Landing in Normandy: 70 years later

On June 6, 1944, the landing of Allied troops in northern France began - a strategically important operation that became one of the most significant events in the history of World War II. The main Allied forces that took part in the operation were the armies of the United States, Great Britain, Canada and the French resistance movement. They crossed the Seine River, liberated Paris and continued their advance towards the French-German border. The operation opened the Western Front in Europe in World War II. So far, it is the largest landing operation in history - more than 3 million people took part in it. The shores of Normandy 70 years later - in the photo project "Kommersant".

Operation Neptune, the first part of the great Normandy operation, began from Omaha Beach. It is the code name for one of the five Allied invasion sectors along the coast of Nazi-occupied France. Steven Spielberg's Saving Private Ryan opens with a landing scene in the Dog Green sector of Omaha Beach. Today, the beach is visited both for recreation and to see the historically important area. Omaha is located in the immediate vicinity of the city of Colleville-sur-Mer. The beach has a rather large length, there are always high waves, so the coast was chosen by surfers.

British Army tanks heading down the Golden Beach Road after landing. According to the official records of the reports, "... the tanks had a hard time ... they saved the day by giving a hell of a bombardment to the Germans and getting a hell of a shell from them." As the day began, the defense of the beach was gradually reduced, often thanks to tanks. 70 years later, this is one of the most popular places for tourists with a developed infrastructure for recreation.

On the beach "Juno" - one of the 5 landing sectors - on June 6, an American fighter crashed. It was an eight-kilometer strip of coast, which overlooked Saint-Aubin-sur-Mer, Bernières-sur-Mer, Courcelles-sur-Mer and Gray-sur-Mer. The landing on this stretch of coast was assigned to the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, under the command of Major General Rod Keller, and the 2nd Armored Brigade. In total, the Allies lost 340 killed and 574 wounded on the day of landing on Juno Beach. In peacetime, thousands of tourists rest here every year.

Canadian military patrolling Rue Saint-Pierre after German troops were forced out of Caen in July 1944. The Allied goal was to capture the French city of Caen, one of the largest cities in Normandy. The city is an important transport hub: it was built on the Orne River, later the Kansky Canal was built; as a consequence, the city became a junction of important roads. The Battle of Caen in the summer of 1944 left the ancient city in ruins. Now more than 100 thousand people live here, St. Pierre Street is one of the main centers for tourists shopping.

The body of a dead German soldier lies in Rouen's main square after the city was taken by US troops who landed at nearby Omaha Beach. Rouen is the historical capital of Normandy, most of all this place is known for the fact that Joan of Arc was burned here. The French Ministry of Culture ranked Rouen among the cities of art and history. The French writer Stendhal called Rouen "Athens of the Gothic style." Although various civil and religious buildings Rouen was heavily damaged during the bombing and fires during the Second World War, fortunately, most of the most iconic historical monuments of the city were reconstructed or rebuilt, making Rouen in the top six French cities in terms of the number of classified historical monuments, and in the top five in antiquity of its historical heritage.

The American parachute landing in Normandy was the first US combat operation of Operation Overlord (the Western Allied invasion of Normandy) on June 6, 1944. About 13,100 paratroopers from the US 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions landed on the night of June 6, and almost 4,000 glider soldiers also landed during the day. Their specific mission was to block the approaches to the amphibious landing area in the Utah-bi sector, seize beach exits via dikes, and establish crossings across the Douve River at Carentan. They pushed back the German 6th Parachute Regiment and on 9 July tied up their lines. The command of the 7th Corps ordered the division to capture Carentan. The 506th Parachute Regiment came to the aid of the exhausted 502nd Regiment and attacked Carentan on June 12, breaking the rearguard left by the Germans during the retreat.

U.S. Army soldiers climb the high ground where a German bunker is located in the Omaha Beach area. The landing was completely classified. All military personnel who received an order regarding a future operation were transferred to camps at the loading bases, where they isolated themselves and were forbidden to leave the base. Today, excursions are regularly held in these places, telling about the events of 70 years ago.

Captured Germans walk along the beach "Juno" - the landing site of Canadian troops during the Normandy landing operation. Some of the fiercest battles took place here. After the end of the war, when the infrastructure of the territory was restored, a tourist flow poured here. Today, for visitors, there are dozens of excursion programs around the battlefields of 1944.

The US military examines a captured German bunker on Omaha Beach. The units that landed at the extreme ends of Omaha Beach suffered the heaviest losses. To the east, in the Fox Green sector and the adjoining part of the Easy Red sector, the scattered units of the three companies lost half their men before they reached the pebbles, where they found themselves in relative safety. Many of them had to crawl 270 meters along the beach ahead of the oncoming tide. Now there is a memorial museum on the landing site. On an area of ​​1.2 thousand square meters. m presents an extensive collection of military uniforms, weapons, personal items, vehicles used in those days. The archives of the museum contain photographs, maps, thematic posters. The exhibition also features a 155 mm Long Tom gun, a Sherman tank, a landing craft and much more.

A US Army battalion walks along the coastline in the city of Dorset, located in the southwestern part of England on the coast of the English Channel. During the Second World War, Dorset took an active part in the preparations for the invasion of Normandy: landing rehearsals were held near Studland and Weymouth, and the village of Tinyham was used for army training. After the war, the county saw a steady increase in the number of vacationers. Weymouth's coastline, which first became famous as a holiday destination under King George III, as well as the sparsely populated rural areas of the county, attracted millions of tourists every year. The role of agriculture in the region's economy has gradually declined, while tourism has become increasingly important.

Soldiers disembark from ships and make their way to the shore, Omaha Beach. "I was the first to land. The seventh soldier, just like me, jumped ashore without receiving any damage to himself. But everyone between us was shot: two were killed, three were wounded. That's how lucky you had to be" - recalls Captain Richard Merrill, of the 2nd Ranger Battalion. Today, sailing competitions are often held here.

A bulldozer clears a path next to the tower of a ruined church, the only structure left standing after the Allied bombing, Onet-sur-Odon (commune in France, located in the Lower Normandy region). The church was later restored. Onet-sur-Odon has always been considered a small settlement, now 3-4 thousand people live here.

The US military prepares a battle plan, stopping at a farm where livestock died from artillery strikes, Utah Beach. By the end of the day on June 6, the Americans had lost about 3 thousand soldiers at Omaha, while only 197 were killed at the Utah sector. Farmer Raymond Berto was 19 years old when the Allied forces came ashore in 1944.

Photo: Chris Helgren/Reuters, U.S. National Archives, National Archives of Canada, U.K. National Archives

By the summer of 1944, 45 states were already participating in World War II. Military operations were conducted in all the most important theaters on land, at sea and in the air. By that time, the US armed forces already numbered 10.2 million people, and the UK - 4.5 million.

From the beginning of 1944, the contingent of American troops in Great Britain grew rapidly. At that time, 150 thousand people a month landed in its ports. In May 1944, this contingent already consisted of 21 divisions and 102 air groups.

The preparation of the armed forces of the United States and Great Britain for the invasion took place in conditions when the main attention of the German command was focused on the Soviet-German front. By the beginning of the landing of the Allied troops, a total of 239.5 divisions of the Wehrmacht and its satellites fought on the Soviet-German front, and 85 divisions on other fronts (France, Italy).

Grouping and defense of German troops. Until the beginning of 1944, German troops in Western Europe (in France, Belgium and Holland) were part of a single army group "D", commanded by Field Marshal G. von Rundstedt. On December 14, 1943, the headquarters of the Army Group "B" for special purposes, headed by Field Marshal E. Rommel, arrived in France, created by order of Hitler on November 10, 1943. The task of the headquarters was to study the readiness of the troops to repel attempts to land troops on the coast, to launch counterattacks on them, and to develop proposals for improving the defense of the coast.

On November 15, 1943, Rommel was appointed commander of Army Group B. This group included the 15th and 7th armies and the 88th separate army corps - a total of 38 divisions. Of these, three divisions formed its reserve. The 88th separate army corps (3 divisions) was stationed in Holland and was engaged in the defense of its coast. The length of the defense section of the 15th Army (commanded by General G. Salmuth), which had 19 divisions, was about 460 km and stretched from the northern border of Belgium to Cabourg. On the coast of Normandy and Brittany, from Cabourg to the mouth of the Loire River (840 km), formations of the 7th Army (commanded by General F. Dolman), which included 13 divisions, were deployed.

In addition to Army Group B, on the basis of Army Group D, Army Group G was also created (commander General I. Blaskowitz) as part of the 1st and 19th armies (16 divisions in total), defending the coast of the Bay of Biscay and the Mediterranean seas. In the reserve of the main command "West" there were 4 divisions. Army Groups "B" and "D" were subordinate to the command "West" (Commander-in-Chief Field Marshal von Rundstedt). In total, by June 6, 1944, 58 German divisions were stationed in France, Belgium and Holland, including 42 infantry, 9 tank, 4 airfield, 2 parachute and motorized divisions.

In addition, in Western Europe there were 64 so-called "legions" (from a battalion to a brigade) from prisoners of war attached to German divisions. There were 886 thousand personnel in Army Groups "B" and "G".

The strongest grouping of troops was created in the area north of the Seine - on the coast of the Pas de Calais. Since Rundstedt and Rommel expected the enemy attack in the first place here, they deployed 9 infantry divisions on the coast. The average density was one division per 10 km of coast.

Directly in the landing zone, which was almost completely included in the zone of the 7th Army, the enemy had six divisions: three stationary infantry (243rd, 709th and 716th), two infantry (352nd and 91st) and one tank (21st). The most dangerous 70-kilometer section of the coast of Normandy was defended by three divisions - 716, 352 and 709. The latter was also responsible for the defense of Cherbourg. In the northwestern part of Normandy was one regiment of the 243rd Infantry Division, and at the base of the Cotentin Peninsula, in case of an airborne assault, the remaining two regiments of this division, along with the 91st Infantry Division. The western coast of the peninsula, with its inconvenient coastline and very high tides, was considered safe and was defended by the 30th Mobile Brigade, which consisted mainly of scooters on motorcycles.

Army Group B Commander Rommel's only operational reserve in the area was the 21st Panzer Division, stationed on the east bank of the river. Orne. The main forces of the division were concentrated in the area of ​​the city of Kahn, although for security reasons several units of motorized infantry moved closer to the coast. The 91st Infantry Division formed the reserve of the 7th Army.

The combat effectiveness of German formations in the West was low. 22 divisions were considered "stationary", that is, they had almost no vehicles and were intended for coastal defense, staffed, as a rule, from soldiers of old age and the sick (for example, the 70th stationary division was manned by soldiers suffering from intestinal diseases who needed special diet.- Note. ed.). 18 divisions were just being formed or restored. With the regular strength of the German infantry division of 12,801 people (as of June 1944), the actual number did not exceed 10 thousand people (70–75% of the staff). The tank divisions were much better manned. With the regular strength of an army tank division (in Western Europe) of 16,932 people and 209 tanks, they numbered from 12,768 (9th tank) to 16,466 (2nd tank) personnel.

In the SS Panzer Divisions, officers and soldiers numbered from 17,590 (9th SS Panzer Division) to 21,386 (1st SS Panzer Division). The staffing of these divisions and tanks was far from the same. If the 1st SS Panzer Division had 203 tanks and 45 self-propelled guns, then the 2nd SS Panzer Division had 69 tanks and 33 self-propelled guns. Most panzer divisions had between 60 and 130 tanks. There were different numbers of heavy tanks in separate tank battalions (from 6 to 50). In total, by the end of April, there were 1608 German tanks in Western Europe, by the end of May their number should have been 1994.

The 3rd Air Fleet included, according to various sources, from 160 to 500 combat-ready aircraft. In addition, the Germans also counted on the strikes of V-1 projectiles and V-2 missiles. The capabilities of the German fleet, which was in the area of ​​​​the expected invasion, were also very limited. A significant part of the German naval forces of the West group (commander German Admiral T. Kranke), performing the tasks of antiamphibious defense of the coast of France, was in the ports of the Atlantic coast (49 submarines, 5 destroyers, 1 destroyer, 59 patrol ships and 146 minesweepers) . In the English Channel and Pas de Calais, the Germans had 5 destroyers, 34 torpedo boats, 463 minesweepers, 57 patrol ships and 42 artillery barges. The Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy, Grand Admiral K. Doenitz, admitted that the fleet could neither prevent nor repel an enemy landing.

In order to cover the most important objects from the air in the territory of Holland, Belgium and France, 350 anti-aircraft batteries were deployed. A strong network of radar posts was set up to detect British and American aircraft and ships. On the front from Calais to Brest, on average, there was one radar per 5-20 km of the coast.

In terms of engineering, the antiamphibious defense of the Germans consisted of one line of fortifications, which had an insignificant depth. The first line of the strip ran along the seashore, at the water's edge, and included mined sections of the coast, wire barriers, guided land mines and various mined obstacles carried into the sea at a distance of up to 400 m from the coast. Hedgehogs and traps were also installed. This line was covered by small arms fire, light to heavy machine guns, anti-tank guns.

The second line consisted of a system of strongholds per platoon, company, located at large intervals along the coast to a depth of 1.5–2 km, and therefore most of them did not have fire links between them. The strongholds had trenches, machine-gun and artillery wood-earth and concrete firing points.

Back in March 1942 (Directive No. 40), Hitler demanded the creation of a system of fortifications in depth on the Atlantic coast. But it was clearly impossible to do this along the 2600 km of the entire coast. The Wehrmacht command was forced to remove the main artillery weapons, barbed wire and mines from the Siegfried Line on the French-German border. However, this was clearly not enough to create the Atlantic Wall.

At the end of 1943, there were 2,692 artillery and 2,354 anti-tank guns of various calibers on the Atlantic coast, and 8,445 long-term firing structures were under construction. The most powerful artillery units in the defense were created at Cape Greene (4 batteries of guns of caliber from 280 to 406 mm) and on the islands of Guernsey and Jersey (11 batteries), but they did not play any role in repelling the invasion of troops. In the Allied amphibious landing area on a front about 75 km wide, there were two batteries of 150-mm guns (6 guns each), a battery of field artillery (four 122-mm guns), two batteries of naval artillery (four 122-mm and four 150-mm guns). -mm guns), that is, the density of guns in the landing area was about 0.3 guns per 1 km of coast.

By May 20, 1944, the plan for engineering construction work in the defense zone of the 15th Army was completed by 68%, and in the zone of the 7th Army - only by 18%. Of the 50 million mines that needed to be installed, a total of 4 million were installed. First of all, the coast of the Pas de Calais was fortified, where the landing and landing of the main Anglo-American forces were expected. The Atlantic Wall was a myth to mislead the German people and the enemy, as well as one of the excuses of the US and British governments to their peoples and the Soviet Union.

The German command did not have a unanimous opinion regarding the methods of organizing and conducting antiamphibious defense. Rundstedt believed that during the landing of an amphibious assault, the maximum possible defeat would be inflicted by artillery fire from the defending troops, counterattacks by private reserves, but he assigned the main role in defeating the landing force to the counterattack by corps and army reserves from the depths of the defense. Rommel, on the other hand, adhered to the point of view that it is possible to destroy the landing force only at the moment of its landing on the shore, when it is the weakest and most helpless, since the people of the area do not yet know and, perhaps, suffered from seasickness during the transition. Unlike Rundstedt, he did not believe in the possibility of strong and quick counterattacks with reserves from the depths of the continent in conditions of complete enemy air supremacy, and therefore Rommel proposed creating a powerful fire system on the coast and concentrating the main forces of infantry, tank and motorized troops there.

Due to heavy losses on the Soviet-German front in 1944, the Wehrmacht High Command did not have enough mobile formations in the West to conduct the maneuver warfare proposed by Rundstedt, and therefore a compromise decision was made - to concentrate the main combat-ready forces directly in the coastal zone, in depth defense to leave only four tank divisions. The plan of the antiamphibious operation of the West High Command provided for the following actions: first, a firefight while the enemy landing force was still on the water; the second is a battle on the seashore; third - a battle in the coastal zone between the reserves and units of the enemy, who will be able to break through the main line of defense; finally, a decisive battle on the coast, in which large motorized and tank troops are introduced in order to defeat and throw the enemy into the sea.

The main shortcomings of the German defense were: the low mobility and weak firepower of the ground forces, as well as their great dispersion; weak air cover; lack of prepared lines in the depth of defense; insufficient reserves; the lack of a unified command of all forces, since the 3rd Air Force of the Luftwaffe was subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, the Naval Command "West" was subordinate to the Commander of the Navy, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces in the West, Field Marshal von Rundstedt, was subordinate to the High Command of the German Armed Forces (OKW).

Grouping of Anglo-American troops. By June 6, 1944, the allied Anglo-American command concentrated the 21st Army Group in the British Isles as part of the 1st American, 2nd British and 1st Canadian armies, as well as the 3rd American army, which was still in direct operational subordination of the Commander-in-Chief of the Anglo-American Expeditionary Force, General D. Eisenhower. In total, the Allied expeditionary forces consisted of 39 divisions, including 12 armored (6 American, 3 British, 1 French, 1 Canadian and 1 Polish) and 4 airborne (3 American, 1 British), 12 separate brigades, 10 commando detachments "and" Rangers "(British and American airborne sabotage units of the Marine Corps).

To ensure the landing, significant air forces were involved - 10,852 combat and 23 transport aircraft, as well as 2,591 gliders. The navy consisted of 1,213 warships and cutters, 4,128 landing craft and landing craft, 736 auxiliary vessels, and 364 merchant ships. The total strength of the Allied Expeditionary Force was 2,876,439, more than half of which (1,533,000) were Americans.

The entire personnel of the expeditionary forces underwent a long period of special training and had a high combat skill. All divisions had combat experience in amphibious operations in North Africa, Sicily and Italy. The command staff was in the absolute majority selected from generals and officers with combat experience.

In addition, there were 41 more divisions in the United States, a significant part of which was intended for transfer to Europe.

When evaluating the correlation of forces, it should also be taken into account that in 1944 partisan detachments operated in the rear of the German troops in France, Belgium and Holland, whose active operations fettered the large forces of the invaders. By the beginning of the Normandy operation, several tens of thousands of members of the Resistance movement were active in France. Eisenhower later admitted that the Resistance forces were worth 15 divisions at the time the Allies landed in France. By June 6, 1944, the German command was forced to send about eight divisions to fight the French partisans.

Military-geographical characteristics of the area designated for the landing operation. The landing of the Allies was carried out in the north-west of France in Normandy, on the Cotentin Peninsula. The seaside of the Bay of Senskaya allowed for the possibility of landing amphibious assaults on an unequipped coast and airborne assault forces in the depths of the Cotentin Peninsula. The relief of the area was basically a flat surface, which rose no more than 200 m above sea level. In this most important agricultural region, all fields were divided into small areas for several centuries, separated by earthen ramparts 0.9–1.2 m high, on which trees and shrubs usually grew densely. Sometimes these "hedges" were double. Located nearby, they formed ready-made trenches and ensured the safety of the fighters in them. Behind each such hedge, American and British soldiers going to break through the enemy’s defenses were waiting for the fire of machine guns or groups of shooters. They also served as good anti-tank barriers, since the tank, trying to overcome such an embankment, climbed it at an almost vertical angle, thereby exposing its unprotected bottom to the fire of armor-piercing shells. Separate sections of the Cotentin were swamped, and some were flooded.

The presence of a large number of highways, railways and waterways connecting the landing area with Paris and the interior of France, as well as airfields, made it possible to successfully use all types of troops and aircraft during the offensive.

The largest ports and naval bases were Le Havre and Cherbourg, which were located on the flanks of the planned landing site. The capture of these ports, especially Cherbourg, was of great importance for the rapid build-up of efforts and the supply of the landing troops.

To reach the coast, the Anglo-American fleet had to cross the English Channel, the width of which reached 154 km. The depths prevailing in the strait from 35 to 100 m allowed submarines to operate. Cloudy and stormy weather with low cloud cover in the early days of June 1944 made it difficult to transfer and land troops and complicate aviation operations.

The slight removal of the landing area made it possible to use aircraft from British airfields to support the ground forces, as well as a relatively quick turnaround of ships.

The Normandy landing operation, like other allied amphibious operations, had the following stages: preparatory; preliminary hostilities; concentration and landing of troops on ships; landing by sea; battles for landing troops and solving problems on the coast.

Operation preparation

The preparatory stage of the amphibious landing in Normandy included the planning of the operation, the organization of forces and command, the organization of interaction, the training of forces and means, and comprehensive support.

Landing operation planning. Planning military operations in Europe, by February 1, 1944, Eisenhower's headquarters developed a general scheme for conducting military operations in Western Europe (Overlord plan, translated from English as "Lord"). Its essence was as follows: to land on the coast of Normandy and seize a bridgehead that occupied the entire territory of Normandy; accumulate the necessary forces and material resources on the bridgehead; to break through the defenses of the German troops in Normandy and, pursuing the enemy with the forces of two army groups on a broad front, on the ninetieth day of the operation, reach the line of the Seine and Loire rivers; develop pursuit on a broad front, delivering the main blow on the left wing in order to seize the necessary ports, reach the German border and threaten the Ruhr; on the right wing, it was planned to link up with troops that would land in the south of France during Operation Dragoon; reaching the German border (a distance of about 500 km) was planned only on the 330th day after the start of the invasion, that is, a low rate of advance was foreseen in advance.

The main component of the operation "Overlord" was the Normandy amphibious assault operation (code name "Neptune").

When planning it, an important place was given to the choice of place and time for the landing of troops. The invasion of the allied armed forces into Western Europe could be carried out: a) northeast of the mouth of the river. Seine, b) in Normandy; c) in Brittany; d) on the coast of the Bay of Biscay. The last two areas were immediately rejected, since they were relatively far from the British Isles, which made it difficult to transfer troops and military equipment to the landing areas and support the amphibious assault by British-based aircraft.

From a strategic and operational point of view, landing on the coast of the Pas de Calais could be the most profitable, through which it would be possible to quickly withdraw the armed forces of the United States and Great Britain to the borders of Germany and cut off the main forces of the German Wehrmacht in Western Europe, etc. .

But the advantageous prospect of the development of the operation was fraught with great risk during the landing on the coast of the strait, which was relatively well equipped in the antiamphibious relation, and the struggle for a bridgehead where the Germans were waiting for the landing and were most ready to fight back.

The coast of Normandy was chosen as the final landing site in Western Europe. This took into account: the small distance of this area from the initial invasion bases on the south and west coast of Great Britain, which made it possible to carry out the transition during the night (160-280 km); finding it within the range of coastal fighter aircraft based in the UK; the weakness of the antiamphibious defense in comparison with the Calais - Boulogne area; the possibility of isolating Normandy from the central regions of France by destroying bridges across the Seine, finding the main forces of the German fleet in the bases of the North Sea and the coast of France and the possibility of isolating them from the invasion area; shallow waters of the Senskaya Bay, which limited the use of large and medium-sized enemy submarines.

The lack of good ports and harbors, coastal reefs, an abundance of marshes and rugged terrain in the depths of the coast - all this, of course, made it difficult to carry out a large naval landing operation, but the German anti-amphibious defense here was much weaker, and therefore the landing operation could be carried out with less risk.

An equally important problem was the timing of the landing. After the Sicilian landing operation (July 1943), when a night landing led to the shelling of ships and ground anti-aircraft weapons against their airborne assault, confusion among their troops on the coast and difficulty in air support, the Anglo-American command began to conduct landing operations during daylight hours. In this operation, dawn was chosen, when coastal underwater barriers could be destroyed at low tide, and the coast attacked at high tide, so that the attacking troops would be under enemy fire as little as possible. The lunar cycle gave the Allied forces only six days per month, during which the tide conditions would satisfy the requirements for landing troops on the coast. The first three such days fell on 5, 6 and 7 June. If the bad weather had prevented the invasion during these days (and it had already delayed the landing by one day), then the operation would have had to be postponed for two weeks.

For five assault formations (in accordance with various conditions in their landing sites), five different “H” were established (a symbol for the start time of the landing. - Note. ed.) in the range of 85 minutes; the earliest was 6 o'clock. 30 min., latest - 7 o'clock. 55 min.

The idea of ​​the operation was to land naval and air assault forces on the coast of the Bay of Senskaya on the very first day in the area from the Grand Ve bank to the very mouth of the river. Orne is about 80 km long. Almost simultaneously, five infantry divisions of the 1st American and 2nd British armies and several detachments of "commandos" and "rangers" were supposed to land on five sections of the coast, three airborne divisions - in three sections at a depth of 5-12 km from the edge water and joint efforts to capture tactical bridgeheads. Already on the first day of the operation, it was planned to combine tactical bridgeheads into one - operational, with a depth of 15–20 km. On the sixth day of the operation, it was planned to increase the composition of the troops on the bridgehead to 16 divisions. In the future, increasing efforts, the main forces of the armies to develop the offensive in the southern and southwestern directions, seize the Cotentin Peninsula with the port of Cherbourg and, by the end of the twentieth day of the operation, reach the line Avranches - Domfon - Falaise - Cabourg, having mastered a bridgehead up to 100 km along the front and 110 km deep. With the release of the 1st American Army to Avranches, it was supposed to bring into battle the 3rd American Army, which was not part of the 21st Army Group and the landing force, as well as the headquarters of the American Army Group.

The 1st American Army was given the task of landing on two sections of the coast (“Utah” and “Omaha”), moving south and west, by the end of the first day to create one common bridgehead about 30 km along the front and to a depth of 8–16 km and connect with airborne troops. Subsequently, the 7th Corps was to develop an offensive against Cherbourg and on the sixteenth day to capture the entire Cotentin Peninsula, and the 5th Corps - first to go to the river. Orne, and then on the seventh day, together with the 19th Corps that landed on the bridgehead, develop an offensive to the south with the aim of capturing the Lessay-Perrier-Saint-Lo line. After regrouping all the forces of the 1st American Army to this line, it was to advance south to the line Avranches - Domfon, take it on the twentieth day and be ready to develop an offensive on Le Mans, Chartres.

The 2nd British Army received the task of landing the 30th and 1st Corps north of Caen on three sections of the coast (Gold, Juno, Sword) on a front of about 50 km and, having joined with the airborne assault, by the end of the day seize the Baye - Kal - Kabur line (to a depth of 10-16 km) and cut the Kan - Vir road with tank units. Then developing the offensive on the right flank, she had to expand the bridgehead so as to ensure the deployment of forward airfields, pin down large enemy forces in front of her and thereby secure the left flank of the 1st American Army. By the twenty-first day, she was supposed to reach the line Domfon - Falaise - Cabourg. In the future, the 2nd British and the deployed 1st Canadian armies were to advance in an easterly direction in order to reach the Seine River.

The operational formation of the 21st Army Group was determined by the concept of the operation and the availability of landing craft, which made it possible to land five infantry divisions at once with reinforcement units (about 130 thousand people and 20 thousand vehicles) on the Cotentin Peninsula in Normandy. It consisted of two echelons: the first echelon was the 1st American and 2nd British armies, the second - the 1st Canadian army. The 1st American and 2nd British armies also had a two-echelon operational formation: in the first echelon of the 1st American army were the 5th and 7th, in the second - the 8th and 19th army corps. In the first echelon of the 2nd British Army were the 1st and 30th, and in the second - the 8th Army Corps.

A few hours earlier, it was planned to land airborne assaults consisting of two American and one British airborne divisions in order to ensure the rapid advance of the first echelon of amphibious assault deep into the coast and delay the approach of enemy reserves to the landing area. The tasks of the formations and units operating as part of the first echelons of the armies were reflected in the plan developed by the headquarters of the expeditionary forces, and brought to the attention of the troops by a special order. The width of the landing front for each corps was on average 15-20 km, and for divisions - 6-10 km. The depth of the formation task on the first day of the operation reached 10–16 km.

The combat formation of corps and divisions was built during the landing in two echelons. In the first echelon of the American corps, two infantry divisions landed (4th and 1st), in the second echelon - four (2, 9, 29th and 79th), in the first echelon of the British corps - three infantry divisions (50- I and the 3rd British, 3rd Canadian), in the second echelon there are also three divisions (49th, 51st Infantry and 7th Armored). One or two reinforced infantry regiments (brigades) were assigned to the first attack echelon of each division. In addition, units of "rangers" and "commandos" operated with them, intended for reconnaissance and capture of important objects on the coast. Such detachments were staffed with specially trained personnel.

To solve the assigned tasks, the divisions of the first echelon were reinforced mainly by tanks, a significant part of which were amphibious tanks and special tanks (mine-sweepers, bridges, etc.). Attached tanks were supposed to parachute and act together with brigades and regiments of the first echelon. Field artillery divisions of the first echelon received almost no reinforcement. Their actions were supported by aviation and the navy involved in the operation.

Thus, on the first day of the operation against six German divisions, it was supposed to land 8 divisions and 14 tank groups and brigades, called assault.

The rate of accumulation of troops on the bridgehead was planned as follows: on the seventh day of the operation - 13 divisions and 5 armored brigades, on the twenty-first day - 23-24 divisions. All divisions of the expeditionary force were supposed to be transferred to France in about seven weeks.

The Allied planning authorities took into account that the success of the amphibious landing operation was determined by the strength of the initial strikes, the rate of accumulation of forces and assets in the bridgehead in the following days, as well as the uninterrupted supply of everything necessary to the landing troops. They understood the initial strike as: a) intensive operations by American and British aviation against the enemy's main communications leading to the coastal strip; b) powerful aviation and artillery preparations for the destruction of enemy coastal fortifications; c) the landing of sea and air assault forces of such force that they, together with subsequent echelons of ground forces, could seize a bridgehead and repel possible enemy counterattacks.

In the course of preliminary aviation preparation, it was planned to isolate the landing area from the possible transfer of enemy reserves here by destroying bridges across the Loire and the Seine, tunnels, railway junctions, etc.

Direct air preparation was to begin 8 hours before the landing of the amphibious assault. The strongest blow to coastal artillery batteries in the defense of the field forces was planned to be delivered 15 minutes before the start of the landing.

Artillery preparation and support for the landing and operations on the coast of the assault divisions were to be carried out by fire groups as part of each landing detachment. The fire group included: 1-2 battleships, 1-3 heavy cruisers, 6-11 destroyers and a number of other ships. In addition to the warships of each landing detachment, artillery guns, rocket (rocket) installations, tanks, self-propelled guns, heavy machine guns mounted on specially equipped landing craft were to take part in fire training. Artillery preparation was planned to begin 40 minutes before the first landing (at 0550 hours). The artillery mounted on the landing craft was to fire at the front line of the enemy's defenses for the last 5 minutes before the landing of the amphibious assault, when aviation and heavy naval artillery carried the fire in depth. Before the landing itself, it was planned to carry out a fire attack with rocket artillery mounted on specially equipped landing craft, and when approaching the coast, with self-propelled guns and medium tanks mounted on special tank landing craft.

Support for the offensive of the ground forces on the coast before the heavy field artillery entered the battles was assigned to naval artillery and tactical aviation. During the offensive of the ground forces, the commanders of the units assigned the tasks of naval artillery through groups and teams to control its fire, which landed on the shore with them.

Organization of forces and command. All forces participating in the landing were consolidated into two operational formations and located in two zones: in the west - American, in the east - Anglo-Canadian troops. The western zone was divided into two sections: "Omaha" and "Utah"; the eastern zone - into three sites: "Gold", "Juno" and "Sword". It was envisaged that one reinforced division was to land on each sector simultaneously with the others. The entire allied fleet, located in the UK, was divided into two commands: the western (American) and eastern (British). Each landing division, together with an escort of ships, transports and landing craft allocated to support its operations, constituted a landing detachment. There were seven such detachments: three in the 1st American Army ("U", "O", "B") and four in the 2nd British Army ("C", "G", "J" and "L") . Five of them were intended for the transfer of assault landing divisions, and two - for the transport of two divisions from the second echelons of the corps, each landing detachment consisted of three to four groups. Ahead were detachments of "commandos" and "rangers" to destroy and capture individual objects.

The organization of command was of a coalition character. American General D. Eisenhower was appointed Supreme Commander of all Allied Expeditionary Forces.

All ground forces were combined into the 21st Army Group (commanded by General B. Montgomery). It included the 1st American Army (commander General O. Bradley), the 2nd British Army (commander General M. Dempsey) and the 1st Canadian Army (commander General G. Crerar).

British Air Chief Marshal T. Lee-Mellory was in command of the air force in the operation. A British admiral was appointed commander-in-chief of the expeditionary naval forces. B. Ramsey. The commanders of the Western (American Rear Admiral A. Kirk) and Eastern (British Rear Admiral F. Vaye) operational formations were subordinate to him in the operation.

The headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force (headed by the American General W. B. Smith) was located in Portsmouth. Between the headquarters of the armies, navy and aviation, located in the same area, the communication lines had several spare channels. Unity of command was established in the management of forces. As a result of the envisaged organization of forces and command, unity of command and coordination of the efforts of the fleet, aviation and ground forces were ensured in the course of hostilities.

Organization of interaction. All issues of interaction were taken into account - in the general and numerous private plans for the preparation and conduct of the operation. In practice, the issues of interaction were worked out in preparation for the operation of headquarters, forces and means.

Preparation of forces and means. The forces and means intended for the landing conducted long-term combat and special training of the troops. During the preparation of the operation, numerous trainings of troops were carried out at special bases and training grounds, similar in nature to the planned landing points. “In a secluded place in East Anglia,” D. Eisenhower later wrote, “the British army recreated all kinds of engineering barriers and obstacles that the Germans could use in defense against us. The British built closed firing structures, erected massive stone walls and barbed wire, set up minefields, made steel gouges for installation under water and on land, and dug anti-tank ditches. Each of these obstacles was a copy of those which, as we knew, the Germans had already created in their defense system. In these conditions, as close as possible to real ones, the troops were preparing for the landing.

The training of personnel, naval landing forces and aviation resulted in a number of special, time-consuming and complex events. All special training of personnel of troops and crews of ships and aircraft was divided into four stages.

At the first stage, classes were held on ships, where the personnel got acquainted with the landing craft, their terminology. At the same time, the following were studied: charters, manuals, instructions of a general type, etc. The command and headquarters studied the area of ​​forthcoming actions, worked out the interaction between forces. Trainings, games and exercises were carried out, which had a specific goal - to prepare troops and staffs for actions in this particular operation using models, mock-ups and experienced crews of landing craft.

At the second stage, training landings on landing craft and exits to the sea were practiced. Here, on the one hand, the training of the personnel of the ships themselves was improved, and on the other, the entire composition of the expeditionary forces was accustomed to operations in sea conditions. The personnel trained in the placement of cargo and ammunition, the organization of communications between units, worked out the basic techniques of boarding combat and self-defense from enemy air strikes.

The content of the third stage was the development of landing issues. This period was the longest (from September 1943 to May 8, 1944), intense and responsible. Ship formations carried out their training in joint navigation, combat maneuvering, firing at coastal targets, maintaining communications, and receiving fuel on the move at sea. Air formations practiced bombing, assault operations, airborne landings, actions to support and cover ships and troops after they landed on the coastline, as well as adjust the artillery fire of ships from the air.

Troop landings were practiced, as a rule, after demonstration landings without interference, in conditions that were more and more complicated by the actions of the "enemy" - shooting, smoke screens, searchlights, minefields, and in some cases air strikes. Under such conditions, each participant prepared for what actually awaited him on the enemy's coast. During the exercises, there were casualties and injuries among the personnel. When working out the landing, photographs, diagrams and models of individual coastal sections or structures were widely used.

Finally, at the fourth stage of preparation, the actions of the troops on the coast after the landing were worked out.

Particular attention was paid to the training of commandos and rangers. They began to be trained 2 years before the invasion at special training centers located on rough terrain and equipped with artificial obstacles. Classes were conducted under the supervision of experienced instructors who received combat practice, and were accompanied by the massive use of fire weapons. The purpose of the training is to work out the landing of the first amphibious assault and the conduct of the battle for mastering the coast in the face of organized enemy resistance.

In the course of preparation for the operation, the construction, re-equipment and armament of landing craft, special equipment of individual ships to accommodate headquarters, etc., were in full swing. Europe in 1942-1943 and the landing operation in Southern France simultaneously with the Normandy landing operation, the Americans allocated only 3 battleships out of 25 available, 3 cruisers out of 75, 40 destroyers out of 391, 1382 small landing boats for the landing operation in Normandy out of 9950, etc. Great Britain sent 4 out of 14 battleships, 21 out of 63 cruisers, 116 out of 257 destroyers into the English Channel.

Ensuring the operation. Based on the experience of naval landing operations, the Allies paid special attention to all types of support for the Normandy landing operation: operational (combat) support - operational reconnaissance, operational camouflage, anti-aircraft, anti-submarine, anti-boat and mine defense; special support for navigation and hydrographic, navigational, topographic and geodetic, hydrometeorological (meteorological) services; logistic support - material, rescue, medical, transport, etc.; technical support - ship-technical, technical support of communication systems and means; metrological, etc. The success of the operation depended on the quality of the solution of all issues of support.

Operational disguise. The greatest experience in operational camouflage and disinformation of the enemy was gained by the Allies in the preparation and conduct of Operation Overlord in general and the Normandy Landing Operation in particular. To cover them, since 1943, the “Bodigard” (“Bodyguard”) operational camouflage plan began to be implemented. It provided for: providing the Allied command with accurate intelligence data about the plans of the German command, about the defensive structures of the Atlantic Wall, about the number and groupings of German troops; the elimination of the German spy network in the UK and the US through active counterintelligence activities; prevention of leakage of secret information about the operation; carrying out camouflage operations to mislead the enemy, conceal from him the true scale of Operation Neptune, the time and place of the landing, and other measures. As part of the Bodyguard plan, more than thirty operations were planned, aimed mainly at diverting the attention of the enemy from the northern coast of Normandy, so that he would keep his troops dispersed throughout Western Europe for as long as possible.

When planning Operation Neptune, various methods of achieving surprise were envisaged: keeping the idea and plan of the operation secret, secrecy of preparation, demonstrative actions of the fleet, distracting air strikes, misinformation of the enemy, etc.

Keeping the concept and plan of the operation secret was achieved by: eliminating enemy agents in the USA and Great Britain; two-month isolation from the outside world of the headquarters that developed the operation; careful protection of persons familiar with the details of the operation; increased censorship, restrictions on postal and telegraph correspondence and the movement of foreign citizens and diplomats; severe disciplinary punishment of persons guilty of divulging secrets.

The secrecy of the preparations for the operation was also facilitated by the prohibition of the population from leaving the areas where the troops were located and entering these areas, and the transfer of ships to Great Britain from the Mediterranean Sea under the guise of the need to repair them. A significant role in ensuring secrecy was played by the struggle of allied aviation with German reconnaissance aircraft, preventing it from flying over the places of deployment of troops, but providing the opportunity to photograph false objects and models of military equipment from a great height, when it was impossible to determine their fictitiousness. The troops that took part in the landing operation were placed before it began in camps surrounded by barbed wire. About two thousand counterintelligence officers carefully monitored the personnel in order to prevent the disclosure of secrets and leakage of information. For the same purpose, the correspondence of personnel with relatives and friends was also detained.

The most important role in ensuring the surprise of Operation Neptune was played by the extensive disinformation of the enemy through various channels. “The disinformation plan carried out in connection with this operation was part of the general, covering all European theaters, coordinated measures of the allies (including Soviet ones. - Note. ed.) by disinforming the enemy, - wrote Field Marshal B. Montgomery, - ... the disinformation plan was intended to mislead the enemy about the invasion area and convince him that we would be ready for the invasion no earlier than six weeks after the actual scheduled date " .

In order to attract the attention of the Germans to the countries of South-Eastern Europe, representatives of the US and British intelligence agencies began negotiations with Turkey in order to involve it in the war as an ally.

At the end of 1943 - beginning of 1944. British and American agents began negotiations with the representative of the Hungarian government Kallai regarding Hungary's withdrawal from the war and its surrender when the Allies approached its border. This became known to the leadership of Germany and was one of the reasons for the entry of German troops into Hungary in March 1944, which, accordingly, weakened their (German) forces in other countries. Similar negotiations took place with pro-Western elements in the Romanian government. In addition, information was disseminated about the preparation of Soviet troops for a landing operation in the Constanta region on the Black Sea coast of Romania. In May 1944, the 9th and 10th armies of Great Britain, located in the Levant (countries of the Eastern Mediterranean. - Note. ed.) and equal in strength to no more than brigades, began to demonstrate the concentration of their units at the southern borders of Turkey and their readiness, together with 40 Turkish divisions, to launch an offensive on the territory of Bulgaria and Greece.

To hold 27 enemy divisions in Norway, Denmark and Finland, Operation Fortitude Nord was carried out (an integral part of the Fortitude plan. - Note. ed.). Launched on June 28, 1943, it was supposed to convince the Germans and their allies that the British, Americans and Russians were going to start hostilities in various parts of Norway in the spring of 1944 in order to force Sweden to join the Allies and use its ports and airfields for cover summer landing in Denmark. For this, a grouping of troops was “created” in Scotland from the fictitious 4th British Army and the real 15th American Corps, “consisting” of 4 infantry, 1 armored and 1 airborne divisions of about 250 thousand people with 350 tanks, ready with non-existent Russian forces to land in Norway.

The second part of the Fortitude plan - Operation Fortitude South - was carried out to mislead the enemy about the number of allied troops and the proposed landing sites in France. The German command was inspired that the 1st US Army Group was deployed in the southeastern part of Great Britain, allegedly consisting of 50 divisions, ready for landing in the area of ​​the Pas de Calais (Operation Quicksilver). For this, they used both recruited enemy agents, and a large number of mock-ups of aircraft, tanks, combat and transport ships, fake campgrounds, and negotiating on false radio networks between the real headquarters in Portsmouth and the false headquarters of the 1st Army Group. The repatriation for health reasons through the Swedish Red Cross of the former commander of the German African Corps, General H. Kramer, who was captured in Tunisia in 1943 and was in Great Britain, also played a role in this. Before being sent to Germany, he was driven along the roads of southern England, clogged with military equipment and troops, had a dinner with the commander of the 1st Army Group, General Patton, and conversations with division commanders, from which he concluded that the Allies were preparing for a landing in the Pas de Calais. He brought his point of view to the leadership of the Wehrmacht ground forces after returning to Germany on May 23, 1944. It is interesting that the Germans had up to 75 divisions in Great Britain by the spring of 1944 (of which 65 were allegedly ready for the invasion, including 6 airborne divisions), and in total by the beginning of the invasion - up to 100 deployed divisions (of which 7 were airborne). -airborne), while in reality, by the beginning of the Normandy operation, Eisenhower had only 39 divisions at his disposal. The Allies managed to keep the most powerful German 15th Army in the Pas de Calais area.

Operations Ironside and Vendetta (components of Operation Fortitude South) were also carried out to hold the German 19th Army in the Marseille region and the German 1st Army in the Bordeaux region, threatening a landing in the Bay of Biscay.

The achievement of tactical surprise was facilitated by the choice of a landing area that did not have major ports and was considered impossible for a strategic landing.

The enemy was misinformed by the powerful air strikes of the allies and the actions of their fleet, when the enemy's vigilance was lulled by frequent demonstrative departures of the fleet forces for the "operation". In fact, the ships of the remote bases of Greenock and Belfast, intended for participation in the operation, periodically went to sea, working out the issues of interaction with infantry when loading and unloading troops, and with aircraft - during the advancement of ships. On the night of June 6, during the passage of the landing ships to the landing sites, three demonstrative strikes were carried out by small groups of small ships along with aviation: on Boulogne, on Capes D "Antifer and Barfleur. The Germans responded to the first demonstrative strike (three hours before dawn in German night fighters rose into the air and began hunting for the ghostly Allied aircraft), which involved British coastal defense ships and aircraft equipped with special electronic devices that ensured the fixation of image signals of a large number of really moving ships and aircraft by German radar stations that had survived after Allied air raids (no more than 20%). The balloons with attached metal corner reflectors were tied to the torpedo boats, which were perceived on the indicators of German radars as large ships. Projectiles and rockets filled with a metallized tape, also imitating the presence of a large number of ships, were fired from aircraft and ships into the air. The Germans did not react to two other demonstrative landings - to Cape D "Antifer and to the northeastern tip of the Cotentin Peninsula.

An hour and a half before the landing of airborne assault forces, the allied command dropped false parachute assault forces in three areas (Operation Titanic). Each of them included one officer and three soldiers. Together with them, about 200 dummies and several thousand various devices designed to simulate shooting and explosions were dropped by parachute. After landing, the landing team turned on powerful amplifiers dropped by parachute, reproducing the sounds of flying mines, rifle shots, shell explosions, as well as orders for the landing and curses of soldiers. One false landing simulated the drop of an entire airborne brigade. Two of them were dropped at midnight in the area west of Saint-Lô, and several in the area between Honfleur and Mezier. Not all of them were thrown out successfully, but they diverted the attention and forces of the German command for several hours, disorienting him about the actual place of landing of air and sea assault forces of the Allied forces. A special role in achieving tactical surprise belongs to the use of new types of military equipment and other technical means of combat in Operation Neptune, such as tank landing and infantry landing ships, self-propelled ferries that justified themselves in the Sicilian landing operation, tanks floating with the help of special tarpaulin devices , armored and simple bulldozers for laying roads on pebbles and sand from landing ships and barges to a solid shore and cleaning the coast from abandoned property and broken equipment. Of great benefit to the special forces commandos and rangers in overcoming the coastal rocky cliffs were specially prepared ropes and rope ladders with boarding cats thrown onto the rocks by mortars and launchers for six rockets each, located on assault landing craft, as well as long 30m retractable fire escapes borrowed from London firefighters and mounted on the back of amphibious trucks.

"A highly unpleasant surprise for the German defense" was, according to K. Tippelskirch, the use of two artificial ports. Secretly built in Great Britain and then delivered across the English Channel to the coast of Normandy, large reinforced concrete caissons 16-17 meters high, which form the basis of the ports, were flooded close to each other. In addition to them, five artificial berths were created for unloading small ships.

On May 26, 1944, the Allies launched Operation Copperhead, which, along with a number of other reconnaissance operations, was supposed to misinform the enemy about the timing of the start of the landing. In its course, the double of General B. Montgomery, Lieutenant James (a former provincial actor), was transferred on a military plane first to Gibraltar, where he met with several prominent Spanish bankers, and then to Algeria. Here he was under the guise of Montgomery until the start of the Normandy operation.

This was supposed to convince the German command that Montgomery was not in Great Britain, and therefore a landing in his absence was unlikely.

The operational camouflage of the operation was also facilitated by the fact that the ships, starting from May 24 until the landing, observed complete radio silence (communication was maintained only by visual means, radio was allowed to be used only to transmit orders from the coast). Most radio installations on ships and vessels were sealed. It was envisaged that even in the event of a mine explosion, the commander of the ship would not have the right to use radio communications, although the nature of the damage would lead to the inevitable death of the ship. It was believed that the senior commander should see what happened, and only he could decide on the use of radio communications.

“After the day of the invasion, our task,” B. Montgomery pointed out, “was to convince the enemy that the operation“ Neptune ”is only a preliminary operation of a sabotage nature and aims to pull the German reserve from the Pas de Calais region and from Belgium, and the main blow will be delivered in the area of ​​Pas de Calais. To fulfill this task, on the day of the landing, on the morning of June 6, 1944, after the official announcement on London radio about the landing of the Allies on the northern coast of France, the appeals of the leaders of the states occupied by Germany were transmitted to their peoples, prepared in advance and recorded on tape. Their main goal was to mislead the enemy about the real plans of the Allied command (Operation Topfleet). The appeals were preceded by a brief speech by D. Eisenhower, who called the landing in Normandy "the first stage of the invasion." King Haakon of Norway said in his address that the landing in Normandy was only “a link in a grand strategic plan”, and Belgian Prime Minister H. Pierlo hinted that the main Allied forces would soon invade Belgium.

Through a double agent who "worked" at the headquarters of the 1st American Army Group, on June 8, information was transmitted to German intelligence that Patton's army group was preparing to be loaded onto ships in the eastern and southeastern ports of Great Britain and would soon be ready to move out. . His message was transmitted to the headquarters of the German High Command, from where an instruction was sent to the headquarters of the German troops in the West about the possibility of landing the main Allied forces in Belgium on June 10. And in the eastern and southeastern ports of Great Britain at that time a large number of models of landing craft and other false objects were exhibited. Only on July 31, 1944, the command of the German Army Group "B" came to the final conclusion that "the assumption of a second major enemy landing operation in the Pas de Calais region was incorrect from the very beginning."

The actions of the German command in response to the measures for the operational camouflage of the Normandy operation showed that, to a certain extent, they achieved their goals. In early 1944, the High Command of the German armed forces considered the Balkans as their weak point, and the Mediterranean theater as the most likely area for the Allied landings, especially the south of France. At the end of April, the German command was confident in the possibility of the allies landing in the first half of May in southern and central Norway from the territory of Scotland. Having learned from intelligence in the second half of May, data on the transfer of part of the forces from Scotland to South England, the Wehrmacht command began to consider a possible landing in Norway as a distraction, and the main forces, in its opinion, should have been transferred across the English Channel to the coast of France or between the Scheldt and Normandy, or to the northern part of Brittany, including Brest.

Due to the lack of reliable information about the allies from their agents, radio intelligence and aviation, the German command was misled by the distracting operations of the allies, holding their main forces in the Pas de Calais for too long. It is quite obvious that if they had immediately moved across the Seine to Normandy, they could have tilted the scales in their favor.

The experience of preparing and carrying out measures for operational camouflage of the American and British armed forces cannot be underestimated, but it cannot be absolutized either. It must be remembered that the main factor in the success of the allies during the invasion was the fettering of the main forces of the Wehrmacht and its reserves on the Soviet-German front by the offensive actions of the Red Army.

In preparation for the Normandy landing operation, well-known American historians (S. E. Morison, for example) identify preliminary military operations, which include military operations carried out for the purpose of reconnaissance, continuous disturbance of the enemy and isolation of the area of ​​​​the upcoming landing.

During the year, British aviation continuously carried out aerial reconnaissance and aerial photography of the planned landing sites, artillery positions and enemy concentration points. In addition to aviation, intelligence was obtained in part by British submarines, as well as during night raids by Allied torpedo boats off the coast of Normandy.

With the help of minelayers, patrol torpedo boats, and aircraft, minefields were actively laid on the enemy's communications in the English Channel and on the approaches to its ports in the strait. Only from April 18 to D-day, 6850 mines were delivered.

Of the hostilities that preceded the operation, aviation operations were the most widespread. The allies carried out a powerful preliminary air preparation against enemy targets, which began two months before the invasion. In the course of it, Anglo-American aviation made more than 200,000 sorties and dropped more than 195,000 tons of bombs. By the day of the invasion, 74 bridges and tunnels, including 13 bridges across the river. Seine and 5 across the river. Loire, were destroyed. As a result, the landing area was to a certain extent isolated from enemy reserves and their maneuverability was severely limited. Enemy coastal batteries and airfields were seriously destroyed, especially within 200 km or more from the landing area. Powerful blows were dealt to the objects of the German aviation industry and areas of production of synthetic fuel, up to Ploiesti. At the same time, up to 80% of all radar installations on the coast of Holland, Belgium and Northern France were destroyed. The suppression of German coastal artillery batteries in the landing area was supposed to begin before the invasion, but in order not to reveal the landing area, it was planned from mid-April until the day of the invasion to drop only 10% of the total weight of bombs on them. The complete suppression of coastal artillery batteries was planned to be carried out by daylight bomber aircraft on the last day before the invasion.

The preparation of the allies for the operation was carried out in exceptionally favorable conditions for diverting the main forces of the Wehrmacht to the Soviet-German front. For two years, the Anglo-American command did a great job of concentrating forces, providing them with comprehensive material support and preparing for the largest amphibious landing operation of the Second World War.

Thus, the peculiarities of its planning and preparation were the length and scrupulousness of the development of plans; careful choice of the place and time of the landing of troops; planning reliable fire suppression of the enemy; preparation for a large airborne assault; special attention to the operational camouflage of the operation to achieve surprise; high logistics, etc.

Combat operations in the Normandy landing operation are divided into the following stages: concentration and landing of troops on ships; landing by sea; battle for the landing and solving problems on the coast.

Concentration and landing of troops on ships. In late May - early June, landing troops were concentrated in the assembly areas, 20–25 km from the landing site. They were located mainly in four starting areas: the troops "Sword" and "Omaha" - in Portsmouth, "Juno" - in Southampton, "Gold" - in the area of ​​about. White, "Utah" - in Plymouth. On June 3–4, they headed for loading points - Falmouth, Plymouth, Weymouth, Southampton, Portsmouth, Newhaven, Poole, Fow, Solent, Spithead and other ports. The loading of military equipment on the transports began a few days before the landing, and the landing of the troops was carried out on the night of June 5.

After loading military equipment onto transports and landing troops, the invasion force was ready to move and land in Normandy.

Landing crossing by sea. The deployment of the forces participating in the operation began on the evening of June 2 with the departure of the ships of the western and eastern fire support groups from their bases. To mark the approaches to the landing sites of the British troops "Juno" and "Sword" from Portsmouth on July 3, two ultra-small British submarines left Portsmouth, which occupied their assigned positions off the coast of Normandy by midnight on June 4. Before dawn on June 6, they surfaced and served as navigational landmarks for the approaching detachments of ships. On June 4, 29 minesweeper flotillas out of 245 vessels set out to sweep 10 fairways (along which the landing units will go to the landing site), clear mines from the maneuvering areas of fire support ships and the parking of transport ships. In the daytime of the day on June 5, minesweepers, without any fire resistance from the enemy, carried out trawling of the fairways and areas indicated by him.

On the morning of June 5, detachments of ships with landing troops left Newhaven, Portsmouth, Southampton, Weymouth, Plymouth, Falmouth and other ports to the control area near the Isle of Wight, arriving there before dark. After that, along the swept fairways, marked by luminous minesweeping buoys, five detachments of ships, guarding minesweepers and patrol ships, moved to the landing sites. At 2 am on June 6, the fire support ships, having anchored, were ready to open fire. The corridor along the fairway and from above was continuously covered by aviation. Strong anti-submarine lines were created from the east and west, on which the enemy lost 20 submarines by August 1.

Simultaneously with the deployment of the main forces, three demonstrative strikes by detachments of ships were delivered to the enemy.

Landing battle. The outset of the battle for the landing was the beginning of direct aviation training at 22 hours 35 minutes. June 5 on coastal batteries, individual centers of resistance, command posts, concentrations of troops in the rear. It ended 10 minutes before the start of the amphibious landing. Within 8 hours, more than 2600 bombers dropped 9400 tons of bombs, of which 4200 tons were hundred pounds (1 pound is equal to 453.6 g. - Note. ed.), the funnels from which were to be used by the advancing troops to shelter the personnel of the landing troops directly on the coast. The main part of the bombs, without causing harm to the enemy, exploded far from the coast. Without causing serious damage to the enemy, the bombardment nevertheless forced the German troops to be in shelters.

Landing of airborne troops. During the period of direct aviation training, the dropping of false and real airborne assault forces began. False landings were thrown into areas where active combat operations were not expected in the first days of the landing. The first echelon of three airborne divisions (18,300 paratroopers) was parachuted from 1,662 American and 733 British aircraft. The second echelon of paratroopers was deployed on gliders and landed in areas captured by paratroopers by landing method. The third echelon consisted of division headquarters, anti-tank guns, engineering equipment, jeeps, bulldozers and other means. The airborne divisions were tasked with capturing areas of the terrain and covering the flanks of the amphibious assault from German counterattacks, as well as promoting the advance of assault troops deep into the Cotentin Peninsula.

First at 1 hour 30 minutes. On June 6, the 101st American Airborne Division of General M. Taylor began landing 5–7 km from the water's edge in the area north of the city of Carentan with the task of capturing dams and roads in the Utah landing area. Due to heavy cloud cover, strong winds and anti-aircraft artillery fire, 60 of 432 aircraft with troops from the US 101st Airborne Division dropped paratroopers at a distance, from 13 to 32 km from the landing site. Of its 6,600 paratroopers, only about 1,100 people gathered at the appointed time. By the end of the day, about 2,500 people had gathered. 60% of weapons and equipment were lost.

The 82nd American Airborne Division of General M. Ridgway was thrown out after 2 hours. 30 min. northwest of the city of Sainte-Mer-Eglise, at a distance of up to 12 km from the coast, in the region of the river. Merder. She was supposed to cover the landing site of American troops from the west and, having captured the crossroads at Sainte-Mer-Eglise, prevent the enemy from sending reinforcements to Cherbourg. This division also found itself scattered over a large area. In addition, its units landed near the area occupied by the German 91st Infantry Division, which arrived here just two weeks before the Allied invasion to reinforce the German 7th Army. They suffered heavy losses, only one of the three regiments managed to complete its task - to cut the road from Monteburg to Carentan. Later, the division managed to capture and hold the city of Sainte-Mer-Eglise.

The 6th British Airborne Division (consisting of two airborne and one airborne brigades) began landing after two in the morning on June 6 northeast of the city of Caen at a distance of 5 km from the water's edge. About 60% of its personnel got into the area of ​​their facilities and began to solve the assigned tasks. The rest of the forces landed on an area of ​​more than 150 square meters. km and far from their facilities, including in the location of parts of the 21st German Panzer Division. Captured by 8 o'clock. 50 min. serviceable bridges across the river. Orne and a small bridgehead, the division pulled back the forces of the 21st German Panzer Division and contributed to the successful actions of the units of the 1st British Corps that landed on the coast. Having failed to establish interaction with its own aircraft, the division also suffered losses from its strikes. The large dispersal of the ejected paratroopers at the same time had a positive result. Numerous reports coming in from early morning to various German headquarters from all places did not make it possible to determine the main landing sites for several hours. False landings with dummies also played their role in misinforming the enemy. Rundstedt's headquarters considered that all this hype during the landing was a sortie or a distraction, but not the beginning of the Allied invasion.

In total, about 35 thousand people, 560 vehicles, 504 artillery pieces, 110 light tanks and about 2000 tons of cargo were transferred by air. To cover the landings, 3200 sorties were made per day. Despite the shortcomings of the airborne landings, the airborne divisions created more favorable conditions for the landing of infantry divisions on the coast of Normandy.

At 5 o'clock. 5 minutes. in the area of ​​​​the Utah sector, one German battery opened fire on two destroyers, and 20 minutes later, a heavy battery began intensive shelling of minesweeper boats that were minesweeping 3-4 km from the coast. The British cruiser immediately responded to the battery, which diverted her fire to herself.

40 minutes before the landing, planned direct artillery preparation began. The fire was fired by 7 battleships, 2 monitors, 23 cruisers, 74 destroyers. The heavy guns of the combined fleet fired at the discovered batteries and reinforced concrete structures of the enemy, the explosions of their shells, in addition, had a very strong effect on the psyche of the German soldiers.

Then, as the distance shortened, the lighter naval artillery began to bombard the field fortifications. When the first wave of landings began to approach the coast, a stationary barrage was placed at the landing sites, which stopped as soon as the troops reached the coast.

Approximately 5 minutes before the start of the landing of the assault detachments, rocket mortars mounted on barges opened fire to increase the density of fire. When firing at close range, one such barge, according to the landing party, Captain 3rd Rank K. Edwards, replaced more than 80 light cruisers or almost 200 destroyers in terms of fire power. About 20,000 shells were fired at British landing sites and about 18,000 shells at American landing sites. The artillery fire of the ships, rocket artillery strikes, which covered the entire coast, turned out, in the opinion of the landing participants, to be more effective than air strikes.

The landing of amphibious assault and the capture of individual bridgeheads. At 6 o'clock. 30 min. in the western (American) and at 7 o'clock. 30 min. in the eastern (British) zones (in the British zone the beginning of the tide was an hour later), the landing of allied troops began in five areas.

By the beginning of the landing on the coast, the main part of the pillboxes, ground structures, “revived” batteries and firing points of the enemy at the forefront of defense, not suppressed by aviation, was largely destroyed by the fire of battleships, cruisers, destroyers and special artillery barges with rocket launchers. By the time the first assault detachments landed, the intensity of artillery fire reached its highest limit.

During the landing of advanced assault detachments, direct fire support was provided by special self-propelled barges and landing ships armed with artillery pieces and 127-mm rocket launchers.

Before the landing of assault detachments, engineer-sapper groups of obstacles approached the shore to destroy antiamphibious obstacles (gouges, welded rails with mines attached to them, etc.). Despite the fact that the actions of the groups were covered by ships and aircraft, they suffered heavy losses. The bombers did not have time to make a sufficient number of reliable passages for the landing craft. Many landing craft were damaged and sank, others were washed ashore.

The actions of the obstacle groups and the first assault detachments were to be covered by long-range amphibious tanks. Amphibious DD tanks, which had been successfully tested in a more favorable environment, began to sink in heavy surf. On the landing site of the 5th US Corps "Omaha" 27 out of 32 tanks sank. 29 of them were launched 4–4.5 km from the shore with a wave of 4–5 points, since no one dared to take the responsibility to deliver them closer to the shore or immediately to the shore, as happened with the other 3 survivors tanks. Another tank battalion, which also landed on the Omaha sector, lost 21 out of 51 tanks. On the Utah landing sector, at the initiative of the landing craft control officer, the tanks were launched just 1.5 km from the coast with little excitement. 28 vehicles out of 32 reached the shore 10 minutes after the landing of the first wave of infantry and immediately entered the battle. At the Juno site, amphibious tanks were launched 900 meters from the coast, of which only 8 sank, and out of 40 obsolete British Centaur tanks with a 95-mm howitzer, which were in service with the Marine Corps and intended for direct artillery support of the Canadian troops, only 6 were brought ashore, the rest capsized during reloading on landing craft and sank. In the Sword sector, 34 out of 40 tanks reached the shore. And in the "Gold" section, tanks landed directly on the shore. According to Montgomery, they greatly helped the success of his offensive with their fire. After the barrage groups, with weak enemy resistance (with the exception of the Omaha sector), the landing of advanced assault detachments began in several waves.

Detachments landed in five sectors with a common front of 75 km. Each division landed on a 6–10 km section, having 1–2 reinforced regiments (brigades) as part of the first echelon, which ensured the capture of bridgeheads.

The ratio of forces and means of the parties to the beginning of the Normandy landing operation

Force means	Allied Expeditionary Force	German forces	Ratio
The personnel of the ground forces	16 000	526	3,0:1
Tanks and self-propelled guns (assault guns)	6000	2000	3,0:1
Guns and mortars	15 000	6700	2,2:1
Combat aircraft	10 859	160	61,4:1
Warships of the main classes, including:	114	54	2,1:1
battleships	7	-	-
monitors	2	-	-
cruisers	23	-	-
destroyers	80	5	16:1
submarines	2	49	1:24,5

On the shore, German troops offered active resistance only to the Americans in the Omaha sector, where two regiments of the 1st division and one regiment of the 29th division landed. Here was one of the best German divisions in the West - the 352nd Infantry Division, stationed earlier in Saint-Lo and arrived here in mid-March on the orders of the commander of the 7th Army to defend the sea coast. Neither British nor American intelligence revealed this. By the time the Allies landed, it was in full combat readiness, while the Allied aviation discovered the division at the last moment. The divisional headquarters managed to warn, but the landing on the ships did not. For him it was a big surprise. In addition, aviation training here was the least successful, and the main part of the most important means of fire suppression of the enemy - amphibious tanks - went under water. Nevertheless, by the end of the day of the invasion, American troops had captured a bridgehead 1.5–3 km deep and 8 km along the front. The division did not fulfill the task of the day, while losing two thousand killed, wounded and missing. The landing of the 4th American division in its sector took place without any problems, and by the end of the day the bridgehead was 5–20 km deep and 10 km along the front. Here, the 7th American Corps was greatly helped by airborne assaults, which diverted parts of the 709th and 91st infantry divisions of the enemy.

Weak resistance was also met by landing troops in the sector of the 2nd British Army. The 50th Infantry Division of the 30th British Corps, reinforced by the 8th Armored Brigade and parts of the 7th Armored Division, landed on the Gold sector and, without encountering serious resistance, advanced on Baye. During the day, she advanced almost 9 km. The 3rd Canadian Division of the 1st British Corps, reinforced by the 2nd Canadian Armored Brigade, landed on the Juno sector and advanced up to 10 km, and its tank detachments crossed the Bayeux-Caen road. The 3rd Infantry Division of the 1st British Corps occupied the Sword sector and advanced towards Caen. She managed to connect with the 6th British Airborne Division, but two kilometers from Caen, she was stopped by part of the forces of the 21st German Panzer Division. In the gap between the 3rd Canadian and 3rd British infantry divisions were units of the 716th German infantry division, which made an attempt to counterattack the landing troops on the flank. Unsuccessful, they withdrew. In the British zone, a bridgehead was created with a depth of 5–10 km and a front of about 35 km.

On the first day of the operation, the forces of three airborne, five infantry divisions and several armored units with a total strength of 156 thousand people were landed. 900 tanks and armored vehicles, 600 guns were delivered. Three separate bridgeheads were captured, but it was not possible to create a single one, as planned. The landing by the allies on a front of about 80 km did not allow the German command to concentrate on the use of divisions located directly on the coast. The main forces of the 709th, 352nd and 716th German divisions from the beginning of the invasion were pinned down simultaneously on the entire front. The 91st Infantry and part of the forces of the 21st Panzer Division were pinned down by airborne assault forces. Reserves were not brought into battle in a timely manner. In just a day, the Allied aviation made more than 14 thousand sorties, German aviation - about 50, since it had no more than 160 aircraft here. The allies dropped about 12 thousand tons of bombs.

The German headquarters in Western Europe received the first report of the airborne landing shortly after it began, already at 02:15. The commander of the 7th Army, General Dolman, announced a combat alert to the 84th Army Corps (709th, 352nd, 716th and 243rd Infantry Divisions). It also applied to the ships of the Navy and aviation units located in its lane. At 3 o'clock the chief of staff of the 7th Army, General M. Pemsel, suggested that the main invasion of the Anglo-American troops had begun, sending their main forces to Caen and Carentan. Field Marshal G. von Rundstedt and the Chief of Staff of Army Group B, General G. Schleidel, despite the reports received, continued, as before, to believe that the enemy was delivering a distracting blow in the zone of the 7th Army, and the main blow would be inflicted in the zone 15 th army. Nevertheless, the order was given to the troops of the 84th Corps to counterattack and destroy the airborne assault on the Catantan Peninsula, for which the 91st Infantry Division was reassigned to it from the army reserve.

The movement of Allied naval ships north of the port of Bessin in a southerly direction was spotted by one of the radar posts at 0309 hours. June 6th This was immediately reported to the command of the ground forces, which did not attach any importance to the actions of the Anglo-American Navy. Only at 6 o'clock. 30 minutes, when the first wave of landing was on the coast, it realized that the invasion of the continent was beginning. Three divisions of the 84th Corps (709th, 352nd and 716th) were involved in the battle, the 234th was on the west coast. Already on the first day, the German command began to commit the reserve 91st Infantry and 21st Panzer divisions into battle. Rundstedt wanted to send a powerful “tank fist” from the 12th SS Panzer and Panzer Training Divisions to the landing airborne assault, but at six in the morning he was forbidden to do this by the headquarters of the Wehrmacht Supreme High Command. Permission was given only after 16 hours. Time was lost, since allied aviation dominated communications, while until 11 in the morning there was heavy cloud cover, which could be used for covert transfer of tank units.

The resistance of the unprepared enemy was, as a rule, ineffective, this is also evidenced by the small losses of the allied troops on the first day: the Americans had 6603 people, including 1465 killed and 3184 wounded, the British and Canadians had about 4000 people killed, wounded and missing.

Problem solving on the beach. On the second and third days of the operation, the landing of the second echelon of the expeditionary forces on the bridgeheads continued. Having concentrated here for three days 8 infantry, 1 tank, 3 airborne divisions and a large number of reinforcement units, on the morning of June 9, the allied forces went on the offensive in order to create a single bridgehead. From June 9 to 12, the expeditionary forces, reaching the line Montebourg - Carentan - Tilly - Cabourg, created a common single bridgehead with a length of 80 km along the front and 13-18 km in depth instead of 35 km according to the plan.

By the end of June 12, 16 infantry and airborne divisions, as well as armored units equivalent to three armored divisions, were already concentrated on the bridgehead. By this time, there were 327 thousand people in the landing force, 54 thousand military and transport vehicles and 104 thousand tons of cargo were transferred here.

In order to improve the overall management of military operations in Normandy by the German command, the sector of the front north and northwest of Caen was transferred to the newly created tank group "West" (commander General von Schweppenburg), which was subordinated to three tank (21st, Training and 12th SS) and two infantry (716th and 352nd) divisions. The defense of the Cotentin Peninsula was assigned to the 84th Army Corps (709th, 243rd and 91st Infantry Divisions); southwest of it was the newly created 2nd Parachute Corps (17th SS Panzergrenadier, 3rd Parachute and 77th Infantry Divisions), which was subordinate to the commander of the 84th Army Corps. Assessing the situation as dangerous, Rundstedt on June 7 ordered three more panzer divisions to be brought up (1st SS from Belgium, 2nd SS from Toulouse and 2nd Wehrmacht from the Army Group B reserve). He continued to pull up reserves to the battlefield in order to drop the landing into the sea, without touching the 15th Army. But without its divisions, it was impossible to quickly create the forces and means necessary for a counterattack. On June 7 and in the following days, the German command launched counterattacks and counterattacks against the Allies. During this period, the most powerful blow to the Anglo-American troops was a counterattack by forces of three divisions on June 12 between the Orne and Vir rivers in order to cut the Allied grouping, but without success. By June 12, the German command had committed 12 divisions (including 4 armored and 1 motorized), most of which were poorly equipped with personnel and military equipment, had little ammunition and fuel. They were introduced into battle in parts, as they arrived, so they could not change the general situation in their favor and suffered heavy losses.

On the night of June 13, the German command for the first time used a new weapon against Great Britain - V-1 projectiles, but it had no practical effect on the course and outcome of the Normandy landing operation of the allies.

By decision of the commander of the 1st American Army, the 7th Corps, with the forces of the 82nd Airborne and 9th Infantry Divisions, began to "cut" the Cotentin Peninsula on June 14, and the 4th and 90th Infantry Divisions, which turned out to be of little combat capability, launched an attack on the port Cherbourg. By the evening of June 17, the Cotentin peninsula was "cut", the 9th division went to the sea on its western coast in the Carteret area. Subsequently, the place of the 90th division, which had failed in the attack on Cherbourg, was given to the newly landed 79th, and the 9th division, after completing the first task, was also turned to Cherbourg. The 8th corps of T. Middleton, together with the airborne divisions, covered the 7th corps from the south, along the base of the Cotentin peninsula. Assessing the situation and foreseeing the dissection of the German defense throughout the entire depth of the Cotentin Peninsula, Rommel decided on June 14 to defend Cherbourg with the forces of the 709th and 234th Infantry Divisions, the remaining divisions were to create a defensive line at the base of the Cotentin Peninsula for defense against the striking forces of the 1st American army.

By June 21, the 7th American Corps approached the defensive works of Cherbourg. Within eight days, with the support of artillery, aviation and fleet, he stormed the city and captured it on June 29. On July 1, the Cotentin was cleared of German troops.

While the 1st American Army was fighting on the Cotentin Peninsula, the 2nd British Army made an attempt to outflank Caen from the east and west. The main blow was delivered from the west by the 30th and the newly arrived 8th corps (5 infantry and 1 armored divisions), while the 51st division of the 1st corps delivered an auxiliary blow from the bridgehead on the river. Orne. On June 25, the 30th, and a day later the 8th Corps went on the offensive. Within three days they broke through the main line of defense of the German troops. In order to develop tactical success into an operational one, the 11th British armored division was introduced into the breakthrough. But she could only go a little deeper into the enemy's disposition. The infantry divisions that approached her helped secure the captured line. On June 29, the enemy brought units of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions, which had just arrived from the Soviet-German front, into the breakthrough area, and on July 1, the offensive of the British corps bogged down. Although another attempt by the 2nd British Army to capture Caen failed, nevertheless, its offensive prevented the German command from withdrawing the 21st, Training and 12th SS Panzer Divisions from it to prepare a powerful counterattack. In addition, units of two newly arrived tank divisions also got stuck in the battle, which were also planned to be used in a counterattack against the British and Canadians.

By the end of June, the allied armies were able to expand the bridgehead to 100 km along the front and 8-10 km in depth. 23 advanced airfields were prepared, to which a significant part of the Allied tactical aviation was relocated. By this time, the allied armies were supposed to reach the Avranches - Domfon - Cabourg line, but in reality they were 45-80 km from it, since the pace of the offensive was significantly behind the planned one and was no more than 0.5-1.5 km per day. day.

By June 30, there were already 875 thousand people, 148,803 vehicles, 570,505 tons of cargo on French soil.

The British and Canadians in the British 2nd Army were brought together in 4 corps, consisting of 10 infantry and 3 armored divisions, while the American troops under the command of Bradley, in 4 corps, had 11 infantry and 2 armored divisions.

At the end of June, the Allied forces were opposed by 18 German divisions, which had suffered heavy losses in previous battles. So, on June 20, there were 25-35 people in the ranks of the 12th SS Panzer Division and the 21st Panzer Division. At the same time, the divisions in the 15th Army remained untouched, and it was practically impossible to take any forces from the Soviet-German front, since at that time the offensive of the Soviet troops was launched in Karelia and Belarus, delaying almost all existing and newly created reserves enemy.

In early July 1944, the commander of the 21st Army Group, B. Montgomery, planned to begin decisive operations on the bridgehead. As a result of these actions, the Allied armies had to quickly reach the Comon - Fougeres - Vire line in order to then strike at Le Mans, Alencon and further on Paris. The 2nd British Army was to pin down the main German forces between Caen and Villers-Bocage, after which they would capture the city of Caen itself and then move to the river. Seine. The American troops were tasked with attacking first to the south, then to the east on Le Mans, Alencon and further on Paris. Montgomery intended in this way to cut off the escape routes of German divisions from Normandy through the passage between Orleans and Paris and to push other German troops back to the river. The Seine is below Paris, which would put the Germans in a very difficult position.

The assigned tasks and the distribution of forces did not correspond to the plan of the operation, since the 1st American Army, which delivered the main attack, advanced on a front of about 80 km, and the 2nd British Army, operating in a secondary direction, on a front of less than 50 km, while the forces of both armies were roughly equal.

Formations of the 1st American Army were distributed evenly along the entire front and were built in one echelon. To build up a strike from the depths, Bradley was not allocated even the minimum necessary forces and means for this, since the Allied command considered it quite sufficient to separate divisions in corps and reserves from among the divisions that had newly arrived at the bridgehead.

Having launched an offensive on July 3 through swamps and "hedges", the 1st Army eventually reduced it to private battles to expand the bridgehead. In three weeks, her troops advanced 10-15 km southward and reached the Lessay-Perrier-Saint-Lo line, which, according to the plan, she was supposed to take on the tenth day of the operation.

On July 8, the British 2nd Army went on the offensive with three armored brigades. The offensive was preceded by the most powerful aviation and artillery (large-caliber guns of the Allied ships) training. 2.3 thousand tons of bombs were dropped on the airfield division, which stood in the way of the British to Caen. From July 8 to July 18, the troops advanced 1-3 km, occupying the northern part of Caen.

On the night of July 15-16, during the offensive of the 12th Army Corps west of the city of Kan in order to capture a bridgehead on the southeastern bank of the river. The orn was widely used by the so-called "moonlight". A large number of searchlights mounted on tanks were directed into the clouds in such a way that the reflected beams provided illumination of the enemy in the combat area.

On July 18, a new offensive was launched by the Anglo-Canadian troops from the area east of Caen. 3 armored and 4 infantry divisions participated in the offensive. The offensive was supported by about 2 thousand heavy and medium bombers, who dropped 7700 tons of bombs on the suburb of Caen - the village of Colombel, and heavy naval artillery.

The German command, knowing about the upcoming offensive, withdrew its main forces to a pre-prepared line 10-12 km from the front line of defense. It also pulled up three of its tank divisions there, preparing for a counterattack. Armored formations captured these positions during July 18 and 19 and on the third day approached the main line of defense, where they were stopped by the main forces of the 1st and 2nd German tank corps. On July 21, the city of Caen was finally captured completely, and on the 44th day of the operation, the 2nd British Army went a little further than the line that was determined by the plan for the end of the first day of the invasion. By July 25, the allies reached the line south of Saint-Lô - Caumont - Caen. The Norman landing operation was completed.

The characteristic features of the conduct of the operation were: the landing of an airborne assault; reliable fire suppression of the enemy; the timing of landings in the American and British zones; the achievement of operational and tactical surprise, which made it possible to ensure superiority in forces and means, especially in firepower, at landing sites, the slow pace of the Allied advance while expanding the operational bridgehead into a strategic one (0.6-1 km per day for the entire period), which led to to push the enemy to new positions, etc.

good luck

In the period from June 6 to July 24, the Anglo-American command managed to carry out the landing of large expeditionary forces in Normandy and occupy a bridgehead 100-110 km along the front and up to 50 km in depth, half the planned. Nevertheless, the most important communications centers in Normandy - Saint-Lo and Caen, as well as the large port of Cherbourg, were captured, and favorable conditions were created for a further offensive in Northern France.

The landing of the Allied expeditionary forces in Normandy, which marked the opening of a second front in Western Europe, was the largest amphibious landing operation of strategic importance in World War II, carried out by ground forces, naval forces, airborne forces and aviation.

The Anglo-American command as a whole successfully solved the problem of the accumulation of forces and means on the bridgehead, despite the delay in the plan and the difficulties created by a strong three-day storm, when over 800 ships were lost (240 during the landing), one of the artificial ports was destroyed, and the other is badly damaged.

Despite the absolute superiority in the air and the help of the Resistance forces, the problem of counteracting the transfer of enemy reserves to the combat area was not fully resolved. During the expansion of the operational bridgehead during the operation, the Allied armies conducted combat operations simultaneously or sequentially on their sectors of the front. The offensive was carried out very slowly, since shock groups were not created. From the beginning of July, the Allies carried out two army offensive operations with the aim of defeating the enemy and reaching Paris. However, ill-prepared, they did not have much success. Enemy losses for the period from June 6 to July 23 amounted to 116,863 people, 2,117 tanks, 345 aircraft, British and Canadians - 49 thousand, Americans - about 73 thousand, and in total - about 122 thousand people.

During the period of landing and struggle for the expansion of the bridgehead, the allied armies gained combat experience and studied the tactics of the enemy. They used all this in the preparation and conduct of subsequent amphibious, airborne and offensive operations.

New spurt

As a result of the Normandy landing operation (June 6–July 24, 1944), the Allied troops captured a bridgehead up to 100–110 km along the front and 20–50 km in depth (more than two times less than that envisaged by the operation plan), their formations reached the line south of Saint-Lo - Caumont - Caen.

Already during the Normandy landing operation, Soviet troops launched a grandiose offensive in Belarus, where the enemy was forced to attract an additional 2,100 combat aircraft in the summer of 1944. From June 25 to July 16, 15 new German divisions and 2 brigades were transferred to Belarus, and in total during the Belarusian operation (from June 23 to August 29, 1944), the enemy transferred 46 divisions and 4 brigades to Belarus, which, of course, made it easier Anglo-American troops to conduct Operation Overlord.

The Anglo-American troops were faced with the task of breaking through the German defenses at the line held by the enemy at the base of the Cotentin Peninsula and developing tactical success into an operational one. This task was successfully completed by the 1st American Army under the command of General O. Bradley.

Characteristics of the combat area. The fighting took place in the northwestern part of France - Normandy (on the Cotentin Peninsula). The terrain was mostly flat. All the fields in the area were divided into small areas, which were separated by embankments. The mounds were usually densely overgrown with trees and shrubs, the roots of which, closely intertwined in the ground, gave them special strength. These "hedges" served as good hiding places for the defending German soldiers and military equipment. Separate swampy areas, especially the Carentan marshes at the base of the Cotentin Peninsula, also hampered the actions of the advancing troops, as well as numerous minefields.

The presence of a large number of highways, railways and waterways connecting Normandy with Paris and other interior regions of France, as well as airfields, made it possible to successfully use all types of ground forces and aviation during the breakthrough of the defense of German troops and the development of tactical success into operational success. Through the large ports of Le Havre and Cherbourg, there was an increase in forces and means to ensure the success of the operation. Military transport aviation also made a significant contribution to this.

After the capture of Saint-Lo on July 18, west of this settlement and on the other side of the Vire River, the Allied forces reached a hill suitable as a starting point for a breakthrough.

Side forces. By July 25, the allied command concentrated on the bridgehead 3 deployed armies of the 21st Army Group - the 1st American, 2nd British and 1st Canadian. They numbered 32 divisions, including 23 infantry, 1 airborne and 8 armored. In units and formations on the bridgehead there were about 2500 tanks. The air force consisted of about 11 thousand aircraft.

In addition, in fact, in the second echelon was the 3rd American army of J. Patton (three corps directorates, 4 armored and 1 infantry divisions), which legally began to exist only on August 1 - at the same time that the Allied forces were divided into two groups armies - the 21st Anglo-Canadian (as part of the 2nd British and 1st Canadian armies) and the 12th American (as part of the 1st and 3rd American armies). In the meantime, five divisions of the 3rd American Army, operationally subordinate to O. Bradley, made up his powerful armored reserve in case of failure when the 1st Army divisions broke through the enemy defenses. Bradley put all his 4 corps (16 divisions) in the first echelon, since he intended to break through the German defenses with one echelon. Thus, all American divisions that arrived in Europe (21 divisions) were concentrated in this direction.

The allied forces on the Normandy front were opposed by 24 German divisions (including 9 tank divisions), which were part of the 7th Army and the West tank group. They numbered about 900 tanks and 500 aircraft. Having lost 116,863 people and 225 tanks from June 6 to July 25, the German troops received, according to the head of the operational department of the headquarters of the Western Front, Lieutenant General B. Zimmerman, 60 thousand people and 17 new tanks as replenishment. True, Zimmerman did not indicate that the replenishment was an addition to the newly arrived units at the front.

The divisions of the allied troops were at full strength, while the German divisions had a severe shortage of personnel and military equipment. For example, the Training Tank Division went into battle with 2,200 personnel and 45 serviceable tanks on the front line. At the same time, the German tank division according to the state of 1943 had 167 armored vehicles, and in the American armored division, in addition to other armored vehicles, there were 269 tanks (according to the state of 1944).

While stubborn battles continued in Normandy and a new offensive of the Anglo-American troops was expected, the 15th German army was located in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe Pas de Calais (150 km to the north) with 19 intact divisions. Hitler continued to believe that an even greater force would be struck through this strait.

The main task of breaking through the German defenses was assigned to the 1st American Army. It consisted of 4 corps (5th, 7th, 8th and 19th), numbering 13 infantry and 3 armored divisions, 11 separate tank battalions, 50 artillery battalions, 54 anti-aircraft artillery battalions, 42 engineer battalions, 42 separate engineer companies , 8 divisions of mechanized cavalry.

In the zone of the upcoming offensive, the troops of the 1st American Army at the time of the offensive were nominally opposed by 9 infantry, 2 parachute, 1 panzergrenadier and 2 tank divisions of the 84th army and 3rd parachute corps of the 7th army, but their real strength was equivalent to only three and a half infantry, one parachute and three tank divisions.

In the area chosen for the breakthrough, units of the Training Panzer, 5th Parachute and 2nd Panzer SS divisions were defending in the first echelon of the German troops, units of the 275th Infantry Division, which was intended to change tank divisions at the front, were in reserve, but to make did not have time to do this. In total, the Germans had no more than 2–2.5 divisions in this sector, numbering about 30 thousand soldiers and officers. Consequently, in terms of the number of divisions in the breakthrough sector, the Americans created an almost threefold superiority over the Germans. The overall superiority over the enemy in the number of troops and artillery, as well as in tanks, was much greater.

Under the conditions of Anglo-American air supremacy, the capabilities of the German troops in repelling the impending strike were even more reduced, since the 3rd Air Fleet was unable to provide even an insignificant fighter cover for the ground forces of Army Group B.

Side plans. The breakthrough of the German defense was scheduled to begin on July 18 with troops from both the 1st American Army and the 2nd British Army.

According to the general plan, the advancing troops were to cut off the escape routes of the main enemy forces located between the Loire and Seine rivers and destroy them. The Americans, due to weather conditions, postponed the offensive to July 24, the British launched it at the scheduled time.

After the unsuccessful British offensive on July 18, in the first strike of which the commander of the 21st Army Group, B. Montgomery, used the 7th, 11th and Guards Armored Divisions of the 8th Army Corps (this was the most powerful Allied tank strike in the entire campaign, as a result of which in three days, 469 tanks out of 1100 were lost), more than 2100 bombers that dropped 7700 tons of bombs on the suburb of Caen, the village of Colombel (the largest Allied bombing strike to support their troops during the Second World War), and naval artillery fire from the Senskaya Bay, the main attention was paid to preparing the offensive of the 1st American Army.

Western historians and many military leaders began to call the offensive operation of the British and Canadians on July 18 southwest of Caen as operational camouflage measures to divert German tank divisions to this sector of the front. Indeed, a significant part of the German divisions was located here, since the Germans knew about the upcoming offensive of the British armored divisions due to their failure to comply with operational camouflage measures. But according to all the canons of military art, this was not a distracting blow, but an unsuccessful offensive operation of the Anglo-Canadian troops led by B. Montgomery. In order not to question his authority, he later stated that it was only a distraction. Moreover, the German troops near the city of Caen were reinforced by a tank division, which had previously been in the reserve of the 7th Army in the Saint-Lo region, and an infantry division, following from the Pas-de-Calais region to strengthen the defense in the offensive zone of the 1st American army. The Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces in the theater of operations, General D. Eisenhower, in his memoirs "Crusade in Europe" tactfully passes over this operation in silence. But his historian Stephen Ambrose writes that Eisenhower was in anger. “He was indignant that it took seven thousand tons of bombs to advance seven miles, since the Allies have no hope of going through all of France, paying for every mile with a thousand tons of bombs. Tedder (British Air Chief Marshal, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Expeditionary Force in Europe for the Air Force. - Note. ed.) blamed Montgomery for the failure of the operation.

The main role was now assigned to the 1st American Army, whose formations were to strike in the sector west of Saint-Lo in a southerly direction to Coutances, break through the defenses and cut off the enemy coastal grouping; in the future, developing the offensive on Avranches, Rennes, from the line of the Selyun River, bring the 3rd American army into battle.

After entering the battle, the 3rd Army, advancing in the southwestern and southern directions, was supposed to clear the Brittany peninsula and its major ports. Then the American divisions planned to turn east through Le Mans, Alençon, push the enemy back to the Seine and clear the territory of Northwestern France from him to the line of the Loire and Seine rivers.

The plan for the breakthrough of the German defenses by the 1st American Army at Saint-Lô, which received the code name "Cobra", was developed by the army commander, General O. Bradley and his headquarters by July 10.

The operational formation of the 1st Army was, as already indicated, in one echelon (4 corps in one row) with a total offensive zone of 58 km. Only the 7th American Corps of General J. Collins was supposed to carry out a breakthrough in the 6.5 km strip, and the rest of the corps (8th, 19th and 5th) of the 1st Army were supposed to put pressure on the enemy in their areas in order to first force the Germans to hold their forces here, and then retreat. At the same time, they had to be ready to use the enemy's disorganization caused by the actions of the 7th Corps to move forward quickly. There was only one Norwegian-American battalion in the army reserve.

The 7th Corps was tasked with breaking through the enemy defenses north of Marigny, capturing the Coutances-Marigny line, cutting off the escape routes of the German 84th Army Corps, and then destroying it with the strike group, together with the 8th Corps. The remaining forces of the corps, primarily its armored divisions, were to cover the possible approaches of German troops to the battle area from the south and east, occupying a line from the area north of Villedieu to Saint-Lo.

The 7th Corps built its battle formation in two echelons. In the first echelon were located: the 9th Infantry Division - on the right, the 4th - in the center, the 30th - on the left. The second echelon of the corps consisted of the 2nd and 3rd armored and 1st infantry divisions.

The divisions of the first echelon were supposed to break through the forward positions of the German defense to a depth of 2.5–3 km, capture the Marigny-Saint-Gilles line and ensure the introduction of the second echelon of the corps. After that, they were to develop an offensive towards the flanks in order to expand the breakthrough, and the divisions of the second echelon, passing through four through routes through the battle formations of the first echelon, completed the breakthrough of the defense, and then turned to the west and struck at Coutances and Granville, mastering abroad Coutances - Villedieu.

The 1st Infantry Division, together with the combat command of the armored division, was to cut the escape route of the 84th Army Corps in the Coutances area and assist General Middleton's 8th Corps in destroying the enemy. For clarity, the American command compared the actions of this division with an anvil, on which the hammer (8th corps), entering the battle in the Lessay sector and advancing on the right flank along the coast, would crush the 84th German army corps. In the future, the task of the armored divisions was to continue the offensive in the general direction of Avranches, preventing the enemy reinforcements from approaching the 84th Corps, and to deepen the breakthrough.

Bradley chose to break through to the west of Saint-Lô on the section of the Perier ring road because there were two main roads and several country roads. On the northern side of this road, the Karantan swamps gave way to dry soil, and to the south for another 40 km, a gradually thinning network of "hedges" stretched.

Bradley mapped a rectangle 6000 wide and 2500 yards deep Note. ed.). According to the plan, it was supposed to suppress the enemy with massive bombardments in this area.

The plans of the German side were to prevent a breakthrough of their defense. Using the defensive properties of the terrain, wear down and bleed the British and American troops, try to buy time before the arrival of new reserves.

Enemy fire planning. Operation Cobra was to begin with a 20-minute fighter-bomber raid on this narrow front along the road to Perier. Behind them, an armada of 1,500 heavy bombers (B-17 Flying Fortress and B-24 Liberator) was supposed to appear at an altitude of 2500 m and work on enemy positions for an hour. Each of them carried forty 45-kilogram fragmentation bombs. Napalm and 130-kilogram fragmentation bombs were also dropped so as not to turn the terrain into impassable for tanks. After the last group of heavy bombers had dropped their load, the three strike divisions of the 7th Corps were to rush forward, withdrawn from the front line for safety at 1,500 meters, supported by a thousand odd guns. While the three divisions of the first echelon were advancing towards the road to Perrier, 350 fighter-bombers would again have to bombard the narrow strip on the northern edge of the rectangle. After that, 396 medium bombers were supposed to appear and process the southern edge of the rectangle within 45 minutes. In total, for processing a plot of 13 square meters. km, 2246 aircraft were to be involved.

Compared with aviation training, artillery training was assigned an insignificant role. It was intended to suppress enemy manpower and firepower in the intervals between the end of aviation training and the exit of infantry and tanks to the line of attack from the line of safe removal. Artillery preparation was planned to a depth of 4-6 km for 30 minutes. It was supposed to be carried out by a consistent concentration of fire.

The success of the offensive in depth largely depended on the clarity of interaction between tactical aviation and armored divisions. To ensure the non-stop movement of armored divisions, the commander of tactical aviation of the 9th Air Army, General E. Cuesada, allocated "aircraft cover for tank columns", which was divided into "air escort parties" according to the number of tank columns. Each tank column was to be escorted continuously by four fighter-bombers with the task of attacking any target that delayed the advance of the column. If the escort aircraft failed to suppress the enemy, the commander of the group of aircraft escorting the convoy had the right to call in additional aviation forces from the airfields. Communication between the "air escort party" and the tank column was maintained continuously by radio, for which aviation radio stations were placed in tanks that moved along with the column commander.

Massing forces and means. The operational density in the breakthrough area was about 1.1 km per division, for the remaining divisions of the 1st American Army - an average of 5.2 km.

The tactical density in the offensive zone of the corps was about 100 tanks and the same number of guns and mortars per 1 km of the breakthrough front. Only 6 divisions out of 16, 4 separate tank battalions out of 11, 20 artillery battalions out of 50, 7 engineer battalions out of 42 carried out a breakthrough and development of success in depth. double breakthrough.

Operational camouflage of troops. In preparation for the offensive, the Allies carried out a number of measures to disinform the enemy and operationally disguise the troops.

First of all, the Anglo-American command sought to confirm the enemy in the opinion that the invasion of Normandy was a distracting blow, and the main blow would be delivered in the area of ​​the Pas de Calais by the forces of the one millionth 1st Army Group of the United States. According to the data received by the German headquarters, it consisted of the 9th and 14th American and 4th British armies. In reality, only the 9th Army was in South East England, several second-rate English infantry brigades demonstrated the deployment of the 4th Army. The 14th Army was fictitious.

The plan to mislead the enemy was developed by the Americans and bore the double code name "Fortitude South-2" and "Rezabud". In accordance with the plan, a concentration of a large number of landing craft was simulated in the ports of South-East England, and false information about the upcoming landing was sent to the enemy's higher headquarters through various channels. German intelligence also intercepted a number of instructions encrypted with a cipher known to the Germans on intensifying sabotage and sabotage, intended for organizations of the Resistance movement in Belgium and North-East France. In addition, rumors circulated about the date of August 14, 1944, as the date of the likely landing of the Allies on the Pas de Calais coast. Simultaneously with the misinformation of the enemy, a number of measures were taken to ensure the secrecy of the transfer of troops and headquarters to Normandy. The actual headquarters of the 1st Army Group, sent there from Bristol, was called the headquarters of the 12th US Army Group, which later included the 1st and 3rd American armies.

The unsuccessful offensive of three armored divisions of the 8th British Corps near Caen also played its role in diverting the attention of the German command from the 1st American Army.

A set of measures was taken to disinform the enemy and regarding the goals of the arrival on July 6 at the bridgehead of General J. Patton, who was previously advertised as the commander of the 1st American Army Group, allegedly intended for landing in the Pas de Calais area. In reality, he was appointed commander of the 3rd American Army, which was to develop the breakthrough of the 1st American Army. D. Eisenhower on July 10 instructed the Chief of Staff, General W. B. Smith, to organize a “leak of information” that General J. Patton had been demoted to army commander due to a major quarrel between them, and a more experienced general arrived to replace him. Lieutenant L. McNair, Commander, US Army Ground Forces.

In order to mislead the enemy, a "rubber armored division" was deployed on the left flank of the 1st American Army. This division was a small detachment, which had rubber inflatable tanks and communications equipment that simulated radio traffic in the same volume as in a conventional armored division.

The divisions of the second echelon of the 7th Corps, which were supposed to build on the success of the divisions of the first echelon, entering the so-called clean breakthrough (after a complete breakthrough of the enemy’s defenses), were supposed to be transferred to their original positions just before the start of the offensive, and even then only at night, subject to careful disguise .

Unexpected for the enemy was the use of tanks equipped with special sapper devices - steel knives welded in front. These knives cut off the earth embankment along with vegetation (dense shrubs, the so-called "hedges", which not every tank could overcome without special knives. - Note. ed.), which allowed the tank not only to calmly overcome obstacles, simultaneously firing from a cannon, but also for some time to use the cut ground with vegetation as a natural camouflage. This invention was demonstrated by O. Bradley less than a week before the operation. A week later, three of every five tanks allocated to participate in the breakthrough were equipped with such devices.

Using covert command and control, measures to disguise and misinform the enemy, and a successful fight against German intelligence, the Anglo-American command achieved operational surprise in Operation Cobra, which subsequently had a positive effect on its development.

New offensive

Aviation and artillery preparation for the offensive. The offensive, scheduled for July 24, 1944, was again postponed on the morning of that day due to bad weather one day later. But the planes were already in the air, and the order to postpone the start of the bombardment of enemy troops was not brought to them in time. The first two waves of bombers did not drop their bombs due to poor visibility, but the third, out of 300 bombers, did. Some of them went to the forward positions of the 30th American division, located 1.5 km from the bombing area, while 27 people were killed and 131 were wounded.

At 9 o'clock. 35 min. On July 25, 1944, Operation Cobra began. 4700 tons of bombs were dropped on the enemy. This was the third most powerful air training in Normandy (after air training under the Goodwood plan at Caen on July 18 - 7700 tons of bombs and air training at the front of the 1st Canadian Army on July 7–8 - 5200 tons of bombs). The bombing density reached 362 tons per square meter. km. Communications of the German troops in the bombardment area were destroyed, supply lines from the rear were cut. The personnel of the enemy units that were bombed were so stunned that some soldiers unconsciously ran towards the positions of the American troops, and the crews of four completely undamaged tanks hoisted white flags even before the ground attack began. But the shock was temporary.

The strike was aimed at the site of the first position of the defense of the German troops, where the losses amounted to 70 percent of the personnel. On the other hand, the units located in the second position and in neighboring sectors did not suffer losses and subsequently put up stubborn resistance. According to the plan, artillery preparation was carried out in the same area. Like air preparation, artillery preparation was carried out by area, not by target.

In the course of aviation training, again a blow was delivered to our troops - the 30th and 9th infantry divisions. As a result, 490 people were injured, 111 were killed; among those killed was the commander of the mythical 1st Army Group, which diverted the attention of the Germans in the Pas de Calais, Lieutenant General Leslie McNair. The headquarters of this army group was transferred to the bridgehead and, in order to misinform the enemy, became the headquarters of the 12 Army Group. And the fictitious 1st Army Group remained in the UK to carry out its task of "preparing for a landing operation in the Pas de Calais area." In total, Allied aircraft made 4,979 sorties that day. Of all the aircraft involved in aviation training, only 6 heavy bombers, 4 light bombers and 19 fighters were lost, shot down mainly by anti-aircraft fire.

Fighting to break through the enemy defenses. Finally, 7 weeks after the Allied landing in Normandy, an offensive was launched from the lines that were planned to be captured on the fifth day of the landing.

The offensive of the 1st American Army on the left flank came across intense enemy artillery fire from positions that were not suppressed by aircraft, and on the right flank German parachute units put up stubborn resistance. The offensive in the breakthrough sector developed very slowly, since the effect of bombing attacks on the enemy hardly seemed very devastating to the American infantrymen, who followed the barrage of fire created by aircraft. In some places, some miraculously surviving sections of the German defense came to life. The American infantry, long accustomed to the slow pace of advance in the battles for Normandy, had little desire to attack the defending enemy. The units that had been bombed and suffered casualties were replaced by reserves. But many of the American soldiers who had been under two bombings of their own planes were psychologically depressed. In addition, the area turned out to be so heavily plowed by craters from explosions that it was difficult even for infantry to move around it.

Having advanced to a depth of 2.5-3 km and pushed the Training Panzer Division to Marigny, the 7th Corps cut the Saint-Lo - Perrier road by midnight, but did not break through the enemy defenses and did not complete its task of the day. To break through the tactical defense zone of the enemy, on July 26, General Collins brought into battle the second echelon - the 1st Infantry, 2nd and 3rd Armored Divisions, which, having advanced to a depth of 7 km (to the depth of the first lane), cut the Saint- Lo - Coutances. But the task of breaking through the defense was not solved on the second day either. On the same day, the divisions of the 8th corps of General Middleton attacked the enemy across the Saint-Lo - Perrier road to the west of the 7th corps.

In the Anglo-Canadian sector, the offensive of the 2nd Canadian and 8th British Corps of the 1st Canadian Army on Falaise, launched on July 25, was delayed in front of a defense zone heavily fortified with tanks dug into the ground, anti-tank guns and mortars. They advanced only 1-2 km. The next day, the 1st SS Panzer Corps pushed them back to their original position, and the advance of the 1st Canadian Army stopped.

Since nothing indicated any new intentions of the Canadians and the British, the new commander-in-chief of the German forces in Western Europe and at the same time of Army Group B, Field Marshal von Kluge, withdrew two tank divisions here and on the night of July 27 sent them on an accelerated march to to strike at the right flank of the wedged American troops. But due to continuous Allied air strikes, these panzer divisions were unable to arrive on time to their destination. Instead of attacking the advancing armored divisions of the 7th Corps, they ran into the infantry of the 19th Corps, advancing south from Saint-Lô. Neither side won a victory here, but the 19th Corps, having started the battle, provided the 7th and 8th Corps with an opportunity to expand the wedging and further collapse of the left wing of the German front.

On July 27, after massive air strikes, formations of the 7th Corps completed the breakthrough of the enemy defenses and reached the city of Coutances, advancing 15–20 km. On the same day, the troops of the 8th Corps occupied Perrier and Lessay, and the attack on Coutances was also carried out along the coast. Despite the large number of mines and traps, tank units operated in the head of the advancing troops. The tanks, moving forward, bypassed the nodes of resistance, which the infantry was supposed to destroy. Despite the fact that the commander of the German 84th Army Corps, in view of the threat to the western wing of the 7th Army, began the withdrawal of all forces, trying to stop the advance of American tanks, it was already too late. Allied aircraft attacked columns of German troops advancing along the roads to Coutances. At that time, the enemy forces at Coutances consisted of units of three infantry, tank, panzergrenadier divisions, as well as combat groups of three infantry divisions.

The German command was primarily concerned with the evacuation of the SS formations, leaving others to fend for themselves. On July 28, the 4th Armored Division of the 8th Corps captured Coutances. Although the corps was only to make a holding offensive along the coast, Middleton struck south on learning of the German withdrawal. However, by this date, the armored divisions of the 7th Corps had already advanced far beyond Coutances. On the same day, the 5th Corps, attacking the Germans, met stubborn resistance from the 3rd Parachute Division.

On July 28, the commander of the 1st American Army, General Bradley, specified the task to the corps commanders. The 8th and 7th corps were to continue the offensive south, towards Avranches, the 19th corps was to move southeast along the river. Vir, and the 5th - to cover the left flank of the army, coordinating their actions with the 2nd British Army. The 19th Corps was reassigned to the 30th Infantry Division and one combat command of the 2nd Armored Division from the 7th Corps, as well as the 28th Infantry Division from the 5th Corps.

On July 29, the 4th armored division of the 8th corps crossed the river. Sienne south of Coutances, and Avranches was captured by the same division two days later. The breakthrough front was extended to 90 km. At the same time, the commander of the German 7th Army, General Hausser, miraculously escaped capture, when a column of American tanks passed a few hundred meters from his observation post 5 km from Avranches.

Pursuing the retreating German troops, the formations of the 1st American Army advanced to a depth of 60 km and reached the line of the river by July 31. Selyun. On July 31, Operation Cobra was completed. The 1st American Army fulfilled its task of breaking through the prepared enemy defenses and creating favorable conditions for bringing the 3rd American Army into battle.

Operation development

Using the results of the offensive of the 1st American Army, from the turn of the river. Selyun entered the battle with the 3rd American Army under the command of General J. Patton, consisting of four corps, which had 7 infantry and 5 armored divisions. From the 1st Army, 7 divisions were transferred to Patton along with their offensive zones, the 8th Corps was placed at his disposal. The 1st American Army was withdrawn from the 21st Army Group, which together with the 3rd Army formed the 12th Army Group under the command of General O. Bradley, who transferred command of the 1st Army (where three corps remained - the 5th, 7th and 19th) to General C. Hodges.

The conditions for bringing the 3rd Army into battle were excellent. The German troops in the area were severely weakened due to the losses they had suffered. There was no continuous front line. Some divisions had no more than 300 infantrymen left. The remnants of the seven divisions of the 84th Corps were consolidated into one division.

The 325,000-strong troops of the 3rd American Army, advancing on the Brittany Peninsula, practically did not meet the resistance of the Germans, who pulled their troops to defend the ports.

The enemy in Brittany was poorly prepared to repel the offensive of the armored formations of the 3rd Army due to the transfer of units in June-July from here to the Normandy Front. On August 1, the German forces in Brittany consisted of 10 battalions of German infantry, 4 "eastern" battalions and about 50 thousand people of naval and service units. These troops were scattered over various ports and positioned in such a way that the front remained open for a long distance. In addition, up to 20 thousand French partisans acted against the invaders here. In this situation, the Anglo-American command on August 3 decided to send to Brittany not the entire 3rd Army, but only one of its corps, while the rest of the forces should be sent to the east and southeast. Corps of the 3rd Army, operating on the open left flank of the enemy, were now advancing in divergent directions: the 8th Corps - to Brittany to Brest; 12th Corps - through Rennes to the river. Loire; 15th and 20th Corps - to Le Mans.

The 1st Army had the task of allocating a minimum of troops to capture Brittany, with the main forces to clear the entire area north of the Loire from the enemy and prepare for further actions with large armored forces to the east and southeast.

By August 18, the 8th Corps of T. Middleton, with the strong support of the French Resistance forces, almost completely occupied the Brittany peninsula. The Germans managed to keep the ports of Brest, Lorian, Saint-Nazaire and destroy the ports of Saint-Malo and Nantes. The 12th Corps reached the line of the river. Loire from Angers to its mouth. The 15th Corps, advancing to the southeast, in turn approached the Laval-Mayenne line.

The 1st American Army advanced much more slowly, which had to overcome the resistance of the main forces of the 7th German Army of General Hausser. By August 7, the American 7th Corps covered the left flank of the 7th Army and turned its front to the northeast, and the 19th and 5th Corps, slowly advancing to the southeast and east, occupied the cities of Mortain and Vire. The main grouping of troops of the 1st Army was not at all on the right flank, as previously planned.

From July 25 to July 31, the 1st American Army managed to break through the defenses of the German troops in the Saint-Lô area, cover the left flank of the 7th Army and introduce the 3rd American Army into the breakthrough, which launched maneuver operations in the operational depth of the German defense.

During the operation, a large territory was captured, the enemy suffered heavy losses. Thus, in the first four days of the offensive of the 1st Army, the enemy lost about 20 thousand soldiers and officers killed, wounded and captured. By 31 July, the Germans were left with only 588 tanks, 145 assault guns, and very little fuel.

As a result of the offensive, the prerequisites were also created for repelling the counterattack of the 5th German Panzer Army (August 6, the West Panzer Group was transformed into the 5th Panzer Army, commanded by Colonel-General Eberhard) near Morten and the Falaise operation (August 10-25 1944).

Map of the plan for the Normandy landing operation. Actions of the warring parties from June 6 to July 31, 1944

Notes:

History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941–1945, vol. 4. M., Military Publishing House, 1962, p. 339.

Only the 2nd shock and 8th combined arms armies were taken into account.

The troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front were commanded by General of the Army I. D. Chernyakhovsky, members of the Military Council were Lieutenant General V. E. Makarov and Lieutenant General of the Quartermaster Service I. S. Khokhlov, Chief of Staff - Lieutenant General A. P. Pokrovsky .

"Military History Journal" No. 7, 1964, p. 42–46.

The commander of the troops of the 1st Baltic Front at that time was General of the Army I.Kh. V. Kurasov.

Commander of the 2nd Baltic Front - General of the Army A. I. Eremenko, members of the Military Council of the Front - Lieutenant General V. N. Bogatkin and Major General S. I. Shabalin, Chief of Staff - Lieutenant General L. M. Sandalov .

This corps, advancing as part of the 22nd Army of the 2nd Baltic Front, included two Latvian rifle divisions - the 308th and 43rd Guards. The combat path of the Latvian soldiers began near Moscow. The 201st Latvian Rifle Division, along with other Soviet formations, fought on the outskirts of our capital. Later, she took part in the liberation of Naro-Fominsk and Borovsk and in October 1942 was transformed into the 43rd Guards Rifle Division. The soldiers of this division bravely fought in the battles near Staraya Russa and Velikiye Luki. The 308th Latvian Rifle Division, formed on the basis of the 1st Reserve Latvian Rifle Regiment, began combat operations in the second half of July 1944.

The troops of the 3rd Baltic Front were commanded by General of the Army I. I. Maslennikov, members of the Military Council of the front were Lieutenant General M. V. Rudakov and Major General F. V. Yatichkin, the chief of staff was Lieutenant General V. R. Vashkevich.

The troops of the Leningrad Front at that time were commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union L. A. Govorov, members of the Military Council of the front were Colonel General A. A. Zhdanov and Lieutenant General A. A. Kuznetsov, and the chief of staff was Colonel General M. M. Popov .

Including in the group "North" - 572 thousand and in 12 divisions of the 3rd tank army - about 130 thousand.

History of World War II 1939–1945. In 12 t. M., 1978, v. 9, p. 19.

Second front forty years later. Dushanbe, 1987, p. 83.

History of World War II 1939–1945. M., 1982, v. 12, p. 217.

History of World War II 1939–1945, vol. 9, p. 236. According to other sources, 59 divisions were stationed here, including 10 tank divisions. (Cm.: Jacobsen G. A. 1939–1945 The Second World War. Chronicle and documents: Per. from German.//The Second World War: Two views. M., 1995, p. 334).

TsAMO RF, f. 1598, op. 72160, house 4219, 4237.

They considered the stretch of coast between the mouth of the Seine and Antwerp to be the most suitable and probable for an amphibious landing. Both from a strategic and operational point of view, this area was much closer to Germany and made it easier to maintain interaction between the landing troops and aircraft. It was assumed that, having landed here, the enemy could reach the Rhine in four days, in addition, he would be able to cut off the 7th Army west of the Seine. Here were the launch pads of German V-1 projectiles and V-2 missiles that threatened London, so the West High Command fully assumed that the enemy would try to capture this area as quickly as possible in order to prevent the destruction of the British capital. At the same time, it also admitted that only diversionary actions could be taken in Normandy (See: Kulish V. M. History of the Second Front. M., 1971, p. 334).

The 91st Infantry Division was trained to act as an airborne division. General B. Zimmerman, head of the operational department of the West command headquarters, calls it the 91st Airborne Division in his memoirs. (See: Fatal Decisions, p. 225).

Ibid, p. 227–228.

Kulish V. M. History of the Second Front, p. 334; History of the Second World War. 1939–1945, vol. 9, p. 236.

Kulish V. M. History of the Second Front, p. 336; History of military art. M., 1984, p. 424.

History of World War II 1939–1945, vol. 9, p. 237.

Ibid., vol. 8, p. 243.

Military history magazine. 1960. No. 10, p. 86.

Kulish V. M. History of the Second Front, p. 335. According to other sources, only in the system of fortifications that covered the Utah sector, there were 28 German batteries. They included 110 guns with a caliber from 75 to 170 mm. 4 batteries of this number also covered the Omaha sector, but most of them were concentrated 3–5 km from the eastern coast of the Cotentin Peninsula. In addition to them, another 18 batteries (42 guns with a caliber from 105 to 210 mm) located in the depths of the peninsula could fire along the coast. (Cm.: Morison S. E. Invasion of France and Germany. 1944–1945 M., 1963, p. 115-116).

The 1st American Army included 9 infantry, 2 armored and 2 airborne divisions; 2nd British Army - 9 infantry, 4 armored and 1 airborne division, 7 armored and 1 infantry brigade, special units and formations; 1st Canadian Army - 1 infantry and 1 armored division and special units. In the reserve of the 21st Army Group were 2 armored and 1 airborne divisions, 2 armored and 2 infantry brigades. Consequently, 32 divisions and 12 brigades were intended directly to capture and expand the bridgehead (See: Kulish V. M. History of the Second Front, p. 344).

History of the Second World War. 1939–1945, vol. 9, p. 243. Data for the Allied Expeditionary Forces include only the troops of Army Group B, the reserves of the West Command, the 1st Army and the tank divisions of Army Group G.

Quoted from: Zolotarev V. A., Lavrov S. B. Second front: forty years later. P. 62. Interestingly, the military history literature still provides various, sometimes contradictory data on the number of warships and amphibious assault vehicles involved in the operation, when, for example, the number of cruisers participating in direct artillery preparation (24) , turns out to be more than the number of cruisers at the disposal of the operation command (23). There is also no clarity regarding the total number of destroyers participating in direct artillery preparation, etc. (See: Soviet military encyclopedia: in 8 vol. M., 1978, vol. 5, p. 633; ​​History of the Second World War. 1939 –1945, v. 9, pp. 243, 245; Hastings M. Operation Overlord: how the second front was opened. Per. from English. M., 1989, p. 128).

This chapter deals only with operational concealment of an operation.

McDonald C. Ordeal: Per. from English. M., 1980, p. 239).

Sofronov G.P. Airborne assaults in World War II. M., 1962, p. 85.

Fuller J.F. The Second World War. 1939–1945, p. 389.

Tank landing armored vehicles, created on the basis of the Shermans and Valentines, were intended for landing in the coastal zone. They were equipped with accordion-folding canvas walls, which straightened out and ensured the buoyancy of the tank. After going ashore, the floats were folded and then dismantled. Tanks were planned to be launched from tank landing ships 4.5 km from the coast.

Kulish V. M. History of the Second Front, p. 375.

Kulish V. M. History of the Second Front, p. 372.

McDonald D. Secrets of British Intelligence (1939–1945). Per. from English. M., 1971, p. 326.

History of the Second World War. 1939–1945, vol. 9, p. 246.

World History: In 10 t. M., 1965, v. 10, p. 358.

The special forces corps of General E. Heineman made the first launch of projectiles on London. Its flight range was 320 km, altitude - up to 1000 m, speed - up to 650 km / h, explosive weight - about 1000 kg. The projectile was controlled either by radio from the ground or from a conventional aircraft. With such a low speed and altitude of the projectiles, the British fighter and anti-aircraft artillery successfully fought them. Of the 9251 projectiles fired by the Germans during the war, 4261 were shot down, and 2679 did not reach the target due to technical reasons. More significant achievements in the field of rocket weapons were the creation by the Germans of the V-2 rocket projectile. The rocket's flight speed reached 5600 km/h, firing range - 320 km, flight altitude - about 100 km, with the same amount of explosive as the V-1. The effectiveness of the missile was significantly greater, since it hit the target before people near the target heard its sound. Her entire flight took only 3-4 minutes. High speeds and flight altitude ruled out the possibility of destroying the V-2 by anti-aircraft artillery and fighter aircraft. The combat use of rocket weapons began in September 1944. 1359 rocket shells were fired at London (of which 1190 were successful launches), 500 of which exploded directly in London. (See: History of military art: In 3 books. M., 1961, book 3, pp. 121–122; Churchill W. Churchill W. Poghue F.S. High Command, p. 211; Fuller J. The Second World War. 1939–1945, p. 293; Bradley O. Soldier's Notes, p. 373).

The well-known modern British historian B. Hastings confirms the decisiveness of the goal of the operation plan, which was “to quickly break through the German defenses, while the enemy is still recovering from bombing attacks, to capture the Bourguiby mountain range in the very first hours and move further from here at high speed over open area. The tanks will make a swift rush to Falaise ... "Describing B. Montgomery as a person, he writes:" ... throughout Montgomery's military career, the worm of self-conceit in this ascetic, somewhat awkward, short man in a beret made him belittle the contribution of others, his equals, without shame to take credit for others and rewrite the history of their own battle planning in such a way that it looks completely consistent with the real events of that time. Hastings notes that by claiming that the British and Canadian troops accomplished their objectives by holding the line north of Caen, "Montgomery retroactively misrepresented his intentions, thus causing bitter disputes that lasted for many years." (Cm.: Hastings M. Operation Overlord: How the Second Front Was Opened, p. 53-54, 62, 334-335).

Ambrose S. Eisenhower. Soldier and President: Per. from English. M., 1993, p. 124–125.

The well-known British historian J. Fuller indicates that the breakthrough section was 4 miles (about 6.5 km). Almost the same width of the breakthrough section is also indicated by M. Hastings - 7000 yards (about 6.4 km). (Cm.: Fuller J. The Second World War. 1939–1945, p. 397; Hastings M. Operation Overlord, p. 361). In other sources, the size of the breakthrough area is indicated as 6, 7, 8 or 9 km. (Cm.: Bradley O. Soldier's Notes, p. 360; History of the Second World War. 1939–1945, vol. 9, p. 252).

By July 25, the corps had 4 infantry and 2 armored divisions, 4 separate tank battalions, 22 field artillery battalions, 11 anti-aircraft artillery and 7 anti-tank battalions, 7 sapper battalions, 3 separate sapper companies and 2 mechanized cavalry battalions. (Cm.: Bradley O.

History of the Second World War. 1939–1945, vol. 9, p. 253.

In a speech at Madison Square on June 6, 1944, D-Day, New York Mayor LaGuardia said a prayer for the warriors who landed that day in Normandy:

"We, the people of New York City, as we meet, send our prayers to Almighty God for the safety and spiritual well-being of each of you, and humbly ask Him to bring complete victory through your hands in the great and valiant struggle to free the world from tyranny."

June 6, 1944. People in Times Square read the news ticker in the New York Times building.

World War II did not take place in the United States. However, the entire population of the United States, including women and adolescents, worked hard and selflessly for victory. Millions of men went to war. These facts remain little known to ordinary Soviet and Russian people.
Soviet propaganda constantly criticized the allies for opening the 2nd front late, without informing the people that the war was going on all over the world, and not only in the USSR and Europe. Soviet propaganda brainwashed the trophy population that only the USSR waged the war, therefore it suffered such human and material losses, and the allies, instead of really helping and joining the war, sat quietly overseas and only sent stew. But when the USSR killed the Nazis near Stalingrad, launched an offensive against Europe and almost won the war, it was then that the allies decided to open a second front, they came to everything ready.

Soviet propaganda blinded ordinary Germans into the image of an enemy that must be fought to the death.

In fact, the enemies were not the Germans, not Germany, but the Vatican, London City and the Federal Reserve System of an illegally created US corporation.
With the funds and resources stolen and confiscated from the trophy population, the trinity of globalist control - the Vatican, London City and the US Federal Reserve - built hundreds of secret underground cities around the world, laid thousands of kilometers of tunnels, high-speed transport moved through these tunnels, connecting these underground cities, in which housed factories for the production of weapons and military equipment and cloning factories.

In the photo: the German factory for the production of V-2 missiles.
A US Army soldier poses in front of a half-assembled V-2 rocket, one of 250 found in the Mittelwerk underground labyrinth after it was captured.

German underground weapons factory

Underground factory for the production of Me-262, Germany used forced labor to build underground factories for the production of weapons.

Underground Nazi tunnels, discovered using special ground-penetrating radars.

Allied armies fought all over the world, destroying underground tunnels, bunkers, weapons factories and cloning factories located on the lost islands. For this, submarines, ships, tunneling shields, radars, aircraft and other equipment and precision instruments were needed. Without clearing these underground bases of the enemy, there would be no victory.

Soviet propaganda did not tell us about this, because then it was necessary to tell the people that the planet was captured and how it was captured, to explain the role of the October Revolution in the enslavement of the Soviet people, to explain what funds were used to build all these underground factories, tunnels and bunkers - that all this was paid for by the life of misery, hard work and hunger of hundreds of millions of people. That is why the Soviet government never had money for a decent life for the Soviet people, even after this people became the "winner" in the so-called Great Patriotic War. The Soviet government was obliged to pay tribute for the right to remain in power and lie to its trophy population.

In the photographs below of ordinary Americans gathered in Times Square on June 6, 1944, you will see thousands of people who experienced all the charms of the Civil War and the Great Depression of the late 1920s.
These people knew from their own experience or from the stories of their parents or grandparents what life was like before the Civil War, what real money was - silver or gold, and then this real money was taken away and made to believe that printed pieces of paper are real money. Ordinary Americans knew who their real enemies were - an illegally created US corporation, which began issuing birth certificates to them in 1933 to compensate for the bankruptcy that the US declared in the same year to satisfy the bankers and creditors of the US debt. Thus, from personalities, people were turned into a labor resource of an illegal US corporation created in 1871.

Birth certificates were traded and pledged on the stock exchange, just like oil, gas, wheat and other commodities. Birth certificates have a specific price.
On the security of birth certificates, a corporation can borrow money, people are guarantors, and in case of non-payment of a debt by a corporation, people are responsible for this debt, although they have never seen any money.

And this affected the lives of ordinary Americans in the worst way, they knew that they were enslaved by a black powerful force that would not give up its power without a war, which is why the Americans were ready to fight to the last, fight to the death in the name of liberation from the tyranny that enslaved them and the entire planet.

At 6:30 a.m. London time on Tuesday 6 June 1944, the German news agency DNB released the first reports that thousands of allied paratroopers had landed near the mouth of the River Seine in fierce fighting near the city of Caen.

When the sun rose in New York, thousands of Allied soldiers had already landed on the beaches of Normandy and had been fighting for several hours. The Daily News proclaimed in bold type "The Invasion Begins."

A special edition of the New York Times issued at 6 am published the first brief communiqué from the Supreme Headquarters of the Combined Expeditionary Force.

New York Times Headline D-Day

"Under the command of General Eisenhower, the Allied naval forces, supported by the air force, began landing this morning on the northern coast of France."
COMMUNIQUE FROM THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE ALLIED EXPEDITION FORCES

People gather in Times Square to watch the news ticker in the New York Times building.

The Normandy landings were the largest naval invasion in history, and came almost exactly four years after the Allies were expelled from Western Europe in the Dunkirk evacuation - a painful memory still fresh in the minds of those who watch and wait for news. (The Norman landings were a revenge.)
In churches and synagogues in Manhattan, people bowed their heads in prayer, and in Times Square, every person in the crowd craned their neck to follow the latest news as the luminous line scrolled through the New York Times building.
The New York Stock Exchange observed two minutes of silence, and thousands of people gathered in Madison Square for a rally led by Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia.

Parishioners enter the 23rd Street Synagogue for a special day of service.

Afternoon at the Church of Saint Vincent de Paul.

Parishioners pray at noon at St. Vincent de Paul Church on 23rd Street.

A woman prays at St. Vincent de Paul's Church on 23rd Street.

Parishioners outside the Church of Saint Vincent de Paul.

Crowds gather in Madison Square.

Thousands of people gather for a rally in Madison Square.

The speaker speaks at a rally in Madison Square.

The speaker addresses the crowd in Madison Square.

Children salute the French flag at a French school in Manhattan.

A girl tends to the school's Victory Garden on 1st Avenue.

D-Day is the date of the Allied landings in Normandy on June 6, 1944.

On June 6, 1944, at 6:30 am, American, British and Canadian soldiers landed on the beaches of French Normandy and engaged the Wehrmacht. By that time, paratroopers deployed in more than 800 aircraft and gliders were operating in the rear of the German troops.

It was the largest landing operation in the history of mankind. In the Soviet Union, it is called the “opening of the Second Front”, in the USA the Overlord operation is more often called D-Day - “D day”: D - from the word “day”, the code designation of the offensive operation, by analogy with the Soviet one: time “H” .

Hitler expected an Allied invasion of France, but through a masterful disinformation campaign, he was convinced that only a distraction would be struck in Normandy, and the main one would follow in the Calais region. Therefore, the Nazis did not transfer reinforcements to Normandy in the first critical days of the battle, which allowed the Allies to gain a foothold on the coast and begin to systematically expand the bridgehead.

The risks were exceptionally great: General Dwight Eisenhower, commander of the invasion, wrote this note before it began, which he intended to submit and resign himself in case of failure:

“Our landing in the area of ​​Cherbourg-Havre did not allow us to occupy a sufficient bridgehead, and I ordered the withdrawal of troops. My decision to attack at this time and place was based on the best information we could get. The ground forces, the air force and the navy acted bravely and skillfully. If anyone is to blame for the failure, it's only me.

However, there was no failure. By the end of June, the Allies already had 850 thousand soldiers in France and began to develop an offensive against Paris and the Netherlands.

For this operation, Dwight Eisenhower received the Order of Suvorov First Class from the Soviet government. In 1953 he became President of the United States.

Tipping point: the world celebrates the 70th anniversary of the Allied landings in Normandy

The entire population of real, unincorporated America prayed for deliverance, and that day has come.

1945 Big military parade of the Victory in New York, which was greeted by 2,500,000 of its inhabitants.

Monster Victory Parade Cheered By 2,500,000 In New York (1945) Monster Victory Parade Cheered By 2,500,000 In New York (1945)

Here are the real enemies of humanity who have taken over the planet:

Trinity of Global Control:

Allied landings in Normandy (Operation Overlord) (1944)

By mid-1944, the position of the belligerent states and the coalition had changed significantly. Soviet troops inflicted major defeats on the Wehrmacht on the eastern front and were approaching the enemy's vital centers. The United States and Britain stepped up the actions of their troops and achieved success on other fronts. The situation for Germany deteriorated sharply. The German command foresaw the inevitability of the continuation of the offensive of the Soviet troops and sought to create a powerful defense in the most dangerous areas, keeping the main forces of the Wehrmacht here.

The position of Germany was also deteriorating because of the real prospect of an early landing of American-British troops in France. The line of defense of German troops on the western front ran along the coast of Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, France, then went along the southern coast of France, crossed Italian territory south of Rome, continued along the coast of Yugoslavia, Albania and ended in Greece. (History of the Second World War, 1939–1945. Vol. 9. M., 1978. P. 23.)

Based on their plans, assessment of the situation and prospects for military events, the opposing coalitions launched preparations for hostilities in the summer of 1944.

The United States and Britain, using favorable conditions, began preparing for the landing of their troops in Northern France (Operation Overlord) and an auxiliary strike in Southern France (Operation Anvil). The headquarters of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces in Britain was turned into the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Forces. American General D. Eisenhower was appointed supreme commander of these forces.

The plan of action for the Allied expeditionary forces in Operation Overlord was to land troops on the coast of Normandy, seizing a bridgehead, and, having accumulated strength and material resources, launch an offensive in an easterly direction in order to occupy the territory of North-East France. (Ibid., p. 238.) In the future, the expeditionary forces, interacting with the troops landed in the south of France, were to cut off the Wehrmacht grouping in southwestern France, break through the Siegfried Line and invade Germany.

Before the direct conduct of Operation Overlord, four armies concentrated in the British Isles: the 1st and 3rd American, the 2nd British and the 1st Canadian. These armies included 37 divisions (23 infantry, 10 armored, 4 airborne) and 12 brigades. (Samsonov A.M. World War II. M., 1985. S. 374.) There were also 10 commando and ranger detachments (English and American airborne sabotage units of the Marine Corps).

Significant air forces were involved in ensuring the landing - 10,859 combat vehicles, 2,316 transport aircraft and 2,591 gliders. (History of the Second World War, 1939-1945. S. 238; Samsonov A. M. (decree, cit., p. 374) cites other data.) The strategic air forces (Air Forces) in the European theater of operations consisted of 8 th US Air Force and the British Strategic Air Force. The commander of the 8th Air Army, Lieutenant General K. Spaats, and his headquarters also coordinated the actions of the 15th Air Army, which was based in Italy. The tactical air force included the US 9th Air Force and two armies of the British Air Force. They were commanded by Air Chief Marshal T. Lee-Mallory.

The Allied Expeditionary Naval Forces (commanded by the English Admiral B. Ramsay) included 1213 warships and boats, 4126 landing craft and landing craft, 736 auxiliary ships and 864 merchant ships. For the further accumulation of invasion forces, 2,000 merchant ships with a total displacement of 4 million tons were constantly used, they were served by 70,000 officers and sailors of the merchant fleet. (Belli V.I., Penzin KV. Combat operations in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean Sea 1939-1945 M., 1967. S. Z36.). Canadian, French, Czechoslovak, Polish formations and units also participated in the operation. As of June 6, the expeditionary armies included more than 2,876 thousand soldiers and officers. (History of the Second World War, 1939–1945. Vol. 9. P. 239.)

The first stage of the landing operation was carried out by the forces of the 21st Army Group under the command of the British General B. Montgomery. It included the 1st American (commander General O. Blir), the 2nd English (commander General M. Dempsey) and the 1st Canadian (commander General X. Grerar) armies.

The landing was carefully prepared. There were tanks for making passages in minefields, amphibious tanks, tanks for destroying concrete fortifications, tanks that spread coatings on the roads themselves, tanks for building bridges. Two artificial ports called "Mulbury" were prepared and were to be towed across the English Channel. The concentrated forces were indeed enormous. Eisenhower once wittily remarked: "Only the barrage balloons, which flew over England in large numbers, held the islands, preventing them from sinking." (World War II: Two views. M., 1995. S. 519.)

The inevitability of opening a second front was obvious to the political leadership of Germany and the command of the Wehrmacht. As early as November 3, 1943, Hitler in Directive No. 51 indicated: "... The danger in the East remains, but even more looms in the West: the Anglo-Saxon invasion." However, German forces on the English Channel and the Atlantic coast of France were largely determined by military operations on the Soviet-German front. In the Western European theater of operations, the German command had 61 divisions, including 10 tank and one motorized. They united in two army groups: "B" (commander Field Marshal E. Rommel) and "G" (commander General I. Blaskowitz) and were subordinate to the commander-in-chief of the German troops in the West, Field Marshal G. Rundstedt. In his reserve were 13 divisions, including 4 tank and 1 motorized (tank group "West").

However, the infantry divisions were, as a rule, understaffed and poorly armed. Of the total number of divisions located on the territory of France, Holland and Belgium, 23 were so-called stationary. (Müller-Gillenbrand B. Land Army of Germany, 1933-1945. Translated from German. T.Z.M., 1976. S. 187.) They differed from conventional infantry units in the almost complete absence of vehicles. Seven infantry divisions were under formation.

The German divisions were dispersed over a vast area. Along the coast of Normandy, west of the river. The Seine, there were only six divisions for more than 300 kilometers. In Normandy, in the amphibious landing area, only two divisions held the line on a front of 70 kilometers. (Volkov F.D. The secret becomes clear. M., 1989. S. 245.) The average operational density was no more than one division per 100 kilometers of the coast. All German aviation in the West did not exceed 500 combat aircraft, of which only 160 (90 attack aircraft and 70 fighters) could take to the air. By the time the Anglo-American troops landed in northern France, the Allies outnumbered the enemy by 2.1 times in men, 2.2 times in tanks, and almost 23 times in aircraft. (History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941–1945. V.4. M., 1962. S. 525.)

The combat effectiveness of German formations in Western Europe was low. Even Hitler admitted that the German troops in the West were neither armed nor equipped for "maneuver warfare" and their fighting efficiency "could not be measured by the number of divisions." (Kulkov E.N. Operation "Watch on the Rhine". M., 1986. - S. 51–52.)

The German defense in the West relied on the "Atlantic Wall" - a system of fortifications along the coast. Its construction was not completed. As of July 1944, 68 percent of the work was completed on the English Channel coast, and 18 percent in the area of ​​​​the invasion of Normandy. Strong fortifications were located in the areas of naval bases and the Calais Boulogne area, where the depth of the antiamphibious defense reached 20 km from the coast. In other areas, including in Seneca Bay itself, the antiamphibious defense was much weaker. Defensive structures were just being created, their construction was slow due to a lack of materials and labor.

The German command made a miscalculation in determining the possible landing area for the American-British troops. It believed that the landing would take place through the Pas de Calais, so the strongest defenses were created here.

On the night of June 6, simultaneously with the amphibious assault, more than 2,000 allied bombers launched attacks on artillery batteries, individual centers of resistance, headquarters, concentrations of troops and enemy rear areas. During the day, 14 thousand sorties were made. The bombing of the German troops facilitated the landing of airborne assault forces. It involved 1662 aircraft and 512 gliders of the American aviation, 733 aircraft and 335 gliders of the British Air Force. The 101st and 82nd American and 6th British Airborne Divisions were dropped by parachute and glider 10-15 km from the coast. They coped with their tasks and assisted the amphibious assault in landing and seizing a bridgehead.

At dawn on June 6, under the cover of artillery and massive air strikes, an amphibious landing began almost without hindrance on five sections of the coast. The German formations did not take decisive measures to disrupt the actions of the Allied forces. The German aviation and navy did not put up adequate resistance to the landing, although individual units and formations located on the coast defended stubbornly, especially in the area where the 1st Infantry Division of the 5th American Corps landed. From the first day of the invasion, the Allies captured three bridgeheads, where 8 divisions and an armored brigade landed, with a total number of 150 thousand soldiers and officers. The time for the German counterattack was largely lost. The 709th, 352nd and 716th German divisions, located directly on the coast, fought on a 100-kilometer front and could not repel the landings of the allied howls (Samsonov A. M. Decree. Op. S. 376.) On the first day During the landing operation, the Americans lost 6,603 people, including 1,465 killed, the British and Canadians - about 4 thousand people killed, wounded and missing.

The command of the expeditionary forces transferred new forces and equipment to the captured bridgeheads. Reflecting the blows of the German units, transferred to the bridgehead of the formation, the Anglo-American troops advanced deep into the coast. On June 10, one common bridgehead was created, which had 70 km along the front and 8-15 km in depth. By June 12, the expeditionary forces managed to expand it to 80 km along the front and 13-18 km in depth. The bridgehead already had 16 divisions and armored units equivalent to three armored divisions. By this time, the Anglo-American troops in Normandy had 327 thousand people, 54 thousand combat and transport vehicles and 104 thousand tons of cargo. (History of the Second World War, 1939-1945. T | S. 247.). The 7th Corps of the 1st American Army fought stubborn battles on the rear approaches to Cherbourg. However, the allies failed to capture the city and port of Caen.

The command of the German troops pulled up reserves in order to eliminate the foothold on the coast. But it still believed that the main blow of the Anglo-American troops would follow through the de Calais Strait and continued to keep large forces here. On June 12, German troops made an unsuccessful attempt to cut the Allied grouping between the Orn and Vir rivers.

Hitler had high hopes for a new weapon - V-1 aircraft projectiles. It was launched shortly after the landing - on the night of June 13th. The most intensive shelling of London by V-1 shells was carried out from June 16th. Unmanned rockets destroyed 25,000 homes and killed 6,184 people, almost exclusively in London. The moral and psychological effect of the new weapon was significant at first, but in other respects it could not change the course of events. By August 1944, 80 percent of the V-1 projectiles were destroyed in the air. (World War II: Two Views. S. 524.)

On July 20, the allied expeditionary forces that landed were fighting: creating a strategic foothold.

Formations of the 1st American Army launched an offensive on June 12 from the area west of Sainte-Mere-Eglise in the western direction captured Caumont. On June 17 they cut off the Cotentin Peninsula, on June 27 they captured Cherbourg, taking 30 thousand people prisoner, and then completed the cleansing of the Cotentin Peninsula from German troops.

The heavy battles of the Anglo-Canadian troops for the city of Caen did not end in success, but they pinned down large enemy forces here. By the end of June, the Allied bridgehead in Normandy reached 110 km along the front and 12-4 km in depth. As Eisenhower recalled, the first major objective of the Normandy campaign was completed, "which was to establish a secure foothold with adequate supply routes in an area not between Cherbourg and the mouth of the Orne." (Second World War in Memoirs. M., 1990. S. 458.) Here were the forces of the 1st American and 2nd British armies. The total number of expeditionary forces on the bridgehead by June 30 was over 875 thousand people. They were opposed by 18 German divisions, which had suffered heavy losses in previous battles. On July 1, the command of the "West" came to the conclusion that it was not possible and would not be possible to cope with the landing Anglo-American troops.

The Headquarters of the High Command of the Wehrmacht (OKB) did not dare to reinforce its troops in Normandy with formations from North-East France, still fearing the landing of the allies in the Pas de Calais strait zone. The powerful offensive of the Red Army in the summer of 1944 did not allow the German command to send troops and equipment to Western Europe at the expense of strategic reserves and the transfer of forces from the Soviet-German front. Thus, the German defense in Normandy could not be significantly strengthened. The headquarters of the OKB made only a private transfer of forces and made a change in the leadership of the German troops in Normandy. Field Marshal Rundstedt was replaced on July 3 by Field Marshal G. Kluge. Kluge soon took over the command of Army Group B, as Rommel was wounded. The commander of the tank group "West" instead of General G. Schweppenburg was General G. Everbach.

The allied troops that landed in Normandy continued to expand their bridgehead. On July 3, the 1st American Army went on the offensive. In 17 days, she moved forward 10-15 km and occupied the mountain and an important road junction of Saint-Lô. The 2nd English Army, after heavy and difficult attacks on July 19, captured Caen. The 3rd American and 1st Canadian armies were landed on the bridgehead. By July 25, the Allied troops reached the line south of Saint-Lô, Caumont, Caen. This ended the Normandy landing operation. (History of the Second World War 1939–1945. Vol. 9. P. 250.) The Allies lost 122 thousand people (49 thousand British and Canadians and about 73 thousand Americans) during the period from June 6 to July 23. The losses of the German troops amounted to 113 thousand people killed, wounded and captured, as well as 2117 tanks and 345 aircraft.

The landing of the allies on French soil, which meant the opening of a second front in Western Europe, was the largest landing operation of strategic importance during the Second World War. It became an important factor in the course of the armed struggle against the fascist bloc. Germany was squeezed in a vice from the east and west and was forced to fight on two fronts. The Allies diverted a certain part of Germany's strategic reserves. The second front made it possible to reduce the duration of the war and the number of its victims.

1. Bailey V. A., Penzin K. V. Combat actions in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean Sea. 1939–1945 - M., 1967.

2. Doenitz K. German submarines in the Second World War. - M., 1964.

4. History of the Second World War. 1939–1945: In 12 volumes / Chapter. ed. ko-miss. A. A. Grechko (prev.). - T.8. - M., 1977.

5. Kulish V. M. History of the second front. - M., 1971.

6. Morison S.-E. Invasion of France and Germany. 1944–1945 - M., 1963.