June 21, 1941, 13:00. German troops receive the code signal "Dortmund", confirming that the invasion will begin the next day.
Commander of the 2nd Panzer Group, Army Group Center Heinz Guderian writes in his diary: “Careful observation of the Russians convinced me that they did not suspect anything about our intentions. In the courtyard of the fortress of Brest, which was visible from our observation posts, to the sounds of an orchestra, they were holding guards. Coastal fortifications along the Western Bug were not occupied by Russian troops.21:00. Soldiers of the 90th border detachment of the Sokal commandant's office detained a German soldier who had crossed the border river Bug by swimming. The defector was sent to the headquarters of the detachment in the city of Vladimir-Volynsky.
23:00. German minelayers, who were in Finnish ports, began to mine the way out of the Gulf of Finland. At the same time, Finnish submarines began laying mines off the coast of Estonia.
June 22, 1941, 0:30. The defector was taken to Vladimir-Volynsky. During interrogation, the soldier named himself Alfred Liskov, servicemen of the 221st regiment of the 15th infantry division of the Wehrmacht. He reported that at dawn on June 22 the German army would go on the offensive along the entire length of the Soviet-German border. The information has been passed on to the higher command.
At the same time, the transfer of directive No. 1 of the People's Commissariat of Defense for parts of the western military districts begins from Moscow. “During June 22-23, 1941, a sudden attack by the Germans on the fronts of the LVO, PribOVO, ZAPOVO, KOVO, OdVO is possible. The attack may begin with provocative actions,” the directive said. “The task of our troops is not to succumb to any provocative actions that could cause major complications.”
The units were ordered to be put on alert, covertly occupy the firing points of fortified areas on the state border, and aviation was dispersed over field airfields.
It is not possible to bring the directive to the military units before the start of hostilities, as a result of which the measures indicated in it are not carried out.
Mobilization. Columns of fighters are moving to the front. Photo: RIA Novosti
“I realized that it was the Germans who opened fire on our territory”
1:00. The commandants of the sections of the 90th border detachment report to the head of the detachment, Major Bychkovsky: "nothing suspicious was noticed on the adjacent side, everything is calm."
3:05 . A group of 14 German Ju-88 bombers drops 28 magnetic mines near the Kronstadt raid.
3:07. The commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral Oktyabrsky, reports to the Chief of the General Staff, General Zhukov: “The VNOS [airborne surveillance, warning and communications] system of the fleet reports on the approach from the sea of a large number of unknown aircraft; The fleet is on full alert.
3:10. The UNKGB in the Lvov region transmits by telephone to the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR the information obtained during the interrogation of the defector Alfred Liskov.
From the memoirs of the head of the 90th border detachment, Major Bychkovsky: “Not having finished interrogating the soldier, I heard strong artillery fire in the direction of Ustilug (the first commandant's office). I realized that it was the Germans who opened fire on our territory, which was immediately confirmed by the interrogated soldier. I immediately began to call the commandant by phone, but the connection was broken ... "3:30. Chief of Staff of the Western District General Klimovsky reports on enemy air raids on the cities of Belarus: Brest, Grodno, Lida, Kobrin, Slonim, Baranovichi and others.
3:33. The chief of staff of the Kyiv district, General Purkaev, reports on air raids on the cities of Ukraine, including Kyiv.
3:40. Commander of the Baltic Military District General Kuznetsov reports on enemy air raids on Riga, Siauliai, Vilnius, Kaunas and other cities.
"Enemy raid repulsed. An attempt to strike our ships has been thwarted."
3:42. Chief of the General Staff Zhukov calls Stalin and announces the start of hostilities by Germany. Stalin orders Tymoshenko and Zhukov to arrive at the Kremlin, where an emergency meeting of the Politburo is being convened.
3:45. The 1st frontier post of the 86th Augustow border detachment was attacked by an enemy reconnaissance and sabotage group. Outpost personnel under command Alexandra Sivacheva, having joined the battle, destroys the attackers.
4:00. The commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral Oktyabrsky, reports to Zhukov: “The enemy raid has been repulsed. An attempt to strike our ships has been thwarted. But there is destruction in Sevastopol.”4:05. The outposts of the 86th August Frontier Detachment, including the 1st Frontier Post of Senior Lieutenant Sivachev, are subjected to heavy artillery fire, after which the German offensive begins. The border guards, deprived of communication with the command, engage in battle with superior enemy forces.
4:10. The Western and Baltic Special Military Districts report the start of hostilities by German troops on land.
4:15. The Nazis open massive artillery fire on the Brest Fortress. As a result, warehouses were destroyed, communications were disrupted, and there were a large number of dead and wounded.
4:25. The 45th Infantry Division of the Wehrmacht begins an attack on the Brest Fortress.
The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Residents of the capital on June 22, 1941 during the announcement on the radio of a government message about the perfidious attack of Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union. Photo: RIA Novosti
"Defending not individual countries, but ensuring the security of Europe"
4:30. A meeting of members of the Politburo begins in the Kremlin. Stalin expresses doubt that what happened is the beginning of the war and does not exclude the version of a German provocation. People's Commissar of Defense Timoshenko and Zhukov insist: this is war.
4:55. In the Brest Fortress, the Nazis manage to capture almost half of the territory. Further progress was stopped by a sudden counterattack by the Red Army.
5:00. German Ambassador to the USSR Count von Schulenburg presents the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR Molotov“Note from the German Foreign Ministry to the Soviet Government”, which states: “The German government cannot be indifferent to a serious threat on the eastern border, therefore the Führer ordered the German armed forces to remove this threat by all means.” An hour after the actual start of hostilities, Germany de jure declares war on the Soviet Union.
5:30. On German radio, the Reich Minister of Propaganda Goebbels read out an appeal Adolf Hitler to the German people in connection with the outbreak of war against the Soviet Union: “Now the hour has come when it is necessary to oppose this conspiracy of the Jewish-Anglo-Saxon warmongers and also the Jewish rulers of the Bolshevik center in Moscow ... what the world has only seen ... The task of this front is no longer the protection of individual countries, but the security of Europe and thereby the salvation of all.7:00. Reich Minister for Foreign Ribbentrop begins a press conference at which he announces the start of hostilities against the USSR: "The German army invaded the territory of Bolshevik Russia!"
“The city is on fire, why aren’t you broadcasting anything on the radio?”
7:15. Stalin approves the directive on repulsing the attack of Nazi Germany: "The troops will attack the enemy forces with all their strength and means and destroy them in areas where they have violated the Soviet border." The transfer of "Directive No. 2" due to the violation by saboteurs of the communication lines in the western districts. Moscow does not have a clear picture of what is happening in the war zone.
9:30. It was decided that at noon Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, would address the Soviet people in connection with the outbreak of war.
10:00. From the memories of the announcer Yuri Levitan: “They call from Minsk: “Enemy planes are over the city”, they call from Kaunas: “The city is on fire, why are you not transmitting anything on the radio?”, “Enemy planes are over Kiev.” Women's crying, excitement: “Is it really a war? ..” However, no official messages are transmitted until 12:00 Moscow time on June 22.
10:30. From the report of the headquarters of the 45th German division on the battles on the territory of the Brest Fortress: “The Russians are fiercely resisting, especially behind our attacking companies. In the citadel, the enemy organized defense by infantry units supported by 35-40 tanks and armored vehicles. The fire of enemy snipers led to heavy losses among officers and non-commissioned officers.11:00. The Baltic, Western and Kiev special military districts were transformed into the Northwestern, Western and Southwestern fronts.
“The enemy will be defeated. Victory will be ours"
12:00. People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov read out an appeal to the citizens of the Soviet Union: "Today at 4 o'clock in the morning, without presenting any claims against the Soviet Union, without declaring war, German troops attacked our country, attacked our borders in many places and bombed from our cities - Zhytomyr, Kiev, Sevastopol, Kaunas and some others - more than two hundred people were killed and wounded. Enemy aircraft raids and artillery shelling were also carried out from Romanian and Finnish territory ... Now that the attack on the Soviet Union has already taken place, the Soviet government has given an order to our troops to repel the piratical attack and drive the German troops from the territory of our homeland ... The government calls on you, citizens and citizens of the Soviet Union, to rally their ranks still more closely around our glorious Bolshevik Party, around our Soviet government, around our great leader Comrade Stalin.
Our cause is right. The enemy will be defeated. Victory will be ours" .
12:30. Advanced German units break into the Belarusian city of Grodno.
13:00.
The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issues a decree "On the mobilization of those liable for military service ..."
“On the basis of Article 49 of paragraph “o” of the Constitution of the USSR, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR announces mobilization on the territory of the military districts - Leningrad, Special Baltic, Western Special, Kiev Special, Odessa, Kharkov, Oryol, Moscow, Arkhangelsk, Ural, Siberian, Volga, North - Caucasian and Transcaucasian.
13:30. The Chief of the General Staff, General Zhukov, flies to Kyiv as a representative of the newly created Headquarters of the High Command on the Southwestern Front.
Photo: RIA Novosti
14:00. The Brest Fortress is completely surrounded by German troops. Soviet units blockaded in the citadel continue to offer fierce resistance.
14:05. Foreign Minister of Italy Galeazzo Ciano declares: “In view of the current situation, due to the fact that Germany has declared war on the USSR, Italy, as an ally of Germany and as a member of the Tripartite Pact, also declares war on the Soviet Union from the moment the German troops enter Soviet territory.”
14:10. The 1st frontier post of Alexander Sivachev has been fighting for more than 10 hours. The border guards, who had only small arms and grenades, destroyed up to 60 Nazis and burned three tanks. The wounded head of the outpost continued to command the battle.
15:00. From the notes of Field Marshal Commander of Army Group Center bokeh background: “The question of whether the Russians are carrying out a planned withdrawal is still open. There is now ample evidence both for and against this.
It is surprising that nowhere is any significant work of their artillery visible. Strong artillery fire is conducted only in the north-west of Grodno, where the VIII Army Corps is advancing. Apparently, our air force has an overwhelming superiority over Russian aviation.Of the 485 frontier posts attacked, none retreated without an order.
16:00. After a 12-hour battle, the Nazis occupy the positions of the 1st frontier post. This became possible only after all the border guards who defended it died. The head of the outpost, Alexander Sivachev, was posthumously awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st class.
The feat of the outpost of Senior Lieutenant Sivachev became one of the hundreds accomplished by the border guards in the first hours and days of the war. The state border of the USSR from the Barents to the Black Sea on June 22, 1941 was guarded by 666 border outposts, 485 of them were attacked on the very first day of the war. None of the 485 outposts attacked on June 22 withdrew without orders.
The Nazi command took 20 minutes to break the resistance of the border guards. 257 Soviet frontier posts held the defense from several hours to one day. More than one day - 20, more than two days - 16, more than three days - 20, more than four and five days - 43, from seven to nine days - 4, more than eleven days - 51, more than twelve days - 55, more than 15 days - 51 outposts. Up to two months, 45 outposts fought.
The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. The working people of Leningrad listen to the message about the attack of fascist Germany on the Soviet Union. Photo: RIA Novosti
Of the 19,600 border guards who met the Nazis on June 22 in the direction of the main attack of Army Group Center, more than 16,000 died in the first days of the war.
17:00. Hitler's units manage to occupy the southwestern part of the Brest Fortress, the northeast remained under the control of Soviet troops. Stubborn battles for the fortress will continue for another week.
"The Church of Christ blesses all Orthodox for the defense of the sacred borders of our Motherland"
18:00. The Patriarchal Locum Tenens, Metropolitan Sergius of Moscow and Kolomna, addresses the faithful with a message: “Fascist robbers have attacked our homeland. Trampling all sorts of treaties and promises, they suddenly fell upon us, and now the blood of peaceful citizens is already irrigating our native land ... Our Orthodox Church has always shared the fate of the people. Together with him, she carried trials, and consoled herself with his successes. She will not leave her people even now… The Church of Christ blesses all Orthodox to defend the sacred borders of our Motherland.”
19:00. From the notes of the Chief of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht Ground Forces, Colonel General Franz Halder: “All the armies, except for the 11th Army of the Army Group South in Romania, went on the offensive according to the plan. The offensive of our troops, apparently, was a complete tactical surprise for the enemy on the entire front. The border bridges across the Bug and other rivers have been everywhere captured by our troops without a fight and in complete safety. The complete surprise of our offensive for the enemy is evidenced by the fact that the units were taken by surprise in the barracks, the planes stood at the airfields, covered with tarpaulin, and the advanced units, suddenly attacked by our troops, asked the command what to do ... The Air Force command reported, that today 850 enemy aircraft have been destroyed, including entire squadrons of bombers, which, having taken to the air without fighter cover, were attacked by our fighters and destroyed.20:00. Directive No. 3 of the People's Commissariat of Defense was approved, ordering the Soviet troops to go on the counteroffensive with the task of defeating the Nazi troops on the territory of the USSR with further advancement into enemy territory. The directive prescribed by the end of June 24 to capture the Polish city of Lublin.
Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. June 22, 1941 Nurses assist the first wounded after the Nazi air raid near Chisinau. Photo: RIA Novosti
"We must give Russia and the Russian people all the help we can"
21:00. Summary of the High Command of the Red Army for June 22: “At dawn on June 22, 1941, the regular troops of the German army attacked our border units on the front from the Baltic to the Black Sea and were held back by them during the first half of the day. In the afternoon, the German troops met with the advanced units of the field troops of the Red Army. After fierce fighting, the enemy was repulsed with heavy losses. Only in the Grodno and Krystynopol directions did the enemy manage to achieve minor tactical successes and take the towns of Kalvaria, Stojanow and Tsekhanovets (the first two at 15 km and the last at 10 km from the border).
Enemy aviation attacked a number of our airfields and settlements, but everywhere they met with a decisive rebuff from our fighters and anti-aircraft artillery, which inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. We shot down 65 enemy planes."
23:00. Message from the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to the British people in connection with the German attack on the USSR: “At 4 o’clock this morning, Hitler attacked Russia. All his usual formalities of treachery were observed with scrupulous precision ... suddenly, without a declaration of war, even without an ultimatum, German bombs fell from the sky on Russian cities, German troops violated Russian borders, and an hour later the German ambassador, who just the day before generously lavished his assurances to the Russians in friendship and almost an alliance, paid a visit to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and declared that Russia and Germany were in a state of war ...
No one has been a more staunch opponent of communism over the past 25 years than I have been. I will not take back a single word said about him. But all this pales before the spectacle unfolding now.The past, with its crimes, follies and tragedies, recedes. I see Russian soldiers standing on the border of their native land and guarding the fields that their fathers have plowed since time immemorial. I see how they guard their homes; their mothers and wives pray—oh, yes, because at such a time everyone prays for the preservation of their loved ones, for the return of the breadwinner, patron, their protectors ...
We must give Russia and the Russian people all the help we can. We must call on all our friends and allies in all parts of the world to follow a similar course and pursue it as steadfastly and steadily as we will, to the very end.
June 22 has come to an end. Ahead were another 1417 days of the most terrible war in the history of mankind.
On December 18, 1940, Hitler in Directive No. 21 approved the final plan for the war against the USSR under the code name "Barbarossa". To implement it, Germany and its allies in Europe - Finland, Romania and Hungary - created an invasion army unprecedented in history: 182 divisions and 20 brigades (up to 5 million people), 47.2 thousand guns and mortars, about 4.4 thousand combat aircraft, 4.4 thousand tanks and assault guns, and 250 ships. In the grouping of Soviet troops that opposed the aggressors, there were 186 divisions (3 million people), about 39.4 guns and mortars, 11 thousand tanks and more than 9.1 thousand aircraft. These forces were not brought to combat readiness in advance. The directive of the General Staff of the Red Army about a possible German attack on June 22-23 arrived in the western border districts only on the night of June 22, and the invasion began at dawn on June 22. After a long artillery preparation, at 4.00 in the morning, German troops, treacherously violating the non-aggression pact concluded with the USSR, attacked the Soviet-German border along its entire length from the Barents to the Black Seas. The Soviet troops were taken by surprise. The organization of powerful counterattacks against the enemy was hampered by the fact that they were relatively evenly distributed along the entire front along the entire border and dispersed to a great depth. With such a formation, it was difficult to resist the enemy.
On June 22, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov. In particular, he said: “This unheard-of attack on our country is an unparalleled treachery in the history of civilized peoples. The attack on our country was carried out despite the fact that a non-aggression pact was concluded between the USSR and Germany.
On June 23, 1941, the highest body of strategic leadership of the armed forces, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, was created in Moscow. All power in the country was concentrated in the hands of the State Defense Committee (GKO), formed on June 30. He was appointed Chairman of the State Defense Committee and Supreme Commander-in-Chief. The country began to implement a program of emergency measures under the motto: “Everything for the front! Everything for the victory! The Red Army, however, continued to retreat. By mid-July 1941, German troops advanced 300-600 km deep into Soviet territory, capturing Lithuania, Latvia, almost all of Belarus, a significant part of Estonia, Ukraine and Moldova, creating a threat to Leningrad, Smolensk and Kiev. Mortal danger hung over the USSR.
OPERATIONAL REPORT No. 1 OF THE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE RKKA ARMY GENERAL G.K. Zhukov. 10.00, June 22, 1941
At 04:00 on June 22, 1941, the Germans, without any reason, raided our airfields and cities and crossed the border with ground troops ...
1. Northern front: the enemy with a link of bomber-type aircraft violated the border and went to the region of Leningrad and Kronstadt ...
2. Northwestern front. The enemy at 0400 opened artillery fire and at the same time began to bomb airfields and cities: Vindava, Libava, Kovno, Vilna and Shulyai ...
Z. Western Front. At 4.20, up to 60 enemy aircraft bombarded Grodno and Brest. At the same time, the enemy opened artillery fire on the entire border of the Western Front .... With ground forces, the enemy is developing a strike from the Suwalki area in the direction of Golynk, Dombrova and from the Stokolow area along the railway to Volkovysk. The advancing enemy forces are being specified. …
4. Southwestern Front. At 4.20 the enemy began shelling our borders with machine-gun fire. From 04:30, enemy planes were bombarding the cities of Lyuboml, Kovel, Lutsk, Vladimir-Volynsky ... At 04:35, after artillery fire in the area of \u200b\u200bVladimir-Volynsky, Lyuboml, enemy ground forces crossed the border, developing an attack in the direction of Vladimir-Volynsky, Lyuboml and Krystynopol ...
The front commanders have put into effect a cover plan and by active actions of mobile troops they are trying to destroy the part of the enemy that has crossed the border ...
The enemy, having preempted our troops in deployment, forced the Red Army units to take up battle in the process of taking up their starting position according to the cover plan. Using this advantage, the enemy managed to achieve partial success in certain areas.
Signature: Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army G.K. Zhukov
The Great Patriotic War - day after day: based on declassified operational reports of the General Staff of the Red Army. M., 2008 .
RADIO SPEECH BY THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE USSR COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS AND THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.M. MOLOTOV June 22, 1941
Citizens and citizens of the Soviet Union!
The Soviet government and its head, Comrade Stalin, have instructed me to make the following statement:
Today, at 4 o'clock in the morning, without presenting any claims against the Soviet Union, without declaring war, German troops attacked our country, attacked our borders in many places and bombed our cities - Zhytomyr, Kiev, Sevastopol, Kaunas and some others, moreover, more than two hundred people were killed and wounded. Enemy aircraft raids and artillery shelling were also carried out from the Romanian and Finnish territories.
This unheard-of attack on our country is treachery unparalleled in the history of civilized peoples. The attack on our country was carried out despite the fact that a non-aggression pact was concluded between the USSR and Germany, and the Soviet government fulfilled all the conditions of this pact in all good faith. The attack on our country was carried out despite the fact that during the entire period of the validity of this treaty, the German government could never make a single claim against the USSR regarding the implementation of the treaty. All responsibility for this predatory attack on the Soviet Union falls entirely on the German fascist rulers (...)
The government calls on you, citizens of the Soviet Union, to rally your ranks still more closely around our glorious Bolshevik Party, around our Soviet government, around our great leader, Comrade. Stalin.
Our cause is right. The enemy will be defeated. Victory will be ours.
Documents of foreign policy. T.24. M., 2000.
J. STALIN'S RADIO SPEECH, July 3, 1941
Comrades! Citizens!
Brothers and sisters!
Soldiers of our army and navy!
I turn to you, my friends!
The treacherous military attack of Nazi Germany on our Motherland, launched on June 22, continues. Despite the heroic resistance of the Red Army, despite the fact that the best divisions of the enemy and the best parts of his aviation have already been defeated and found their grave on the battlefields, the enemy continues to push forward, throwing new forces to the front (...)
History shows that there are no invincible armies and never have been. Napoleon's army was considered invincible, but it was defeated alternately by Russian, English, German troops. Wilhelm's German army during the first imperialist war was also considered an invincible army, but it was defeated several times by Russian and Anglo-French troops and was finally defeated by Anglo-French troops. The same must be said about Hitler's current German fascist army. This army has not yet encountered serious resistance on the European continent. Only on our territory did it meet serious resistance (...)
It may be asked: how could it happen that the Soviet government agreed to conclude a non-aggression pact with such treacherous people and monsters as Hitler and Ribbentrop? Was there a mistake on the part of the Soviet government here? Of course not! A non-aggression pact is a peace pact between two states. It was this pact that Germany proposed to us in 1939. Could the Soviet government refuse such a proposal? I think that not a single peace-loving state can refuse a peace agreement with a neighboring power, if at the head of this power there are even such monsters and cannibals as Hitler and Ribbentrop. And this, of course, on one indispensable condition - if the peace agreement does not affect either directly or indirectly the territorial integrity, independence and honor of a peace-loving state. As you know, the non-aggression pact between Germany and the USSR is just such a pact (...)
With the forced withdrawal of the Red Army units, it is necessary to steal the entire rolling stock, not to leave the enemy a single locomotive, not a single wagon, not to leave the enemy a kilogram of bread or a liter of fuel (...) In areas occupied by the enemy, partisan detachments, horse and foot, must be created, create sabotage groups to fight against parts of the enemy army, to incite guerrilla warfare everywhere and everywhere, to blow up bridges, roads, damage telephone and telegraph communications, set fire to forests, warehouses, carts. In the occupied areas, create unbearable conditions for the enemy and all his accomplices, pursue and destroy them at every step, disrupt all their activities (...)
In this great war we will have true allies in the peoples of Europe and America, including the German people, enslaved by the Nazi bosses. Our war for the freedom of our Fatherland will merge with the struggle of the peoples of Europe and America for their independence, for democratic freedoms (…)
In order to quickly mobilize all the forces of the peoples of the USSR, to repulse the enemy who treacherously attacked our Motherland, the State Defense Committee was created, in whose hands all power in the state is now concentrated. The State Defense Committee has begun its work and calls on all the people to rally around the party of Lenin-Stalin, around the Soviet government for the selfless support of the Red Army and the Red Navy, for the defeat of the enemy, for victory.
All our strength is to support our heroic Red Army, our glorious Red Fleet!
All the forces of the people - to defeat the enemy!
Forward to our victory!
Stalin I. About the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. M., 1947.
In 1939, planning an attack on Poland and foreseeing the possible entry into the war on its side of Great Britain and France, the leadership of the Third Reich decided to secure itself from the east - in August, a Non-Aggression Pact was concluded between Germany and the USSR, dividing the spheres of interests of the parties in Eastern Europe. On September 1, 1939, Germany attacked Poland, Great Britain and France declared war on Germany. On September 17, the Soviet Union sent troops into Western Ukraine and Western Belarus and later annexed these territories. A common border appeared between Germany and the USSR. In 1940, Germany captured Denmark, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and defeated France. The victories of the Wehrmacht gave rise to hopes in Berlin for an early end to the war with England, which would allow Germany to throw all its forces into the defeat of the USSR. However, Germany failed to force Britain to make peace. The war continued.
The decision to go to war with the USSR and the general plan for the future campaign were announced by Hitler at a meeting with the high military command on July 31, 1940, shortly after the victory over France. The Fuhrer planned to liquidate the Soviet Union by the end of 1941.
The leading place in planning the German war against the USSR was occupied by the General Staff of the Ground Forces (OKH) of the Wehrmacht, headed by its chief, Colonel-General F. Halder. Along with the General Staff of the Ground Forces, an active role in planning the "eastern campaign" was played by the headquarters of the operational leadership of the Supreme High Command of the German Armed Forces (OKW), headed by General A. Jodl, who received instructions directly from Hitler.
On December 18, 1940, Hitler signed Directive No. 21 of the Wehrmacht Supreme High Command, which received the code name "Variant Barbarossa" and became the main guiding document in the war against the USSR. The German armed forces were tasked with "defeating Soviet Russia during one short campaign", for which it was supposed to use all the ground forces with the exception of those that performed occupational functions in Europe, as well as about two-thirds of the Air Force and a small part of the Navy. Rapid operations with a deep and rapid advance of tank wedges, the German army had to destroy the Soviet troops located in the western part of the USSR and prevent the withdrawal of combat-ready units into the interior of the country. In the future, quickly pursuing the enemy, the German troops were to reach the line from where Soviet aviation would not be able to carry out raids on the Third Reich. The ultimate goal of the campaign is to reach the Arkhangelsk-Volga-Astrakhan line.
As the immediate strategic goal of the war against the USSR, the defeat and destruction of Soviet troops in the Baltic States, Belarus and Right-Bank Ukraine were set. It was assumed that during these operations the Wehrmacht would reach Kyiv with fortifications east of the Dnieper, Smolensk and the area south and west of Lake Ilmen. The further goal was to timely occupy the militarily and economically important Donetsk coal basin, and in the north to quickly reach Moscow. The directive demanded that operations to take Moscow be started only after the destruction of Soviet troops in the Baltic states, the capture of Leningrad and Kronstadt. The task of the German Air Force was to disrupt the opposition of Soviet aviation and support their own ground forces in decisive directions. The naval forces were required to ensure the defense of their coast, preventing the breakthrough of the Soviet fleet from the Baltic Sea.
The beginning of the invasion was scheduled for May 15, 1941. The expected duration of the main hostilities was, according to the plan, 4-5 months.
With the completion of the development of the general plan for the war of Germany against the USSR, operational-strategic planning was transferred to the headquarters of the branches of the armed forces and associations of troops, where more specific plans were developed, tasks for the troops were clarified and detailed, measures were determined to prepare the armed forces, the economy, and the future theater of military actions.
The German leadership proceeded from the need to ensure the defeat of the Soviet troops along the entire length of the front line. As a result of the grandiose “border battle” planned, the USSR should have had nothing left but 30-40 reserve divisions. This goal was supposed to be achieved by an offensive along the entire front. The Moscow and Kiev directions were recognized as the main operational lines. They were provided by Army Groups "Center" (48 divisions were concentrated on the front of 500 km) and "South" (40 German divisions and significant allied forces were concentrated on the front of 1250 km). Army Group North (29 divisions on a front of 290 km) had the task of securing the northern flank of the Center group, capturing the Baltic states and establishing contact with Finnish troops. The total number of divisions of the first strategic echelon, taking into account the Finnish, Hungarian and Romanian troops, was 157 divisions, of which 17 were tank and 13 motorized, and 18 brigades.
On the eighth day, German troops were to reach the line Kaunas - Baranovichi - Lvov - Mogilev-Podolsky. On the twentieth day of the war, they were supposed to capture the territory and reach the line: the Dnieper (to the area south of Kiev) - Mozyr - Rogachev - Orsha - Vitebsk - Velikiye Luki - south of Pskov - south of Pyarnu. This was followed by a pause of twenty days, during which it was supposed to concentrate and regroup formations, rest the troops and prepare a new supply base. On the fortieth day of the war, the second phase of the offensive was to begin. During it, it was planned to capture Moscow, Leningrad and Donbass.
In connection with Hitler's decision to expand the scale of Operation Marita (attack on Greece), which required the involvement of additional forces, in mid-March 1941, changes were made to the war plan against the USSR. The allocation of additional forces for the Balkan campaign required the postponement of the start of the operation to a later date. All preparatory measures, including the transfer of mobile formations necessary for an offensive in the first operational echelon, were required to be completed by approximately June 22.
To attack the USSR by June 22, 1941, four army groups were created. Taking into account the strategic reserve, the grouping for operations in the East consisted of 183 divisions. Army Group North (commanded by Field Marshal Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb) was deployed in East Prussia, on the front from Memel to Goldap. Army Group Center (commanded by Field Marshal Fedor von Bock) occupied the front from Goldap to Vlodava. Army Group South (commanded by Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt), under whose operational control was the Command of the Romanian Land Forces, occupied the front from Lublin to the mouth of the Danube.
In the USSR, on the basis of the military districts located on the western border, according to the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of June 21, 1941, 4 fronts were created. On June 24, 1941, the Northern Front was created. According to a certificate compiled on the eve of the war by the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, General Vatutin, there were a total of 303 divisions in the ground forces, of which 237 divisions were in the grouping for operations in the West (of which 51 were tank and 25 motorized). The grouping for operations in the West was lined up in three strategic echelons.
The Northwestern Front (commanded by Colonel-General F.I. Kuznetsov) was created in the Baltics. The Western Front (commander General of the Army D. G. Pavlov) was created in Belarus. The Southwestern Front (commanded by Colonel-General MP Kirponos) was created in Western Ukraine. The Southern Front (commanded by General of the Army I. V. Tyulenev) was created in Moldova and southern Ukraine. The Northern Front (commanded by Lieutenant General M. M. Popov) was created on the basis of the Leningrad Military District. The Baltic Fleet (commander Admiral VF Tributs) was stationed in the Baltic Sea. The Black Sea Fleet (commanded by Vice Admiral F. S. Oktyabrsky) was stationed in the Black Sea.
Part 1.
Seventy-six years ago, on June 22, 1941, the peaceful life of the Soviet people was interrupted, Germany treacherously attacked our country.
Speaking on the radio on July 3, 1941, I.V. Stalin called the outbreak of war with Nazi Germany - the Patriotic War.
In 1942, after the establishment of the Order of the Patriotic War, this name was officially fixed. And the name - "Great Patriotic" war appeared later.
The war claimed about 30 million lives (now they are talking about 40 million) of Soviet people, brought grief and suffering to almost every family, cities and villages were in ruins.
Until now, the question of who is responsible for the tragic beginning of the Great Patriotic War, for the colossal defeats that our army suffered at its beginning and the fact that the Nazis ended up at the walls of Moscow and Leningrad is being discussed. Who was right, who was wrong, who did not fulfill what he was obliged to do, because he took the oath of allegiance to the Motherland. You need to know the historical truth.
As almost all veterans recall, in the spring of 1941, the approach of the war was felt. Informed people knew about its preparation, the townsfolk were alarmed by rumors and gossip.
But even with the declaration of war, many believed that “our indestructible and best army in the world”, which was constantly repeated in the newspapers and on the radio, would immediately defeat the aggressor, moreover, on his own territory, encroaching on our borders.
The existing main version about the beginning of the War of 1941-1945, born during the time of N.S. Khrushchev by the decisions of the XX Congress and the memoirs of Marshal G.K. Zhukov, reads:
- “The tragedy of June 22 occurred because Stalin, “afraid” of Hitler, and at the same time “believing” him, forbade the generals to put the troops of the western districts on alert before June 22, due to which, as a result, the soldiers of the Red Army met the war sleeping in their barracks »;
- “The main thing, of course, that dominated him, over all his activities, which also responded to us, was the fear of Hitler. He was afraid of the German armed forces ”(From the speech of G.K. Zhukov in the editorial office of the Military History Journal on August 13, 1966. Published in the magazine Ogonyok No. 25, 1989);
- “Stalin made an irreparable mistake by trusting false information that came from the relevant authorities .....” (G.K. Zhukov “Memoirs and Reflections”. M. Olma -Press.2003.);
- “…. Unfortunately, it must be noted that I.V. Stalin, on the eve and at the beginning of the war, underestimated the role and significance of the General Staff .... he was little interested in the activities of the General Staff. Neither my predecessors nor I had the opportunity to fully report to I. Stalin on the state of the country's defense and on the capabilities of our potential enemy ..». (G.K. Zhukov “Memories and Reflections”. M. Olma - Press. 2003).
Until now, in different interpretations, it sounds that the “main culprit”, of course, was Stalin, since “he was a tyrant and despot”, “everyone was afraid of him” and “nothing happened without his will”, “did not allow the troops to be brought into combat readiness in advance", and "forced" the generals to leave soldiers in the "sleeping" barracks before June 22, etc.
In a conversation in early December 1943 with the commander of long-range aviation, later Chief Marshal of Aviation A.E. Golovanov, unexpectedly for the interlocutor, Stalin said:
“I know that when I am gone, more than one tub of dirt will be poured on my head, a pile of rubbish will be put on my grave. But I am sure that the wind of history will dispel all this!”
This is also confirmed by the words of A.M. Kollontai, recorded in her diary, back in November 1939 (on the eve of the Soviet-Finnish war). According to this testimony, even then Stalin clearly foresaw the slander that would fall upon him as soon as he passed away.
A. M. Kollontai recorded his words: “And my name will also be slandered, slandered. Many atrocities will be attributed to me."
In this sense, the position of Marshal of Artillery I.D. Yakovlev, who was repressed in his time, is typical, who, speaking about the war, considered it most honest to say this:
“When we undertake to talk about June 22, 1941, which covered our entire people with a black wing, then we need to digress from everything personal and follow only the truth, it is not permissible to try to put all the blame for the surprise attack of fascist Germany only on I.V. Stalin.
In the endless lamentations of our military leaders about the "surprise" one can see an attempt to relieve themselves of all responsibility for the mistakes in the combat training of the troops, in their command and control in the first period of the war. They forget the main thing: having taken the oath, commanders of all units - from front commanders to platoon commanders - are obliged to keep the troops in a state of combat readiness. This is their professional duty, and to explain the non-fulfillment of it with references to I.V. Stalin is not to the face of the soldiers.
Stalin, by the way, just like them, gave a military oath of allegiance to the Fatherland - below is a photocopy of the military oath given in writing by him as a member of the Main Military Council of the Red Army on February 23, 1939.
The paradox is that those who suffered under Stalin, but even under him, rehabilitated people subsequently showed exceptional decency towards him.
Here, for example, what the former People's Commissar of the USSR aviation industry A.I. Shakhurin said:
“You can’t blame everything on Stalin! The minister should also be responsible for something ... For example, I did something wrong in aviation, so I will definitely bear responsibility for this. And then everything is on Stalin ... ".
The great Commander Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky, and Chief Marshal of Aviation A.E. Golovanov were the same.
Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky, one might say, “sent” Khrushchev very far with his proposal to write something nasty about Stalin! He suffered for this - he was very quickly sent into retirement, removed from the post of Deputy Minister of Defense, but he did not renounce the Supreme. Although he had many reasons to be offended by I. Stalin.
I think that the main one is that he, as the Commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, who was the first to reach the distant approaches to Berlin and was already preparing for its future assault, was deprived of this honorable opportunity. I. Stalin removed him from the Command of the 1st Belorussian Front and appointed him to the 2nd Belorussian.
As many people said and wrote, he did not want Pole to take Berlin, and G.K. became the Marshal of Victory. Zhukov.
But K.K. Rokossovsky showed his nobility here too, leaving G.K. Zhukov almost all of his officers of the Front Headquarters, although he had every right to take them with him to the new front. And the staff officers at K.K. Rokossovsky have always been distinguished, as all military historians note, by the highest staff training.
Troops led by K.K. Rokossovsky, unlike those led by G.K. Zhukov, were not defeated in a single battle during the entire war.
A. Ye Golovanov was proud that he had the honor to serve the Motherland under the command of Stalin personally. He also suffered under Khrushchev, but he did not renounce Stalin!
Many other military figures and historians speak about the same.
Here is what General N.F. Chervov writes in his book “Provocations against Russia”, Moscow, 2003:
“... there was no surprise attack in the usual sense, and Zhukov’s wording was invented at one time in order to shift the blame for the defeat at the beginning of the war onto Stalin and justify the miscalculations of the high military command, including their own during this period ... ".
According to the opinion of the long-term chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, General of the Army P. Ivashutin, “neither in strategic nor in tactical terms, the attack of fascist Germany on the Soviet Union was not sudden” (VIZH 1990 No. 5).
The Red Army in the prewar years was significantly inferior to the Wehrmacht in terms of mobilization and training.
Hitler declared universal military service from March 1, 1935, and the USSR, based on the state of the economy, was able to do this only from September 1, 1939.
As you can see, Stalin first thought about what to feed, what to wear and how to equip the conscripts, and only then, if the calculations proved this, he drafted into the army exactly as much as, according to the calculations, we could feed, clothe and arm.
On September 2, 1939, the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars No. 1355-279ss approved the "Plan for the Reorganization of the Ground Forces for 1939 - 1940", developed by the head since 1937. General Staff of the Red Army Marshal B.M. Shaposhnikov.
In 1939, the Wehrmacht numbered 4.7 million people, the Red Army - only 1.9 million people. But by January 1941. the number of the Red Army increased to 4 million 200 thousand people.
It was simply impossible to train an army of such size and re-equip it in a short time to wage a modern war against an experienced enemy.
I. V. Stalin understood this very well, and very soberly assessing the capabilities of the Red Army, he believed that she would be ready to fully fight the Wehrmacht no earlier than mid-1942-43. That is why he sought to delay the start of the war.
He had no illusions about Hitler.
I. Stalin was well aware that the Non-Aggression Pact, which we concluded in August 1939 with Hitler, was considered by him as a disguise and a means to achieve the goal - the defeat of the USSR, but continued to play a diplomatic game, trying to play for time.
All this is a lie that I. Stalin trusted and was afraid of Hitler.
Back in November 1939, before the Soviet-Finnish war, in the personal diary of the USSR Ambassador to Sweden A.M. Kollontai, an entry appeared that recorded the following words of Stalin personally heard by her during an audience in the Kremlin:
“The time for persuasion and negotiations is over. We must practically prepare for a rebuff, for a war with Hitler.
As to whether Stalin "trusted" Hitler, his speech at a meeting of the Politburo on November 18, 1940, when summing up the results of Molotov's visit to Berlin, testifies very well:
“... As we know, immediately after the departure of our delegation from Berlin, Hitler loudly declared that “German-Soviet relations have been finally established.”
But we well know the price of these statements! For us, even before meeting with Hitler, it was clear that he would not want to take into account the legitimate interests of the Soviet Union, dictated by the requirements of the security of our country ....
We considered the Berlin meeting as a real opportunity to probe the position of the German government....
Hitler's position during these negotiations, in particular his stubborn refusal to take into account the natural security interests of the Soviet Union, his categorical refusal to stop the de facto occupation of Finland and Romania - all this indicates that, despite demagogic assurances about not infringing on the "global interests" of the Soviet Union, in fact, preparations are underway for an attack on our country. In seeking the Berlin meeting, the Nazi Fuhrer sought to disguise his true intentions...
One thing is clear: Hitler is playing a double game. While preparing aggression against the USSR, at the same time he tries to buy time, trying to give the Soviet government the impression that he is ready to discuss the question of the further peaceful development of Soviet-German relations ....
It was at this time that we managed to prevent the attack of fascist Germany. And in this case, the Non-Aggression Pact concluded with her played a big role ...
But, of course, this is only a temporary respite, the immediate threat of armed aggression against us has only been somewhat weakened, but not completely eliminated.
But having concluded a non-aggression pact with Germany, we have already gained more than a year to prepare for a decisive and deadly struggle against Hitlerism.
Of course, we cannot regard the Soviet-German pact as the basis for creating reliable security for us.
State security issues are now becoming even more acute.
Now that our borders have been moved to the west, we need a powerful barrier along them, with operational groupings of troops put on alert in the near, but ... not in the immediate rear.
(The final words of I. Stalin are very important for understanding who is to blame for the fact that our troops on the Western Front were taken by surprise on June 22, 1941).
On May 5, 1941, at a reception in the Kremlin for graduates of military academies, I. Stalin said in his speech:
“... Germany wants to destroy our socialist state: exterminate millions of Soviet people, and turn the survivors into slaves. Only a war with fascist Germany and victory in this war can save our Motherland. I propose to drink for the war, for the offensive in the war, for our victory in this war .... "
Some saw in these words of I. Stalin his intention to attack Germany in the summer of 1941. But this is not so. When Marshal S.K. Timoshenko reminded him of the statement about the transition to offensive actions, he explained: “I said this in order to encourage those present to think about victory, and not about the invincibility of the German army, which the newspapers of the whole world are trumpeting about.”
On January 15, 1941, speaking at a meeting in the Kremlin, Stalin spoke to the commanders of the troops of the districts:
“The war creeps up imperceptibly and will begin with a surprise attack without declaring war” (A.I. Eremenko “Diaries”).
V.M. Molotov in the mid-1970s recalled the beginning of the war:
“We knew that war was not far off, that we were weaker than Germany, that we would have to retreat. The whole question was how far we would have to retreat - to Smolensk or to Moscow, we discussed this before the war .... We did everything to delay the war. And we succeeded in this for a year and ten months .... Even before the war, Stalin believed that only by 1943 could we meet the Germans on an equal footing. …. Air Chief Marshal A.E. Golovanov told me that after the defeat of the Germans near Moscow, Stalin said: “God grant that we end this war in 1946.
Yes, by the hour of the attack, no one could be ready, even the Lord God!
We were waiting for the attack, and we had a main goal: not to give Hitler a reason to attack. He would say: “Soviet troops are already gathering on the border, they are forcing me to act!
The TASS report of June 14, 1941 was sent to give the Germans no reason to justify their attack... It was needed as a last resort.... It turned out that on June 22, Hitler became the aggressor in front of the whole world. And we have allies .... Already in 1939 he was determined to unleash a war. When will he untie her? The delay was so desirable for us, for another year or a few months. Of course, we knew that we had to be ready for this war at any moment, but how to ensure this in practice? It is very difficult ... "(F. Chuev. "One hundred and forty conversations with Molotov."
Much is said and written about the fact that I. Stalin ignored and did not trust the mass of information on the preparation of Germany for an attack on the USSR, which was presented by our foreign intelligence, military intelligence and other sources.
But this is far from the truth.
As one of the leaders of foreign intelligence at that time, General P.A. Sudoplatov, “although Stalin was irritated with intelligence materials (why, it will be shown below-sad39), nevertheless, he sought to use all the intelligence information that was reported to Stalin to prevent war in secret diplomatic negotiations, and our intelligence was instructed to bring it to the German military circles of information about the inevitability for Germany of a long war with Russia, emphasizing that we have created a military-industrial base in the Urals, invulnerable to German attack.
So, for example, I. Stalin ordered to acquaint the German military attache in Moscow with the industrial and military power of Siberia.
In early April 1941, he was allowed to tour the new military factories that produced tanks and aircraft of the latest designs.
And about. German attache in Moscow G. Krebs reported on April 9, 1941 to Berlin:
“Our representatives were allowed to see everything. Obviously, Russia wants to intimidate potential aggressors in this way.”
Foreign intelligence of the People's Commissariat of State Security, on Stalin's instructions, specifically provided the Harbin residency of German intelligence in China with the opportunity to "intercept and decipher" a certain "circular from Moscow", which ordered all Soviet representatives abroad to warn Germany that the Soviet Union was preparing to defend its interests. (Vishlev O.V. “On the eve of June 22, 1941.” M., 2001).
The most complete information about Germany's aggressive intentions against the USSR was obtained by foreign intelligence through its agents ("the magnificent five" - Philby, Cairncross, MacLean and their comrades) in London.
Intelligence obtained the most secret information about the negotiations that British Foreign Ministers Simon and Halifax conducted with Hitler in 1935 and 1938, respectively, and Prime Minister Chamberlain in 1938.
We learned that England agreed to Hitler's demand to partially remove the military restrictions imposed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles, that Germany was encouraged to expand to the East in the hope that access to the borders of the USSR would remove the threat of aggression from Western countries.
At the beginning of 1937, information was received about a meeting of the highest representatives of the Wehrmacht, at which issues of war with the USSR were discussed.
In the same year, data were obtained on the operational-strategic games of the Wehrmacht, conducted under the leadership of General Hans von Seeckt, which resulted in the conclusion (“Sect’s testament”) that Germany would not be able to win the war with Russia if the hostilities dragged on for a period more than two months, and if during the first month of the war it is not possible to capture Leningrad, Kiev, Moscow and defeat the main forces of the Red Army, simultaneously occupying the main centers of the military industry and the extraction of raw materials in the European part of the USSR.
The conclusion, as we see, was fully justified.
According to General P.A. Sudoplatov, who oversaw the German direction of intelligence, the results of these games were one of the reasons that prompted Hitler to take the initiative to conclude a non-aggression pact in 1939.
In 1935, information was received from one of the sources of our Berlin residency, agent Breitenbach, about testing a liquid-propellant ballistic missile with a range of up to 200 km, developed by engineer von Braun.
But the objective, full-fledged characterization of Germany's intentions towards the USSR, the specific goals, the timing, and the direction of its military aspirations remained not yet clarified.
The obvious inevitability of our military clash was combined in our intelligence reports with information about a possible German armistice agreement with England, as well as Hitler's proposals to delimit the spheres of influence of Germany, Japan, Italy and the USSR. This naturally caused a certain distrust in the reliability of the intelligence data received.
We must also not forget that the repressions that took place in 1937-1938 did not bypass intelligence either. Our residency in Germany and other countries was severely weakened. In 1940, People's Commissar Yezhov declared that he "cleaned 14,000 Chekists"
On July 22, 1940, Hitler decides to start aggression against the USSR even before the end of the war with England.
On the same day, he instructs the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht Ground Forces to develop a plan for war with the USSR, completing all preparations by May 15, 1941, in order to start hostilities no later than mid-June 1941.
Hitler's contemporaries claim that he, as a very superstitious person, considered the date of June 22, 1940 - the surrender of France - very happy for himself and then appointed June 22, 1941 as the date of the attack on the USSR.
On July 31, 1940, a meeting was held at the headquarters of the Wehrmacht, at which Hitler justified the need to start a war with the USSR, without waiting for the end of the war with England.
On December 18, 1940, Hitler signed Directive No. 21 - Plan "Barbarossa".
“For a long time it was believed that the USSR did not have the text of Directive No. 21 - “Plan Barbarossa”, and it was indicated that American intelligence had it, but did not share it with Moscow. American intelligence did have information, including a copy of Directive No. 21 "Plan Barbarossa".
In January 1941, Sam Edison Woods, the commercial attache of the US Embassy in Berlin, obtained it through his connections in the German government and military circles.
US President Roosevelt ordered that the Soviet Ambassador in Washington K. Umansky be acquainted with the materials of S. Woods, which was carried out on March 1, 1941.
At the direction of Secretary of State Cordell Hull, his deputy, Samner Welles, handed over these materials to our Ambassador Umansky, moreover, with an indication of the source.
The information of the Americans was very significant, but nevertheless an addition to the information of the NKGB intelligence department and military intelligence, which at that time had much more powerful intelligence networks in order to independently be aware of the German plans of aggression and inform the Kremlin about it. (Sudoplatov P.A. "Different days of the secret war and diplomacy. 1941". M., 2001).
But the date - June 22, is not and never was in the text of Directive No. 21.
It contained only the date of completion of all preparations for the attack - May 15, 1941.
.jpg)
First page of Directive No. 21 - Plan Barbarossa
The long-term chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU GSh), General of the Army Ivashutin, said:
"The texts of almost all documents and radiograms relating to the military preparations of Germany and the timing of the attack were reported regularly according to the following list: Stalin (two copies), Molotov, Beria, Voroshilov, People's Commissar of Defense and Chief of the General Staff."
Therefore, the statement of G.K. looks very strange. Zhukov that “... there is a version that on the eve of the war we were allegedly aware of the Barbarossa plan ... Let me state with all responsibility that this is pure fiction. As far as I know, neither the Soviet government, nor the People's Commissar of Defense, nor the General Staff had any such data ”(G.K. Zhukov“ Memories and Reflections ”M. APN 1975. p. vol. 1, p. 259.).
It is permissible to ask, what data did the Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov, if he did not have this information, and was not even familiar with the memorandum of the head of the Intelligence Directorate (since February 16, 1942, the Intelligence Directorate was transformed into the Main Intelligence Directorate - GRU) of the General Staff, Lieutenant General F.I. Golikov, who was subordinate to directly G.K. Zhukov, dated March 20, 1941 - "Variants of military operations of the German army against the USSR", compiled on the basis of all intelligence information obtained through military intelligence and which was reported to the country's leadership.
This document outlined the options for the possible directions of attacks by the German troops, and one of the options essentially reflected the essence of the "Barbarossa plan" and the direction of the main attacks of the German troops.
So G.K. Zhukov answered a question posed to him by Colonel Anfilov many years after the war. Colonel Anfilov subsequently cited this answer in his article in Krasnaya Zvezda dated March 26, 1996
(Moreover, it is characteristic that in his most "truthful book about the war" G.K. Zhukov described this report and criticized the incorrect conclusions of the report).
When Lieutenant General N.G. Pavlenko, whom G.K. Zhukov assured that he knew nothing on the eve of the war about the “Barbarossa plan,” G.K. Zhukov copies of these German documents, which were signed by Timoshenko, Beria, Zhukov and Abakumov, then according to Pavlenko - G.K. Zhukov was amazed and shocked. Strange forgetfulness.
But F.I. Golikov quickly corrected the mistake he had made in his conclusions of the March 20, 1941 report and began to present irrefutable evidence of the Germans preparing to attack the USSR:
- 4, 16. April 26, 1941 Head of the General Staff Directorate F.I. Golikov sends special messages to I. Stalin, S.K. Timoshenko and other leaders about strengthening the grouping of German troops on the border of the USSR;
- May 9, 1941, the head of the RU F.I. Golikov introduced I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov, the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff, received a report “On the plans for a German attack on the USSR”, which assessed the grouping of German troops, indicated the directions of attacks and gave the number of concentrated German divisions;
- May 15, 1941, the report of the Republic of Uzbekistan “On the distribution of the armed forces of Germany in theaters and fronts as of May 15, 1941” was presented;
- On June 5 and 7, 1941, Golikov presented a special report on the military preparations of Romania. Until June 22, a number of messages were submitted.
As mentioned above, G.K. Zhukov complained that he did not have the opportunity to report to I. Stalin about the potential capabilities of the enemy.
What capabilities of a potential adversary could the Chief of the General Staff G. Zhukov report on if, according to him, he was not familiar with the main intelligence report on this issue?
Regarding the fact that his predecessors did not have the opportunity for a detailed report to I. Stalin - also a complete lie in "the most truthful book about the war."
For example, only in June 1940, the People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko spent 22 hours and 35 minutes in I. Stalin's office, Chief of the General Staff B.M. Shaposhnikov 17 hours 20 minutes.
G.K. Zhukov, from the moment he was appointed to the post of Chief of the General Staff, i.e. from January 13, 1941 to June 21, 1941, spent 70 hours and 35 minutes in I. Stalin's office.
This is evidenced by entries in the journal of visits to I. Stalin's office.
("At a reception at Stalin's. Notebooks (journals) of records of persons received by I.V. Stalin (1924-1953)" Moscow. New Chronograph, 2008. Records of reception secretaries on duty I.V. Stalin for 1924-1953, in which every day, to the nearest minute, the time spent in Stalin's Kremlin office of all his visitors was recorded).
In the same period, Stalin's office was repeatedly visited, in addition to the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief. General Staff, Marshalov K.E. Voroshilov, S.M. Budyonny, Deputy People's Commissar Marshal Kulik, General of the Army Meretskov, Lieutenant Generals of Aviation Rychagov, Zhigarev, General N.F. Vatutin and many other military leaders.
On January 31, 1941, the High Command of the Wehrmacht Ground Forces issued Directive No. 050/41 on the strategic concentration and deployment of troops in order to implement the Barbarossa plan.
The directive determined "Day B" - the day the offensive began - no later than June 21, 1941.
On April 30, 1941, at a meeting of the top military leadership, Hitler finally announced the date of the attack on the USSR - June 22, 1941, writing it on his copy of the plan.
On June 10, 1941, Order No. 1170/41 of the Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces Halder “On setting the date for the start of the offensive against the Soviet Union” was determined;
"1. Day "D" of the operation "Barbarossa" is proposed to be considered June 22, 1941.
2. In case of postponement of this period, the corresponding decision will be made no later than June 18. Data on the direction of the main strike will continue to remain secret.
3. At 13.00 on June 21, one of the following signals will be transmitted to the troops:
a) Dortmund signal. It means that the offensive will begin on June 22 as planned, and that you can proceed to the open execution of the order.
b) Alton's signal. It means that the offensive is postponed to another date. But in this case, it will already be necessary to fully disclose the goals of the concentration of German troops, since the latter will be in full combat readiness.
4. June 22, 3 hours 30 minutes: the beginning of the offensive and the flight of aircraft across the border. If meteorological conditions delay the departure of aircraft, then the ground forces will launch an offensive on their own.
Unfortunately, our external, military and political intelligence, as Sudoplatov said, “having intercepted data on the timing of the attack and correctly determined the inevitability of war, did not predict the Wehrmacht's bet on blitzkrieg. This was a fatal mistake, because the bet on the blitzkrieg indicated that the Germans were planning their attack regardless of the end of the war with England.
Foreign intelligence reports about German military preparations came from various residencies: England, Germany, France, Poland, Romania, Finland, etc.
Already in September 1940, one of the most valuable sources of the Berlin residency "Corsican" (Arvid Harnak. One of the leaders of the Red Chapel organization. He began to cooperate with the USSR in 1935. In 1942 he was arrested and executed) transmitted information that "at the beginning of the future Germany will start a war against the Soviet Union. There were similar reports from other sources.
In December 1940, a message was received from the Berlin residency that on December 18, Hitler, speaking about the graduation of 5 thousand German officers from schools, spoke out sharply against “injustice on earth, when the Great Russians own one sixth of the land, and 90 million Germans huddle on piece of land" and called on the Germans to eliminate this "injustice".
“In those pre-war years, there was an order to report to the leadership of the country each material received through foreign intelligence separately, as a rule, in the form in which it was received, without its analytical evaluation. Only the degree of reliability of the source was determined.
The information reported to the leadership in this form did not create a unified picture of the events taking place, did not answer the question for what purpose certain measures were being taken, whether a political decision had been made on the attack, etc.
Generalizing materials were not prepared, with a deep analysis of all the information received from sources and conclusions for consideration by the country's leadership.” ("Hitler's secrets on Stalin's table" ed. Mosgorarkhiv 1995).
In other words, before the war, I. Stalin was simply “filled up” with various intelligence information, in a number of cases contradictory, and sometimes false.
Only in 1943 did an analytical service appear in foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.
It should also be taken into account that in preparation for the war against the USSR, the Germans began to carry out very powerful camouflage and disinformation measures at the level of state policy, which were developed by the highest ranks of the Third Reich.
At the beginning of 1941, the German command began to implement a whole system of measures to falsely explain the military preparations being carried out on the borders with the USSR.
On February 15, 1941, signed by Keitel, document No. 44142/41 “Guiding instructions of the Supreme High Command on masking the preparation of aggression against the Soviet Union” was introduced, which provided for hiding from the enemy preparations for the operation according to the Barbarossa plan.
The document prescribed at the first stage, “until April, to maintain the uncertainty of information about their intentions. At subsequent stages, when it will no longer be possible to hide the preparations for the operation, it will be necessary to explain all our actions as disinformation, aimed at diverting attention from the preparations for the invasion of England.
On May 12, 1941, the second document was adopted - 44699/41 "Order of the Chief of Staff of the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces dated May 12, 1941 on conducting the second phase of disinformation of the enemy in order to maintain the secrecy of the concentration of forces against the Soviet Union."
This document provided:
“... from May 22, with the introduction of the maximum condensed schedule for the movement of military echelons, all the efforts of disinformation agencies should be aimed at presenting the concentration of forces for Operation Barbarossa as a maneuver in order to confuse the Western enemy.
For the same reason, it is necessary to continue with particular energy the preparations for an attack on England ...
Among the formations stationed in the East, a rumor must circulate about a rear cover against Russia and a "distracting concentration of forces in the East", and the troops stationed in the English Channel must believe in real preparations for an invasion of England ...
Spread the thesis that the action to capture the island of Crete (Operation Mercury) was a dress rehearsal for the landing in England ... ".
(During Operation Mercury, the Germans airlifted more than 23,000 soldiers and officers, more than 300 artillery pieces, about 5,000 containers with weapons and ammunition and other cargo to Crete by air. This was the largest airborne operation in the history of wars) .
Our Berlin residency was framed by an agent provocateur "Lyceum student" (O. Berlinks. 1913-1978 Latvian. Recruited in Berlin on August 15, 1940.).
Abwehr Major Siegfried Müller, who was in Soviet captivity, during interrogation in May 1947 testified that in August 1940 Amayak Kobulov (a resident of our foreign intelligence in Berlin) was set up by a German intelligence agent, Latvian Berlings (“Lyceum student”), who, on the instructions of the Abwehr for a long time supplied him with disinformation materials.).
The results of the meeting of the Lyceum student with Kobulov were reported to Hitler. Information for this agent was prepared and coordinated with Hitler and Ribentrop.
There were reports from the "Lyceum student" about the low probability of a war between Germany and the USSR, reports that the concentration of German troops on the border was a response to the movement of Soviet troops to the border, etc.
However, Moscow knew about the “double day” of the “Lyceum student”. The foreign policy intelligence and military intelligence of the USSR had such strong agent positions in the German Foreign Ministry that it was not difficult to quickly determine the true face of the "Lyceum student".
The game began and, in turn, our resident in Berlin, Kobulov, provided the “Lyceum student” with relevant information during meetings.
In German disinformation actions, information began to appear that German preparations near our borders were aimed at putting pressure on the USSR and forcing it to accept economic and territorial demands, a kind of ultimatum that Berlin supposedly intends to put forward.
Information was spread that Germany was experiencing an acute shortage of food and raw materials, and that without solving this problem through supplies from Ukraine and oil from the Caucasus, she would not be able to defeat England.
All this disinformation was reflected in their messages not only by the sources of the Berlin residency, but it also came to the attention of other foreign intelligence services, from where our intelligence service also received them through its agents in these countries.
Thus, it turned out to be a multiple overlap of the information obtained, which, as it were, confirmed their “reliability” - and they had one source - disinformation prepared in Germany.
On April 30, 1941, information came from the Corsican that Germany wanted to solve its problems by presenting an ultimatum to the USSR on a significant increase in the supply of raw materials.
On May 5, the same "Corsican" gives information that the concentration of German troops is a "war of nerves" in order for the USSR to accept Germany's conditions: the USSR must give guarantees for entering the war on the side of the "Axis" powers.
Similar information comes from the British residency.
On May 8, 1941, in a message from the "Sergeant" (Harro Schulze-Boysen), it was said that the attack on the USSR was not removed from the agenda, but the Germans would first present us with an ultimatum, demanding to increase exports to Germany.
And all this mass of foreign intelligence information, as they say, in its original form, fell out, as mentioned above, without conducting its generalized analysis and conclusions on the table to Stalin, who himself had to analyze it and draw conclusions ..
Here it will become clear why, according to Sudoplatov, Stalin felt some irritation with intelligence materials, but by no means with all materials.
Here is what V.M. Molotov:
“When I was the Presovnarkom, it took me half a day every day to read intelligence reports. What was not there, no matter what terms were called! And if we had succumbed, the war could have started much earlier. The task of the scout is not to be late, to have time to report ... ".
Many researchers, speaking of I. Stalin's "distrust" of intelligence materials, cite his resolution on the special message of the People's Commissar for State Security V. N. Merkulov No. 2279 / M dated June 17, 1941, containing information received from the "Foreman" (Schulze-Boysen) and "The Corsican" (Arvid Harnak):
"Tov. Merkulov. Can send your source from the headquarters of the German. aviation to the fucking mother. This is not a source, but a misinformer. I.St.” 
In fact, those who spoke about Stalin's distrust of intelligence apparently did not read the text of this message, but drew a conclusion only on the basis of I. Stalin's resolution.
Although a certain amount of distrust in intelligence data, especially in the numerous dates for a possible German attack, since more than ten of them were reported only through military intelligence, Stalin apparently developed.
Hitler, for example, issued an offensive order during the war on the Western Front, and canceled it on the planned day of the offensive. On the offensive on the Western Front, Hitler issued an order 27 times and canceled it 26 times.
If we read the very message of the "Foreman", then the irritation and resolution of I. Stalin will become clear.
Here is the text of the Master's message:
"1. All military measures for the preparation of an armed uprising against the SSR have been completely completed and a strike can be expected at any time.
2. In the circles of the aviation headquarters, the TASS message of June 6 was perceived very ironically. They emphasize that this statement cannot have any meaning.
3. The objects of German air raids will primarily be the Svir-3 power plant, Moscow factories producing individual parts for aircraft, as well as car repair shops ... ".
(Following the text is the report of the "Corsican" on economic and industrial issues in Germany).
.
"Foreman" (Harro Schulze-Boysen 09/2/1909 - 12/22/1942. German. Born in Kiel in the family of a captain of the 2nd rank. He studied at the Faculty of Law of the University of Berlin. He was appointed to one of the departments of the communications department of the Imperial Ministry of Aviation, Before the start of the Second World War, Schulze-Boysen established a relationship with Dr. Arvid Harnack ("The Corsican"). Harro Schulze-Boysen was arrested and executed on August 31, 1942. He was posthumously awarded the Order of the Red Banner in 1969. He was always honest agent who gave us a lot of valuable information.
But his report of June 17 looks rather frivolous just because it confused the date of the TASS report (not June 14, but June 6), and the second-rate Svirskaya hydroelectric power station, Moscow factories "producing individual parts for aircraft, as well as car repair shops.
So Stalin had every reason to doubt such information.
At the same time, we see that the resolution of I. Stalin applies only to the "Foreman" - an agent working in the headquarters of the German aviation, but not to the "Corsican".
But after such a resolution, Stalin then summoned V.N. Merkulov and the head of foreign intelligence P.M. Fitina.
Stalin was interested in the smallest details about the Sources. After Fitin explained why the intelligence service trusted Starshina, Stalin said: "Go check everything and report back to me."
A huge amount of intelligence information also came through military intelligence.
Only from London, where a group of military intelligence officers was led by the military attaché, Major General I.Ya. Sklyarov, in one pre-war year, 1638 sheets of telegraph reports were sent to the Center, most of which contained information about Germany's preparations for a war against the USSR.
The telegram of Richard Sorge, who worked in Japan through the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, was widely known:
In reality, there was never a message with such a text from Sorge.
On June 6, 2001, Krasnaya Zvezda published materials from a round table dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the start of the war, in which SVR Colonel Karpov quite definitely said that, unfortunately, this was a fake.
The same fake and "resolution" L. Beria dated June 21, 1941:
"Many workers are sowing panic ... The secret collaborators of Yastreb, Carmen, Almaz, Verny should be wiped into camp dust as accomplices of international provocateurs who want to quarrel us with Germany."
These lines are circulating in the press, but their falsity has long been established.
Indeed, since February 3, 1941, Beria did not have foreign intelligence under his control, because the NKVD was divided that day into Beria’s NKVD and Merkulov’s NKGB, and foreign intelligence became completely subordinate to Merkulov.
And here are some actual reports by R. Sorge (Ramsay):
- “May 2:“ I talked with the German ambassador Ott and the naval attache about the relationship between Germany and the USSR ... The decision to start a war against the USSR will be made only by Hitler either in May or after the war with England.
- May 30: “Berlin informed Ott that the German uprising against the USSR would begin in the second half of June. Ott is 95% sure the war will start."
- June 1: “The expectation of the outbreak of the German-Soviet war around June 15 is based solely on information that Lieutenant Colonel Scholl brought with him from Berlin, from where he left - on May 6 to Bangkok. In Bangkok, he will take the post of military attache.
- June 20 "The German ambassador in Tokyo, Ott, told me that war between Germany and the USSR was inevitable."
Only according to military intelligence reports on the date of the start of the war with Germany, since 1940, more than 10 have come.
Here they are:
- December 27, 1940 - from Berlin: the war will begin in the second half of next year;
- December 31, 1940 - from Bucharest: the war will begin next spring;
- February 22, 1941 - from Belgrade: the Germans will perform in May - June 1941;
- March 15, 1941 - from Bucharest: war should be expected in 3 months;
- March 19, 1941 - from Berlin: the attack is planned between May 15 and June 15, 1941;
- May 4, 1941 - from Bucharest: the start of the war is scheduled for mid-June;
- May 22, 1941 - from Berlin: an attack on the USSR is expected on June 15;
- June 1, 1941 - from Tokyo: the beginning of the war - around June 15;
- June 7, 1941 - from Bucharest: the war will begin on June 15 - 20;
- June 16, 1941 - from Berlin and from France: German attack on the USSR on June 22 - 25;
June 21, 1941 - from the German Embassy in Moscow, the attack is scheduled for 3 - 4 am on June 22.
As you can see, the latest information from a source in the German Embassy in Moscow contains the exact date and time of the attack.
This information was received from an agent of the Intelligence Directorate - "HVTs" (aka Gerhard Kegel), an employee of the German embassy in Moscow, who, early in the morning of June 21. "KhVTs" himself called for an urgent meeting of his curator Colonel of the Republic of Uzbekistan K.B.Leontva.
On the evening of June 21, Leontiev once again met with an agent of the HVC.
Information "KhVTs" was immediately reported to I.V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, S. K. Timoshenko and G. K. Zhukov.
Very extensive information was received from various sources about the concentration of German troops near our borders.
As a result of intelligence activities, the Soviet leadership knew and posed a real threat from Germany, its desire to provoke the USSR into military action, which would compromise us in the eyes of the world community as the culprit of aggression, thereby depriving the USSR of allies in the fight against the true aggressor.
How extensive was the agent network of Soviet intelligence is also evidenced by the fact that the agents of our military intelligence were such celebrities as film actresses Olga Chekhova and Marika Rekk.
The illegal intelligence officer, acting under the pseudonym "Merlin", she is also Olga Konstantinovna Chekhova, worked for Soviet intelligence from 1922 to 1945. The scale of her intelligence activities, the volume, and especially the level and quality of the information she sent to Moscow is clearly evidenced by the fact that communication between O.K. Chekhova and Moscow, three radio operators in Berlin and its environs supported at once.
Hitler conferred on Olga Chekhova the title of State Artist of the Third Reich, established especially for her, invited her to the most prestigious events, during which he defiantly showed her signs of supreme attention, invariably seated her in rows with him. (A.B. Martirosyan “The tragedy of June 22: Blitzkrieg or treason.”)
.jpg)
OK. Chekhov at one of the receptions next to Hitler.
Marika Rekk belonged to the undercover group of the Soviet military intelligence, which bore the code name "Krona". Its creator was one of the most prominent Soviet military intelligence officers, Yan Chernyak.
The group was founded in the mid 1920s. XX century and it operated for about 18 years, but none of its members was discovered by the enemy.
And it included over 30 people, most of whom became important officers of the Wehrmacht, major industrialists of the Reich.
Marika Rekk
(Known to our viewers by captured German
film "The Girl of My Dreams"
But G.K. Nevertheless, Zhukov did not miss the opportunity to cheat our intelligence and accused the Intelligence Directorate of insolvency, writing in a letter to the writer V.D. Sokolov dated March 2, 1964 the following:
“Our undercover intelligence, which was led by Golikov before the war, worked poorly and failed to reveal the true intentions of the Nazi high command. Our undercover intelligence was unable to refute Hitler's false version of his unwillingness to fight the Soviet Union.
Hitler, on the other hand, continued to play his disinformation game, hoping to outplay J. Stalin in it.
So on May 15, 1941, the non-scheduled Yu-52 aircraft (the Junkers-52 aircraft was used by Hitler as a personal transport), flying freely over Bialystok, Minsk and Smolensk, landed in Moscow at 11.30 on the Khodynka field, without encountering opposition from Soviet means air defense.
After this landing, many leaders of the Soviet air defense and aviation forces had very "serious troubles."
The plane brought a personal message from Hitler to J. Stalin.
Here is part of the text of this message:
“During the formation of the invasion forces far from the eyes and aircraft of the enemy, as well as in connection with recent operations in the Balkans, a large number of my troops, about 88 divisions, accumulated along the border with the Soviet Union, which may have given rise to the rumors circulating now about a possible military conflict between us. I assure you on the honor of the head of state that this is not the case.
For my part, I am also sympathetic to the fact that you cannot completely ignore these rumors and have also concentrated a sufficient number of your troops on the border.
In such a situation, I do not at all exclude the possibility of an accidental outbreak of an armed conflict, which, under conditions of such a concentration of troops, can take on very large proportions, when it will be difficult or simply impossible to determine what was its root cause. It will be no less difficult to stop this conflict.
I want to be very frank with you. I fear that one of my generals will deliberately enter into such a conflict in order to save England from her fate and frustrate my plans.
It's only about one month. Around June 15 - 20, I plan to start a massive transfer of troops to the West from your border.
At the same time, I most convincingly ask you not to succumb to any provocations that may take place on the part of my generals who have forgotten their duty. And, needless to say, try not to give them any reason.
If a provocation by one of my generals cannot be avoided, I ask you to show restraint, do not take retaliatory actions and immediately report the incident through a communication channel known to you. Only in this way will we be able to achieve our common goals, which, it seems to me, we have clearly agreed with you. I thank you for meeting me halfway in a matter known to you, and I ask you to excuse me for the way I chose to deliver this letter to you as soon as possible. I continue to hope for our meeting in July. Sincerely yours, Adolf Hitler. May 14, 1941".
(As we see in this letter, Hitler practically himself "calls" the approximate date of the attack on the USSR on June 15-20, covering it up with the transfer of troops to the West.)
But I. Stalin always had a clear position regarding Hitler's intentions and confidence in him.
The question of whether he believed or did not believe - simply should not exist, he never believed.
And all subsequent actions of I. Stalin show that he really did not believe Hitler's "sincerity" and continued to take measures to "bring operational groupings of troops in the near, but ... not in the immediate rear," about which he spoke in his speech from November 18, 1940 at a meeting of the Politburo, so that the German attack would not take us by surprise.
So directly according to his instructions:
On May 14, 1941, directives of the General Staff No. 503859, 303862, 303874, 503913 and 503920 (for the Western, Kiev, Odessa, Leningrad and Baltic districts, respectively) were sent on the preparation of border defense and air defense plans.
However, the command of all military districts, instead of the deadline for submitting plans indicated in them by May 20 - 25, 1941, submitted them by June 10 - 20. Therefore, neither the General Staff nor the People's Commissar of Defense had time to approve these plans.
This is the direct fault of the commanders of the districts, as well as the General Staff, which did not demand the submission of plans by the specified date.
As a result, thousands of soldiers and officers answered with their lives with the beginning of the war;
- “... In February - April 1941, commanders of troops, members of military councils, chiefs of staff and operational departments of the Baltic, Western, Kiev special and Leningrad military districts were called to the General Staff. Together with them, the procedure for covering the border was outlined, the allocation of the necessary forces for this purpose and the forms of their use .. ”(Vasilevsky A.M. “The Work of All Life”. M., 1974);
From March 25 to April 5, 1941, a partial conscription into the Red Army was carried out, thanks to which it was possible to additionally call up about 300 thousand people;
On January 20, 1941, the order of the People's Commissar of Defense was announced on the admission to the cadres of the reserve command staff, called up for mobilization on the eve of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, who was detained in the army after the end of this war until a special order;
On May 24, 1941, at an expanded meeting of the Politburo, I. Stalin openly warned all the top Soviet and military leadership that in the very near future the USSR could be subjected to a surprise attack by Germany;
During May-June 1941. as a result of "hidden mobilization" about a million "accomplices" from the inner districts were raised and sent to the western districts.
This made it possible to bring almost 50% of the divisions up to the regular strength of wartime (12-14 thousand people).
Thus, the actual deployment and resupplying of troops in the western districts began long before June 22.
This covert mobilization could not be carried out without I. Stalin's instructions, but it was carried out covertly in order to prevent Hitler and the entire West from accusing the USSR of aggressive intentions.
After all, this has already happened in our history, when in 1914 Nicholas II announced mobilization in the Russian Empire, which was regarded as a declaration of war;
On June 10, 1941, at the direction of I. Stalin, the Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 503859 / ss / s was sent to the ZapOVO, which provided: “To increase the combat readiness of the troops of the district, all deep rifle divisions ... withdraw to the areas provided for by the cover plan,” which meant the actual putting troops on high combat readiness;
- On June 11, 1941, the Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense was sent on the immediate bringing into proper condition and full combat readiness of the defensive structures of the first line of fortified areas of the Western OVO, primarily strengthening their firepower.
“General Pavlov was obliged to report on the execution by June 15, 1941. But the report on the implementation of this directive has not been received.” (Anfilov V.A. “The failure of the Blitzkrieg”. M., 1975).
And as it turned out later, this directive was not implemented.
Again the question was, where was the General Staff and its chief, who were supposed to demand its execution, or were I. Stalin to control these issues for them?;
On June 12, 1941, directives from the People's Commissariat of Defense signed by Timoshenko and Zhukov were sent to put into effect Cover Plans for all western districts;
On June 13, 1941, at the direction of I. Stalin, a directive of the General Staff was issued on the advancement of troops located in the depths of the district, closer to the state border (Vasilevsky A.M. “The Work of All Life”).
In three of the four districts, this directive was implemented, except for the Western OVO (commander of the district, General of the Army D.F. Pavlov).
As military historian A. Isaev writes, “since June 18, the following units of the Kyiv OVO moved closer to the border from their places of deployment:
31 sc (200, 193, 195 sd); 36 sc (228, 140, 146 sd); 37 sc (141.80.139 sd); 55 sc (169,130,189 sd); 49 sc (190.197 sd).
Total - 5 rifle corps (sk), having 14 rifle divisions (sd), which is about 200 thousand people "
In total, 28 divisions were advanced closer to the state border;
In the memoirs of G.K. Zhukov also find the following message:
“People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Tymoshenko already in June 1941 recommended that the district commanders conduct tactical exercises of formations towards the state border in order to bring troops closer to the deployment areas according to cover plans (i.e. to defense areas in the event of an attack).
This recommendation of the People's Commissar of Defense was put into practice by the districts, however, with one significant caveat: a significant part of the artillery did not take part in the movement (to the border, to the line of defense)....
... The reason for this was that the commanders of the districts (Western OVO-Pavlov and Kiev OVO-Kirponos), without agreement with Moscow, decided to send most of the artillery to firing ranges.”
Again the question: Where was the General Staff, its chief, if without their knowledge the commanders of the districts are taking such measures when the war with Germany is on the verge?
As a result, some corps and divisions of the covering troops during the attack of fascist Germany found themselves without a significant part of their artillery.
K.K. Rokossovsky writes in his book that “back in May 1941, for example, an order followed from the district headquarters, the expediency of which was difficult to explain in that alarming situation. The troops were ordered to send artillery to the ranges located in the border zone.
Our corps managed to defend its artillery.”
Thus, large-caliber artillery, the strike force of the troops, was practically absent in combat formations. And most of the anti-aircraft weapons of the Western OVO were generally located near Minsk, far from the border, and could not cover the units and airfields attacked from the air in the first hours and days of the war.
The district command rendered this "invaluable service" to the invading German troops.
Here is what the German General Blumentritt, the chief of staff of the 4th Army of the Army Group Center, writes in his memoirs (the 2nd tank group of this army, commanded by Guderian, advanced on June 22, 1941 in the Brest region against the 4th Army of the Western OVO - the commander of the army, Major General M.A. Korobkov):
“At 3 hours 30 minutes, all our artillery opened fire ... And then something happened that seemed like a miracle: the Russian artillery did not answer ... A few hours later, the divisions of the first echelon were on the other side of the river. Bug. Tanks were crossed, pontoon bridges were built, and all this with almost no resistance from the enemy ... There was no doubt that they caught the Russians by surprise ... Our tanks almost immediately broke through the strip of Russian border fortifications and rushed east on level ground ”(“ Fatal Decisions ” Moscow, Military Publishing House, 1958).
To this it must be added that the bridges in the Brest region were not blown up, along which the German tanks moved. Even Guderian was surprised by this;
On December 27, 1940, People's Commissar of Defense Timoshenko issued order No. 0367 on the mandatory camouflage of the entire airfield network of the Air Force in a 500-km strip from the border with the completion of work by July 1, 1941.
Neither the Air Force Main Directorate nor the districts complied with this order.
The direct fault is the Air Force Inspector General, Assistant Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army for Aviation Smushkevich (in accordance with the order, he was entrusted with control and a monthly report on this to the General Staff) and the Air Force command;
On June 19, 1941, the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0042 was issued.
It states that “nothing significant has yet been done to mask the airfields and the most important military installations”, that the aircraft, in the “complete absence of their masking”, are crowded at the airfields, etc.
The same order states that “... Artillery and mechanized units show a similar carelessness to camouflage: the crowded and linear arrangement of their parks is not only excellent objects of observation, but also targets that are advantageous for hitting from the air. Tanks, armored vehicles, command and other special vehicles of motorized and other troops are painted with colors that give a bright reflection, and are clearly visible not only from the air, but also from the ground. Nothing has been done to camouflage warehouses and other important military installations...”.
What was the result of this carelessness of the command of the districts, especially the Western OVO, showed on June 22, when about 738 aircraft were destroyed at its airfields, including 528 were lost on the ground, as well as a large number of military equipment.
Who is to blame? Again I. Stalin, or the command of the military districts and the General Staff, which failed to exercise strict control over the implementation of its orders and directives? I think the answer is clear.
The commander of the Air Force of the Western Front, Hero of the Soviet Union, Major General I.I. Kopets, having learned about these losses, on the same day, June 22, shot himself.
Here I will quote the words of the People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsova:
“Analyzing the events of the last peaceful days, I assume: I.V. Stalin imagined the combat readiness of our armed forces to be higher than it actually was ... He believed that at any moment, on a combat alert, they could give a reliable rebuff to the enemy ... Knowing exactly the number of aircraft deployed on his orders at border airfields , he believed that at any moment, on a combat alarm signal, they could take off into the air and give a reliable rebuff to the enemy. And he was simply stunned by the news that our planes did not have time to take off, but died right at the airfields.
Naturally, I. Stalin's idea of the state of combat readiness of our Armed Forces was based on the reports, first of all, of the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff, as well as other military commanders, whom he regularly heard in his office;
On June 21, I. Stalin decided to deploy 5 fronts:
Western, Southwestern. South, Northwest, North.
By this time, the command posts of the fronts were already equipped, because. As early as June 13, a decision was made to separate the command and control structures in the military districts and to transform the departments of the military districts into front-line departments.
The command post of the Western Front (Front Commander General of the Army D.G. Pavlov was deployed in the area of the Obuz-Lesnaya station. But only Pavlov did not appear there before the start of the war).
In the city of Ternopil, there was a front-line command post of the South-Western Front (Front Commander Colonel-General M.P. Kirponos died on 09/20/1941).
Thus, we see that before the war, on the instructions of I. Stalin, a number of measures were taken to strengthen the readiness of the Red Army to repel aggression from Germany. And he had every reason to believe, as the People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov, "the combat readiness of our armed forces is higher than it turned out to be in reality ...".
It should be noted that I. Stalin, receiving information about the impending war from Merkulov’s foreign intelligence residencies from the NKGB, from the military intelligence of General Golikov of the RU General Staff, through diplomatic channels, apparently could not be completely sure that all this was not a strategic provocation of Germany or Western countries that see their own salvation in the clash between the USSR and Germany.
But there was also reconnaissance of the border troops, subordinated to L. Beria, which provided information about the concentration of German troops directly at the borders of the USSR, and its reliability was ensured by the constant observation of border guards, a large number of informers of the border regions who directly observed the concentration of German troops - these are residents of the border regions, train drivers , switchmen, greasers, etc.
Information from this intelligence is integral information from such an extensive peripheral intelligence network that it cannot but be reliable. This information, summarized and put together, gave the most objective picture of the concentration of German troops.
Beria regularly reported this information to I. Stalin:
- In information No. 1196/B dated April 21, 1941, Stalin, Molotov, Timoshenko are given specific data on the arrival of German troops at points adjacent to the state border.
- On June 2, 1941, Beria sends note No. 1798 / B personally to Stalin with information about the concentration of two German army groups, the increased movement of troops mainly at night, the reconnaissance carried out by German generals near the border, etc.
- On June 5, Beria sends Stalin another note No. 1868 / B on the concentration of troops on the Soviet-German, Soviet-Hungarian, Soviet-Romanian border.
In June 1941, more than 10 such information messages from the intelligence of the border troops were presented.
But here is what Chief Marshal of Aviation A.E. Golovanov recalls, who in June 1941, commanding a separate 212th long-range bomber regiment subordinate directly to Moscow, arrived from Smolensk in Minsk to be presented to the Commander of the Air Force of the Western Special Military District I.I. Kopts and then to the Commander of the ZapOVO D. G. Pavlov himself.
During the conversation with Golovanov, Pavlov contacted Stalin via HF. And he began to ask the general questions, to which the District Commander answered the following:
“No, Comrade Stalin, this is not true! I have just returned from the defensive lines. There is no concentration of German troops on the border, and my scouts are working well. I'll check again, but I think it's just a provocation ... "
And then, turning to him, he said:
“Not in the spirit of the Boss. Some bastard is trying to prove to him that the Germans are concentrating troops on our border...”. Apparently, by this "bastard" he meant L. Beria, who was in charge of the border troops.
And many historians continue to repeat that Stalin allegedly did not believe "Pavlov's warnings" about the concentration of German troops ....
The situation heated up every day.
On June 14, 1941, a TASS message was published. It was a kind of trial balloon to test the reaction of the German leadership.
The TASS report, intended not so much for the population of the USSR as for official Berlin, refuted rumors about "the proximity of the war between the USSR and Germany."
There was no official reaction from Berlin to this message.
It became apparently clear to I. Stalin and the Soviet leadership that Germany's military preparations for an attack on the USSR had entered the final stage.
June 15 came, then June 16, 17, but no "withdrawal" and "transfer" of German troops, as Hitler assured in his letter of May 14, 1941, from the Soviet border, "toward England" did not happen.
On the contrary, an intensified accumulation of Wehrmacht troops began on our border.
On June 17, 1941, a message was received from Berlin from the USSR Naval Attache, Captain 1st Rank M.A. Vorontsov, that the German attack on the USSR would take place on June 22 at 3.30 am. (Captain 1st rank Vorontsov was summoned by I. Stalin to Moscow and, according to some information, on June 21 in the evening he attended a meeting in his office. This meeting will be discussed below).
And then a reconnaissance flight over the border was made with the "inspection" of German units near our border.
Here is what he writes in his book - “I am a fighter” - Major General of Aviation, Hero of the Soviet Union G. N. Zakharov. Before the war, he was a colonel and commanded the 43rd Fighter Air Division of the Western Special Military District:
“Somewhere in the middle of the last pre-war week - it was either the seventeenth or the eighteenth of June of the forty-first year - I received an order from the aviation commander of the Western Special Military District to fly over the western border. The length of the route was four hundred kilometers, and it was necessary to fly from south to north - to Bialystok.
I flew out on the U-2 together with the navigator of the 43rd Fighter Aviation Division, Major Rumyantsev. The border areas west of the state border were packed with troops. In the villages, on the farms, in the groves, there were poorly camouflaged, or even not at all camouflaged tanks, armored vehicles, and guns. Motorcycles darted along the roads, cars - apparently, headquarters - cars. Somewhere in the depths of a vast territory, a movement was born, which here, at our very border, slowed down, resting on it ... and ready to overflow over it.
We flew then a little over three hours. I often landed the plane on any suitable site, which might seem random if the border guard did not immediately approach the plane. The border guard appeared silently, silently saluted (as we see, he knew in advance that a plane with urgent information -sad39 would soon land) and waited for several minutes while I wrote a report on the wing. Having received a report, the border guard disappeared, and we again took to the air and, having traveled 30–50 kilometers, sat down again. And I wrote the report again, and the other border guard waited silently and then, saluting, silently disappeared. By evening, in this way, we flew to Bialystok
After landing, the commander of the Air Force of the district, General Kopets, took me after the report to the commander of the district.
D. G. Pavlov looked at me as if he had seen me for the first time. I had a feeling of dissatisfaction when, at the end of my message, he smiled and asked if I was exaggerating. The intonation of the commander frankly replaced the word “exaggerate” with “panic” - he clearly did not fully accept everything that I said ... With that, we left.
D.G. Pavlov did not believe this information either ....
The art of war is a science in which nothing succeeds except what has been calculated and thought out.
Napoleon
The Barbarossa plan is a plan for Germany's attack on the USSR, based on the principle of lightning war, blitzkrieg. The plan began to be developed in the summer of 1940, and on December 18, 1940, Hitler approved a plan according to which the war was to be ended by November 1941 at the latest.
Plan Barbarossa was named after Frederick Barbarossa, a 12th century emperor who became famous for his conquests. This traced elements of symbolism, to which Hitler himself and his entourage paid so much attention. The plan received its name on January 31, 1941.
Number of troops to implement the plan
Germany prepared 190 divisions for war and 24 divisions as a reserve. For the war, 19 tank and 14 motorized divisions were allocated. The total number of the contingent that Germany sent to the USSR, according to various estimates, ranges from 5 to 5.5 million people.
The apparent advantage in the technology of the USSR should not be taken into account, since by the beginning of the wars, German technical tanks and aircraft were superior to Soviet ones, and the army itself was much more trained. Suffice it to recall the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, where the Red Army demonstrated weakness in literally everything.
Direction of the main attack
The Barbarossa plan defined 3 main directions for the strike:
- Army Group South. A blow to Moldova, Ukraine, Crimea and access to the Caucasus. Further movement to the line Astrakhan - Stalingrad (Volgograd).
- Army Group Center. Line "Minsk - Smolensk - Moscow". Advance to Nizhny Novgorod, leveling the line "Wave - Northern Dvina".
- Army Group North. Attack on the Baltic states, Leningrad and further advance towards Arkhangelsk and Murmansk. At the same time, the army "Norway" was to fight in the north together with the Finnish army.
| SOUTH | CENTER | NORTH | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Target | Ukraine, Crimea, access to the Caucasus | Minsk, Smolensk, Moscow | Baltic States, Leningrad, Arkhangelsk, Murmansk |
| population | 57 divisions and 13 brigades | 50 divisions and 2 brigades | 29 division + army "Norway" |
| Commanding | Field Marshal von Rundstedt | Field Marshal von Bock | Field Marshal von Leeb |
| common goal | Get on line: Arkhangelsk - Volga - Astrakhan (Northern Dvina) |
||
Approximately by the end of October 1941, the German command planned to reach the Volga-Northern Dvina line, thereby capturing the entire European part of the USSR. This was the plan of the blitzkrieg. After the blitzkrieg, the lands beyond the Urals should have remained, which, without the support of the center, would quickly surrender to the winner.
Until about mid-August 1941, the Germans believed that the war was going according to plan, but in September there were already entries in the diaries of officers that the Barbarossa plan had failed and the war would be lost. The best proof that Germany in August 1941 believed that only a few weeks were left before the end of the war with the USSR is the speech of Goebbels. The Minister of Propaganda suggested that the Germans additionally collect warm clothes for the needs of the army. The government decided that this step was not necessary, since there would be no war in the winter.
Implementation of the plan
The first three weeks of the war assured Hitler that everything was going according to plan. The army advanced rapidly, winning victories, the Soviet army suffered huge losses:
- 28 divisions out of 170 disabled.
- 70 divisions lost about 50% of their personnel.
- 72 divisions remained combat-ready (43% of those available at the start of the war).
During the same 3 weeks, the average rate of advance of German troops inland was 30 km per day.
By July 11, the army group "North" occupied almost the entire territory of the Baltic states, providing access to Leningrad, the army group "Center" reached Smolensk, the army group "South" went to Kiev. These were the last achievements that fully corresponded to the plan of the German command. After that, failures began (still local, but already indicative). Nevertheless, the initiative in the war until the end of 1941 was on the side of Germany.
German failures in the North
The army "North" occupied the Baltic states without problems, especially since there was practically no partisan movement there. The next strategic point to be captured was Leningrad. It turned out that the Wehrmacht was not capable of this task. The city did not capitulate to the enemy, and until the end of the war, despite all efforts, Germany failed to capture it.
Failures of the Army Center
The "Center" army reached Smolensk without any problems, but got stuck under the city until September 10. Smolensk resisted for almost a month. The German command demanded a decisive victory and the advance of the troops, since such a delay under the city, which was planned to be taken without heavy losses, was unacceptable and cast doubt on the implementation of the Barbarossa plan. As a result, the Germans took Smolensk, but their troops were pretty battered.
Historians today evaluate the battle for Smolensk as a tactical victory for Germany, but a strategic victory for Russia, as they managed to stop the advance of troops on Moscow, which allowed the capital to prepare for defense.
Complicated the advance of the German army deep into the country partisan movement of Belarus.
Failures of the Army of the South
The army "South" reached Kyiv in 3.5 weeks and, like the army "Center" near Smolensk, got stuck in battles. In the end, they managed to take the city in view of the clear superiority of the army, but Kyiv held out almost until the end of September, which also made it difficult for the German army to advance, and made a significant contribution to the disruption of the Barbarossa plan.
Map of the advance plan of the German troops
Above is a map showing the plan of the German command for the offensive. The map shows: green - the borders of the USSR, red - the border to which Germany planned to reach, blue - the deployment and the plan for the advancement of the German forces.
General state of affairs
- In the North, it was not possible to capture Leningrad and Murmansk. The advance of the troops stopped.
- In the Center, with great difficulty, we managed to get to Moscow. At the time the German army entered the Soviet capital, it was clear that no blitzkrieg had happened.
- In the South, they failed to take Odessa and capture the Caucasus. By the end of September, the Nazi troops had only captured Kyiv and launched an offensive against Kharkov and the Donbass.
Why did the blitzkrieg fail in Germany?
Germany failed the blitzkrieg because the Wehrmacht was preparing the Barbarossa plan, as it later turned out, on false intelligence. Hitler admitted this by the end of 1941, saying that if he had known the real state of affairs in the USSR, he would not have started the war on June 22.
The lightning war tactics were based on the fact that the country has one line of defense on the western border, all large army units are located on the western border, and aviation is located on the border. Since Hitler was sure that all Soviet troops were located on the border, this formed the basis of the blitzkrieg - to destroy the enemy army in the first weeks of the war, and then rapidly move inland without encountering serious resistance.
In fact, there were several lines of defense, the army was not located with all its forces on the western border, there were reserves. Germany did not expect this, and by August 1941 it became clear that the lightning war had failed, and Germany could not win the war. The fact that World War II lasted until 1945 only proves that the Germans fought very organized and brave. Due to the fact that they had the economy of the whole of Europe behind them (speaking of the war between Germany and the USSR, many for some reason forget that the German army included units from almost all European countries) they managed to fight successfully.
Did Barbarossa's plan fail?
I propose to evaluate the Barbarossa plan according to 2 criteria: global and local. Global(landmark - the Great Patriotic War) - the plan was thwarted, because the lightning war did not work, the German troops were bogged down in battles. Local(landmark - intelligence data) - the plan was implemented. The German command drew up the Barbarossa plan on the basis that the USSR had 170 divisions on the country's border, there were no additional defense echelons. There are no reserves and reinforcements. The army was preparing for this. In 3 weeks, 28 Soviet divisions were completely destroyed, and in 70, approximately 50% of the personnel and equipment were disabled. At this stage, the blitzkrieg worked and, in the absence of reinforcements from the USSR, gave the desired results. But it turned out that the Soviet command has reserves, not all troops are located on the border, mobilization brings quality soldiers into the army, there are additional lines of defense, the "charm" of which Germany felt near Smolensk and Kiev.
Therefore, the disruption of the Barbarossa plan must be regarded as a huge strategic mistake of German intelligence, led by Wilhelm Canaris. Today, some historians associate this person with the agents of England, but there is no evidence for this. But if we assume that this is indeed the case, then it becomes clear why Canaris slipped an absolute “linden” to Hitler that the USSR was not ready for war and all the troops were located on the border.
