victory was won unusually easily, because the Soviet troops withdrew without serious resistance.

But already on May 14, a successful counter-offensive of the troops of the Western Front (commander M.N. Tukhachevsky) began, and on May 26 - the South-Western Front (commander A.I. Egorov). In mid-July, they reached the borders of Poland. On June 12, Soviet troops occupied Kyiv. The speed of a victory won can only be compared with the speed of an earlier defeat.

The war with bourgeois-landlord Poland and the defeat of Wrangel's troops (IV-XI 1920)

On July 12, British Foreign Secretary Lord D. Curzon sent a note to the Soviet government - in fact, an ultimatum from the Entente demanding to stop the Red Army's advance on Poland. As a truce, the so-called “ Curzon line”, which took place mainly along the ethnic border of the settlement of the Poles.

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), clearly overestimating its own strength and underestimating the strength of the enemy, set a new strategic task for the high command of the Red Army: to continue the revolutionary war. IN AND. Lenin believed that the victorious entry of the Red Army into Poland would cause uprisings of the Polish working class and revolutionary uprisings in Germany. For this purpose, the Soviet government of Poland was promptly formed - the Provisional Revolutionary Committee consisting of F.E. Dzerzhinsky, F.M. Kona, Yu.Yu. Marchlevsky and others.

This attempt ended in disaster. The troops of the Western Front in August 1920 were defeated near Warsaw.

In October, the belligerents signed an armistice, and in March 1921, a peace treaty. Under its terms, a significant part of the lands in the west of Ukraine and Belarus went to Poland.

In the midst of the Soviet-Polish war, General P.N. Wrangell. With the help of harsh measures, up to public executions of demoralized officers, and relying on the support of France, the general turned Denikin's scattered divisions into a disciplined and combat-ready Russian army. In June 1920, an assault was landed from the Crimea on the Don and Kuban, and the main forces of the Wrangelites were thrown into the Donbass. On October 3, the offensive of the Russian army began in a northwestern direction towards Kakhovka.

The offensive of the Wrangel troops was repulsed, and during the operation launched on October 28 by the army of the Southern Front under the command of M.V. Frunze completely captured the Crimea. On November 14-16, 1920, an armada of ships under the St. Andrew's flag left the shores of the peninsula, taking away the broken white regiments and tens of thousands of civilian refugees to a foreign land. Thus, P.N. Wrangel saved them from the merciless red terror that hit the Crimea immediately after the evacuation of the Whites.

In the European part of Russia, after the capture of the Crimea, it was liquidated last white front. The military question ceased to be the main one for Moscow, but the fighting on the outskirts of the country continued for many more months.

The Red Army, having defeated Kolchak, went out in the spring of 1920 to Transbaikalia. The Far East was at that time in the hands of Japan. To avoid a collision with it, the government of Soviet Russia contributed to the formation in April 1920 of a formally independent "buffer" state - the Far Eastern Republic (FER) with its capital in Chita. Soon the army of the Far East began military operations against the White Guards, supported by the Japanese, and in October 1922 occupied Vladivostok, completely clearing the Far East of whites and invaders. After that, it was decided to liquidate the FER and include it in the RSFSR.

The defeat of the interventionists and the whites in Eastern Siberia and the Far East (1918-1922)

The Civil War became the biggest drama of the 20th century and the greatest tragedy of Russia. The armed struggle that unfolded in the vastness of the country was carried out with extreme tension of the forces of the opponents, was accompanied by mass terror (both white and red), and was distinguished by exceptional mutual bitterness. Here is an excerpt from the memoirs of a participant in the Civil War, who talks about the soldiers of the Caucasian Front: “Well, how, son, is it not scary for a Russian to beat a Russian?” — the comrades ask the recruit. “At first it really seems awkward,” he replies, “and then, if the heart is inflamed, then no, nothing.” These words contain the merciless truth about the fratricidal war, in which almost the entire population of the country was drawn.

The fighting parties clearly understood that the struggle could only have a fatal outcome for one of the parties. That is why the civil war in Russia became a great tragedy for all its political camps, movements and parties.

“Red” (Bolsheviks and their supporters) believed that they were defending not only Soviet power in Russia, but also “the world revolution and the ideas of socialism.”

In the political struggle against the Soviet regime, two political movements consolidated:

• democratic counterrevolution with slogans for the return of political power to the Constituent Assembly and the restoration of the gains of the February (1917) revolution (many Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks advocated the establishment of Soviet power in Russia, but without the Bolsheviks (“For Soviets without Bolsheviks”));
• white movement with the slogans of "non-decision of the state system" and the elimination of Soviet power. This direction threatened not only the October, but also the February conquests. The counter-revolutionary white movement was not homogeneous. It included monarchists and liberal republicans, supporters of the Constituent Assembly and supporters of the military dictatorship. Among the "whites" there were differences in foreign policy guidelines: some hoped for the support of Germany (Ataman Krasnov), others - for the help of the Entente powers (Denikin, Kolchak, Yudenich). The “Whites” were united by their hatred of the Soviet regime and the Bolsheviks, the desire to preserve a united and indivisible Russia. They did not have a single political program, the military in the leadership of the “white movement” pushed politicians into the background. There was also no clear coordination of actions between the main groups of "whites". The leaders of the Russian counter-revolution were competing and at enmity with each other.

In the anti-Soviet anti-Bolshevik camp, part of the political opponents of the Soviets acted under a single SR-White Guard flag, part - only under the White Guard.

Bolsheviks had a stronger social base than their opponents. They received the decisive support of the workers of the cities and the rural poor. The position of the main peasant mass was not stable and unequivocal, only the poorest part of the peasants consistently followed the Bolsheviks. The peasants' vacillation had its own reasons: the "Reds" gave land, but then introduced a surplus appropriation, which caused strong discontent in the countryside. However, the return of the old order was also unacceptable for the peasantry: the victory of the “whites” threatened the return of land to the landowners and severe punishments for the destruction of landlord estates.

The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Anarchists hurried to take advantage of the vacillations of the peasants. They managed to involve a significant part of the peasantry in the armed struggle, both against the whites and against the reds.

For both warring parties, it was also important what position the Russian officers would take in the conditions of the civil war. Approximately 40% of the officers of the tsarist army joined the “white movement”, 30% sided with the Soviet government, 30% evaded participation in the civil war.

The Russian Civil War escalated armed intervention foreign powers. The interventionists conducted active military operations on the territory of the former Russian Empire, occupied some of its regions, contributed to inciting a civil war in the country and contributed to its prolongation. The intervention turned out to be an important factor in the “revolutionary all-Russian turmoil”, multiplied the number of victims.

At the first stage of the Civil War of 1917 - 1922/23, two powerful opposing forces took shape - "red" and "white". The first represented the Bolshevik camp, whose goal was a radical change in the existing system and the construction of a socialist regime, the second - the anti-Bolshevik camp, striving to return the order of the pre-revolutionary period.

The period between the February and October revolutions is the time of the formation and development of the Bolshevik regime, the stage of accumulation of forces. The main tasks of the Bolsheviks before the outbreak of the Civil War were: the formation of a social support, transformations in the country that would allow them to gain a foothold at the top of power in the country, and protect the achievements of the February Revolution.

The methods of the Bolsheviks in strengthening power were effective. First of all, this concerns propaganda among the population - the slogans of the Bolsheviks were relevant and helped to quickly form the social support of the "Reds".

The first armed detachments of the "Reds" began to appear at the preparatory stage - from March to October 1917. The main driving force behind such detachments were workers from industrial regions - this was the main force of the Bolsheviks, which helped them come to power during the October Revolution. At the time of the revolutionary events, the detachment numbered about 200,000 people.

The stage of formation of the power of the Bolsheviks required the protection of what was achieved during the revolution - for this, at the end of December 1917, the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission was created, headed by F. Dzerzhinsky. On January 15, 1918, the Cheka adopted a Decree on the creation of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army, and on January 29, the Red Fleet was created.

Analyzing the actions of the Bolsheviks, historians do not come to a consensus about their goals and motivations:

The most common opinion is that the “Reds” initially planned a large-scale Civil War, which would be a logical continuation of the revolution. Fighting, the purpose of which was to promote the ideas of the revolution, would have consolidated the power of the Bolsheviks and spread socialism throughout the world. During the war, the Bolsheviks planned to destroy the bourgeoisie as a class. Thus, based on this, the ultimate goal of the "Reds" is a world revolution.

One of the admirers of the second concept is V. Galin. This version is fundamentally different from the first - according to historians, the Bolsheviks had no intention of turning the revolution into a Civil War. The goal of the Bolsheviks was to seize power, which they succeeded in the course of the revolution. But the continuation of hostilities was not included in the plans. The arguments of the fans of this concept: the transformations planned by the "Reds" demanded peace in the country, at the first stage of the struggle, the "Reds" were tolerant of other political forces. A turning point regarding political opponents occurred when in 1918 there was a threat to lose power in the state. By 1918, the "Reds" had a strong, professionally trained enemy - the White Army. Its backbone was the military times of the Russian Empire. By 1918, the fight against this enemy became purposeful, the army of the "Reds" acquired a pronounced structure.

At the first stage of the war, the actions of the Red Army were not successful. Why?

Recruitment to the army was carried out on a voluntary basis, which led to decentralization and disunity. The army was created spontaneously, without a specific structure - this led to a low level of discipline, problems in managing a large number of volunteers. The chaotic army was not characterized by a high level of combat capability. Only since 1918, when the Bolshevik power was under threat, did the "Reds" decide to recruit troops according to the mobilization principle. From June 1918, they began to mobilize the military of the tsarist army.

The second reason is closely related to the first - against the chaotic, non-professional army of the "Reds" were organized, professional military, which at the time of the Civil War, participated in more than one battle. The "Whites" with a high level of patriotism were united not only by professionalism, but also by the idea - the White movement stood for a united and indivisible Russia, for order in the state.

The most characteristic feature of the Red Army is uniformity. First of all, it concerns the class origin. Unlike the "whites", whose army included professional soldiers, workers, and peasants, the "reds" accepted only proletarians and peasants into their ranks. The bourgeoisie was to be destroyed, so an important task was to prevent hostile elements from entering the Red Army.

In parallel with the hostilities, the Bolsheviks were implementing a political and economic program. The Bolsheviks pursued a policy of "red terror" against hostile social classes. In the economic sphere, "war communism" was introduced - a set of measures in the domestic policy of the Bolsheviks throughout the Civil War.

Biggest victories for the Reds:

• 1918 - 1919 - the establishment of Bolshevik power on the territory of Ukraine, Belarus, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia.
• The beginning of 1919 - the Red Army goes on the counteroffensive, defeating the "white" army of Krasnov.
• Spring-summer 1919 - Kolchak's troops fell under the blows of the "Reds".
• The beginning of 1920 - the "Reds" ousted the "Whites" from the northern cities of Russia.
• February-March 1920 - the defeat of the rest of the forces of Denikin's Volunteer Army.
• November 1920 - the "Reds" ousted the "Whites" from the Crimea.
• By the end of 1920, the "Reds" were opposed by scattered groups of the White Army. The civil war ended with the victory of the Bolsheviks.

In Russia, everyone knows about the “reds” and “whites”. From school, and even preschool years. "Reds" and "Whites" - this is the history of the civil war, these are the events of 1917-1920.

Who was then good, who is bad - in this case it does not matter. Ratings are changing. But the terms remained: “white” versus “red”. On the one hand - the armed forces of the Soviet state, on the other - the opponents of the Soviet state. Soviet - "red". Opponents, respectively, are “white”.

According to official historiography, there were many opponents. But the main ones are those who have shoulder straps on their uniforms, and cockades of the Russian army on their caps. Recognizable opponents, not to be confused with anyone. Kornilov, Denikin, Wrangel, Kolchak, etc. They are white". First of all, they should be overcome by the “reds”. They are also recognizable: they have no shoulder straps, and red stars on their caps. Such is the pictorial series of the civil war.

This is a tradition. It was approved by Soviet propaganda for more than seventy years. Propaganda was very effective, the graphic series became familiar, thanks to which the very symbolism of the civil war remained beyond comprehension. In particular, the questions about the reasons that led to the choice of red and white colors to designate the opposing forces remained beyond comprehension.

As for the “reds”, the reason was, it seems, obvious. The Reds called themselves that.

Soviet troops were originally called the Red Guard. Then - the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army. The Red Army soldiers swore allegiance to the red banner. State flag. Why the flag was chosen red - explanations were given different. For example: it is a symbol of “the blood of freedom fighters”. But in any case, the name “red” corresponded to the color of the banner.

You can't say anything about the so-called "whites". Opponents of the "Reds" did not swear allegiance to the white banner. During the Civil War, there was no such banner at all. Nobody.

Nevertheless, the name “White” was established behind the opponents of the “Reds”.

At least one reason is also obvious here: the leaders of the Soviet state called their opponents "white". First of all - V. Lenin.

To use his terminology, the "Reds" defended "the power of the workers and peasants", the power of the "workers' and peasants' government", and the "Whites" defended "the power of the tsar, the landlords and the capitalists". Such a scheme was approved by all the might of Soviet propaganda. On posters, in newspapers, and finally in songs:

White army black baron

Again they prepare the royal throne for us,

But from the taiga to the British seas

The Red Army is the strongest of all!

It was written in 1920. Lyrics by P. Grigoriev, music by S. Pokrass. One of the most popular army marches of the time. Here everything is clearly defined, here it is clear why the “Reds” are against the “Whites”, commanded by the “Black Baron”.

But so - in the Soviet song. In life, as usual, otherwise.

The notorious "black baron" - P. Wrangel. "Black" he was called by the Soviet poet. It must be assumed that it was clear: this Wrangel is very bad. The characterization here is emotional, not political. But from the point of view of propaganda, it is successful: the “White Army” is commanded by a bad person. "Black".

In this case, it doesn't matter if it's bad or good. It is important that Wrangel was Baron, but he never commanded the White Army. Because there wasn't one. There was the Volunteer Army, the Armed Forces of the South of Russia, the Russian Army, etc. But there was no “White Army” during the years of the civil war.

From April 1920, Wrangel took the post of commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia, then - commander-in-chief of the Russian army. These are the official titles of his positions. At the same time, Wrangel did not call himself “white”. And he did not call his troops the “White Army”.

By the way, A. Denikin, whom Wrangel replaced as commander, also did not use the term “White Army”. And L. Kornilov, who created and led the Volunteer Army in 1918, did not call his comrades-in-arms "white".

They were called that in the Soviet press. "White Army", "White" or "White Guards". However, the reasons for the choice of terms were not explained.

The question of the reasons was also avoided by Soviet historians. Delicately bypassed. Not that they were completely silent, no. They reported something, but at the same time they literally evaded a direct answer. Always dodged.

A classic example is the reference book “Civil War and Military Intervention in the USSR”, published in 1983 by the Moscow publishing house “Soviet Encyclopedia”. The concept of "White Army" is not described there at all. But there is an article about the "White Guard". By opening the corresponding page, the reader could find out that the "White Guard" -

the unofficial name of the military formations (White Guards) who fought for the restoration of the bourgeois-landlord system in Russia. The origin of the term “White Guard” is associated with the traditional symbolism of white as the color of supporters of the “legal” law and order, as opposed to red - the color of the insurgent people, the color of revolution.

That's all.

There seems to be an explanation, but nothing has become clearer.

It is not clear, firstly, how to understand the turnover “informal name”. Who is it “unofficial” for? In the Soviet state, it was official. What can be seen, in particular, in other articles of the same directory. Where official documents and materials of Soviet periodicals are quoted. It can, of course, be understood that one of the military leaders of that time unofficially called his troops “white”. Here the author of the article would clarify who it was. However, there are no details. Understand as you wish.

Secondly, it is impossible to understand from the article where and when that very “traditional symbolism of white color” first appeared, what kind of legal order the author of the article calls “legal”, why the word “legal” is enclosed in quotation marks by the author of the article, finally, why “red - the color of the rebellious people. Again, as you wish, so understand.

Approximately in the same vein, the information in other Soviet reference publications, from the first to the last, is sustained. This is not to say that the necessary materials cannot be found there at all. It is possible if they have already been obtained from other sources, and therefore the seeker knows which articles should contain at least bits of information that must be collected and put together in order to then get a kind of mosaic.

The evasions of Soviet historians look rather strange. There would seem to be no reason to avoid the question of the history of terms.

In fact, there was never any mystery here. But there was a propaganda scheme, which Soviet ideologists considered inappropriate to explain in reference publications.

It was in the Soviet era that the terms “red” and “white” were predictably associated with the civil war in Russia. And before 1917, the terms "white" and "red" were correlated with another tradition. Another civil war.

Beginning - the Great French Revolution. Confrontation between monarchists and republicans. Then, indeed, the essence of the confrontation was expressed at the level of the colors of the banners.

The white banner was originally. This is the royal banner. Well, the red banner, the banner of the Republicans, did not appear immediately.

As you know, in July 1789, the French king ceded power to a new government that called itself revolutionary. The king after that was not declared an enemy of the revolution. On the contrary, he was proclaimed the guarantor of her conquests. It was also possible to preserve the monarchy, albeit limited, constitutional. The king then still had enough supporters in Paris. But, on the other hand, there were even more radicals who demanded further transformations.

That is why on October 21, 1789, the "Law of Martial Law" was passed. The new law described the actions of the Parisian municipality. Actions required in emergency situations fraught with uprisings. Or street riots that threaten the revolutionary government.

Article 1 of the new law read:

In the event of a threat to public peace, the members of the municipality, by virtue of the duties entrusted to them by the commune, must declare that military force is immediately necessary to restore peace.

The desired signal was described in article 2. It read:

This announcement is made in such a way that a red banner is hung out of the main window of the town hall and in the streets.

What followed was determined by Article 3:

When the red banner is hoisted, all gatherings of the people, armed or unarmed, are recognized as criminal and dispersed by military force.

It can be noted that in this case the “red banner” is, in fact, not yet a banner. So far, just a sign. Danger signal given by a red flag. A sign of a threat to the new order. To what was called revolutionary. A signal calling for the protection of order on the streets.

But the red flag did not remain a signal for long, calling for the protection of at least some order. Soon desperate radicals began to dominate the city government of Paris. Principled and consistent opponents of the monarchy. Even a constitutional monarchy. Thanks to their efforts, the red flag has acquired a new meaning.

Hanging out red flags, the city government gathered its supporters to carry out violent actions. Actions that were supposed to intimidate the supporters of the king and everyone who was against radical changes.

Armed sans-culottes gathered under red flags. It was under the red flag in August 1792 that the sans-culottes, organized by the then city government, marched to storm the Tuileries. That's when the red flag really became a banner. The banner of uncompromising Republicans. Radicals. The red banner and the white banner became symbols of the opposing sides. Republicans and monarchists.

Later, as you know, the red banner was no longer so popular. The French tricolor became the national flag of the Republic. In the Napoleonic era, the red banner was almost forgotten. And after the restoration of the monarchy, it - as a symbol - completely lost its relevance.

This symbol was updated in the 1840s. Updated for those who declared themselves the heirs of the Jacobins. Then the opposition of “reds” and “whites” became a common place in journalism.

But the French Revolution of 1848 ended with yet another restoration of the monarchy. Therefore, the opposition of “reds” and “whites” has again lost its relevance.

Once again, the "Red"/"White" opposition arose at the end of the Franco-Prussian War. Finally, it was established from March to May 1871, during the existence of the Paris Commune.

City-Republic The Paris Commune was perceived as the realization of the most radical ideas. The Paris Commune declared itself the heir to the Jacobin traditions, the heir to the traditions of those sans-culottes who came out under the red banner to defend the “gains of the revolution”.

The state flag was also a symbol of continuity. Red. Accordingly, the “reds” are the Communards. Defenders of the city-republic.

As you know, at the turn of the XIX-XX centuries, many socialists declared themselves the heirs of the Communards. And at the beginning of the 20th century, the Bolsheviks first of all called themselves such. Communists. They considered the red flag as their own.

As for the confrontation with the “whites”, there seemed to be no contradictions here. By definition, socialists are opponents of the autocracy, therefore, nothing has changed.

The "Reds" were still opposed to the "Whites". Republicans - monarchists.

After the abdication of Nicholas II, the situation changed.

The tsar abdicated in favor of his brother, but his brother did not accept the crown, a Provisional Government was formed, so that the monarchy no longer existed, and the opposition of “reds” to “whites” seemed to have lost its relevance. The new Russian government, as you know, was called “provisional” for this reason, because it was supposed to prepare the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. And the Constituent Assembly, popularly elected, was to determine the further forms of Russian statehood. Determine democratically. The question of the abolition of the monarchy was considered already resolved.

But the Provisional Government lost power without having time to convene the Constituent Assembly, which was convened by the Council of People's Commissars. It is hardly worth discussing why the Council of People's Commissars considered it necessary to dissolve the Constituent Assembly now. In this case, something else is more important: most of the opponents of Soviet power set the task of convening the Constituent Assembly again. This was their slogan.

In particular, it was the slogan of the so-called Volunteer Army formed on the Don, which was eventually led by Kornilov. Other military leaders also fought for the Constituent Assembly, referred to in Soviet periodicals as “whites”. They fought against Soviet state, not behind monarchy.

And here we should pay tribute to the talents of Soviet ideologists. We should pay tribute to the skill of Soviet propagandists. By declaring themselves "Red", the Bolsheviks were able to attach the label of "White" to their opponents. Managed to impose this label - contrary to the facts.

Soviet ideologists declared all their opponents to be supporters of the destroyed regime - autocracy. They were declared "white". This label was itself a political argument. Every monarchist is “white” by definition. Accordingly, if “white”, then a monarchist. For any more or less educated person.

The label was used even when it seemed ridiculous to use it. For example, “White Czechs”, “White Finns”, then “White Poles” arose, although the Czechs, Finns and Poles who fought with the “Reds” were not going to recreate the monarchy. Neither in Russia nor abroad. However, the label “white” was familiar to most of the “reds”, which is why the term itself seemed understandable. If “white”, then always “for the king”.

Opponents of the Soviet government could prove that they - for the most part - are not monarchists at all. But there was no way to prove it.

Soviet ideologists had a major advantage in the information war: in the territory controlled by the Soviet government, political events were discussed only in the Soviet press. There was almost no other. All opposition publications were closed. Yes, and Soviet publications were tightly controlled by censorship. The population practically had no other sources of information.

That is why many Russian intellectuals really considered the opponents of Soviet power to be monarchists. The term “whites” emphasized this once again. If they are “white”, then they are monarchists.

It is worth emphasizing that the propaganda scheme imposed by Soviet ideologists was very effective. M. Tsvetaeva, for example, was convinced by Soviet propagandists.

As you know, her husband - S. Efron - fought in the Kornilov Volunteer Army. Tsvetaeva lived in Moscow and in 1918 wrote a poetic cycle dedicated to the Kornilovites - “The Swan Camp”.

She then despised and hated the Soviet regime, the heroes for her were those who fought with the “reds”. Tsvetaeva was convinced by Soviet propaganda only that the Kornilovites were “white”. According to Soviet propaganda, the “whites” set mercantile goals. With Tsvetaeva, everything is fundamentally different. The "whites" sacrificed themselves disinterestedly, without demanding anything in return.

White Guard, your path is high:

Black barrel - chest and temple ...

For Soviet propagandists, "whites" are, of course, enemies, executioners. And for Tsvetaeva, the enemies of the “Reds” are martyr warriors who selflessly oppose the forces of evil. What she formulated with the utmost clarity -

holy White Guard army...

What is common in Soviet propaganda texts and Tsvetaeva's poems is that the enemies of the "Reds" are certainly "Whites".

Tsvetaeva interpreted the Russian civil war in terms of the French Revolution. In terms of the French Civil War. Kornilov formed the Volunteer Army on the Don. That is why the Don for Tsvetaeva is the legendary Vendee, where the French peasants remained faithful to traditions, loyalty to the king, did not recognize the revolutionary government, fought with the republican troops. Kornilovites - Vendeans. What is directly stated in the same poem:

The old world's last dream:

Youth, valor, Vendée, Don...

The label imposed by Bolshevik propaganda became a real banner for Tsvetaeva. The logic of tradition.

The Kornilovites are at war with the "Reds", with the troops of the Soviet Republic. In the newspapers, the Kornilovites, and then the Denikinists, are called “whites”. They are called monarchists. For Tsvetaeva, there is no contradiction here. “Whites” are monarchists by definition. Tsvetaeva hates the “Reds”, her husband is with the “Whites”, which means she is a monarchist.

For a monarchist, the king is God's anointed. He is the only legitimate ruler. Legitimate precisely because of its divine destiny. What Tsvetaeva wrote about:

The king from heaven to the throne is raised:

It is pure as snow and sleep.

The king will ascend the throne again.

It's holy as blood and sweat...

In the logical scheme adopted by Tsvetaeva, there is only one defect, but it is significant. The volunteer army has never been "white". It is in the traditional interpretation of the term. In particular, on the Don, where Soviet newspapers were not yet read, Kornilovites, and then Denikinites, were called not “whites”, but “volunteers” or “cadets”.

For the local population, the defining feature was either the official name of the army, or the name of the party that sought to convene the Constituent Assembly. The Constitutional-Democratic Party, which everyone called - according to the officially adopted abbreviation “k.-d.” - cadet. Neither Kornilov, nor Denikin, nor Wrangel "tsar's throne", contrary to the assertion of the Soviet poet, "prepared".

Tsvetaeva did not know about this at the time. After a few years, she, according to her, became disillusioned with those whom she considered “white”. But the poems - evidence of the effectiveness of the Soviet propaganda scheme - remained.

Not all Russian intellectuals, despising the Soviet regime, were in a hurry to join forces with its opponents. With those who were called “whites” in the Soviet press. They were indeed perceived as monarchists, and intellectuals saw the monarchists as a danger to democracy. Moreover, the danger is no less than the communists. Still, the “Reds” were perceived as Republicans. Well, the victory of the “whites” meant the restoration of the monarchy. Which was unacceptable for intellectuals. And not only for intellectuals - for the majority of the population of the former Russian Empire. Why did Soviet ideologists affirm the labels “red” and “white” in the public mind.

Thanks to these labels, not only Russians, but also many Western public figures comprehended the struggle between supporters and opponents of Soviet power as a struggle between republicans and monarchists. Supporters of the republic and supporters of the restoration of autocracy. And the Russian autocracy was considered in Europe as savagery, a relic of barbarism.

That is why Western intellectuals' support for the supporters of autocracy provoked a predictable protest. Western intellectuals have discredited the actions of their governments. They set public opinion against them, which governments could not ignore. With all the ensuing grave consequences - for the Russian opponents of Soviet power. Why did the so-called “whites” lose the propaganda war. Not only in Russia, but also abroad.

Yes, the so-called “whites” were essentially “reds”. Only it didn't change anything. The propagandists who sought to help Kornilov, Denikin, Wrangel and other opponents of the Soviet regime were not as energetic, talented, and efficient as the Soviet propagandists.

Moreover, the tasks solved by Soviet propagandists were much simpler.

Soviet propagandists could clearly and concisely explain for what And with whom the Reds are fighting. True, no, it doesn't matter. The main thing is to be brief and clear. The positive part of the program was obvious. Ahead - the kingdom of equality, justice, where there are no poor and humiliated, where there will always be plenty of everything. Opponents, respectively, the rich, fighting for their privileges. "Whites" and allies of "whites". Because of them, all the troubles and hardships. There will be no “whites”, there will be no troubles, no hardships.

Opponents of the Soviet regime could not clearly and briefly explain for what they are fighting. Such slogans as the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, the preservation of "one and indivisible Russia" were not and could not be popular. Of course, opponents of the Soviet regime could more or less convincingly explain with whom And Why they are fighting. However, the positive part of the program remained unclear. And there was no common program.

In addition, in the territories not controlled by the Soviet government, opponents of the regime failed to achieve an information monopoly. This is partly why the results of the propaganda were incommensurable with the results of the Bolshevik propagandists.

It is difficult to determine whether the Soviet ideologists consciously immediately imposed the label of “whites” on their opponents, whether they intuitively chose such a move. In any case, they made a good choice, and most importantly, they acted consistently and efficiently. Convincing the population that the opponents of the Soviet regime are fighting for the restoration of autocracy. Because they are "white".

Of course, there were monarchists among the so-called “whites”. The real whites. Defended the principles of autocratic monarchy long before its fall.

For example, V. Shulgin and V. Purishkevich called themselves monarchists. They really talked about the “holy white cause”, tried to organize propaganda for the restoration of the autocracy. Denikin later wrote about them:

For Shulgin and his associates, monarchism was not a form of government, but a religion. In a fit of enthusiasm for the idea, they took their faith for knowledge, their desires for real facts, their moods for the people ...

Here Denikin is quite accurate. A republican can be an atheist, but there is no real monarchism outside of religion.

The monarchist serves the monarch not because he considers the monarchy the best “state system”, here political considerations are secondary, if at all relevant. For a true monarchist, service to a monarch is a religious duty. As Tsvetaeva claimed.

But in the Volunteer Army, as in other armies that fought against the "Reds", there were negligibly few monarchists. Why didn't they play any important role.

For the most part, ideological monarchists generally avoided participation in the civil war. This was not their war. Them for no one was to fight.

Nicholas II was not forcibly deprived of the throne. The Russian emperor abdicated voluntarily. And released from the oath all those who swore to him. His brother did not accept the crown, so the monarchists did not swear allegiance to the new king. Because there was no new king. There was no one to serve, no one to protect. The monarchy no longer existed.

Undoubtedly, it was not fitting for a monarchist to fight for the Council of People's Commissars. However, it did not follow from anywhere that a monarchist should - in the absence of a monarch - fight for the Constituent Assembly. Both the Council of People's Commissars and the Constituent Assembly were not legitimate authorities for the monarchist.

For a monarchist, legitimate power is only the power of the God-given monarch to whom the monarchist swore allegiance. Therefore, the war with the "Reds" - for the monarchists - became a matter of personal choice, and not of religious duty. For a “white”, if he is really “white”, those fighting for the Constituent Assembly are “reds”. Most monarchists did not want to understand the shades of "red". It did not see the point in fighting against other “Reds” together with some “Reds”.

As you know, N. Gumilyov declared himself a monarchist, having returned to Petrograd from abroad at the end of April 1918.

The civil war has already become commonplace. The volunteer army fought its way to the Kuban. In September, the Soviet government officially declared the “Red Terror”. Mass arrests and executions of hostages have become commonplace. The "Reds" suffered defeats, won victories, and Gumilyov worked in Soviet publishing houses, lectured in literary studios, led the "Workshop of Poets", etc. But he defiantly “was baptized in the church” and never renounced what was said about his monarchical convictions.

A nobleman, a former officer, who called himself a monarchist in Bolshevik Petrograd - this looked overly shocking. A few years later, this was interpreted as an absurd bravado, a senseless game with death. A manifestation of the strangeness inherent in poetic natures in general and Gumilyov in particular. A demonstrative disregard for danger, a propensity for risk were, in the opinion of many of Gumilev's acquaintances, always characteristic of him.

However, the strangeness of the poetic nature, the propensity for risk, almost pathological, can explain anything. In fact, such an explanation is hardly acceptable. Yes, Gumilyov took risks, desperately took risks, and yet there was logic in his behavior. What he himself had to say.

For example, he argued, somewhat ironically, that the Bolsheviks strive for certainty, but everything is clear with him. In terms of the Soviet propaganda context, there is no clarity here. Given the context then implied, everything is indeed clear. If a monarchist, it means that he did not want to be among the "Cadets", supporters of the Constituent Assembly. A monarchist - in the absence of a monarch - is neither a supporter nor an opponent of the Soviet government. He does not fight for the “Reds”, he does not fight against the “Reds” either. He has no one to fight for.

Such a position of an intellectual, a writer, although not approved by the Soviet government, was not considered dangerous then. For the time being, there was enough willingness to cooperate.

Gumilyov did not need to explain to the Chekists why he did not get into the Volunteer Army or other formations that fought with the “Reds”. Other manifestations of loyalty were also enough: work in Soviet publishing houses, Proletkult, etc. Explanations awaited acquaintances, friends, admirers.

Of course, Gumilyov is not the only writer who became an officer and refused to participate in the civil war on anyone's side. But in this case, the most important role was played by literary reputation.

It was necessary to survive in hungry Petrograd, and in order to survive, compromises had to be made. Work for those who served the government that declared the “Red Terror”. Many acquaintances of Gumilev habitually identified Gumilev's lyrical hero with the author. Compromises were easily forgiven to anyone, but not to a poet who praised desperate courage and contempt for death. For Gumilyov, no matter how ironically he treated public opinion, it was in this case that the task of correlating everyday life and literary reputation was relevant.

He has dealt with similar issues before. He wrote about travelers and warriors, dreamed of becoming a traveler, a warrior, a famous poet. And he became a traveler, moreover, not just an amateur, but an ethnographer working for the Academy of Sciences. He went to war as a volunteer, was twice awarded for bravery, promoted to officer, and gained fame as a military journalist. He also became a famous poet. By 1918, as they say, he proved everything to everyone. And he was going to return to what he considered the main thing. Literature was the main thing. What did he do in Petrograd.

But when there is a war, a warrior is supposed to fight. The former reputation contradicted everyday life, and the reference to monarchical convictions partly removed the contradiction. A monarchist - in the absence of a monarch - has the right to take any power for granted, agreeing with the choice of the majority.

Whether he was a monarchist or not, one can argue. Before the outbreak of the World War and during the years of the World War, Gumilev's monarchism, as they say, was not evident. And Gumilev's religiosity too. But in Soviet Petrograd, Gumilyov spoke about monarchism, and even defiantly “baptized himself on the church.” It is understandable: if a monarchist, then religious.

It seems that Gumilyov consciously chose a kind of game of monarchism. A game that made it possible to explain why the nobleman and officer, not being a supporter of the Soviet government, evaded participation in the civil war. Yes, the choice was risky, but - for the time being - not suicidal.

About his real choice, not about the game, he said quite clearly:

You know that I'm not red

But not white - I'm a poet!

Gumilyov did not declare allegiance to the Soviet regime. He ignored the regime, was fundamentally apolitical. Accordingly, he formulated his tasks:

In our difficult and terrible time, the salvation of the spiritual culture of the country is possible only through the work of each in the area that he chose before.

He did exactly what he promised. Perhaps he sympathized with those who fought with the “reds”. Among the opponents of the "Reds" were Gumilyov fellow soldiers. However, there is no reliable information about Gumilev's desire to participate in the civil war. Together with some compatriots, Gumilev did not begin to fight against other compatriots.

It seems that Gumilev considered the Soviet regime a reality that could not be changed in the foreseeable future. What he said in a comic impromptu addressed to the wife of A. Remizov:

At the gates of Jerusalem

An angel is waiting for my soul

I'm here and, Seraphim

Pavlovna, I sing you.

I'm not ashamed before an angel

How long do we have to endure

Kiss us for a long time, apparently

We are a scourging whip.

But you, almighty angel,

I am guilty because

That the broken Wrangel fled

And the Bolsheviks in the Crimea.

It is clear that the irony was bitter. It is also clear that Gumilyov again tried to explain why he was not “Red”, although he was not and never intended to be with those who defended Crimea from the “Reds” in 1920.

Gumilyov was officially recognized as "white" after his death.

He was arrested on August 3, 1921. The troubles of acquaintances and colleagues turned out to be useless, and no one really knew why he was arrested. The security officers, as was customary initially, did not give explanations during the investigation. It was, as usual, short-lived.

On September 1, 1921, Petrogradskaya Pravda published a lengthy report by the Petrograd Provincial Extraordinary Commission -

About the disclosure in Petrograd of a conspiracy against the Soviet power.

Judging by the newspaper, the conspirators united in the so-called Petrograd Combat Organization, or, for short, the PBO. And cooked

restoration of bourgeois-landlord power with a dictator-general at the head.

According to the Chekists, the generals of the Russian army, as well as foreign intelligence services, led the PBO from abroad -

Finnish General Staff, American, English.

The scale of the conspiracy was constantly emphasized. The Chekists claimed that the PBO not only prepared terrorist acts, but also planned to capture five settlements at once:

Simultaneously with the active action in Petrograd, uprisings were to take place in Rybinsk, Bologoye, St. Rousse and at st. Bottom with the aim of cutting off Petrograd from Moscow.

The newspaper also cited a list of "active participants" who were shot in accordance with the decision of the Presidium of the Petrograd Provincial Cheka of August 24, 1921. Gumilyov is thirtieth on the list. Among former officers, well-known scientists, teachers, sisters of mercy, etc.

It is said about him:

Member of the Petrograd Combat Organization, actively contributed to the drafting of proclamations of counter-revolutionary content, promised to associate with the organization a group of intellectuals who would actively take part in the uprising, received money from the organization for technical needs.

Few of Gumilev's acquaintances believed in the conspiracy. With a minimally critical attitude towards the Soviet press and the presence of at least superficial military knowledge, it was impossible not to notice that the tasks of the PBO described by the Chekists were unsolvable. This is first. Secondly, what was said about Gumilyov looked absurd. It was known that he did not participate in the civil war, on the contrary, for three years he declared apathy. And suddenly - not a fight, an open fight, not even emigration, but a conspiracy, an underground. Not only the risk that, under other circumstances, Gumilev's reputation would not contradict, but also deceit, treachery. Somehow it didn’t look like Gumilev.

However, Soviet citizens in 1921 did not have the opportunity to refute information about the conspiracy in the Soviet press. The emigrants argued, sometimes frankly mocking the KGB version.

It is possible that the “PBO case” would not have received such publicity abroad if the all-Russian famous poet, whose fame was growing rapidly, had not been on the list of the executed, or if everything had happened a year earlier. And in September 1921 it was a scandal at the international level.

The Soviet government has already announced the transition to the so-called "new economic policy". In Soviet periodicals, it was emphasized that the “Red Terror” was no longer needed, KGB executions were also recognized as an excessive measure. A new task was officially promoted - to end the isolation of the Soviet state. The execution of Petrograd scientists and writers, a typical KGB execution, as was the case in the era of the "Red Terror", discredited the government.

The reasons that led to the action of the Petrograd province
Extraordinary Commission, have not been explained so far. Their analysis is beyond the scope of this work. It is only obvious that the Chekists soon tried to somehow change the scandalous situation.

Information about the deal, the official agreement allegedly signed by the leader of the PBO and the Chekist investigator, was intensively disseminated among the emigrants: the arrested leader of the conspirators, the famous Petrograd scientist V. Tagantsev, reveals the plans of the PBO, names the accomplices, and the Chekist leadership guarantees that everyone will be saved life. And it turned out that the conspiracy existed, but the leader of the conspirators showed cowardice, and the Chekists broke their promise.

It was, of course, an "export" option, designed for foreigners or emigrants who did not know or had time to forget the Soviet legal specifics. Yes, the very idea of ​​a deal was not new at that time in European and not only European countries, yes, deals of this kind were not always fully respected, which was also not news. However, the agreement signed by the investigator and the accused in Soviet Russia is absurd. Here, unlike in a number of other countries, there was no legal mechanism that would allow such transactions to be officially concluded. It was not in 1921, it was not before, it was not later.

Note that the security officers have solved their problem, at least in part. Abroad, though not all, but some admitted that if there was a traitor, then there was a conspiracy. And the faster the details of newspaper reports were forgotten, the faster the specifics, the plans of the conspirators described by the Chekists, were forgotten, the easier it was to believe that there were some plans and Gumilyov intended to help implement them. Which is why he died. Over the years, the number of believers has increased.

Gumilyov's literary reputation again played the most important role here. The poet-warrior, according to most of his admirers, was not destined to die naturally - from old age, illness, etc. He himself wrote:

And I will not die in bed

With a notary and a doctor ...

It was taken as a prophecy. G. Ivanov, summing up, argued:

In essence, for a biography of Gumilyov, such a biography as he wanted for himself, it is difficult to imagine a more brilliant end.

Ivanov was not interested in political specifics in this case. Predestination is important, the ideal completeness of a poetic biography, it is important that the poet and the lyrical hero have the same fate.

Many others wrote about Gumilyov in a similar way. Therefore, the memoirs of writers, directly or indirectly confirming that Gumilyov was a conspirator, are hardly appropriate to accept as evidence. Firstly, they appeared quite late, and secondly, with rare exceptions, the stories of writers about themselves and other writers are also literature. Artistic.

The execution became the main argument in creating the political characterization of the poet. In the 1920s - through the efforts of Soviet propagandists - the civil war was understood everywhere as a war of "reds" and "whites". After the end of the war with the label "whites" one way or another agreed with those who, fighting with the "reds", remained opponents of the restoration of the monarchy. The term has lost its former meaning, another tradition of word usage has appeared. And Gumilyov called himself a monarchist, he was recognized as a conspirator who intended to participate in an uprising against the “Reds”. Accordingly, he should have been recognized as "white". In a new sense of the term.

In Gumilyov's homeland, attempts to prove that he was not a conspirator were made back in the second half of the 1950s - after the 20th Congress of the CPSU.

There was no search for truth here. The goal was to remove the censorship ban. As you know, the “White Guards”, especially those convicted and executed, were not supposed to have mass circulations. First rehabilitation, then circulation.

However, in this case, the 20th Congress of the CPSU did not change anything. Because Gumilyov was shot when Stalin had not yet come to power. The “PBO case” could not be attributed to the notorious “cult of personality”. The era was undeniably Leninist, for the Soviet press the official communication was prepared by subordinates of F. Dzerzhinsky. And the discrediting of this “knight of the revolution” was not part of the plans of Soviet ideologists. The “PBO case” still remained beyond critical reflection.

Attempts to lift the censorship ban intensified almost thirty years later: in the second half of the 1980s, the collapse of the Soviet ideological system became apparent. Censorship pressure was rapidly weakening, as was the state power. Gumilyov's popularity, despite all the censorship restrictions, was constantly growing, which Soviet ideologists had to reckon with. In this situation, it would be expedient to remove the restrictions, but to remove them, so to speak, without losing face. Not just to allow mass circulation of the books of the “White Guard”, although such a solution would be the simplest, and not to rehabilitate the poet, officially confirming that the PBO was invented by the Chekists, but to find a kind of compromise: without calling into question “the disclosure in Petrograd of a conspiracy against Soviet power ”, to admit that Gumilyov was not a conspirator.

To solve such a difficult task, various versions were created - not without the participation of "competent authorities". Created and very actively discussed in periodicals.

The first is the version of “involvement, but not complicity”: Gumilyov, according to secret archival materials, was not a conspirator, he only knew about the conspiracy, did not want to report on the conspirators, the punishment was excessively severe, and allegedly for this reason the issue of rehabilitation was practically resolved.

In the legal aspect, the version is, of course, absurd, but it also had a much more serious drawback. It contradicted the official publications of 1921. Gumilyov was convicted and shot among the "active participants", he was charged with specific actions, specific plans. There were no reports of "misreporting" in the newspapers.

Finally, emboldened historians and philologists demanded that they, too, be allowed access to archival materials, and this could already end in the exposure of “Dzerzhinsky’s associates.” So no compromise was reached. The version of “involvement, but not complicity” had to be forgotten.

The second compromise version was put forward already at the end of the 1980s: there was a conspiracy, but the investigation materials do not contain sufficient evidence of the crimes that Gumilyov was accused of, which means that only the Chekist investigator is guilty of the death of the poet, only one investigator, due to negligence or personal hostility literally brought Gumilyov under execution.

From a legal point of view, the second compromise version is also absurd, which was easily seen by comparing the materials of the “Gumilyov case” published at the end of the 1980s with the publications of 1921. The authors of the new version involuntarily contradicted themselves.

However, the disputes dragged on, which did not contribute to the growth of the authority of the “competent authorities”. Some decision had to be made.

In August 1991, the CPSU finally lost influence, and in September the Board of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR, having considered the protest of the USSR Prosecutor General against the decision of the Presidium of the Petrograd Provincial Cheka, canceled the sentence against Gumilyov. The poet was rehabilitated, the proceedings were terminated "for lack of corpus delicti".

This decision was as absurd as the versions that prompted him to take it. It turned out that an anti-Soviet conspiracy existed, Gumilyov was a conspirator, but participation in an anti-Soviet conspiracy was not a crime. The tragedy ended in a farce seventy years later. The logical result of attempts to save the authority of the Cheka, to save at all costs.

The farce was discontinued a year later. The Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation has officially admitted that the entire “PBO case” is a falsification.

It is worth emphasizing once again: the description of the reasons due to which the “PBO case” was falsified by the Chekists is beyond the scope of this work. The role of terminological factors is interesting here.

Unlike Tsvetaeva, Gumilyov initially saw and emphasized the terminological contradiction: those whom Soviet propaganda called “whites” were not “whites”. Were not "white" in the traditional interpretation of the term. They were imaginary “whites”, because they did not fight for the monarch. Using a terminological contradiction, Gumilyov built a concept that made it possible to explain why he did not participate in the civil war. The declared monarchism was - for Gumilyov - a convincing justification for apoliticality. But in the summer of 1921, the Petrograd Chekists, hastily choosing candidates for “active participants” in the PBO, hastily invented on the instructions of the party leadership, also chose Gumilyov. In particular, and because Soviet propaganda determined: monarchism and apoliticality are incompatible. This means that Gumilyov's participation in the conspiracy must have seemed quite motivated. The facts here did not matter, because the task set by the party leadership was being solved.

Thirty-five years later, when the question of rehabilitation arose, the monarchism declared by Gumilyov again became almost the only argument that somehow confirmed the shaky Chekist version. The facts were again ignored. If a monarchist, then he was not apolitical. "White" is not supposed to be apolitical, "White" is supposed to participate in anti-Soviet conspiracies.

Thirty years later there were no other arguments either. And those who insisted on the rehabilitation of Gumilyov still diligently avoided the question of monarchism. They talked about the bravado inherent in the poet, about the propensity to take risks, about anything, but not about the original terminological contradiction. The Soviet terminological construction was still effective.

Meanwhile, the concept used by Gumilev to justify refusal to participate in the civil war was known not only to Gumilev's acquaintances. Because it was used not only by Gumilyov.

It is described, for example, by M. Bulgakov: the heroes of the novel “The White Guard”, who call themselves monarchists, at the end of 1918 do not at all intend to participate in the flaring civil war, and they do not see any contradiction here. He is not. The monarch has renounced, there is no one to serve. For the sake of food, you can serve at least the Ukrainian hetman, or you can not serve at all when there are other sources of income. Now, if the monarch appeared, if he called upon the monarchists to serve him, which is mentioned more than once in the novel, service would be obligatory, and he would have to fight.

True, the heroes of the novel still cannot get away from the civil war, but an analysis of the specific circumstances that led to a new choice, as well as consideration of the question of the truth of their monarchical convictions, are not included in the task of this work. It is significant that Bulgakov calls his heroes, who justified their refusal to participate in the civil war by reference to monarchical convictions, the “white guard”. Proves that they really are the best. Because they are really “white”. They, and not at all those who fight against Council of People's Commissars or behind Constituent Assembly.

In the late 1960s, not to mention the 1980s, Bulgakov's novel was well-known. But the concept, which was based on the traditional interpretation of the term "whites", the very terminological game described by Bulgakov and understood by many of his contemporaries, was usually not recognized by readers decades later. Exceptions were rare. Readers no longer saw the tragic irony in the title of the novel. Just as they did not see the terminological game in Gumilev's arguments about monarchism and apoliticality, they did not understand the connection between religiosity and monarchism in Tsvetaeva's poems about the "White Guard".

There are many examples of this kind. These examples relate primarily to the history of ideas expressed in current and/or de-actualized political terms.