How many in our time can immediately define natural gas? Do they know its history and chemical composition? Obviously not, because Google can find everything.
So.
Natural gas is a mixture of hydrocarbons, which is something ephemeral, something that cannot be touched, seen and odorless. The basis of natural gas is methane (CH4) - the simplest hydrocarbon (an organic compound consisting of carbon and hydrogen atoms). It usually also contains heavier hydrocarbons, methane homologues: ethane (C2H6), propane (C3H8), butane (C4H10) and some non-hydrocarbon impurities.
In search of truth.
Scientists still cannot come to a consensus regarding the origin of natural gas, and their dispute fell into two camps, trying to prove the origin of gas, they proposed two main theories.
mineral theory
According to this theory, all the chemical elements that make up natural gas and oil were originally embedded in the Earth's mantle, representing deposits of minerals. being deep in rock layers are part of the Earth's degassing process. Due to the internal movements of the Earth, hydrocarbons at greater depths rise closer to the surface, where there is the least pressure, thus, oil and gas deposits are formed as a result.
biogenic theory.
Adherents of this theory believe that natural gas was formed from the remains of plant and animal organisms that became extinct at the end of the Paleozoic era, which, under the action of bacteria, high pressure and temperature, turned into a mixture of gaseous carbons. It was biochemical processes that provided the chemical cocktail of natural gas: 80-98% methane, 2-3% of its closest homologues - ethane, propane, butane, pentane, as well as a small amount of impurities - hydrogen sulfide, carbon dioxide, nitrogen.
Do you see the gas? No. And he is.
Most people who are far from the gas industry imagine that underground gas is like valuable minerals, it occupies some voids in the bowels of the earth, and is easily completely extracted. But this is not entirely true. Natural gas is indeed located deep underground, inside rocks that have a porous structure, but the pores are so microscopic that it is almost impossible to see them with the naked eye. Therefore, picking up a small piece of sandstone extracted from the bowels of the earth, it is difficult to realize that natural gas is contained inside.
Sacred fire.
Ancient Zoroastrian temple Ateshgah
For many peoples, fire caused reverent awe. People worshiped fire, loved fire, hated fire.
Mankind has known about the existence of natural gas for a long time. And, although already in the IV century BC. e. in China they learned to use it for heating and lighting, for a long time a bright flame that does not leave ashes was the subject of a mystical and religious cult for some peoples. For example, on the Absheron peninsula (modern territory of Azerbaijan) in the 7th century, the temple of fire worshipers Ateshgah was erected, revered at different times by Zoroastrians, Hindus and Sikhs. The temple arose on the site of "eternal" inextinguishable fires - burning outlets of natural gas, due to which the temple is called "Ateshgah", which means "House of Fire". It served until the 19th century. However, the Zoroastrians themselves say that they do not worship fire as such, but worship the Creator (Q'rt'), whose symbol is fire.
Get and use.
“Humanity is only about 200 thousand years old. And gas production began only in the last century.”
Man always and everywhere seeks profit. So the Persian king in the 1st century AD, seeing a fire that burned day and night, which did not require additional fuel, ordered the construction of a palace kitchen in the place where the gas came to the surface. Natural gas was first used in 1821 in Fredonia, New York.
On a note: The total length of gas pipelines in Russia is twice as long as the distance from the Earth to the Moon, or 20 times longer than the length of the equator.
February 14th, 2015
German gas attack. Aerial view. Photo: Imperial War Museums
According to rough estimates of historians, at least 1.3 million people suffered from chemical weapons during the First World War. All the main theaters of the Great War became, in fact, the largest testing ground in the history of mankind for testing weapons of mass destruction in real conditions. The international community thought about the danger of such a development of events as early as the end of the 19th century, when it tried to impose restrictions on the use of poisonous gases through a convention. But, as soon as one of the countries, namely Germany, violated this taboo, all the others, including Russia, joined the chemical arms race with no less zeal.
In the material of the "Russian Planet" I suggest you read about how it began and why the first gas attacks were never noticed by mankind.
The first gas lump
On October 27, 1914, at the very beginning of the First World War, near the village of Neuve Chapelle in the vicinity of Lille, the Germans fired at the French with improved shrapnel shells. In a glass of such a projectile, the space between the shrapnel bullets was filled with dianisidine sulfate, which irritates the mucous membranes of the eyes and nose. 3,000 of these shells allowed the Germans to capture a small village on the northern border of France, but the destructive effect of what would now be called "tear gas" was small. As a result, the disappointed German generals decided to abandon the production of "innovative" shells with insufficient lethality, since even Germany's developed industry could not cope with the monstrous needs of the fronts for conventional ammunition.
In fact, humanity then did not notice this first fact of a new "chemical war". Against the background of unexpectedly high losses from conventional weapons, the tears from the soldiers' eyes did not seem dangerous.
German troops release gas from cylinders during a gas attack. Photo: Imperial War Museums
However, the leaders of the Second Reich did not stop experiments with military chemistry. Just three months later, on January 31, 1915, already on the Eastern Front, German troops, trying to break through to Warsaw, near the village of Bolimov, fired at Russian positions with improved gas ammunition. That day, 18,000 150-millimeter shells containing 63 tons of xylyl bromide hit the positions of the 6th Corps of the 2nd Russian Army. But this substance was more "tearful" than poisonous. Moreover, the severe frosts that prevailed in those days nullified its effectiveness - the liquid sprayed by exploding shells did not evaporate in the cold and did not turn into gas, its irritating effect was insufficient. The first chemical attack on Russian troops was also unsuccessful.
The Russian command, however, drew attention to her. On March 4, 1915, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, then Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Imperial Army, received a proposal from the Main Artillery Directorate of the General Staff to begin experiments with shells filled with poisonous substances. A few days later, the secretaries of the Grand Duke replied that "the supreme commander has a negative attitude towards the use of chemical projectiles."
Formally, the uncle of the last tsar was right in this case - the Russian army was sorely lacking conventional shells to divert the already insufficient forces of industry into the manufacture of a new type of ammunition of dubious effectiveness. But military equipment during the Great years developed rapidly. And by the spring of 1915, the "gloomy Teutonic genius" revealed to the world a truly deadly chemistry that terrified everyone.
Nobel laureates kill near Ypres
The first effective gas attack was undertaken in April 1915 near the Belgian town of Ypres, where the Germans used chlorine released from cylinders against the British and French. On the attack front of 6 kilometers, 6,000 gas cylinders filled with 180 tons of gas were installed. It is curious that half of these cylinders were of civilian design - the German army collected them throughout Germany and captured Belgium.
The cylinders were placed in specially equipped trenches, combined into "gas-cylinder batteries" of 20 pieces each. Burying them and equipping all positions for a gas attack was completed on April 11, but the Germans had to wait more than a week for a favorable wind. In the right direction, he blew only at 5 pm on April 22, 1915.
Within 5 minutes, "gas-balloon batteries" released 168 tons of chlorine. A yellow-green cloud covered the French trenches, and the fighters of the “colored division” that had just arrived at the front from the French colonies in Africa fell under the action of the gas.
Chlorine caused spasms of the larynx and pulmonary edema. The troops did not yet have any means of protection against gas, no one even knew how to defend themselves and escape from such an attack. Therefore, the soldiers who remained in position suffered less than those who ran away, since each movement increased the effect of the gas. Since chlorine is heavier than air and accumulated near the ground, those soldiers who stood under fire suffered less than those who lay or sat at the bottom of the trench. The most injured were the wounded lying on the ground or on stretchers, and people moving to the rear along with a cloud of gas. In total, almost 15 thousand soldiers were poisoned, of which about 5 thousand died.
It is significant that the German infantry advancing after the chlorine cloud also suffered losses. And if the gas attack itself was a success, causing panic and even the flight of the French colonial units, then the actual German attack turned out to be almost a failure, and progress was minimal. The breakthrough of the front, which the German generals counted on, did not happen. The German infantrymen themselves were frankly afraid to go forward through the contaminated area. German soldiers who were captured in this area later told the British that the gas caused a sharp pain in their eyes when they occupied the trenches left by the fleeing French.
The impression of the tragedy at Ypres was aggravated by the fact that the Allied command was warned at the beginning of April 1915 about the use of new weapons - the defector said that the Germans were going to poison the enemy with a cloud of gas, and that "gas cylinders" had already been installed in the trenches. But the French and British generals then only brushed it aside - the information was included in the intelligence reports of the headquarters, but was classified as "information not credible."
Even greater was the psychological impact of the first effective chemical attack. The troops, who then had no protection against a new type of weapon, were struck by a real "gas fear", and the slightest rumor of the beginning of such an attack caused general panic.
Representatives of the Entente immediately accused the Germans of violating the Hague Convention, since Germany in 1899 in The Hague at the 1st Disarmament Conference, among other countries, signed a declaration “On the non-use of shells that have the sole purpose of spreading asphyxiating or harmful gases.” However, using the same wording, Berlin replied that the convention prohibited only gas projectiles, and not any use of gases for military purposes. After that, in fact, no one else remembered the convention.
Otto Hahn (right) in the laboratory. 1913 Photo: US Library of Congress
It is worth noting that it was chlorine that was chosen as the first chemical weapon for completely practical reasons. In civilian life, it was then widely used to produce bleach, hydrochloric acid, paints, medicines and a host of other products. The technology of its manufacture was well studied, so obtaining this gas in large quantities was not difficult.
The organization of the gas attack near Ypres was led by German chemists from the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin - Fritz Haber, James Frank, Gustav Hertz and Otto Hahn. The European civilization of the 20th century is best characterized by the fact that they all subsequently received Nobel Prizes for various scientific achievements of an exclusively peaceful nature. It is noteworthy that the creators of chemical weapons themselves did not consider that they were doing something terrible or even simply wrong. Fritz Haber, for example, claimed that he had always been an ideological opponent of the war, but when it began, he was forced to work for the good of his homeland. Gaber categorically denied accusations of creating inhumane weapons of mass destruction, considering such reasoning to be demagogy - in response, he usually stated that death is death in any case, regardless of what exactly caused it.
“Showed more curiosity than anxiety”
Immediately after the “success” near Ypres, the Germans in April-May 1915 carried out several more gas attacks on the Western Front. For the Eastern Front, the time for the first "gas balloon attack" came at the end of May. The operation was again carried out near Warsaw near the village of Bolimov, where in January the first unsuccessful experiment on the Russian front with chemical shells took place. This time, 12,000 cylinders of chlorine were prepared on a 12-kilometer stretch.
On the night of May 31, 1915, at 3:20 a.m., the Germans released chlorine. Parts of two Russian divisions - the 55th and 14th Siberian divisions - fell under the gas attack. Intelligence in this sector of the front was then commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Alexander De-Lazari, who later described that fateful morning as follows: “Complete surprise and unpreparedness led the soldiers to show more surprise and curiosity at the appearance of a gas cloud than anxiety. Mistaking the cloud of gas for a camouflage attack, the Russian troops reinforced the forward trenches and pulled up reserves. Soon the trenches were filled with corpses and dying people.
Almost 9,038 people were poisoned in two Russian divisions, of whom 1,183 died. The concentration of the gas was such that, as an eyewitness wrote, chlorine “formed gas swamps in the lowlands, destroying spring and clover seedlings on the way” - the grass and leaves from the gas changed color, turned yellow and died after people.
As at Ypres, despite the tactical success of the attack, the Germans failed to develop it into a breakthrough of the front. It is significant that the German soldiers near Bolimov were also very afraid of chlorine and even tried to object to its use. But the high command from Berlin was relentless.
No less significant is the fact that, just like the British and French near Ypres, the Russians were also aware of the impending gas attack. The Germans, with balloon batteries already placed in the advanced trenches, waited for a favorable wind for 10 days, and during this time the Russians took several "languages". Moreover, the command already knew the results of the use of chlorine near Ypres, but the soldiers and officers in the trenches still did not warn about anything. True, in connection with the threat of the use of chemistry, "gas masks" were issued from Moscow itself - the first, not yet perfect gas masks. But by an evil irony of fate, they were delivered to the divisions attacked by chlorine on May 31 in the evening, after the attack.
A month later, on the night of July 7, 1915, the Germans repeated a gas attack in the same area, not far from Bolimov near the village of Volya Shidlovskaya. “This time the attack was no longer as unexpected as on May 31,” wrote a participant in those battles. “However, the chemical discipline of the Russians was still very low, and the passage of the gas wave caused the abandonment of the first line of defense and significant losses.”
Despite the fact that the troops had already begun to supply primitive "gas masks", they still did not know how to properly respond to gas attacks. Instead of wearing masks and waiting for a cloud of chlorine to blow through the trenches, the soldiers fled in panic. It is impossible to overtake the wind by running, and they, in fact, ran in a gas cloud, which increased the time they spent in chlorine vapors, and fast running only aggravated the damage to the respiratory organs.
As a result, parts of the Russian army suffered heavy losses. The 218th Infantry Regiment lost 2,608 men. In the 21st Siberian Regiment, after the retreat in a cloud of chlorine, less than a company remained combat-ready, 97% of the soldiers and officers were poisoned. The troops also did not yet know how to carry out chemical reconnaissance, that is, to determine heavily contaminated areas of the terrain. Therefore, the Russian 220th Infantry Regiment went on a counterattack through the area contaminated with chlorine, and lost 6 officers and 1346 privates from gas poisoning.
"In view of the complete illegibility of the enemy in the means of struggle"
Already two days after the first gas attack against Russian troops, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich changed his mind about chemical weapons. On June 2, 1915, a telegram left him for Petrograd: “The Supreme Commander-in-Chief admits that, in view of our enemy’s complete indiscriminateness in the means of struggle, the only measure of influence on him is the use on our part of all the means used by the enemy. The Commander-in-Chief asks for orders to carry out the necessary tests and supply the armies with appropriate devices with a supply of poisonous gases.
But the formal decision to create chemical weapons in Russia was made a little earlier - on May 30, 1915, the order of the Military Ministry No. 4053 appeared, which stated that “the organization of the procurement of gases and asphyxiants and the conduct of the active use of gases is entrusted to the Commission for the Procurement of Explosives ". This commission was headed by two colonels of the guard, both Andrei Andreevich - specialists in artillery chemistry A.A. Solonin and A.A. Dzerzhkovich. The first was instructed to manage "gases, their procurement and use", the second - "to manage the business of equipping shells" with poisonous chemistry.
So since the summer of 1915, the Russian Empire took care of the creation and production of its own chemical weapons. And in this matter, the dependence of military affairs on the level of development of science and industry was especially clearly manifested.
On the one hand, by the end of the 19th century, a powerful scientific school in the field of chemistry existed in Russia, it is enough to recall the epoch-making name of Dmitri Mendeleev. But, on the other hand, the chemical industry of Russia in terms of the level and volume of production was seriously inferior to the leading powers of Western Europe, primarily Germany, which at that time was the leader in the world chemical market. For example, in 1913, 75,000 people worked in all chemical industries of the Russian Empire - from the production of acids to the production of matches, while in Germany over a quarter of a million workers were employed in this industry. In 1913, the value of the products of all chemical industries in Russia amounted to 375 million rubles, while in that year Germany only sold chemical products abroad for 428 million rubles (924 million marks).
By 1914, there were less than 600 people with a higher chemical education in Russia. There was not a single special chemical-technological university in the country, only eight institutes and seven universities of the country trained an insignificant number of chemists.
It should be noted here that the chemical industry in wartime is needed not only for the production of chemical weapons - first of all, its capacities are required for the production of gunpowder and other explosives, which are needed in gigantic quantities. Therefore, the state "state" factories that had free capacities for the production of military chemicals were no longer in Russia.
Attack of the German infantry in gas masks in the clouds of poison gas. Photo: Deutsches Bundesarchiv
Under these conditions, the first manufacturer of "suffocating gases" was the private manufacturer Gondurin, who proposed to produce phosgene gas at his plant in Ivanovo-Voznesensk - an extremely poisonous volatile substance with the smell of hay that affects the lungs. Since the 18th century, the Gondurin merchants had been engaged in the production of chintz, so by the beginning of the 20th century, their factories, thanks to the dyeing of fabrics, had some experience in chemical production. The Russian Empire concluded a contract with the merchant Gondurin for the supply of phosgene in an amount of at least 10 pounds (160 kg) per day.
In the meantime, on August 6, 1915, the Germans tried to carry out a large gas attack against the garrison of the Russian fortress of Osovets, which had been successfully holding the defense for several months. At 4 o'clock in the morning they released a huge cloud of chlorine. The gas wave, released along a front 3 kilometers wide, penetrated to a depth of 12 kilometers and spread to the sides up to 8 kilometers. The height of the gas wave rose to 15 meters, this time the gas clouds had a green color - it was chlorine with an admixture of bromine.
Caught in the epicenter of the attack, three Russian companies died completely. According to surviving eyewitnesses, the consequences of that gas attack looked like this: “All the greenery in the fortress and in the nearest area along the path of the gases was destroyed, the leaves on the trees turned yellow, curled up and fell off, the grass turned black and lay on the ground, the flower petals flew around. All copper objects in the fortress - parts of guns and shells, washbasins, tanks, etc. - were covered with a thick green layer of chlorine oxide.
However, this time the Germans were unable to build on the success of the gas attack. Their infantry attacked too early and suffered losses from the gas themselves. Then two Russian companies counterattacked the enemy through a cloud of gases, losing up to half of the soldiers poisoned - the survivors, with swollen veins on their faces affected by the gas, launched a bayonet attack, which brisk journalists in the world press would immediately call "attack of the dead."
Therefore, the warring armies began to use gases in increasing quantities - if in April the Germans released almost 180 tons of chlorine near Ypres, then by the autumn in one of the gas attacks in Champagne - already 500 tons. And in December 1915, the new, more toxic gas phosgene was first used. Its "advantage" over chlorine was that it was difficult to determine the gas attack - phosgene is transparent and invisible, has a faint smell of hay, and does not begin to act immediately after inhalation.
The widespread use of poison gases by Germany on the fronts of the Great War forced the Russian command to also enter into a chemical arms race. At the same time, it was necessary to urgently solve two problems: firstly, to find a way to protect against new weapons, and secondly, “not to remain indebted to the Germans”, and to answer them the same. The Russian army and industry coped with both more than successfully. Thanks to the outstanding Russian chemist Nikolai Zelinsky, already in 1915 the world's first universal effective gas mask was created. And in the spring of 1916, the Russian army carried out its first successful gas attack.
The empire needs poison
Before responding to the German gas attacks with the same weapon, the Russian army had to establish its production almost from scratch. Initially, the production of liquid chlorine was created, which was completely imported from abroad before the war.
This gas began to be supplied by existing before the war and converted production - four plants in Samara, several enterprises in Saratov, one plant each - near Vyatka and in the Donbass in Slavyansk. In August 1915, the army received the first 2 tons of chlorine, a year later, by the fall of 1916, the production of this gas reached 9 tons per day.
A significant story happened with the plant in Slavyansk. It was created at the very beginning of the 20th century to produce bleach electrolytically from rock salt mined in local salt mines. That is why the plant was called "Russian Electron", although 90% of its shares belonged to French citizens.
In 1915, this was the only production located relatively close to the front and theoretically capable of quickly producing chlorine on an industrial scale. Having received subsidies from the Russian government, the plant did not give the front a ton of chlorine in the summer of 1915, and at the end of August the management of the plant was transferred to the military authorities.
Diplomats and newspapers of supposedly allied France immediately raised a fuss about the violation of the interests of French proprietors in Russia. The tsarist authorities were afraid of quarreling with the Entente allies, and in January 1916 the management of the plant was returned to the previous administration and even new loans were provided. But until the end of the war, the plant in Slavyansk did not reach the production of chlorine in the quantities stipulated by military contracts.
An attempt to obtain phosgene in Russia from private industry also failed - the Russian capitalists, despite all their patriotism, inflated prices and, due to the lack of sufficient industrial capacity, could not guarantee timely fulfillment of orders. For these needs, new state production facilities had to be created from scratch.
Already in July 1915, the construction of a “military chemical plant” began in the village of Globino on the territory of the current Poltava region of Ukraine. Initially, they planned to establish the production of chlorine there, but in the fall it was reoriented to new, more deadly gases - phosgene and chloropicrin. For the plant of military chemistry, the ready-made infrastructure of the local sugar factory, one of the largest in the Russian Empire, was used. Technical backwardness led to the fact that the enterprise was built for more than a year, and the Globinsky Military Chemical Plant began the production of phosgene and chloropicrin only on the eve of the February Revolution of 1917.
The situation was similar with the construction of the second large state enterprise for the production of chemical weapons, which began to be built in March 1916 in Kazan. The first phosgene was produced by the Kazan Military Chemical Plant in 1917.
Initially, the Ministry of War expected to organize large chemical plants in Finland, where there was an industrial base for such production. But the bureaucratic correspondence on this issue with the Finnish Senate dragged on for many months, and by 1917 the "military chemical plants" in Varkaus and Kajaan were not ready.
In the meantime, state-owned factories were only being built, the War Ministry had to buy gases wherever possible. For example, on November 21, 1915, 60 thousand pounds of liquid chlorine were ordered from the Saratov city government.
"Chemical Committee"
Since October 1915, the first "special chemical teams" began to form in the Russian army to carry out gas balloon attacks. But due to the initial weakness of Russian industry, it was not possible to attack the Germans with a new "poison" weapon in 1915.
In order to better coordinate all efforts in the development and production of combat gases, in the spring of 1916, a Chemical Committee was created under the Main Artillery Directorate of the General Staff, often simply called the "Chemical Committee". All existing and created chemical weapons plants and all other work in this area were subordinated to him.
The 48-year-old Major General Vladimir Nikolaevich Ipatiev became the Chairman of the Chemical Committee. A prominent scientist, he had not only a military, but also a professorial rank, before the war he taught a course in chemistry at St. Petersburg University.
Gas mask with ducal monograms
The first gas attacks immediately required not only the creation of chemical weapons, but also means of protection against them. In April 1915, in preparation for the first use of chlorine near Ypres, the German command provided its soldiers with cotton pads soaked in sodium hyposulfite solution. They had to cover the nose and mouth during the release of gases.
By the summer of that year, all the soldiers of the German, French and British armies were equipped with cotton-gauze bandages soaked in various chlorine neutralizers. However, such primitive "gas masks" turned out to be uncomfortable and unreliable, besides softening the defeat with chlorine, they did not provide protection against the more toxic phosgene.
In Russia, such dressings in the summer of 1915 were called “stigma masks”. They were made for the front by various organizations and individuals. But as the German gas attacks showed, they almost did not save from the massive and prolonged use of toxic substances, and were extremely inconvenient to use - they quickly dried out, finally losing their protective properties.
In August 1915, Professor of Moscow University Nikolai Dmitrievich Zelinsky suggested using activated charcoal as a means to absorb poisonous gases. Already in November, Zelinsky's first coal gas mask was tested for the first time complete with a rubber helmet with glass "eyes", which was made by Mikhail Kummant, an engineer from St. Petersburg.
Unlike previous designs, this one is reliable, easy to use and ready for immediate use for many months. The resulting protective device successfully passed all the tests and received the name "Zelinsky-Kummant gas mask". However, here the obstacles to the successful arming of the Russian army with them were not even the shortcomings of Russian industry, but the departmental interests and ambitions of officials. At that time, all work on protection against chemical weapons was entrusted to the Russian general and German prince Friedrich (Alexander Petrovich) of Oldenburg, a relative of the ruling Romanov dynasty, who held the position of Supreme Head of the sanitary and evacuation unit of the imperial army. By that time, the prince was almost 70 years old and he was remembered by Russian society as the founder of the resort in Gagra and a fighter against homosexuality in the guard. The prince actively lobbied for the adoption and production of a gas mask, which was designed by teachers from the Petrograd Mining Institute using experience in mines. This gas mask, called the "gas mask of the Mining Institute", as shown by the tests, protected less from asphyxiating gases and it was more difficult to breathe in it than in the Zelinsky-Kummant gas mask.
Despite this, the Prince of Oldenburg ordered to begin production of 6 million "gas masks of the Mining Institute", decorated with his personal monogram. As a result, the Russian industry spent several months producing a less perfect design. On March 19, 1916, at a meeting of the Special Conference on Defense, the main body of the Russian Empire for managing the military industry, an alarming report was made on the situation at the front with “masks” (as gas masks were then called): “Masks of the simplest type poorly protect against chlorine, but do not protect against other gases. The masks of the Mining Institute are unusable. The production of Zelinsky masks, long recognized as the best, has not been established, which should be considered criminal negligence.
As a result, only the solidarity opinion of the military allowed the mass production of Zelinsky gas masks to begin. On March 25, the first state order for 3 million and the next day for another 800 thousand gas masks of this type appeared. By April 5, the first batch of 17 thousand had already been produced. However, until the summer of 1916, the production of gas masks remained extremely insufficient - in June, no more than 10 thousand pieces per day were delivered to the front, while millions were needed to reliably protect the army. Only the efforts of the "Chemical Commission" of the General Staff made it possible to radically improve the situation by the fall - by the beginning of October 1916, over 4 million different gas masks were sent to the front, including 2.7 million "Zelinsky-Kummant gas masks". In addition to gas masks for people during the First World War, special gas masks for horses, which then remained the main draft force of the army, not to mention the numerous cavalry, had to be taken care of. Until the end of 1916, 410 thousand horse gas masks of various designs were delivered to the front.
In total, during the years of the First World War, the Russian army received over 28 million gas masks of various types, of which over 11 million were of the Zelinsky-Kummant system. Since the spring of 1917, only they were used in combat units of the active army, thanks to which the Germans abandoned “gas-balloon” attacks with chlorine on the Russian front due to their complete ineffectiveness against troops in such gas masks.
"The war has crossed the last line»
According to historians, during the years of the First World War, about 1.3 million people suffered from chemical weapons. The most famous of them, perhaps, was Adolf Hitler - on October 15, 1918, he was poisoned and temporarily lost his sight as a result of a close explosion of a chemical projectile. It is known that in 1918, from January to the end of the fighting in November, the British lost 115,764 soldiers from chemical weapons. Of these, less than one tenth of a percent died - 993. Such a small percentage of fatal losses from gases is associated with the complete equipping of troops with perfect types of gas masks. However, a large number of the wounded, or rather poisoned and lost their combat effectiveness, left chemical weapons with formidable force on the fields of the First World War.
The US Army entered the war only in 1918, when the Germans brought the use of various chemical projectiles to their maximum and perfection. Therefore, among all the losses of the American army, more than a quarter accounted for chemical weapons. This weapon not only killed and wounded - with massive and prolonged use, it made entire divisions temporarily incapacitated. So, during the last offensive of the German army in March 1918, during artillery preparation against the 3rd British Army alone, 250 thousand shells with mustard gas were fired. British soldiers on the front line had to wear gas masks continuously for a week, which made them almost incapable of fighting. The losses of the Russian army from chemical weapons in the First World War are estimated with a wide spread. During the war, for obvious reasons, these figures were not made public, and two revolutions and the collapse of the front by the end of 1917 led to significant gaps in the statistics.
The first official figures were already published in Soviet Russia in 1920 - 58,890 non-fatally poisoned and 6,268 gas dead. In the 1920s and 1930s, studies in the West, which came out in hot pursuit, showed much larger numbers - over 56,000 killed and about 420,000 poisoned. Although the use of chemical weapons did not lead to strategic consequences, but its impact on the psyche of the soldiers was significant. The sociologist and philosopher Fyodor Stepun (by the way, himself of German origin, real name - Friedrich Steppuhn) served as a junior officer in the Russian artillery. Even during the war, in 1917, his book “From the Letters of an Artillery Ensign” was published, where he described the horror of people who survived a gas attack: “Night, darkness, howling above their heads, splashing shells and whistling heavy fragments. Breathing is so difficult that it seems that you are about to suffocate. The masked voices are almost inaudible, and in order for the battery to accept the command, the officer needs to shout it right into the ear of each gunner. At the same time, the terrible unrecognizability of the people around you, the loneliness of the damned tragic masquerade: white rubber skulls, square glass eyes, long green trunks. And all in a fantastic red sparkle of explosions and shots. And above everything is the insane fear of a hard, disgusting death: the Germans shot for five hours, and the masks are designed for six.
You can't hide, you have to work. With each step, it pricks the lungs, knocks over backwards and the feeling of suffocation intensifies. And you have to not only walk, you have to run. Perhaps the horror of gases is not characterized by anything so clearly as by the fact that no one in the gas cloud paid any attention to the shelling, but the shelling was terrible - more than a thousand shells fell on our single battery ...
In the morning, after the shelling stopped, the view of the battery was terrible. In the dawn mist, people are like shadows: pale, with bloodshot eyes and gas-mask charcoal deposited on their eyelids and around their mouths; many are sick, many are fainting, the horses are all lying on the hitching post with cloudy eyes, with bloody foam at the mouth and nostrils, some are convulsing, some have already died.
Fyodor Stepun summarized these experiences and impressions of chemical weapons in the following way: “After the gas attack in the battery, everyone felt that the war had crossed the last line, that from now on everything was allowed and nothing was sacred.”
The total losses from chemical weapons in WWI are estimated at 1.3 million people, of which up to 100 thousand were fatal:
British Empire - 188,706 people suffered, of which 8109 died (according to other sources, on the Western Front - 5981 or 5899 out of 185,706 or 6062 out of 180,983 British soldiers);
France - 190,000, 9,000 died;
Russia - 475,340, 56,000 died (according to other sources - out of 65,000 victims, 6340 died);
USA - 72,807, died 1462;
Italy - 60,000, 4627 died;
Germany - 200,000, 9,000 died;
Austria–Hungary 100,000, 3,000 died.
Ford-A and Ford-AA models were chosen as prototypes for production.
Already on January 1, 1932, the Nizhny Novgorod Automobile Plant (NAZ) went into operation and in the same year the first 1.5-ton NAZ-AA truck rolled off its assembly line.
Later it gets the name GAZ-AA.
In December of the same year, the assembly of a GAZ-A passenger car with an open 5-seater phaeton body began.
The first cars were made according to the drawings of the American company Ford. However, they were initially somewhat different from the American prototypes. So on GAZ cars, the clutch housings and steering gears were strengthened, the shape of the radiators was changed, the inch thread was replaced with a metric one. Combining Ford patents with the development of their own solutions, GAZ designers created an extensive family of original serial models and modifications based on the GAZ-AA lorry. So in 1933, the 17-seater bus GAZ-03-30, produced at the car assembly plant No. 1, saw the light of day. Later, this enterprise was renamed the Gorky Bus Plant.
In 1934, a 2-ton three-axle GAZ-AAA truck with a 6X4 wheel arrangement appeared.
And a 1.2-ton dump truck GAZ-410.
In 1938, a 50-horsepower GAZ-MM truck was modernized and a gas-generating 1-ton GAZ-42 truck was launched into series.
As well as the half-track truck GAZ-60
There was also a place in the production program for the GAZ-55 ambulance.
In 1933, on the basis of the GAZ-A car, the GAZ-4 pickup truck was created with an all-metal cab from a lorry and a metal platform that allows you to carry cargo weighing up to 500 kg. The model was produced at the Gorky Automobile Assembly Plant.
On April 17, 1935, GAZ became the first automobile manufacturer in the country to produce 100,000 vehicles. The 100,000th car rolled off the production line. They became the passenger GAZ-A. In accordance with the agreement, GAZ continued to receive technical support from Ford Motor Company for another 5 years after the start-up of the plant. It was thanks to this cooperation that the plant received documentation for the Ford Model B, 1933 model year.
The model was adopted for production at GAZ, but with rather serious modifications to meet the requirements of operation in the USSR. Among the features of the M-1 compared to the previous model, GAZ-A, Emka had an almost completely metal body, a more rigid spar frame with an X-shaped cross member, a more advanced and, importantly, more tenacious suspension on longitudinal springs, automatic ignition timing, better finished and equipped salon. So, in particular, a forward-backward adjustable front seat, an electric fuel gauge, sun visors, body ventilation with four rotary “windows” in the side windows. In May 1936, serial production of the 4-door 5-seater GAZ-M-1 sedan began, known as the Emka. The letter "M" in the model index did not appear by chance. The fact is that at that time the plant began to bear the name of the then head of the government of the USSR, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, and "1" - the serial number of the model. The letter "M" remained in the designations of the plant's products until the late fifties - early sixties. In 1937-38. the car received the ominous nickname "Black Raven" due to the fact that it was used by the NKVD to arrest "enemies of the people". which came at the peak of Stalin's repressions.
This car became the most massive pre-war Soviet passenger car model. On the basis of Emka, a number of serial modifications were created, including the world's first comfortable SUV with a closed body GAZ-61-73.
Later, the off-road theme was continued by the GAZ-64 army command all-wheel drive vehicle. The first car was produced in August 1941.
In the initial period of the war, the plant mastered the production of an off-road light army vehicle GAZ-64. In October 1941, the production of the T-60 light tank began, the design of which was improved by the factory workers in order to improve its performance. Also in the same spring, the BA-64 light armored car based on the GAZ-64 was put into production.
In 1943, the BA-64B armored car and the light army off-road vehicle GAZ-67 unified with it on the chassis were mastered. The GAZ tank design bureau during the second half of 1942 worked on strengthening the chassis of the T-70,
To eliminate its most important drawback - a single tower. The result of this work was the adopted T-80 light tank with a two-man turret.
In the same period, a modernized GAZ-67B off-road light army vehicle was mastered, which was also produced in the post-war period.
In addition, GAZ massively produced engines, mortars and other military products. The leading role in the design of Soviet off-road vehicles was played by the designer Vitaly Andreevich Grachev, who was awarded the Stalin Prize for 1942 for the creation of the BA-64 armored car. At the end of the Great Patriotic War, work was carried out at the plant to replace the entire pre-war model range, the development of which had begun partially before the war and was actively resumed in 1943-1945. Already in 1946, the Pobeda GAZ-M-20 went into production. "Victory" became famous primarily due to the original body shape, which created a very small aerodynamic drag, only 0.34.
GAZ-M-20 became the first Soviet car with a monocoque body and the world's first mass-produced car with a body without wings. The car was distinguished by an independent suspension of the front wheels, hydraulic brakes, hinged doors on the front hinges. In a comfortable cabin with a heater, 5 people were freely accommodated. It is worth noting that all "Victory" were equipped with radios.
In the same year, the 2.5-ton GAZ-51 truck saw the light, the design work of which began back in 1943.
In 1947, the production of the GAZ-MM lorry was transferred to Ulyanovsk. At the same time, the production of the tracked snow and swamp vehicle GAZ-47 was mastered.
In 1948, the all-wheel drive truck GAZ-63 was mastered,
And in 1949, a prototype GAZ-69 was created.
In 1950, the executive sedan of the large class GAZ-12 ZIM, and its modifications, began to roll off the assembly line.
In the same year, mass production of the armored personnel carrier BTR-40 (GAZ-40) began.
In 1953-1954, the production of GAZ-69 and GAZ-69A was mastered, later transferred to the Ulyanovsk Automobile Plant, as well as the first comfortable SUV with a load-bearing body GAZ-M-72 Pobeda on GAZ-69 units.
In 1956, the Pobeda was replaced by the Volga GAZ-21 middle-class sedan, which underwent a number of upgrades on the way to mass production.
For many people, "twenty-first" has become a symbol of an entire era. Advanced for its time, it still has a huge number of fans. Recently, there has been an increase in interest in this model from collectors. No less fashionable are the "hot rods" based on the "twenty-first", and the conveyor original cars still catch the eye. The latter once again confirms that the Volga GAZ-21 is one of the iconic cars.
And in 1959, ZIM was replaced by the GAZ-13 Chaika, which lasted in production for over twenty years. In technical terms, the Chaika design was of undoubted interest due to a number of innovations. The car was equipped with a 195 hp V-shaped eight-cylinder engine, a four-chamber carburetor, power steering, and a hydromechanical gearbox. Gearshift control was push-button, and the radio antenna extended automatically.
Body equipment included: power windows, windshield washer, auto-tuning radio, fog lights and more. Along with the base model, which had a sedan body, GAZ-13A limousines and GAZ-13B convertibles were produced in small batches.
In 1958, the team of designers and designers GAZ-21 "Volga", GAZ-13 "Seagull" and the GAZ-52 truck at the World Exhibition in Brussels was awarded the highest award - the Grand Prix. However, in reality, the development of the production of GAZ-52 and GAZ-53 trucks was delayed.
In the same year, for the needs of the Soviet army, a 1.2-ton landing truck GAZ-62 with a cab over the engine was mastered.
In the 1960s, the renewal of the truck line was completed. GAZ-52, GAZ-53 and GAZ-66, which got on the conveyor, formed the third generation of GAZ trucks. On the GAZ-53 and GAZ-66, they began to install new power units with a powerful V-shaped eight. Dual purpose 4x4 truck
GAZ-66 was the first among the cars of the USSR awarded the State Quality Mark. The car, without straining, could carry two tons of cargo and tow a trailer with a total mass of two tons. By changing the tire pressure and including one of eight gears, the driver easily coped with off-road. On dry hard ground, the GAZ-66 overcame slopes up to 37 degrees, and on loose sandy - 22 degrees. The car had a number of innovations, such as: a hypoid main gear, an all-metal cargo platform, a cab that leans forward, a power steering, a windshield washer, etc. Due to its outstanding performance, the GAZ-66 quickly won recognition from both military and civilian drivers. The only criticism was the location of the backstage of the gearbox. In connection with the original layout, the lever was actually located behind the driver, and even a strongly curved rocker did not give proper ergonomic comfort when shifting gears.
At the same time, the plant launched serial production of the BTR-60, which, and subsequently, which was subsequently modernized more than once and actively supplied and exported, in total, as of today, the BTR-80 is already in service with approximately 26 states. By the way, the prototype, from the first serial BTR-60, differed in the propulsion system. It was a GAZ-40P carburetor engine with a power of 90 liters. s., which was clearly not enough for a 10-ton machine. An attempt to replace it with a YaAZ-206B diesel engine with a capacity of 205 liters. With. was also unsuccessful - the engine turned out to be too heavy and created a serious overweight of the car to the stern, which was unacceptable for an amphibian. In the absence of other suitable power plants, it was decided to install a pair of two GAZ-40Ps with their own transmissions on the armored personnel carrier, each of which worked on two bridges and, in the event of a failure of one of the power units, allowed the combat vehicle to remain on the move.
In 1970, mass production of the GAZ-24 began, replacing the GAZ-21. The car was awarded with gold medals at the International Exhibitions in 1969 in Plovdiv (Bulgaria) and in 1970 in Leipzig (GDR). "Twenty-fourth" was distinguished by the severity of forms, simplicity, grandeur and has always been the embodiment of dignity and prestige. The high strength of the body and chassis of the GAZ-24 made this car indispensable for working as a "taxi". With a 98-horsepower engine, the GAZ-24 reached speeds of up to 140 km / h, and accelerated to 100 km / h in 23 seconds, against 34 seconds for the GAZ-21. The production of the GAZ-21 was completely curtailed in July 1970.
In 1977, the production of the GAZ-14 "Chaika" began - a representative of the third generation of large-class passenger cars. This car was famous, at that time, for its high technical level and comfort.
Also in the 1970s, a reorganization of production was carried out: on August 24, 1971, the AvtoGAZ production association was formed on the basis of the branch plants and production facilities of the head enterprise. In 1973, it was renamed into PO GAZ, which included 11 plants. At the same time, the development of a new generation of GAZ trucks with diesel engines began. Along the way, a significant modernization of the Volga is planned.
In the 1980s, guided by the planned plan, GAZ began work on a fourth-generation truck and a diesel engine for it. In 1984, a GAZ-4301 truck with an air-cooled diesel engine was assembled.
The transition to diesel fuel in the 1980s became a priority for the development of the enterprise. The reconstruction carried out in connection with this program turned out to be the most significant in the entire history of the plant. However, against the background of this reconstruction, there has been a certain stagnation in the production of passenger cars. Alas, the Volga GAZ-3102, which appeared in 1981, did not become a fundamental novelty, but only a deep restyling of the 24th.
In addition, its production volumes were limited to a few thousand a year. At the same time, the modernized "twenty-fourth", which received the GAZ-24-10 index, continues to arrive at taxi companies and be sold to private owners in limited quantities.
And only in the late 1980s, the development of a fundamentally new family of passenger cars with front and all-wheel drive began. The design of the GAZ-3105 executive sedan was the first to begin, which was subsequently produced in a limited series.
The GAZ-3103 (front-wheel drive) and GAZ-3104 (all-wheel drive) sedans intended for mass production did not become serial due to the crisis in the 1990s. At the end of the "eighties", in the wake of perestroika, work began at the plant on the creation of a light-duty truck with a gross weight of up to 3.5 tons for the needs of the then-nascent small business. Thanks to the CAD design system and the accelerated testing procedure, the future Gazelle family got on the conveyor in record time - back in the first half of the 1990s. The design capacity and production of cars by the plant by the end of the Soviet period exceeded 200 thousand per year, about half of which were cars.
After the collapse of the USSR, GAZ became one of the first large enterprises in the country that tried to adapt to new market conditions. In November 1992, the Gorky Automobile Plant was transformed into an open joint stock company (OJSC). The huge demand for passenger cars since the times of the USSR allowed GAZ to increase the production of the Volga by 1.8 times, simultaneously carrying out its constant modernization.
So, in 1992, the GAZ-31029 sedan appeared, which differed from the previous GAZ-24-10 model in an exceptionally modernized design of the front and rear parts of the body.
At the same time, on the basis of the Volga, the GAZ-2304 Burlak pickup truck was created, which never went into production due to a sharp increase in the production of a passenger model.
The business-class sedan GAZ-3105, which was planned to take the place of the Seagull, did not find its mass consumer either. The high cost, which was primarily due to the lack of domestic production technologies, modern components and accessories, as well as ever-increasing competition from prestigious foreign cars, actually killed the project.
But the small-tonnage Gazelle truck, which appeared in July 1994, with a gross weight of 3.5 tons, on the contrary, became the most popular small-tonnage series in the nascent LCV class, extremely popular with small and medium-sized businesses, thus becoming the savior of the enterprise and providing it with sufficiently stable development prospects. The minibus GAZ-32213 of the Gazelle family has become no less in demand. Mastered in the spring of 1996, it has become the main type of public transport in large cities, namely a fixed-route taxi.
In 1997, another modernized Volga was released. The car received the GAZ-3110 index.
In the same year, GAZ acquired a license from the Austrian company Steyr for the production of small diesel engines for cars, minibuses and light trucks. Along the way, in 1997, GAZ entered into an agreement with the Italian concern Fiat on the creation of a joint venture called Nizhegorod-Motors to assemble Fiat cars. In the second half of 1998, the second family of light trucks and minibuses GAZ Sobol with a gross weight of up to 2.8 tons was put into production.
In 1999, the legendary "Shishiga" GAZ-66, produced in almost a million copies, was replaced by a more modern GAZ-3308 "Sadko", also adopted by the Russian army.
In 1998, on the rear-wheel drive platform "Volga", a "transitional" sedan GAZ-3111 was developed, designed to strengthen the position of GAZ in the business class. However, after 1998, the cost of the GAZ-3111 model turned out to be too high for the market. In total, about 500 cars were produced. However, there were also pre-production samples (until 2000), which were assembled before the car went into series. Various tests were carried out on them at UKER GAZ. In this connection, the exact number of cars produced is not known.
The default of 1998, alas, did not allow such cars as the GAZ-2308 "Ataman", GAZ-23081 "Ataman Yermak" and GAZ-3106 "Ataman-2" to become mass-produced.
In November 2000, a controlling stake in OAO GAZ was acquired by Oleg Deripaska's Basic Element. In 2001, GAZ OJSC became part of the RusPromAvto automotive holding, which, as a result of a radical restructuring in 2005, was transformed into the GAZ Group holding, where GAZ OJSC was assigned the role of the parent company.
In 2005, the enterprise was able to master the serial production of a new family of low-frame medium-duty trucks GAZ-3310 Valdai, and the general economic recovery increased the demand for traditional medium-duty trucks GAZ-3307, 3309 and GAZ-3308 Sadko.
In 2006, the LCV division was increased due to the acquisition by the GAZ Group of the English company LDV Group, which specializes in the production of lightweight front-wheel drive vans Maxus with a gross weight of up to 3.5 tons. In May 2008, GAZ began assembling vans and minibuses in Nizhny Novgorod Maxus from English kits. With localization and transition to SKD technology, Maxus's production volume was supposed to be 50 thousand per year, but due to the crisis and bankruptcy of LDV, the project never reached this stage and was curtailed in mid-2009.
Due to the conflict over prices for engines with ZMZ in 2006-2008, part of the production of Volg, Sobol and GAZelle was equipped with imported Chrysler 2.4 liter engines. In June 2007, the Volga salon GAZ 31105 and 3102 was restyled, but the fall in demand for the obsolete model range and the crisis forced GAZ to curtail the production of these models at the end of 2008. In 2006, GAZ Group bought the Sterling Hills assembly plant from the DaimlerChrysler concern, which produced Chrysler Sebring and Dodge Stratus mid-size sedans, to develop the passenger model range. Since July 2008, the production of its own E-segment model, Volga Siber, has been organized on equipment exported from America. The volume of production of Volga Siber was supposed to be 65 thousand per year, but the model turned out to be unpopular, and after the release of 8.7 thousand cars, the assembly was curtailed at the end of 2010.
To maintain sales of light commercial vehicles, GAZ has developed a version of the Gazelle cheaper to $6,000 with an UMZ-4216 engine and a lightweight cab. However, the model was not in demand - only a limited batch of about 700 cars was produced.
In February 2010, GAZ Group began serial production of modernized families of light commercial vehicles Gazelle-Business and Sobol-Business. And in July, GAZ Group began serial production of a diesel modification of the Gazelle-Business car.
In October of the same year, GAZ announced the start of production of a 4-ton version of the GAZ-33106 with a Cummins engine.
In early February 2011, GAZ Group and the American concern GM signed an agreement on contract assembly of a new generation of the Chevrolet Aveo model at GAZ facilities. At the moment, the car is available in sedan and hatchback.
In mid-June 2011, Volkswagen Group Rus and the GAZ Group signed an eight-year agreement on the contract assembly of 110,000 cars per year at GAZ facilities. The agreement was signed as part of Volkswagen's transition to a new mode of industrial assembly of cars in Russia. The VW Jetta, Škoda Yeti and Škoda Octavia models are assembled on the basis of the Volga Siber line.
GAZ does not plan to produce passenger cars of its own design in the near future. On April 9, 2013, the mass production of the Gazelle Next car, which is the second generation Gazelle, was launched. Initially, this car was designed for export to other countries. It is planned to start exporting these cars from Turkey, Poland and Germany. The release of Gazelle Next will run in parallel, along with the release of Gazelle Business.
As you know, the first car had a steam engine, but he conquered the world only after he found an engine that runs on gasoline. Periodic attempts to replace gasoline with solid, liquid synthetic or natural fuels did not shake his position.
Currently, in many countries, including the most developed (primarily importing oil), work has been intensified on the development of technologies for the use of local and renewable energy sources. Biomass in the form of woody or agricultural residues is the most readily available in this case. Research is being carried out in the direction of creating and improving equipment for the thermochemical conversion of plant biomass. Moreover, the main efforts are aimed at creating compact installations for vehicles. The need to develop this direction is due to the increase in the energy needs of mankind, on the one hand, and the depletion of fossil fuel reserves, on the other. In addition, as is known, there are environmental problems caused by the growth of the world's auto-tractor fleet. The development of these technologies is especially important for Russia with its huge reserves of biofuels such as logging and woodworking waste, plant biomass, peat, black and brown coal.
The transport gas generator and the car are almost the same age. But the history of the gas generator begins much earlier. When they began to build transport gas generators, the traditions of stationary technology were completely transferred to the new installation, determining the nature of its development for a long time. Methods for cooling and cleaning gas, the theory of the process, the method of thermal calculation, the optimal ratio of the main dimensions - everything that was obtained as a result of the experience of almost a century of operation was used in the design of new machines.
Such succession had both its positive and negative aspects. Specific requirements for transport gas generators (small dimensions, instability of the gasification process, variable mode and the need for more thorough cleaning and cooling of gas) very soon forced designers to go beyond stationary equipment. A number of issues related to the conversion of engines from liquid fuel to generator gas required additional non-standard solutions. However, the very methodology for calculating and designing automotive gas generators has not changed significantly since the middle of the last century. It is already morally obsolete and requires a comprehensive analysis and refinement for further constructive optimization of gas generators.
It is interesting to study the history of the design development of stationary, power and transport gas generating plants in order to determine directions for their further optimization.
It has long been noticed that by limiting the access of air under the coal layer, gas is obtained from solid fuel. This gas can be burned after being separated from the fuel by supplying secondary air. Gas production and the actual gas generator, however, only emerged when the use of gas was completely separated from the process of extracting it.
The creator of the first gas generator is considered to be the French engineer Philippe Lebon, who was born in Brache on May 29, 1767. Once, in 1788, throwing a handful of sawdust into a vessel standing in front of him on the fire, Lebon saw that thick smoke rose from the vessel, which flared up on fire and gave a bright luminous flame. Le Bon realized that the case helped him make a discovery of extreme importance. Continuing his experiments, he created the first gas plant in miniature, for the construction of which in 1799 he received a patent. He set to work with the greatest energy, developing projects for the most diverse uses of producer gas. A project for a gas engine was devised, for which Lebon received a patent in 1801. This engine was supposed to work on the principle of a steam engine. Instead of steam, gas was supplied, ignited alternately to the sweat and the other side of the piston. After the tragic death of Le Bon in December 1804. his work was continued by V. Murdohomy in England and S. Minkeders in Belgium.
In the first ten years of the 19th century, the number of patents received in England and France for gas generators and engines was very small. None of the invented installations of this kind found practical application, although in general terms they were close to subsequent developments. Of particular note are the interesting works of the Frenchmen Faber de Fort and Oberto (1837-1839). They suggested using the grate gases of blast furnaces for heating purposes. Their experiences were more related to the work on the disposal of waste from the blast-furnace process and can only be considered as rationalization measures. Although they were very close to the idea of an independent gas generator.
Probably the first industrial gas generator was built at the beginning of 1839 in Lauchhammer by engineer Bischoff. According to Bischoff himself, he tried to create a fiery furnace with a semi-gas firebox. Bischoff wanted to achieve savings in the consumption of coke and coal by converting raw fuel (primarily peat) directly into gas to be used for the smelting process. On fig. 1 shows Bischoff's improved gas generator, which he used in Megdesprung in 1844. The device was a simple mine generator.
Rice. 1. Bischoff gas generator Fig. 2. Edelman gas generator A
In a gas generator built in 1840. in the city of Audikurt (Austria) at the S.-Stefan plant by engineer Ebelman, the principle of reverse combustion was first applied (Fig. 2). Subsequently, this principle has become widespread in transport installations. Ebelman extremely successfully solved the problem of the decomposition of water vapor and the combustion of tarry substances that are formed during the gasification of wood fuel. However, the appearance of the first industrial-type gas generator and its solid introduction into factory practice occurred after the invention of the regenerative furnace by F. Siemens in 1856. (Fig. 3).
Rice. 3. Siemens gas generator
F. Siemens, in collaboration with his brother W. Siemens, managed to give his idea such a perfect practical design for that time that the gas generator named after him became almost universal in the next 40-50 years. The gas generator invented by Siemens has become a necessary element of glass-smelting, pudding, steel-smelting (Siemens-Marten), welding and heating furnaces operating on the basis of the regenerative principle.
It is also worth noting such important design improvements in the gas generator as the Grebe-Lerman oblique retort (1877) and the Neze (1878) and Olshevsky (1880) gas generators. In fact, they were gas generators with reverse combustion. But their design led to the complete decomposition of the distillation components of the generator gas. In practice, they were rarely used, since the decomposition of distillation components was not necessary for furnace heating, and the decomposition of resins was desirable only to reduce soot.
Only after the introduction of gas engines by Langen-Otto (1867) and improvements in gas generators by Twyde (1880) and Setzerland (1883) did the latter become of great importance for the use of gas for power purposes. The rapid development of power gas generators began after the gold medal was awarded to the gas generator engine of the German company Otto Deutz at the Paris World Exhibition in 1867. As a result, the company received a large number of orders.
