Many times I had to stumble upon such questions on the Internet. Some people are sure that war in Afghanistan was meaningless. Some whim of the bloodthirsty Soviet regime, which suddenly took it and out of boredom decided to arrange a massacre, in the manner of Vietnam.

“Degenerates tend to hate normal people. Millions and millions of normal people perish for the amusement and sadistic pleasure of the leaders of a degenerate sect."
G.P. Klimov

Other people sincerely do not understand - why was this war needed? The official reason is "support for a loyal USSR government in Afghanistan" does not give an answer (primarily a moral one), but why did the Russian soldiers themselves have to die in order to solve the political issues of another country? No visible benefit supposedly have not received.

So Why was the war in Afghanistan started?

The main stumbling block in this matter is that the causes of the Afghan war lie not in what we got (seized territory or achieved some other tangible good), but in what was avoided, what negative events NOT happened.

It is this formulation of the question that gives rise to the position - was there a threat at all? After all, if it did not exist, then it is absolutely fair to consider such a war senseless.

Here I want to emphasize and draw your attention to a very important detail. This position was still justified in 1989. But today it is completely untenable for a very simple reason. If earlier the calculation of all threats was available only to the special services and was an exclusively theoretical calculation, today it is available to everyone who has access to the Internet, because all the predicted threats have actually come true.

A bit of theory

The USSR adhered to the ideology of internationalism and friendship of peoples. There is an opinion that this friendship was imposed on people almost by force. There is some truth in this. Most of the population did not really have a strong love for other peoples, but they were not hostile either, i.e. easily got along with the same adequate representatives of any other nationalities.

However, in addition to sane people, on the territory of almost all republics there were local "Svidomo" - a special caste, turned on radical nationalism or religious fanaticism . Pay attention to this bundle, I will mention it below.

Under strong Soviet rule, they could not afford to be in any way active, but they were a social time bomb that would work at the first opportunity, i.e. as soon as the control of the authorities weakens (a vivid example of such a triggering is Chechnya).

The leadership of the USSR believed that if radical Islamists came to power in Afghanistan, and let me remind you that Afghanistan directly bordered on the USSR, they would inevitably begin to inflame the existing hotbeds of tension within the country.

Thus, the actions of the USSR are the actions of a person who saw that a neighbor's house caught fire. Of course, this is not our house yet, and you can drink tea imposingly, but entire settlements burn down. Common sense tells us that we need to start fussing when our house is not on fire yet.

Was this assumption correct?

Our generation has a unique opportunity not to guess, but to look at how history developed after the events in Afghanistan.

War in Chechnya

They lived quietly for themselves as part of the USSR, and suddenly here you are - war.

The reasons for the war were found as many as 2, and mutually exclusive:

• the war of the Chechen people for independence;
• jihad.

If this is war Chechen people, it is not clear what Khattab, Una-UNSO (Muzychko) and mercenaries from the Baltic republics were doing there.

If this jihad - what about the Chechen people? After all, nationalism is a sin for a Muslim, because. Allah created people differently and made no distinction between them.

Having two mutually exclusive reasons indicates that in reality it was not so much the idea itself or the reason (any one, specific) that was important as the war itself and preferably on the largest possible scale, for which the maximum number of reasons was used to immediately draw into it and nationalists and religious fanatics.

Let us turn to the primary sources and listen to what the main instigator of the war, Dudayev, says about the causes of the war. If you wish, you can watch the video in its entirety, but we only care about its beginning, namely the phrase from 0:19-0:30.

Is it worth these huge sacrifices and destruction of the desire of Chechens to live in a free and independent state?

Freedom and independence is for us life or death.

It sounds very poetic and beautiful. But a legitimate question arises. And why was the topic of independence not raised before, if it is such a fundamental issue of life and death?

Yes, it’s trite because in the days of the USSR, Dudayev’s posing the question in this way “freedom or death” would have ended with his death within 48 hours. And for some reason I think he knew about it.

Simply because the leadership of the USSR, with all its shortcomings, had the political will and was able to make difficult decisions, such as the Storming of Amin's Palace.

Dudayev, being a military officer, felt very well that Yeltsin was not in a position to make such a decision. And so it happened. As a result of the inaction of Boris Nikolaevich, Dzhakhar Dudayev was able to seriously strengthen his position in the military, political and ideological sense.

As a result, ancient military wisdom worked: Whoever cannot strike first, gets it first. Athenagoras of Syracuse

I will also draw your attention to the fact that shortly before the war in Chechnya, 15 (!!!) republics seceded from the USSR. Their separation took place without a single shot being fired. And let's ask ourselves a simple question - was there a peaceful way to resolve the issue of life and death (to use Dudayev's poetic terminology)"? If 15 republics managed to do this, it is logical to assume that such a method existed. Draw your own conclusions.

Other conflicts

The example of Chechnya is very vivid, but it may not be convincing enough, because this is just 1 example. And let me remind you that it was given to substantiate the thesis that in the USSR there really were social time bombs, the activation of which by some external catalyst could provoke serious social problems and military conflicts.

Chechnya is by no means the only example of the explosion of these "mines". Here is a list of similar events that took place on the territory of the republics of the former USSR after its collapse:

• the Karabakh conflict - the war of Armenians and Azerbaijanis for Nagorno-Karabakh;
• the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict - the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia;
• the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict - the conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia;
• Ossetian-Ingush conflict - clashes between Ossetians and Ingush in the Prigorodny district;
• Civil war in Tajikistan - inter-clan civil war in Tajikistan;
• conflict in Transnistria - the struggle of the Moldovan authorities with the separatists in Transnistria.

Unfortunately, it is not possible to consider all these conflicts within the framework of the article, but you can easily find materials on them yourself.

Islamic terrorism

Look at the events in the world - Syria, Libya, Iraq, the Islamic State.

Wherever Islamic extremism takes root, there is war. Long, protracted, with a large number of civilian casualties, with terrible social consequences. It is noteworthy that Islamic extremists kill even fellow believers who do not share radical views.

The Soviet Union was an atheistic state in which any religion was subjected to repression. There is also communist China, but China has never conquered Muslim territories, unlike the USSR.

And I remind you that the oppression of Muslims on their territory is a pretext for the start of Jihad. Moreover, an occasion that is recognized by all currents of Islam.

As a result, the Soviet Union risked become enemy No. 1 for the entire Muslim world.

US threat

It's no secret that the US supported Islamic radicals in Afghanistan. In the distant 1980s, the United States, as part of Operation Cyclone, financed the training of Mujahideen detachments in Pakistan, which were then armed and deployed to Afghanistan to participate in the civil war. that is why the government of Afghanistan could not stand alone against them. For the United States, the Soviet Union was the main, and in fact, the only enemy. Accordingly, if we had not entered Afghanistan, the United States would have done it, because by that time they had already begun to spend a lot of money on training and supplying the Mujahideen. Moreover, they could enter Afghanistan in different senses:

• establish a controlled regime in Afghanistan, which would become their springboard for subversive activities against the USSR in an ideological war;
• send troops into Afghanistan and have the prospect of deploying their own ballistic missiles on our border.

Were these fears justified? Today we know that the Americans actually entered Afghanistan. This fear is entirely justified.

conclusions

The start of the war in Afghanistan was vital.

Soviet soldiers were heroes who died for a reason, but defended the country from a HUGE number of threats. Below I will list them and next to each I will write the state of affairs today, so that it would be clearly visible whether these were fictional threats or real ones:

• the spread of radical Islam in the southern republics, where it was fertile ground. Today, radical Islamists pose a threat to the whole world. Moreover, a threat in different senses of the word, ranging from direct military operations and terrorist acts, as in Syria, to simple social unrest and tension, as, for example, in France or Germany;
• creation from the USSR of the main enemy of the Islamic world. The Wahhabis in Chechnya openly called on the entire Islamic world for Jihad. At the same time, another part of the Islamic world turned its attention to the US;
• the location of NATO troops on the borders with the Soviet Union. US troops are in Afghanistan today. Let me remind you that Afghanistan is located at a distance of 10,000 km from the United States and was located on the border of the USSR. Draw your own conclusions;
• an increase in drug trafficking to the Soviet Union, across a 2,500 km border. After the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the production of drugs on the territory of this country increased many times over.

Afghan war 1979-1989: the entire chronicle of events from beginning to end

For more than 30 years after the Second World War, the Soviet Union was at peace, not taking part in any major military conflicts. So, Soviet military advisers and soldiers participated in wars and conflicts, but they did not take place on the territory of the USSR and, in terms of the scope of participation of Soviet citizens in them, they were essentially insignificant. Thus, the Afghan war became the largest armed conflict since 1945, in which Soviet soldiers and officers took part.

Historical background

Since the 19th century, a peaceful struggle has been going on between the Russian and British empires, aimed at expanding the sphere of influence in the Central Asian region. At the same time, Russia's efforts were aimed at annexing the lands that lay along its southern outskirts (Turkestan, Khiva, Bukhara), and Great Britain - at the colonization of India. It was here that already in 1885 the interests of both powers clashed for the first time. However, things did not come to a war, and the parties continued to colonize the lands that were in their spheres of influence. At the same time, Afghanistan was the cornerstone in relations between Russia and Britain, a very advantageous position that would allow for decisive control over the region. At the same time, the country remained neutral, extracting its own benefits from this situation.

The first attempt by the British crown to subjugate Afghanistan was made back in 1838-1842. Then the British expeditionary forces stumbled upon the stubborn resistance of the troops of the Afghan emirate, as well as guerrilla warfare. The result was the victory of Afghanistan, the preservation of its independence and the withdrawal of British troops from the country. Nevertheless, the presence of Britain in the Central Asian region has increased.

The next attempt by the British to take control of Afghanistan was a war that lasted from 1878 to 1880. During this war, the British troops again suffered a series of defeats from the Afghan army, however, the Afghan army, in turn, was defeated. As a result, Afghanistan became a British protectorate, and the southern part of the country was annexed to British India.

However, this state of affairs was temporary. The freedom-loving Afghans did not want to remain under the control of the British, and discontent quickly and massively matured in the country. However, Afghanistan did not have a real chance to free itself from the British protectorate until after the First World War. In February 1919, Amanullah Khan ascended the throne in Afghanistan. He was supported by representatives of the "Young Afghans" and the army, who wanted to finally get rid of the oppression of the British. Already upon accession to the throne, Amanullah Khan announced the independence of the country from Britain, which caused the invasion of British troops. The 50,000-strong Afghan army was quickly defeated, but a powerful national movement practically nullified the military victories of the British. Already in August 1919, a peace treaty was concluded between Afghanistan and Great Britain, according to which Afghanistan became a completely independent state, and its border ran along the Durand line (the modern Afghan-Pakistani border).

In foreign policy, the focus on the young Soviet state became the most obvious. So, Soviet military instructors arrived here, which made it possible to create a fairly combat-ready Air Force, and also participated in hostilities against Afghan rebels.

However, the north of Afghanistan became a refuge for the mass migration of residents of Soviet Central Asia who did not want to accept the new government. Basmachi detachments were also formed here, which then carried out partisan attacks on the territory of the USSR. At the same time, the financing of the armed groups was carried out by Great Britain. In this regard, the Soviet government sent a note of protest to Amanullah Khan, after which the channels of British assistance to the Basmachi were substantially suppressed.

However, in Afghanistan itself, things were far from calm. Already in the autumn of 1928, an uprising broke out in the east of the country by a new pretender to the throne, Khabibullah, who also received support from Great Britain. As a result, Amanullah Khan was forced to flee to Kandahar, and Khabibullah seized power. The result of this was the complete immersion of Afghanistan into the abyss of anarchy, when absolutely everything was subjected to pogroms: schools, hospitals, villages.

Thus, by April 1929, a difficult situation had developed: the legitimate ruler of Afghanistan, Amanullah Khan, was in Kandahar, forming an army of people loyal to him. Khabibullah was in Kabul, who continued to impose the cruel laws of Islamic fundamentalism. In this situation, the Soviet leadership decided to help the legitimate leader of Afghanistan regain power in the country. On April 15, Soviet troops under the command of the Soviet military attache V. Primakov crossed the border of Afghanistan and began active hostilities against the supporters of Khabibullah. Events from the very first days developed unequivocally in favor of the Red Army, and the number of losses correlated approximately 1:200 in its favor. However, the successes of the operation, achieved in a month and a half, were nullified by the flight of Amanullah Khan to India and the cessation of his struggle for power. After that, the Soviet contingent was withdrawn from the country.

In 1930, the Red Army again undertook a campaign on the territory of Afghanistan in order to defeat the Basmachi gangs based there and destroy their economic bases and supply bases. However, the Basmachi did not accept the battle and retreated to the central regions of the country, which made the continued presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan not only inexpedient, but also diplomatically dangerous. In this regard, the Red Army left the country.

In Afghanistan itself, the civil war subsided only at the end of 1929, when Khabibullah was overthrown by Nadir Shah (the latter became the king of Afghanistan). After that, the country continued to develop, albeit extremely slowly. Relations with the Soviet Union were quite close, thanks to which the country had many benefits from this, mainly of an economic nature.

At the turn of the 1950s and 1960s, popular democratic movements began to emerge in Afghanistan, including the Marxist one. So, the ideological inspirer and leader of the Marxist movement was Nur Mohammed Taraki, a magazine poet. It was he who, on January 1, 1965, announced the creation of the PDPA - the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. However, the composition of the party was heterogeneous - it included both people from the lower strata of society, and from the middle and even upper ones. This inevitably led to a conflict within the party and led to its split already in 1967, when two branches were formed at once: Khalq (People, the most radical faction) and Parcham (Banner, a moderate faction represented mainly by intellectuals).

Afghanistan remained a monarchy until 1973, when the king's cousin Mohammed Daoud led an anti-monarchist coup and did not come to power as prime minister as a result. The change in the form of government had practically no effect on Soviet-Afghan relations, since Mohammed Daoud continued to maintain close relations with the USSR. The name of the country changed to the Republic of Afghanistan.

Over the next five years, Mohammed Daoud took steps to modernize the Afghan industry and the state as a whole, but his steps did not actually have any results. By 1978, the situation in the country was such that almost all segments of the population were opposed to the vain prime minister. The severity of the political situation can be indicated by the fact that already in 1976 both factions of the PDPA - Khalq and Parcham - agreed on cooperation against the dictatorship of Daoud.

The revolution and the assassination of Mohammed Daoud, which took place on April 28, 1978 under the leadership of the PDPA and the army, became a milestone in the history of the country. Now a regime has been established in Afghanistan that is very similar and akin to the Soviet one, which could not but cause further rapprochement between the two countries. As in the USSR, the Secretary General of the Central Committee of the PDPA Nur Mohammed Taraki, who was the leader of the Khalq faction, became the head of state. The name of the state changed to "Democratic Republic of Afghanistan".

Beginning of the civil war

However, Afghanistan was still not calm. First of all, after the April (or Saur) revolution, the struggle between the factions of the PDPA intensified. Since it was the “Khalk” wing that received the leading position in the government, the gradual removal of the “Parchamists” from the levers of power began. Another process was the departure from Islamic traditions in the country, the opening of schools, hospitals and factories. Also, an important decree was the gratuitous allocation of land to peasants.

However, all these measures, which were aimed at improving life and thus gaining the support of the people, led in the main to diametrically opposite results. The formation of armed opposition groups began, consisting mainly of peasants, which, in principle, is not surprising. People who had been living Islamic traditions for hundreds of years and suddenly lost them simply could not accept it. Also dissatisfied with the actions of the Afghan government army, which often, in the fight against the rebels, attacked peaceful villages whose inhabitants were not connected with the opposition.

In 1978, a civil war began, which, in fact, continues in Afghanistan to this day. At its early stage, this war was fought between the Afghan government and armed rebels - the so-called "dushmans". However, in 1978, the actions of the rebels were still insufficiently coordinated and consisted mainly of attacks on Afghan military units and shelling of columns. There were also strikes on party functionaries, but this mainly concerned lower-level party representatives.

However, the main signal that the armed opposition was ripe and ready for decisive action was the uprising in the large city of Herat, which broke out in March 1979. At the same time, there was a real danger of capturing the city, since the Afghan government army was very reluctant to fight against its compatriots, and there were frequent cases of government soldiers going over to the side of the rebels.

It was in this connection that real panic began among the Afghan leadership. It became clear that with the loss of such a large administrative center as Herat, the position of the government would be seriously shaken. A long series of negotiations began between the Afghan and Soviet leadership. In these negotiations, the Afghan government asked to send Soviet troops to help suppress the rebellion. However, the Soviet leadership clearly understood that the intervention of the Soviet Armed Forces in the conflict would only lead to a worsening of the situation, including the international one.

Ultimately, the Afghan government army managed to cope with the Herat rebellion, but the situation in the country continued to deteriorate. It became clear that a civil war was already in full swing in the country. Thus, the Afghan government army was drawn into battles with rebel gangs that controlled mainly rural and mountainous areas. The "people's" Afghan authorities managed to control only a number of large cities (and even then not always completely).

In the same vein, Nur Mohammad Taraki's popularity in Afghanistan began to decline, while his prime minister, Hafizullah Amin, was rapidly gaining political weight. Amin was a rather tough politician who believed that only by military means could order be restored to the country.

Undercover intrigues in the Afghan government led to the fact that in mid-September 1979, Nur Mohammad Taraki was removed from all his posts and expelled from the PDPA. The reason for this was an unsuccessful attempt on the life of Prime Minister Amin, when he arrived at the residence of Taraki for negotiations. This attempt (or a provocation, because there is still no sufficient evidence that Mohammad Taraki himself was involved in the attempt) made him a clear enemy of Amin, which sentenced the first to death. Taraki was killed in October 1979, and his family and friends were taken to the Puli-Charkhi prison.

After becoming the ruler of Afghanistan, Hafizullah Amin began to purge both the ranks of the clergy and the rival faction, Parcham.

At the same time, Amin realized that he could no longer cope with the rebels on his own. Increasingly, there were cases of transition of soldiers and officers from the government Afghan army to the ranks of the Mujahideen. The only deterrent in the Afghan units were Soviet military advisers, who sometimes prevented such incidents by the force of their authority and character. In the course of numerous negotiations between the Soviet and Afghan leaderships, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, having weighed all the pros and cons, at its meeting on December 12, 1979, decided to send a limited contingent of troops to Afghanistan.

Soviet troops have been in Afghanistan since July 1979, when a battalion of the 111th Guards Airborne Regiment of the 105th Airborne Division was deployed to Bagram (a city about 60 km from Kabul, also a major air base in the country). The duties of the battalion were to control and protect the Bagram airfield, where they landed and from which Soviet aircraft took off with supplies for the Afghan leadership. On December 14, 1979, a battalion from the 345th separate airborne regiment arrived here as reinforcements. Also on December 20, the Soviet “Muslim Battalion” was transferred to Kabul, which received this name because of the configuration exclusively by Soviet military personnel from the Central Asian republics. This battalion was included in the security brigade of Amin's palace, allegedly to strengthen the security of the Afghan leader. But few people knew that the Soviet party leadership decided to "remove" the too impulsive and obstinate leader of Afghanistan.

There are many versions of why it was decided to remove Hafizulu Amin and put Babrak Karmal in his place, but there is no consensus on this matter. It is likely that after restoring order in Afghanistan with the help of Soviet troops, Amin would become too independent, which, with his close contacts with the United States, threatened the Soviet presence in the country. In the event that the United States of America received an ally in the person of Amin, the threat to the southern borders of the USSR would become clear. Also, do not forget that Amin, with his extensive repressions and the murder of Nur Mohammad Taraki, managed in a very short time to set against himself not only the lower strata of Afghan society (which, however, were already in their majority in opposition to the regime), but and the Afghan elite. Having concentrated great power in his hands, he was not going to share it with anyone. It would be unreasonable for the Soviet leadership to rely on such a leader, to put it mildly.

By December 25, 1979, two motorized rifle and one airborne divisions, two motorized rifle regiments, 2 aviation regiments of fighter-bombers, 2 helicopter regiments, one aviation fighter regiment, airborne -assault brigade and logistics units. Additionally, as a reserve, three more divisions were formed and manned according to the states of wartime. All these troops were part of the 40th Combined Arms Army, which was to enter Afghanistan.

The staffing of the troops was carried out mainly by reservists - residents of the Central Asian republics, called up for military training. So, for example, in the 201st motorized rifle division, whose task was to march and take up positions in the area of ​​​​the city of Kunduz, about half of the personnel were represented by reservists. All this, of course, had a negative impact on the combat training of the units, but given that the participation of Soviet troops in hostilities was not planned, then such a “demonstration of force” made its own sense.

Already on December 25, the entry of a limited contingent of Soviet troops (OKSV) into Afghanistan began. The units of the 108th motorized rifle division, as well as units of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division, were the first to enter the territory of Afghanistan, which were landed in Kabul by landing method. Also on that day, the 4th Airborne Assault Battalion of the 56th Separate Airborne Assault Brigade entered the country, tasked with guarding the strategically important tunnel at the Salang Pass.

In the period from December 25 to December 31, 1979, almost all units of the 40th Army, which were intended for this, entered the territory of Afghanistan.

As of March 1980, the deployment of units of the 40th Army had the following form:

• Kabul - 103rd Guards Airborne Division and 108th Motorized Rifle Division.
• Bagram - 345th separate airborne regiment.
• Herat - 101st motorized rifle regiment of the 5th motorized rifle division.
• Shindand - 5th motorized rifle division.
• Kunduz - 201st motorized rifle division and 56th separate air assault brigade.
• Kandahar - 70th separate motorized rifle brigade.
• Jalalabad - 66th separate motorized rifle brigade.
• Ghazni - 191st separate motorized rifle regiment.
• Puli-Khumri - 395th motorized rifle regiment of the 201st motorized rifle division.
• Khanabad - 122nd motorized rifle regiment of the 201st motorized rifle division.
• Faizabad - 860th separate motorized rifle regiment.
• Jabal-Ussaraj - 177th motorized rifle regiment of the 108th motorized rifle division.
• Aviation units were based at the airfields: Bagram, Kunduz, Shindand, Kandahar, Jalalabad, Faizabad, Ghazni and Gardez.

On December 27, 1979, the forces of the Alpha group in the residence of Amin carried out an operation to eliminate the obstinate leader. As a result, Hafizula Amin was eliminated, and on the night of December 28, the new ruler of Afghanistan, Babrak Karmal, arrived in Kabul. On the same night (from December 27 to 28), Soviet troops, mainly with the forces of the 103rd Airborne Division, occupied a number of important buildings in the Afghan capital and established complete control over them.

Start of the war (1979-1982)

The first losses of the OKSV in Afghanistan began to bear back in December 1979. So, on December 25, when landing at the Kabul airfield, an Il-76 with paratroopers of the 103rd Airborne Division crashed into a mountain. Dozens of soldiers and officers died as a result.

Already from the very first days of the stay of a limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, our units began to be drawn into hostilities, which at first were of an exclusively episodic nature. So, on January 11, 1980, units of the 186th motorized rifle regiment of the 108th motorized rifle division stormed the village of Nakhrin not far from Baghlan, suppressing the rebellion of the Afghan artillery regiment. At the same time, the losses during the operation were extremely low (two wounded and two killed, with about 100 Afghans killed).

It is noteworthy that the nature of the first military operations of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan was rather the suppression of the uprisings of the Afghan units than the battles with the dushmans, whose detachments were still essentially being created and formed. Also, the tasks of the Soviet units at that time included maintaining control over a number of large settlements in the country, disarming deserters and arranging life.

The first clash of Soviet troops with dushmans was the Kunar operation, which was carried out from late February to mid-March 1980. During this operation, three Soviet battalions carried out a raid against bandit formations in the province of the same name. As a result, having inflicted significant losses on the enemy, our troops lost 52 people killed.

From the beginning of the spring of 1980, the war in Afghanistan unfolded in full. To ensure control over a number of areas, as well as to reduce the effectiveness of the rebels' actions, Soviet military units began to be regularly involved in military operations, often in cooperation with the Afghan army ("green") or Afghan units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs ("tsaranda"). The combat effectiveness of the Afghan government army (unlike the Mujahideen) was at a very low level, which was explained by the unwillingness of ordinary Afghans to fight for what they themselves did not really know.

Although the effectiveness of OKSVA's actions was quite high, losses also increased sharply with an increase in the intensity of hostilities. Naturally, this was hushed up in the official Soviet press, which stated that "Soviet troops are in Afghanistan for maneuvers, as well as to provide international assistance to the fraternal people, which consists in the construction of hospitals, houses and schools."

By the middle of 1980, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU decided to withdraw from the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan a number of tank and anti-aircraft units, which were not needed in the conditions of guerrilla warfare. However, at the same time, the question of the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country was postponed. It became clear that the Soviet Army was "bogged down" in Afghanistan, and this fact simply could not go unnoticed by the CIA. It was 1980 that marked the beginning of cooperation between the American intelligence services and the Afghan Mujahideen.

1981 for OKSVA is characterized by further intensification of hostilities. During the first half of the year, Soviet troops fought the rebels mainly in the northern and eastern provinces of Afghanistan, but already in May the situation in the central region of the country, near Kabul, escalated. Here, actions were intensified by the group of Ahmad Shah Masud, whose fiefdom was the Panjshir Gorge, thanks to which he received the title of "Lion of Panjshir". The purpose of the actions of his grouping was to expand the area of ​​​​control, as well as to pin down Soviet troops in order to prevent their penetration into Panjshir.

Nevertheless, by August 1981, four combined-arms operations had already been carried out by Soviet troops in the Panjshir Gorge. However, as in previous times, Soviet troops occupied the territory of the gorge, destroyed part of the enemy’s manpower and ammunition depots, but could not stay here for a long time - difficulties in supplying them far from the places of permanent deployment of units, as well as the fact that dushmans in such a "deaf" area they acted exceptionally boldly. The effectiveness of the Panjshir operations was seriously reduced by the fact that the rebels left the gorge ahead of time, leaving only barriers from small detachments and mining the paths.

By the end of 1981, it became clear that the Dushmans, having an inexhaustible stream of volunteers and supplies from Pakistan, could fight for as long as they wanted. It was for this purpose that the 56th separate air assault brigade was deployed from Kunduz to block the mountain paths in the southeast, to the city of Gardez, the capital of the province of Paktia. In addition, the actions of other Soviet units near the southern border of Afghanistan intensified. Indeed, already in the first months of 1982, it was possible to significantly reduce the flow of reinforcements and supplies for the Mujahideen from Pakistan. However, in the following months, due to the intensification of dushman activities in other parts of the country, the situation practically returned to its initial state. The most striking episode, testifying to the increased combat capabilities of the rebels, was the encirclement of an entire battalion (4th airborne assault) of the 56th airborne assault brigade in the Aliheil area. Only thanks to the energetic actions of the brigade leadership, as well as the competent interaction of the military branches (aviation, landing and artillery), the battalion was released with relatively small losses.

The war goes on (1982-1987)

The year 1982 was also marked by a major tragedy at the strategically important for the whole of Afghanistan tunnel through the Salang pass. In November, there was a sabotage action dushman, which consisted in the fact that the exit from one side of the tunnel was blocked by their cars.

As a result of this action, 64 Soviet soldiers died, as well as more than 100 Afghans, including civilians. The rebels, in pursuit of momentary success, did not even stop at the murder of their compatriots, Afghan women and children.

At the end of the same 1982, a meeting was held in Moscow between the President of Pakistan, Zia ul-Haq, and the head of the USSR, Yuri Andropov. During the meeting, the conditions for terminating the provision of assistance by Pakistan to the Afghan rebels, as well as the conditions for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country, were discussed.

During 1983, Soviet troops in Afghanistan continued to carry out operations against armed opposition groups. However, this period is characterized by an increased intensity of hostilities in the area of ​​the Soviet-Afghan border (Marmol operation), as well as the completion of the fighting in the Panjshir Gorge by signing a truce with the armed forces of Ahmad Shah Massoud. The 177th Special Forces Detachment, which was located in the gorge, was withdrawn from it after 8 months of intense hostilities.

In April, in the province of Nimroz, a large fortified area of ​​the militants Rabati-Jali was defeated. This fortified area also had the functions of a transshipment base for the transport of drugs. After its destruction, the rebels' economic base suffered significant damage, not to mention the fact that they lost a powerful base capable of letting through a large number of militants from Iran and Pakistan.

Another "hot" point in the far from calm Afghanistan in the summer of 1983 was the city of Khost, located in the southeast of the country, almost right next to the border of Pakistan. It was on him that the dushmans launched an offensive in July. Their plan was simple: to capture the city and make it the capital of the "rebellious" areas. Taking Khost would allow them to gain recognition in the world.

However, the stubborn defense of Khost made adjustments to the plans of the leadership of the Afghan opposition. Unable to take the city immediately, it was decided to take it into the blockade ring. But this plan also failed. Soviet troops, with massive support from aviation and artillery, managed to thwart an attempt to blockade the city.

The winter of 1983-1984 in the Afghan war is notable for the fact that during it the armed opposition groups did not leave the territory of Afghanistan for the first time, as was the case before. This became the reason for the aggravated situation in the area of ​​Kabul and Jalalabad, where the Mujahideen began equipping bases and fortified areas for a long-term guerrilla war.

It was in this connection that already at the beginning of 1984 it was decided that the Soviet troops would conduct Operation Veil. Its essence was to create a barrier line along the Afghan-Pakistani and partially Afghan-Iranian borders in order to prevent the supply of Mujahideen detachments and intercept caravans going to the territory of Afghanistan. For these purposes, rather large forces were allocated with a total strength of 6 to 10 thousand people and a large number of aircraft and artillery.

But the operation ultimately did not achieve its goal, since it was almost impossible to completely close the border with Pakistan, especially with such limited, albeit mobile, forces. Only 15-20% of the total number of caravans coming from Pakistan were intercepted.

The year 1984 is mainly characterized by hostilities against the newly created staging posts and fortified areas of dushmans in order to deprive them of long-term bases and ultimately reduce the intensity of their operations. At the same time, the Mujahideen were not only fighting, but also carried out a number of terrorist acts in the cities of the country, such as the explosion of a bus with passengers in Kabul in June of the same year.

In the second half of the 84th year, the rebels intensified in the area of ​​​​the city of Khost, in connection with which a large army operation was carried out here in November-December to escort columns and break through the orders of dushmans who were trying to take the city. As a result, the Mujahideen suffered heavy losses. It is worth noting, however, that the losses of the Soviet troops were very noticeable. Constant explosions on mines, which by 1984 on Afghan roads had become almost 10 times more than in the initial period of the war, unexpected shelling of columns and Soviet units already exceeded in terms of losses ordinary fire contacts with dushmans.

However, the situation as of January 1985 remained stable. The Afghan government, with the strong support of the Soviet Army, held Kabul and a number of provincial centers. The Mujahideen, on the other hand, "dominated" with might and main in rural and mountainous areas, having serious support among dehkans - Afghan peasants and receiving supplies from Pakistan.

It was with the aim of increasing the number of intercepted caravans coming from Pakistan and Iran that in the spring of 1985, the 15th and 22nd separate GRU special forces brigades were introduced into the territory of Afghanistan. Being divided into several detachments, they were dispersed throughout the country, from Kandahar to Jalalabad. Due to their mobility and exceptional combat capability, the special forces of the GRU General Staff were able to significantly reduce the number of caravans conducted from Pakistan, and also, as a result, seriously hit the supply of dushman in a number of areas.

Nevertheless, 1985 was marked primarily by large and bloody operations in the Panjshir Gorge, as well as in the Khost region and in the so-called "green zone" of a number of provinces. These operations ensured the defeat of a number of gangs, as well as the capture of a large number of weapons and ammunition. For example, in the province of Baghlan, serious losses were inflicted on the detachments of the field commander Said Mansur (he himself survived).

The year 1985 is also notable for the fact that the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU took a course towards a political solution to the Afghan problem. New trends, caused by the young General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, came in handy in the Afghan issue, and already in February of the following year, 1986, the development of a plan for the phased withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan began.

In 1986, there was an increased effectiveness of the actions of the Soviet troops against the bases and fortified areas of the Mujahideen, as a result of which the following points were defeated: Karera (March, Kunar province), Javara (April, Khost province), Kokari-Sharshari ( August, Herat province). At the same time, a number of major operations were carried out (for example, in the north of the country, in the provinces of Kunduz and Balkh).

On May 4, 1986, at the XVIII Plenum of the Central Committee of the PDPA, M. Najibullah, the former head of the Afghan security service (KHAD), was elected to the post of Secretary General instead of Babrak Karmal. The new head of state announced a new - exclusively political - course towards solving intra-Afghan problems.

At the same time, M. Gorbachev announced the imminent withdrawal from Afghanistan of a number of military units numbering up to 7 thousand people. However, the withdrawal of six regiments from Afghanistan took place only 4 months later, in October. This move was rather psychological, aimed at showing the Western powers the readiness of the Soviet Union to resolve the Afghan issue by peaceful means. The fact that a number of withdrawn units practically did not participate in hostilities, and the personnel of a number of newly formed regiments consisted exclusively of soldiers who had served 2 years and were being demobilized, did not bother anyone. That is why this step of the Soviet leadership was a very serious victory with minimal casualties.

Also an important event that opened the page for a new, final period of the Soviet war in Afghanistan was the proclamation by the Afghan government of a course towards national reconciliation. Since January 15, 1987, this course provided for a unilateral ceasefire. However, the plans of the new Afghan leadership remained just plans. The Afghan armed opposition regarded this policy as a cause of weakness and stepped up efforts to fight against government troops throughout the country.

Final stage of the war (1987-1989)

The year 1987 is characterized by the complete failure of the policy of national reconciliation put forward by M. Najibullah. The rebels were not going to follow the example of government troops, and the fighting continued throughout the country. However, it was precisely from 1987 that the Soviet troops operated mainly through large-scale army operations, which were successful thanks to the competent interaction of all branches of the military. The largest operations during this period were: “Strike” (Kunduz province), “Thunderstorm” (Ghazni province), “Circle” (Logar and Kabul provinces), “South-87” (Kandahar province).

Separately, it is also worth mentioning the operation "Magistral" to release the city of Khost. It was this city that for more than 5 years was stubbornly defended by both Afghan and Soviet forces and, as a result, was still surrounded. However, the supply of the Khost garrison was carried out by air. The result of the operation "Magistral" was the complete release of the Gardez-Khost highway in January 1988 and the defeat of a number of rebel gangs.

April 14, 1988 in Geneva, the ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan signed an agreement on a political settlement of the Afghan conflict. The guarantors of these agreements were the USSR and the USA. In addition, the USSR pledged to withdraw troops from Afghanistan within 9 months. The United States and Pakistan pledged to stop supporting the Mujahideen.

The first period of withdrawal of the OKSV from Afghanistan began on May 15, 1988. During it, Soviet units were withdrawn from the Panjshir Gorge, Kunduz, Kandahar, Gardez and other points of the country. As a result, a kind of "vacuum" was initially formed, which was quickly filled by the rebels. Already in August-October, dushmans occupied a number of large settlements in Afghanistan, including Kunduz and Khanabad. The number of the limited contingent of Soviet troops was about half of what it was as of January 1, 1988 - 50 thousand people.

By November, the Afghan government army, with the support of Soviet troops, controlled only about 30% of the country's territory, while after the departure of the Soviet units, entire provinces came under the control of the rebels.

November 15 began the second and final stage of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country. This period is characterized by a significantly reduced intensity of hostilities. The last operation for the Soviet Army in Afghanistan was Operation Typhoon in the provinces of Baghlan, Parvan and Kapisa. It was carried out at the request of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the PDPA M. Najibullah, who thus wanted to seriously weaken the forces of the rebels in the end before facing them one on one. Nevertheless, although the losses of dushmans were quite large, they were not critical, but this operation somewhat complicated the withdrawal of the last Soviet units from Afghanistan.

Side tactics

During the Afghan War, both sides widely used tactics that originated during the Second World War in Yugoslavia, and also developed in the wars for the freedom of Algeria and Vietnam. At the same time, the USSR, which previously supported the rebels who fought against the armies of the capitalist countries, now itself faced a serious guerrilla struggle.

At the beginning of the war, the Soviet army had practically no experience in fighting modern partisan movements, which caused a number of command errors and serious losses in the first operations. Nevertheless, the Soviet troops had good combat skills and seriously outnumbered the Afghan rebels technically, materially and morally.

A striking example of the initial period of hostilities of the Soviet army in Afghanistan was the capture of a bridge across the Kokcha River. This bridge was captured in late 1979 - early 1980 and was held by large forces of dushman (up to 1500 people). The Soviet forces consisted of up to 70 people (the 1st airborne company of the 1st airborne assault brigade of the 56th airborne assault brigade, reinforced with AGS-17 crews).

As a result of the battle, the Soviet troops drove the rebels from their positions and occupied the bridge, with losses of 7 dead and 10 wounded. Dushman losses were much greater. This operation was considered successful, and the company commander, Senior Lieutenant S.P. Kozlov, was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

In the future, Soviet tactics were significantly developed and became more flexible. To defeat the bases of the Mujahideen, the Soviet units (usually, at first, no more than a battalion, divided into combat groups for ease of control, went out on a military operation) walked through the mountains or were delivered by helicopters. The firepower of combat groups almost always made it possible to suppress the firing points of dushmans, as well as to destroy their ambushes. In addition to small arms, combat groups were often reinforced by mortar and AGS crews. In rare cases, battle groups were even given SPTG calculations (mounted anti-tank grenade launchers), which usually practically did not participate in combat operations.
In cases where the enemy was hiding in villages or green zones, the Soviet units themselves or interacting with the “greens” (the Afghan government army) carried out a “search” (search for dushmans on the territory) of a given area.

Parts of the special purpose of the GRU, used to intercept caravans, interacted more closely with aviation. Helicopters delivered them to ambush sites, from where they were already operating, intercepting, inspecting caravans, or eliminating them if necessary.

The supply of Soviet troops was carried out by means of columns marching along the Afghan roads with everything necessary. These columns without fail, in addition to trucks, were equipped with military equipment (armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles, tanks and ZSU). However, with all precautions, dushman attacks on columns were a very frequent occurrence, and more and more broken and burned equipment became. Notorious throughout Afghanistan was the road near the village of Mukhamed-Aga in the province of Logar (the so-called "mukhamedka") - almost every column was fired upon here. It is noteworthy that the drivers of the cars in the columns had instructions - during the shelling, by increasing the speed, try to get out of the fire as soon as possible.

The Soviet army also massively used aircraft and artillery. If Vietnam became the “star” hour for American helicopters, then for the Soviet army aviation, it was the Afghan war that became such a time. Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters were not only mobile and reliable means of delivering personnel to the required areas, but also excellent means of supporting ground troops, as well as suppressing enemy firing points. In total, during the years of the Afghan war, the USSR lost 333 helicopters.

Dushman's tactics consisted mainly in inflicting as much damage as possible on Soviet troops and actions on their communications, as well as (for example, near Khost in 1983-1988 or in general at the final stage of the war) in capturing settlements. Ambushes, attacks on columns, mining of mountain paths and even terrorist attacks in Kabul and other large cities - these measures had their results, albeit sometimes very doubtful. There were also frequent cases of the destruction of families by the Mujahideen, and even entire villages, in any way collaborating with the "infidels".

In the event that a group of dushmans was in danger, it easily dissolved in the mountains, which were native to the Afghans. However, the retreat was not always successful for the dushmans, and in such cases the group died or was captured.

At the beginning of the war (1979-1983), the Mujahideen, as a rule, went to spend the winter in Pakistan, where they had equipped field camps and bases. However, starting from 1983, they began to equip similar bases on the territory of Afghanistan, and often these bases were discovered and destroyed by Soviet troops. Replenishment in the ranks of the Mujahideen came mainly from the defeated villages or from deserted soldiers of the Afghan government army.

The results of the Afghan war and its significance

The result of the Afghan war was that the pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan, with the support of Soviet troops, was able to hold out much longer than it would have held out without it (the regime finally fell in 1992). However, at the same time, the confidence of the Afghan people in the PDPA was completely undermined, in connection with which no political solution to intra-Afghan problems could be found.

The USSR, which was created near the southern border, somewhat fettered the Soviet forces, preventing them from effectively solving other foreign policy problems in the 1980s, such as, for example, the crisis in Poland. Ultimately, this circumstance seriously affected the balance of power in Eastern Europe and, as a result, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact.

The American leadership, barely recovering from the Vietnam War, was interested in tying the USSR in Afghanistan, and therefore provided serious support to the Afghan rebels. However, in reality, the Afghan insurgency was poorly controlled, as a result of which, already in the mid-90s, it was completely discredited in the eyes of almost the entire world.

In military terms, the Soviet Army gained a very extensive experience in fighting partisans in mountainous areas, which, however, was little taken into account after 6 years - during the war in Chechnya. Nevertheless, OKSVA honorably fulfilled all the military tasks assigned to it, in the words of General B. Gromov, "returned to the Motherland in an organized manner."

The losses of Soviet troops in Afghanistan amounted, according to various sources, from 13,835 to 14,427 people. The losses of the KGB amounted to 576 people, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs - 28 people. 53,750 people were wounded and shell-shocked, 415,930 fell ill (mainly with diseases such as malaria, typhoid and hepatitis). 417 servicemen were taken prisoner, 130 of them were released.

If you have any questions - leave them in the comments below the article. We or our visitors will be happy to answer them.

And the republican system was established. This served as an impetus for the start of a civil war between various socio-political and nationalist forces in the country.

In April 1978, the People's Democratic Party (PDPA) came to power in Afghanistan. The radicalism of the new Afghan leadership, the hasty breaking of the centuries-old traditions of the people and the foundations of Islam, increased the resistance of the population to the central government. The situation was complicated by foreign interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. The USSR and some other countries provided assistance to the Afghan government, while NATO countries, Muslim states and China provided assistance to the opposition forces.

By the end of 1979, the situation in the country had deteriorated sharply, and the threat of the overthrow of the ruling regime loomed. In this regard, the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) repeatedly appealed to the USSR with a request to send military units to the country. The Soviet side at first rejected this form of intervention, but, in the context of the aggravation of the Afghan crisis, on December 12, 1979, the leadership of the USSR, fearing the transfer of hostilities to the territory of the Central Asian republics, decided to send troops to provide military assistance to the government of Afghanistan. The decision was made at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU in accordance with Article 4 of the Soviet-Afghan "Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation", concluded on December 5, 1978, and formalized by a secret decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan was considered by the political leadership of the USSR as a short-term measure aimed at ensuring the security of the southern borders of the Soviet Union.

The main task of the limited contingent of Soviet troops (OKSV) was to create a "cordon sanitaire" near the borders of the USSR in the face of the impending threat of the spread of Islamic fundamentalism on the territory of the Soviet Muslim republics.

On December 16, 1979, an order was given to separate the field administration of the 40th Army from the administration of the Turkestan Military District (TurkVO) and its full mobilization. First Deputy Commander of the TurkVO troops, Lieutenant General Yuri Tukharinov, was appointed commander of the army. Formations and units of the 40th Army were fully mobilized 10-12 days before the entry.

The introduction and placement of OKSV in the DRA was carried out from December 25, 1979. By mid-January 1980, the entry of the main forces of the 40th Army was basically completed. Three divisions (two motorized rifle and one airborne), an air assault brigade, two separate regiments and other units were introduced into the territory of Afghanistan.

Subsequently, the combat composition of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan was constantly refined in order to strengthen it. The largest number of OKSV (1985) was 108.7 thousand people, including 73.6 thousand people in combat units. The composition of the OKSV mainly included: the command of the 40th Army, three motorized rifle and one airborne divisions, nine separate brigades and seven separate regiments, four regiments of front-line and two regiments of army aviation, as well as rear, medical, repair, construction and other units and divisions.

The general management of the OKSV was carried out by the operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense, which was headed by Marshal of the USSR Sergei Sokolov, since 1985 - General of the Army Valentin Varennikov. The direct control of the combat and daily activities of the OKSV was carried out by the commander of the 40th Army, who was subordinate to the command of the troops of the TurkVO.

Soviet troops in Afghanistan guarded and defended national economic facilities, airfields, roads vital for the country, carried out convoys of transport convoys with goods through the territory under the control of the armed opposition.

To reduce the military activity of the opposition, the OKSV conducted active hostilities of various scales using the entire arsenal of conventional weapons, and carried out air strikes on opposition bases. In accordance with the decision of the political leadership of the USSR, Soviet troops, in response to numerous shelling of their garrisons and transport columns by opposition detachments, began to conduct military operations together with Afghan units to search for and eliminate the most aggressive enemy armed groups. Thus, the Soviet troops introduced into Afghanistan became involved in an internal military conflict on the side of the country's government against the opposition forces, which received the most assistance from Pakistan.

The stay of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and their combat activities are conditionally divided into four stages.

Stage 1: December 1979 - February 1980. The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, their placement in garrisons, the organization of the protection of deployment points and various objects.

Stage 2: March 1980 - April 1985. Conducting active hostilities, including large-scale ones, together with Afghan formations and units. Work on the reorganization and strengthening of the armed forces of the DRA.

Stage 3: May 1985 - December 1986. The transition from active combat operations mainly to supporting the actions of the Afghan troops by Soviet aviation, artillery and sapper units. Special Forces units fought to prevent the delivery of weapons and ammunition from abroad. Six Soviet regiments were withdrawn to their homeland.

Stage 4: January 1987 - February 1989. The participation of Soviet troops in the Afghan leadership's policy of national reconciliation. Continued support for the combat activities of Afghan troops. Preparation of Soviet troops for their return to their homeland and the implementation of their complete withdrawal.

Even after the introduction of troops into Afghanistan, the USSR continued to seek opportunities for a political solution to the intra-Afghan conflict. From August 1981, he tried to ensure the negotiation process of the DRA with Pakistan and Iran, from April 1986 - to promote a systemic policy of national reconciliation.

On April 14, 1988 in Geneva (Switzerland), representatives of Afghanistan, Pakistan, the USSR and the USA signed five fundamental documents on the settlement of the political situation around Afghanistan. These agreements regulated the process of the withdrawal of Soviet troops and declared international guarantees of non-interference in the internal affairs of the republic, under which the USSR and the USA assumed obligations. Deadlines were set for the withdrawal of Soviet troops: half of the limited contingent was withdrawn by August 15, 1988, the rest of the units after another six months.

On May 15, 1988, the withdrawal of OKSV began, which ended on February 15, 1989. The withdrawal of troops was led by the last commander of the 40th Army, Lieutenant General Boris Gromov.

About 620,000 servicemen completed military service in Afghanistan, including 525,200 people in the OKSV.

The losses of the military personnel of the 40th Army were: killed and dead - 13,833 people, including 1979 officers and generals, wounded - 49,985 people. During the hostilities in Afghanistan, in addition, 572 servicemen of the state security agencies, 28 employees of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, as well as 190 military advisers, including 145 officers, were killed. 172 officers stopped their service in the Armed Forces due to injuries. 6,669 "Afghans" became disabled, including 1,479 disabled people of the first group.

For military and other services, over 200 thousand people were awarded orders and medals, 86 were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, 28 of them posthumously.

(Additional

The Soviet-Afghan war lasted more than nine years from December 1979 to February 1989. Mujahideen rebel groups fought during it against the Soviet Army and allied Afghan government forces. Between 850,000 and 1.5 million civilians were killed and millions of Afghans fled the country, mostly to Pakistan and Iran.

Even before the arrival of Soviet troops, power in Afghanistan through 1978 coup captured by the communists, planting the president of the country Nur Mohammad Taraki. He undertook a series of radical reforms, which turned out to be extremely unpopular, especially among the rural population committed to national traditions. The Taraki regime brutally suppressed all opposition, arresting many thousands and executing 27,000 political prisoners.

Chronology of the Afghan war. video film

Armed groups began to form around the country to resist. By April 1979, many large areas of the country had rebelled; in December, the government kept only cities under its rule. It itself was torn apart by internal strife. Taraki was soon killed Hafizullah Amin. In response to the requests of the Afghan authorities, the allied Kremlin leadership, headed by Brezhnev, first sent secret advisers to the country, and on December 24, 1979, moved the 40th Soviet army of General Boris Gromov there, declaring that they were doing this in pursuance of the terms of the 1978 agreement on friendship and cooperation and good neighborliness with Afghanistan.

Soviet intelligence had information that Amin was making attempts to communicate with Pakistan and China. On December 27, 1979, about 700 Soviet special forces captured the main buildings of Kabul and staged an assault on the Taj Beck presidential palace, during which Amin and his two sons were killed. Amin was replaced by a rival from another Afghan communist faction, Babrak Karmal. He headed the "Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan" and requested additional Soviet assistance.

In January 1980, the foreign ministers of 34 countries of the Islamic Conference approved a resolution demanding the "immediate, urgent and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops" from Afghanistan. The UN General Assembly by 104 votes to 18 adopted a resolution protesting Soviet interference. President of the U.S.A Carter announced a boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics. Afghan fighters began to receive military training in neighboring Pakistan and China - and receive huge amounts of assistance, funded primarily by the United States and the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf. In carrying out operations against Soviet forces CIA Pakistan actively helped.

Soviet troops occupied the cities and main lines of communication, and the Mujahideen waged guerrilla warfare in small groups. They operated on almost 80% of the country's territory, not subject to the control of the Kabul rulers and the USSR. Soviet troops made extensive use of aircraft for bombing, destroyed villages where the Mujahideen could find shelter, destroyed ditches, and laid millions of land mines. However, almost the entire contingent introduced into Afghanistan consisted of conscripts who were not trained in the complex tactics of fighting partisans in the mountains. Therefore, the war from the very beginning went hard for the USSR.

By the mid-1980s, the number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan had risen to 108,800 soldiers. The fighting went on throughout the country with more energy, but the material and diplomatic cost of the war for the USSR was very high. In mid-1987 Moscow, where a reformer has now come to power Gorbachev announced its intention to begin the withdrawal of troops. Gorbachev openly called Afghanistan a "bleeding wound."

On April 14, 1988, in Geneva, the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan, with the participation of the United States and the USSR as guarantors, signed the "Agreements to Settle the Situation in the Republic of Afghanistan." They determined the schedule for the withdrawal of the Soviet contingent - it took place from May 15, 1988 to February 15, 1989.

The Mujahideen did not take part in the Geneva Accords and rejected most of their terms. As a result, after the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the civil war in Afghanistan continued. New pro-Soviet leader Najibullah barely held back the onslaught of the Mujahideen. His government split, many of its members entered into relations with the opposition. In March 1992, General Abdul Rashid Dostum and his Uzbek militia stopped supporting Najibullah. A month later, the Mujahideen took Kabul. Najibullah hid in the capital building of the UN mission until 1996, and then was captured by the Taliban and hanged.

The Afghan war is considered part of cold war. In the Western media, it is sometimes called "Soviet Vietnam" or "Bear Trap", because this war became one of the most important reasons for the fall of the USSR. It is believed that about 15 thousand Soviet soldiers died during it, 35 thousand were injured. After the war, Afghanistan lay in ruins. Grain production in it fell to 3.5% of the pre-war level.

The military conflict in Afghanistan, called the Afghan war, was in fact one of the stages of the civil war. On the one hand, government forces acted, enlisting the support of the USSR, and on the other, numerous formations of the Mujahideen, who were supported by the United States and most Muslim states. For ten years there was a senseless struggle for control over the territory of this independent state.

Historical context

Afghanistan is one of the key regions for ensuring the stability of the situation in Central Asia. For centuries, in the very center of Eurasia, at the junction of South and Central Asia, the interests of the leading states of the world intersect. From the beginning of the nineteenth century, the so-called "Great Game" was waged between the Russian and British empires for dominance in South and Central Asia.

At the beginning of the last century, the king of Afghanistan proclaimed the independence of the state from Great Britain, which caused the third Anglo-Afghan war. The first state to recognize the independence of Afghanistan was Soviet Russia. The Soviets provided economic and military assistance to the ally. Then Afghanistan was a country with a complete lack of an industrial complex and an extremely impoverished population, more than half of which was illiterate.

In 1973, a republic was proclaimed in Afghanistan. The head of state established a totalitarian dictatorship and tried to implement a series of reforms that ended in failure. In fact, the country was dominated by the old order, characteristic of the era of the communal-tribal system and feudalism. This period in the history of the state is characterized by political instability, rivalry between Islamist and pro-communist groups.

The April (Saur) revolution began in Afghanistan on April 27, 1978. As a result, the People's Democratic Party came to power, the former leader and his family were executed. The new leadership made an attempt to carry out reforms, but ran into resistance from the Islamic opposition. A civil war began, and the government officially turned to the USSR with a request to send Soviet advisers. Specialists from the USSR left for Afghanistan in May 1978.

Causes of the war in Afghanistan

The Soviet Union could not allow the neighboring country to leave the sphere of influence. The coming to power of the opposition could lead to the strengthening of the position of the United States in a region located very close to the territory of the USSR. The essence of the war in Afghanistan is that this country has simply become a place where the interests of the two superpowers clash. It was interference in domestic politics (both overt intervention by the USSR and covert intervention by the United States) that caused the devastating ten-year war.

The decision to send Soviet troops

At a meeting of the Politburo on March 19, 1979, Leonid Brezhnev said that the USSR "should not be drawn into a war." However, the rebellion forced to increase the number of Soviet troops near the border with Afghanistan. The memoirs of the former director of the CIA mention that in July of the same year, US Secretary of State John Carter signed a decree (secret), according to which the States provided assistance to anti-government forces in Afghanistan.

Further events of the war in Afghanistan (1979-1989) caused a stir among the Soviet leadership. Active armed protests by the opposition, mutinies among the military, intra-party struggle. As a result, it was decided to prepare the overthrow of the leadership and its replacement by a more loyal USSR. When developing an operation to overthrow the government of Afghanistan, it was decided to use requests for help from the same government.

The decision to deploy troops was made on December 12, 1979, and the next day a special commission was formed. The first attempt to assassinate the leader of Afghanistan was made on December 16, 1979, but he survived. At the initial stage of the intervention of Soviet troops in the war in Afghanistan, the actions of the special commission consisted in the transfer of military personnel and equipment.

Storming of Amin's Palace

On the evening of December 27, Soviet soldiers stormed the palace. The important operation went on for forty minutes. During the assault, the leader of the state, Amin, was killed. The official version of events is somewhat different: the Pravda newspaper published a message that Amin and his henchmen, as a result of a wave of popular anger, appeared before citizens and were executed by a fair people's court.

In addition, the USSR military personnel took control of some units and military units of the Kabul garrison, a radio and television center, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and State Security. On the night of the twenty-seventh to the twenty-eighth of December, the next stage of the revolution was proclaimed.

Timeline of the Afghan War

The officers of the USSR Ministry of Defense, who generalized the experience of the military, divided the entire war in Afghanistan into the following four periods:

1. The entry of Soviet troops and their placement in garrisons continued from December 1979 to February 1980.
2. From March 1980 to April 1985, there were active hostilities, including large-scale ones.
3. From active operations, the Soviet military switched to supporting the Afghan troops. From April 1985 to January 1987, the USSR troops were already partially withdrawn from Afghanistan.
4. From January 1987 to February 1989, the troops participated in the policy of national reconciliation - this is the course of the new leadership. At this time, the troops were preparing for the withdrawal and the withdrawal itself.

This is the brief course of the war in Afghanistan, which lasted ten years.

Results and consequences

Before the start of the withdrawal of troops, the Mujahideen never managed to occupy a large settlement. They did not conduct a single major operation, but by 1986 they controlled 70% of the state's territory. The troops of the USSR during the war in Afghanistan pursued the goal of suppressing the resistance of the armed opposition and strengthening the power of the legitimate government. They did not set the goal of an unconditional victory.

Soviet military personnel called the war in Afghanistan a “sheep war”, because the Mujahideen, in order to overcome the border barriers and minefields set up by the USSR troops, drove out herds of sheep or goats in front of their detachments so that the animals “paved” the way for them, undermined by mines and land mines.

After the withdrawal of troops, the situation on the border escalated. There were even shelling of the territory of the Soviet Union and attempts to penetrate, armed attacks on the Soviet border troops, mining of the territory. Until May 9, 1990 alone, seventeen mines were removed by border guards, including British, Italian and American ones.

Losses of the USSR and results

For ten years in Afghanistan, fifteen thousand Soviet servicemen died, more than six thousand became disabled, and about two hundred people are still missing. Three years after the end of the war in Afghanistan, radical Islamists came to power, and in 1992 the country was proclaimed Islamic. Peace and tranquility in Afghanistan never came. The results of the war in Afghanistan are extremely ambiguous.