August 14th, 2012

Exactly 20 years ago, on August 14, 1992, one of the largest and bloodiest conflicts in Transcaucasia broke out - the Georgian-Abkhazian war of 1992-1993. I could not help but write about this conflict, as it affected my relatives and a large number of acquaintances. And besides, the day before yesterday I returned from Abkhazia and I can draw some conclusions.
What caused the conflict? There are quite a few versions, but I don’t really want to get into politics and understand this dirt. However, you can still tell a little from the history of the issue.
The Abkhazian kingdom arose in the 8th century. In the second half of the 9th century it became part of Georgia. In the 13th century, Abkhazia was conquered by the Mongols-Tatars, from the 16th century it was dependent on Turkey, in 1810 it became part of Russia. But still, even at that time, Turkey's influence in Abkhazia was extremely high. For the war with the highlanders of the Russian Empire, a buffer zone was needed, which until 1864, that is, until the end of the Caucasian war, was Abkhazia. After that, in order to strengthen its power here, Russia eliminated part of the ruling Chachba dynasty. The indigenous people were very dissatisfied with this, and the uprisings of 1866 and 1877 were the result of these discontents. However, after the harsh suppression of these uprisings, most of the Muslim population (up to 60%) was forced to move to the Ottoman Empire - this process is called Muhajirism, and it is in honor of the Muhajirs (and about 80% of all Abkhazians currently live outside the borders of Abkhazia itself) that the main embankment of the capital of the country - Sukhumi.
Thus, at the end of the 19th century, the fertile coastal territory remained practically uninhabited, since the indigenous Abkhazians preferred (and were forced) to live in the mountains.
After the 1917 revolution, Abkhazia became part of Georgia as an autonomous republic. This was enshrined in the Russian-Georgian agreement of May 7, 1920, which states that "the state border between Georgia and Russia runs from the Black Sea along the Psou River to Mount Akhakhcha" (the Abkhaz section of the modern Russian-Georgian border).
Tension in relations between the Georgian government and the Abkhazian autonomy was periodically manifested even in the Soviet period. The migration policy, which began under the auspices of Lavrenty Beria, reduced the proportion of Abkhazians in the total population of the republic (by the beginning of the 1990s, it was only 17%). The migration of Georgians to the territory of Abkhazia (1937-1954) was formed by settling in Abkhazian villages, as well as the settlement of Greek villages by Georgians, liberated after the deportation of Greeks from Abkhazia in 1949. The Abkhazian language (until 1950) was excluded from the secondary school curriculum and replaced by the obligatory study of the Georgian language, the Abkhazian writing was transferred to the Georgian graphic basis (in 1954 it was transferred to the Russian basis).
Mass demonstrations and unrest among the Abkhaz population demanding the withdrawal of Abkhazia from the Georgian SSR broke out in April 1957, in April 1967, and - the largest - in May and September 1978.

But what led to an open war, in which, according to official figures, about 16,000 people died, including 4,000 Abkhazians, 10,000 Georgians and 2,000 volunteers from various republics of the North Caucasus?

The aggravation of relations between Georgia and Abkhazia began on March 18, 1989. On this day, in the village of Lykhny (the ancient capital of the Abkhaz princes), a 30,000-strong gathering of the Abkhaz people took place, which put forward a proposal for the secession of Abkhazia from Georgia and its restoration to the status of a union republic.
And here is the same glade in Lykhny

On July 15-16, 1989, bloody clashes took place in Sukhumi between Georgians and Abkhazians (16 dead). The leadership of the republic then managed to resolve the conflict and the incident remained without serious consequences.
A new aggravation of the situation in Abkhazia occurred in connection with the announcement by the Georgian authorities of the abolition of the Constitution of the Georgian SSR of 1978 and the restoration of the constitution of the Georgian Democratic Republic of 1918, which proclaimed Georgia a unitary state and excluded the existence of territorial autonomies. In Abkhazia, this was perceived as the beginning of a course towards the complete assimilation of the small Abkhaz ethnic group, which by that time was a minority of the population of the Abkhaz ASSR.
On September 25, 1991, elections were held in the Armed Forces of Abkhazia, a deputy corps was formed on a quota basis: 28 seats for Abkhazians, 26 for Georgians, 11 for representatives of other ethnic groups.
On August 14, 1992, hostilities began between Georgia and Abkhazia, which developed into a real war with the use of aviation, artillery and other types of weapons. The beginning of the military phase of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict was initiated by the entry of Georgian troops into Abkhazia under the pretext of releasing Vice-Premier of Georgia A. Kavsadze, who was captured by the Zviadists and held on the territory of Abkhazia, guarding communications, incl. railroad, and other important facilities. This move provoked fierce resistance from the Abkhaz, as well as from other ethnic communities in Abkhazia.
At the beginning of the war, the Abkhazians did not have a regular army, there were practically no weapons - Georgian troops were met with hunting rifles and similar weapons. At such a pace, the Georgian troops pushed back the Abkhazians in Gagra, having occupied Sukhumi.
On September 3, 1992, in Moscow, during a meeting between Boris Yeltsin and Eduard Shevardnadze (who at that time held the posts of President of the Russian Federation and Chairman of the State Council of Georgia), a document was signed providing for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of Georgian troops from Abkhazia, and the return of refugees. Since the conflicting parties did not fulfill a single point of the agreement, hostilities continued.
By the end of 1992, the war had acquired a positional character, where neither side could win. On December 15, 1992, Georgia and Abkhazia signed several documents on the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of all heavy weapons and troops from the region of hostilities. There was a period of relative calm, but in early 1993, hostilities resumed after the Abkhaz offensive on Sukhumi, occupied by Georgian troops.
At the end of September 1993, Sukhumi came under the control of the Abkhaz troops. This happened largely due to the support (both in arms and "manpower") from the peoples of the North Caucasus and Transnistria, including from the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, which declared the readiness of the Chechens and the Circassians ethnically related to the Abkhazians to oppose the Georgians. The detachment of Chechen volunteers was headed by Shamil Basaev. In Abkhazia, Basayev showed himself well during the battles with the Georgian units, was appointed commander of the Gagra Front, commander of the corps of KNK troops, deputy minister of defense of Abkhazia, adviser to the commander-in-chief of the armed forces of Abkhazia, and after that he was also given the highest award of the republic - the hero of Abkhazia.
Gennady Troshev in the book "My war. The Chechen diary of a trench general” described Basayev’s activities in the vicinity of Gagra and the village of Leselidze:

"Basayev's Janissaries (and there were 5,000 of them) were distinguished in that war by senseless cruelty. In the autumn of 1993, in the vicinity of Gagra and the village of Liselidze, the "commander" himself personally led a punitive action to exterminate refugees. Several thousand Georgians were shot, hundreds of Armenians were massacred, Russian and Greek families. According to the stories of eyewitnesses who miraculously escaped, the bandits were happy to record scenes of bullying and rape on videotape. "

During the war, multiple war crimes were recorded, both on one side and on the other, but, as they say, it was these mercenaries (North Caucasians and Cossacks) who committed the most atrocities ...
In the battles in Abkhazia, the Adyghe volunteers, led by General Sosnaliev, played a huge role. He was awarded the title Hero of Abkhazia. Sosnaliev took the post of Minister of Defense of Abkhazia, received the rank of General of the Abkhazian army. Sending volunteers to Abkhazia was undertaken by the Congress of the Kabardian people, Adyge Khase of Adygea, the Chechen Congress, KNK. KNK President Shanibov was the leader of the volunteers.
After all this, the Georgian troops were forced to completely leave Abkhazia.
Of course, one cannot fail to mention here the participation of the Russian armed forces, which, according to some, took an active part in the conflict on the side of Abkhazia. Most likely, this was done in order to put pressure on Shevardnadze, who did not want to join the CIS, but in the end he had to do it. But, of course, we can guess as much as we like, but we will not know the true causes and secrets of this war for a long time...

But in the photo below you can see the house where my grandparents lived, this house is almost on the outskirts of the city, not far from the Kelasur River, right under the Abkhaz University. In total, it has three entrances, but, as you can see in the photo, there is no central part of the house - before the war there was a branch of the Geological Institute (or a museum?). It was bombed during the war, and it is not clear who - whether the Georgians, or the Abkhazians themselves. For what? There were many topographic maps, and some did not want these maps not to go to others. Traces of fragments and bullets are still visible on the walls of the house, and the central burnt-out part of the house still turns black in the middle of the street...
On the fifth floor then lived my grandmother's friend Baba Shura with her ancient mother, about 80 years old. So, during the shooting and bombardment, an unexploded bomb stuck in the ceiling, which stuck out there almost until the end of the war. And the old woman's leg was torn off by a shrapnel...
My grandfather is a Georgian, and the worst thing that happened to us was that he would not be killed for this, so we were lucky and you took my grandfather to Tbilisi, which was then restless, where he waited for some time and then returned back to Sukhumi. By the way, he lived there until his death.

Georgian military Abkhaz militias

During the war, Sukhumi, and almost all the cities of Abkhazia, were almost completely destroyed. My grandmother told me that there were mountains of corpses on the streets that no one cleaned up, it was autumn - heat, high humidity, the smell was unbearable and it was simply impossible to go outside ...

What is going on in Abkhazia now? After all, it seems like 20 years have passed. Literally 3 months ago, I saw with my own eyes how Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia recovered over the same 20 years - everything is much sadder in Abkhazia ... See for yourself - the photos speak for themselves.
On the central embankment of the capital

Plane Alley

Sea port. Very rare ships come here, mainly from Turkey

All that remains of the hotel "Tbilisi"

Trade port

Sukhumpribor

This is where many houses in Abkhazia look...

Monument "Bayonet stuck in the ground" in the Park of Glory

And here is one of the main symbols of the victory of the Abkhazians in this conflict - the building of the Supreme Council, the City Council, as the locals call it

And here are the employees of "Alpha" escort you know who? Young Shoigu leaving the building

"A very significant photographit depicts Gia Karkarashvili, commander of the Georgian army, Shoigu, minister of the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations, Geno Adamia, commander of the 23rd brigade of the Georgian Defense Ministry, based in Sukhumi (killed by Abkhazians in Sukhumi, after taking the city)"

Shevardnadze goes to the building of the City Council a few days before the assault on Sukhumi by the Abkhaz

But after the assault on September 27, 1993 ... Shevardnadze miraculously escapes on a Russian boat.

Against the background of the building is a poster with the first president of Abkhazia V. Ardzinba

Monument to Ordzhonikidze

Swings in Voronov Park

Cafe "Old Sukhum"

Gumista is a river on the border of the city of Sukhumi. It was on Gumista that there were some of the most terrible battles

Now a memorial complex has been built behind the bridge on its left bank.

And here is New Athos, which was also badly damaged during the war. This pond was home to a lot of swans before the conflict, which are said to have been eaten during the war...

Memorial Complex

Destroyed and non-operational station Pstsyrkha. By the way, now you will not find a single inscription in Georgian on the streets of the city - all the signs have been redone, even the famous masterpiece of medieval architecture, known as Queen Tamar's Bridge, is now called Basletsky, and by travel agencies - Venetian. The surviving inscription in the Georgian language of the 10th century on it, in my opinion, was also erased. Anyway, I didn't find it...

However, time passes and the city, like the whole country, is being restored - the city center has already been well restored

New buildings are being built, badly damaged old ones are being demolished.

The bombed and shelled skyscrapers at the entrance to the city, which frightened tourists there, were restored, sheathed with siding and plastic windows were inserted

The civil war in Georgia, like the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, allowed Russia to gain a foothold in the Transcaucasus, a view shared by many foreign politicians until recently. But it is interesting to note that at the very beginning of the development of the Abkhaz-Georgian conflict, the United States paid little attention to the problem of its settlement, despite Eduard Shevardnadze's repeated initiatives to develop closer relations with Washington. But after September 11, the situation changed dramatically. A line called the axis of evil appeared on the political map of the world. Ringing out endless appeals: Defeat the world's evil!, Crusade against terrorism!. All these exclamations at the moment no longer cut the ear so much, and ordinary people simply do not pay attention. After all, the struggle with something or someone has become simply an integral part of modern political life. But right now, interest in Georgia has increased, connected with the fact that Russia has accused Georgia of state terrorism. But in order to give an accurate assessment of the current situation that has developed in the zone of strategic interests of both Russia and now the United States, it is necessary to consider the historical aspect of this conflict, as well as the positions and goals pursued by each of the parties.

First of all, in our opinion, we should still return to the so-called oil problem, namely, the reconstruction of the Baku-Supsa pipeline, which will make it possible to pump up to 3 million tons of oil per year. After all, Georgia was striving to transfer a huge flow of oil from Azerbaijan, which was planned to be transported from Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey, and as you know, the main part of the Baku-Supsa oil pipeline (port of Georgia), 950 km long. functioning, but it is planned to modernize it. However, participation in the restoration and improvement of the pipeline does not guarantee that the participants will receive not only the money invested back, but control and profit. And here politics comes to the fore, in other words, the subordination of Georgia to the political influence of the countries participating in the consortium, which became possible due to the collapse of the USSR. It is in this context that inter-ethnic tensions in Georgia should be considered.

As is known, there is an autonomous republic of Adzharia in Georgia, the population of which is approximately 400,000 people. It is here that the port of Batumi is located, in which the only oil refinery in the Caucasus is located. And this is a sufficient reason for Adjarian separatism. Georgian leaders understood that the loss of control over Adzharia could greatly undermine the economy of Tbilisi. Therefore, having come to power, M. Saakashvili did everything possible to prevent the strengthening of the influence of the leader of the autonomy, Aslan Abashidze.

Firstly, Adjara is in complete energy dependence on the center;

secondly, Tbilisi does not allow the development of a network of power plants in this region.

In addition, the center creates a most favorable regime for another Georgian port - Poti, refuses to grant Batumi the status of a free economic zone, and also prevents the development of oil fields near Batumi.

A very important point is that it was the Russian troops that played a big role in the modern history of Adjara, which began in April 1991 with the return of Aslan Abashidze to Batumi.

He returned to Adzharia when the fermentation began - the first demands for the expulsion of the Russian invaders were heard, the slogans of Adzharia were heard for the Adzharians. Eight days after his arrival, A. Abashidze was assassinated. On the same night, the supporters of the new head of the autonomy disarmed all legal and illegal formations of Adzharia. Nevertheless, Abashidze made no secret of the fact that Russian troops were for him the guarantor of peace and stability. But, according to the journalist of Nezavisimaya Gazeta, this guarantor will exist until a situation is created in Georgia in which one can safely talk about the real need to withdraw the rest of Russian troops from the republic. And such a situation was created, because not only the oil companies that are going to control the oil pipeline, but also the politicians of these countries were interested in it.

One of the reasons for the withdrawal of Russian troops is the conflict with Abkhazia, which is trying to gain independence from Georgia. It is known that then, during the battles for Sukhumi, the Abkhazians completely liberated the regions of Abkhazia previously occupied by the Georgians. In addition, they occupied the strategically important Gali region, where the only hydroelectric power station in this region is located, supplying electricity to almost a third of Georgia and all of Abkhazia.

The Gali region, which is home to about 70 thousand people, is separated from Georgia by the Inguri River. It was on it that the famous hydroelectric power station was built in Soviet times, the control panel of which remained on the Abkhaz side. The Abkhazians would turn off the electricity going to Georgia, but in this way Adzharia and part of Turkey, from where most of the essential goods come to Abkhazia, will be de-energized.

The HPP system includes a canal running through the Abkhazian territory along the Inguri at a distance of 12-16 km from the river. The space between the river and the canal, plus the same territory on the Georgian side, is the zone of the CIS peacekeeping forces, and according to the quadripartite agreement (between Abkhazia, Georgia, Russia and the OSCE), neither Abkhaz nor Georgian troops should be sent there. But the CIS peacekeeping force is just a name. In fact, only Russia has brought in its peacekeeping forces. It was then that the Georgian Zviad Gamsakhurdia lost his post, and E. Shevardnadze came to power in Georgia. The capture of the Gali region allowed Shevardnadze to accuse Abkhazia of aggression and insist on sanctions against it, resulting in a complete blockade of it. But the blockade and restriction of the rights of Russia's peacekeeping forces to a large extent contributed to the prolongation and deepening of the conflict between Abkhazia and Georgia, as well as drawing the population of the Gali region into it. Let us dwell in more detail on the analysis of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict.

So, let us recall that as a result of the weakening of the power of the center, nationalist sentiments intensified in the country. Thus, the leader of the national-radical persuasion, E. Gamsakhurdia, came to power in Georgia. To end what he saw as colonial dependence on Russia, the Georgian leader fomented inter-ethnic conflicts, inciting both Moscow and national minorities against him. In the end, national minorities took up arms to secede (Abkhazians in Georgia) or unite with their compatriots living on the other side of the border (Ossetians in Georgia). The elites of the titular nations in Georgia and Azerbaijan were determined to stop the looming threat of dismemberment of their country. The result was a full-scale war.

When Georgia announced its complete secession from the Soviet Union in April 1991, Western governments were in no hurry to establish diplomatic relations with it. Since in this situation the question was raised about the incompetence of Zviad Gamsakhurdia to act as a democratically elected president. The refusal of Western leaders to recognize the first government of post-Soviet Georgia was also due to the fact that there was still hope for a democratic reform of the Soviet federal system and Gamsakhurdia's radical policy, which was unpredictable.

Pursuing a policy of confrontation, Gamsakhurdia thus isolated his country from the international community. As a result, Gamsakhurdia also lost domestic support, which led to his removal from the presidency in 1992. In December, he turned to Western countries for help and announced his readiness to include Georgia in the CIS, which he had categorically refused to do before. The West did not respond to the request of the President of Georgia, as well as Russia, which stated that the Georgian President should first of all settle his internal problems. It should be emphasized that the leaders of the coup hoped that Shevardnadze would be able to provide the country with international recognition and internal legitimacy. These hopes were based mainly on the conviction that the man who made such an important contribution to the unification of Germany and the end of the Cold War would certainly be able to bring Georgia closer to the West. It was assumed that Georgia would join the EU in the relatively near future.

The anxiety of the Abkhazians for the preservation of their own identity increased as the nationalist sentiments of the Georgian government grew. After all, Georgian ultra-nationalists called the Abkhazians uninvited guests, newcomers who arbitrarily settled on the territory of Georgia, the fifth column, which Russia uses to create and preserve its own fiefdoms in the Transcaucasus. The strategic importance of Abkhazia (as well as South Ossetia) to the Russian Federation heightened Georgia's concerns about Moscow's goals. The Georgian leadership also has suspicions that Russia is providing assistance to these two states. What goals did Russia pursue when helping Abkhazia?

So, let's consider the answer to this question from the point of view of the geostrategic importance of this territory: Abkhazia is located directly on the Black Sea, has fertile lands, coal reserves, and popular resorts are located on its territory. The military highway M-27 and the railway passing through the territory of Abkhazia are important transport communications for the logistics of Russian troops in the Transcaucasus, in Georgia itself or in Armenia. Through Abkhazia, Russia gets access to the western region of Transcaucasia - the Suram Pass divides Georgia into western and eastern parts - and further through Adzharia to Turkey. South Ossetia plays the same role as a connecting corridor, but leading to the central part of Transcaucasia, since the Georgian Military Highway passes through it, connecting Russia and Georgia. Both regions have close ties with the peoples of the North Caucasus, and armed detachments from this region crossed the Russian-Georgian border to help the Abkhazians in battles with the Georgian troops. Friction in relations between Georgians, on the one hand, and Ossetians and Abkhazians, on the other, has a long history. But the political line of the first president of Georgia increased the conflict situation.

Gamsakhurdia was later replaced by Shevardnadze, whom Moscow considered a more acceptable leader as he had long held a senior position in the Soviet Union's power hierarchy. But it cannot be argued that Shevardnadze was a protege of Moscow.

In parallel, we note that a comparison of the Transcaucasus with Central Asia shows that the orientation of the local ruling elites was of great importance for Russia. For example, Georgia under Gamsakhurdia's presidency and Azerbaijan under Elchibey represented a striking contrast against this background. Neither of these two leaders came from the Soviet ruling elite. On the contrary, during the years of the existence of the USSR, they were both nationalist dissidents, they were determined to contribute to the rise of national consciousness and reduce dependence on Russia. Gamsakhurdia refused to join Georgia to the CIS, led by Russia, fought for the creation of a union of Caucasian peoples. Moscow welcomed the fact that Shevardnadze took the place of Gamsakhurdia. Shevardnadze was much more suited to the role of Central Asian leader in the sense that he belonged to the Soviet ruling elite at both the republican and federal levels. Russia also saw its weapon in the person of the new president of Georgia. But as it turned out, Shevardnadze's eyes were directed to the West.

By the time Shevardnadze came to power, Georgian nationalist formations, namely the National Guard of Kitovani and Mkhedrioni Jaba Ioseliani, were fomenting inter-ethnic conflict. Shevardnadze did not actually control any of these formations. In both breakaway regions, various ultra-nationalist groups emerged, against which Georgian troops were sent under the pretext of releasing Georgian officials kidnapped by Gamsakhurdia's supporters and held in the Galli region of Abkhazia. Another pretext for the invasion was the need to protect the railway along the coast towards Russia, since the trains following it were often looted. Georgian commanders planned to occupy the entire territory of Abkhazia. According to reports, Shevardnadze was afraid to take responsibility for this operation, but he had to do it, since there was a real threat of losing the presidency. The Abkhaz received military support from volunteers from the North Caucasus and from Russian troops stationed on the territory of this autonomous republic. Shevardnadze also solidified his power by removing Kitovani as defense minister in May 1993 and jailing him in October 1996 for trying to rekindle war in Abkhazia and send troops there.

Thus, the instability in Russia's periphery, characterized by inter-ethnic clashes and the precarious position of the governments in power, created the conditions for Russia to intervene in local conflicts to achieve its own goals. What goals did the Russian Federation pursue?

· Ensure that instability from the Transcaucasus does not spread to the North Caucasus and exacerbate the already tense situation in the region, generated by Chechen separatism. After all, Gamsakhurdia's cooperation with the Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudayev was of particular concern to Moscow, since the Georgian leader planned the creation of an anti-Russian union of Caucasian states;

· To prevent foreign powers, in particular Turkey and Iran, from dominating the Transcaucasus after the withdrawal of parts of the Russian army from all states of the region except Armenia;

· Guarantee that the Transcaucasus will continue to serve as a strategic point of support for Russia in relation to Iran and Turkey.

· To ensure the fulfillment of these goals, parts of the Russian army stationed in Abkhazia supplied weapons to the Abkhaz militias and allowed the use of airfields and military bases (in Bombora and Gudauta) at their disposal for operations against Georgian troops.

Thus, in the war that Tbilisi was waging with Gamsakhurdia's forces in western Georgia, Russia initially refrained from supporting the Georgian government, but once Georgia decided to join the CIS on October 8, 1993, Moscow began to help the central authorities, helping to suppress the rebellion.

As early as July 1993, Russian mediation led to a ceasefire between the Abkhazians and Georgians, which brought the war to a halt. But a month later hostilities resumed. Shevardnadze made a number of attempts to negotiate the deployment of international peacekeeping forces in the region so that Russia would not get the main role in resolving the conflict. The Georgian president was also pushed to this by the local opposition, which opposed the participation of Russian military personnel in the peacekeeping efforts. But due to the categorical refusal of the UN and Western powers to increase spending on numerous peacekeeping operations, Eduard Shevardnadze agreed to the entry of CIS troops with the simultaneous presence of UN observers. On May 10, 1994, he addressed the Council of the CIS Heads of State with a request to introduce peacekeeping forces into the conflict zone. The same request came from the Abkhaz leader V. Ardzinba.

On May 14, a solemn signing of the agreement "On a ceasefire and separation of forces in Abkhazia" took place in Moscow (see annex). On the basis of this document and the decision of the Council of Heads of State of the CIS since June 1994, the Collective Peacekeeping Forces of the CIS, numbering 1800 people, have been deployed in Abkhazia. It was assumed that by the autumn of 1994 units of troops - members of the CIS would join the peacekeeping operation of the Russian troops. It is important to emphasize that, until recently, it was carried out entirely by the forces of only the Russian military contingent. Despite the speech of the national opposition accusing Russia of seeking to consolidate the dismemberment of the country and restore the empire, the majority of Georgians supported the measures taken and the policy of a peaceful settlement, so according to a public opinion poll in 1994, 75% were in favor. The mandate and conditions of Russian participation are determined by the Agreement on a ceasefire in Abkhazia and the mechanism for monitoring its observance of July 27, 1993 and the decision of the Council of Heads of State of the CIS On approval of the mandate to conduct a peacekeeping operation in the conflict zone in Abkhazia and Georgia of October 21, 1994 . In accordance with which, the main tasks of the Russian peacekeeping contingent are:

Blocking of the conflict area;

· Monitoring the withdrawal of troops and their disarmament;

· Protection of important objects and communications;

· Escort of humanitarian cargoes;

The most that has been done without Russia's participation is the formation of a UN team to monitor the situation - the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). In addition, a commission has been created from representatives of Georgia, Abkhazia, Russia and the UN to work out an agreement on the issue of the return of Georgian refugees. But it must be emphasized that it is Russia in this process that plays an important role in resolving the conflict peacefully. For maintaining peace in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia initially secured more significant concessions. Shevardnadze tried in every possible way to accuse Russia of helping the Abkhaz militants, of trying to undermine the positions of the Georgian government and of trying to infiltrate the country's military leadership. But, despite resistance from the political elite, Shevardnadze decided on Georgia's accession to the CIS in October 1993, and the Parliament ratified it the following year. In February 1994, Shevardnadze signed a friendship treaty with Russia. In March 1995, Georgia and Russia signed an agreement on military cooperation, according to which Russia received the right to own four military bases free of charge for 25 years and station its troops numbering up to 25 thousand people in them: in Batumi (Adzharia), Vaziani (next to Tbilisi), Gudauta, (north of Sukhumi, in Abkhazia) and Akhalkalaki, in the Samtskhe-Javakheti region near the northern border with Turkey and Armenia. In this regard, let us recall the events of recent days. Thus, on May 15, 2005, the official authorities of Georgia declared in an ultimatum form the need for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgian territory and the curtailment of Russian military bases. To which Russia refused, one of the reasons for which is the impossibility of a quick withdrawal of troops due to possible large material losses (citing the withdrawal of Russian troops from Germany as an example). At the moment, we are talking at least about the redeployment of Russian military bases on the territory of North Ossetia.

Despite Russia's mediation in the settlement of the Abkhaz-Georgian conflict, the main reason for the protracted nature of the peaceful settlement of the problem is the diametrical opposition of the positions of the parties. Georgia insists on the restoration of Abkhazia as part of the Georgian state, the Abkhazian side - on the recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and the establishment of equal interstate relations with Georgia. The point of view of the Georgian government boils down to the following: Georgian society from the very beginning perceived this conflict not only in the context of preserving the country's territorial integrity, but also as a continuation of the struggle for independence. The origins and consequences of this conflict are now perceived in Georgian society as a continuous chain of efforts by Moscow to take Abkhazia away from Georgia. Also very popular is the idea of ​​comparing the psychological state of an ordinary Georgian with the state of a Frenchman who would lose the Cote d'Azur, or an American who would be left without California.

In parallel, we note that among the entourage of modern Abkhaz leaders, hardliners prevail. Therefore, it is practically impossible to get Abkhazia's consent to the concession offered by Georgia (the status of autonomy for its republic within the framework of the Georgian state). A peculiar indication of Abkhazia's determination to defend its right to independence was the holding in November 1996 of elections to the legislative body of this republic, despite the objections of Georgia and the international community, as well as the unsuccessful elections of the President of Abkhazia in 2004. Abkhazia, for its part, offered to create a confederation in which both countries would have an equal status. But due to the fact that Georgia is dominated by militant parliamentarians, the Abkhaz government is in exile. The Georgian government expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that Russian troops did not protect Georgian refugees who were able to return to Abkhazia, and insisted on more decisive actions from Russia in relation to the Abkhaz militants.

From the very beginning, both Shevardnadze and the current President of Georgia Saakashvili and the Georgian parliament repeatedly demanded to withdraw the CIS peacekeeping forces if they did not comply with the decision taken at the CIS summit in March 1997 to expand the zone of the peacekeeping operation to the Gali region, adjoining the Inguri River from the north, and ensuring law and order there. The obvious reason for this decision was the desire to facilitate the return of Georgian refugees. At the same time, the Georgian government maintains that only a small number of refugees have returned home. According to the Abkhaz side, Georgia's demand to expand the powers of the peacekeeping contingent was a ploy to force it to leave the heavily fortified defense line along the Gallic Canal.

In this situation, Russia faced a difficult choice. Russian support for Georgia and attempts to force Abkhazia to submit to someone else's will may lead to increased anti-Russian sentiment in the region. If Abkhazia nevertheless agrees to accept the status of autonomy instead of complete independence, then Georgia will secure less independence from Moscow, and Russia's strategic position will no longer be so strong.

According to the Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of Georgia to Russia, the disappointment from the Abkhazian syndrome was so great that many Georgians began to look to the West with hope. Subsequently, the topic of Georgia's Western orientation became another irritant in Russian-Georgian relations. But the Georgian government is turning its eyes to the West for another reason, namely, for state building, Georgia has chosen the model of Western liberalism. This model is universal and not limited to geographic categories. According to this point of view, states are built and successfully developed on its principles not only in Europe and America, but also on other continents. And the development of a market economy and a pluralistic political system in Russia is equated with the same path of development. Why is Georgia's orientation to America causing dissatisfaction? Official Tbilisi has repeatedly stated that respect for Western values ​​is not directed against anyone: We believe that Russia should not interpret this assessment differently, besides declaring Europe a priority of its foreign policy.

In connection with political conflicts, everyone forgets about the natural problems that develop in abandoned territories. So, ground vibrations of a relatively narrow coastal strip of the Black Sea coast of Abkhazia can cause destructive storms. In the abandoned mines of Tkuarchal, methane has accumulated in large quantities, which can explode at any moment. An error in targeting high-precision weapons can lead to depressurization of the nuclear repository on the territory of the Sukhumi Institute of Physics and Technology, where the first Soviet atomic bomb was "forged". Radiation dust with the movement of air masses will quickly spread along the entire Black Sea coast and reach the countries from whose airfields NATO planes will take off. A special conversation about the Inguri hydroelectric power station. According to the documents, the Enguri hydroelectric complex is the property of Russia. Now the dam is in an emergency condition. When it is destroyed, a stream of several cubic kilometers of water will wash away everything in its path.

Moreover, Russia is objectively interested in stabilizing the situation in Georgia itself. This will largely ensure stability in the entire Caucasus region and prevent the escalation of interethnic conflicts affecting the national security of the Russian Federation.

Russia's obvious loss of its positions and influence in the Transcaucasus, the growing threat to Russia from the south, the build-up of the Western, primarily the American and Turkish political, economic and military presence in the Caucasus, make Russia face the need to pay close attention to security issues, primarily military , in the South, preserving potential allies, among which Georgia could take a prominent place. Russia's access to the countries of Southern Europe, Asia Minor, the Near and Middle East is carried out from its territory via sea, air and land communications.

It seems that the solution to the Abkhaz-Georgian conflict is not in the use of military force, but in purposeful, patient negotiations. And in this regard, the role of Moscow as a long-standing friend and partner of the Caucasus and Transcaucasia, as well as the Collective Peacekeeping Forces in the conflict zone of Abkhazia-Georgia, is sharply increasing. The departure of the Russian border guards showed that the fuse of a new regional war in this area was smoldering, the mine warfare by Georgian saboteurs intensified, Abkhaz-Georgian naval incidents began with shelling and seiner seizures. More recently, Türkiye was involved in one of the maritime incidents.

We must keep in mind the determination of the military-political leadership of Abkhazia to repel aggression. Representatives of the Confederation of Peoples of the Caucasus have already made a statement in the open press about delivering strikes on the territory of Georgia from the territory of the Caucasian republics in the event of a new Abkhaz-Georgian conflict. They claim that their strikes will lead to a split of Georgia into 4-6 parts. The statement of the chief of the general staff of the Abkhazian army about the study of the issue of inflicting unacceptable damage on Georgia in the first 48-72 hours after the start of the aggression seems very serious.

The latest operation of the Russian peacekeeping forces on the territory of the CIS was the operation in Abkhazia, which began in July 1994. By this time, the Russian military was bogged down in the Guzino-Abkhaz conflict to an even greater extent than in Tajikistan.

Throughout the conflict, official Moscow maintained its neutrality, condemned human rights violations and imposed sanctions against both belligerents. At the same time, the Russian units that Russia inherited after the division of the allied armed forces were in the conflict zone from the very beginning and provided unofficial support to the Abkhaz formations. According to numerous testimonies, it was Russian planes that bombed Georgian positions, and Abkhaz landings were carried out on Russian ships. At the same time, official sources in the Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that Russian troops guard only themselves and respond only with return fire. After the Sochi armistice agreement on July 27, 1993, an attempt was made to give these troops the status of peacekeepers after the fact. Expecting that their presence could become a deterrent, the Russian government assumed the role of guarantor of the implementation of the agreements reached. In addition, the UN promised to allocate 50 military observers and actually sent some of them to the region.

However, when Abkhazia violated these agreements and its forces launched an assault on the autonomy's capital city of Sukhumi, it turned out that Russian troops did not have the authority to enforce the ceasefire agreements. It soon became clear that Georgia did not want the presence of Russian peacekeeping forces on its territory.

And it is not known whether the Russian peacekeeping operation would have taken place if the armed struggle between the supporters of the ousted President Z. Gamsakhurdia and the detachments supporting the new government had not flared up with renewed vigor on the Georgian territory adjacent to Abkhazia. Supporting E. Shevardnadze, Russian troops in October 1993 took control of the most important transport communications of Georgia and blocked the way to the capital for scattered detachments of supporters of Z. Gamsakhurdia. On October 23, E. Shevardnadze decided to sanction Georgia's entry into the CIS. Tbilisi gave permission for the preservation of Russian military bases in Georgia. A decision in principle was also made to agree to a peacekeeping operation of Russian troops in Abkhazia. On December 1, 1993, the Abkhazian and Georgian delegations signed the “Agreement of Understanding”. On May 9, 1994, UN Secretary General Butras Ghali submitted a report to the Security Council, in which he expressed his opinion that there were no necessary conditions in Georgia for the deployment of UN troops. He expressed the opinion that before the arrival of the UN troops, the tasks of maintaining peace can be solved by Russian troops, which then will be able to join the UN contingent.

For the first time, the introduction of peacekeeping forces was preceded by lengthy preparations. Both sides have tentatively accepted proposals for a complete cessation of hostilities. Russia has achieved UN recognition of its operation as a CIS operation. The mandate of the peacekeeping forces was developed in detail with the involvement of the UN experience and the area of ​​responsibility was limited to the Gali region adjacent to the interior regions of Georgia. UN observers were to monitor the situation in the conflict zone. After a number of agreements, by June 26, 1994, Russian peacekeepers entered Abkhazia.

In the first months, combined battalions of the Akhalkalaki and Batumi divisions of the Russian army were also introduced into the conflict zone. Local residents also serve as part of these two divisions, and now Russian military bases. Until recently, there were citizens of Georgia among them.

As a result, the following layout of the peacekeeping forces was adopted. Three battalions were stationed on the territory of Abkhazia, one battalion - in Mingrelia, in the neighboring city of Abkhazia Zugdidi. The commander and headquarters of the peacekeeping forces are located in Sukhumi, and the deputy commander is in the Georgian regional center, the city of Zugdidi. The first task of the Russian forces was the separation of the parties and the organization of checkpoints on the Gumista River, which became the demarcation line. Within a short time, the peacekeepers managed to take control of the bridges and the main fords, however, groups of Abkhazian and Georgian militants still periodically penetrate to opposite sides of the river and disturb the population.

The next task was the demilitarization of the Kodori Gorge in the mountains - the last section of Abkhazia inhabited by the Georgian people - Svans and controlled by the Georgian government. After lengthy negotiations, it was possible to reduce the level of confrontation by excluding heavy weapons from the arsenals of both sides and to separate the detachments. At the same time, although it turned out to be impossible to carry out a complete demilitarization of the gorge, the number of shellings fell several times.

The peacekeeping forces also launched large-scale demining operations, enabling the inhabitants of Abkhazia to engage in agricultural activities. Mine clearance was extremely difficult due to the lack of mining maps, however, during the first month of the deployment of peacekeeping forces, mine clearance was carried out in a 10-kilometer strip of their zone of responsibility. The peacekeeping forces took under protection the Inguri HPP, which provides the region with electricity.

However, the peacekeepers failed to fulfill the most important task from the point of view of Georgia - ensuring the process of returning refugees. It should be noted that many in Georgia perceived the agreements concluded as Russia's obligation to create an opportunity for the return of refugees by force. Meanwhile, Russian troops are only required to ensure security upon return. The Abkhazian authorities in every possible way prevented the return of refugees outside Little Gali. On the territory of this region, until recently, the Abkhaz militia had to maintain law and order, whose members until recently took part in the armed conflict. As a result, the refugees who returned to their places of residence are not only exposed to the danger of being attacked by numerous criminal groups, but also experiencing harassment by the Abkhaz police officers. Cases are described when such actions took place in front of Russian servicemen who did not take any measures to stop them. At the same time, the command of the peacekeeping forces justified their subordinates by the absence of police functions in the mandate of the peacekeepers.

Only once did the Russian peacekeepers try to act at their own risk, as they used to act before in other operations. In early September 1994, Colonel General Georgy Kondratiev, Deputy Minister of Defense, who was in charge of, among other things, the Russian peacekeeping forces, who was in the region and outraged by the death of Russian officers in the territory controlled by the Abkhaz forces and the unwillingness of the Abkhaz side to accept Georgian refugees, took a desperate step. He stated that on September 14, and then postponed this date to September 16, Russian troops would begin an operation to return the refugees, “giving an armed rebuff to all those who would try to prevent this.”27 On September 15, the Abkhaz police in the Gali district were blocked by Russian military and they also blocked the paths for the approach of forces urgently transferred from other regions of Abkhazia. However, on September 16, Defense Minister Pavel Grachev stopped the operation and flew to Georgia on B. Yeltsin's instructions. A meeting of the leaders of Russia and Georgia was scheduled. The Abkhaz side declared its readiness to consider cases of returning refugees from October 1. Soon Georgy Kondratiev returned to Moscow to act as Deputy Minister of Defense, which he remained until the outbreak of the armed conflict in Chechnya.

From the very beginning of the operation, the object of criticism was the lack of police functions of the peacekeeping forces in their area of ​​responsibility. It should be recognized that Georgian politicians began to put forward demands for the provision of such functions starting from the spring of 1995, before that they more hoped that the peacekeeping forces would help quickly restore control over the territory of Abkhazia. The authorities of Abkhazia are constantly advocating the maximum restriction of the functions of peacekeepers. In their opinion, the population, including the returning Georgian refugees, should be protected from thieves and bandits by the law enforcement agencies of the republic.

Official Moscow has repeatedly declared its unconditional recognition of the territorial integrity of Georgia, of which Abkhazia is an integral part.

According to Sergei Karaganov, chairman of the presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, “Russia, of course, can help resolve this conflict, but for this it will first need to assume a completely overwhelming role. This is the restoration of Georgian statehood. Now, when Georgian statehood has weakened to the limit, when in fact the government of Tbilisi controls only a small part of the territory around Tbilisi, and when Georgia has de facto split into several principalities, and in many of them there is no power at all, it can hardly count on that someone will join this country.”

Are there great chances for Abkhazia to join Russia or become an associated state with it?

Most experts agree that Abkhazia's intentions to establish a confederation with Russia or become part of the Russian Federation have no legal basis.

For example, this opinion was expressed in 2003 by Alexander Kalita, Deputy Chairman of the Federation Council Committee on Security and Defense. According to Kalita, the statements of the vice-president of Abkhazia, Valery Arshba, that Abkhazia is preparing documents aimed at the actual entry of the republic into Russia, are "an action more political than legal."

The senator stressed that Russia "recognizes Georgia and Abkhazia as part of Georgia, and this was recently confirmed by Russian President Vladimir Putin." The issue of Abkhazia joining Russia or the creation of a confederation can be considered at the state level only if Georgia agrees to Abkhazia's withdrawal from its composition, stressed A. Kalita. In his opinion, the statements of the leaders of Abkhazia do not contribute to strengthening stability in the region.

Shota Malashkhia, chairman of the temporary commission of the Georgian parliament on refugee affairs, believes that Russia has destroyed the legal basis for the implementation of the peacekeeping mission in Abkhazia.

“Russia itself destroyed the legal basis for the mission of peacekeepers when it unilaterally withdrew from the 1996 CIS agreement. Based on this, the Georgian side has additional arguments to fulfill the decision adopted last year on the withdrawal of peacekeeping forces from the Abkhazian conflict zone,” Shota Malashkhia said on the air of the Imedi radio station.

Georgia's achievement, in his opinion, is that the country's legal position at the international level is fair.

“Those mistakes that the previous government of Georgia made have been corrected, so our fair demands to return the refugees, the inviolability of their property, etc. must be recognized by the international community. Russia does not recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia, because in legal terms it is doing wrong,” Malashkhia said.

According to him, the Georgian side will give an answer with an emphasis on the legal side of the issue.

“Moreover, the legal side concerns different levels. Our response will certainly touch upon all the violations with which Russia made its decision. Firstly, all decisions in the CIS are made by consensus and at the summit of the organization, while Russia withdrew from the agreement on sanctions unilaterally. And then, having withdrawn from one agreement, Russia thereby actually renounces a number of agreements,” says the chairman of the temporary commission of the Georgian parliament on refugees.

In addition, according to Malashkhia, "there are many inaccuracies in the decision that run counter to the latest report of UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and the UN on ethnic sanctions."

“We will carry out work in all these areas. Within 6 months, Georgia's demands will be reflected in a UN resolution, and Russia will have more problems than Georgia. In the case of our correct behavior, if we carry out everything that we intend, this statement by Russia on the lifting of sanctions will remain a declaration,” Malashkhia said.

The chairman of the interim commission of the Georgian parliament on refugees said that the Georgian leadership has no desire for a humanitarian blockade on the territory of Abkhazia, the Georgian government is trying to cooperate with the Abkhaz side on various programs, but, unfortunately, without a response.

“The separatist regime itself does not want to solve the problems. It is easily managed, receives significant subsidies, which are divided "at the top", and the problem remains. The de facto authorities of the unrecognized republic are trying to stay in power as long as possible, while using Russian resources. With all its actions, Russia proves that it is not a party, but a participant in the conflict, and it has its own interests and ties with the unrecognized republic of Abkhazia. In this case, another conversation will already start with her, ”says Malashkhia.

Based on the foregoing, I would like to draw the main conclusion. The events taking place in the zone of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, according to domestic analysts, have a negative impact on the state of the national security of the Russian Federation. The aggravation of the conflict can destabilize the situation in the region. The country's political leadership is required to have a carefully balanced foreign policy aimed (together with the world community) at an exclusively peaceful resolution of the conflict. In addition, it is important to prevent infringement of Russia's national interests in this region.

The South Caucasus has always been of interest to the big powers. Their interests often clashed here: it happened historically. Political realism is to organically fit into the political processes taking place in the Caucasus region. At the same time, ensuring fundamental national interests requires the correct definition and consistent implementation of priority tasks aimed primarily at protecting national security and economic development of the country.

In February 1810 By the highest manifesto, Emperor Alexander I announced the annexation of the Abkhaz principality to the Russian Empire. Thus, in 2010 200 years have passed since the establishment of historical ties, which even today determine the vector of foreign policy priorities of the Republic of Abkhazia.

The opportunity to maintain a strategic partnership with Russia, among other things, gives us the opportunity to maintain and develop economic and cultural ties with kindred peoples of the North Caucasus and southern Russia. And, finally, the Russian state is the most important economic partner of our republic, and of the entire region as a whole. It is in Russia that the population of Abkhazia sees a force that can protect against external threats. This was vividly confirmed by the mass appeal of citizens of Abkhazia with a request for Russian citizenship.

Acquisition of Russian citizenship by the majority of the population of Abkhazia gives real hope for the protection of the Russian state. In addition, for thirteen years the Russian peacekeeping forces continue to be the guarantors of the non-resumption of hostilities.

Thus, we can say that Abkhazia is actually under the protectorate of Russia. This is how President Putin's words should be understood that Russia cannot remain indifferent to the fate of its citizens living in Abkhazia.

In this regard, in relations between Russia and Abkhazia, the model of cooperation between the United States and Taiwan, which have concluded a number of interstate agreements, including those of a military nature, may already become the most viable today. President Bush has stated that if China invades Taiwan, he will definitely have to deal with the US military (The Times, April 26, 2001). “I hope,” says Margaret Thatcher in her book The Art of Statecraft, “that the US will go even further and provide Taiwan with an effective regional missile defense system.” (Margaret Thatcher. M.: Alpina Publisher, 2003, p. 232.)

We hope that Russia, just as the United States is doing, will firmly state that Abkhazia, neither now nor in the future, can be recognized as an exclusively “internal” problem of Georgia. We regard this model of relations between Russia and Abkhazia as temporary and transitional, which should prepare a qualitatively new level of relations between our countries. And we have formulated such proposals. They imply the conclusion of associated relations. For the first time, these proposals were announced by President Ardzinba, then they were reflected in the appeal of the Parliament of Abkhazia to the State Duma of Russia. They imply the conclusion of interstate agreements in the military-political, customs, border, as well as in the economic and cultural fields.

Having considered the appeal of the Parliament of the Republic of Abkhazia to the President of the Russian Federation and the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on the recognition of the independence of the Republic of Abkhazia and on the establishment of associated relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Abkhazia, the State Duma noted that Russia has a deep historical, political and humanitarian interest in a fair resolution of the problems of the Abkhaz a people with whom Russians have many close ties. The statement notes that the Appeal of the RA Parliament is a reasoned document worked out from the legal and scientific-historical points of view. The deputies of the State Duma believe that the Appeal of the Parliament of the Republic of Abkhazia to the President and the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on the recognition of the independence of the Republic of Abkhazia and on the establishment of associated relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Abkhazia reflects the true aspirations of the population of Abkhazia and should be fully taken into account by the international community for the sake of ensuring human rights, peace and security in the region and a just settlement of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict.

The deputies of the State Duma also declared their support for the efforts of the President of the Russian Federation V. Putin and the Government of the Russian Federation to improve the economic situation of Abkhazia and remove restrictions on its foreign economic activity, to provide the inhabitants of Abkhazia with the achievements of Russian and world culture, education, to protect the rights of citizens of the Russian Federation and Russian compatriots living on the territory of Abkhazia. Such a consistent and firm policy, which meets, first of all, the enduring interests of Russia in the Caucasus, which for centuries has been and remains a zone of its exclusive political dominance, will become a fundamentally important factor in ensuring stability in the region. This becomes especially relevant on the eve of the upcoming Winter Olympics in Sochi.

During the last sixty years, the system of the world order has changed twice. After the end of the Second World War, dozens of independent states were emerging for twenty years. Often these events were accompanied by long bloody wars. Ultimately, all these self-proclaimed states were recognized by the world community and became members of the UN. Similar processes have been taking place in the world since 1991, and there are no fair arguments against the fact that the states that have emerged as a result of the modernization of the world order should also be recognized by the world community. The political-territorial content of the "first tier" of the Helsinki Final Act, on which the USSR especially insisted, has long lost its force and significance. Descended from the world stage and the Soviet Union. There is no Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, Germany has united.

The issue of recognizing Kosovo's independence is currently being widely discussed. At the same time, statements are being made about the impossibility of extending this approach to other unrecognized states. In this regard, the position of the President of the Russian Federation V. Putin demonstrates the only objective approach. The recognition of Kosovo's independence and the use of this fact as a precedent for solving a number of similar problems, in addition to demonstrating the objectivity of the main actors in world politics, will help to cut the Gordian knot of many accumulated problems that cannot be resolved either peacefully or militarily. Of course, for some countries this decision will be painful, but it will only legalize a long-term fait accompli.

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe recently adopted a resolution condemning the massive human rights violations committed under totalitarian communist regimes. It says that the peoples of the former USSR suffered the most from these crimes. Abkhazia, as one of the many repressed peoples, also calls on the UN Security Council, the OSCE, the EU, and the international community to show consistency and objectivity in relation to Abkhazia, which became the autonomy of Georgia exclusively at the will of Stalin in 1931.

Before the collapse of the USSR, Abkhazia repeatedly raised the question of restoring the status of a union republic, lost at the will of Stalin, and not only was not going to leave, but voted for the preservation of the USSR at the All-Union March Referendum.

The situation changed after the declaration of independence by Georgia. As is known, the norm proclaimed in the Soviet Constitution, which provided for the withdrawal of a union republic from the USSR, was not provided with an appropriate mechanism. In this regard, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in 1990 adopted a law regulating the procedure for the withdrawal of a union republic from the USSR. In accordance with this law, the autonomous entities that were part of the union republics that raised the issue of secession from the Union could independently resolve this issue (by the way, the Constitution of Yugoslavia did not provide for such a right for the autonomy of Kosovo). Having voted for the preservation of the USSR, Abkhazia gave the answer to this question in the most democratic way - by popular vote.

However, Georgia carried out the exit from the USSR completely ignoring all these factors. After leaving the Union, the Georgian leadership declared null and void all the legal acts adopted in Georgia during the Soviet era. Thus, Georgia itself terminated relations with Abkhazia. It is important to note that Abkhazia did not take part in the referendum that declared the independence of Georgia. Thus, after the withdrawal of Georgia from the USSR, Abkhazia, from the point of view of the Soviet legislation in force at that time, actually remained part of the USSR. After the legal registration of the collapse of the Soviet Union in Belovezhskaya Pushcha, Abkhazia ceased to be part of the USSR. Thus, since the end of 1990, Abkhazia has been both de facto and legally an independent state.

Since that time, the Republic of Abkhazia has constantly demonstrated its stability and viability. Three times, in 1992-1993, 1998 and 2001 The people of Abkhazia defended their right to self-determination with weapons in their hands. During the years of independent existence under the blockade and constant political pressure, Abkhazia demonstrates that it has emerged as a state with a peaceful policy, democratic principles, a developing economy, respect for individual rights and respect for the environment. These circumstances favor the recognition of the Republic of Abkhazia by the Russian Federation, and after it by other states of the world.

In this regard, it is necessary to develop such a mechanism for recognizing the independence of Abkhazia, which would fully meet the interests of both parties, without causing excessive irritation of the leading international partners of the Russian Federation.

Within the framework of this mechanism, it seems possible to gradually implement a number of activities that, if implemented in a comprehensive and timely manner, would lead to the designated goal. Bilateral measures include:

Development of the initiative of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on the recognition of the right of the peoples of Abkhazia, Transnistria and South Ossetia to self-determination, enshrined in the resolutions of the State Duma of the Russian Federation adopted in the autumn of 2006;

Conclusion of a number of interstate agreements on key issues of interaction between Russia and Abkhazia;

Integration of Abkhazia into the legal space of the Russian Federation through the harmonization of legislation, as well as its connection to the national projects of the Russian Federation on the basis of concluded interstate agreements.

By recognizing the independence of the Republic of Abkhazia, the PMR and RSO, Russia will thereby complete the political and legal formalization of the collapse of the USSR and confirm its status as the legal successor of the Soviet Union.

At the same time, Russia will have the opportunity to create a "belt of good neighborliness", including Abkhazia, Transnistria and South Ossetia as states loyal to the Russian Federation.

Such actions of Russia will undoubtedly be approved by the population of the North Caucasus and the South of Russia, who have repeatedly declared their support for the independence of Abkhazia. Thus, Russia will gain additional potential to influence the situation in this region.

Practically no additional material costs are required from the Russian Federation to implement this scenario. The economy of Abkhazia is already closely connected with Russia, which is practically its only trade and economic partner, creditor and main foreign owner of property on the territory of the Republic.

Russian business will also not need any additional guarantees of inviolability of property and protection of investments in Abkhazia, since the transactions were executed under the laws of de facto independent states, which, of course, will not change after the legal recognition of independence.

The Russian side gets access to important transit transport corridors and infrastructure facilities, including the Black Sea strip in the immediate vicinity of the upcoming 2014 Winter Olympics.

The issues of the Russian military presence in this strategically important region will be taken out of the international agenda and into the plane of bilateral Russian-Abkhazian relations.

It should be noted that some significant milestones on the path of consistent, phased advancement have been successfully overcome. These, undoubtedly, include the entry of Abkhazia into the ruble zone, the granting of Russian citizenship to the residents of Abkhazia, a visa-free regime and the influx of Russian investments into the economy of Abkhazia

At the same time, in the context of the events developing around Kosovo, the proposed project for the gradual recognition of the independence of Abkhazia is limited in time. If Russia does not react decisively adequately and quickly in case of recognition of Kosovo's independence, then the favorable moment may be missed and when this topic ceases to be relevant, references to it will not be perceived appropriately.

The modern world builds the foundations of its life according to the rules of rigid, often cynical rationality, and in interstate relations all sorts of abstractions recede into the background, giving way to the enduring fundamental interests of influential actors in international politics.

Modern international law does not provide for any legal norms that in any way restrict the right of states to recognize newly formed states, even if the secession occurred without the consent of the former mother country.

In exercising its right to recognize Abkhazia, Russia will primarily proceed from the need to protect its political and economic interests, as well as be guided by political and economic expediency. Such an action by Russia, aimed at restoring historical justice, will be justified from the point of view of high morality; it will also be firmly based on the will of the people, expressed in a popular referendum.

Regional conflict (on the example of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict)

5 Georgian-Abkhaz conflict: causes, history and consequences

On the southern borders of Russia, Christianity coexists with Islam, and the Slavs - with the Georgians, Armenians, Turkic and Iranian peoples. The result is an incredible hodgepodge of peoples and religions. The Abkhaz, a Turkic-speaking and predominantly Muslim people, fell under Georgian rule a millennium ago. Georgia itself was absorbed into the Russian Empire in the 19th century.

Abkhazia, like Chechnya, fought with Russia in the 19th century, and after the revolution in Russia, it also established Soviet power. However, due to the weakness of Russia at that time, the Georgian Mensheviks overthrew the Soviet power in Abkhazia and annexed it to Georgia. With the Sovietization of Georgia (February 1921), an independent Abkhazian Soviet Republic was formed (March 3, 1921) and concluded an agreement with Georgia, becoming part of it. In April 1925, the Abkhazian Congress of Soviets approved the Constitution of the republic. As soon as the political possibility of joining Russia appeared (after the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine), the Abkhazians began a political struggle for their joining the Krasnodar Territory. But the head of Georgia, Mzhavanadze, confidently promised to attach all the dissatisfied to the Krasnoyarsk Territory.

Ten years later, already under Eduard Shevardnadze, the Abkhaz became politically active again, but the President of Georgia took control of the situation. At the end of the 80s, an armed confrontation between the Abkhazians and Georgians began, but the USSR, breathing its last breath, was able to stop the blood. The collapse of the USSR and the weakness of Russia gave Georgia a second chance, as in the 1920s, to annex Abkhazia again.

On March 31, 1991, a referendum was held in Georgia, including Abkhazia, on the restoration of state sovereignty. In the Abkhaz ASSR, 61.27% of voters took part in the referendum, 97.73% of whom voted for the state sovereignty of Georgia, which accounted for 59.84% of the total number of voters in Abkhazia. Only 1.42% of those who took part in the voting, that is, 1.37% of the total number of voters, voted against. Across Georgia, 90.79% of voters took part in the referendum, 99.08% of which voted for the restoration of Georgia's state sovereignty. Based on the results of the referendum, on April 9, 1991, the Supreme Council of Georgia proclaimed the Declaration on the Restoration of the State Sovereignty of the Republic of Georgia.

So, in 1991, Georgia regained its independence. But its first leader, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, elected by the people, was forcibly removed from his post, and his supporters fought against government forces for a long time. And in 1992, the Abkhazian separatists declared independence, despite the fact that only 18 percent of the people living in Abkhazia belong to the indigenous nationality.

Abkhazia is an autonomy within Georgia, most of whose territory, as a result of the ethnic conflict of 1992-1994, was not controlled by the authorities of Tbilisi. An independent republic was proclaimed in Sukhumi (it is not recognized by the world community, but the Sukhumi authorities have an army, police and other attributes of statehood. The UN mission in Georgia regarded the regular elections to the parliament of Abkhazia in March 2002 as illegitimate).

The war in Abkhazia was complicated by the intervention of Russian troops stationed at the military bases of the autonomous republic. Georgia agreed to provide Russia with four military bases on its territory, informally conditioned this decision by the fact that Russia should take a certain (pro-Georgian) position in the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-South Ossetian conflicts for this. In exchange for Russian military assistance, Georgia agreed to join the CIS. However, according to the Georgian side, Russia did not fulfill its obligations and did not help Tbilisi enough. At the same time, irregular armed formations, sent by the radical Confederation of the Peoples of the Caucasus (in particular, one of these units was commanded by then little-known Shamil Basaev), came out on the side of the Abkhaz formations.

In 1994, the Abkhazians ousted the Georgian troops from the republic. From 1996 until the autumn of 2001, there were no large-scale armed clashes in Abkhazia. However, sporadically skirmishes occur constantly. On the militarized Georgian-Abkhazian border, smugglers and drug dealers seem to feel free, in the Kodori Gorge - the only region of Abkhazia, over which Georgia has established partial control - the so-called "power line business" - that is, extortion " for the protection of the Kavkasia power line from Russia.

The situation around Abkhazia gradually began to worsen in 2001. In September, information was leaked about Georgia's possible use of force in resolving the Abkhazian problem. Partial mobilization was announced in Abkhazia, local television was talking about the beginning of hostilities. On September 25, more than 400 Chechen fighters penetrated into the Kodori Gorge area, which is controlled by the Georgian side (it was alleged that they arrived on trucks of the Georgian army, accompanied by Georgian police). There were clashes, after which regular Georgian troops were brought into Kodori. This was a violation of the 1994 Moscow Agreement. The UN opposed their presence there because it is another factor of instability in the region, and Abkhazia refuses any negotiations on a settlement, demanding the unconditional withdrawal of Georgian armed forces.

Currently, Russian peacekeepers and UN observers are stationed in Abkhazia, but both groups are forced to limit their activities for fear of being blown up by mines or coming under fire from guerrillas. In total, there are 107 military observers from 23 countries in the conflict zone, who, together with the CIS peacekeepers, are trying to ensure security. Patrols are carried out daily along the line of demarcation. As of June 2002, 93 Russian servicemen from the Collective Peacekeeping Forces (KPFM) have died in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict zone over eight years. Another 248 Russian peacekeepers received gunshot and shrapnel wounds M. Razorenova, K. Dzindzibadze. The Abkhaz conflict in the Georgian periodical press // http://www.abkhazeti.ru/pages/42.html.

For Western politicians, Georgia's arguments about the need to protect its territorial sovereignty sound convincing enough. The United States supports all efforts aimed at a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Georgia. The keys to settling the Abkhazian-Georgian conflict are in Russia. However, much of the Russian experience has been in counter-insurgency operations rather than peacekeeping operations.

The public is already accustomed to reports from the zone of the Abkhaz-Georgian conflict about the blowing up of buses and equipment of the Collective Peacekeeping Forces by mines, the death of civilians and Russian peacekeepers, the mining of roads by Georgian saboteurs from formations such as the White Legion and Forest Brothers in Gali , Tkuarchal and Ochamchira districts, shelling of checkpoints, etc. Against the backdrop of the events of the bloody Abkhaz-Georgian war of 1992-1993. such an environment is sometimes characterized by a false calmness. Meanwhile, judging by the materials of the Russian, Georgian and Abkhaz press, as well as the mood of the local population, tension in the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict zone is growing.

The threat to the integrity of Russia from the Transcaucasus and the North Caucasus is very real, since there is a high ethnic population density, problems of historical development, a large number of unaccounted for weapons, etc. This is skillfully used by Russia's geopolitical rivals.

Abkhazia's main trouble is that it does not fit into the world order of the 21st century. according to the US scenario, that the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict threatens the implementation of US plans for the organization of the Silk Road in the North Caucasus and the operation of the oil pipeline. First, Abkhazia is located next to these routes; secondly, pro-Russian sentiments are very strong in this republic; thirdly, the precedent of Abkhazia's secession from Georgia violates the integrity of this republic. The Abkhazians, in turn, flatly refuse to stay. The desire to weaken Russia's influence in the Caucasus region is seen in the buildup of NATO's military presence in the Black Sea zone. So, if in 1990 there were five ships of the NATO states, then in 1996 there were already 27. In the spring of 1998, joint exercises of the Georgian and Turkish navies were held in the waters of Poti and Batumi.

The open press is currently considering three possible scenarios for the development of hostilities in this region. In all three, the main ideas are the same: to achieve the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from the security zone, to replace them with NATO, or from CIS countries friendly to the West, and then draw in the alliance contingents. Seize at least a part of the Gali region, plant an "Abkhazian government in exile" there, which will ask for help from the West. Neutralize Russia's actions and hold this part of the Abkhazian territory until NATO forces approach. Subsequently, completely absorb Abkhazia and deploy NATO bases on its territory. As a result, Russia loses control over the Transcaucasus, and then over the entire North Caucasus.

For Abkhazia and the South of Russia, the current US President's statement that "NATO's operation against Yugoslavia can be repeated at any time and anywhere in the world" is very significant.

It seems that the solution to the Abkhaz-Georgian conflict is not in the use of military force, but in purposeful, patient negotiations. And in this regard, the role of Moscow as a long-standing friend and partner of the Caucasus and Transcaucasia, as well as the Collective Peacekeeping Forces in the conflict zone of Abkhazia-Georgia, is sharply increasing. The departure of the Russian border guards showed that the fuse of a new regional war in this area was smoldering, the mine warfare by Georgian saboteurs intensified, Abkhaz-Georgian naval incidents began with shelling and seiner seizures.

We must keep in mind the determination of the military-political leadership of Abkhazia to repel aggression. Representatives of the Confederation of Peoples of the Caucasus have already made a statement in the open press about delivering strikes on the territory of Georgia from the territory of the Caucasian republics in the event of a new Abkhaz-Georgian conflict. They claim that their strikes will lead to a split of Georgia into 4-6 parts.

In a word, a new Abkhaz-Georgian military conflict, if it happens, will be an obvious threat to Russia on its southern borders.

In general, a regional conflict is the result of a competitive interaction of two or more political actors, challenging each other for the distribution of power, territory or resources. This interaction can be carried out in different ways: diplomatic negotiations, the inclusion of a third party, armed intervention, etc.

A regional war is a limited conflict, the cause of which is unresolved contradictions of a regional scale. It is localized within the borders of the region, but its political and economic consequences can affect far beyond these borders. In such a conflict, the participation of countries that do not belong to this region is not ruled out (deliveries of military equipment, sending advisers or volunteers)

The new era that came with the collapse of the Soviet Union is characterized by many signs, the saddest of which can be called a whole series of conflicts that have flared up in the post-Soviet space.

The curtailment of Russia's external influence, carried out first in the name of "common human values" (by which in practice the interests of our strategic competitors were understood), then in order to reduce the budget deficit, ultimately paid off: Russia lost significant influence outside the territory of the former USSR. Even the representatives of the countries most favorably disposed towards Russia are, in fact, inclined to deny its right to defend all its citizens.

Russia's weakness in the international arena has caused a sharp narrowing of the agenda in negotiations with the United States and Europe, which, in turn, contributes to the increase in the significance of regional conflicts. After all, the pressure of global competition is the "great constant" of modern historical development, and states that are not strong enough to participate in global processes face this competition at a lower, regional level. Those who do not want to defend their interests at distant frontiers will be forced to defend them at close approaches.

Over the past 15 years, the security of the South Caucasus region has been under the threat of unresolved conflicts in Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, instability in Chechnya and Dagestan. International terrorist networks and religious extremism are using separatist movements as training in acts of sabotage and recruiting new mercenaries. Russia faced this threat in the form of international terrorism, attempts to provoke conflicts in areas densely populated by some ethnic minorities, and the export of radical religious movements in the border regions with the North Caucasus and the southern regions of the country. This determines the active participation of Russia in the settlement of regional conflicts in the post-Soviet space.

Poverty, the unsettledness of ethnic and territorial conflicts, authoritarianism and the informational secrecy of local communities are the roots of international terrorism and religious extremism. Therefore, from the mediating peacekeeping side, measures to promote economic development, the establishment of the principles of democracy and human rights, and the settlement of long-standing conflicts in unstable regions are also very important.

Among the potential prerequisites for new interethnic conflicts in the CIS countries are youth unemployment, lack of land, lumpenization of a significant part of the population. All this can be the causes of social instability and regional conflicts, nationalism, political speculation, strengthening the positions of conservatism and traditionalism. Due to these circumstances, in our opinion, Central Asia and the Caucasus remain the most conflict regions. The rapid growth of the population, especially its able-bodied part, will contribute to the displacement of the newcomer population.

In the Russian Federation, interethnic tension still persists in a number of regions due to the fact that the issues of the federal structure and equalization of the rights of the subjects of the federation have not yet been resolved. Considering that Russia was formed both on a territorial and ethno-national basis, the rejection of the ethnoterritorial principle of Russian federalism in favor of extraterritorial cultural and national contradictions can lead to conflicts. But this problem also requires separate consideration.

Literature

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Annex A

Main events and dates in the history of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict

1918, June - under the pretext of fighting the Bolshevik forces, the troops of the Georgian Democratic Republic enter Abkhazia.

February 11, 1931 - The 6th Congress of Soviets of Abkhazia "approved" the decision to transform the Abkhazian SSR into an autonomous SSR within the Georgian SSR. 1956

July 10 -- Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU On Mistakes and Shortcomings in the Work of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, condemning the "distortions of national policy" in Abkhazia.

1957, April - unrest among the Abkhazian population demanding the withdrawal of Abkhazia from the Georgian SSR.

1967, April - mass demonstrations of Abkhazians demanding the withdrawal of Abkhazia from the Georgian SSR.

1978, May, September - mass demonstrations of Abkhazians demanding the withdrawal of Abkhazia from the Georgian SSR.

March 18, 1989 - the 30,000th gathering of Abkhazians. An appeal was adopted to the highest authorities of the USSR on the return of the status of a (union) Soviet socialist republic to Abkhazia.

1989, July 15-16 - bloody clashes between Georgians and Abkhazians in Sukhumi (16 dead).

1990, August 25 - The Supreme Council of Abkhazia adopts the Declaration on the Sovereignty of the Abkhaz ASSR. The split between the Abkhaz deputies and the Georgian faction of the Armed Forces, which opposed the Declaration.

September 25, 1991 - elections to the Supreme Council of Abkhazia; The formation of the deputy corps takes place on a quota basis: 28 seats for Abkhazians, 26 for Georgians, 11 for representatives of other ethnic groups.

1992, early February - political tension in Abkhazia due to the fact that, under the pretext of fighting supporters of the ousted president Zviad Gamsakhurdia, units of the National Guard of Georgia entered Abkhazia.

May 5, 1992 - the highest point of growing contradictions between the Abkhazian and Georgian factions of the Armed Forces. The Georgian faction leaves the meeting. The Parliament never met in its entirety.

1992, June - in Abkhazia, the process of creating armed formations is underway: a regiment of internal troops of Abkhazia and local Georgian units.

July 23, 1992 - The Supreme Court of Abkhazia adopts a resolution on the termination of the 1978 constitution of Abkhazia. and the introduction of the constitution of 1925, which fixed the pre-autonomous status of Abkhazia.

December 1, 1993 - A Memorandum of Understanding is signed during the peace talks that began in Geneva.

April 4, 1994 - The Statement on Measures for the Political Settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict and the Agreement on Refugees and the Procedure for Their Return were signed in Moscow.

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The Georgian-Abkhazian conflict is one of the most acute ethnic conflicts in the South Caucasus. Tension in relations between the Georgian government and the Abkhazian autonomy was periodically manifested even in the Soviet period. The fact is that when the USSR was created in 1922, Abkhazia had the status of a so-called treaty republic - it signed the treaty on the creation of the USSR. In 1931, the "contractual" Abkhaz SSR was transformed into an autonomous republic within the Georgian SSR. After that, the "Georgianization" of the republic began: in 1935, car numbers of the same series were introduced as in Georgia, a year later the geographical names were modified to the Georgian way, and the Abkhazian alphabet was made on the basis of Georgian graphics.

The Abkhazian language until 1950 was excluded from the secondary school curriculum and replaced by the obligatory study of the Georgian language. In addition, Abkhazians were forbidden to study in Russian schools, Russian sectors were closed in Sukhumi institutes. Signboards in the Abkhazian language were banned, radio broadcasting in the native language of the inhabitants of the region was stopped. All office work was translated into Georgian.

The migration policy, which began under the auspices of Lavrenty Beria, reduced the proportion of Abkhazians in the total population of the republic (by the beginning of the 1990s, it was only 17%). The migration of Georgians to the territory of Abkhazia (1937-1954) was formed by settling in Abkhazian villages, as well as the settlement of Greek villages by Georgians, liberated after the deportation of Greeks from Abkhazia in 1949.

Mass demonstrations and unrest among the Abkhaz population demanding the withdrawal of Abkhazia from the Georgian SSR broke out in April 1957, in April 1967, and the largest in May and September 1978.

The aggravation of relations between Georgia and Abkhazia began on March 18, 1989. On this day, in the village of Lykhny (the ancient capital of the Abkhazian princes), a 30,000th gathering of the Abkhazian people took place, which put forward a proposal for the secession of Abkhazia from Georgia and its restoration to the status of a union republic.

The Lykhny declaration provoked sharp protests from the Georgian population. On March 20, mass rallies began, which took place both in the regions of Georgia and in the cities and villages of Abkhazia. The culmination was a multi-day unauthorized rally in front of the Government House in Tbilisi - it began on April 4, and on April 9 it was dispersed with the use of troops, while in the ensuing stampede about 20 people died, more than 250 were injured and injured, and 189 military personnel were also injured.

On July 15-16, 1989, bloody clashes took place in Sukhumi between Georgians and Abkhazians. During the riots, 16 people were reportedly killed and about 140 injured. Troops were used to stop the unrest. The leadership of the republic then managed to resolve the conflict and the incident remained without serious consequences. Later, the situation was stabilized by significant concessions to the demands of the Abkhaz leadership, made during Zviad Gamsakhurdia's tenure in Tbilisi.

On February 21, 1992, the ruling Military Council of Georgia announced the abolition of the Constitution of the Georgian SSR of 1978 and the restoration of the constitution of the Georgian Democratic Republic of 1921.

The Abkhaz leadership perceived the abolition of the Soviet constitution of Georgia as the actual abolition of the autonomous status of Abkhazia, and on July 23, 1992, the Supreme Council of the Republic (with a boycott of the session by Georgian deputies) restored the Constitution of the Abkhaz Soviet Republic of 1925, according to which Abkhazia is a sovereign state (this decision The Supreme Council of Abkhazia was not recognized at the international level).

On August 14, 1992, hostilities began between Georgia and Abkhazia, which developed into a real war with the use of aviation, artillery and other types of weapons. The beginning of the military phase of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict was initiated by the entry of Georgian troops into Abkhazia under the pretext of releasing the Deputy Prime Minister of Georgia Alexander Kavsadze, captured by the Zviadists and held in Abkhazia, guarding communications, incl. railroad, and other important facilities. This move provoked fierce resistance from the Abkhaz, as well as from other ethnic communities in Abkhazia.

The goal of the Georgian government was to establish control over Abkhazia, which it regarded as an integral part of Georgian territory. The goal of the Abkhaz authorities is to expand the rights of autonomy and, ultimately, gain independence.

On the part of the central government, the National Guard, volunteer formations and individual volunteers acted, on the part of the Abkhaz leadership - armed formations of the non-Georgian population of the autonomy and volunteers (who arrived from the North Caucasus, as well as Russian Cossacks).

On September 3, 1992, in Moscow, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Chairman of the State Council of Georgia Eduard Shevardnadze signed a document providing for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of Georgian troops from Abkhazia, and the return of refugees. Since the conflicting parties did not fulfill a single point of the agreement, hostilities continued.

By the end of 1992, the war had acquired a positional character, where neither side could win. On December 15, 1992, Georgia and Abkhazia signed several documents on the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of all heavy weapons and troops from the region of hostilities. There was a period of relative calm, but in early 1993, hostilities resumed after the Abkhaz offensive on Sukhumi, occupied by Georgian troops.

On July 27, 1993, after lengthy fighting, an agreement on a temporary ceasefire was signed in Sochi, in which Russia acted as a guarantor.

At the end of September 1993, Sukhumi came under the control of the Abkhaz troops. Georgian troops were forced to completely leave Abkhazia.

The armed conflict of 1992-1993, according to the published data of the parties, claimed the lives of 4,000 Georgians (another 1,000 went missing) and 4,000 Abkhazians. The loss of the economy of the autonomy amounted to 10.7 billion dollars. About 250 thousand Georgians (almost half of the population) were forced to flee from Abkhazia.

On May 14, 1994, in Moscow, between the Georgian and Abkhaz sides, with the mediation of Russia, an agreement was signed on a ceasefire and separation of forces. On the basis of this document and the subsequent decision of the Council of CIS Heads of State, the CIS Collective Peacekeeping Forces have been deployed in the conflict zone since June 1994, whose task was to maintain the non-resumption of fire regime. These forces were fully staffed by Russian servicemen.

On April 2, 2002, a Georgian-Abkhazian protocol was signed, according to which the patrolling of the upper part of the Kodori Gorge (the territory of Abkhazia, controlled at that time by Georgia) was entrusted to Russian peacekeepers and UN military observers.

On July 25, 2006, units of the Georgian armed forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (up to 1.5 thousand people) were introduced into the Kodori Gorge to conduct a special operation against local armed Svan formations (“militia”, or “Monadire” battalion) Emzar Kvitsiani, who refused to obey the demand of the Minister of Defense Georgian Irakli Okruashvili lay down his arms. Kvitsiani is accused of "treason".

Official negotiations between Sukhumi and Tbilisi were then interrupted. As the authorities of Abkhazia emphasized, negotiations between the parties can be resumed only if Georgia begins to implement the UN Security Council Resolution, which provides for the withdrawal of troops from Kodori.

In the summer-autumn of 2006, Georgia regained control over the Kodori Gorge. On September 27, 2006, on the Day of Memory and Sorrow, by the decree of the President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili, Kodori was renamed Upper Abkhazia. In the village of Chkhalta, on the territory of the gorge, the so-called "legitimate government of Abkhazia" in exile was located.

On October 18, 2006, the People's Assembly of Abkhazia turned to the Russian leadership with a request to recognize the independence of the republic and establish associated relations between the two states. For its part, the Russian leadership has repeatedly declared its unconditional recognition of the territorial integrity of Georgia, of which Abkhazia is an integral part.

On August 9, 2008, after Georgian troops attacked South Ossetia, Abkhazia launched a military operation to oust Georgian troops from the territory of the Kodori Gorge. On August 12, the Abkhazian army entered the upper part of the Kodori Gorge and surrounded the Georgian troops. Georgian formations were completely ousted from the Abkhazian territory.

On August 26, 2008, after Georgia's military operation in South Ossetia, Russia recognized the independence of Abkhazia.

STORIES OF THE PARTICIPANTS OF THE OPERATION IN THE KODOR GORGE

The participants in the operation remember the officers of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Abkhazia, Major Nodar Avidzba and Senior Lieutenant Daut Nanba:

“Landing in Mi-8 airborne transport helicopters was made at 10:20 am on August 12, 2008. There were 15 people in our fire group. In total, 87 servicemen from various brigade tactical groups of our armed forces participated in the landing. Each group was assigned a landing point and an object of attack. Our group included two sappers, two snipers, two machine gunners with RPK and PK, one grenade launcher with RPG-7. In addition, each soldier in the group had a disposable RPG-26 Mukha grenade launcher.

Flight time to the target was three minutes. Already during the landing approach at the Svan settlement of Chkhal-ta, it was clear that the Georgians had panic and confusion. They dropped everything and ran towards the border with Georgia. Having united after landing with the assault group, together, consisting of 25 people, we examined the entire village and the surrounding area for three hours. During the inspection, a stone road bridge across one of the mountain rivers was cleared. A Georgian observation post discovered near the village was opened fire from small arms and a grenade launcher, completely smashing it to smithereens.

After that, they began to advance to the settlement of Azhara, located seven kilometers east of Chkhalta. They advanced to Azhara on foot, simultaneously conducting reconnaissance and inspecting the area adjacent to the highway. At every step there were thrown weapons. In particular, US-made 5.56 mm Bushmaster assault rifles (apparently, we are talking about the XM15E2 automatic carbine developed on the basis of the M4), shots for an RPG-7 grenade launcher, abandoned brand new hunter cars, three-bridge KamAZ trucks, graders, French Renault ambulances, American-made ATV snowmobiles. NATO uniforms and ammunition were scattered everywhere. The names of Georgian servicemen on the tags are in English. There were many documents thrown in a hurry, NATO instructions for conducting classes.

By 4 pm we reached Azhara. It was quiet. At the entrance to the mountain village, we were met by the priest of the local church. During the conversation with him, it turned out that a hundred meters from the church building there is a house in which the Georgians left an ammunition depot. During the retreat, they wanted to blow it up, but did not have time. Upon careful inspection of the house, the sappers found many 82mm mortar rounds, as well as US-made 60mm mortar rounds. In each room there was a box of TNT bombs with detonators. From the house towards the forest there was a field wire 30 meters long. All of this was defused. Also in Azhar, during the inspection, they found a depot of ammunition for artillery and small arms destroyed by an air strike. In this settlement, the Georgians left a large warehouse of fuel and lubricants. Here we captured a fully deployed stationary military hospital with a significant supply of medicines. In terms of time, it took exactly an hour to inspect Azhara.

Further, by order of the commander of the Kodori direction, Major General Law Nanba (he is the first deputy minister of defense of the Republic of Abkhazia - commander of the ground forces), we began advancing from Azhara to Gentsvish. For the whole day, of course, we got a bit tired, because from the very landing from the helicopter we went on foot. Therefore, we decided to go on trophy cars. We got from Azhara to Genzwisz in 30 minutes. Georgians were nowhere to be found. Already in Azhar, and then in Gentsvish, paratroopers, special forces and intelligence officers from other groups and assault units joined our group.

Somewhere at half past six in the evening we reached the village of Saken. Local residents were not visible throughout the movement from Chkhalta to the very border with Georgia, located 10 kilometers from Saken. They, as it turned out later, were hiding. These are mostly women, old people and children. The Svan men left with the Georgians across the cordon. Already at about half past eight in the evening we reached the foot of the Khida pass, where the border with Georgia passed. With this, we have completed our task. There were no fights, as the Georgians simply ran away.”

The chief of staff of the intelligence department of the general staff of the armed forces of the Republic of Abkhazia, Colonel Sergey Arshba, a 1983 graduate of the Lviv Higher Military-Political School, says:

“Yes, the Georgians were preparing for the offensive operation codenamed “Rock” thoroughly. We managed to capture as trophies tens of thousands of artillery shells, mortar mines, dozens of guns, mortars, communications equipment compatible with NATO systems, GPS space navigation receivers, thermal imagers, the latest Western-made night vision devices, military equipment.

The Pentagon and NATO structures were thoroughly preparing an operation to seize Abkhazia, as well as South Ossetia. We managed to find out all this both through secret agents and from captured documents. The Georgians were only puppets in their hands. If Russia had yielded to them here as well, then these dashing guys from Washington and Brussels would not have stopped there. They would have climbed further, to the North Caucasus, primarily to Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan. There and so the situation is explosive. There are also difficulties in Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cherkessia. Abkhazia directly borders on these two subjects of the Russian Federation. If the Americans and their henchmen managed to carry out their plans, then no one would have thought a little. They have one goal - to seize natural resources, which, by the way, are rich in both Transcaucasia and the North Caucasus. First of all, it is oil, gas and other strategic raw materials.

That is why they armed and trained the Georgians according to their patterns. They just didn’t take into account the mentality and morale of those trained and armed.

The result is known - by the end of the day on August 12, 2008, units and subunits of the armed forces of the Republic of Abkhazia along the entire length from the junction of the borders of Russia and Abkhazia with Georgia from the Main Caucasian Range in the areas of the Southern Shelter, Khida passes, Kalamri-Suki in the upper part of the Kodori Gorge reached the line at which the operation to capture the Upper Kodors was completely completed.

There were no contact battles with Georgian troops, except for reconnaissance in force on August 10, 2008, during the entire operation. Artillery and aviation did a good job, inflicting accurate strikes on identified targets. Here we should also note the good work of scouts, spotters of artillery fire and aircraft gunners.

Of course, it was difficult in the conditions of mountainous wooded areas and high mountains to conduct mounted fire to hit point targets with heavy artillery and multiple launch rocket systems. The artillerymen several times asked the scouts and the artillery spotters who were with them for the specified coordinates of the targets being hit. But thanks to the filigree work of artillerymen and pilots, not a single building in the district, except for those objects that were hit, was not damaged.

According to radio interception, at 9 pm on August 11, 2008, the radio network of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia in Upper Kodery ceased to exist. From 3:50 am on August 12, 2008, the grouping of law enforcement agencies of the Republic of Georgia in Upper Kodery also ceased to exist.”

According to Colonel Sergei Arshba, who oversees special operations with the participation of special forces, the enemy, having entered the upper part of the Kodori Gorge at the end of July 2006, also captured the Marukhsky, Klukhorsky, Nakharsky and a number of other passes along the Main Caucasian Range along the state border with Russia on its Abkhazian section with a total length of 50-60 kilometers. And he "planted" special forces and intelligence units on them. The Abkhazians held the Adange pass and all the others towards Krasnaya Polyana, Adler and Sochi. On the northern slopes from the side of the Russian Federation, the state border with Georgia was guarded by Russian border guards. For reinforcement, they were given airborne assault maneuver groups of the Directorates of the Border Service of the FSB of Russia in Karachay-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria, the Krasnodar and Stavropol Territories, the Directorate of the Border Guard Service of the FSB of the Russian Federation in the Southern Federal District, as well as army special forces from the North Caucasus military district.

According to the military intelligence of the Abkhaz, on the above passes and in the Southern Shelter, where the base camp of the special forces of the Georgian Armed Forces was, there was a regular rotation of special forces and intelligence units. Moreover, the permanent "guests" there were American, Israeli, French, Turkish "specialists" and specialists in sabotage and intelligence from other NATO states and their friendly countries. What they were doing there, I think, is easy to guess.

Sergey Arshba recalls such a case: “We are sitting in ambush on a slope near one of the passes. I look, Georgian special forces are walking along the path in NATO camouflage. And in front of the "students" they stomp ... who would you think? That's right - Americans, blacks. Confidently they go in the direction of the Main Caucasian Range, where the border with Russia passes. And not one or two, but a whole group of "comrades" from across the ocean. Well, I think we'll hit them now. I contacted the higher command. To my great regret, I received an order to let us through, although they were 5-6 meters away from us. We would put them all in a row...

And all this special forces "brotherhood" from different foreign countries constantly "hung out" in this area, as if it was smeared with honey there. Moreover, helipads and special forces bases were openly equipped. It can be seen that they were preparing not only for actions against Abkhazia, but also, it is possible, against Russia. Abkhazian fighters on the territory recaptured from the Georgians. On the building - the flag of Abkhazia.

And in August 2008, they draped from the passes as best they could. Some were photographed from a height of 2500 meters by helicopters, and some went down the paths and glaciers towards Georgia under their own power. But these bastards gave us "gifts" in the form of minefields, and very sophisticated ones, pretty much. I've already lost six experienced commandos there. Therefore, the passes where the Georgians and their friends from the West crowded together are impassable, there are mines everywhere.”

According to Sergei Arshba, the depth of the operation from the starting line in the Kuabchar region to the border with Georgia was 50 kilometers, and from the Adange pass area to the Khida and Kalamri-Suki passes - about 70 kilometers.

Everything that the Georgians abandoned during their flight from the Upper Kodors, the Abkhaz military took out for a long time. There were not enough trucks for such a volume of trophies, and the capacity of the broken roads in the Kodori Gorge is not enough. As Colonel S. Arshba noted, the reserves created by the Georgian side show that they expected to fight long and hard.

The Georgians even managed, probably not without the help of their friends from abroad, to drag heavy guns and mortars, as well as multiple launch rocket systems, to the mountain peaks and pass points. "We still cannot understand, - said Sergey Arshba, - how they managed to do it in the conditions of high mountains." From there, they, as in a shooting range, could freely shoot through the entire defense of the Abkhazian army and its supply routes for tens of kilometers.

Moreover, it must be said that during the two years of ownership of the Upper Kodors, with the help of funds allocated by foreign sponsors, the Georgian military built an excellent road there, part of which was asphalted, and part had a gravel surface. Through the communications of Tsebelda - Azhara - Upper Kodori, the enemy could freely transfer various forces and means to the battlefield. Road bridges across the mountain rivers Kodor, Chkhalta, Gvandra, Klych and others were capital, that is, stone. Heavy equipment, tanks, armored combat vehicles, etc. could move along them. The Georgians at any time could build up their grouping with manpower, weapons and military equipment.

During their rapid flight, the Georgians did not have time to blow up the bridges over the mountain rivers behind them, although explosives were placed under their foundation. Abkhazian sappers, moving forward, neutralized dangerous finds in time and preserved bridge crossings over the rivers.

And one more point, which drew the attention of Colonel S. Arshba. The Georgians, with the help of the Americans, were able to quickly form brigades of reservists during the preparation and during the hostilities in South Ossetia and transfer them to the areas where the fighting was going on. Another thing is that they had low combat capability and low morale. But the very fact of their quick knocking together and putting into battle says a lot. Here, the experience of the US National Guard units, the strategic reserve of the US armed forces, was used with might and main. In a good situation for the Georgians, if with the help of their overseas friends they managed to create a combat-ready reserve, both in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the defenders of these republics, and the Russian military, would have had a hard time. Moreover, the mobilization reserve in Georgia is significant. Fighting on both sides could then take on a fierce and protracted character. And it is not known which side would prevail. We need to draw certain conclusions from what happened. Moreover, the Georgians have not calmed down and will not calm down. The events of recent months show that they, too, have drawn certain conclusions from the short war. And now more thoroughly, using foreign military and economic assistance, they will prepare for revenge.

In many respects, the positive results of the operation in the Upper Kodori were influenced by the fact that units and subunits of the Russian Armed Forces prevented the intensification of Saakashvili's actions to strike at Abkhazia.

V. Anzin, "Soldier of Fortune", 2009

Since Tuesday morning, the authorities of Abkhazia have closed traffic on the bridge over the Inguri River, whereadministrative boundary between the Zugdidi region of Georgia and the Gali region of the unrecognized republic, a source in the regional police of the Georgian region of Samegrelo told RIA Novosti.

The Georgian-Abkhazian conflict is one of the most acute inter-ethnic conflicts in the South Caucasus. Tension in relations between the Georgian government and the Abkhazian autonomy was periodically manifested even in the Soviet period. The migration policy pursued under Lavrenty Beria led to the fact that Abkhazians began to make up a small percentage of the population of the region (by the beginning of the 1990s, they were no more than 17% of the total population of Abkhazia). The migration of Georgians to the territory of Abkhazia (1937-1954) was formed by settling in Abkhazian villages, as well as the settlement of Greek villages by Georgians, liberated after the deportation of Greeks from Abkhazia in 1949. The Abkhazian language (until 1950) was excluded from the secondary school curriculum and replaced by the obligatory study of the Georgian language. Mass demonstrations and unrest among the Abkhaz population demanding the withdrawal of Abkhazia from the Georgian SSR broke out in April 1957, in April 1967, and the largest in May and September 1978.

The aggravation of relations between Georgia and Abkhazia began on March 18, 1989. On this day, in the village of Lykhny (the ancient capital of the Abkhaz princes), the 30,000th Gathering of the Abkhaz people took place, which put forward a proposal for the secession of Abkhazia from Georgia and its restoration in the status of a union republic.

On July 15-16, 1989, clashes took place in Sukhumi between Georgians and Abkhazians. During the riots, 16 people were reportedly killed and about 140 injured. Troops were used to stop the unrest. The leadership of the republic then managed to resolve the conflict and the incident remained without serious consequences. Later, the situation was stabilized by significant concessions to the demands of the Abkhaz leadership, made during Zviad Gamsakhurdia's tenure in Tbilisi.

On February 21, 1992, the ruling Military Council of Georgia announced the abolition of the Constitution of the Georgian SSR of 1978 and the restoration of the constitution of the Georgian Democratic Republic of 1921.

The Abkhaz leadership perceived the abolition of the Soviet constitution of Georgia as a de facto abolition of the autonomous status of Abkhazia, and on July 23, 1992, the Supreme Council of the Republic (with a boycott of the session by Georgian deputies) restored the Constitution of the Abkhaz Soviet Republic of 1925, according to which Abkhazia is a sovereign state (this decision The Supreme Council of Abkhazia was not recognized at the international level).

On August 14, 1992, hostilities began between Georgia and Abkhazia, which developed into a real war with the use of aviation, artillery and other types of weapons. The beginning of the military phase of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict was initiated by the entry of Georgian troops into Abkhazia under the pretext of liberating Deputy Prime Minister of Georgia Alexander Kavsadze, captured by the Zviadists and held in Abkhazia, guarding communications, incl. railroad, and other important facilities. This move provoked fierce resistance from the Abkhaz, as well as from other ethnic communities in Abkhazia.

The goal of the Georgian government was to establish control over part of its territory and preserve its integrity. The goal of the Abkhaz authorities is to expand the rights of autonomy and, ultimately, gain independence.

On the part of the central government, the National Guard, paramilitary formations and individual volunteers acted, on the part of the Abkhaz leadership - armed formations of the non-Georgian population of the autonomy and volunteers (who arrived from the North Caucasus, as well as Russian Cossacks).

On September 3, 1992, in Moscow, during a meeting between Boris Yeltsin and Eduard Shevardnadze (who at that time held the posts of President of the Russian Federation and Chairman of the State Council of Georgia), a document was signed providing for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of Georgian troops from Abkhazia, and the return of refugees. Since the conflicting parties did not fulfill a single point of the agreement, hostilities continued.

By the end of 1992, the war had acquired a positional character, where neither side could win. On December 15, 1992, Georgia and Abkhazia signed several documents on the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of all heavy weapons and troops from the region of hostilities. There was a period of relative calm, but in early 1993, hostilities resumed after the Abkhaz offensive on Sukhumi, occupied by Georgian troops.

On July 27, 1993, after lengthy fighting, an agreement on a temporary ceasefire was signed in Sochi, in which Russia acted as a guarantor.

At the end of September 1993, Sukhumi came under the control of the Abkhaz troops. Georgian troops were forced to completely leave Abkhazia.

The armed conflict of 1992-1993, according to the published data of the parties, claimed the lives of 4 thousand Georgians (another 1 thousand were missing) and 4 thousand Abkhazians. The loss of the economy of the autonomy amounted to 10.7 billion dollars. About 250 thousand Georgians (almost half of the population) were forced to flee from Abkhazia.

On May 14, 1994, in Moscow, between the Georgian and Abkhaz sides, with the mediation of Russia, an agreement was signed on a ceasefire and separation of forces. On the basis of this document and the subsequent decision of the Council of CIS Heads of State, the CIS Collective Peacekeeping Forces have been deployed in the conflict zone since June 1994, whose task is to maintain the regime of non-resumption of fire.

Collective peacekeeping forces, fully staffed by Russian military personnel, control a 30-kilometer security zone in the zone of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. About 3,000 peacekeepers are permanently stationed in the conflict zone. The mandate of the Russian peacekeepers is set at six months. After this period, the Council of CIS Heads of State decides to extend their mandate.

On April 2, 2002, a Georgian-Abkhazian protocol was signed, according to which the patrolling of the upper part of the Kodori Gorge (the territory of Abkhazia controlled by Georgia) was entrusted to Russian peacekeepers and UN military observers.

On July 25, 2006, units of the Georgian armed forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (up to 1.5 thousand people) were introduced into the Kodori Gorge to conduct a special operation against local armed Svan formations (“militia”, or “Monadire” battalion) Emzar Kvitsiani, who refused to obey the demand of the Minister of Defense Georgian Irakli Okruashvili lay down his arms. Kvitsiani was accused of "treason".

Official negotiations between Sukhumi and Tbilisi were then interrupted. As the authorities of Abkhazia emphasized, negotiations between the parties can be resumed only if Georgia begins to implement the UN Security Council Resolution, which provides for the withdrawal of troops from Kodori.

On September 27, 2006, on the Day of Memory and Sorrow, by the decree of the President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili, Kodori was renamed Upper Abkhazia. In the village of Chkhalta, on the territory of the gorge, the so-called "legitimate government of Abkhazia" in exile is located. Abkhazian military formations controlled by Sukhumi are stationed a few kilometers from this village. The Abkhazian authorities do not recognize the "government in exile" and are categorically against its presence in the Kodori Gorge.

On October 18, 2006, the People's Assembly of Abkhazia turned to the Russian leadership with a request to recognize the independence of the republic and establish associated relations between the two states. For its part, the Russian leadership has repeatedly declared its unconditional recognition of the territorial integrity of Georgia, of which Abkhazia is an integral part.

The material was prepared on the basis of information from open sources