Developing the design of battleships of the dreadnought type, the United States in the second decade of the 20th century took a leading position in this part in world shipbuilding. In 1911, the world's largest battleships Wyoming and Arkansas were launched. With a design displacement of 26,000 tons, a speed of 20.5 knots, and side armor 280 mm thick, these ships carried a dozen 12750 guns in six turrets with 21 5751 anti-mine guns.

In the same year, the first American superdreadnoughts were laid down. They were New York and Texas (27,000 tons, speed 21 knots, 10 14745 guns in five turrets with similar anti-mine artillery). In terms of firepower, they surpassed all their foreign contemporaries. However, already at the time of the order, these battleships did not fully meet the tactical views that had formed in the US Navy.

By that time, many new ideas had matured across the ocean. Most of them were expressed as early as the summer of 1908 at a naval conference in Newport. The starting point was the belief that artillery combat distances would increase significantly in the near future due to the rapid improvement of fire control equipment. A number of quite logical conclusions followed from this.

First, with increased distances to the target, it is beneficial to switch from 12-inch guns, standard for most countries, to larger-caliber artillery systems. The heavier the projectile, the slower it loses speed when moving in the air and the better it retains armor-piercing properties. As a result, it was decided to equip prospective US battleships with 14-inch (356 mm) guns.

Secondly, at long distances, the number of hits is expected to be relatively small. Under such conditions, a fatal defeat can be inflicted not by high-explosive shells (as at Tsushima), but only by armor-piercing shells that can penetrate the vital centers of the ship, covered with heavy armor. Hence, the expediency of maintaining intermediate and thin armor on battleships was called into question.

Since armor-piercing shells pose the main danger, it was first of all necessary to provide reliable protection against them.

In these circumstances, thin armor became unnecessary, and sometimes harmful. She did not protect against armor-piercing shells, but could activate their fuses, thereby causing even more destruction. Consequently, powder magazines, artillery turrets, boilers, vehicles and steering mechanisms had to be covered with the heaviest armor possible even due to its weakening in other places.

Other proposals were also widely discussed in naval circles. For example, try oil as a boiler fuel or change the layout, moving away from the location of the towers in the middle of the hull. Nobody liked the last one. In the presence of five towers, the firing angles of the middle installation were smaller than those of the end and elevated ones. In addition, there was a group of cellars between the machines and boilers. They were surrounded by steam pipelines on both sides, which did not favor maintaining a stable temperature of the charges.

The optimal way out was the introduction of three-gun installations, with a simultaneous reduction in the number of towers to four or even three. Along with other advantages, this reduced the weight per barrel of the main caliber.

However, the path to the implementation of all these ideas and intentions turned out to be gradual and rather lengthy. First of all, it was required to create 14-inch guns, which was fraught with design problems and was difficult to predict in terms of timing. "Wyoming" and "Arkansas" did not have time to get such weapons without the risk of disrupting the construction schedule. Especially for them, the 12750 Mk.7 guns were developed, elongated from 45 to 50 calibers compared to the previous 12745 Mark 6. On the battleships New York and Texas, 14-inch guns were finally installed.

Ships of this type carried 10 14745 Mk.1 Mod 1 systems in five twin turrets. The caliber was half an inch larger than that of modern British battleships, which had a dozen 13.5745 barrels and were proudly called superdreadnoughts.

Thus, the New York and Texas, when commissioned in the spring of 1914, could be considered the strongest ships in the world. Otherwise, these battleships repeated the Wyoming project with the replacement of the middle pair of linearly elevated towers with one. Their displacement, general location and armor have changed slightly. Only the belt along the waterline became one inch thicker, and the gun turrets received a very solid armor cover.

In terms of the power plant, the Americans seemed to have taken a step back, returning to triple expansion steam engines instead of turbines. This measure was of a waiting nature and was associated with insufficient efficiency of the then turbine installations. The requirement for a long range, which was very important for US ships, explained such a relapse. In general, the New York and Texas turned out to be successful battleships and served in the US Navy for more than 30 years, taking an active part in both world wars.

However, even at the design stage, it was clear that these ships would be the last American dreadnoughts built according to traditional canons.

By 1910, the concept of uniformly thick armor was widely accepted in American naval circles. The Naval General Council, the Bureau of Ordnance, and the Bureau of Design and Repair of the US Navy have been discussing it for the past few years. It was expected that artillery combat distances would continue to increase. More recently, this has led to the disappearance of medium-caliber artillery from battleships. At long distances, she was out of the game. Logically, thin armor should have suffered the same fate. 15-20 years ago, it was practically non-existent on battleships.

Heavy steel-iron plates covered only vital parts in a relatively small area.

Thin armor appeared as a response to the proliferation of rapid-fire medium-caliber guns. A hail of their shells, carrying a blasting charge, could very quickly destroy unarmored extremities and superstructures, making the enemy ship incapable of combat, depriving it of control and movement, or even leading to its death. At the turn of the century, medium artillery acted almost as the main weapon of battleships. In turn, light and durable Harvey and Krupp armor, which replaced steel-iron, made it possible to cover a significant area of ​​the side with thin and medium plates.

Thus, in the 90s of the XIX century, a distributed reservation system was formed, justified at limited combat distances using medium artillery. This protection scheme was inherited by dreadnoughts.

With the growth of artillery combat distances and the transition to arming battleships with only large guns, the chain of new technical solutions regarding vertical armor had to move in the opposite direction. At the same time, another important aspect was manifested - a projectile fired from a long distance reached the target, falling along a steep trajectory. As a result, the relative probability of hitting the horizontal surfaces of the ship increased. At the same time, the armor-piercing ability of the projectile increased. As a protective measure, it was necessary to strengthen the armor of decks, tower roofs and deckhouses.

From the circumstances described above, ambiguous conclusions were drawn in different countries. National naval doctrines and tactical views had an effect. For example, the German fleet was going to fight in the North Sea, where visibility was limited three-quarters of the days of the year. For this reason, the Germans focused on medium and short distances of battle. Another thing is the US Navy. His theater of war was to be the ocean expanses at low latitudes. There, in the daytime, excellent visibility prevails. In this regard, it was desirable to open fire at the reach of the guns.

So, in 1910, the Americans began to search for a prototype of a new ship - an ideal battleship capable of supporting US national interests in the 20th century and intended to be implemented under the FY1912 program. The hull and general location of the New York were taken as the basis.

We started with the modernization of the armored deck system. In May 1910, the Bureau of Design and Repair prepared a draft design known as the "improved" New York ". It was the same smooth-deck ship with a freeboard lift from stern to bow, a displacement of 27,500 tons, two pipes and coal-fired heating of 16 boilers in four compartments. The type of machine installation was not determined.

Its power of 37 thousand horsepower was supposed to provide the battleship with a speed of about 23 knots. It seems that the designers sought to get a fast ship, having information about the Russian and Italian dreadnoughts under construction.

The waist armor of the “improved New York” had a thickness of 279 mm (11 ") and consisted of two rows of plates. Its upper part, 3.35 meters (11 feet) wide, as on previous types of battleships, was called a casemate. The lower belt covered the waterline area. It had a width of 2.44 meters, of which one quarter rose above the water. In the underwater part there was a wedge-shaped decrease in thickness to 229 mm (9 ") along the lower edge. The ledge began in the middle of the armor plate, two feet below the waterline.

Along the plane of the upper edges of the casemate, the belt armor was covered by a second deck. She was the only armored one. In the draft design, its thickness was not set. The third deck was not armored, but was watertight.

At a distance of about 20 feet (6.1 meters) from the side, it curved downward at an angle of 45 ° and extended in the form of bevels to the junction with the lower edge of the belt. At the bend, there was a longitudinal vertical bulkhead, which was armorless and covered all spaces from the bottom to the armored deck. According to calculations, such a deck system increased the rigidity of the hull. As usual, the function of additional protection was performed by coal pits (in the space between the bevel of the third deck and the side, as well as behind the vertical bulkhead).

Above the second deck, there was no side armor. There was no upper casemate. The chimneys were covered with only two-inch plates (50.8 mm).

The main artillery of the improved New York, consisting of a dozen 14 caliber barrels, was housed in four three-gun turrets. The general arrangement resembled the British battlecruiser Tiger. Two bow towers were linearly elevated. The third stood, as on previous battleships, between the boiler room and squads, but was raised on a high barbette.This made it possible to shoot over the aft (fourth) tower.Steam lines went around the middle group of cellars with all the ensuing shortcomings.The developers did not dare to move the third tower further aft, for fear of causing overvoltage to the hull.

The anti-mine battery of the “improved New York” consisted of 17 barrels 5751. Nine of them were located on the second deck behind an unarmored side in the bow (4 pieces) and stern (5 pieces). The rest stood higher: one each on the roofs of towers No. 2 and No. 3, and six in the superstructure. At least the last eight guns were spared from flooding, which greatly affected the anti-mine artillery of previous projects. The armament was completed by four underwater torpedo tubes. All of the above was still very far from the future "Nevada".

In June 1910, the General Council issued an official specification for a promising battleship with the following characteristics: 12 356 mm guns, a speed of 21 knots, and additional armor requirements.

It was ordered to pay special attention to covering the chimneys. The size of the ship was not set, but by default it was assumed that it should not noticeably exceed 27,000 tons (such a displacement was with great difficulty passed through Congress on 06/24/1910 for battleships No. 34 and No. 35 of the FY1911 program - the future "New York" and "Texas").

The Bureau of Design and Repair commented on this task, indicating that the new location of the armored deck with an increase in its thickness will provide an increase in the overall strength of the hull, but the belt of 11 "(279 mm) can no longer be considered sufficient. Such plates were pierced by the 12750 Mk.7 gun from a distance 15,000 yards (13.7 km), and the 14-inch caliber will hit them at all combat distances.

There was no obstacle behind the belt armor for the shells that penetrated it, except for coal, the presence of which was not guaranteed. In general, the requirements for the project looked clearly unbalanced - powerful weapons with relatively weak structural protection. To serve as a reliable cover at combat distances, the belt must be much thicker - about 356 mm.

In response, the General Council proposed to strengthen the side protection by armoring with homogeneous plates one and a half inches (38 mm) the bevels of the third deck and a vertical bulkhead 6.1 meters from the waist. It was assumed that an armor-piercing projectile would break in this space, and thin armor would stop the fragments. Later experiments showed that such a weak additional protection is ineffective. But in 1910 they did not know this.

By the end of the year, the size of the future ship was set - as expected, 27 thousand tons. In the fall, Secretary of the Navy Meyer issued a regular (annual) report. This document contained estimates and calculations for the battleship of the FY1912 program. They were based on the New York project. The cost of the hull and machines of the new capital ships was set at the same level - $6 million. It was this cost estimate that automatically limited the displacement to about 27,000 tons. All new ideas had to be packed into this tonnage. And as the project developed, there were more and more of them.

The fleet already had four dreadnoughts, including the five-tower Delaware and North Dakota. Began to appear information about the experience of their operation. In September 1910, it turned out that the cooling system of the middle group of cellars was not efficient enough. The higher temperature of the powder charges of the third tower in comparison with the other four led to an increased scattering of shells in the salvo.

This was especially true at long ranges. The time has come to finally solve the old layout problem. The modified system of armored decks of the new project increased the rigidity of the hull, which made it possible to group the gun turrets aft behind the engine compartments.

A little later, at the end of November 1910, the General Council officially chose oil (fuel oil) as the only fuel for future battleships. The staunch supporters of this decision were the then head of this department, the hero of the Spanish-American War and the favorite of the nation, Admiral George Dewey, as well as Rear Admiral Schroeder, commander of the Atlantic Fleet.

Positive experience in the use of oil has already accumulated. On the battleship Delaware, mixed boiler heating was organized. Coal clearly lost in comparison with oil. Labor-intensive transportation from bunkers to furnaces, regular cleaning of the latter from slag (at full speed every three hours), long-term dilution of vapors and afterburning of residues, painful jobs with bunkering, dirt and corrosive coal dust (especially on optics), a problem with the accumulation of combustible gas in coal pits, requiring additional ventilation, numerous grimy and undisciplined firemen, and so on. With oil heating, everything was greatly simplified. Refueling could be carried out even at sea.

According to the calculations of the chief engineer of the Delaware, 212 stokers and coal carriers could be replaced by a staff of 24 people. Hence the saving of space (kubricks, stocks), weight and money. And of course, the transition to oil heating gave an increase in autonomy. Steam production per unit weight of fuel increased by 55%, and per unit area of ​​the grate - by 25%. In addition, oil (fuel oil) fills the volume of fuel storages more compactly.

They could be reduced in size and weight, double-bottomed for fuel, and the bulkheads could be made truly watertight, eliminating the doors and ports needed to transfer and transport coal. In 1910, these advantages seemed obvious. The Navy Engineering Bureau enthusiastically supported the proposal to switch to oil heating. According to calculations for a New York-class ship, such a step promised a reduction in the mass of boilers from 671 to 500 tons. The boiler room became compact, allowing you to get by with one pipe. The upper weight was reduced, and space was freed up in the superstructures.

By the way, the British decided to switch to liquid fuel boilers later, but they were even able to get ahead of the Americans - Queen Elizabeth-class battleships began to enter service in January 1915. And there was no oil in England itself. The United States, on the contrary, possessed a significant part of the explored world reserves of "black gold" and the most powerful oil refining industry. On both the west and east coasts, advanced communications made this fuel even more affordable than coal.

However, hesitation and doubts continued for more than two years. At that time, some properties of oil caused concern, more related to the established practice of military shipbuilding. First of all, the ships were deprived of the traditional side protection from coal bunkers.

It also seemed dangerous to put compartments with flammable liquid in the way of an underwater explosion. The storage of fuel oil in the cavity of the double bottom entailed a decrease in the center of gravity and an increase in the metacentric height. As a result, gusty rolling of the ship was expected, making it difficult to conduct gunfire. The Design and Repair Bureau took an extremely cautious position in this regard - the battleship projects that had begun were completed in the old fashioned way (for example, Texas and New York were laid down in April and September 1911, however, with coal-fired boilers).

Oil boilers significantly saved the tonnage of future American battleships.

No less useful was the transition to placing the main artillery in three-gun turrets. Naturally, one barrel has a significantly lower weight of direct booking. In addition, the length of the ship and its citadel is reduced, space on the deck is freed up, it becomes easier to form superstructures and place anti-mine artillery.

Multi-barrel towers in the US Navy appeared a long time ago. The two-tiered bicaliber monsters of pre-dreadnoughts such as Virginia and Kearsarge cannot be called successful. Nevertheless, they allowed to gain experience in solving complex problems of projectile supply. At one time, the project of three-gun turrets for the battleships South Caro Line and Michigan was considered. But even the task for the development of such installations was not officially issued. Alternatively, these early American dreadnoughts featured an exceptionally successful variant with two terminal pairs of linearly elevated twin-gun turrets.

Then, in March 1910, calculations were made for three-gun mounts for 12750 Mk.7 guns for the FY1911 ship project. However, this time too, the matter did not come to practical steps. In addition, almost simultaneously with the new 12750 Mk.7 gun, the 14745 Mk.1 artillery system appeared.

It was decided to install it on the battleships 1911 FY in five spirit gun turrets. The development of a draft design for an “improved New York” with four three-gun turrets did not mean anything yet. The Bureau of Design and Repair, as usual, took a cautious stance, giving preference to proven technical solutions that guaranteed compliance with the planned dates for the construction of ships.

The terms of reference for the development of a three-gun turret for guns 14745 was approved on January 31, 1911. These installations had to be placed in a housing of the same size, and therefore it was necessary, if possible, to shrink their dimensions and weight. The new tower could only be slightly larger than the two-gun one. Four months later, on May 31, 1911, the Secretary of the Navy approved the design of the FY1912 battleship. It provided for three-gun towers. However, the timing of the readiness of such installations was not at all clear.

The Bureau of Design and Repair suggested not to rush (this department insisted on five two-gun turrets, which in fact amounted to a repetition of the New York in the variant with oil boilers). In case of unforeseen delays with the three-gun mounts, serious complications could arise. In this case, the shipbuilding companies had the right to bring financial claims.

The issue was finally resolved after the report of the intelligence service of the fleet. On June 17, she announced that she had information about ongoing projects of foreign battleships with three-gun turrets. Two days later, the Secretary of the Navy officially stopped all attempts to turn back.

On 07/11/1911, the Bureau of Arms reported that the first copy of the new turret, intended for testing, could be expected only by April of next year. That is, three months after the planned deadline for signing a contract for the construction of two FY1912 ships. The situation was fraught with great risk.

With severe restrictions on weight and dimensions, the design of such an artillery installation seemed an extremely difficult task. Lieutenant Commanders Petingil and Smith were involved in its decision. The work of his men was personally supervised by the new chief of the weapons bureau, Admiral Nathan Twining, who took this post on 05/25/1911. In the end, the efforts of the designers of the tower were crowned with success. A characteristic feature of their offspring was a very dense layout. All three trunks had a common cradle and simultaneously moved in a vertical plane.

Unlike designs with separate guidance of guns, the Americans called such a tower not a three-gun, but a triplex tower. The obvious disadvantage of such a scheme was the increased probability of incapacitating the entire complex with one projectile hit. In addition, the closely spaced three gun ports created a large unprotected opening in the armor. Inside the two-gun turrets there was an armored partition between the compartments of the right and left guns. Their vertical aiming mechanisms and loading system could operate independently.

Triplex did not give such an opportunity. He had a single gun compartment, was brought together at the loading angle and then also moved to a given elevation. A projectile penetrating inside the tower would inevitably disable the entire system. They decided to compensate for this by strengthening the armor. At first, they wanted to increase the thickness of the frontal plate to 20 "(508 mm). Later, they decided to limit themselves to 18 inches (457 mm).

The experimental copy of the triplex tower was still late. In fact, it was not ready until August 1912. By this time, the project of battleship No. 38 of the FY1913 program with four such towers (the future Pennsylvania) had passed the approval stage, and ships No. 36 and No. 37 FY1912 were about to be laid.

Now we will return to the turn of 1910-1911 to trace the vicissitudes of the formation of the most remarkable part of the Nevada-class battleship project - their layout and structural protection. So, the size of future ships was set (27,000 tons), the first prototype in the form of an “improved New York” was considered, and directions for its improvement were outlined.

The General Council authorized the transition to oil heating of the boilers, demanded to strengthen the cover of the chimneys, as well as to provide protection from shells on the underwater part of the trajectory. The last task arose from the same prerequisites for the growth of combat distances. A projectile fired from afar flies along a steep trajectory and, falling near the side, can dive under the armor belt.

At the same time, it was ordered to provide protection against Davis' firing torpedoes (a lot of spears were broken around this miracle weapon in those years, but it never appeared in the arsenals of the fleets). The General Council initially proposed in the "improved New York" project to add below the main belt armor a 5-inch underwater belt 4 feet (1.22 m) wide, continued to the turn of the hold with a 2-inch bulkhead of homogeneous armor. However, categorical objections followed from the fleet weapons bureau, which was responsible for armoring the ships. This department drew attention to a clear weakness at the junction of the main and lower belts.

Better to just continue the main belt a couple of feet down. However, heterogeneous armor plates with a wedge-shaped decrease in thickness could not be thinner than 6.5-7 inches (165-178 mm) along the lower edge. Otherwise, for technological reasons, their front surface could not be made sufficiently hard. The general council itself refused to extend the belt with two-inch armor. Experimental data on such a scheme of underwater protection did not exist, and he decided to get by with a conventional bulkhead of 38.1 mm, sufficiently removed from the outer side.

These details of the new battleship were discussed in detail by November 1910. The Bureau of Design and Repair invariably sought to deviate minimally from the design of the 1911 ship of the year, that is, from the New York type. The main argument was the displacement, set at the level of 27 thousand tons, as well as the vague deadlines for the completion of the three-gun turret. The shipbuilding department believed that the characteristics of the new battleship declared by the General Council would require large ship sizes for their implementation. According to rough calculations, the increase in displacement was at least 1000, but rather all 3000 tons with the ensuing costs.

The figure is clearly unrealistic to pass through Congress. The Bureau of Design and Repair reminded the General Council that it only approved the New York project in July, and now it is demanding the impossible within the same dimensions of the ship and its price. A rather caustic response followed. The General Council of the Fleet regretted that it did not intervene in a timely manner in the process of designing the battleship of the FY1911 program. But now it is on the analysis of the shortcomings of this project that the new requirements are based, which are not subject to revision.

At the same time, it was proposed to return once again to the question of choosing the type of the main power plant. The Bureau of Design and Repair wanted to keep triple expansion steam engines on the 1912 battleship. The General Council took the initiative to review this decision in connection with the forthcoming transition to oil heating of boilers. Fuel oil gave a significant weight gain and an increase in range.

This could compensate for the low efficiency of the then steam turbines. However, they have not yet decided to completely abandon piston engines. It was considered expedient to equip only one of the two ships of the FY1912 program with turbines. Thus, a basis was formed for comparing the types of the main power plant (MPP). Once a similar experiment has already taken place on the battleships Delaware (steam engines) and North Dakota (Curtis turbines). Now it was repeated in conditions of oil heating of boilers.

In the winter of 1910-1911, the design and repair bureau developed a new draft design, in which it tried to take into account, as far as possible, all the requirements of the General Council in terms of structural protection. In comparison with the “improved New York”, the thickness of the belt at the waterline has increased from 279 to 305 mm. Above was a casemate of armor plates 6.5 inches (165 mm).

It protected part of the anti-mine artillery, but mainly, as before, was intended to cover the chimneys. The latter were enclosed in armor casings 38.1 mm (1.5") thick and 2.44 m (8") high. Additional protection for them was created by an inch (25.4 mm) upper deck above the boiler compartments. Another belt, 127 mm (5") thick, adjoined the belt armor along the waterline from below. The main caliber consisted of 12 14745 guns in four turrets. To reduce flooding, the designers tried to slightly raise the anti-mine artillery, represented by 21 5751 barrels.

For this, a long forecastle was introduced. 14 guns were placed in it: ten in the central armored casemate and four behind the unarmored side in the nose. Two cannons were placed openly in the superstructure. The five others are behind the unarmored side in the stern. As a power plant, the power of which was not indicated in the project, piston engines or Curtis turbines could serve. The latter were somewhat inferior in terms of efficiency to the units of the Parsons system, but were more compact, which gave a weight gain due to slightly shorter engine rooms.

The main drawback of this first interpretation of the requirements of the General Council was a very large excess of the specified displacement - by two thousand tons. Such a project could not succeed in Congress. An attempt was made to shrink the size of the ship without significantly changing the parameters. It was this version of the Design and Repair Bureau that was presented on February 13, 1911. There is no information about its details.

It is known that the ship still turned out to be very large - about 28,000 tons with a length of 179.2 or 179.34 meters, respectively, with Curtis and Parsons turbines. Only four docks could accommodate him: in New York, Norfolk, Puget Sound and Pearl Harbor. As a result, this version of the project was rejected. Further, the design and repair bureau concentrated its efforts in the direction of reducing the length of the future battleship and eliminating thin and intermediate booking. I had to abandon the underwater belt and the upper casemate. The anti-mine battery now had no armor cover.

Meanwhile, Congress approved the construction of battleships No. 36 and No. 37 under the FY1912 program. Legislative act dated 03/04/1911 read: “The president is hereby authorized to build two first class battleships carrying no less heavy armor and weapons than any ship of this class, having the maximum possible speed and range at a cost of six million for each ship, excluding armor and weapons."

By this time, there were already quite a few developments that met the basic requirements of the General Council of the Fleet.

During the month of March, the design and repair bureau presented eight new variants of the 1912 battleship of the year (the so-called "spring projects"). The speed in different versions varied in a modest range of 20-21 knots, and the number of 14-inch guns - from 8 to 12 barrels, including an unusual version from 03/17/1911 with 11 guns (turret No. 4 is two-, the rest are three-gun).

A characteristic feature of the booking system of all these prototypes was strict compliance with the principle of "all or nothing". Towers, barbettes, cuttings and chimneys received a very powerful cover. The thickness of the belt armor was at least 13 inches (330 mm) with an increased width and a new mounting method. The plates were now oriented with the long side vertically and stood in one row. As a result, the longitudinal joint, which was a weak point of the old side belt design, disappeared.

Under these circumstances, the armament of 12 14745 guns in four triplex towers again failed to fit into 27,000 tons. Of course, it was not difficult to create an 8-gun variant (all turrets were two-gun). However, a battleship with such a main battery (but smaller displacement) had already been rejected at the design stage of the ship of the FY1911 program. He did not pass even now, despite the particularly thick armor.

The same applies to the project with nine guns in three towers. The General Council could not afford to reduce the firepower of the new ship in comparison with the New York. As a result, on March 30, he opted for a variant with a 356-mm belt along the waterline, a speed of 20.5 knots and 10 main guns in four turrets of two types: end - three-, and elevated - two-gun. The project was dated March 11th. Side armor here had a remarkable feature. The plane-parallel part, 356 mm thick, occupied only 4 feet (1.22 m) in width.

The structural waterline ran just in the middle of this section, and above and below, a wedge-shaped decrease in thickness began with ledges on the inner surface of the slab. Belt armor converged to 279 and 203 mm, respectively, on the upper and lower edges. A similar configuration of the cross-section of the armor plates had a belt of the project dated March 17. All other options provided belt plates with a wedge-shaped decrease in thickness only in the underwater part.

The slightly lower speed of the project chosen by the General Council in comparison with a similarly sized 21-knot ship (project dated March 9, 1911) gave a weight gain of 255 tons. This was equivalent to an inch of thickness or one and a half feet (0.46 m) of belt width. In the option chosen by the General Council, the first alternative was embodied with a simultaneous increase in the armor of the conning tower.

From above and below, armor and fragmentation decks adjoined the corresponding edges of the belt. Both carried armor 38.1 mm (1.5") thick. The fragmentation deck ended with bevels at the sides. They were reinforced to two inches (50.8 mm). Behind the belt armor was a longitudinal bulkhead of the same thickness, which joined with the fragmentation deck along its fracture lines.

Such horizontal protection was soon considered insufficient by the designer himself. The Bureau of Engineering and Repair proposed to increase the displacement by 500 tons, thereby increasing the armor deck to three inches (76.2 mm). At the same time, the length of the ship increased to 175.3 meters with a minimum weight gain of hull structures. A similar option was already close to the protection scheme of the future Nevada. However, there were still many changes to be made.

First of all, in June, the arms bureau announced the impossibility of creating armor plates with a wedge-shaped decrease in thickness towards two ends. An unpleasant alternative was the use of a double-row belt, as on previous types of American battleships. In this case, a long horizontal joint arose again, weakening the structure. The designers tried to avoid this.

They preferred to use vertical slabs of a simpler configuration with a reduction in thickness only under water. For weight compensation, one inch of armor in the plane-parallel part had to be sacrificed. Now the plates at a depth of 0.61 meters (2") below the waterline acquired a wedge-shaped decrease in thickness from 330 to 203 mm.

The following month, the design and repair bureau proposed to abandon the two-inch armor of the internal bulkhead, strengthening the side protection due to it. The thickness of the belt was increased to 343 mm (13.5 "), and the width (or height) to 5.3 meters. The project of the future Nevada was completed by the rejection of the rotary fire control post on the roof of the conning tower. It was weakly armored and not gave reliable protection to fragile artillery devices.Further, the project was no longer subject to significant changes, although proposals were made, and various kinds of fears continued to haunt the minds.

First of all, the ground for debate was provided by sea trials of new guns and ammunition, conducted on March 21-22, 1911. The target was the old battleship San Marco (former Texas, completed on 08/15/1895). The crushing effect of 356-millimeter shells exceeded all expectations. When the test results were evaluated, the already almost completed 1912 battleship project of the year began to seem to many insufficiently protected.

Late options from among the "spring projects" apparently were the result of such concerns. Moreover, the possibility of increasing the thickness of the side belt to 431 mm was studied by reducing firepower, speed (not higher than 20 knots) and range (6000 miles). Fortunately, things did not come to the realization of such ideas, and they did not begin to redo the almost finished, well-balanced project.

A similar fate befell the various proposals that appeared after the fall of 1911 in the fleet held a broad discussion of the future "ideal battleship". A lot of comments were made, for example, regarding the vulnerability of the triplex tower or the device on the new ships of the clipper stem. The most virulent criticism was caused by the low position of the 5-inch artillery.

In fact, the designers did not eliminate the drawback that was obvious by that time. Large ships such as Delaware and Utah were already in service. Their anti-mine artillery, as before, was heavily flooded. The dreadnought commanders rightly demanded that such an obvious flaw be eliminated in the new project. However, there was no time for that. Anti-mine artillery remained in the same (“wet”) positions, including an inconvenient installation above the sternpost.

Contracts for the construction of battleships No. 36 (Nevada) and No. 37 (Oklahoma) were signed on January 22, 1912, respectively, with Fore River Shipbuilding Co. (Quincy, Massachusetts) and New York Shipbuilding Corp. (Camden, New Jersey). According to the plan, the ships were to be handed over to the fleet in three years. The construction cost of two combat units was equal to 13,645,360 dollars. This figure does not include costs of $9,304,286. for the purchase of armor and weapons. The full cost of Nevada was $11,401,073.04 and Oklahoma was $11,548,573.28.

Battleships No. 37 and No. 36 were laid down on October 26 and November 4, 1912, respectively. The planned construction period for both ships was exceeded by about a year. It took a particularly long time to finish building the Oklahoma afloat, which was commissioned on May 3, 1916. "Nevada" was completed almost two months earlier - on March 11.

And on the last day of spring, the battle of Jutland broke out. Its largely unexpected results, which revealed the weakness of the armor of British ships, aroused the most keen interest in most countries in relation to the design of new US battleships.

Briefly about the article: The history of battleships and battlecruisers - the most powerful war machines ever created by man.

Twilight of the Giants

Battleships of the latest generation

A lifeless Concordian dreadnought sailed past us. The battleship got the first number, and it’s hard for me to imagine what else, besides the armor-piercing silumin shells of other battleships, is capable of disfiguring a mighty flying fortress in such a way.

Alexander Zorich "Tomorrow the war"

The largest warships have always been considered the beauty and pride of the state, the embodiment of the strength, wealth and technical excellence of the state. But prosperity and failure always go hand in hand. In the 30-40s of the 20th century, heavy artillery ships reached the limit of perfection. This means that they could no longer develop further, keeping up with the times. We present to your attention the story of the rise and fall of the most powerful fighting machines created by man.

"Treaty of the Five Powers"

In 1922, Great Britain, the USA, France, Japan and Italy concluded an agreement on the limitation of armaments at sea - the so-called " Washington Treaty ».

Surprisingly, the main instigator of disarmament was England - the strongest maritime power, going according to the treaty for the greatest sacrifices. If other states parted with only a few obsolete ships and limited the construction of new ones, then the British “put under the knife” half of their battle fleet.

The reasons for this "generosity" were, of course, predominantly economic. The war drained the resources of the kingdom. The British, in any case, were forced to make their "Great Fleet", where 400,000 sailors served, half as great.

Tactical considerations also played their part. At the beginning of the 20th century, England thoughtlessly built ships, trying to maintain a two-fold superiority over the Germans. The classic dreadnought had a speed of about 20 knots and was not suitable for active operations. For shelling coastal targets, monitors with a small draft were much better suited. The only purpose of the battleship was to fight with similar enemy ships. And if the enemy did not go out to battle, the ship became only a "finance destroyer".

No one was particularly eager to fight, and for almost the entire war the English and German fleets stood at their bases. There was nothing to fight for: the German fleet from Hamburg could not threaten the communications of England; the British saw no reason to invade the North Sea.

fast battleships

By the end of the war, it became clear that the battleship, with the previous level of armor and armament, should have a speed of at least 27 knots. More powerful machines would have increased the displacement of the ship to about 45,000 tons, but such giants would have required few. Faster ships are easier to transfer from one theater of operations to another. Instead of waiting years for a general battle with enemy battleships, a high-speed ship could participate in operations, escorting and supporting the cruisers.

But the Washington Treaty, among other things, forbade the construction of ships with a displacement of more than 35,000 tons. The high-speed battleship did not fit into this framework. As a result, in the 20-30s, the powers did not even use the established limit on the number and total displacement of battleships. The restrictions still did not allow the creation of a ship with the capabilities that corresponded to the requirements of the time. The effects of the Great Depression also affected.

Until the end of the 30s, the British launched only " Rodney " And " Nelson "- ships of by no means outstanding merits: well-armed (9 406-mm guns) and protected, but slow-moving. The Americans decided on 3 similar battleships of the " Maryland ". The Italians, French and Japanese did not build anything. The Germans were bound by the Versailles restrictions. And socialism was built in the USSR.

The situation revived only in the last pre-war years. As soon as there was a smell of gunpowder, the powers rushed to arm themselves, unanimously rejecting the Washington restrictions. But it was already too late. In total, only 23 high-speed battleships were built during the pre-war and war years.

Dry figures do not give a completely adequate idea of ​​the combat capability of these ships. So, in terms of the ratio of protection, speed, armament and displacement, “ Littorio ". But if Italian ship armor by that time was the best in the world, then the guns of this country were of very low quality.

In one respect, it was the Italians who demonstrated the overwhelming advantage of the fast battleship over the conventional one. During the battle at Matapan, the Vittorio Veneto received a torpedo in the stern, lost half of the screws and settled into the water along the deck ... But even after that, the old English Valiant could not catch up with him.

On the other hand, formally unremarkable German battleships, due to their well-thought-out design, showed incredible survivability under enemy fire. The British put into Bismarck » about 40 shells with a caliber of 356-406 mm. Moreover, the last shots were fired from a distance of only 2500 m. In addition, the battleship was hit by 4 torpedoes. But after the war, an inspection of the hull lying at the bottom showed that the Bismarck had sunk. as a result of the discovery by the crew of the kingston.

Just as unpleasantly surprised the enemy and " Tirpitz ". He remained afloat after the explosion under the bottom of four 2-ton mines laid by saboteurs. The British managed to "get" it only with bombs weighing 5.5 tons. Tirpitz did not sink immediately, but after 3 direct and several close hits. By the way, " Roma "- the last of the three battleships of the "Littorio" type - disappeared under water after 2 hits with bombs weighing 1800 kg.

If you ask yourself which of the projects was the best, then you have to admit that most types of high-speed battleships were approximately equal in strength. The European ones had better protection, the American ones had more powerful weapons. The title of the best ship in the class is traditionally claimed by " Yamato " And " Iowa ". Moreover, one can hardly doubt that the much more powerful Japanese battleship would easily have emerged victorious from the duel.

Gigantism did not make the Yamato a clumsy ugly, like a German supertank " Mouse ". Careful selection of the hull shape provided her with even better maneuverability than many other battleships, acceptable speed and the ability to operate in shallow water.

For their part, the Iowas had better balanced characteristics, and would have surpassed the Yamato in any combat mission (except, in fact, the battle with the Yamato). The speed of these ships is sometimes even indicated as 33 knots. The wave raised by the battleship going at full speed posed a serious threat to the destroyers accompanying it. But sometimes it was also saving: experienced captains specially sent their ships to it so that the water that swept the decks would put out the fires.

battlecruisers

Another option for a heavy artillery ship was the battlecruisers that appeared at the beginning of the 20th century. With the same displacement and armament as battleships, ships of this type had lighter armor, but increased speed to 25-29 knots. It was assumed that the combination of agility and weapons would allow the battlecruiser to participate in both raids and battles.

But in reality, for patrolling on communications, the battlecruisers turned out to be excessively armed. Guns with a caliber of 343-381 mm could only be needed to fight battleships. But with them, the cruiser was not allowed to engage in battle armor. Also in Tsushima battle it was the battlecruiser that went to the bottom first " Oslyabya ". IN Jutland In the same battle, the British lost 3 battlecruisers, but not a single battleship. The Germans also lost an old battleship and a battlecruiser.

However, after the First World War, it was the battlecruiser " Hood "- the largest and closest to the ideal of a" high-speed battleship "ship. But the result of his meeting with a real high-speed battleship - the Bismarck - was quite predictable. After the second hit, Hood exploded. Whereas the battleship Prince of Wales ”, Even having received 5 shells from Bismarck, he left the battle only due to a technical malfunction.

The battlecruisers of the new generation were designed only for combat with other cruisers, which made it possible to reduce the caliber of the guns. By the beginning of the war, the French had built " Dunkirk " And " Strasbourg ", the Germans acquired" Scharnhorst " And " Gneisenau ". And if the French ships were distinguished primarily by the original placement of weapons (the main caliber in two 4-gun turrets at the bow, auxiliary guns at the stern), then the German version was distinguished by an absurdly powerful armor for a battlecruiser. Having limited themselves to protection only from the fire of 203-mm guns, the Germans would have received a truly ideal "killer of cruisers" with a speed of 34-35 knots.

The original characteristics of the Scharnhorsts were connected with the fact that, having freed themselves from Versailles (but not Washington!) Restrictions in 1935, the Germans tried to get both a full-fledged battleship and a raider at once. Moreover, keeping within the permitted 35,000 tons. Naturally, the result left much to be desired.

Designed battlecruisers in other countries. But the American Alaska " And " Guam "(undoubtedly, the best ships in their class) appeared only towards the end of the war, and did not have time to take part in the hostilities. Two Soviet cruisers of the " Kronstadt » were not completed.

battleship vs aircraft carrier

In our time, it is often argued that by the beginning of World War II, the battleship was an obsolete type of ship. The outcome of battles was determined by aircraft carriers, because the most powerful guns hit a maximum of 40-45 km, and carrier-based aircraft are able to detect and attack the enemy at a distance of 300-400 km.

But the strategists of the 40s did not share this point of view, rightly believing that comparing a battleship with an aircraft carrier is just as ridiculous as with a submarine. No one disputed the advantages of naval aviation, but after all, on land, aircraft did not replace guns. Only in Japan, the production of battleships ceased in 43. In the United States and Great Britain, battleships were built until the end of the war.

Aircraft carriers aroused quite justified distrust among the admirals. After all, aviation is active only during the day and only in good weather. During the night, the fast battleship managed to strike and go beyond the reach of torpedo bombers. The best sailors - the British and Japanese - were preparing to fight at night. And preferably in heavy storm conditions. The exercises of the fleets of these nations were so extreme that they often led to the loss of ships. Down to the battleships.

But hard in teaching - easy in battle. At night, the Japanese used ordinary binoculars to detect American ships earlier than the Americans were able to notice the enemy with the help of radar. The British, on the other hand, conducted convoys through the Strait of Sicily in such weather when enemy destroyers sent to intercept disappeared in the waves, radioing: “We are sinking, long live Italy!”.

According to the pre-war ideas of the British, Japanese, German and American admirals, the aircraft carrier had to constantly accompany 2-3 battleships, carrying out reconnaissance and covering them from air attacks. Accordingly, he was forced to act regardless of the weather and approach the enemy at the same distance as his "wards". And this, in turn, required the ship to be equipped with powerful armor even to the detriment of the number of aircraft on board. The Japanese went the farthest, arming some of their aircraft carriers with 8-inch guns.

Aircraft carriers would have remained an auxiliary force in the battle fleet. But in 1941 Admiral Yamamoto made a revolutionary decision to apply them independently and massively. Only by choosing the time and place of the battle at its own discretion, naval aviation could fully use its advantages. Lost battleships in Pearl Harbor , the Americans were forced to adhere to the same tactics. The British, on the other hand, remained unconvinced for a long time.

American aircraft sank the giant Yamato and Musashi, and this fact is often regarded as evidence of the superiority of aircraft carriers. Indeed, neither the most powerful anti-aircraft artillery (24 universal 127-mm guns and up to 150 25-mm machine guns) nor barrage salvos from 460-mm guns saved the battleships from the armada of bombers. But ... no aircraft carrier would have held out for so long against a quarter of the forces thrown at the Yamato. The only thing was that the battleship was still not designed for operations in conditions of complete domination of the enemy in the air.

Briefly about the article: The history of battleships and battlecruisers - the most powerful combat vehicles ever created by man.
Twilight of the Giants
Battleships of the latest generation

A lifeless Concordian dreadnought sailed past us. The battleship got the first number, and it’s hard for me to imagine what else, besides the armor-piercing silumin shells of other battleships, is capable of disfiguring a mighty flying fortress in such a way.

Alexander Zorich "Tomorrow the war"

The largest warships have always been considered the beauty and pride of the state, the embodiment of the strength, wealth and technical excellence of the state. But prosperity and failure always go hand in hand. In the 30-40s of the 20th century, heavy artillery ships reached the limit of perfection. This means that they could no longer develop further, keeping up with the times. We present to your attention the story of the rise and fall of the most powerful fighting machines created by man.

"Treaty of the Five Powers"

In 1922, Great Britain, the USA, France, Japan and Italy concluded an agreement on the limitation of armaments at sea - the so-called "Washington Treaty".

Surprisingly, the main instigator of disarmament was England - the strongest maritime power, going according to the treaty for the greatest sacrifices. If other states parted with only a few obsolete ships and limited the construction of new ones, then the British “put under the knife” half of their battle fleet.

Past and future of the artillery ship.

The reasons for this "generosity" were, of course, predominantly economic. The war drained the resources of the kingdom. The British, in any case, were forced to make their "Great Fleet", where 400,000 sailors served, half as great.

Tactical considerations also played their part. At the beginning of the 20th century, England thoughtlessly built ships, trying to maintain a two-fold superiority over the Germans. The classic dreadnought had a speed of about 20 knots and was not suitable for active operations. For shelling coastal targets, monitors with a small draft were much better suited. The only purpose of the battleship was to fight with similar enemy ships. And if the enemy did not go out to battle, the ship became only a "finance destroyer".

The parade of "irons" of the English "Grand Fleet".

No one was particularly eager to fight, and for almost the entire war the English and German fleets stood at their bases. There was nothing to fight for: the German fleet from Hamburg could not threaten the communications of England; the British saw no reason to invade the North Sea.

running boar

Speed ​​solved not only the problem of battleship mobility, but also significantly reduced its vulnerability. The flight time of the projectile at a distance of 20-25 km reaches 40 seconds. During this time, the battleship shifted by 2-3 hulls and, noticing the flash of an enemy salvo, could change course.

An increase in speed by one and a half times also reduced the number of enemy submarines that had time to intercept the ship. The accuracy of torpedo fire turned out to be much worse. Destroyers, whose speed was most often 35-37 knots at that time, could hardly be dangerous. In order to catch up with the fleeing giant, they needed to spend 2-3 hours in the range of its guns.

At a distance of 20-40 kilometers, even the colossus of a battleship turns into a small-sized moving target.

fast battleships

By the end of the war, it became clear that the battleship, with the previous level of armor and armament, should have a speed of at least 27 knots. More powerful machines would have increased the displacement of the ship to about 45,000 tons, but such giants would have required few. Faster ships are easier to transfer from one theater of operations to another. Instead of waiting years for a general battle with enemy battleships, a high-speed ship could participate in operations, escorting and supporting the cruisers.

But the Washington Treaty, among other things, forbade the construction of ships with a displacement of more than 35,000 tons. The high-speed battleship did not fit into this framework. As a result, in the 20-30s, the powers did not even use the established limit on the number and total displacement of battleships. The restrictions still did not allow the creation of a ship with the capabilities that corresponded to the requirements of the time. The effects of the Great Depression also affected.

Until the end of the 1930s, the British launched only Rodney and Nelson - ships of by no means outstanding qualities: well-armed (9 406-mm guns) and protected, but slow-moving. The Americans decided on 3 similar Maryland-class battleships. The Italians, French and Japanese did not build anything. The Germans were bound by the Versailles restrictions. And socialism was built in the USSR.

The situation revived only in the last pre-war years. As soon as there was a smell of gunpowder, the powers rushed to arm themselves, unanimously rejecting the Washington restrictions. But it was already too late. In total, only 23 high-speed battleships were built during the pre-war and war years.

Dry figures do not give a completely adequate idea of ​​the combat capability of these ships. So, in terms of the ratio of protection, speed, armament and displacement, the Littorio look the most advantageous. But if Italian ship armor by that time was the best in the world, then the guns of this country were of very low quality.

"Rodney" (type "Nelson"). Member of the hunt for the Bismarck.

In one respect, it was the Italians who demonstrated the overwhelming advantage of the fast battleship over the conventional one. During the battle at Matapan, the Vittorio Veneto received a torpedo in the stern, lost half of the screws and settled into the water along the deck ... But even after that, the old English Valiant could not catch up with him.

On the other hand, formally unremarkable German battleships, due to their well-thought-out design, showed incredible survivability under enemy fire. The British planted about 40 shells with a caliber of 356-406 mm into the Bismarck. Moreover, the last shots were fired from a distance of only 2500 m. In addition, the battleship was hit by 4 torpedoes. But after the war, an inspection of the hull lying at the bottom showed that the Bismarck sank as a result of the discovery by the crew of the kingstons.

Just as unpleasantly surprised the enemy and "Tirpitz". He remained afloat after the explosion under the bottom of four 2-ton mines laid by saboteurs. The British managed to "get" it only with bombs weighing 5.5 tons. Tirpitz did not sink immediately, but after 3 direct and several close hits. By the way, "Roma" - the last of the three battleships of the "Littorio" type - disappeared under water after 2 hits with bombs weighing 1800 kg.

"Littorio". The Italians were better at building ships than at fighting on them.

If you ask yourself which of the projects was the best, then you have to admit that most types of high-speed battleships were approximately equal in strength. The European ones had better protection, the American ones had more powerful weapons. The Yamato and Iowa traditionally claim the title of the best ship in the class. Moreover, one can hardly doubt that the much more powerful Japanese battleship would easily have emerged victorious from the duel.

Gigantism did not make the Yamato a clumsy ugly creature like the German Maus supertank. Careful selection of the hull shape provided her with even better maneuverability than many other battleships, acceptable speed and the ability to operate in shallow water.

"Tirpitz". Dark community.

For their part, the Iowas had better balanced characteristics, and would have surpassed the Yamato in any combat mission (except, in fact, the battle with the Yamato). The speed of these ships is sometimes even indicated as 33 knots. The wave raised by the battleship going at full speed posed a serious threat to the destroyers accompanying it. But sometimes it was also saving: experienced captains specially sent their ships to it so that the water that swept the decks would put out the fires.

"Yamato" in battle.

Soviet Union

By the beginning of World War II, the USSR had only three old battleships built back in the days of the empire. One of them was based in Sevastopol, in order to neutralize the Turkish battlecruiser Yavuz (formerly the German Goeben) on occasion. The other two in the Baltic were preparing to join the salvos of their guns to the fire of the coastal batteries of Kronstadt. After all, the indicators of "Marat", "Paris Commune" and "October Revolution" looked modest even by the standards of the First World War. This state of affairs did not seem acceptable to the Soviet leadership. Adopted in 1938, the "Great Shipbuilding Program" provided for the construction of 15 giant battleships of the "Soviet Union" type. But by the summer of 1941, only 4 were laid down. The country's industry was not yet ready to produce either armor or vehicles for battleships. After the victory, the completion of the Soyuz did not resume. Both because of the devastation, and because it became known that at a significantly higher cost, Soviet battleships and battlecruisers would have been no better than the American Iows and Alaskas.

"Marat". Displacement 22,000 tons, speed 21 knots, 12 305 mm guns, 225 mm armour.

battlecruisers

Another option for a heavy artillery ship was the battlecruisers that appeared at the beginning of the 20th century. With the same displacement and armament as battleships, ships of this type had lighter armor, but increased speed to 25-29 knots. It was assumed that the combination of agility and weapons would allow the battlecruiser to participate in both raids and battles.

But in reality, for patrolling on communications, the battlecruisers turned out to be excessively armed. Guns with a caliber of 343-381 mm could only be needed to fight battleships. But with them, the cruiser was not allowed to engage in battle armor. Even in the battle of Tsushima, it was the battlecruiser Oslyabya that was the first to go to the bottom. In the Battle of Jutland, the British lost 3 battlecruisers, but not a single battleship. The Germans also lost an old battleship and a battlecruiser.

Nevertheless, after the First World War, it was the battlecruiser Hood, the largest and closest to the ideal of a “high-speed battleship” ship, that became the flagship of Her Majesty’s fleet. But the result of his meeting with a real high-speed battleship - the Bismarck - was quite predictable. After the second hit, Hood exploded. Whereas the battleship "Prince of Wales", even having received 5 shells from the "Bismarck", left the battle only due to a technical malfunction.

Battlecruisers of the Second World War: "Hood" and "Gneisenau".

The battlecruisers of the new generation were designed only for combat with other cruisers, which made it possible to reduce the caliber of the guns. By the beginning of the war, the French built Dunkirk and Strasbourg, while the Germans acquired Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. And if the French ships were distinguished primarily by the original placement of weapons (the main caliber in two 4-gun turrets at the bow, auxiliary guns at the stern), then the German version was distinguished by an absurdly powerful armor for a battlecruiser. Having limited themselves to protection only from the fire of 203-mm guns, the Germans would have received a truly ideal "killer of cruisers" with a speed of 34-35 knots.

The original characteristics of the Scharnhorsts were connected with the fact that, having freed themselves from Versailles (but not Washington!) Restrictions in 1935, the Germans tried to get both a full-fledged battleship and a raider at once. Moreover, keeping within the permitted 35,000 tons. Naturally, the result left much to be desired.

French battlecruiser Dunkirk.

Designed battlecruisers in other countries. But the American "Alaska" and "Guam" (undoubtedly the best ships in their class) appeared only towards the end of the war, and did not have time to take part in the hostilities. Two Soviet cruisers of the Kronstadt type were not completed.

"Pocket" battleships

The classification of the German ships of the Deutschland series is an old subject of dispute. Can they be considered battlecruisers?

In fact, there is nothing to argue about here. The Germans themselves used the definition of "panzership" only to circumvent the Versailles restrictions. After the start of the war, the Deutschlands were immediately assigned to the class of heavy cruisers, which both their displacement and armor clearly indicated belonging to.

The cruiser "Deutschland" ("Germany") was later renamed "Lützow". To reduce moral damage in case of sinking.

battleship vs aircraft carrier

In our time, it is often argued that by the beginning of World War II, the battleship was an obsolete type of ship. The outcome of battles was determined by aircraft carriers, because the most powerful guns hit a maximum of 40-45 km, and carrier-based aircraft are able to detect and attack the enemy at a distance of 300-400 km.

But the strategists of the 40s did not share this point of view, rightly believing that comparing a battleship with an aircraft carrier is just as ridiculous as with a submarine. No one disputed the advantages of naval aviation, but after all, on land, aircraft did not replace guns. Only in Japan, the production of battleships ceased in 43. In the United States and Great Britain, battleships were built until the end of the war.

Aircraft carriers aroused quite justified distrust among the admirals. After all, aviation is active only during the day and only in good weather. During the night, the fast battleship managed to strike and go beyond the reach of torpedo bombers. The best sailors - the British and Japanese - were preparing to fight at night. And preferably in severe storm conditions. The exercises of the fleets of these nations were so extreme that they often led to the loss of ships. Down to the battleships.

The displacement of modern aircraft carriers exceeds 90,000 tons. The Yamato record has been broken.

But hard in teaching - easy in battle. At night, the Japanese used ordinary binoculars to detect American ships earlier than the Americans were able to notice the enemy with the help of radar. The British, on the other hand, conducted convoys through the Strait of Sicily in such weather when enemy destroyers sent to intercept disappeared in the waves, radioing: “We are sinking, long live Italy!”.

According to the pre-war ideas of the British, Japanese, German and American admirals, the aircraft carrier had to constantly accompany 2-3 battleships, carrying out reconnaissance and covering them from air attacks. Accordingly, he was forced to act regardless of the weather and approach the enemy at the same distance as his "wards". And this, in turn, required the ship to be equipped with powerful armor even to the detriment of the number of aircraft on board. The Japanese went the farthest, arming some of their aircraft carriers with 8-inch guns.

Aircraft carriers would have remained an auxiliary force in the battle fleet. But in 1941, Admiral Yamamoto made a revolutionary decision to apply them independently and massively. Only by choosing the time and place of the battle at its own discretion, naval aviation could fully use its advantages. Having lost battleships at Pearl Harbor, the Americans were forced to adhere to the same tactics. The British, on the other hand, remained unconvinced for a long time.

Admiral Yamamoto.

American aircraft sank the giant Yamato and Musashi, and this fact is often regarded as evidence of the superiority of aircraft carriers. Indeed, neither the most powerful anti-aircraft artillery (24 universal 127-mm guns and up to 150 25-mm machine guns) nor barrage salvos from 460-mm guns saved the battleships from the armada of bombers. But ... no aircraft carrier would have held out for so long against a quarter of the forces thrown at the Yamato. The only thing was that the battleship was still not designed for operations in conditions of complete domination of the enemy in the air.

Jean Bart, the last battleship built, was laid down before the war.

Universal caliber

In the 1930s, 12-20 universal guns with a caliber of 114-133 mm, intended for firing at both surface and air targets, became the standard armament of battleships. The exceptions were the German Scharnhorsts and Bismarcks. Their creators were so sure that a caliber of at least 150 mm was required to fight destroyers that they tried to put 6-inch guns even on their own destroyers.

Naturally, the battleship also received 12 of these guns. Another 14-16 anti-aircraft guns were intended to combat aircraft. As a result, the total weight of the salvo of auxiliary artillery in relation to the weight of the salvo of the main caliber was 26% for Scharnhorst, instead of 3-13% for "normal" battleships. Undoubtedly, the "standard set" of auxiliary artillery with less weight would have better protected the ship from attacks both from the sea and from the air.

The fire of anti-aircraft guns.

Postwar years

With the last salvos of World War II, the history of battleships basically ended. Although they were still under construction. In 1946, the British launched the Wangard, an unremarkable ship that differs from its fellow King Georges only in its speed increased to 30 knots and armed with eight 381-mm cannons taken from old dreadnoughts. The French, in 1950, completed the Jean Bart of the same type as Richelieu.

In the USSR, new battleship projects continued to be worked out until 53. But none of the plans was embodied in metal. As a result, the Novorossiysk, a captured Italian battlecruiser Giulio Cesare (Cavour type), born in 1914, remained the flagship of the Soviet fleet.

In 1955, in the harbor of Sevastopol, the Novorossiysk was destroyed by an underwater explosion of unknown origin. Such an explanation as "sabotage by foreign intelligence agencies" can apparently be dismissed from the threshold. For this ship no longer represented any combat (and even propaganda) value. In the very near future, like other battleships, it was expected to be scrapped.

"Novorossiysk" after the disaster.

By the end of the 50s, not only the old battleships, but also most of the new ones, had already undergone metal cutting. Only 4 "Iowa" Americans were sorry. They decided to conserve until the case. As a result, the eternal rest of these battleships turned out to be very restless. "Iowas" fought off the coast of Korea, then they were "awakened" during the Vietnam War. They then supported the landing of American troops in Lebanon. In 84, the battleships even decided to put them back into service "on a permanent basis", re-arming them with 32 Tomahawks. It was assumed that with the help of cruise missiles and guns they would be able to protect aircraft carriers and hit ground targets.

"Iowas" would still have served ... If the USSR had not collapsed.

In their latest "rebirth" "Iowa" combined artillery weapons with missiles.

It is worth mentioning another quality of the battleship, which in 1984 seemed to the Americans an important advantage. A battleship looks more impressive than an aircraft carrier and, unlike it, can get close enough to a hostile coast that the natives can see the US military presence with the naked eye.

Space Force Battleship.

Is that why battleships do not let go of the human imagination and still remain the flagships of space squadrons in science fiction novels and electronic games?

At the beginning of the 20th century, the basis of any fleet was battleships - large ships with strong artillery and powerful armor protection. Let us recall three Russian ships of this class - participants in the Russo-Japanese and World War I.

Squadron battleship "Sevastopol"

The battleship Sevastopol was commissioned in 1900. The ship carried four 305 mm main battery guns. Eight 152 mm guns were located in pairs in four towers, and four more six-inch guns on the battery.

By the time the Russo-Japanese War began, Sevastopol, along with the Poltava and Petropavlovsk of the same type, was far from a new ship, but it was very problematic to destroy it in an artillery battle.

"Sevastopol" took part in the battle on January 27, 1904, supporting the actions of the ground forces at Port Arthur and the naval battle in the Yellow Sea. Several times the battleship was damaged by Japanese mines, but, unlike the Petropavlovsk, it happily escaped death. In October 1904, Japanese troops began a methodical shooting of the ships of the 1st Pacific Squadron in the inner roadstead of Port Arthur. Only when most of the squadron died under fire from Japanese siege artillery, did the commander of the battleship, Captain 1st Rank Essen, on his own initiative, manage to obtain permission to bring the battleship to the outer raid of the fortress in White Wolf Bay, where the crew began preparing an independent breakthrough of the blockade.

However, the lack of people in the team, the lack of part of the artillery transferred to the shore forced the breakthrough to be postponed. Meanwhile, the Japanese command, having discovered the Sevastopol in the outer roadstead, decided to destroy the Russian battleship with destroyer attacks. For several nights, the Sevastopol, which was under the protection of coastal batteries, the gunboat Groshiy and several destroyers, was subjected to numerous mine attacks.

Having fired up to 80 torpedoes at the Russian ship, the Japanese achieved one hit and two close explosions of torpedoes. On the "Sevastopol" a number of compartments were flooded and the battleship received a significant roll. True, this success cost the Japanese dearly. Destroyer No. 53 died on a Russian mine barrier with the entire crew, and destroyer No. 42, damaged by the fire of “Sevastopol”, was finished off by a torpedo from the destroyer “Angry”.0

Another two dozen Japanese fighters and destroyers were damaged, and some, apparently, were no longer commissioned until the end of the war. The damage received by the Russian ship already ruled out the possibility of a breakthrough, and the Sevastopol crew switched to fighting Japanese batteries, which continued until the very last day of the defense of Port Arthur. In connection with the surrender of the fortress, the battleship was towed from the shore and flooded at a depth of more than 100 meters. Thus, the Sevastopol became the only Russian battleship sunk in Port Arthur, which was not raised by the Japanese and did not fall into the hands of the enemy.

Squadron battleship "Evstafiy"

The squadron battleship "Evstafiy" was a further development of the project of the battleship "Prince Potemkin Tauride". Unlike its prototype, the Evstafia has 152 mm. the guns at the extremities were replaced by 203 mm guns. However, the experience of the Russo-Japanese War made it necessary to reconsider the design of the ship. As a result, the already lengthy construction was delayed.

In 1907, all battleships of the Russian fleet were reclassified into battleships. With the advent of the Dreadnought battleship in England, all the battleships of the world of the “pre-dreadnought” type, including the Eustathius, instantly became obsolete. Despite this, both the Eustathius and the John Chrysostom of the same type represented an impressive force on the Black Sea, and the Ottoman Empire, as the main potential adversary, in principle, could not oppose anything serious to the Russian battleships.

To reinforce the Turkish fleet, the German command transferred the newest battlecruiser Goeben and the light Breislau, which Russia's allies in the Entente so obligingly let into the Black Sea.

The first collision with the "Goeben" occurred at Cape Sarych on November 5, 1914. The battle, in fact, came down to a duel between the flagship Eustathius and the German cruiser. The rest of the Russian ships, due to fog and errors in determining the distance, fired with large flights or did not open fire at all.

From the first volley, the commandors of "Evstafiya" managed to cover the "Goeben", which, according to various sources, received from three to fourteen direct hits in 14 minutes of the battle. As a result, the German cruiser withdrew from the battle and then underwent a two-week repair. The Eustathius was hit by five German shells that did not cause fatal damage.

The second clash between the Eustathius and the Goeben took place on April 27, 1915 near the Bosphorus, when a German raider attempted to destroy the core of the Black Sea Fleet in parts. However, faced with three dreadnought battleships, the Germans did not tempt fate and hurried out of the battle after a short skirmish. The fate of "Evstafiy", which successfully operated in the First World War, turned out to be sad. In 1918, he fell into the hands of the German command, and then - the former allies in the Entente. Leaving Sevastopol, they blew up the Eustathius cars. The successful restoration of the battleship, which required skilled workers and a powerful industrial base, proved impossible immediately after the end of the Civil War, and in 1922 the ship was cut into metal.

Coastal defense battleship "Admiral Ushakov"

Coastal defense battleships of the Admiral Ushakov type were built to protect the Baltic coast. Each of them carried four 254 mm guns (three Apraksin), four 120 mm guns and small-caliber artillery. Having a relatively small displacement (a little over 4,000 tons), the ships were distinguished by powerful weapons.

After the fall of Port Arthur, the formation of the 3rd Pacific squadron begins, which, along with the Apraksin and Senyavin, included the Admiral Ushakov. The value of these ships consisted, first of all, in the well-trained crews, which, as part of the artillery training detachment, were engaged in the preparation of fleet commanders. However, before the ships were sent, the crews were replaced, and the battleships were sent to the Far East without replacing the main caliber guns, which subsequently played a fatal role in the fate of the Admiral Ushakov.

In the Battle of Tsushima, “Admiral Ushakov was part of the 3rd combat detachment, closing the column of the main forces of the squadron. In a daytime battle on May 14, 1905, the ship, at about 15:00, during a firefight with Admiral Kamimura's armored cruisers, received two large holes in the bow and lagged behind the squadron. The speed of the battleship dropped to 10 knots.

At night, the Admiral Ushakov, walking without lighting, managed to avoid attacks by Japanese destroyers, but the next day was overtaken by the armored cruisers Yakumo and Iwate. At the offer of the Japanese to surrender, the Russian ship opened fire. Each of the Japanese cruisers carried four 203 mm and fourteen 152 mm guns, significantly outperforming the Russian battleship in speed. And if the first volleys of "Ushakov" covered the "Iwate", causing a fire on the Japanese cruiser, then in the future the Japanese ships kept out of reach of the armadillo's guns at a favorable battle distance for themselves. After a 40-minute battle, the Admiral Ushakov, when further resistance became pointless, was flooded by the crew. Among the 94 dead officers and sailors of the Ushakov was the commander of the battleship Vladimir Nikolaevich Miklukha (brother of the famous explorer of Oceania N. N. Miklukho-Maklay). According to one version, he was mortally wounded by a shrapnel, and according to another, he himself refused to be rescued, pointing out to the Japanese a sailor drowning nearby.

Grosskreuzer program

Despite the fact that in Germany there was a discussion on the topic that it was time to combine the two classes of ships, battleships and battlecruisers into one class - high-speed battleships, work on the projects of new battlecruisers was still underway.

At a meeting with the German Kaiser, the head of the German Imperial Naval Office, Eduard von Capelle, presented the draft designs of armored and battlecruisers, known by code names as the cruisers of the GK1, GK 2 and GK 3 projects and the battlecruisers of the L1, L2, and L3 projects. On all projects, 380 mm caliber guns were chosen as the main caliber. The medium caliber was to consist of sixteen 158 mm guns, 8 guns per side.

According to the draft design, the GK1 armored cruiser was supposed to have a displacement of 34,000 tons and a length of 235 meters. The power plant of the cruiser was supposed to be 110,000 hp. With such machines, the cruiser had to reach a speed of 29 knots. According to the GK2 project, the cruiser should have turned out to be much larger:

• Displacement - 38,000 tons;


• Length - 243 meters;


• Machine power - 120,000 hp


• Maximum speed - 29.5 knots.

The GK3 cruiser sketch had the same overall dimensions as the GK2 project cruiser, but the power of the machines on this ship was provided for somewhat less - 115,000 hp. and accordingly, the cruiser had a lower speed - 29 knots. The main attention on these cruisers was given to their armor.

These projects were carefully evaluated by the German admirals. And if von Capelle leaned towards the cruiser of the GK1 project, then the commander of the High Seas Fleet, Admiral Reinhard Scheer, was more to the liking of the GK3 project.

Actually, there was no consensus on the issue of the future cruiser in Germany, all the time there were heated debates about what maximum speed cruisers should have, what armor should be. In the period from May to July 1916, another, new cruiser project, the GK 6, was developed.

The cruiser had a displacement of 26,500 tons, a length of 235 m and the same protection as the cruiser of the GK 3 project. However, Scheer and the German Imperial Naval Office did not like the GK6 project. In their opinion, the speed of the cruiser was insufficient, and the armament and armor did not take into account the experience of Jutland.

The German admirals suggested that the engineers think about installing a fifth turret with a pair of 380 mm guns on the cruiser or, as an alternative, re-equip the cruiser with eight 420 mm guns as the main caliber.

Meanwhile, the difficult military situation in Germany led to a sharp slowdown in work on new projects and shifted their completion to 1920-21.

1. Project GK1, Main armament 8 x 38 cm, Design date April 19, 1916;


2. Project GK2, Main armament 8 x 38 cm, Design date April 19, 1916;


3. Project GK3 Main armament 8 x 38 cm, Dated April 19, 1916;


4. Project GK6, Main armament 8 x 38 cm, Design date 5 July 1916;


5. Project GK6a, Main armament 8 x 38 cm, Design date 1916;


6. Project GK7, Main armament 8 x 38 cm, Design date 1916;


7. Project GK8, Main armament 8 x 38 cm, Design date 1916;


8. Project GK8a, Main armament 8 x 38 cm, Design date 1916;


9. Project GK9, Main armament 8 x 38 cm, Design date 1916;


10. Project GK10, Main armament 8 x 38 cm, Design date 1916;


11. Project GK11, Main armament 8 x 38 cm, Design date 1916;


12. Project GK12, Main armament 8 x 38 cm, Design date 1916

Grosskampfschiff program

Assessing the experience of the battle of Jutland, it became obvious that the ships must grow in size further. However, in Germany, the growth in the size of warships was limited by the size of the stocks in Wilhelmshaven. In these shipyards it was not possible to build more ships:

• Length - 235 m;


• Width - 31 m;


• Precipitation - 9.5 m.

For the construction of larger ships, new stocks were required, as well as deepening of the fairways in the Yade and Elba rivers.

However, these restrictions did not stop the design work. It was necessary to understand, at least, to what extent the increase in shipyards is required. According to preliminary estimates, it became clear that the future high-speed battleship would have to have a displacement of at least 20,000 tons more than that of Mackensen-class battlecruisers.

Side view of the battlecruiser Mackensen. Estimated view according to the drawings.

(