Exit "Varangian" and "Korean". The beginning of the battle.

At noon on February 9, 1904, the cruiser "Varyag" and the gunboat "Koreets" weighed anchor and headed for the exit from Chemulpo Bay, blocked by the Japanese squadron. According to some sources, the ultimate goal was a breakthrough from the bay, which seems doubtful, given the low maximum speed of the Korean (no more than 14 knots), which practically ruled out the possibility of breaking away from the Japanese. The exit of the Russian ships was unexpected for the Japanese, which led to some confusion: battle groups were formed as they were removed from the anchors.

The Japanese cruiser Asama was the first to open fire, followed immediately by Russian ships. The distance to the beginning of the battle was about 38 cables (7,000 meters). 10 minutes after the start of the battle, the first hit followed: a 203-mm shell hit the Varyag's stern bridge area and caused a fire.

Around the same time, the peak of the intensity of the artillery fire of the Russian cruiser falls, then, as damage was received, it began to subside. This was followed by hits on the bow rangefinder station "Varyag", which significantly complicated aiming, in the central and aft parts of the ship.

End of the battle and return to Chemulpo.

The battle ended at 12:50 and lasted about 50 minutes, after which the heavily damaged Varyag (the cruiser received at least 9 hits, including 3 with 203 mm shells) and the undamaged Korean returned to the port of Chemulpo . On the Japanese side, mainly the Asama, Niitaka and Chiyoda took part in the battle, other ships did not have a significant impact on the battle. Since the Japanese fire was concentrated on the Varyag, the Korean received no hits.

After the battle, the commanders of the Russian ships decided to destroy them in order to avoid being captured by the Japanese. The cruiser "Varyag" was sunk, "Korean" was blown up.

Overall result of the battle.

All contemporaries of the battle, including the Japanese, agree that the battle of Russian ships with enemy forces many times superior to them is an example of great courage and valor. At the same time, the results of the battle itself are extremely ambiguous.

According to the report of the captain of the Varyag, a Japanese destroyer was destroyed, the cruiser Takachiho was seriously damaged and then sank, and the cruiser Asama was heavily damaged. It can be said for sure that with regard to the Takachiho, the information was incorrect: the cruiser successfully served for more than 10 years. There is no evidence of serious damage to the Asama cruiser either. After the battle, the commander of the Japanese squadron sent a report in which he pointed out the absence of hits from Russian ships and any casualties or damage.

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 began with two attacks by the Japanese Navy on the fleet of the Russian Empire. The document on the declaration of war was not provided to the Russian side, and a note on the termination of diplomatic relations was sent to St. Petersburg four days before the start of hostilities. The battle at Chemulpo was the second incident of the Russian-Japanese war, but it was he who was remembered by Russian society thanks to the unparalleled courage of the crew of the Varyag cruiser, who took the battle with enemy ships.

By the end of January 1904, the Japanese government had exhausted the means of diplomatic pressure on Russia. Petersburg refused to recognize Japan's "exclusive" rights to the Korean Peninsula and by all means prevented the establishment of a Japanese protectorate over Japan. At the same time, the Russian army was building up its presence in Manchuria and planned to transfer the fleet from its European ports to the Far East.

In January 1904, the Japanese Imperial Privy Council decided to send troops to Korea and attack the Russian military base in Port Arthur. The arguments in favor of this decision were as follows:

• Negotiations on the delimitation of spheres of influence in the Far East have reached an impasse.
• The Japanese fleet had a significant advantage over the Russian in the Yellow Sea. The rapid liquidation of the Russian fleet and the blockade of the base in Port Arthur could guarantee Japan a strategic advantage in the conflict.
• Shortly before the war, Japan entered into an alliance with the British Empire, the strongest state of its time. He had to guarantee the non-intervention of third parties in a new war.
• The war party in the Japanese government craved victory over the European state, which would serve as proof of the superiority of the yellow race over the white.

In accordance with the chosen strategy, the Japanese General Staff decided to attack Russian ships stationed in the Yellow Sea: on the Port Arthur roadstead and in Chemulpo Bay.

Tasks of the Varyag in Korea

The cruiser "Varyag" and the gunboat "Koreets" entered Chemulpo Bay (now Joseon, South Korea) in December 1903. their main goal was to ensure the security of the Russian diplomatic mission in neighboring Seoul. The crew of the Varyag consisted of about 500 people. Part of the crew was ready to leave the ship if there were unrest in Seoul that threatened the lives of Russian diplomats. At the same time, the ships of Japan, Great Britain, France, Italy and the USA were in Chemulpo, which had similar goals. In addition to the well-known task, the Varyag sailors had secret instructions. The landing party from the Varyag was supposed to go ashore not only in case of unrest in the Korean capital, but also in the event that the Japanese army appeared in Korea. In fact, the crews of the Varyag and the Japanese Chiyoda followed each other. On January 21, the Korean government notified Tokyo and major European capitals of their neutrality in the brewing Russo-Japanese conflict. International law obligated both sides to refrain from aggressive actions in a neutral bay. Nevertheless, Russian and Japanese sailors kept a close eye on each other, expecting a provocation. After the announcement of the break in diplomatic relations, the commander of the Varyag, Vsevolod Rudnev, began to develop a plan for the evacuation of the Russian embassy from Seoul.

The course of the battle in Chemulpo

On the morning of January 26 (February 8), 1904, a squadron of six cruisers and three destroyers formed in the Japanese port of Sasebo headed for Chemulpo with the aim of landing troops there. In the afternoon, the Japanese squadron met with the boat "Korean", which was heading from Chemulpo to Port Arthur. The Japanese fleet impeded the movement of the "Korean", and the Russian boat opened fire, and a torpedo was launched from the cruiser "Chyoda" at the "Korean". The Russian gunboat was not damaged, but was forced to change course and return to Chemulpo.

In the evening of the same day, the Japanese squadron entered Chemulpo. The commander of the Chemulpo raid, the English captain Bailey, notified the Japanese side of the inadmissibility of military operations on the territory of a neutral state. However, the Japanese fleet received permission from its command to fight both in neutral waters and on the Chemulpo roadstead.

On the night of January 26-27, the crews of the Varyag and Koreyets prepared for battle. On the morning of January 27, the entire Japanese squadron, except for the cruiser Chiyoda, left Chemulpo for an outer roadstead. The Varyag received an ultimatum: the Japanese command demanded that the Russian ships leave the bay and take the fight in neutral waters. Otherwise, the Japanese threatened to return to Chemulpo and open fire right in the port.

Captain Rudnev decided to go to break through the outer raid. In fact, he took the fight. Around noon, "Varyag" and "Korean" opened fire on enemy forces, which had a multiple advantage. In an hour and a half battle, the Varyag received 11 holes. During the battle, 23 of the 500 crew members were killed. The ship started on fire. The officers of the "Varyag" decided to leave and flood the ship. The crew of the "Korean" also evacuated and blew up their gunboat. Russian sailors were evacuated by the ships of the Western powers stationed in Chemulpo.

Up, comrades, all in their places!
The last parade is coming!
Our proud Varyag does not surrender to the enemy,
Nobody wants mercy!

IN that day, "Varyag" and "Korean" took an unequal battle with the Japanese squadron.
It became known to the whole world as a battle with the Japanese squadron near the port of Chemulpo, after which the Russian sailors sank their ship, but did not surrender to the enemy. The feat was accomplished in front of sailors from all over the world. It is in this case that you understand the validity of our saying "In the world and death is red." It was thanks to these numerous witnesses and the press of their countries that this battle became known.

The feat of the Russian cruiser Varyag and its commander V.F. Rudnev. Having withstood an unequal battle with the Japanese squadron and not lowering the flag in front of the enemy, the Russian sailors themselves sank their ship, deprived of the opportunity to continue the battle, but did not surrender to the enemy.

The cruiser "Varyag" was considered one of the best ships of the Russian fleet. In 1902, the Varyag became part of the Port Arthur squadron.

It was a four-pipe, two-masted, armored cruiser of the 1st rank with a displacement of 6500 tons. The cruiser's main battery artillery consisted of twelve 152-mm (six-inch) guns. In addition, the ship carried twelve 75 mm guns, eight 47 mm quick-firing guns, and two 37 mm guns. The cruiser had six torpedo tubes. He could reach speeds up to 23 knots.

The ship's crew consisted of 550 sailors, non-commissioned officers, conductors and 20 officers.

Captain 1st rank Vsevolod Fedorovich Rudnev, a native of the nobility of the Tula province, an experienced naval officer, took command of the cruiser on March 1, 1903. It was a difficult and stressful time. Japan was intensively preparing for a war with Russia, creating a significant superiority in forces here.

A month before the start of the war, the tsar's governor in the Far East, Admiral E.I. Alekseev sent the Varyag cruiser from Port Arthur to the neutral Korean port of Chemulpo (now Incheon).

On January 26, 1904, a Japanese squadron of six cruisers and eight destroyers approached Chemulpo Bay and stopped in the outer roadstead in a neutral port: At that time, Russian ships were in the inner roadstead - the cruiser "Varyag" and the seaworthy gunboat "Koreets", as well as cargo-passenger steamer "Sungari". There were also foreign warships.

On February 8, 1904, the Japanese squadron under the command of Rear Admiral Uriu (2 armored cruisers Asama and Chiyoda, 4 armored cruisers Naniwa, Niitaka, Takachiho, Akashi; 8 destroyers) blocked Chemulpo, having the purpose of covering the landing (about 2 thousand people) and preventing the intervention of the "Varyag". On the same day, the Korean went to Port Arthur, but upon leaving the port was attacked by destroyers (two fired torpedoes did not hit the target), after which he returned to the raid.

Early in the morning on January 27, 1904 V.F. Rudnev received an ultimatum from Japanese Rear Admiral S. Uriu demanding to leave Chemulpo before 12 noon, otherwise the Japanese threatened to open fire on Russian ships in a neutral port, which was a gross violation of international law.
V.F. Rudnev announced to the crew that Japan had begun military operations against Russia and announced the decision to break through with battle to Port Arthur, and in case of failure, blow up the ships.

Commander's cabin Varyag.

The Varyag weighed anchor and headed for the exit from the bay. In the wake was the gunboat "Korean" (commander Captain 2nd Rank G.P. Belyaev). On the ships, a combat alarm was sounded.

At the exit from the bay there is a Japanese squadron, which outnumbers the Varyag by more than five times in artillery weapons, and seven times in torpedoes. She reliably blocked the Russian ships from entering the open sea.

The plans of the Japanese and their squadron

Japanese ships: Asama in 1898

Akashi on the roads in Kobe, 1899

Naniwa in 1898

The Japanese side had a detailed battle plan, brought by Uriu's order to the commanders of the ships at 9:00 on February 9. It provided for two scenarios for the development of events - in the event of an attempt to break through the Russian ships and in the event of their refusal to break through. In the first case, given the tightness of the fairway, Uriu identified three lines of interception of Russian ships, each of which had to operate its own tactical group:

Asama was assigned to the first group
in the second - Naniwa (flagship Uriu) and Niitaka
in the third - Chiyoda, Takachiho and Akashi.

Asama, as the most powerful ship of the detachment, played a major role. In the event that the Russian ships refused to break through, Uriu planned to attack them in the port with torpedoes by the forces of the 9th detachment of destroyers (if the neutral ships had not left their anchorages), or by artillery and torpedoes by the forces of the entire squadron.

If until 13:00 on February 9, Russian ships do not leave the anchorage, then all ships take up positions next to the flagship.
- if the ships of the neutral powers remain at the anchorage, then a torpedo attack is made in the evening;
- in the event that only Russian ships and a small number of foreign ships and vessels are at the anchorage, then an artillery attack is carried out by the forces of the entire squadron.

Battle progress

Six Japanese cruisers - "Asama", "Naniva", "Takachiho", "Niitaka", "Akashi" and "Chyoda" took their starting positions in the bearing formation. Eight destroyers loomed behind the cruisers. The Japanese offered the Russian ships to surrender. V.F. Rudnev ordered that this signal be left unanswered.

The first shot was fired from the armored cruiser Asama, followed by the entire enemy squadron opening fire. "Varangian" did not answer, he was moving closer. And only when the distance was reduced to a sure shot, V.F. Rudnev ordered to open fire.

Varangian and Korean go to the last battle. Rare photo.

The fight was brutal. The Japanese concentrated all the force of fire on the Varyag. The sea boiled with explosions, splashing the deck with shell fragments and cascading water. Every now and then there were fires, holes opened. Under heavy enemy fire, sailors and officers fired at the enemy, brought down the plaster, patched up holes, and put out fires. V.F. Rudnev, wounded in the head and shell-shocked, continued to direct the battle. Many sailors fought heroically in this battle, among whom were our countrymen A.I. Kuznetsov, P.E. Polikov, T.P. Chibisov and others, as well as the ship's priest M.I. Rudnev.

Well-aimed fire from the Varyag brought results: the Japanese cruisers Asama, Chiyoda, and Takachiho were seriously damaged. When the Japanese destroyers rushed towards the Varyag, the Russian cruiser concentrated its fire on them and sank one destroyer.

Hit 6-inch guns - XII and IX; 75 mm - No. 21; 47-mm - No. 27 and 28. The combat mainsail was almost demolished, the rangefinder station No. 2 was destroyed, guns No. 31 and No. 32 were knocked out, and a fire was made in the lockers and in the armored deck, which was soon extinguished. During the passage of the traverse of the island of Iodolmi, one of the shells broke the pipe in which all the steering gears pass, and at the same time, fragments of another shell that flew into the conning tower, the cruiser commander was shell-shocked in the head, his bugler and drummer standing on both sides were killed on the spot, wounded in the back near the steering foreman (who did not declare his wound and remained at his post throughout the battle); at the same time, the commander's orderly was wounded in the arm. Management was immediately transferred to the tiller compartment on the manual steering wheel. With the thunder of shots, orders to the tiller compartment were hard to hear, and it was necessary to control mainly machines, despite this, the cruiser still obeyed poorly.

At 1215 hours, wanting to get out of the sphere of fire for a while, in order to fix the steering gear if possible and put out the fires, they began to turn around with cars, and, since the cruiser did not obey the steering wheel well and, due to the proximity of the island of Iodolmi, reversed both cars (the cruiser set to this position at the time when the steering gear was interrupted with the left steering wheel). At this time, the Japanese fire intensified and the hit increased, since the cruiser, turning around, turned its port side towards the enemy and did not have high speed.

At the same time, one of the serious underwater holes was received on the left side, and the third stoker began to quickly fill with water, the level of which approached the fireboxes; brought the patch and began to pump out water; then the water level subsided somewhat, but nevertheless the cruiser continued to heel rapidly. A shell that passed through the officer’s cabins, destroyed them and pierced the deck, ignited flour in the provision department (the fire was extinguished by midshipman Chernilovsky-Sokol and senior boatswain Kharkovsky), and another shell smashed the bed nets on the waist above the infirmary, and the fragments fell into the infirmary, and the grid caught fire, but was soon extinguished. Serious damage forced them to leave the sphere of fire for a longer time, which is why they went at full speed, continuing to shoot back with the port side and stern guns. One of the shots of the 6-inch gun No. XII destroyed the aft bridge of the Asama cruiser and set a fire, and the Asama stopped firing for a while, but soon opened again.

Its stern turret was apparently damaged, since it was no longer active until the end of the battle. Only when the cruiser passed to the anchorage and when the fire of the Japanese could be dangerous for foreign ships, did they stop it, and one of the cruisers chasing us returned to the squadron that remained in the fairway behind the island of Iodolmi. The distance increased so much that it was useless for us to continue the fire, and therefore the fire was stopped at 12 hours 45 minutes day.

Battle results

During the battle, which lasted for one hour, "Varyag" fired 1105 shells at the enemy, "Korean" - 52 shells. After the battle, the losses were counted. On the Varyag, out of a crew of 570 people, 122 were killed and wounded (1 officer and 30 sailors were killed, 6 officers and 85 sailors were wounded). In addition, more than 100 people were slightly injured.

The wounded but not defeated "Varyag" (higher in the photo "Varangian" after the battle) returned to the port to make the necessary repairs and again go for a breakthrough.

According to the report of the Varyag commander, one Japanese destroyer was sunk by cruiser fire and the Asama cruiser was damaged, and the Takachiho cruiser sank after the battle; the enemy allegedly lost at least 30 men killed.

In this battle, it is customary to forget about the "Korean". I read some interesting information in one of the documents. Before the battle, the commander of the ship, captain of the 2nd rank G.P. Belyaev ordered the ship's masts to be shortened. It was a military trick. He knew that the Japanese knew the detailed characteristics of our ships and understood that rangefinders would measure the distance to the Korean by the height of the masts. Thus, all the shells of the Japanese ships flew safely over the Russian ship.

Korean with masts before and after the battle.

Meanwhile, during the battle, the "Korean" fired 52 shells at the enemy, and the only damage was the ram compartment pierced by a fragment of a Japanese shell. There were no losses at all.

"Varangian" also heeled aboard, the machines were out of order, most of the guns were broken. V.F. Rudnev made a decision: to remove the teams from the ships, to flood the cruiser, and to blow up the gunboat so that they would not get to the enemy. The council of officers supported their commander.

After the team was brought to neutral ships, the Varyag was flooded by opening the kingstones, and the Korean was blown up (the explosion of the Korean is above in the photo). The Russian steamer Sungari was also sunk.

"Varangian" after flooding, at low tide.

Russian heroes were placed on foreign ships. The English "Talbot" took on board 242 people, the Italian ship took 179 Russian sailors, the rest was placed on board the French "Pascal".

The commander of the American cruiser Vicksburg behaved absolutely disgustingly in this situation, categorically refusing to place Russian sailors on his ship without official permission from Washington.

And without taking a single person on board, the "American" limited himself to sending a doctor to the cruiser.

French newspapers wrote about this: Obviously, the American navy is still too young to have those lofty traditions with which all the navies of other nations are inspired."

After the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese government created a museum in memory of the Varyag heroes in Seoul and awarded Rudnev with the Order of the Rising Sun.

The sailors of the "Varyag" and "Koreets" returned to their homeland in several echelons, where they were enthusiastically received by the Russian people.

General Baron Kaulbars greets the sailors "Varyag" and "Korean" upon their arrival in Odessa.

The sailors were warmly welcomed by the residents of Tula, who filled the station square late at night. Large celebrations in honor of the heroes-sailors were held in St. Petersburg.

The crews of the "Varyag" and "Koreets" were awarded with high awards: the sailors were awarded St. George's crosses, and the officers were awarded the Order of St. George of the 4th degree. Captain 1st rank V.F. Rudnev was awarded the Order of St. George 4th degree, the rank of adjutant wing and was appointed commander of the 14th naval crew and the squadron battleship "Andrei the First-Called" under construction in St. Petersburg. The medal “For the Battle of the Varyag and the Korean” was established, which was awarded to all participants in the battle.

In November 1905, for refusing to take disciplinary measures against the revolutionary-minded sailors of his crew, V.F. Rudnev was dismissed with a promotion to rear admiral.

He left for the Tula province, where he settled in a small estate near the village of Myshenki, three versts from the Tarusskaya station.

July 7, 1913 V.F. Rudnev died and was buried in the village of Savino (now the Zaoksky district of the Tula region).

The further fate of the cruiser "Varyag"

In 1905, the cruiser was raised by the Japanese, repaired and commissioned on August 22 as a 2nd class cruiser under the name "Soya" (jap. 宗谷).

During the First World War, the Russian Empire and Japan became allies. In 1916, the Soya cruiser (together with the battleships Sagami and Tango) was bought by Russia.

On April 4, the Japanese flag was lowered and on April 5, 1916, the cruiser was transferred to Vladivostok, after which, under the former name "Varyag", it was included in the flotilla of the Arctic Ocean (made the transition from Vladivostok to Romanov-on-Murman) as part of the Detachment of Special Purpose Ships under the command of Rear Admiral Bestuzhev-Ryumin.

In February 1917, he went to the UK for repairs, where he was confiscated by the British, since the Soviet government refused to pay the debts of the Russian Empire.

In 1920, it was resold to German firms for scrapping. In 1925, while being towed, the ship got into a storm and sank offshore in the Irish Sea. Part of the metal structures was then removed by local residents. Was subsequently blown up.

In 2003, the first Russian expedition to dive into the area of ​​the wreck took place, some small details were recovered. The grandson of captain Rudnev, who lives in France, took part in the dive ...

After the feat of the crew of the cruiser "Varyag", the Austrian writer and poet Rudolf Greinz wrote a poem "Der "Warjag"" dedicated to this event. The full story of the song and the original test can be read

"Song about the feat of the Varyag" (to the translation of Greinz's poems) became the anthem of Russian sailors

On October 29, 1955, the battleship Novorossiysk exploded and capsized in Sevastopol Bay, killing hundreds of sailors. Recalls a veteran of the Armed Forces of the USSR, retired officer M. Pashkin: “ Below, in the armored womb of the battleship, the sailors immured and doomed to death sang, they sang the Varyag. On the bottom it was not audible, but, approaching the speaker, one could make out the barely audible sounds of the song. It was a stunning experience, I have never experienced such a state. No one noticed the tears, everyone looked down at the bottom, as if trying to see the sailors singing below. Everyone stood without hats, there were no words».

April 7, 1989 the submarine K-278 "Komsomolets" sank due to a fire on board after a 6-hour crew struggle for the ship's buoyancy. Sailors in the icy water of the Norwegian Sea said goodbye to their commander and ship by singing the song "Varangian"...

Infa and photo (C) different places on the Internet ... I supplemented my post last year with new photos and corrected it.

Japanese Navy Victory

The situation before the battle

"Varangian" and "Korean" before the battle

The Japanese admiral offered to surrender, the Russian ships ignored the signal.

• 11 hours 45 minutes.

After the cruiser had fully turned around, a large caliber shell pierced the port side underwater; water poured into the hole and the 3rd stoker compartment began to quickly fill with water, the level of which approached the furnaces. The coal pits were filled with water. The senior officer with the senior boatswain brought a plaster, the water was pumped out all the time, the level began to drop, but the cruiser continued to roll to the port side.

A shell that passed through the officer's cabins, which were destroyed, pierced the deck and lit flour in the provision department. After that, the bed nets on the waist under the infirmary were pierced, and the fragments fell into the infirmary; the beds in the nets caught fire, the fire was quickly extinguished. Serious damage forced her to leave the sphere of fire for a longer time, which is why the cruiser went at full speed to the raid, continuing to shoot back with her port side and stern guns.

"Varangian" under Japanese fire in Chemulpo Bay

The Japanese squadron followed the Russian ships, leaving Yodolmi to the north and stopped on the parallel of this last island. . Distance to cruiser Asama during the persecution there were about 30 cables.

According to the cruiser's logbook Varangian :

“In the continuation of the battle, one of the shots of 6” of gun No. XII destroyed the aft bridge of the Asama cruiser and set it on fire, and Asama temporarily ceased fire. Its stern turret was apparently damaged, as it was no longer active until the end of the battle.

Damage to the stern bridge was also noted in the logbook of the gunboat.

• 12 hours 40 minutes.

When the cruiser approached the anchorage, the Japanese fire became dangerous for foreign ships stationed in the roadstead, they stopped it and pursued Varangian two cruisers returned to the squadron left behind the island of Yodolmi. fire with Korean was terminated simultaneously with the Japanese squadron.

• 12 hours 45 minutes.

Shells stopped reaching Japanese cruisers, Varangian ceased fire.

• Around 13 o'clock.

Korean anchored in 4 cables from the island of So-Wolmi (Observatory), remaining in full combat readiness.

• 13 hours 15 minutes.

Approaching his former anchorage, Varangian gave up the port anchor abeam the cruiser Talbot at a distance of about 1½ -2 cables. The second patch was brought in, work began to correct the damage, the rest of the team was separated by guns in anticipation of a possible enemy attack on the roadstead.

During an hour-long battle, shells were fired: 6-inch - 425, 75-mm - 470, 47-mm - 210. In total - 1105.

After anchoring, foreign ships, despite their readiness to leave, immediately sent boats with orderlies and doctors.

destruction

When examining the cruiser, in addition to the listed damage, the following were also found:

1. All 47 mm guns are unsuitable for firing.
2. Another 5 6-inch guns received various serious damage.
3. Seven 75mm guns were damaged in the knurlers and compressors.
4. The upper elbow of the 3rd chimney was destroyed.
5. All fans and boats are turned into a sieve.
6. The upper deck is pierced in many places.
7. Four more underwater holes were found, as well as many other damages.

Flooding

The explosion of the "Korean"

• 13 hours 35 minutes.

The captain of the cruiser on a French boat went to the English cruiser "Talbot", where he announced that he intended to destroy the Varyag for its complete unsuitability. He received consent to transfer the team to the English cruiser.

So, on January 29, 1903, the Varyag arrived in Chemulpo (Incheon). Less than a month is left before the fight, which took place on January 27 next year - what happened in these 29 days? Arriving at the place of duty, V.F. Rudnev quickly discovered and reported that the Japanese were preparing to occupy Korea. The materials of the historical commission noted:

"Cap. 1 p. Rudnev reported to Port Arthur about the arrangement by the Japanese of food warehouses in Chemulpo, at the Jong tong-no station and in Seoul. According to the reports of Capt. 1 p. Rudnev, the total amount of all Japanese provisions already reached 1,000,000 pounds, and 100 boxes of cartridges were delivered. The movement of people was uninterrupted, in Korea there were already up to 15 thousand Japanese, who, under the guise of Japanese and in a short time before the war, settled throughout the country; the number of Japanese officers in Seoul reached 100, and although the Japanese garrisons in Korea officially remained the same, the actual number of garrisons was much higher. At the same time, scows, tugboats and steam boats were openly delivered to Chemulpo by the Japanese, which, as the commander of the cr. "Varyag" clearly indicated extensive preparations for landing operations ... All these preparations pointed too clearly to the inevitable occupation of Korea by the Japanese.

The same was reported by Russia's military agent in Japan, Colonel Samoilov, who on January 9, 1904 reported on the charter of numerous steamers, the mobilization of divisions, etc. Thus, the preparation for the occupation of Korea was no secret either to the Viceroy or to higher authorities, but they continued to remain silent - as we said in the previous article, Russian diplomats decided not to consider the landing of Japanese troops in Korea as a declaration of war on Russia, about which Nikolai II and notified the Viceroy. It was decided to consider only the landing of Japanese troops north of the 38th parallel dangerous, and everything to the south (including Chemulpo) was not read as such and did not require additional instructions for stationary personnel. We wrote about this in more detail in the previous article, and now we only note once again that the refusal to armed opposition to the Japanese landing in Korea was accepted by much higher authorities than the commander of the Varyag, and the instructions he received completely forbade interfering with the Japanese.

But let's get back to Varyag. Without a doubt, the best way to avoid the loss of the cruiser and the gunboat "Koreets" would be to recall them from Chemulpo, together with the Russian envoy to Korea A.I. Pavlov or without him, but this, unfortunately, was not done. Why so - alas, it is very difficult to answer this question, and one can only speculate. Without a doubt, if it had already been decided that the Japanese landing in Korea would not lead to a war with Russia, then there were no grounds for recalling the Russian stationers from Chemulpo - the Japanese were going to land, and let them. But the situation changed decisively when the Japanese broke off diplomatic relations: despite the fact that in St. Petersburg they believed that this was not yet a war, the risks to which the cruiser and gunboat were exposed already clearly outweighed the benefits of our military presence in Korea.

Strictly speaking, events unfolded as follows: at 4 pm on January 24, 1904, a note on the break in relations was officially received in St. Petersburg. What was important - the classic phrase in this case: "Diplomatic relations with the Russian government at the present time no longer have any value and the government of the Japanese Empire decided to break these diplomatic relations" was supplemented by a very frank threat: "The government of the empire, in order to protect its sovereignty and interests, leaves reserves the right to act at its own discretion, considering this the best way to achieve the stated goals. This was already a real threat of war: but, alas, it was not taken into account.

The fact is that, for the reasons voiced earlier, Russia absolutely did not want a war in 1904 and, apparently, did not want to believe in its beginning. Therefore, in St. Petersburg they preferred to listen to the envoy of Japan, Kurino, who never tired of repeating that the break in diplomatic relations is not yet a war, and everything can still be arranged for the better. As a result, our Ministry of Foreign Affairs (and Nicholas II), in fact, allowed themselves to ignore reality, hoping for the mirages that the Japanese envoy painted for them and in which they really wanted to believe. Moreover, there was a fear that “our heroes in the Far East would not suddenly be carried away by some kind of military incident” (the words of Foreign Minister Lamsdorf). As a result, a gross mistake was made, which, perhaps, ended up ruining the "Varyag": the Viceroy was notified of the severance of relations with Japan by St. Petersburg the next day, January 25, but the second part of the Japanese note (about the "right to act at ) was omitted from the message, and E.I. Alekseev did not know anything about this.

Let's be frank - it is far from a fact that, having received the text of the Japanese note in full, E.I. Alekseev would have taken measures to recall the "Varyag" and "Korean", and in addition, in order for these measures to be successful, it was necessary to act with lightning speed: at the same time, it is known that the speed of action is one of the virtues of the Viceroy E.I. Alekseeva was not included. But still there was some chance, and it turned out to be missed.

It is also interesting how E.I. Alekseev disposed of the information he received: he informed the consuls in Hong Kong and Singapore about the break in diplomatic relations with Japan, notified the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers and the Manchurian gunboat, but did not report anything about this to either the Port Arthur squadron or the envoy in Korea A.I. . Pavlov, nor, of course, the commander of the Varyag. One can only assume that E.I. Alekseev received the task "in no case to provoke the Japanese" and, guided by the principle "whatever happens," he preferred not to tell the Arthurian sailors anything. The author of this article, unfortunately, could not figure it out when the head of the squadron, O.V., found out about the break in diplomatic relations. Stark and Chief of the Naval Staff of the Viceroy V.K. Witgeft. It is possible that they also received this information belatedly, so perhaps N.O. Essen (expressed by him in his memoirs) that the inaction of the latter led to the untimely withdrawal of Russian stationers in Chemulpo and Shanghai (there was a gunboat Majur) is not entirely justified. But in any case, the news was no longer about the break in diplomatic relations, but about the beginning of the war, was sent to Chifu for the Varyag only on January 27, after a successful attack by Japanese destroyers that undermined the Retvisan, Tsesarevich and Pallada and on the day when the "Varyag" entered his first and last battle. Of course, this was a belated warning.

And what was happening on the cruiser at that time? Already on January 24 (on the day when St. Petersburg officially received a notice of the break in diplomatic relations), the commanders of foreign hospitals "secretly" informed Vsevolod Fedorovich Rudnev about this unfortunate event. The commander of the Varyag immediately requested instructions from Admiral Vitgeft: “rumors have reached the rupture of diplomatic relations; due to the frequent delay in dispatches by the Japanese, please let me know if we were ordered to take further actions, ”and a request to the envoy A.I. Pavlov in Seoul: "I heard about the break in diplomatic relations, please provide information." However, no response was received from Port Arthur, and A.S. Pavlov replied:

Apparently, upon receipt of V.F. Rudnev went by the very first train to Seoul (he left on the morning of January 25, 1904) and there, in the Korean capital, the last chance was missed to take the Russian stationers out of Chemulpo before the start of the war.

During the conversation, it quickly became clear that A.I. Pavlov, like V.F. Rudnev, has not received any answers to his requests or any new orders for a week now. All this strengthened the opinion that the Japanese were intercepting and detaining the dispatches of the Varyag commander and the Russian envoy to Korea: but how was this situation to be resolved? V.F. Rudnev offered to take the envoy and the consul and immediately leave Chemulpo, but A.I. Pavlov did not support such a decision, citing the lack of relevant instructions from his leadership. The envoy proposed to send the gunboat "Koreets" to Port Arthur with a report - according to A.I. Pavlov, unlike the telegrams, the Japanese could not intercept it, which means that in Port Arthur they would have been able to put two and two together and send orders, say, by a destroyer.

As a result, the commander of the Varyag, returning to the cruiser, on the same day on January 25, ordered the dispatch of the Korean to Port Arthur - according to his order, the gunboat was to leave Chemulpo on the morning of January 26. On the night of January 25-26, the Japanese stationer "Chyoda" left the raid (strictly speaking, it would be more correct to write "Chiyoda", but for the convenience of the reader, we will adhere to historically established and generally accepted names in Russian-language literature). Unfortunately, for unknown reasons, the "Korean" did not leave in the morning, as V.F. demanded. Rudnev, but was delayed until 15.40 on January 26 and, while trying to get out, was intercepted by a Japanese squadron en route to Port Arthur.

Gunboat "Korean"

We will not describe in detail the preparation and nuances of the landing operation, which was prepared by the Japanese. We only note that it was supposed to be made in Chemulpo, but only if there were no Russian warships there, otherwise it was necessary to land not far from Chemulpo, in Asanman Bay. It was there that the general collection of Japanese ships participating in the operation was appointed, it was there that the Chiyoda left the Chemulpo raid. But on January 26, 1904, when all the "actors" were assembled, the commander of the operation, Rear Admiral Sotokichi Uriu, realizing that the occupation of Seoul must be carried out as soon as possible, and having received information that the Russian stationers behave as usual and do not take no threatening actions, decided to land in Chemulpo, which, of course, as a landing site was much more convenient than Asanman Bay. Nevertheless, the Japanese, of course, had to reckon with the possibility of Russian ships interfering - they should have been neutralized if possible.

Sotokichi Uriu gathered the commanders of the warships and the captains of the transport ships carrying the landing force, announced to them the plan of the operation and brought to their attention his order No. 28. This order is very important for understanding what happened next, so we will quote it in full. Although some points of the order, insignificant for our analysis, could be omitted, but in order to avoid any speculation on this topic, we will quote it without cuts:

“Secret.
February 8, 37 Meiji ( January 26, 1904, old style - approx. ed.)
Board of the flagship "Naniva" Asanman Bay.

2. The Chemulpo Bay was determined as the landing point for the expeditionary detachment, upon arrival at which the landing of troops should begin immediately;

3. If Russian ships meet outside the anchorage in Chemulpo Bay, abeam Phalmido ( Yodolmi - approx. auth) or to S from it, then they must be attacked and destroyed;

4. If the Russian ships do not take hostile actions against us at the anchorage in Chemulpo Bay, then we will not attack them;

5. Simultaneously with the preparations for leaving the temporary anchorage in Asanman Bay, the forces of the Detachment are divided as follows:
- 1st tactical group: (1) Naniwa, (2) Takachiho, (3) Chiyoda with the 9th detachment of destroyers attached to it;
- 2nd tactical group: (4) "Asama", (5) "Akashi", (6) "Niytaka" with the 14th detachment of destroyers attached to it;

6. Actions for entering the anchorage in Chemulpo Bay:

a) Chiyoda, Takachiho, Asama, the 9th detachment of destroyers, transport ships Dairen-maru, Otaru-maru, Heidze-maru enter the anchorage in Chemulpo Bay;

b) The 9th detachment of destroyers, having passed the island of Phalmido, goes forward and calmly, without arousing suspicion from the enemy, enters the anchorage. Two destroyers stand at a point inaccessible to enemy fire, and the other two, with a peaceful look, take such a position next to the Varyag and Koreyets so that in an instant it is possible to decide their fate - live or die;

c) "Chyoda" independently chooses a suitable place for itself and anchors in it;

d) A detachment of transport ships, following in the wake of the Asama, after the failure of the Chiyoda and Takachiho, enter the anchorage as soon as possible and immediately begin to unload the troops. It is desirable that they be able to enter the port during the full water of the evening tide.

e) "Naniwa", "Akashi", "Niitaka" follow in the wake of the detachment of transport ships, and then anchor to S from the island of Herido in a line to NE. The 14th detachment of destroyers, having finished receiving coal and water from the Kasuga-maru, is divided into two groups of two destroyers each. One group takes a position to the S from the islet of Phalmido, and the other is located next to the "Naniva". If at night the enemy starts moving from the anchorage to the open sea, then both groups must attack and destroy him;

f) Before sunset, the Asama leaves the position near the Incheon anchorage and proceeds to the Naniwa anchorage and anchors there;

7. In the event that the enemy takes hostile actions against us, opens artillery fire or launches a torpedo attack, then we must immediately attack and destroy him, acting in such a way as not to cause damage to the ships and ships of other powers at anchorage;

8. Ships located near the island of Herido, by the dawn of the next day, move to a temporary anchorage in Asanman Bay;

9. Ships and destroyers anchored in Chemulpo Bay, after making sure that the landing is fully completed, move to a temporary anchorage in Asanman Bay;

10. "Kasuga-maru" and "Kinsyu-maru", having finished bunkering the destroyers of the 14th detachment with coal and water, anchor at the entrance to Masanpo Bay and do not open anchor lights at night, observing blackout;

11. Destroyers carrying combat guards in Chemulpo Bay, having discovered that enemy ships have begun to move from the anchorage to the open sea, immediately begin their pursuit and, when they are to S from the island of Phalmido, they must attack and destroy them;

12. During the stay, be ready for immediate shooting from the anchor, for which prepare everything necessary for riveting the anchor chains, keep the boilers under steam and set up a reinforced signal and observation watch.

Thus, the plan of the Japanese admiral was very simple. He needed to land troops in Chemulpo, but without shooting in the roadstead, which would have been extremely disapproving of foreign stationers. Accordingly, he was going to first enter the bay and take Russian ships at gunpoint, and only then lead transports with landing forces to the raid. If the Russians open fire, great, they will be the first to violate neutrality (as we said earlier, no one considered the landing of troops on Korean territory a violation of neutrality) and will be immediately destroyed by destroyers. If they try to get close to the transports, they will fall under the sight of not only destroyers, but also cruisers, and when they try to shoot, again, they will be immediately destroyed. If the "Varyag" and "Koreets" try to leave Chemulpo without firing, the destroyers will accompany them and sink them with torpedoes as soon as they leave the raid, but even if the Russians by some miracle manage to break away, then pass by the Japanese cruisers blocking the exit they still won't succeed.

The most "funny" thing was that the torpedo attack of Russian ships with a probability of 99.9% would not be considered by foreign stationers as a violation of neutrality. Well, two Russian ships suddenly exploded, who knows for what reason? No, of course, among the commanders of foreign ships there were no crazy people, unable to put two and two together and understand whose hands this was. But, as we said earlier, European and American ships on the Chemulpo roadstead did not defend Korean neutrality, but the interests of their countries and their citizens in Korea. Any actions of the Japanese that did not threaten these interests were indifferent to these stationers. The war between Russia and Japan was a matter for Russia and Japan, in which neither the Italians, nor the French, nor the Americans had any interest. Therefore, the destruction of the "Varyag" and "Korean", provided that no one else was harmed, would only cause a formal protest on their part, and even then - hardly, because the British "Talbot" was considered the senior on the raid, and England's interests in this war were entirely on the side of Japan. Rather, here one should have expected unofficial congratulations to the Japanese commander ...

In fact, S. Uriu was going to build a wonderful trap, but man proposes, and God disposes, and at the very entrance to the raid his ships collided with the “Korean” that set off for Port Arthur. What happened next is rather difficult to describe, because domestic and Japanese sources completely contradict each other, and even, often, themselves. Perhaps in the future we will make a detailed description of this collision in the form of a separate article, but now we will limit ourselves to the most general review - fortunately, a detailed clarification of all the nuances of maneuvering the Korean and the ships of the Japanese detachment is not necessary for our purposes.

Canonical for Russian-language sources is the description presented in the “Work of the Historical Commission on the Description of the Fleet’s Actions in the War of 1904-1905. at the Naval General Staff. According to him, the "Korean" weighed anchor at 15.40, and after a quarter of an hour, at 15.55, they saw the Japanese squadron on it, which was moving in two wake columns. One of them was formed by cruisers and transports, with the Chiyoda, Takachiho, and Asama leading the way, followed by three transports and the rest of the cruisers, and the second column consisted of destroyers. The "Korean" tried to pass them, but this turned out to be impossible, since the Japanese columns were scattered to the sides, and the gunboat was forced to follow between them. At this time, Asama turned around across the course of the Korean, thereby blocking access to the sea. It became clear that the Japanese squadron was not going to release the "Korean" into the sea, and its commander G.P. Belyaev decided to return to the raid, where Japanese provocations would hardly be possible. But at the time of the turn, the gunboat was attacked by torpedoes from destroyers, which, however, passed by, and one sank before reaching the side of the ship. G.P. Belyaev gave the order to open fire, and immediately canceled it, because the "Korean" was already entering the Chemulpo neutral raid, nevertheless, one of the gunners managed to fire two shots from a 37-mm gun. In general, everything is clear and logical, and the actions of the Japanese look, although completely illegal, but consistently and logically. But the Japanese reports cast serious doubt on this.

Armored cruiser Asama, 1902

According to Japanese data, the ships of S. Uriu at first acted according to a previously planned plan. The Japanese moved in the following formation:

The scheme is taken from the monograph by A.V. Polutov "Amphibious operation of the Japanese army and navy in February 1904 in Inchon"

When the columns approached the traverse of Fr. Phalmido (Yodolmi), then the leading Chiyoda and Takachiho separated from the main forces and, accompanied by the 9th detachment of destroyers, increased their speed and moved forward - in accordance with the plan of the landing operation, they should have been the first to enter the Chemulpo raid, in order to to take aim at the Russian stationers. And when o. Phalmido was covered by them for about three miles, unexpectedly on the Japanese ships they found the Korean coming towards them. Thus, a situation not envisaged by Order No. 28 arose.

If the “Korean” had come out a little earlier and the meeting would have taken place for Fr. Phalmido, the Japanese would simply destroy the Russian ship, as was the order. But the meeting took place between Fr. Phalmido and the raid, the order did not regulate such a situation, and the intentions of the "Korean" were unclear. The Japanese feared that the gunboat would attack the transports, so they prepared for battle on the Chiode and Takachiho - the gunners took their places at the guns, but crouching behind the bulwarks so that their warlike preparations were not visible if possible. When the advanced cruisers approached the Korean, they saw that the Russian ship was not preparing for battle, on the contrary, a guard was built on its deck to greet. Whether at that moment the Korean was between the cruisers and the destroyers, it is impossible to say for sure - on the one hand, the distance between the Japanese cruisers and destroyers did not exceed 1-1.5 cables, but on the other, the Korean broke up with the Chiyoda and Takachiho at a distance of no more than 100 m, so, in principle, he could wedge between the two.

In any case, the "Korean" was between two detachments, one of which passed him to the raid "Chemulpo", and the second, led by "Asama", went towards the Russian gunboat. There was some confusion on the Japanese transports, and then the armored cruiser left the formation, turning 180 degrees, and went on a course parallel to that held by the Korean in order to remain between the Russian gunboat and the caravan escorted by Asama. But then "Asama" again turned to the right - apparently, it was this maneuver of his that was adopted by G.P. Belyaev for trying to block his access to the sea. The funny thing is that the Asama commander did not think anything of the sort - according to his report, he turned to the right in order to avoid torpedoes, which, in his opinion, the Korean could fire at him.

Accordingly, G.P. Belyaev decided to return to the raid and turned back. We have already seen that the commanders of Chiyoda and Takachiho, having made sure that the gunboat did not have aggressive intentions, went further towards the raid in order to fulfill the task assigned to them, but the commander of the 9th detachment of Japanese destroyers had a different opinion. He believed that the "Korean" could conduct reconnaissance in the interests of the "Varyag" and that the Russians might be planning a strike. Therefore, having dispersed with the "Korean", he rebuilt from the wake column to the front, and then took the "Korean" in pincers: the destroyers "Aotaka" and "Hato" took up a position from the port side of the "Korean", and "Kari" and "Tsubame" - from the right ... more precisely, they should have taken it. The fact is that, while performing the maneuver, Tsubame did not calculate, went beyond the fairway and jumped out onto the stones, so that further the Korean was accompanied by only three destroyers, while the torpedo tubes on them were put on alert.

And when the "Korean" began its turn back to Chemulpo, it turned out that the Russian ship went towards the Japanese destroyers, who were between it and the edge of the fairway. On the destroyer "Kari" they decided that this creates a dangerous situation, and on the other hand, it makes it possible to finish off the "Korean" while none of the foreign stationers sees it, and fired a torpedo, from which the "Korean" dodged. As the saying goes, “a bad example is contagious,” so Aotaka and Hato immediately increased their speed and lay down to approach the Korean, while Hato fired one torpedo, and Aotaka refused to attack for unclear reasons. It can be assumed that the distance is to blame - at the moment when the "Korean" entered the Chemulpo raid, the distance between it and the "Aotaka" was still about 800-900 m, which was far enough for a torpedo shot of those years.

In general, everything is as usual - the Russians have one pattern of maneuvering, the Japanese have a completely different one, while information on the consumption of ammunition also differs: the Russians believe that three torpedoes were fired at the Koreyets, the Japanese that two, while the Russians claim that the "Koreets" fired two artillery shots, the Japanese note that the gunboat fired at all three destroyers that took part in the attack (which, you see, is extremely difficult to do with two shells).

Separately, I would like to draw attention to the Tsubame accident - moving along the fairway, along which the Varyag and Koreets will go into battle the next day, chasing the gunboat, which had a maximum of 10-12 knots of travel, the destroyer managed to end up on the rocks and take damage by losing one blade of the left propeller and damaging three blades of the right propeller, which is why its speed was now limited to 12 knots. True, the Japanese claim that they pursued the "Korean" as much as 26 knots, but this is extremely doubtful for the "Tsubame" - it flew onto the stones almost immediately after the turn, and hardly managed to pick up such speed (if even one of the Japanese destroyers, which, again, is somewhat doubtful). In general, it is unlikely that a small skirmish between a Russian gunboat and Japanese destroyers can be called a battle, but, without a doubt, the pitfalls of the Chemulpo fairway proved to be the most effective in it.

In any case, as soon as the "Korean" returned to the Chemulpo roadstead, the Japanese abandoned the attack, and "taking on a peaceful appearance as far as possible" took up their assigned positions: "Aotaka" anchored 500 m from the "Varyag", "Kari" - at the same distance from the "Korean", and the "Hato" and the "Tsubame" that had independently taken off the stones hid behind the English and French ships, but, in accordance with order No. 28, they were ready to attack at any moment.

And now let's look at this situation from the position of the commander of the cruiser "Varyag". Here the "Korean" leaves the water area of ​​​​the raid and goes along the fairway to the sea, and then miracles begin. First, two Japanese cruisers, Chiyoda and Takachiho, enter the raid. The returning “Korean” suddenly appears behind them - it is not clear whether they heard his shots on the Varyag, but, of course, they could not know about the attack with torpedoes.

In any case, it turned out that the “Varyag” either saw that the “Korean” was shooting, or they didn’t see it, and either they heard the shots, or they didn’t. In any of these cases, either on the Varyag they saw that the Korean was shooting, and the Japanese were not shooting, or they heard two shots (which, for example, could well have been a warning), while it was not clear who fired. In other words, nothing that could be seen or heard on the Varyag cruiser required immediate military intervention. And then the Japanese cruisers and 4 destroyers entered the raid, which took up positions not far from the Russian ships, and only then, finally, V.F. Rudnev received information about the events.

At the same time, again, it is not entirely clear when exactly this happened - R.M. Melnikov reports that the Korean, returning to the raid, approached the Varyag, from where he briefly conveyed the circumstances of his meeting with the Japanese squadron, and then the gunboat anchored. At the same time, the “Work of the Historical Commission” does not mention this - from its description it follows that the “Korean”, having entered the roadstead, anchored 2.5 cables from the “Varyag”, then G.P. Belov went to the cruiser with a report, and 15 minutes after anchoring the gunboat, the Japanese destroyers took up positions - two ships in 2 cables from the Varyag and the Korean. Obviously, in 15 minutes it was only possible to lower the boat and arrive at the Varyag, that is, the Russian ships were at gunpoint when G.P. Belov only reported to V.F. Rudnev about the circumstances of the battle.

In general, despite the difference in interpretations, both sources agree on one thing - by the time Vsevolod Fedorovich Rudnev was aware of the attack undertaken by the Japanese destroyers:

1. The "Korean" was already out of danger;

2. The 9th detachment of destroyers (and probably also cruisers) were located in the immediate vicinity of the Varyag and Koreyets.

In this situation, for the Varyag cruiser, opening fire and engaging in battle made absolutely no sense. Of course, if the "Korean" would be attacked, and the "Varyag" saw this, then the cruiser had to, despising any danger, go to the rescue of the "Korean" and engage in an arbitrarily unequal battle. But by the time the cruiser learned about the Japanese attack, everything was already over, and the Korean was no longer needed to be saved. And after a fight they don't wave their fists. As the old British proverb says, “A gentleman is not the one who does not steal, but the one who does not get caught”: yes, the Japanese fired torpedoes at the Korean, but none of the foreign stationers saw this and could not confirm this, but means that there was only "word against word" - in diplomacy it's the same as nothing. Suffice it to recall almost a century-old confrontation between the official Russian and Japanese - the Russians claimed that the first shots in the war were Japanese torpedoes, the Japanese - that two 37-mm shells fired by the "Korean". And only recently, as the Japanese reports were published, it became obvious that the Japanese still fired first, but who cares today, except for a few history buffs? But if the "Varyag" had opened fire on the ships of Japan entering the raid, he, in the eyes of the "entire civilized world", would be the first to violate Korean neutrality - whatever one may say, but at that time the Japanese had not yet started landing and did nothing reprehensible on a neutral raid.

In addition, tactically, the Russian stationers were in a completely hopeless situation - they stood in the roadstead under the guns of Japanese ships and could be sunk by destroyers at any moment. So, not only did the opening of fire on the Japanese directly violate all received by V.F. Rudnev's orders, violated Korean neutrality, spoiled relations with England, France, Italy and the United States, and still gave nothing militarily, leading only to the rapid death of two Russian ships. Of course, there could be no question of any destruction of the landing force here - it was purely technically impossible.

In diplomatic language, the following happened. The honor of the Russian flag obliged the Varyag to come to the defense of any domestic ship or vessel that was attacked and to protect its crew (fight with it) against any and arbitrarily superior enemy forces. But no notions of honor required the Varyag to engage in battle with the Japanese squadron after the incident with the Korean was successfully resolved (the Russian sailors were not injured, and they were no longer in immediate danger). The attack of the Japanese destroyers, no doubt, could become a belli incident, that is, a formal reason for declaring war, but, of course, such a decision should not have been made by the commander of the Russian cruiser, but by much higher authorities. In such situations, the duty of any member of the armed forces is not to rush into the attack with a saber at the ready, but to inform his leadership of the circumstances that have arisen and then act according to their orders. We have already said that all the orders received by V.F. Rudnev, just directly testified that Russia does not want war yet. At the same time, an "amateur" attack by the Japanese squadron would only lead to providing Japan with a wonderful reason to enter the war at a convenient time for her, to the immediate death of two Russian warships with virtually no possibility of harming the enemy, and to diplomatic complications with European countries.

The concept of honor for a military man is extremely important, but it is equally important to understand the boundaries of the obligations imposed by it. So, for example, it is known that during the Second World War, when the USSR was bleeding in the fight against fascist Germany, the armed forces of Japan carried out various kinds of provocations more than once or twice, which could well become a pretext for declaring war. But the USSR did not need a war on two fronts at all, so our armed forces were forced to endure, although, one must think, the troops present at such provocations frankly "itched their hands" to answer the samurai as they deserved. Can our troops and navy be reproached with cowardice or lack of honor on the grounds that they did not open fire in response to Japanese provocations? Did they deserve such accusations? Obviously not, and in the same way, Vsevolod Fedorovich Rudnev does not deserve reproach for the fact that on January 26, 1904, the ships under his command did not begin to engage in a hopeless battle with the Japanese squadron.

To be continued...

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