VERSAILLES PEACE TREATY 1919
Formally ended World War I 1914-18; signed on 28 VI, on the one hand, by Germany and, on the other hand, by the "Allied and Associated Powers": the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Cuba, Ecuador, Greece, Guatemala , Haiti, Hijaz, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbo-Croat-Slovenian State, Siam, Czechoslovakia and Uruguay. Some of these states were only formally belligerents who actually did not take part in the war (Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, etc.). Three states were formed only in the period between the capitulation of Germany and the signing of the V. M. D. (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Serbo-Croat-Slovenian state). Of the states listed on the title page of the W. M. D., China refused to sign the treaty because of its provisions relating to the transfer of Shandong to Japan. Hijaz and Ecuador, having signed the W. M. D., refused to ratify it. The US Senate, under the influence of isolationists, also refused to ratify it, in particular due to the unwillingness of the United States to join League of Nations(see), the charter of which was an integral part of the V. m. about the League of Nations.
The W. M. D. entered into force on January 10, 1920, after it had been ratified by Germany and the four principal allied powers (Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan). The instruments of ratification of the V. M. D., kept in Paris, after the entry of Germany into the League of Nations (1926) were transferred to the General Secretariat of the League of Nations. The history of V. m. d. went through the following stages:
Armistice negotiations. For the first time, the political conditions for a future world were formulated in a collective note of the Allies addressed to President Wilson dated January 10, 1917. This note was a response to an American note dated December 18, 1916, in which President Wilson invited the Allies to speak out about the conditions for a future world. In a note dated 10 January 1917, the Allies demanded that Germany's responsibility for the war be recognized and that their losses be compensated. They demanded the restoration of Belgium, Serbia and Montenegro, the cleansing of the occupied areas of France, Russia and Romania by Germany, the return of areas that had previously been "forcibly taken away against the will of the population", the liberation of Italians, southern Slavs, Romanians, Czechs and Slovaks "from foreign domination", the liberation of peoples subject to the "bloody tyranny of the Turks" and "the expulsion of the Ottoman Empire from Europe."
The next document in the history of peace negotiations is the declaration of President Wilson, the so-called. ".fourteen points of Wilson"(cm.). This peace program was outlined by Wilson in his message to the US Congress on January 8, 1918.
Official attempts on the part of the powers of the quadruple block (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria) to achieve the opening of peace negotiations began with a note from the Austro-Hungarian government dated 14. IX 1918 to all the belligerent powers with a proposal to start direct peace negotiations. Prior to this note, Germany had made repeated unofficial attempts to conclude a separate peace with France (negotiations between Baron Lanken through the Countess de Merode and Koppe with Briand), with Russia (negotiations between Lucius and Protopopov); Austria-Hungary also tried to achieve a separate peace with the allies (the mission of Sixtus of Bourbon). All these attempts ended in failure.
The Austrian note of 14.IX.1918, which received the approval of the other members of the quadruple bloc, was rejected by the allies.
On the day this note was sent, the allied troops broke through the Bulgarian front. Bulgaria had to capitulate and on 29. IX 1918 signed an armistice agreement in Thessaloniki. On October 5, 1918, the German Chancellor, Prince Max of Baden, approached President Wilson with a proposal to take the cause of peace into his own hands. While (between 5 X and 5 XI 1918) the German government was in correspondence with President Wilson about the conditions for starting armistice negotiations, Turkey (XX 30, 1918) and Austria-Hungary (XI 3, 1918) capitulated.
Compiègne truce. 11. XI 1918 in the forest of Compiègne in the carriage of Marshal Foch, the German peace delegation, headed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Germany Erzberger, signed the terms of the armistice proposed by the allied military command. The armistice agreement contained 34 articles, and the term of the armistice was set at 36 days with the right to extend. The main terms of the armistice were as follows: the evacuation of the territories of Belgium, France, Luxembourg and Alsace-Lorraine occupied by the Germans within 15 days, the transfer of military equipment by the German army according to a special list, the cleansing of the left bank of the Rhine, the creation of a neutral zone on the right bank of the Rhine, the transfer to the allies of 5 thousand steam locomotives, 150 thousand wagons and 5 thousand trucks, the immediate return to their homeland (without reciprocity) of all allied prisoners of war, the immediate return to Germany of all its troops from Austria-Hungary, Romania and Turkey, the cleansing of Russian territories in a time that will be pointed out by the allies, Germany's rejection of the Bucharest (7. V 1918) and Breet-Litovsk (3. III 1918) treaties, the evacuation of German military forces from East Africa, the immediate return of cash cash of the Belgian National Bank, as well as Russian and Romanian gold seized Germany, the surrender of all German submarines to the Allies, the immediate disarmament and internment of German surface warships, the evacuation by Germany of all Black Sea ports and the transfer to the Allies of all Russian ships captured by the Germans in the Black Sea.
The armistice agreement was extended on December 13, 1918, January 16, 1919, and February 16, 1919.
Preparing for a peace conference. After the signing of the armistice, Allied delegates began to gather in Paris for preliminary negotiations on a future peace treaty. US President Wilson sent his immediate assistant and friend, Colonel House. Most of the prime ministers and foreign ministers of the allied countries arrived in Paris, including British Prime Minister Lloyd George. On December 13, 1918, Wilson arrived. Until 18 January 1919 there were continuous meetings between the allied delegations. It was decided to invite German delegates only after the full text of the peace treaty had been worked out.
Conference Organs. 18. I 1919 the official opening of the Paris Peace Conference took place. During the first four months, negotiations were conducted exclusively between the allies. There were 26 commissions on individual problems of the treaty and the general scheme of the post-war world order. There were continuous meetings of various bodies created by the conference. The plenary sessions of the conference (before the signing of the V. M. D. there were only 10 of them) were reduced to a discussion of the general declarative statements of its individual participants. On the other hand, such bodies worked intensively as the "Council of Ten", composed of representatives of the five main participants in the Paris Conference (USA, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan), two from each country, the "Council of Five", composed of the foreign ministers of these same states and finally the "Council of Four" or "Big Four" represented by President Wilson, French Prime Minister Clemenceau, British Prime Minister Lloyd George and Italian Prime Minister Orlando.
The position of the German delegation. Only on May 7, 1919, after a series of conflicts, did the allies manage to agree on the text of the military pact. On the same day, the German delegation was admitted to the peace conference for the first time and received the text of the peace treaty from the hands of its chairman, Clemenceau.
The German delegation, headed by Foreign Minister Count Brokdorf-Rantzau, counted on the possibility of an open discussion about peace conditions. She was denied this. She could only make her objections to certain articles of the treaty in writing. Taking advantage of this, she flooded the conference with her memorandums, objections and memorandums. The vast majority of the German counterproposals were rejected without any discussion. Only on minor and unimportant issues did Germany achieve some concessions.
Brockdorff-Rantzau refused to sign the peace treaty, saying that "the allies are offering us suicide." After leaving Paris, he went to Weimar, where the German National Assembly met. Brockdorff-Rantzau tried to convince the National Assembly of the impossibility of signing the proposed text of the treaty. Brockdorff-Rantzau's point of view was rejected and he retired. The National Assembly adopted a resolution on the need to sign a peace treaty, excluding from it an article establishing Germany's sole responsibility for the world war (German politicians tried to create a loophole that would allow them to avoid the consequences arising from responsibility for the war in the future). This attempt failed. The allies demanded either the unconditional acceptance of the entire text of the treaty, or the refusal to sign it. The National Assembly of Germany was to capitulate, and on 28 June 1919 in the Hall of Mirrors at the Palace of Versailles, where in January 1871 Bismarck proclaimed the creation of the German Empire, the W. M. D. was signed.
Anglo-French controversy. All meetings of the peace conference were characterized by a stubborn struggle between the allied delegations, mainly between the French delegation (Clemenceau), on the one hand, and the British (Lloyd George) and American (Wilson) - on the other. While France demanded the maximum weakening of Germany in territorial, military, political and economic terms, Great Britain, with the support of the United States, opposed her. Not wanting to encourage the hegemony of France on the continent of Europe, Great Britain sought to preserve in the face of Germany a stronghold that counteracted French influence. Thus, England adhered to its traditional policy of the balance of power in Europe, which in this case also promised it the preservation of the German market.
Territorial issues. The struggle at the conference between France and Great Britain on territorial questions concerned mainly the following two issues:
1) The problem of the territorial division of Germany. France tried first of all to achieve the separation of the left bank of the Rhine from Germany in order to create an "autonomous state" in this territory under its influence. The French delegation argued that seizing the left-bank lands of the Rhine from Germany was one of the most important conditions for the security of France, since it would deprive Germany of the opportunity to carry out a sudden military aggression against her in the future. The British, with the support of Wilson, strongly resisted France (British Foreign Secretary Balfour categorically rejected the idea of an autonomous Rhineland back in 1917 in two successive speeches). The French delegation, having enlisted the support of tsarist Russia as early as February 1917, continued stubbornly to achieve the implementation of its program. Russia's consent was recorded in a secret Russian-French treaty signed during an inter-allied conference in Petrograd.
The French delegation, despite persistent harassment, failed to carry out its program. She was forced to agree to a compromise: the left bank of the Rhine and the 50-kilometer strip on the right bank of the Rhine are demilitarized, but remain part of Germany and under its sovereignty. Within 15 years, a number of points in this zone should be under the occupation of the allied forces. Great Britain, on the one hand, and the United States, on the other, conclude special treaties with France, by virtue of which both states come to the aid of France in the event of an attack by Germany. If, after 15 years, the reparation commission finds that Germany has not fulfilled its obligations, the occupation may last longer.
The compromise was clearly unfavorable for France. The US Senate, having rejected the ratification of the V. M. D., simultaneously refused to ratify the Franco-American Guarantee Treaty. Referring to this, Lloyd George did not submit a Franco-English guarantee agreement for ratification by Parliament.
Thus, France, having yielded on the question of the left bank of the Rhine, did not receive compensatory guarantees against possible German aggression.
2) The problem of the Saar basin. The French delegation, pointing to the destruction of the coal mines of northern France by the German troops, demanded that the Saar coal basin be annexed to France as compensation. The French referred to the fact that under the treaty of 1814 (after the first abdication of Napoleon) the Saar basin was left to France. The French demand met with a categorical refusal by the United States and Great Britain. “Never in any official document,” Wilson declared, “France demanded the border of 1814. The foundations of the world adopted by her speak of compensation for the injustice to which she was subjected in 1871, and not in 1815” (according to the treaty of 1815, after “one hundred days ", the Saar basin was annexed and annexed to Prussia). The discussion on the Saar question was extremely heated and often took on a dramatic character. Thus, for example, on April 7, 1919, due to the stubbornness of the French delegation, President Wilson threatened to leave the conference.
In the plans of French imperialism, the annexation of the Saarland pursued mainly the hidden goal of creating an economic base for French hegemony on the European continent. From the very beginning of the First World War, the influential French press emphasized the economic importance for France of Lorraine ore in conjunction with the coal mines of the Saar basin.
The determined resistance of Lloyd George and Wilson forced Clemenceau to compromise on the Saar question. France came into possession of the Saar coal basin (more precisely, the coal mines of this basin) for 15 years. During this period, the Saar Basin was to be governed by a commission of the League of Nations with a French chairman at its head. After 15 years (in 1935), a popular plebiscite was to decide the further nationality of the Saar basin.
reparation question. The problem of reparations occupied a very large place in the discussion between the Allies and repeatedly threatened to disrupt the Paris Conference. The French thesis on the reparations question was as follows; Germany must pay for all the losses caused by the war. For this it is necessary that Germany assume in advance a blanket obligation to pay the amount to be subsequently fixed by a special reparation commission. The Anglo-American thesis was something else: Germany should not be forced to sign a blanket obligation. Calculating the amount of damages is a difficult and controversial matter. Therefore, it is necessary to establish some kind of global (total) amount of reparations and write it into the contract. The main struggle took place between Clemenceau and Lloyd George, who was supported by Wilson. It was, of course, not a matter of the technique of calculating reparations. The position of Lloyd George was dictated by the unwillingness to weaken Germany too much and thereby strengthen France too much, as well as the fear that Germany, as a result of an excessive amount of reparations obligations, would be forced to increase her exports. The complexity of the reparations question was increased by the problem of the transfer, i.e., the transfer of German currency into foreign currency, since Germany had to pay most of the reparations not in kind, but in money. “So that she (Germany,” said Lloyd George, “could pay what we want ... it is necessary that she take an even more significant place in the market than what she occupied before the war. Is this in our interests ?" These words reflected Lloyd George's understanding of the problem of German competition, which very soon after the Paris Conference stood before England in full growth.
The long struggle over the reparations question ended in victory for the French thesis. The appointment of a French representative as chairman of the reparations commission also represented a victory for Clemenceau in this matter. The very fact of the creation of a special reparation commission headed by a French representative meant the establishment of permanent French control over the entire economic organism of Germany.
Poland. Significant disagreements between the allies were caused by the question of the borders of Poland and, in particular, its eastern borders. Not yet born as a sovereign state, not yet mastering its own territories, Poland laid "rights" to non-Polish lands. The Polish National Committee in Paris (recognized by the Allies) on October 12, 1918, on the eve of the surrender of Germany, handed over to the allied governments a memorandum demanding the occupation by Polish troops (the army of General Haller, formed in France) of the districts: Kamenetz-Podolsk, Brest-Litovsk and Kovno. "This occupation," the memorandum read, "would guarantee Poland's security in the east and could serve as a future base for Allied military operations in Russia." The demand of the Polish National Committee to send Haller's army to Poland served as the basis for discussing the Polish question at the meeting of the Allies on 2.XI.1918, before the signing of an armistice with Germany. At this meeting, French Foreign Minister Pichon outlined the French program concerning the borders of the future Poland. "I would like," he said, "to insist that the evacuated territories be understood as all the territories that constituted the Kingdom of Poland before the first partition of 1772." In response, British Foreign Secretary Balfour stated: “I heard this proposal with concern. Poland 1772, you say, should be Poland 1918. This is not what we aspired to and what we committed ourselves to. inhabited by Poles. Poland 1772 does not meet this goal: it did not consist exclusively of Poles. Non-Polish territories were included in it, while Polish territories constituted only one part of it. Thus, this formula sins both due to its insufficiency and due to my exaggeration. The exact delimitation of the borders of the new Poland is such a difficult subject that I beg you not to introduce it into a truce."
Colonel House, on behalf of President Wilson, declared that he fully subscribed to Balfour's proposal. Pishon had to retreat. The thesis on the Polish borders of 1772 was not accepted for inclusion in the terms of the truce. The struggle, however, resumed at the peace conference itself. The dispute between France, on the one hand, and Great Britain and the United States, on the other, concerned the western and eastern borders of Poland, Upper Silesia and Danzig.
France sought to create a strong Polish state, which could play the role of its ally in the east of Europe both against Germany and against the Soviet Republic. The military-political Franco-Polish alliance built on these foundations would be, in the view of French politicians, one of the main foundations of French hegemony on the continent of Europe. It is for this reason that France's Polish program aroused determined and stubborn resistance from Great Britain. France, despite Clemenceau's persistence, failed to carry out its program of "rebuilding Poland within the borders of 1772". Instead of handing over all of Upper Silesia to Poland, France had to agree to a plebiscite, which subsequently ended with the partition of Upper Silesia between Poland and Germany. Contrary to Clemenceau's insistence that Danzig be handed over to Poland, he had to back down on this issue too and agree to Lloyd George's proposal to create a "Free City" under the control of a League of Nations Commissioner. But Clemenceau still managed to achieve the transfer of the foreign policy of the "Free City" into the hands of Poland. Although, at the insistence of France, the Paris Peace Conference on 26. VI 1919 authorized Poland to occupy eastern Galicia, nevertheless, the question of the state ownership of eastern Galicia was not resolved, and the eastern borders of Poland were not fixed by either the Versailles or Saint-Germain treaties. The latter established only the renunciation of Austria from any rights to eastern Galicia. An attempt to determine the eastern borders of Poland was made after the signing of the V. M. D. by a resolution of the Supreme Council of the Allies on 8. XII 1919 (see. Curzon line). Only on March 14, 1923, under the direct pressure of France, the conference of ambassadors passed a decision on the eastern borders of Poland and, in particular, on the transfer of eastern Galicia to it.
Italian question. Italy came to the conference with two documents in which her claims were formulated. One of these documents was the secret Treaty of London dated 26. IV 1915, and the second was the exchange of notes between Rome, London and Paris in August 1917, which recorded the conditions reached at the conference in Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne. The Italian claims presented at the peace conference, however, did not correspond to the military situation in which Italy was at the end of the First World War. The defeat of the Italian army at Caporetto almost caused the surrender of Italy to the Austro-German bloc. The extreme weakness of Italy, both militarily and economically, predetermined the decisions of the V. M. D. on the Italian question.
In Art. 5 of the London Treaty of 1915 stated that "Italy will also be given the province of Dalmatia within its current administrative boundaries." At the peace conference, the Italian delegation demanded that not only Dalmatia be transferred to it, but also Fiume. Both leaders of the Italian delegation - Prime Minister Orlando and Foreign Minister Baron Sonnino - insisted that the Fiume question was a condition for Italy to sign a peace treaty. Orlando's pathos in this matter has reached extreme limits. At one of the meetings of the "Council of Four" during the debate about Fiume, Orlando burst into tears. The tears of the Italian Prime Minister, however, had no effect on the fate of this demand. By raising the issue of Fiume, Italian diplomacy made it easier for the Allies to ignore other Italian demands that followed from the text of the London Treaty. Clemenceau very cleverly played on this tactical error of Italian diplomacy. “You are demanding the fulfillment of the London Treaty,” he told the Italian delegation, “and you yourself are making claims about which the London Treaty knows nothing. I,” added Clemenceau, “I stand on the point of view of the need to fulfill the London Treaty, but in this case I give Fiume to you." When it came to the obligations of the same treaty (London) in relation to Dalmatia, Clemenceau, without embarrassment, declared: “I have obligations in relation to Italy - this is the London Treaty. But Dalmatia is inhabited not by Italians, but by Slavs, and I have the same obligations in relation to the Slavs - obligations that arose after the Treaty of London was concluded and which could not be provided for by this agreement. (Clemenceau had in mind an obligation towards Serbia).
Insisting on the implementation of Art. 5 of the London Treaty and demanding Fiume, Italian diplomacy did not receive either one or the other. The demonstrative departure of the Italian delegation from the conference in April 1919 did not help either. Saying goodbye to the departing Orlando, Clemenceau said that the Allies would very much regret the departure of the Italian delegation, but that he was afraid that the Italian delegation would regret it even more. Indeed, the departure of the Italian delegation led to the fact that, taking advantage of its absence, the Allies violated not only the London Treaty, but also the decisions of the conference in Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne concerning Italian claims to Izmir (Smyrna). 6. V 1919 Prime Minister of Greece Venizelos received from Lloyd George, Clemenceau and Wilson consent to the occupation of Izmir by Greek troops. This act was part of the plans of Lloyd George, who saw Greece as an instrument of British influence in the Middle East, which was especially evident during the signing of the Treaty of Sevres and the Greco-Turkish war. Having received a message about the transfer of Izmir to Greece, the Italian delegation was forced to hastily return to Paris and agree to the conditions that were dictated to it by the allies. However, Italy still managed to establish a border on the Brenner and thus get South Tyrol.
"Russian question". Despite the fact that the Soviet Republic was not represented at the Paris Peace Conference, the "Russian question" occupied a paramount place in its work and at times even pushed its main problem, the German one, into the background. The Paris Peace Conference opened at a time when the Entente countries, in the implementation of the Anglo-French agreement of December 23, 1917 "on the division of zones of influence in Russia," carried out an active military intervention within the Soviet state. In accordance with this agreement, France contributed to the capture of Bessarabia by Romania, launched an intervention in the Crimea and Ukraine, and Great Britain, together with France and the United States, landed their troops (in March 1918) in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. From the end of May 1918, England and France led the uprising of the Czechoslovak legions, stretching from the Volga to Siberia and the Far East. In April 1918 Japan began intervention in the Far East, and in August 1918 Great Britain, the USA and France joined Japan. The Entente states supported the counter-revolutionary "governments" of Kolchak in Siberia and the Far East, Denikin in southern Russia, Tchaikovsky in the north, and Yudenich in the northwest. In the same way they supported Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Lithuania and Rumania in their struggle against the Soviet state. Such was the state of the "Russian question" at the time of the opening of the Paris Peace Conference. The main leaders of the conference, and in particular the "Big Four", who set themselves the task of rebuilding the world and redrawing the map of Europe, were aware that without solving the "Russian question" it would not be possible to stabilize the post-war order of the world. Thus, for example, on the eve of the opening of the conference, while rejecting the French draft program of its work, the British delegation declared that, in its opinion, the problems should be dealt with in order of their urgency. "From this point of view," declared the British, "the question of Russia should be dealt with first."
Although all members of the "Big Four" believed that the "Russian question" must be resolved and, moreover, in the first place, their opinions on how to resolve this problem differed sharply. Clemenceau was the most consistent supporter of not only the continuation, but also the all-out intensification of armed intervention in the Soviet state. He ruled out any possibility of an agreement with the Soviet government and demanded the establishment of a "cordon sanitaire" around the Soviet Republic. Clemenceau's program was supported by Foreign Minister Sonnino, who replaced Italian Prime Minister Orlando (who was much more insistent than Orlando on the issue of armed intervention). Clemenceau's concept was fought by Lloyd George, who was supported by President Wilson. Already at the end of December 1918, sharp disagreements emerged between Lloyd George, on the one hand, and Clemenceau, on the other. During this period, Lloyd George was perhaps the only major statesman in Western Europe who was aware of the hopelessness of military methods of combating the "communist danger" and who put forward the idea of negotiations with the Soviet government. In December 1918, Lloyd George addressed a note to Clemenceau, proposing to invite delegates of the Soviet government to the Paris Peace Conference. Clemenceau abruptly rejected this offer. After a series of meetings, at the insistence of Lloyd George, supported by Wilson, and with the fierce resistance of Clemenceau, supported by Sonnino, in January 1919 it was decided to convene a conference on the Princes' Islands, where representatives of all the actual governments formed on the territory of the former Russian Empire would be invited. The Soviet Government accepted this invitation from the Supreme Soviet of the Allies. Forced to consent to the convening of the conference, Clemenceau, behind the backs of Lloyd George and Wilson, through the mediation of French representatives to the White Guard governments, proposed to the latter that they refuse to send their delegates to the Princes' Islands. In disrupting the conference, Clemenceau also relied in this on the conservative members of the British government, and in particular on Lord Curzon and Churchill. The conference on the Princes' Islands did not take place. At the beginning of March 1919, Wilson, in agreement with Lloyd George, sent Bullitt, an official of the State Department, to Moscow. Bullitt mission) for sounding and discussion with the Soviet government of the contours of a possible agreement. When Bullitt returned from Moscow in mid-March with a draft agreement, the situation on the "Russian question" changed considerably. In the coalition government of Lloyd George, the conservative part won, insisting on the continuation and intensification of armed intervention. Under these conditions, Lloyd George not only refused to accept the project brought by Bullitt, but in a public parliamentary statement denied any involvement in his trip. Shortly thereafter, the so-called. the first campaign of the Entente against the Soviet Republic.
Throughout its work, the Paris Peace Conference has repeatedly dealt with the "Russian question." This took place during the discussion of the question of the eastern borders of Poland, of sending the army of Gen. Galler, about the cleansing of the Baltic territory by German troops, etc. When discussing the "Russian question", the Big Four invited and heard representatives of the so-called. "political meeting" (represented by the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia S. D. Sazonov, the former ambassador of the Provisional Government in Paris V. A. Maklakov and the former chairman of the "Northern Government" N. V. Tchaikovsky).
However, the Paris Conference turned out to be powerless not only to resolve the "Russian question", but even to outline possible ways of this solution. Yet in this matter, Clemenceau undoubtedly defeated Lloyd George and Wilson and turned the conference into the central headquarters of armed intervention against the Soviet Republic.
The League of nations. An exceptionally stubborn struggle at the Paris Conference broke out around the idea put forward by President Wilson of creating the League of Nations. Wilson sought to create an effective League of Nations, which could be something like a supranational organization. Clemenceau and Lloyd George, however, wanted first to consolidate the results of the war in the form of a peace treaty and did not attach much importance to the League of Nations. In addition, they feared that the League projected by Wilson would be dominated by US influence. Wilson's struggle with Lloyd George and Clemenceau on this question continued until April 25, 1919, when the charter of the League of Nations was adopted by the plenum of the conference and included as Part I in the V. M. D.
Versailles system. The WMD was an attempt to fix the balance of power that had been established in Europe as a result of the First World War of 1914-18. Together with those who followed him Saint Germain, Trianon, Neuilly And treaties of Sevres(see) he created a whole political and economic system known as "Versailles". This system created the conditions for the hegemony of France on the European continent, the predominance of Great Britain in the Middle East and the seas, while at the same time providing Japan with huge advantages in the Far East. As for the United States, the latter did not acquire (which, however, they did not claim) any new territories. Nevertheless, the United States occupied a prominent place in the balance of world power established at the time of the Paris Peace Conference. Having predetermined by its participation in the war (especially after the withdrawal of Soviet Russia from the war) the victory of the Allies and the defeat of Germany, the United States at the end of the war turned out to be the main creditor of the Entente countries, to which they provided $ 11 billion. Having accumulated huge military and economic resources, the United States during The signings of the V. M. D. were, undoubtedly, the strongest of all the warring powers. However, due to a number of conditions, the United States recorded and realized their victory not in V. p.m., but a little later - on Washington Conference 1921-22 (cm.). On the contrary, at the Paris Conference itself, the American delegation showed a certain passivity, yielding, for example, to the insistence of Japan, which seized the Shandong Peninsula in China, which clearly ran counter to US interests.
The political hegemony of France on the continent of Europe was determined primarily by the facts of the military defeat and disarmament of its most dangerous rival - Germany, the occupation of the Rhineland, the creation of an independent Poland, the creation of new states (Czechoslovakia) at the expense of the former Austria-Hungary and the increase in the territories of such states as Yugoslavia and Romania. Thanks to this, France's hegemony in continental Europe relied not only on its armed forces (with the simultaneous disarmament of Germany), but also on constant cooperation with Poland and the states Little Entente(see), interested in preserving both V. m. d., and the agreements accompanying it.
The political value of the British acquisitions, in terms of W. p.m., lay mainly outside Europe. In Europe itself, England achieved for a certain period the elimination of German competition on the world market. In Asia, Great Britain received a significant part of the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, establishing its dominance over Iraq with its oil wealth, over Palestine and Transjordan, establishing itself in Egypt, the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea and providing a direct connection with India. While France, thanks to her land army, became the most powerful state on the European continent as a result of the Great Patriotic War, England acquired a predominant role in the Mediterranean Sea and in communications to India and the British dominions. In addition, England, together with France, divided the German colonies in Africa (Togo and Cameroon), having received them as mandated territories from the League of Nations. Such was the main distribution between England and France of the benefits that V. p.m. gave them.
Part I (art. 1-26) contains the statute of the League of Nations.
Part II (pp. 27-30) is devoted to describing and delineating Germany's borders with Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Switzerland, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Denmark.
Part III deals with the political situation in Europe. This part is divided into the following sections:
Section 1 (art. 31-39) about Belgium. Within the meaning of these articles, Germany "undertakes henceforth to recognize and observe all agreements of any kind whatsoever which the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, or some of them, may conclude with the Governments of Belgium or the Netherlands for the purpose of replacing the Treaties of 1839" establishing Belgian neutrality. Germany recognizes the transfer to Belgium of the districts of Eupen and Malmedy (Art. 34) and the territory of Morena (Art. 32).
Section 2 (art. 40-41) about Luxembourg. According to these articles, Luxembourg withdraws from the German Customs Union on January 1, 1919, and thus Germany recognizes its full independence.
Section 3 (art. 42-44) on the demilitarization of the Rhineland. The main provision of this department is the prohibition of Germany to maintain or build either on the left or on the right bank of the Rhine, west of the line drawn in 50 km to the east of this river, military installations, as well as to contain any military units in the specified zone.
Section 4 (Articles 45-50 with annexes) on the Saar basin. The main article of this department (45) provides that "in compensation for the destruction of the coal mines in the north of France ... Germany cedes to France full and unrestricted ownership ... of the coal mines located in the Saar basin." In Art. 49 establishes a 15-year term for the statute of the Saar basin, i.e., the management of the Commission of the League of Nations. At the end of this period, the plebiscite of the population of the Saar basin should decide whether to keep the established one. V. p.m. statute, whether to annex the Saar basin to France or return it to Germany.
Section 5 (Art. 51-79 with appendix) on Alsace-Lorraine. The main article of this section (51) states that "the territories ceded to Germany by virtue of the preliminary peace signed at Versailles on 26. II. 1871, and the Treaty of Frankfurt of 10. V. 1871, return to French sovereignty from the day of the armistice-11. XI 1918" .
Section 6 (art. 80) about Austria. This article states that "Germany recognizes and will strictly respect the independence of Austria within the limits to be established by the treaty concluded between this state and the Principal Allied and Associated Powers" (implemented by the Treaty of Saint-Germain, signed in September 1919).
Section 7 (Art. 81-86) about Czechoslovakia. Germany recognizes the complete independence of the Czechoslovak State within the boundaries established by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. According to Art. 82 The frontier between Germany and Czechoslovakia will be the old frontier between Austria-Hungary and.
German Empire as it existed by 3. VIII 1914.
Section 8 (art. 87-93) about Poland. Germany undertakes to recognize the full independence of Poland and to renounce part of Upper Silesia in her favor. The question of the rest of Upper Silesia must be decided by popular vote. According to Art. 88 defines the eastern border of Germany (the western border of Poland). As for Poland's eastern borders, V. M. D. leaves the question of them open. According to Art. 93 Poland undertakes to conclude a special treaty with the Principal Allied and Associated Powers (signed on June 28, 1919), which will include provisions "necessary for the protection in Poland of the interests of inhabitants who differ from the majority of the population in race, language or religion."
Section 9 (Art. 94-98) on East Prussia. Establishes the boundaries of those districts of East Prussia in which a popular vote is to be taken in order to decide on the future ownership of this territory by Poland or Germany. Thus, the final decision on the question of East Prussia was postponed until the outcome of the plebiscite. The plebiscite area separated East Prussia from the rest of Germany.
Section 10 (Art. 99) about Memel (Klaipeda). According to this article, Germany renounces in favor of the main allied and united powers from all rights and titles to the territory of Memel (Klaipeda). Thus, V. m. d. only separated Memel from Germany, but did not establish its nationality. (The transfer of Memel to Lithuania was made in 1923.)
Section 11 (Art. 100-108) on the Free City of Danzig. According to Art. 100 Germany renounces rights and title to the territory of Danzig and its surroundings. The boundaries of this district were clearly marked. The city of Danzig and the district are declared a Free City under the protection of the League of Nations; its constitution must be worked out subsequently by the representatives of Danzig, in agreement with the high commissioner of the League of Nations. Art. 104 lists the rights of Poland in relation to the Free City, the most important of which are the inclusion of Danzig within the customs border of Poland and the granting to Poland the right to conduct Danzig's external relations and protect its citizens in foreign countries.
Section 12 (Art. 109-114) about Schleswig. Establishes a new border between Germany and Denmark. The fate of the territories taken by Prussia from Denmark as a result of the war of 1864 must be decided by a plebiscite.
Section 13 (art. 115) decides that Germany undertakes to demolish all the fortifications of the islands of Helgoland and Dune.
Division 14 (Art. 116-117). "Russia and the Russian States". According to Art. 116 Germany recognizes "the independence of all territories that were part of the former Russian Empire by 1. VIII 1914", as well as the abolition of both Brest-Litovsk and all other treaties concluded by it with the Soviet government. According to Art. 117 Germany recognizes all treaties and agreements that the Allied and Associated Powers will conclude with the states that have been and are being formed on the territory of the former Russian Empire.
Part IV of the W. M. D. deals with German rights and interests outside of Germany.
Section 1 of Part IV (Articles 118-127) develops the provisions proclaimed in Art. 119, that "Germany renounces in favor of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights and titles to her overseas possessions." Thus, this department deprives Germany of all her colonies.
Section 2 (arts. 128-134) governs the issue of German rights in China. Germany renounces in favor of China all the privileges and advantages that flowed for her from the previous German-Chinese treaties. Germany renounces in favor of Great Britain the property belonging to her in the territory of the British concession in Canton and in favor of China from her concessions.
Section 3 (vv. 135-137) is dedicated to Siam. Germany renounces the rights of consular jurisdiction and all property of the German Empire in Siam in favor of the Siamese government.
Section 4 (arts. 138-140) governs the issue of German rights in Liberia. Germany recognizes as null and void all treaties and agreements concluded by it with Liberia before the war.
Section 5 (arts. 141-146) deals with the question of Morocco. Germany renounces all rights and privileges arising for her from the Algeciras General Act of 7. IV. 1906 and from the Franco-German agreements of 9. II. 1909 and 4. XI. 1911. Germany recognizes the French protectorate in Morocco and renounces the regime of capitulations.
Section 6 (Art. 147-154) deals with the rights of Germany in Egypt. Germany undertakes to recognize the protectorate proclaimed by Great Britain over Egypt on December 18, 1914, and renounces the capitulation regime in Egypt and all treaties with it concluded before the war. Finally, Germany renounces in favor of the Egyptian government all property that was the property of the German government in Egypt.
Section 7 (Article 155) on Germany's relations with Turkey and Bulgaria. Germany undertakes to recognize any agreements that the Allied and Associated Powers conclude with Turkey and Bulgaria regarding any rights, interests and privileges to which Germany or German citizens could claim in Turkey and Bulgaria.
Section 8 (Art. 156-158) about Shandong. The main article of this section (156) establishes Germany's renunciation in favor of Japan of all rights and privileges to the territory of Jiaozhou, from railways, mines and submarine cables, which Germany acquired by virtue of an agreement with China dated 6.Sh 1898, and from any other acts. relating to Shandong Province. Similarly, all German rights to the railway from Qingdao to Jinanfu pass to Japan.
Part V of the military, maritime and air regulations is devoted to military, maritime and air regulations. It begins with a specific introduction which reads: "For the purpose of making possible the preparation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes to observe strictly the provisions laid down below, whether military, naval or air." Thus, according to this introduction, the complete disarmament of Germany was to be a prerequisite for a general limitation of the armaments of all countries. This introduction subsequently made it possible for Germany to refer to the non-fulfilment of its own promises by the Allies and to rely on this circumstance as an argument allowing Germany to abandon the military regulations of the V. M. D. Part V is divided into the following sections:
Division 1 (art. 159-180) on martial law.
Section 2 (Art. 181-197) on maritime regulations.
Section 3 (Art. 198-202) on provisions relating to military and naval aviation.
Section 4 (Art. 203-210) is devoted to the inter-Allied control commissions.
Section 5 (art. 211-213) on general provisions.
The disarmament of Germany boils down to the following: the German army must not exceed 100,000 men. and serves solely to maintain order within the country. The number of officers in this army should not exceed 4 thousand people. The large general staff is disbanded, and its creation is prohibited from now on. The number and types of weapons for this army are firmly established. The production of weapons (according to a strictly developed nomenclature) can only take place at certain factories under the control of the allies. The importation into Germany of weapons and war material of any kind is prohibited. General military service in Germany is abolished, and the German army must be recruited through voluntary recruitment, and non-commissioned officers and soldiers must serve 12 years, and officers - up to 45 years (Articles 173-175). Any kind of mobilization activities in Germany are prohibited (Article 178). Most of the fortifications, fortresses, etc. on the borders of Germany must be disarmed and demolished (Article 180). Possession of heavy artillery above the established caliber and tanks is prohibited. The German Navy is interned in the English harbor of Scapa Flow (in the summer of 1919 it was sunk by its own crew). Germany is permitted in the future to have a navy of 6 battleships, 6 light cruisers, 12 destroyers and 12 destroyers (Article 181). Tonnage norms are established for each type of permitted ships, and for battleships this norm should not exceed 10 thousand tons. m(Art. 190). The construction and acquisition of submarines are prohibited (Article 191). The military forces of Germany must not include any military or naval aviation (art. 198). All military restrictions imposed on Germany must be supervised by special inter-Allied commissions, which will have their branches and separate representatives in various parts of Germany.
Part VI (Art. 214-226) is devoted to the question of German prisoners of war and the graves of German soldiers and officers.
Part VII (Art. 227-230) is called sanctions. This part contains a decree on the international trial of Wilhelm II, as well as on the prosecution of persons "accused of committing acts contrary to the laws and customs of war." The German government undertakes to assist such a court in every possible way and, in particular, to extradite its citizens accused of these crimes.
Part VIII (Art. 231-247) is devoted to the question of reparations Art. 231 establishes the guilt of Germany and its allies for unleashing the war of 1914-18. The main article of this part (233) states that the amount of losses caused by the attack of Germany and her allies, "which Germany is obliged to compensate, will be established between the allied commission, which will take the name of the Reparation Commission."
In V. M. D. itself, the amount of German reparations remained unrecorded. Thus, Germany had to assume a blanket obligation to pay the amount of reparations that the Allies would subsequently fix.
Part IX (Articles 248-263) deals with financial regulations. These provisions, in particular, provide for the obligation of Germany to transfer to the Allies the gold and other valuables received during the war from Turkey, Avetro-Hungary (as collateral for loans), as well as from Russia (by virtue of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk) and Romania (by virtue of the Bucharest contracts). Other articles of this part regulate the question of debts falling on territories that have departed by force of V. p.m. from Germany. As a rule, Germany was exempted from paying such debts, with the exception of the debt that fell on Alsace-Lorraine (since in 1871 Germany refused to take over part of the French debt that fell on Alsace-Lorraine).
Part X (s. 264-312) governs economic provisions in detail. Germany undertakes not to impose any prohibitions or restrictions on the importation into Germany of any goods from the allied countries and to extend the most favored nation principle to trade and shipping (fishing and cabotage) of the allied and associated powers. Germany must cancel all agreements and treaties of an economic nature that she concluded during the war with Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey, as well as with Romania and Russia. A number of other articles in this part regulate the issues of private contracts, judgments, industrial property, etc.
Part XI (Art. 313-320) is devoted to questions of aeronautics. The main article of this part (art. 313) establishes that "aircraft belonging to the Allied or Associated Powers will have complete freedom of flight and descent in the territory and territorial waters of Germany." Likewise, all German airfields will be open to Allied aircraft.
Part XII (Articles 321-386) regulates the issue of ports, waterways and railways. According to Art. 321 "Germany undertakes to grant freedom of transit through its territory" for goods, ships, vessels, wagons and persons coming from Allied and Associated Countries. Art. 327 grants citizens, ships and ships of the Allied and Associated countries in all ports and inland waterways of Germany the same treatment as German citizens, ships and ships enjoy. Art. 331 declares international, i.e. free for foreign navigation, rivers: the Elbe from the confluence of the Vltava and the Vltava from Prague, the Oder from the confluence of the Opta, the Neman from Grodno and the Danube from Ulm. Navigation on the Elbe is transferred under the control of an international commission, which includes representatives of Czechoslovakia, Great Britain, France, Italy and Belgium, as well as four representatives of the coastal German states. Navigation on the Oder is placed under the control of an international commission, which includes representatives from Poland, Prussia, Czechoslovakia, Great Britain, France, Denmark and Sweden.
Germany is excluded from the European Danube Commission, established before the war. According to Art. 363 Germany undertakes to lease to Czechoslovakia the free zones in the ports of Hamburg and Stettin for 99 years.
According to Art. 380 "The Kiel Canal and access to it will always be free and open on a perfectly equal footing to warships and merchant ships of all nations at peace with Germany."
Part XIII (Articles 387-427) deals with international labor administration and the establishment of the International Labor Office. This part of V. p.m. has nothing to do with Germany.
Part XIV (Art. 428-433) establishes guarantees for the performance of the contract by Germany. According to Art. 428 German territories located to the west of the Rhine (left bank) will be occupied by the troops of the Allied and Associated Powers for a period of 15 years, counting from the date of entry into force of the W. M. D.
Art. 433 obliges Germany to withdraw its troops from the Baltic provinces and Lithuania "as soon as the governments of the principal Allied and Associated Powers deem the moment appropriate, in accordance with the internal situation of these territories."
It should be noted that, according to Kautsky, who declared this at the Lucerne Congress of the Second International, Art. 433 had a secret application that obliged Germany to temporarily detain its troops in the indicated territories until the Allies could replace them with their own.
Part XV (vv. 434-440) is devoted to "miscellaneous provisions." This part in Art. 434 obliges Germany "to recognize the full force of the peace treaties and additional conventions to be concluded by the Allied and Associated Powers with the Powers fighting on the side of Germany", as well as "to agree to the regulations to be adopted regarding the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the Bulgarian Kingdom and Ottoman Empire, and to recognize the new states within the boundaries which will thus be established for them."
Violation of the W. p.m. by Germany The system recorded by the V. p.m. The entire history of the V. M. D. from the moment of its signing to the beginning of the Second World War is a gradual destruction of the Versailles system at an ever-accelerating pace. The first object in time was reparations. Germany's violation of reparation obligations, on the one hand, and the position taken by Britain, which was striving not to allow too much weakening of the German national economy, on the other, led to the fact that the reparations question underwent a radical change as early as 1924 with the help of Counce plan(cm.). This last one operated until 1930 and was replaced by a new one. plan cabin boy(cm.). The Dawes Plan deprived France of the dominant role in the problem of reparations and significantly contributed to the revival of the German economy and the creation of economic prerequisites for future German aggression. In 1932, Germany succeeded in completely freeing itself from reparation obligations.
In parallel with the struggle against the reparation decrees of the War of Peace, Germany waged a struggle against the obligations of disarmament, as well as against its military and territorial articles.
The regulations on military reserves, on the production of armaments, on the navy and air force were continuously violated by Germany, which took advantage of the weakness and insufficiency of inter-Allied control. 21. V 1935 Hitler openly violated the V. M. D., announcing that he refuses to comply with the entire fifth part of the contract (military regulations). On 18. VI 1935, the Anglo-German Naval Treaty was signed, which legalized Germany's renunciation of the naval regulations of the V. M. D., giving her the right to a navy four times larger than that which was fixed in the peace treaty .
With regard to the air force, Germany's violations of the decrees of the V. p. m. and colonies combined. Reality subsequently confirmed this statement.
The first violation of the territorial decrees of the W. M. D. was carried out by Hitler on March 7, 1936, when German troops occupied the Rhine demilitarized zone. The next violation of the territorial provisions of both the Versailles and Saint-Germain treaties was the capture of Austria on March 12, 1938. Hitler, with the consent of Chamberlain and Daladier, captured the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia on September 30, 1938. On March 15, 1939, all of Czechoslovakia was captured. 22. I II 1939 Germany captured Memel (Klaipeda) from Lithuania.
Thus, by the beginning of the Second World War, most of the territorial regulations of the Military Rule of Law had been violated.
The Cause of the Collapse of the V. M. D. Despite the decisions of the V. M. D., German aggression steadily increased, reaching its climax on 22. VI 1941. The reasons for this can be reduced to the following:
1) The V. M. D. was concluded without the participation of the Soviet state and, moreover, in a number of its decisions was directed against it. Already at the Paris Peace Conference, Germany was viewed not only as a defeated enemy, but also as a possible instrument of anti-Soviet policy. This trend has especially intensified since the signing of the Locarno Treaty (1925), which set as its main task the involvement of Germany in the anti-Soviet bloc. The same goal was pursued by the admission of Germany in 1926 to the League of Nations.
2) The Anglo-French contradictions and the desire of Great Britain to prevent French hegemony on the continent of Europe led to the fact that England systematically supported Germany and contributed to the violation of the military policy on the part of the latter.
3) The non-participation of the United States in the World War of Peace and the policy of isolation that they pursued during the first five years after the signing of the World War of Peace also contributed in no small way to the violation of this treaty by Germany and the growth of German aggression. And when the United States returned to an active European policy, the first act of this policy towards Germany was the Dawes Plan, which opened wide the gates for investing American-Anglo-French capital in Germany, which allowed the Germans to reorganize their national economy and lay the economic foundations for subsequent aggression.
4) The main assistance to Hitler in the matter of violating the military rule of law and the systematic growth of German aggression was provided by the "non-intervention policy." This policy made it possible for Hitler to annul the war articles of the War of Peace, to seize the Rhine demilitarized zone, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Memel, and made it possible for Hitler to turn Germany into an armed camp and start a new world war in 1939.
5) The problem of German reparations in the form in which it was solved by V. M. D. contained a number of gross contradictions. On this question, no unity of views and common interests was ever achieved between the main powers that signed the V. M. D. Germany took into account these contradictions and deftly used them.
6) The task of controlling Germany's compliance with the military decrees of the V. M. D. was solved in the highest degree unsatisfactorily. This control, or rather the absence of real control, made it possible for Germany, from the very first days after the signing of the V. M. D., to violate military restrictions and to secretly arm Germany.
These were the main reasons why the W. M. D., violated by Germany during the entire period of its existence, did not solve the problem that its authors set themselves.
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