The death of submarines in the USSR: sunken submarines. sunken submarine

According to the plan of the exercises that took place in August 2000, the K-141 nuclear-powered icebreaker was supposed to carry out a conditional torpedoing of an enemy surface ship between 11-40 and 13-20 hours on August 12. But instead, at 11 hours 28 minutes 26 seconds, there was an explosion with a power of 1.5 points on the Richter scale. And after 135 seconds - the second - more powerful. Until 13-50 "Kursk" did not get in touch. The commander of the Northern Fleet, Vyacheslav Popov, orders "at 13.50 to start acting according to the worst option" and takes off from the nuclear cruiser "Peter the Great" to Severomorsk, apparently to discuss the situation. And only at 23-30 announces a combat alert, recognizing the "loss" of the best submarine of the Northern Fleet.

By 3:30 p.m., an approximate search area is determined, and by 4:20 p.m., technical contact is established with the Kursk. The rescue operation itself begins at 7 am on August 14.

On the one hand, the actions of the rescuers, who seemed sluggish to an outside observer, on the other hand, the apparent inaction of the President of the country, who continued to rest in Sochi for four days after the accident, on the third hand, data on the technical defects of the submarine, on the fourth hand, conflicting information from the authorities, as if trying to confuse everyone who followed the fate of the crew - all this gave rise to rumors about the incompetence of the leaders.

People, according to Vladimir Putin, indulged in their favorite pastime: the search for the guilty. And subsequently they were indignant that no one, by and large, was punished. But the trouble is that if we were to punish, then many would have to - all those who had a hand in the collapse of the fleet, who turned a blind eye to this, who did not work at full strength for a meager (1.5-3 thousand rubles) ) salary. But it didn’t matter: even if the military had started searching for the Kursk at 1300 hours on August 12, they still wouldn’t have had time to save the crew.

Who gave the distress signals?

The reason for numerous speculations was the SOS signals, by which the Kursk was discovered and which lasted for two days. The signals were recorded on different ships, and some eyewitnesses even claimed to have heard the call sign of the submarine - "Vintik".

Until August 15, the leaders of the operation continued to assure that communication with the crew, established through tapping, was continuing. And already on the 17th, a new version became official: most of the sailors of the Kursk died in the first minutes after the explosion, the rest lived only a few hours.
And the SOS signals were recorded on magnetic tape and studied by experts. It was proved that it was not a man who tapped out, but an automatic machine, which could not be and was not on board the Kursk. And this fact formed a new proof in the theory about the collision of a nuclear-powered ship with a foreign submarine.

Did the Kursk collide with an American submarine?

The cause of the first explosion on the Kursk was the deformation of the torpedo. This is recognized by most researchers. But the cause of the deformation itself remains a matter of controversy. The version about the collision with the American submarine "Memphis" has become widespread. It is believed that it was she who gave the notorious distress signals.

In the Barents Sea, Memphis, along with other American and British submarines, monitored the exercises of the Russian fleet. Performing a complex maneuver, its officers made a mistake with the trajectory, came close and crashed into the K-141, which was preparing to fire. "Memphis" went to the bottom, like "Kursk", plowed the ground with her nose and got up. And a few days later she was found under repair in the Norwegian port. This version is also supported by the fact that the K-141 was a kilometer or two from the place from which the distress signal was given.

When did the crew die?

The question of the time of the death of the crew of the Russian submarine became fundamental. The command of the fleet actually admitted that at first they misled everyone: there was no tapping with the submariners. Most of the crew, indeed, died as a result of the first and second explosions. And the survivors locked in the ninth compartment could have lasted longer if not for the tragic accident discovered during the autopsy.

Attempts by sailors to get to the surface on their own did not give any result. They had to sit patiently and wait for rescue. At 19 o'clock, when they were still hesitating upstairs whether to announce a combat alert, oxygen starvation began in the compartment. The sailors needed to charge new regeneration plates. The three went to the installation, and someone apparently dropped the plate into the oily water. To save his comrades, one of the submariners rushed, covering the plate with his body. But it was too late: there was an explosion. Several people died from chemical and thermal burns, the rest suffocated with carbon monoxide in a matter of minutes.

Note of Captain-Lieutenant Kolesnikov

Indirectly, the hypothesis of the death of the crew on August 12 is confirmed by a note left by Lieutenant Commander Kolesnikov: “15.15. It's dark to write here, but I'll try to feel it. There seems to be no chance: 10-20 percent. Let's hope someone reads it." That is, already at three o'clock in the afternoon, the team members were saving light, quietly sitting in the dark and waiting. And the uneven handwriting in which this - the second in a row - note was written, indicates that Dmitry Kolesnikov had little strength left.

And then in the note was what became famous - a testament to all of us who survived: “Hello everyone, there is no need to despair. Kolesnikov. And - some phrase, missed, concealed from the public by the investigation.
New conjectures grew out of that phrase: as if the commission was covering up someone's sloppiness, as if the lieutenant commander answered with that phrase the question of who was to blame, or at least what was the cause of the accident. For a long time the investigators convinced that, for ethical reasons, they did not reveal the contents of the rest of the note, that it contained a personal message to his wife, which had no meaning for us. Until then, the public did not believe until the contents of the classified part were revealed. And the investigation did not give the note itself to Dmitry Kolesnikov's wife - only a copy.

Why was the captain of the Kursk awarded the title of Hero of Russia?

On August 26, 2000, the commander of the submarine, Gennady Lyachin, was awarded the title of Hero of Russia by order of the President, and all on board were awarded the Order of Courage. This news was rather skeptical: they decided that the country's leadership was thus trying to atone for their sins before the crew, to make amends for the mistakes made during the rescue operation.

But the commander of the Northern Fleet explained: the Kursk submariners were presented for the award much earlier, after the operation successfully completed in the Mediterranean in 1999, at the height of NATO aggression in Yugoslavia. Then the crew of the K-141 managed to conditionally hit enemy ships five times, that is, destroy the entire American sixth fleet, and escape unnoticed.
But in fairness, it is worth noting that many of those who died in August 2000 the year before did not participate in the Mediterranean campaign.

Saved by the Norwegians?

Almost from the very beginning of the rescue operation, the British and Americans offered their help, and a little later the Norwegians. The media actively promoted the services of foreign specialists, convincing them that they had better equipment and better specialists. Then, in hindsight, accusations were already pouring out: if they had invited earlier, 23 people locked in the ninth compartment would have been saved.
In fact, no Norwegians were able to help. Firstly, by the time the Kursk was discovered, the submariners had already been dead for a day. Secondly, the amount of work that our rescuers did, the level of self-sacrifice and dedication with which they worked and which allowed them to operate around the clock, without interruptions, was unthinkable for foreign specialists.
But - most importantly - even if the members of the Kursk team were still alive on the 15th and 16th, it was impossible to save them for technical reasons. Submersibles could not stick to the submarine due to damage to its hull. And here the most modern and perfect technology was powerless.
The submarine and its crew were the victim of a confluence of a thousand different circumstances. And her death, in which there is no personal fault, perhaps for the first time in many years, united the hardened country.

Preface.

The characteristic hole on the starboard side of the Kursk could not be obtained from a collision of a submarine with any surface or underwater vessel (including the US Navy Memphis or Toledo submarines) due to the lack of structural parts on the ships capable of inflicting such damage and even at such a depth.

This characteristic hole cannot be the result of a combat torpedo hitting the Kursk nuclear submarine (as it was assumed until that time, fired from a US submarine), because. in the area of ​​the hole, including the internal volume of the Kursk (between the outer and inner hulls), there is no destruction of the submarine structure, which is typical for the explosion of a combat torpedo.

Based on the research data of Western seismologists, it was determined that the power of two successive shocks preceding the main explosion at the Kursk did not exceed 10 kg of TNT for each shock. This objective scientifically established fact completely refutes the official version of the Russian Ministry of Defense about the initial explosion inside the Kursk of one torpedo, which subsequently caused the detonation of the rest of the torpedoes in the torpedo room. The power of preliminary shocks established by seismologists also rejects any torpedo (or missile) attack on the Kursk carried out by any other ship. The minimum explosion power from a torpedo is estimated at hundreds of kilograms of TNT, but not 10 kilograms.

Rock hole.

I repeat: the hole could only be left by an object moving from outside to inside the submarine. Concave metal eloquently testifies to this.

The object that left the hole entered the hull not at a right angle to the hull, but at an angle from the side, as if catching up with the submarine. This is evidenced by the ovality of the hole (provided that the penetrating object was cylindrical). At the same time, he moved under water almost parallel to the hull of the boat.

During the puncture of the skin of the light hull and the transition from the aquatic to the air environment inside the boat, the object, as it were, lost its holding power and, entering the “airspace” of the submarine, leaned its weight on the lower edge of the hole punched by it. This follows from a very distinct edge of punctured metal at the top and left of the hole and a thickened (reflow-like) metal and rubber coating at the bottom edge of the hole (shown by the yellow arrow in photo #15).

The object that pierced the submarine caused, as it moved inside the submarine (due to the formation of high temperature in the area of ​​penetration), swelling and detachment of a part of the rubber shell from the main metal of the light body. See the red arrow in the photo.

After dismantling the section of the skin of the outer hull, it is clearly seen that as the object penetrated into the submarine, it caused mechanical damage along its route.

1. The pipeline of the cruise missile shaft was cut off, small pipelines were cut off, and their ends were bent in the direction of the object in the inter-hull space (shown by yellow arrows in the photo).

2. The bulkhead is bent in the direction of movement of the object, located between the light and main hulls (blue arrow in the photo).

3. The beam of the power frame is bent inside the boat. This is the only power beam that is bent towards the epicenter of the torpedo explosion (indicated by a green arrow in the photo).

4. But the most important point, which was not paid attention to before, is indicated by a red arrow.

Earlier it was said that in the area of ​​​​the hole, the outer skin of the submarine was affected by high temperature. Extremely high temperature. Now we can see the condition of the bulkhead behind this light skin. If all adjacent bulkheads are cut evenly when dismantling a piece of outer skin (and this is the work of gas cutters during dismantling), then the end of this bulkhead is strongly and ugly melted. The characteristic appearance of the bulkhead end at the junction with the light hull indicates that it was in such a state immediately after the disaster.

At the same time, the bulkhead was not deformed, which means that it did not experience any mechanical impact from the shock wave of the torpedo explosion that occurred inside the power hull of the submarine. It could not melt in this way also from the temperature of the internal explosion, because. melting occurred only at the point of contact with the outer light body, and not at the point of contact with the inner power case, where the main explosion occurred. Even more interesting is the state of this bulkhead below the place of the end melting. In the photo, this place is not visible due to the handrail that fell into the frame. So let's look at the next photo.

Taking into account the location of these thermal damages on the bulkhead, there is a strong impression that after a puncture on the starboard side, a substance flowed downward along the inner surface of the light hull, starting from the area of ​​the hull puncture, which melted the metal of the outer end of the bulkhead at a very high temperature. Flowing down and accumulating in the “pocket” of the bulkhead, this substance, by its burning, simply evaporated the metal of the bulkhead in the zone of formation of the “lake”. At the same time, I repeat, the burnout of the metal, judging by the location of the hearth, is in no way related to the temperature from the explosion of torpedoes in the inner hull, because located on the outside of the power housing. There was no burnout and mechanical action of the shock wave from the explosion in the place. The burnt-out hanging piece of metal, like the bulkhead itself, did not even change its position.

So what pierced the skin of the Kursk? It is clear that such a puncture is impossible for any object with any mass moving at a low speed. Even in the case of a “punch” of a rounded shape on the structure of any ship, in a collision with the “Kursk” at low speed, the area and degree of deformation of the plating section would be much larger.

Therefore, such a hole can only leave an object of a conical shape (like a bullet) and at the same time moving at an enormous speed in the water. Incredible speed... And at the time of the exercises of the Russian Navy in this area there was only one such object ....

The root cause of the disaster

But it is not typical for a combat torpedo:

No explosion on impact.

Low speed for a conventional torpedo to make such a jewelry puncture in the hull.

But for the SHKVAL torpedo, both of these conditions are met. After all, torpedo launches at such naval exercises are always carried out by training torpedoes, i.e. without warhead.

Let us estimate the kinetic energy of the Shkval torpedo. With initial data from open sources, with a Shkval torpedo weighing 2700 kg and a speed of 500 km / h, energy of 26 MJ is released when it hits an obstacle.

And now let's remember that seismologists on instruments, being at a distance of more than 500 km from the nuclear submarine "Kursk", received as a result of their research the approximate power of a weak single shock (not an explosion !!!) of about 10 kg of TNT. In terms of the usual joules, this is approximately 40-42 MJ. As you can see, the results on the energy of shocks and the kinetic energy of the moving torpedo "SHKVAL", taking into account the seismological error, are very similar.

But let's add one more important point.

Torpedo "SHKVAL" is, in essence, an underwater missile with a jet engine. The Shkval engine consists of a launch booster, which accelerates the projectile, and a sustainer engine, which delivers it to the target. The main engine of the torpedo is a hydrojet direct-flow, for its work it uses metals, water reactive(magnesium, lithium, aluminum), and as an oxidizing agent - sea water. When the torpedo reaches a speed of 80 m/s, an air cavitation bubble begins to form near its bow, which significantly reduces the hydrodynamic resistance. But speed alone is not enough: on the nose of the Shkval there is a special device - a cavitator, through which additional gases are pressurized from a special gas generator. This is how a cavitation cavity is formed, which envelops the entire body of the torpedo.

"Shkval" does not have a homing head (GOS), target coordinates are entered immediately before launch. Torpedo turns are carried out due to the rudders and deflection of the cavitator head .

I summarize:

1. The fuel of the SHKVAL torpedo, when interacting with sea water, gives a very high temperature.

And now back to the Kursk. Only a cone-shaped object (and not a cigar-shaped one, like other torpedoes) and moving at an incredible speed in the water could leave a puncture in the hull, located well below the sea surface. Only an object that uses water as an oxidizing agent for fuel, and at the same time a very high combustion temperature is reached, could spill this super-temperature fuel into the space between the main and light hulls when its structure was destroyed after a skin puncture. And only such fuel, starting to come into contact with sea water in the space between the light and main hulls and flowing down the inner surface of the light hull, could easily melt and burn the bulkhead metal to ashes.

Based on the totality of all the facts presented, the following picture emerges on that fateful day.

The nuclear submarine "Kursk", being at the periscope depth, according to the assignment, takes a position for firing the "SHKVAL" torpedo in the Barents Sea. At the same time, the bow of the submarine is turned in the west-north-west direction, so as not to launch a torpedo at the location of other ships participating in the exercises.

Exactly at the appointed time, the nuclear submarine "Kursk" fires a demonstrative shot of the "Shkval" training torpedo without combat equipment planned for the exercise. The main task is to show the highest speed of the product and the short time of movement to the intended target. During the movement to the intended goal, a failure occurs. Perhaps the torpedo collides tangentially with the intended target (ricochet), or with one of the American submarines on duty in the area. We recall the slow departure of the Memphis submarine from the exercise area and its subsequent repair. And this first collision was recorded by seismologists. 135 seconds before the explosion on the Kursk.

The energy from the collision of a torpedo with a submarine and the energy of the second seismic shock coincide in their value. After this collision, only 75 seconds remain before the explosion of the Kursk nuclear submarine ... It is during this time that the splashed fuel from the ShKVAL torpedo that got inside the torpedo compartment causes a local fire with a very high combustion temperature. But this is not yet the main explosion of torpedoes. Just the strongest breakdown of the hull from a mad blank, followed by a fire and a powerful flow of water into the compartment. Therefore, part of the crew, seeing the futility of the struggle for the survivability of the torpedo compartment in such conditions, I think, during this time manages to leave the first compartment (torpedo).

And here it is necessary to make a remark. The well-known disadvantages of the SHKVAL torpedo include its range. The first models were capable of hitting targets no further than 13 km. For a greater distance, there was not enough stock of jet fuel. During the exercises, it was supposed to test an improved modification .

The second disadvantage is that "SHKVAL" cannot hit targets deeper than 30 meters under water..

As we remember, about 60 seconds passed from the first recorded weak seismic signal (ricochet on the target) to the second one. During this time, a torpedo launched and strayed off course, with an average speed of 100 m / s, would have covered a distance of about 6 km. And here it converges. The distance is just such that after a ricochet from the target and downed rudders, the torpedo could return to the Kursk ....

What could the captain of the nuclear submarine "Kursk" Lyachin do, knowing (and the "SHKVAL" moves very noisily in the water) that a frenzied torpedo began to return back? The response time was just seconds. In this situation, he made the only correct decision. Although non-standard, at first glance. Why not standard? For submarines of this type, according to regulatory documentation, it is impossible to sink to a depth when less than 80 meters remain from the bottom to the bottom of the sea. This is due to the fact that the pumps in the reactor cooling system could not suck in the soil. The author is deeply grateful to Senior OfficerEvert Zegelaar Norwegian shipsea ​​way Eagle for their help in the preparation of this material. Vessel "sea ​​way Eagle"Took a direct part in the operation to examine and possibly rescue the surviving sailors from the Kursk."

According to the plan of the exercises that took place in August 2000, the K-141 nuclear-powered icebreaker was supposed to carry out a conditional torpedoing of an enemy surface ship between 11-40 and 13-20 hours on August 12. But instead, at 11 hours 28 minutes 26 seconds, there was an explosion with a power of 1.5 points on the Richter scale. And after 135 seconds - the second - more powerful. Until 13-50 "Kursk" did not get in touch. The commander of the Northern Fleet, Vyacheslav Popov, orders "at 13.50 to start acting according to the worst option" and takes off from the nuclear cruiser "Peter the Great" to Severomorsk, apparently to discuss the situation. And only at 23-30 announces a combat alert, recognizing the "loss" of the best submarine of the Northern Fleet.

By 3:30 p.m., an approximate search area is determined, and by 4:20 p.m., technical contact is established with the Kursk. The rescue operation itself begins at 7 am on August 14.

On the one hand, the actions of the rescuers, who seemed sluggish to an outside observer, on the other hand, the apparent inaction of the President of the country, who continued to rest in Sochi for four days after the accident, on the third hand, data on the technical defects of the submarine, on the fourth hand, conflicting information from the authorities, as if trying to confuse everyone who followed the fate of the crew - all this gave rise to rumors about the incompetence of the leaders.
People, according to Vladimir Putin, indulged in their favorite pastime: the search for the guilty. And subsequently they were indignant that no one, by and large, was punished. But the trouble is that if we were to punish, then many would have to - all those who had a hand in the collapse of the fleet, who turned a blind eye to this, who did not work at full strength for a meager (1.5-3 thousand rubles) ) salary. But it didn’t matter: even if the military had started searching for the Kursk at 1300 hours on August 12, they still wouldn’t have had time to save the crew.

Who gave the distress signals?

The reason for numerous speculations was the SOS signals, by which the Kursk was discovered and which lasted for two days. The signals were recorded on different ships, and some eyewitnesses even claimed to have heard the call sign of the submarine - "Vintik".
Until August 15, the leaders of the operation continued to assure that communication with the crew, established through tapping, was continuing. And already on the 17th, a new version became official: most of the sailors of the Kursk died in the first minutes after the explosion, the rest lived only a few hours.
And the SOS signals were recorded on magnetic tape and studied by experts. It was proved that it was not a man who tapped out, but an automatic machine, which could not be and was not on board the Kursk. And this fact formed a new proof in the theory about the collision of a nuclear-powered ship with a foreign submarine.

Did the Kursk collide with an American submarine?

The cause of the first explosion on the Kursk was the deformation of the torpedo. This is recognized by most researchers. But the cause of the deformation itself remains a matter of controversy. The version about the collision with the American submarine "Memphis" has become widespread. It is believed that it was she who gave the notorious distress signals.
In the Barents Sea, Memphis, along with other American and British submarines, monitored the exercises of the Russian fleet. Performing a complex maneuver, its officers made a mistake with the trajectory, came close and crashed into the K-141, which was preparing to fire. "Memphis" went to the bottom, like "Kursk", plowed the ground with her nose and got up. And a few days later she was found under repair in the Norwegian port. This version is also supported by the fact that the K-141 was a kilometer or two from the place from which the distress signal was given.

When did the crew die?

The question of the time of the death of the crew of the Russian submarine became fundamental. The command of the fleet actually admitted that at first they misled everyone: there was no tapping with the submariners. Most of the crew, indeed, died as a result of the first and second explosions. And the survivors locked in the ninth compartment could have lasted longer if not for the tragic accident discovered during the autopsy.
Attempts by sailors to get to the surface on their own did not give any result. They had to sit patiently and wait for rescue. At 19 o'clock, when they were still hesitating upstairs whether to announce a combat alert, oxygen starvation began in the compartment. The sailors needed to charge new regeneration plates. The three went to the installation, and someone apparently dropped the plate into the oily water. To save his comrades, one of the submariners rushed, covering the plate with his body. But it was too late: there was an explosion. Several people died from chemical and thermal burns, the rest suffocated with carbon monoxide in a matter of minutes.

Note of Captain-Lieutenant Kolesnikov

Indirectly, the hypothesis of the death of the crew on August 12 is confirmed by a note left by Lieutenant Commander Kolesnikov: “15.15. It's dark to write here, but I'll try to feel it. There seems to be no chance: 10-20 percent. Let's hope someone reads it." That is, already at three o'clock in the afternoon, the team members were saving light, quietly sitting in the dark and waiting. And the uneven handwriting in which this - the second in a row - note was written, indicates that Dmitry Kolesnikov had little strength left.
And then in the note was what became famous - a testament to all of us who survived: “Hello everyone, there is no need to despair. Kolesnikov. And - some phrase, missed, concealed from the public by the investigation.
New conjectures grew out of that phrase: as if the commission was covering up someone's sloppiness, as if the lieutenant commander answered with that phrase the question of who was to blame, or at least what was the cause of the accident. For a long time the investigators convinced that, for ethical reasons, they did not reveal the contents of the rest of the note, that it contained a personal message to his wife, which had no meaning for us. Until then, the public did not believe until the contents of the classified part were revealed. And the investigation did not give the note itself to Dmitry Kolesnikov's wife - only a copy.

Why was the captain of the Kursk awarded the title of Hero of Russia?

On August 26, 2000, the commander of the submarine, Gennady Lyachin, was awarded the title of Hero of Russia by order of the President, and all on board were awarded the Order of Courage. This news was rather skeptical: they decided that the country's leadership was thus trying to atone for their sins before the crew, to make amends for the mistakes made during the rescue operation.
But the commander of the Northern Fleet explained: the Kursk submariners were presented for the award much earlier, after the operation successfully completed in the Mediterranean in 1999, at the height of NATO aggression in Yugoslavia. Then the crew of the K-141 managed to conditionally hit enemy ships five times, that is, destroy the entire American sixth fleet, and escape unnoticed.
But in fairness, it is worth noting that many of those who died in August 2000 the year before did not participate in the Mediterranean campaign.

Saved by the Norwegians?

Almost from the very beginning of the rescue operation, the British and Americans offered their help, and a little later the Norwegians. The media actively promoted the services of foreign specialists, convincing them that they had better equipment and better specialists. Then, in hindsight, accusations were already pouring out: if they had invited earlier, 23 people locked in the ninth compartment would have been saved.
In fact, no Norwegians were able to help. Firstly, by the time the Kursk was discovered, the submariners had already been dead for a day. Secondly, the amount of work that our rescuers did, the level of self-sacrifice and dedication with which they worked and which allowed them to operate around the clock, without interruptions, was unthinkable for foreign specialists.
But - most importantly - even if the members of the Kursk team were still alive on the 15th and 16th, it was impossible to save them for technical reasons. Submersibles could not stick to the submarine due to damage to its hull. And here the most modern and perfect technology was powerless.
The submarine and its crew were the victim of a confluence of a thousand different circumstances. And her death, in which there is no personal fault, perhaps for the first time in many years, united the hardened country.

Not so long ago, a film called "The Tragedy of Submarine K-129" was released on Russian screens. The picture was positioned as a documentary and told about the mournful events that occurred in March 1968. "Project Azorian" is the name of a secret operation that was later considered one of the most unpleasant events of the Cold War. Just then, the United States Navy recovered the sunken Soviet submarine K-129 from the bottom of the ocean.

In the twentieth century, the death of submarines, perhaps, was not uncommon. In the northern part of the Pacific Ocean lies the remains of the most famous submarine in history. For a long time, information about these events was kept secret, even the exact place where she sank was hushed up. Just think: a huge nuclear submarine ceased to exist, claiming the lives of ninety-eight Soviet officers.

American intelligence agencies, having the most innovative equipment, were able to find and investigate the boat in the first two weeks after the incident. And in August 1974, K-129 was taken from the bottom.

background

1968 had just begun, it was a frosty February outside. Nothing foreshadowed trouble, besides, the upcoming mission was to pass completely calmly and without incident. Then the submarine K-129 set off on its last voyage from a military base on the shores of Kamchatka with the function of patrolling the borders. Three ballistic missiles, a pair of nuclear-powered torpedoes - the submarine was very powerful, and the crew was experienced and active. He commanded the submarine cruiser Kobzar VI - captain of the first rank. This man was distinguished by endurance, great experience and a serious attitude to business.

It should be said that by the time of departure, she had practically no time to rest after a long journey through the expanses of the oceans. The submarine arrived in the town under the unusual name Olenya Guba quite recently. There was no fundamental repair that should have been done, and the crew was in a depressed state, not having time to properly rest after a long and exhausting voyage. But there was no choice, all other submarines turned out to be even more unprepared for the mission, because the K-129 command did not ask any extra questions, but simply went to patrol the borders. In addition, the submarine was equipped with a D-4 missile system, which meant that it was superior to other ships. By the way, many officers from the crew have already been released on vacation, some even dispersed around Russia, heading home for a visit. The commander failed to assemble a team in full force. But, as we understand it, the very people who did not come to the training camp literally saved their lives.

Everything went wrong

There was nothing to do, I had to staff the team using people serving on other ships, and also recruit newcomers for responsible navigation. Everything went wrong from the very first days of the training camp. It is noteworthy that the command of the military base did not even have a ready list of the crew, certified by the captain with a ship's seal, and after all, V.I. Kobzar was known for his pedantry. They frantically searched for the document in the papers when the tragedy happened, but found nothing. This is unheard of negligence, which simply could not be in the Navy! Olenya Guba was famous for the fact that professionals, the best in their field, served there. And yet…

On March 8, a short signal was to come from the submarine to the base, since this was the turning point of the route, completely standard procedure. But he did not follow, on the same day the alarm was announced on duty. could not afford such an oversight.

The beginning of the search

K-129 did not get in touch, because all the forces were sent to search for it, the entire Kamchatka flotilla, as well as aviation, were actively involved in the search. The submarine showed no signs of life. After two weeks of fruitless work, the Pacific Fleet of the USSR realized that the ship was no more. At that time, attracted by the noise on the radio, the American troops became interested in what was happening. It was they who discovered the oily spot on the surface of the ocean waves. An analysis of this substance showed that it was indeed a solar liquid that had flowed out of a Soviet submarine.

At that time, the news shocked the entire world community. Ninety-eight brave Soviet officers, experienced sailors, young people for whom this voyage was the first serious test in their lives, a good, well-equipped submarine K-129 - all this perished in one moment. It was not possible to establish the causes of the tragedy; the equipment to raise the boat from the bottom did not yet exist. Over time, all search work was curtailed, and the boat was forgotten for a while, deciding that, as in many cases when ships sank, the sea would become a mass grave for the crew. Lost submarines in the Pacific were not uncommon.

Versions of what happened

Of course, the most current version of what was happening at that time was the perfidy of the American fleet. The appearance of these thoughts in society was also facilitated by the fact that information was disseminated in the press about an American vessel with the sonorous name "Swordfish" - it was a submarine with ballistic missiles, which was also on duty at that time in Pacific waters. It would seem that nothing special: she was on duty - and let it be the right of the Americans - to take care of their borders, only on March 8 this ship also did not get in touch with its base, and a couple of days later appeared off the coast of Japan. There, the crew disembarked for a while, and the submarine went to the repair docks, apparently, there were some problems with it. This, you see, is also completely normal - anything could happen at sea, so she, perhaps, did not get in touch. But the oddity is not in this, but in the fact that, according to some sources, the crew was forced to sign non-disclosure documents. In addition, this submarine subsequently did not go on a mission for several years. The radical version of what happened says that the American submarine was spying on the actions of the Soviet one and for some reason rammed its object of surveillance. Maybe that's how it was originally intended.

Of course, all this raised questions even then, but the American government explained the situation as follows: through negligence, their submarine collided with an iceberg. And everything would be fine, but only it happened in the central part of the Pacific Ocean, and icebergs are usually not found there, therefore the option of a collision with an ice block disappeared immediately, and with respect to K-129 too.

It is not possible today to prove the Americans' involvement in the tragic events, it may well be that all this is just speculation and a series of coincidences, but it is very strange that the most experienced crew, who have been on such trips more than once, died so ingloriously.

Another version follows from the previous one. Based on it, it can be assumed that the teams of both submarines did not have bad intentions, there was an accident: they collided under water, patrolling the same territory. Now this is hard to imagine, but in the twentieth century, technology could well fail.

In any case, the outcome of the events we are discussing is known: a Soviet diesel submarine ended up on the bottom in the northern part of the Pacific Ocean, at a distance of one thousand two hundred miles from the base in Kamchatka. The depth at which the submarine turned out to be equal to five thousand meters. The boat sank with an even keel. It is terrible to imagine how terrible it was for the crew in a confined space filled with cold water to realize imminent death.

Rise from the bottom

But one should not think that the authorities have completely forgotten about the sad event. After some time, it was precisely in order to raise the K-129 from the bottom of the ocean that two specialized ships were built. One of them was the very famous Explorer, and the second was the NSS-1 docking chamber, according to the project, its bottom was moved apart, and a huge mechanical “arm” was attached to the body, which looked more like pincers, the span of which was exactly the diameter of K -129. If the reader had the impression that these were Soviet devices, then they were mistaken. This is wrong. These designs were designed and manufactured in the United States. The best specialists on the West and East coasts were connected to the design.

A curious fact is that even in the final stages of assembling the vehicles, the engineers working on the design had no idea what exactly they were working on. But on the other hand, their work was well paid, so no one protested.

Operation start

It is difficult to imagine the scale of the operation. Just for statistics: the special vessel-apparatus "Explorer" looked like a huge floating platform, the displacement of which exceeded thirty-six tons. A remote-controlled thruster was attached to this platform. Thanks to this, this device accurately found any given coordinate on the ocean floor, and then could be kept strictly above it, the error was only a dozen centimeters. At the same time, this colossus did not have any difficulties with the management.

And that's not all: the platform was equipped with a "well" in the center, surrounded by structures that vaguely resemble oil rigs; tubes of a particularly strong alloy, each of which had a length of twenty-five meters; a set of various indicators, which, with the help of special equipment, sank to the bottom. This type of ship did not exist before.

The operation was carried out in stealth mode and consisted of three simple steps. To date, the information has been declassified, so you can easily find information about those events in the public domain.

Stage 1 took place at the very beginning of the seventy-third year. At first, the equipment was prepared and tested for a long time, the operation was extremely risky, so there could be no mistakes. At the same time, a large international vessel specializing in oil production was used to move the special platform into place. This ship did not cause any questions from the ships passing by. But that was just preparation.

Stage 2 is the second half of the year, now all the necessary technical devices and specialists have been transported to the accident site. But even this was not enough. Until that moment, such operations had never been carried out before, to get a sunken submarine from the bottom of the ocean was considered something on the verge of fantasy. During this period, training work was carried out.

Stage 3 - the seventy-fourth year. At the very beginning of the year there is a long-awaited rise. All work was carried out in the shortest possible time and did not cause any difficulties.

The Soviet government kept a close eye on this square, as many things were suspicious, especially the fact that the international ship stood over the sunken K-129. In addition, the question arose: why is oil production carried out in the middle of the ocean at a depth of six kilometers? Not very logical, because usually drilling took place at a depth of two hundred meters, and several kilometers is unheard of. This ship, in turn, did nothing suspicious, the work was carried out quite typical, the conversations on the radio waves also did not stand out in any way, and after a month and a half, which is absolutely normal, it moved off the point and continued the planned course.

But in those days it was not customary to trust America, therefore a reconnaissance group on a high-speed ship went to the scene, this fact should not have been mentioned on the radio. Tracking was established, but it was not possible to fully understand why the Americans were so fussy, what exactly was happening here. The Americans noticed the surveillance, but behaved as if nothing had happened, continuing to work. Nobody hid anything in particular, and the actions of both sides were very predictable. For a long time it seemed that American sailors were busy searching for oil, which, in fact, they had every right to do: these waters are neutral, and it is not forbidden to conduct underwater research. A week and a half later, the ship moved off the point and headed for the island of Oahu in Honolulu. The Christmas festivities were already approaching there, therefore it became obvious that surveillance would not give any result in the future. In addition, the Soviet ship was already running out of fuel, and it was possible to refuel only in Vladivostok, and this was a couple of weeks of travel.

It was decided to stop this initiative, relations with America were already strained, surveillance did not bring any results, and the deployment precisely above the place of death of the Soviet crew could well turn out to be an accident. At least officially, the US did nothing wrong. Having caught the mood of the government, the local command stopped surveillance (as you understand, only at the second stage of the operation, and, who knows, perhaps it was calculated that way).

And, of course, no one in the USSR could have imagined that US ships were trying to raise a sunken boat, it really seemed impossible. Because the skepticism of the authorities was understandable: what can the Americans do?

That's just all the same American ship of unusual shape and huge dimensions after Christmas again went to the ill-fated point. In addition, no one had ever seen such a type of ship before. And it really seemed suspicious.

We must pay tribute to the American authorities: as soon as the K-129 submarine was delivered to the shores of the United States, all the bodies that were inside (six people in total) were buried in the sea according to the ritual due to sailors, the Americans even turned on the USSR anthem at that moment. The burial was filmed on color film, which was sent to American intelligence agencies. At the same time, the behavior and attitude of the Americans towards the dead was extremely respectful. It is still unknown where the rest of the Soviet crew members are, but, according to American data, they were not on the submarine. By the way, V.I. Kobzar was not among those reburied.

cold war

By that time, the Soviet Union already knew about what was happening, a new round of diplomatic struggle began between the two giant states. The USSR was dissatisfied with the secret actions on the part of America and the fact that the diesel submarine was precisely Soviet, which means that the Americans did not have the right to extract it from the bottom. The United States assured that the death of the submarine was not recorded anywhere (this is true), which means that this is no one's property, and the finder can do with it at his own discretion. In addition, so that there would be no further debate, the American side provided video footage of the reburial of Russian sailors. They were buried really with all respect and according to all the rules. Therefore, unnecessary questions from the Soviet side have disappeared.

Only now it remains a mystery what actually happened to the submarine, why the Americans made so much effort to get it from the bottom of the ocean, why they did it all in secret, and why after this operation they hid the Explorer out of sight in the depths of America's repair docks because it's a very useful piece of equipment. The equipment was placed along with a Soviet submarine somewhere near San Francisco.

Perhaps the American side just wanted to know the secrets that the Soviet submarine fleet hides. It may seem to some that the Soviet government was eventually fooled, because it is obvious that the Americans examined Soviet equipment, perhaps even that they found something interesting and they adopted something. Perhaps torpedoes, which were created very elegantly, or maybe other secrets. But, according to modern sources, the antagonists could not get the main one. And a happy coincidence is to blame for everything: the crew commander V. Kobzar, who was mentioned earlier, was very tall and had a heroic physique, therefore, for obvious reasons, he was cramped at the place of work. When the boat was once again being repaired, the captain asked the engineers to place his cipher-cabin in the rocket compartment, there was more space, although this was a risky neighborhood. So, all the most important information was stored there. But the Americans, removing the submarine from the bottom, did not raise the missile compartment. It seemed to them not so important.

The year 1968 showed that this is how it is - Russian reality: everything is not like people's, but at the same time, sometimes it even plays into our hands. The Americans, of course, did not return the submarine itself to the Soviet side, its further fate also remains a mystery. Most likely, it was dismantled, carefully studied and disposed of. But no one hoped to return. Perhaps this is fair, because so much money and effort was spent by the Americans.

By the way, these not too pleasant events only spurred the arms race and technological innovations. For practice has shown that one state is stronger in some ways, and another in some ways. Maybe this is not so bad, because progress in science leads humanity to development.

Last questions

So much remains unclear. Why did a submarine with experienced sailors and a talented captain sink for no apparent reason? Why did the Americans spend so much money and effort building vehicles to lift it from the bottom of the ocean? What happened to most of the team, after all, more than a hundred people could not have gone somewhere? What happened to K-129 after it was taken out of the deep ocean? The sinking of submarines in the twentieth century, of course, was not uncommon, but in this case there are already a lot of unsolved questions.

Conclusion

In the very film with which our story begins, there are far from answers to all questions. Its production is American-Russian, which, of course, should be noted, since the creators wanted the most objective consideration of what happened. But, perhaps, now it is not so important, because all this is a matter of bygone days, and nothing can be changed. The Cold War is considered bloodless and not as dangerous as other wars in the history of mankind, but there were enough unpleasant moments. It is a pity for the people who made up the crew of the K-129 submarine, and especially for the young sailors who went on their first serious voyage. In any case, this unfortunate event will forever remain in the annals of history and in the memory of the Russian people.

Disappeared underwater

On January 28, 1990, the newspaper “On Guard of the Polar Region” published an article by A. V. Krivenko, senior researcher at the Museum of the Northern Fleet, “The Mystery of the Sunken Submarine” about the disappearance of the first Soviet submarine “D-1” (“Decembrist”) on November 13, 1940 .

The submarine disappeared (died) with the entire crew in the Motovsky Bay in the visual visibility zone of the naval coastal observation posts, presumably 15 cables from Bolshoy Arsky Island at a depth of 70-127 m.

In March 1990, several responses to this article were published, including those of the Hero of the Soviet Union, retired Vice Admiral G. I. Shchedrin, about the need to raise the Decembrist to create a monument to the submariners who laid the foundation of the Northern Fleet.

The officially accepted version of the death of the ship was the submersion of the submarine below the maximum depth, then the destruction of the strong hull of the ship (or the outboard clinkets of diesel engines, or the valves of the dive and ascent station). A possible cause of diving below the maximum depth was assumed to be a jamming of the horizontal rudders of the boat or a mistake by the crew. These reasons really could take place.

The wedge of horizontal rudders.

In the spring of 1940, after another military campaign in the area of ​​​​the island of Vardo, "D-1" got up for repairs at the side of the Krasny Gorn floating workshop.

The control system of the horizontal rudders was located in the central post of the ship (4th compartment) and was connected to the end compartments by roller drives. Manual steering wheels and electric motors were installed in the central post, their switching was carried out using cam clutches.

It is here that the malfunction of the rudders could manifest itself.

An addition to the assumption about the jamming of horizontal rudders can be lines from a letter from the former assistant to the flagship mechanical engineer of the submarine brigade P. A. Miroshnichenko to the son of the commander of D-1 F. M. Eltishchev, written in January 1967: “... I suppose that during the maneuvering of the D-1 under water, the horizontal rudders jammed and she went beyond the maximum diving depth ... ”(“ On Guard of the Arctic, 01/28/1990, p. 7).

However, the shifting of the rudders for immersion, their locking or fixing in this position, i.e., external circumstances, which will be discussed below, could contribute to the direct impact on the rudders.

Submarine diving below the depth limit due to a crew error.

There are good reasons for this assumption. We will use the list of D-1 crew members who died on 11/13/1940 ("On Guard of the Arctic", 03/04/1990, p. 7).

At sea, to practice torpedo firing, complicated by diving under the target ship, with a regular crew of 10 officers, 15 foremen and 28 privates, the submarine went out without 3 officers, 3 foremen and squad leaders and 6 privates. The main specialists were absent on board - the senior assistant to the commander of the ship G. I. Galagan and the commander of the electromechanical warhead K. V. Stepanov (both were on vacation), as well as the commander of the artillery and mine-torpedo warhead (not listed).

At the same time, the assistant commander (probably from one of the division's cruising submarines), senior lieutenant I. I. Grachev, arrived at the brigade and on the ship 10 days before the last exit, the commander of the torpedo group, Lieutenant P. L. Chernoknizhny, arrived at the ship 3 months before the last release.

In the fall of 1940, at the end of active military service in the Navy, a significant part of the privates and foremen were transferred to the reserve. They were replaced by younger recruits. Of the 13 students who went to sea on the D-1 on November 13, 7 served on the ship for a month and a half, and two - only 3 days.

At some combat posts of the compartments, instead of the regular personnel already worked out by long-range combat campaigns, there could be 9 students who did not have sufficient practical training and training, each of which could make erroneous actions that led to a submarine disaster.

Having accepted these versions as true, we will “automatically” agree with the most accessible and simplest causes of the death of the “D-1”, which were “convenient” precisely for 1940.

But why now, 60 years after the death, the mystery of the disaster is not disclosed?

In 1990, the commander of the KSF, Admiral F. N. Gromov, planned to carry out search work in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe death of the D-1. The search and rescue ship of the Northern Fleet "Georgy Titov" was specially allocated to carry out the work, which returned after surveying the area of ​​the death of the nuclear submarine "Komsomolets". Then, representatives of the PSS SF began to make references to the fact that “naval specialists have never yet searched for and examined submarines that died in the 1930-1940s,” as well as to “difficult bottom relief, faults, underwater rocks. Hydroacoustics can be ineffective ”(V. V. Sorokazherdyev“ The sea kept the secret. - Murmansk, 1996, p. 31). Then any information about the conduct of search operations disappeared. 10 years have passed. Nobody mentioned the Decembrist.

At present, there is simply no reason to keep the death of the submarine and 55 members of its crew a secret, but the D-1 submariners remain "Missing".

Deceased or disappeared?

The submarine "D-1" (until August 21, 1934 - "Decembrist") factory N 177, the lead in the 1st series of Soviet submarine shipbuilding, was laid down on March 5, 1927 in Leningrad and became part of the Naval Forces of the Baltic Sea on November 12 1930.

On May 18, 1933, "D-1" as part of a special-purpose expedition (EON-1) left Kronstadt and began crossing the White Sea-Baltic Canal to Murmansk. On August 5 of the same year, EON-1 ships became the basis of the Northern military flotilla being created. In 1934-1935, the Decembrist, as part of a separate division of the Northern Fleet, made long trips to the White Sea, to the Novaya Zemlya archipelago and the North Cape.

In 1938-1939, the crew of the submarine made two long trips to Novaya Zemlya Island, one to Medvezhiy Island, completed 3 combat trips to the Vardø region (during the war with Finland, a total of 45 days). According to the results of the military campaign, the commander of the "D-1" captain-lieutenant F. M. Eltishchev was awarded the Order of the Red Banner of War, and the commander of the motor group, military engineer of the 2nd rank S. P. Belov and the foreman of the engine team V. S. Fedotov - the Order of the Red Star . It was these sailors who performed the duties of the commander of the warhead-5 and the commander of the motor group, respectively, in the last campaign of the "Decembrist".

At 08.55 on November 13, 1940, the submarine of the 1st division of the brigade of the Northern Fleet "D-1" (commander lieutenant commander F. M. Eltishchev) entered the polygon N 6 (Motovsky Bay) from the main base of the fleet Polyarnoye. To carry out training torpedo firing, the brigade's floating base, Umba, was allocated as a target and a support ship (senior commander of the 1st division on board, Captain 2nd Rank M. I. Gadzhiev). An element that complicates the combat exercise was the task of firing from stern vehicles, diving under the target ship.

After 4 hours, the boat arrived at the landfill. At 13.26, Eltishchev reported to the management that he was ready to dive and (probably) about the start of the exercise.

At 13.30, the submarine sank under the periscope along the true bearing from Cape Vyev-Navolok 335 degrees and began moving on a course of 270 degrees.

At 13.45, on a bearing of 160 degrees from Cape Sharapov, at a distance of 17 cables from the tip of the cape, coastal posts observed the movement of the submarine's periscope heading 225 degrees. More coastal posts of the observation and communication system of the fleet "D-1" were not observed.

The submarine successfully attacked the Umba. After the end of the shooting, the floating base went to Polyarnoye, where the commander reported on the completion of the training task and that everything was in order on the Dekabrist.

In the evening, after the submarine did not get in touch at the appointed time, the fleet began searching for the missing D-1.

The next day, November 14, the MBR-2 aircraft, which was conducting a search in the dive area, discovered large spots of solarium. Later, the ships of the Northern Fleet found here the Red Navy peakless cap and fragments of cork insulation (presumably from D-1). Search work continued until November 26, minesweepers and the Pamyat Ruslan rescue tug of the Northern Special Underwater Expedition (EPRON) took part in them.

November 18 at 02.00 in the southern part of the polygon N 6, at the point 69º 29 "1" "North latitude 32º 54"7"" East longitude (15-18 cables from the island of Bolshoy Arsky) during the search work, the bottom cable of the minesweeper was cut off, and the metal detector showed the presence of a large amount of metal here three times.

The second point where a large metal object was found was a point above Cape Vyev-Navolok, at a distance of 18-20 cables from the coastline.

After the end of the period of autumn-winter storms in April 1941, the commander of the Northern Fleet conducted an exercise for the rescue squad of the fleet to raise the "sunken" submarine. Probably, the exercise was carried out to test the fleet's ability to lift the D-1. And that's why.

By 1940, the limit for the work of divers was a depth of 200 meters (this unique and record-breaking descent at that time was made on the basis of the Naval Diving College in Balaklava).

In the prewar years, 2 submarines were lost in the Northern Fleet. "D-1" was at a relatively shallow depth (70-127 meters), while another submarine "Sch-424" was at a depth of 250 meters.

Lifting a sunken submarine from a depth of 250 meters would be simply impossible.

The very fact of organizing such an exercise suggests that the command of the fleet knew that the depth of the place in the area of ​​the wreck of the submarine was available for long-term work of rescue divers. And this, in turn, may indicate that the place of death of "D-1" was either the area of ​​Bolshoy Arsky Island, or the area near Cape Vyev-Navolok.

As the “sunken” submarine, the Shch-404 boat was chosen with the same maximum diving depth as the “Decembrist”, though with a smaller displacement.

This choice was forced. By April 1941, the 1st division of the brigade included one submarine of the "Dekembrist" type - "D-3" and two that came in July 1940 from the shipyard of cruiser submarines of the "K" type. The brigade command could not risk these ships.

The exercise was carried out by the means and forces of the emergency rescue squad of the fleet. When lifting, 4 "soft" 10-ton pontoons were used, brought under the "sunk submarine" by naval divers.

The rescue operation ended in failure. One of the bow pontoons broke the braid and independently jumped to the surface. "Pike" hit the ground at a depth of 30 meters and only thanks to the decisive and timely actions of the crew surfaced. Then the war began, and the lost submarine was forgotten.

The maneuvers of D-1 and the ships that carried out the search were displayed on map N 942 (let's call it map N 1), which is currently preserved only in the Museum of the Red Banner Northern Fleet. A copy of this map was published in the newspaper "On Guard of the Arctic" on March 04, 1990.

There is a modern version of the Motovsky Bay map, let's call it map N 2. Let's use this map to plot the D-1 maneuver on it according to the data obtained from the Central State Archive of the USSR Navy Yu. P. Prokhorenko (the son of the deceased commissar D-1 "Senior political officer P. M. Prokhorenko), published in the newspaper "On Guard of the Arctic" on January 28, 1990.

At the first comparison of these maps, we will get a significant discrepancy between the calculated D-1 dive sites at 13.30 on November 13. There are several very important questions that need a precise answer:

1. Why did "D-1" end up in the area of ​​\u200b\u200babout. Big Arsky?

On the 1st map, the D-1 immersion point at 13.30 is located off the northern coast of the Motovsky Bay, coordinates are 69º 33 "7"" North latitude 32º 58 "5" "E longitude (outside the polygon N 6) according to the true bearing from Cape Vyev -Pillowed 342 degrees.

But according to the data of the Central State Archive of the Navy of the USSR (“On Guard of the Arctic” 01/28/1990), the coastal observation post on Vyev-Navolok observed the submersion of the submarine along the bearing of 335 degrees (approximately 69 degrees 31.7 minutes north latitude 32 degrees 58.5 minutes east longitude). This dive point is located almost in the middle of the Motovsky Bay.

When comparing the data of the archive and map No. 1, the difference in the estimated location of "D-1" at 13.30 is 2.7 miles to the south. After completing the exercise according to the plan, the submarine could be much further south than the place of the ship calculated by the navigator. Here, an error is possible both in determining the place of the submarine by the ship's own means, and in determining its place by observation posts before diving "D-1". This is so far the only explanation for the location of the sunken submarine in the area of ​​Bolshoi Arsky Island.

2. Could a submarine have been crushed at depths in the area of ​​Bolshoy Arsky Island?

The depths at the point of the alleged death of the boat are from 70 to 127 meters and are not so great as to crush the ship's strong hull. The maximum diving depth for submarines of the 1st series, to which the Decembrist belonged, is 90 m. -1 "at a depth of 100-135 m, the strong hull should not have collapsed. This assumption was confirmed by an accident with the submarine of the same type "D-2" ("Narodovolets"), which on 06/25/1938, when trimmed, sank to a depth of 123 meters. At the same time, “... only drops of water were found in the glands and on the bolts of the removable sheets of the pressure hull” (V. I. Dmitriev “Soviet submarine shipbuilding”. - Moscow, Military Publishing House, 1990, p. 44).

Consequently, the death of a submarine in this area could only occur due to external influence on the ship's strong hull.

3. Where was the source of solar spots coming to the surface?

The numbering of the places of observation of the solarium emerging from the crushed fuel tanks of the boat on map N 1 for the point of its alleged death near Bolshoi Arsky Island does not find a clear explanation.

If the submarine sank in the southern part of the bay, then the numbering of the detected spots should increase as it approaches the center of the bay.

When the "D-1" was located at a shallow depth in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe Big Arsky, the hull of fuel tanks (located outside the strong hull) could only be destroyed from external influences: a ram, a mine explosion, coastline stones.

The numbers of discovered sunspots on the 1st map increase from north to south. Probably, in this case, the source of spots can be located in the center of polygon No. 6 at great depths, where it is necessary to look for "D-1".

4. Why was no one found on the surface of the bay?

If the submariners had the opportunity to go to the surface or release a life buoy, on the surface of the bay or on the coast, the search forces would be able to find the sailors. Moreover, the total vector of currents in the bay is directed towards the southern coast of the Motovsky Bay. But why did the crew not use personal means of rescuing submariners (ISA) from a sunken submarine or did not indicate the place of the ship lying on the ground? The answer to this question will only be given by the rise of the "Decembrist" to the surface. This most likely means:

Either the submariners died from the rapid spread of outboard water and therefore remained in a strong hull at combat posts;

Either the exit to the surface of the surviving crew members was impossible due to the great depth of the ground;

Either the 4th compartment, which is also the central post of the “Decembrist” (at the same time, the refuge compartment containing centralized systems for diving, ship control, locking to leave the sunken submarine), where the entire command staff of the ship and helmsmen died, controlled by horizontal rudders. And the submariners who were in the end compartments could not independently reach the surface.

The reality of these assumptions is supported by the cases of the death of the North Sea submarines: Shch-424 (October 20, 1939), S-80 (January 27, 1961) and Pacific submarines: S-117 (December 15, 1952) and "K-129" (March 8, 1968).

In any case, the disaster could have occurred both due to the re-burrowing of the D-1, and from external influences on its hull.

Three out of four answers reveal the presence of a possible external impact on the D-1 hull when it is submerged or at periscope depth.

In favor of the version of external influence on the "D-1" (in this case, both the command staff and helmsmen died immediately), namely on the 4th compartment, the following can be said. According to the D-1 project, it had a very “large margin of buoyancy (45.5%)”, and in the event of a large influx of water into the ship’s strong hull, the ability to control horizontal rudders and decisive actions of the command staff of the central post “was able to surface when flooding of any compartment, ”including the largest - torpedo or diesel (V. I. Dmitriev “Soviet submarine shipbuilding” - Moscow, Military Publishing House, 1990, pp. 39, 51-52).

In addition, if the "Decembrist" was on the surface, then there would be an upper watch, a submarine commander or his assistant on the bridge or in the felling fence. In this case, after the death of the ship, the search forces would have been able to find either the surviving submariners of the upper watch, or the bodies of the sailors. The search for the missing "D-1" by the ships of the fleet began already 5 hours after the submersion of the boat and the start of the combat exercise, that is, around 19:00 on November 13. But not until November 26, not later, neither on the surface of the bay, nor on the coast of the traces of the dead submariners, with the exception of the Red Navy cap and pieces of insulation (presumably from the submarine hull), were never found.

But a year before the death of the D-1, a catastrophe had already occurred in the Northern Fleet with the death of most of the crew and the submarine itself, which was on the surface. On October 20, 1939, the submarine of the 2nd division of the Shch-424 brigade left for a shift on patrol near the Rybachy Peninsula "Shch-404". Actually, she did not reach the watch line. At the exit from the Kola Bay, not far from the island of Toros, she was rammed by the Soviet trawler RT-43 "Rybets" entering the bay. The submarine was on the surface, on the bridge was the acting commander of the Shch-424, Captain 3rd Rank K. M. Shuisky and 6 submariners. The trawler hit the "Pike" on the left side in the area of ​​the 4th compartment. A submarine with a large trim aft sank in 2 minutes at a depth of 250 meters. 29 crew members were killed, the divisional mechanic of the 1st division of the brigade captain of the 3rd rank G.F. Noritsyn and two cadets of the VMU. Dzerzhinsky. Everyone who was on the bridge at the time of the disaster was thrown overboard upon impact. In addition, before the "Pike" disappeared under water, 3 sailors managed to get out of the central post and were also rescued. The rescue ships and fishermen arrived in time to take 10 living members of the Shch-424 crew aboard.

But "D-1" disappeared, leaving virtually no trace. It is most likely that the submarine died when it was submerged or at periscope depth, or the true cause of the death of the crew and the ship was otherwise ...

In his book “Together with the Fleet,” the former commander of the Northern Fleet, Admiral A. G. Golovko, wrote:

“... All sorts of assumptions were made about the causes of death. Some believed that someone else's submarine was in the bay, she supposedly ambushed the "D-1" and sank her. Others believed that someone had planted mines in Motovsky Bay and that the boat had blown up on one of them.

The question arises: “What kind of alien submarine or mines laid by someone can we talk about in a peaceful interwar autumn?”

Why did "D-1" die?

There may be several reasons for the death of "D-1".

As already mentioned, the official version of the death of the submarine - due to care for the maximum diving depth due to the fault of the crew or due to a malfunction of the GR - could indeed have taken place, but it would have been too obvious and superficial.

The following could contribute to the secret of the true causes of the death of the submarines at that time:

The beginning (precisely on November 13, 1940, on the day of the death of the submarine) in Berlin, German-Soviet negotiations on the prospects for further cooperation and interstate relations, where each side tested the reliability of its alliance from 1939. At the same time, Germany did not particularly strive to maintain this union, and even vice versa. Already during the negotiations (11/14/1940), Hitler at a meeting with his generals noted that in order to achieve victory over England, it is necessary to strengthen the Air Force and Navy. At the same time, this would lead to a weakening of the ground forces, despite the fact that it is not acceptable as long as the threat from Russia remains. In Hitler's opinion, Russia could not be expected to remain indifferent until the resistance of England was broken;

The desire of the Soviet leadership to at least outwardly demonstrate its neutrality in the outbreak of World War II, in general, and in undermining the economic blockade of the British Isles by the ships of the Kriegsmarine, in particular. At the same time, it tried in every possible way not to aggravate interstate relations with either Germany or Great Britain, while the latter, in order to protect their own interests, did everything to draw their enemy into hostilities with the Soviet Union, thereby scattering his forces.

And here it must be said about the presence in the Arctic of the secret German base "Nord", about which little is known for certain:

1. According to German sources, the location of the base was indicated by the coordinates 69º 25 "north latitude, 32º 26" east. longitude.

2. From December 1939 to April 1940, the captain zur see Nischlag was the senior naval commander of the base, and in July 1940, the corvettenkapiten Gaushofer.

3. German supply ships were constantly based here: Viking-5, Sachsenwald, Kedingen, Fenitsia (Venice) and Jan Willem. In June-July 1940, the Iller banana carrier was located here, originally intended to go to the Pacific Ocean along the Northern Sea Route.

There are two mysteries at the Nord base (possibly related), the solution of which could be of great help in clarifying the need for such a late training exit of the D-1 (while all training trips were carried out only in the summer months), which became the last for 55 crew members and the submarine itself.

One of them is the operation Fall Grun. This operation probably "showed" for the British Admiralty the existence of some connection between the secret base "Nord" and the unexpected appearance in the Pacific Ocean of German warships-raiders and submarines.

Nothing is known about another secret, except that in 1998 information appeared in the open literature (requiring careful verification) about some secret mission of the 1st (cruising) division of M. Gadzhiev in 1940. At the same time, it is also indicated here that one of the submarines of the division died. Only D-1 could become a dead submarine. But what kind of secret operation it was remains a mystery to this day.

In addition, there is evidence of another point of death of "D-1". This is a point with coordinates 70º 52"06"" North latitude 48º 45"05"" East. longitude. But this point is located in the southern part of the Barents Sea, approximately 95 miles from the northern tip of Kolguev Island and from the Gusinaya Zemlya Peninsula (on the Novaya Zemlya archipelago). With an understaffed and poorly trained crew, especially during the autumn-winter storms, F. M. Eltishchev would hardly have gone so far from the Main Base of the Fleet. And while "D-1" is not found in Motovsky Bay, this point of death "has the right to life."

Below are the possible versions of the death of "D-1".

Version N 1. English Navy.

Given the great dependence of the British economy on the uninterrupted functioning of maritime navigation, the Admiralty considered the organization of a naval blockade of Kriegsmarine ships within the North and Baltic Seas, as well as the organization of a system for escorting their own merchant ships, as one of the main elements of protecting sea lanes.

However, in reality, with the outbreak of hostilities, everything turned out to be much worse. And from the very first days of the war, the successes of the German raiders and submarines showed that most of the plans of the Admiralty remained only "on paper". By the beginning of 1940, the British felt a lack of food and many types of industrial raw materials (especially iron ore and timber). In addition, after the capture of the Norwegian naval bases, the Kriegsmarine submarines got the opportunity, when traveling to the combat areas, to no longer go around the British Isles and act much more effectively on the communications of the allies. And already in the summer of 1940, the British Isles were forced to start living to a large extent at the expense of the reserves accumulated earlier. In addition, British intelligence received information that “in Poland, the Germans held only 7 divisions, 2 of which were transferred to the west during the spring campaign” (W. Shearer “The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich.” - M .: Voenizdat, 1991. Vol. 2, p.185)

The defeat of the allied forces on the continent created a real threat of the invasion of German troops into the British Isles. In early July, the British government recognized that Germany would attempt an invasion within the next few weeks and began to take the most urgent measures to strengthen the defenses of the islands. Never before, outwardly, was the manifestation of the threat of defeat for Great Britain so serious. However, as it turned out later, the actual threat of landing on the British Isles was not as great as it seemed. Hitler considered the Soviet Union a more formidable force that could not be left behind in an attack on Britain. And already on June 30, 1940, the chief of the German General Staff, F. Halder, had the first entry about the idea of ​​​​the German leadership to first solve the "Eastern problem", that is, the invasion of the USSR ("Military History Journal", N 2, 1959 year, p. 65). At the same time, the German leadership understood that only the secrecy of preparation and the surprise of an attack could give positive results in a "blitzkrieg" against the Soviet Union. The main potential adversary of Germany had to remain confident in the prosperity of German-Soviet friendship and cooperation, while Great Britain had to be in constant tension and think only of her own defense. And this was facilitated by grandiose disinformation actions, the sole purpose of which was the need to convince both opponents of the complete uncertainty of Germany's intentions.

Germany succeeded. The preparations for operations Seeleve and Felix (the capture of Gibraltar) drew all the attention of the world community to the British Isles and, in turn, diverted the attention of the Soviet leadership from the concentration of German troops in the east according to the Otto plan. The Soviet Union continued to treat Germany with full confidence (at least outwardly), fulfilling its trade obligations and carefully delivering strategic raw materials in accordance with the closed commodity lists "B" and "C" of the loan agreement of August 19, 1939 and economic agreements of 1940 and 1941, without suspecting that preparations for the attack had already begun and German troops, mainly from Army Group B (France), began a covert transfer to the borders of the USSR. Initially, the hostilities of Germany were scheduled for the autumn of 1940.

Almost simultaneously, the British Intelligence Committee received "reliable information" that Army Group A had been created for the "invasion" of the British Isles and Operation Seelewe was scheduled for August. Then, that it was postponed to September 1940. Great Britain further intensified defense preparations.

The British leadership understood that from October-November in the English Channel there would come a time of autumn-winter storms and then the use of landing ships and funds collected by Germany on the coast (for the Zeelev) and capable of delivering troops to the British Isles, in the fall of 1940 year becomes impossible. And Great Britain did everything possible to hold out until the onset of these autumn storms. The regrouping of German troops in the eastern direction was completely completed on October 7, 1940, the headquarters were transferred: the 4th, 12th, 18th armies and 12 corps, as well as 30 divisions with all weapons and equipment. On October 12, Hitler canceled the state of readiness of the troops for Operation Seelewe, and a month later (December 8) Operation Felix was also canceled. But all this became known later.

In July 1940, the British continued to prepare for a possible landing of German troops on the British Isles and continued to look for any means of protection. Probably, one of the ways to protect was to be the "neutralization" of the Nord base.

In November 1940, in the Pacific Ocean, far from the Atlantic theater of operations (ATVD), a new raider "Komet" (raider "B", "Ship N 45") appeared, which, in a group with another auxiliary cruiser "Penguin" (raider F , “Ship N 33”), with complete impunity arranged the extermination of allied transports here. In a short time, this group sank 9 transports and captured the Dutch transport with natural rubber (due to the lack of rubber in Germany, civil department vehicles with a carrying capacity of less than 3 tons were supposed to be transferred to iron rims).

The transition along the Northern Sea Route to the Pacific Ocean of the German auxiliary cruiser "Komet" (depending on the area of ​​​​the transition bore the names on board: "Semyon Dezhnev", "Danube", "Donau", "Doon", Japanese transport) under the command of the frigatekapiten Keptel was produced in the provision of Soviet icebreakers and under the control of the Main Directorate of the Northern Sea Route (GU NSR). He showed the command of the Kriegsmarine that it was possible to go from Bergen to the Bering Strait in 3.5-4 weeks and not need to spend several months (if the raider went through the Suez or Panama Canal). Moreover, under the conditions of a naval blockade, the raider might not even have reached the Far East.

07/09/1940 "Komet", disguised as the Soviet icebreaker "Semyon Dezhnev", left Bergen and began moving eastward. It was one of the fastest (speed up to 15 knots) and well-armed Kriegsmarine raiders, owned by the North German Lloyd company.

With its own displacement of about 7.5 thousand tons, it had a fuel reserve of more than 2 thousand tons, which made it possible to travel almost 50 thousand miles on an economical course (up to 9 knots) and arrive in the Pacific Ocean without refueling. In terms of its armament, the Komet was superior to the special-built Allied cruisers. It had six 150-mm (according to other sources 180-mm) guns (covered with folding and camouflage shields), up to 10 torpedo tubes (located in lap ports and also covered with camouflage shields) with a large supply of torpedoes, 7-9 anti-aircraft guns, 400 anchor mines of the "EMS" type and a high-speed boat "LS", equipped for their covert setting, 2 seaplanes "Arado-196" in the hangar. The seaplanes were equipped with special devices to cut off the radio antennas on detected ships, which would prevent these ships from reporting a raider attack.

Radio communications and radio intelligence for the cruiser were provided by 6 radio operators fluent in Russian and English.

An ideal and reliable legend was created to mask the transition of the Comet. Outwardly, the Komet really resembled the new Soviet icebreaker Semyon Dezhnev, whose arrival in Arkhangelsk was expected in the summer of 1940. Some differences in the contours of the German raider were eliminated with the help of canvas body kits and special devices made in the factory.

On July 12, while in the area of ​​the North Cape, "Komet" received a radiogram from the Main Directorate of the NSR about the beginning of the piloting on August 4-6, in the same radiogram, R. Eissen, the senior officer at the Capiten zur See crossing, received an invitation to wait until the piloting began in the port of Murmansk.

However, Eissen, due to the secrecy of the Fall Grun operation, officially rejected this proposal, and the Komet, as the Soviet Danube transport, according to the official version, independently headed for the Pechora Bay area, where it stayed for more than a month.

Since July 15, the werewolf raider in the bay has been waiting for the passage of the ships of the EON-10 expedition and, probably, the arrival of the real Dezhnev in the area. Before the start of the Arctic navigation in 1940, the Soviet trust Arktikugol planned to charter the real Dezhnev to provide cargo transportation in the area of ​​the island of Svalbard, between the villages of Barentsburg, Grumant City and Pyramiden. But the Main Directorate of the NSR made changes to the plans of Arktikugol and for August-September the ship was sent to deliver cargo to polar stations in the little-explored areas of the Kara Sea and Laptev Sea islands.

In early August, the real "Semyon Dezhnev" began its Arctic navigation in 1940. During the trip, the crew of the ship accepted the challenge for the competition of the crew of the steamer "Stalingrad", and, in turn, challenged the crew of the icebreaking steamer "Sibiryakov" to the competition, informing them by radiograms.

On August 5, 1940, the Shch-423 submarine left Polyarny for the Far East as part of a special expedition (EON-10) (commander captain 3rd rank I. M. Zaidulin, backup commander senior lieutenant A. M. Bystrov).

In the history of preparations for the passage of the submarine "Shch-423" along the Northern Sea Route, there is one feature that possibly fatally influenced the fate of the crew of the "D-1". Unlike the combat training of the other submarines of the brigade, the Pike worked out all its naval tasks in the Motovsky Bay. This was probably determined by the installation of an anti-ice "fur coat" on the submarine's hull, but after the appearance in the English press of information about the joint transition of the German ship and submarine to the Far East, in the ORC this feature of the preparation could easily be associated with the Nord base and the presence in the base special group of submarines.

On August 14, the real Dezhnev, passing through the Novaya Zemlya Strait Matochkin Shar, met the first ice in the Kara Sea. "Komet", ending a long stay in the Pechora Bay, began preparations for the transition to the Novaya Zemlya area.

By August 16, a representative of the German embassy Krepsch appeared on board the Komet, who had been with the assistant to the German naval attaché on the ship Venice (in the Nord base) since July 19, with a check on the state of affairs of the base.

After the end of the passage along the NSR, which the raider passed in a record short time - 23 days, of which only 15 were running (during a normal passage, caravans of ships and vessels spent at least 26 days), Krepsh (according to other sources - Krepsht) at the point "Ailinglop "He switched to a special supply vessel" Regensburg "and through Tokyo and Vladivostok immediately returned to Moscow to the German naval attache von Baumbach.

If the "Komet" did not enter the ports of the Kola Peninsula, then how and for what purpose did this "representative" of the German embassy end up on board the raider? After all, he could get to Moscow more conveniently and comfortably by the Kirov railway? Maybe the cruiser still went to the Nord base or to Murmansk?

The stealth and secrecy of the raider's transition from west to east was preserved, but, apparently, in October some information nevertheless reached the British Isles and the English Admiralty.

On November 2, 1940 (10 days before the disappearance of D-1), the GTU of the NKVD of the USSR informed its leadership that an article was published in one of the English newspapers about escorting a submarine and a German steamer into the Arctic navigation in 1940 from west to east. And without a doubt, these ships were considered as one unit. (In addition, the Komet began its movement to the Far East from Gotenhafen, where in July 1940 the 27th German submarine flotilla was created, specially designed for tactical training of Kriegsmarine submarine commanders. The Komet could probably have officers in the crew or passengers from this fleet).

In this case, Shch-423 was unequivocally considered by the English ORC for the German submarine, which, together with the surface raider, went over to conduct combat operations in the Pacific Ocean. After all, it was October 1940 that became the most successful for the submariners of Rear Admiral Doenitz. German submarines sank 63 allied transports in a month.

During this time, the real Dezhnev actually visited 15 points in the Arctic and returned to Murmansk in November 1940, and then left for Svalbard in early December to work in the Ice Fjord.

On November 5, 1940, the Kriegsmarine struck again at the Royal Navy. The German heavy cruiser Admiral Scheer attacked and destroyed the allied convoy HX-84 coming from Halifax. At the same time, 5 transports and the English auxiliary cruiser Jervis Bay guarding them were destroyed. Two other convoys from Halifax and a convoy from Bermuda were returned to their bases. Economic, financial and combat losses were great. But as mentioned above, once every nineteen days the cruiser met with support ships, which, before arriving in the waiting area, had to break through the line of the English naval blockade or, thanks to the Nord base, safely bypass it.

Consequently, a secret base on the Kola Peninsula could still exist.

The covert and fast passage of the Komet along the Northern Sea Route, its successful operations against the allied transports in the Pacific Ocean and the successful operations of the Admiral Scheer in the Atlantic, the unusual preparation of the Shch-423 in the Motovsky Bay, combined with each other, easily turned for the English Admiralty into a "strong irritant" and a kind of "mine detonator" that possibly sank the "D-1".

The British knew the location of the Nord base with great certainty from the captured members of the crews of the supply ships. The Motovsky Bay area was also well known to the Admiralty since 1930, when Royal Navy warships (guarding fishing trawlers in the fishing area off the coast of the Kola Peninsula) replenished their fresh water supplies here and settled in bad weather. According to the reports of the Main Directorate of the Border Guard and the troops of the OGPU, only in March-April 1930, English ships (including the cruiser) came here more than 5 times, stayed in the bay until 12 o'clock.

Later, in August 1937, a foreign submarine (most likely an English one) was discovered by Soviet ships in the area of ​​the Polyarnoye Main Naval Base under construction. After the discovery, the submarine sank and left the Kola Bay. Later it turned out that the same boat landed a reconnaissance group on the Kola coast, and then also quietly removed it.

Taken together, the events allow us to conclude that the appearance in the area of ​​the Kola or Motovsky bays on November 13, 1940, of an English hunter submarine that would be looking for German submarines, is quite real. Moreover, in November 1940, the British Admiralty hardly knew that on September 5 the Germans had decided to liquidate the base and that in November the success of using German submarines would decrease by more than 2 times and remain on average within these limits until the end 1941.

Version N 2. Secret minefield.

The laying of an English minefield at the entrance to Motovsky Bay or Western Litsa Bay (i.e., in Soviet territorial waters), including one disguised as a defensive barrier at the Nord base, can be considered just as realistically.

Undermining a Soviet ship on this barrier would not have caused an armed conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union, but it would have deprived Soviet-German relations of confidence, and therefore “neutralized” the Nord base itself.

The use of British submarines for laying minefields in World War II was generally limited, but it was in 1940 that the Admiralty was forced to actively use its minelayer submarines to impede the exits of German raiders, including from Norwegian bases. At the same time, out of 7 special-built underwater minelayers, 3 were lost, including the Narual, which, according to official data, died under unknown circumstances on August 1, 1940 in the Norwegian Sea.

The covert laying of a British minefield in the territorial waters of a neutral state that provided assistance to Germany had already been carried out earlier. On April 8, 1940, off the coast of Norway, British ships, in order to prevent a possible German landing, set up minefields on the approaches to Narvik, Trondheim and Bode within a three-mile zone.

In order to protect their own sea lanes in the Atlantic and the Pacific, as well as to prevent the use of the Nord base as a potential stronghold for the German landing on the British Isles from the rear, the Royal Navy could actually set up mines on the way to the Nord base, perhaps even excluding the appearance of Soviet ships in the bay.

The British knew about the seasonality of firing practice by ships of the Northern Fleet (summer months of the year) and the firing area (shallow waters of the White Sea). This was probably also confirmed by the report of the commander of the submarine, which came to the Polyarny area in August 1937.

Consequently, for the English ORC, the D-1 and PBS Umba that appeared in the Motovsky Bay could become the 2nd group preparing to move to the Far East (suppose the southern route). At the same time, they probably became the first warships to enter the Motovsky Bay after the storm that raged in the Barents Sea from November 7th.

The English commander could have information that only German submarines from the Nord base could work out their naval tasks in Motovsky Bay, as did the submarine (Shch-423) that had just transferred to the Pacific Ocean together with the raider - auth.).

Therefore, "D-1" as a "German submarine" could have been torpedoed by an English hunter submarine by mistake.

True, it is difficult to talk about the versions of the explosion on the minefield or as a result of the defeat of the English submarine by torpedoes, since observers or gunners of the 4th battery of the 104th PAP at Cape Vyev-Navolok should have heard the explosion. And they didn't hear anything.

But we cannot deny this version until the D-1 itself is raised or examined.

Version N 3. Kriegsmarine.

In April-May 1940, Germany occupied Norway, having received free access to the North Atlantic and the North Sea, practically ensured the safety of its maritime transport of iron ore and strategic raw materials (including transit through the Soviet Union or the Northern Sea Route) and allowed its Navy to hunt freely on the trade routes of allied coastal shipping. The need for the existence and use of the secret "Base" Nord, always closely associated with the individual opinion of the Soviet leadership, has practically disappeared.

On September 5, 1940, the Kriegsmarine decided to liquidate the secret base in Zapadnaya Litsa.

One of the reasons for Germany's refusal to continue using the Nord base could also be the establishment of control of the Northern Fleet over the Motovsky Bay. In November 1939, the 6th battery of the 104th cannon-artillery regiment was deployed in the western part of the bay, and the 4th battery of the 104th PAP was deployed at Cape Vyev-Navolok, armed with 152-mm guns that were capable of not only to protect the base from uninvited guests, but also to cover any target in the Motovsky Bay.

Perhaps the submarine died as a result of the liquidation activities of the Nord base.

To preserve the secrecy of liquidation measures, the evacuation of property was probably carried out at night. An exit at this time of day was necessary for German ships in order to leave Soviet territorial waters before dawn and break away from the sea areas off the coast of the Kola Peninsula. In addition, the exit of the transports was probably carried out without notifying the Soviet observation posts, since the ships of the Northern Fleet were based in Polyarny and Zapadnaya Litsa Bay was quite far away from them.

Thus, the D-1, which surfaced after independently performing training tasks, on the possible route of the ship leaving the Nord base on November 13, 1940, in the dark could easily be mistaken for an English submarine conducting reconnaissance here, or sunk by accident collision.

The fact that the ramming, if it took place, was accidental (and probably not noticeable to the crew of the ship or transport) is evidenced by the fact that on April 30, 1941, the German naval attache (probably von Baumbach) made a report to the General headquarters on the presence of three D-type submarines in the Northern Fleet. The reliability of the information in the report was quite high (only 2 submarines of the “K” type that arrived in Polyarnoye in August 1940, “D-2”, which went to Leningrad for modernization, and the lost “D-1”) were not taken into account.

This report contained the last reliable information on the composition of the Northern Fleet as of September 1939 (in September 1939, D-2 went to Leningrad) and was received by the German naval attache no earlier than November 1939 (it took into account the death of Shch-424 October 20, 1939).

Therefore, it did not contain information about the new cruising submarines of the fleet and the death of the D-1.

In turn, this allows us to conclude that the Kriegsmarine command had no data on the incident in Motovsky Bay on November 13, 1940.

This can be explained by the fact that either the collision was imperceptible to the crew of the foreign ship, or the ship that collided with the D-1 did not reach its base.

Minesweepers with a metal detector on November 18 near Cape Vyev-Navolok, at a distance of 18-20 cables from the shore, discovered a second point - a large metal object (approximately 69º 29 "north latitude 33º 03" 8 "" longitude east). The lack of survey data suggests that at this point there may be an English submarine (or another vessel or ship, including a German one), which accidentally collided with the D-1.

In 1940, the Royal Navy lost six submarines (including the underwater minelayer Narwhal). At the same time, for unknown reasons, most close to November 13, disappeared:

However, the possible laying of mines in the territorial waters of a neutral state is an operation of particular importance and secrecy. It would be naive to believe that information about the areas where minefields were laid in 1940 would have “surfaced” in the archives: the Barents Sea, the Kola Bay or the Motovsky Bay.

We must not forget that there is still no complete information about the disappearance of the Polish submarine "Ozhel" (passed over to the allies in June 1940), as well as the fate of the Norwegian submarine "V-1" and 4 Dutch submarines - "K -14", "K-15", "O-21" and "Zvardis".

So far, there is no complete data on the disappearance of British boats and submarines that went over to the side of the Allies (acting according to the plans of the English Admiralty), as well as on the second large metal object at the bottom of the Motovsky Bay. This version will exist, and it would be premature to exclude the participation of the Royal Navy of Great Britain in the death of the D-1.

In addition, as mentioned above, the 1st division of the brigade of the SF submarine brigade, which at that time consisted of two newest K-type cruiser submarines and two large D-type submarines, completed a secret mission in the late autumn of 1940 (submarines were at sea for more than two months). Perhaps it was connected with the autumn fleet maneuvers to practice landing and antiamphibious operations. After all, according to the operational plan, the Northern Fleet was supposed to solve, among other tasks, “conducting submarine cruising operations in sea communications off the western coast of Norway and in the Skagerrak Strait” (Northern Fleet of Russia. - Murmansk, 1996, p. 83).

True, it should be noted that apart from the mention of this task in the Encyclopedia of Military Art (dedicated to famous sailors and submariners of the 20th century), no other references to the operation have yet been found.

Version N 5. Will of chance.

According to the headquarters of the Northern Fleet, out of 404 mines laid by Soviet ships in January 1940 to block approaches to Petsamo and the western part of the Sredny and Rybachy peninsulas, by the end of 1940, 88 were found to be torn from anchors and drifting under the influence of wind and waves. From November 6-7, 1940, a hurricane raged over Rybachy for almost a week, and there was a strong storm in the sea. The mines exposed in the Petsamo area could have been brought into any bay or Rybachy Bay, especially since the resulting vector of currents in the Motovsky Bay is directed precisely to the southern coast.

Therefore, it is impossible to exclude the undermining of "D-1" on a random floating mine.

The eastern regions of the Kola Peninsula were well known to the Royal Navy since the First World War. By its beginning, Russian minesweeping forces in the North were weak. Therefore, in the second half of 1915, 8 English TSCs of special construction came to Arkhangelsk to ensure the delivery of goods by allied transports. The area northwest of Iokanga was assigned to the English ships. In the second half of 1916, the British set up an anti-submarine barrier on the Yokangsky roadstead, since in the summer English warships, including the cruiser Iphigenia, began to be based here.

It was in the anti-submarine network in the autumn of 1937 near the Murmansk coast that the submarine "D-3" (commander - M.N. Popov) got. She returned to the base and found a large group of fishing trawlers on the route. Judging by the further actions of the boat commander, the trawlers belonged to the UK or Norway. The submarine commander decided to bypass these trawlers in a submerged position. Having submerged, "D-3" got into an anti-submarine network, not indicated on the map, and lost the ability to move and be controlled. For about an hour, the boat, changing course, tried to escape from the underwater trap.

When this was possible, then while the density of the electrolyte in the battery allowed the submarine in the underwater position "D-3" went in the direction of the Polar.

Only in the evening she surfaced to the surface. The crew discovered that the submarine's hull and the felling fence were entangled in anti-submarine nets left over from the First World War. At the same time, damage to the rudders of the submarine was revealed. For the courage and self-control shown, part of the crew was encouraged by the commander of the Northern Fleet.

Similar anti-submarine barriers were also set up in the Kola Bay (the area of ​​Sedlovaty Island - Cape Belokamenka), and a chain mail boom was placed in front of the entrance to Ekaterininskaya Harbor, where 3 English submarines were based since 1916.

Since Motovsky Bay was an area that British ships used until 1930 (and possibly longer) for replenishing fresh water supplies and minor repairs, it can theoretically be assumed that anti-submarine nets could have been set up here as well. Considering that "D-1" could have a position error of up to 2.7 miles towards the southern coast, then if there were nets here, it could fall into this trap and not break away from it.

A trap for submarines could also be of natural (natural) origin: a narrow cleft between boulders on the ground or a rocky “visor” not marked on the map on the southern coast of Motovsky Bay. But, I repeat, this version is the most unrealistic.

Conclusions.

The disappearance of the submarine "D-1" may mean that the following happened.

1). "D-1" was sunk by an English submarine, which was carrying out topographic reconnaissance of the coast of the Motovsky Bay, or which had come specially to destroy another German submarine from the Nord base, which was preparing to move from Zapadnaya Litsa to the Pacific Ocean;

2). D-1 was mistaken for one of the British submarines conducting reconnaissance off the Soviet coast. In this case, as an English submarine, she could be destroyed by German transport or a warship;

3). "D-1" came under an accidental ramming attack by a German ship or transport leaving the "Nord" base during its liquidation activities;

4). "D-1" was blown up on an English (unlikely German) minefield, exposed on the approaches to the Nord base or on a drifting mine;

5). There was a navigational accident associated with the loss of the ability to surface;

6). The submarine went beyond the maximum diving depth due to a malfunction of the GR or due to a mistake by the personnel in the middle part of the Motovsky Bay.

The brevity of the content of one version or another depends on the availability of materials and documents or real events that occurred in the Northern Fleet before November 1940. Later, perhaps, new versions of the death of the D-1 will appear, since it is already known that the senior political instructor P. M. Prokhorenko, the military commissar of the ship, kept a personal diary. After the death of the boat, the wife of the military commissar was visited twice by a "submarine mechanic", at the same time a neighbor in a communal apartment, and in the most rude form demanded to give this diary (V. V. Sorokazherdyev. The sea kept the secret. - Murmansk, 1996, p. 30). The submariner of the submarine brigade of the Northern Fleet hardly began to demand a diary in a similar tone. Perhaps it can be found in some special storage.

It will soon be 65 years since the 1st submarine of the Northern Fleet with the entire crew disappeared near the Main Base. In any case, the Decembrist submariners deserved to be remembered and a monument to the ancestor of the submarine forces of the Northern Fleet was opened.

The primary elements of revealing the mystery of the death of the "D-1" are the detection and inspection of the ship on the ground, and if possible, its recovery.

Reliable sources of information about the disaster at the present time can be the German naval archives, the above-mentioned Collection of Captured Documents, possibly the documents of the English Admiralty.

Presumably "D-1" may be located:

In the former polygon No. 6: 69º 33"2"" north latitude 32º 47"2"" east. longitude;

69º 33"2"" North latitude 33º East longitude;

69º 30" north latitude 33º east longitude;

69º 30" North 32º 51"2"" East longitude;

69º 30"7"" North 32º 47"2"" East longitude;

In the area of ​​Bolshoi Arsky Island 69º 29"1"" N. latitude 32º 54"7"" E. longitude;

In the area of ​​Cape Vyev-Navolok 69º 29" north latitude 33º 03"8"" east. longitude.

Funds for the search operation and the installation of the monument can be received:

From all-Russian voluntary donations to the Monument to the first submariners of the Northern Fleet;

From the funds of the Administrations of the regions whose natives were the dead submariners;

In agreement with the governments of Germany and Great Britain.

If it is not possible to raise the submarine, then it will be necessary to raise the cabin fence or artillery guns of the submarine to install them in the Memorial with the announcement of the place of death of the D-1 submarine as a memorial site of the Northern Fleet.

Sergey Kovalev,