The bloodiest battle in the history of mankind is Stalingrad. Nazi Germany lost 841,000 soldiers in the battle. The losses of the USSR amounted to 1,130,000 people. Accordingly, the total death toll was 1,971,000 people.
By the middle of the summer of 1942, the battles of the Great Patriotic War had reached the Volga. The German command also included Stalingrad in the plan for a large-scale offensive in the south of the USSR (Caucasus, Crimea). Hitler wanted to carry out this plan in just a week with the help of the 6th Paulus Field Army. It included 13 divisions, where there were about 270,000 people, 3 thousand guns and about five hundred tanks. From the side of the USSR, the forces of Germany were opposed by the Stalingrad Front. It was created by decision of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on July 12, 1942 (commander - Marshal Timoshenko, from July 23 - Lieutenant General Gordov).
On August 23, German tanks approached Stalingrad. From that day on, fascist aviation began to systematically bomb the city. On the ground, battles did not stop either. The defending troops were ordered to hold the city with all their might. With each passing day, the fighting became more and more fierce. All houses were turned into fortresses. Fights went for floors, basements, separate walls.
By November, the Germans had captured almost the entire city. Stalingrad was turned into solid ruins. The defending troops held only a low strip of land - a few hundred meters along the banks of the Volga. Hitler hurried to the whole world to announce the capture of Stalingrad.
On September 12, 1942, at the height of the battles for the city, the General Staff began to develop the offensive operation "Uranus". It was planned by Marshal G.K. Zhukov. The plan was to hit the flanks of the German wedge, which was defended by the Allied troops (Italians, Romanians and Hungarians). Their formations were poorly armed and did not have a high morale. Within two months, under conditions of the deepest secrecy, a strike force was created near Stalingrad. The Germans understood the weakness of their flanks, but could not imagine that the Soviet command would be able to collect such a number of combat-ready units.
On November 19, the Red Army, after a powerful artillery preparation, launched an offensive with the forces of tank and mechanized units. Having overturned Germany's allies, on November 23, Soviet troops closed the ring, surrounding 22 divisions numbering 330 thousand soldiers.
Hitler rejected the option of retreat and ordered the commander-in-chief of the 6th Army, Paulus, to begin defensive battles in the environment. The command of the Wehrmacht tried to release the encircled troops with a strike by the Don army under the command of Manstein. There was an attempt to organize an air bridge, which our aviation stopped. The Soviet command presented an ultimatum to the Surrounded units. Realizing the hopelessness of their situation, on February 2, 1943, the remnants of the 6th Army in Stalingrad surrendered.
2 "Verdun meat grinder"
The Battle of Verdun is one of the largest and one of the bloodiest military operations in the First World War. It took place from February 21 to December 18, 1916 between the troops of France and Germany. Each side unsuccessfully tried to break through the enemy's defenses and launch a decisive offensive. During the nine months of the battle, the front line remained virtually unchanged. Neither side achieved a strategic advantage. It was not by chance that contemporaries called the battle of Verdun a "meat grinder". 305,000 soldiers and officers from both sides lost their lives in a useless confrontation. The losses of the French army, including those killed and wounded, amounted to 543 thousand people, and the German - 434 thousand. 70 French and 50 German divisions passed through the Verdun meat grinder.
After a series of bloody battles on both fronts in 1914-1915, Germany did not have the forces to attack on a wide front, so the goal of the offensive was a powerful blow on a narrow sector - in the area of the Verdun fortified region. The breakthrough of the French defense, the encirclement and defeat of 8 French divisions would mean free passage to Paris, followed by the surrender of France.
On a small section of the front, 15 km long, Germany concentrated 6.5 divisions against 2 French divisions. Additional reserves could be brought in to maintain a continuous offensive. The sky was cleared of French aircraft for the unhindered work of German fire spotters and bombers.
The Verdun operation began on 21 February. After a massive 8-hour artillery preparation, the German troops went on the offensive on the right bank of the Meuse River, but met stubborn resistance. The German infantry was advancing in tight battle formations. During the first day of the offensive, the German troops advanced 2 km and took the first position of the French. In the following days, the offensive was carried out according to the same scheme: during the day, the artillery destroyed the next position, and by the evening the infantry occupied it.
By February 25, the French had lost almost all of their forts. Almost without resistance, the Germans managed to take the important Fort Douaumont. However, the French command took measures to eliminate the threat of encirclement of the Verdun fortified area. On the only highway connecting Verdun with the rear, troops from other sectors of the front were transferred in 6,000 vehicles. During the period from February 27 to March 6, about 190,000 soldiers and 25,000 tons of military cargo were delivered to Verdun by motor vehicles. The offensive of the German troops was stopped by almost one and a half superiority in manpower.
The battle took on a protracted character, since March the Germans suffered the main blow to the left bank of the river. After intense fighting, the German troops managed to advance only 6-7 km by May.
The last attempt to capture Verdun was made by the Germans on June 22, 1916. They acted, as always, according to the pattern, at first, after a powerful artillery preparation, the use of gas followed, then the thirty thousandth vanguard of the Germans went on the attack, which acted with the despair of the doomed. The advancing avant-garde managed to destroy the opposing French division and even take Fort Tiamon, located just three kilometers north of Verdun, the walls of the Verdun Cathedral were already visible ahead, but there was simply no one to continue the attack further, the advancing German troops died almost completely on the battlefield, reserves ran out, the general offensive bogged down.
The Brusilovsky breakthrough on the Eastern Front and the Entente operation on the Somme forced the German troops to go on the defensive in the autumn, and on October 24, the French troops went on the offensive and by the end of December reached the positions they occupied on February 25, pushing the enemy back 2 km from Fort Douaumont.
The battle did not bring any tactical and strategic results - by December 1916, the front line had moved to the lines occupied by both armies by February 25, 1916.
3 Battle of the Somme
The Battle of the Somme is one of the largest battles of World War I, with over 1,000,000 killed and wounded, making it one of the bloodiest battles in human history. Only on the first day of the campaign, July 1, 1916, the English landing lost 60,000 people. The operation dragged on for five months. The number of divisions participating in the battle increased from 33 to 149. As a result, French losses amounted to 204,253 people, British - 419,654 people, a total of 623,907 people, of which 146,431 people were killed and missing. German losses amounted to more than 465,000 people, of which 164,055 were killed and missing.
The offensive plan on all fronts, including the Western one, was developed and approved as early as early March 1916 in Chantilly. The combined army of the French and British was to launch an offensive against the fortified German positions in early July, and the Russian and Italian 15 days earlier than this date. In May, the plan was significantly changed, the French, who had lost over half a million soldiers killed near Verdun, could no longer put up in the upcoming battle the number of soldiers that the allies demanded. As a result, the length of the front was reduced from 70 to 40 kilometers.
On June 24, British artillery began heavy shelling of German positions near the Somme River. As a result of this shelling, the Germans lost more than half of their entire artillery and the entire first line of defense, after which they immediately began to pull reserve divisions into the breakthrough area.
On July 1, as planned, the infantry was launched, which easily overcame the almost destroyed first line of German troops, but when moving to the second and third positions, lost a huge number of soldiers and was thrown back. On this day, over 20 thousand English and French soldiers died, more than 35 thousand were seriously injured, some of them were taken prisoner. At the same time, the small French not only captured and held the second line of defense, but also took Barlet, however, leaving it a few hours later, since the commander was not ready for such a quick turn of events and ordered to retreat. A new offensive on the French sector of the front began only on July 5, but by this time the Germans had pulled several additional divisions to this area, as a result, several thousand soldiers died, but the city, abandoned so recklessly, was not taken. The French tried to capture Barlet from the moment they retreated in July until the month of October.
Already a month after the start of the battle, the British and French lost so many soldiers that 9 additional divisions were brought into battle, while Germany transferred as many as 20 divisions to the Somme. By August, against 500 British aircraft, the Germans were able to field only 300, and against 52 divisions, only 31.
The situation for Germany became much more complicated after the implementation of the Brusilov breakthrough by the Russian troops, the German command depleted all its reserves and was forced to switch to planned defense from the last forces, not only on the Somme, but also near Verdun.
Under these conditions, the British decided to make another attempt at a breakthrough, scheduled for September 3, 1916. After the artillery shelling, all available reserves, including the French, were thrown into action, and on September 15, tanks went into battle for the first time. In total, the command had at its disposal about 50 tanks with a well-trained crew, but only 18 of them actually took part in the battle. A big miscalculation of the designers and developers of the tank offensive was the rejection of the fact that the terrain near the river was swampy, and bulky, clumsy tanks simply could not get out of the swamp. However, the British were able to advance deep into the enemy positions for several tens of kilometers and on September 27 they were able to capture the heights between the Somme River and the small river Ancre.
A further offensive did not make sense, since the exhausted soldiers would not be able to hold the recaptured positions, therefore, despite several offensive attempts made in October, in fact, no military operations had been conducted in this area since November, and the operation was completed.
4 Battle of Leipzig
The Battle of Leipzig, also known as the Battle of the Nations, is the largest battle in the Napoleonic Wars and in world history before the First World War. The French army, according to rough estimates, lost 70-80 thousand soldiers near Leipzig, of which about 40 thousand were killed and wounded, 15 thousand prisoners, another 15 thousand were captured in hospitals, and up to 5 thousand Saxons went over to the Allied side. According to the French historian T. Lenz, the losses of the Napoleonic army amounted to 70 thousand killed, wounded and captured, another 15-20 thousand German soldiers went over to the side of the Allies. In addition to combat losses, the lives of the soldiers of the retreating army were carried away by a typhus epidemic. Allied losses amounted to 54 thousand killed and wounded, of which up to 23 thousand Russians, 16 thousand Prussians, 15 thousand Austrians and 180 Swedes.
From October 16 to October 19, 1813, a battle took place near Leipzig between the armies of Napoleon I and the sovereigns united against him: Russian, Austrian, Prussian and Swedish. The forces of the latter were divided into three armies: the Bohemian (main), Silesian and northern, but only the first two of them participated in the battle on October 16. The bloody actions of that day did not bring any significant results.
On October 17, both warring parties remained inactive, and only on the north side of Leipzig did a cavalry skirmish occur. During this day, the position of the French deteriorated significantly, since only one Renier corps (15 thousand) came to reinforce them, and the allies were strengthened by the newly arrived northern army. Napoleon found out about this, but did not dare to retreat, because, retreating, he left the possessions of his ally, the king of Saxony, in the hands of the enemies, and finally abandoned the French garrisons scattered at different points on the Vistula, Oder and Elbe to the mercy of fate. By the evening of the 17th, he pulled his troops to new positions, closer to Leipzig, on October 18, the allies resumed the attack along the entire line, but, despite the enormous superiority of their forces, the result of the battle was again far from decisive: on the right wing of Napoleon, all the attacks of the Bohemian army were repulsed; in the center, the French lost several villages and retreated back to Leipzig; their left wing held its ground north of Leipzig; in the rear, the French retreat route to Weissenfels remained free.
The main reasons for the small success of the Allies were the timing of their attacks and the inactivity of the reserve, which Prince Schwarzenberg did not know how or did not want to properly use, contrary to the insistence of Emperor Alexander. Meanwhile, Napoleon, taking advantage of the fact that the retreat route remained open, began to send back his carts and separate parts of the troops before noon, and on the night of 18-19 the entire French army retreated to Leipzig and beyond. For the defense of the city itself, 4 corps were left. The commander of the rear guard, MacDonald, was ordered to hold out until at least 12 noon the next day, and then retreat, blowing up the only bridge on the Elster River behind him.
On the morning of October 19, a new Allied attack followed. About one o'clock in the afternoon, the allied monarchs could already enter the city, in some parts of which fierce fighting was still in full swing. Due to a disastrous mistake for the French, the bridge on the Elster was blown up prematurely. The cut off troops of their rearguard were partly taken prisoner, partly died, trying to escape by swimming across the river.
The battle at Leipzig, in terms of the size of the forces of both sides (Napoleon had 190 thousand, with 700 guns; the allies had up to 300 thousand and more than 1300 guns) and due to its enormous consequences, is called by the Germans the "battle of the peoples." The consequence of this battle was the liberation of Germany and the falling away from Napoleon of the troops of the Confederation of the Rhine.
5 Battle of Borodino
The battle of Borodino is considered the bloodiest one-day battle in history. During it, every hour, about 6 thousand people died or were injured, according to the most conservative estimates. During the battle, the Russian army lost about 30% of its composition, the French - about 25%. In absolute numbers, this is about 60 thousand killed on both sides. But, according to some reports, up to 100 thousand people were killed during the battle and died later from wounds.
The battle of Borodino took place 125 kilometers west of Moscow, near the village of Borodino, on August 26 (September 7, old style), 1812. French troops under the leadership of Napoleon I Bonaparte invaded the territory of the Russian Empire in June 1812 and reached the capital itself by the end of August. Russian troops constantly retreated and, naturally, caused great discontent both in society and in Emperor Alexander I himself. To turn the tide, the commander-in-chief Barclay de Tolly was removed, and Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov took his place. But the new head of the Russian army also preferred to retreat: on the one hand, he wanted to wear down the enemy, on the other, Kutuzov was waiting for reinforcements to give a general battle. After the retreat near Smolensk, Kutuzov's army settled down near the village of Borodino - there was nowhere to retreat further. It was here that the most famous battle of the entire Patriotic War of 1812 took place.
At 6 am, the French artillery opened fire on the entire front. The French troops lined up for the attack launched their onslaught on the Life Guards Jaeger Regiment. Desperately resisting, the regiment retreated across the Koloch River. The flashes, who would become known as the Bagrationovs, protected the chasseur regiments of Prince Shakhovsky from being bypassed. Ahead, the huntsmen also lined up in a cordon. The division of Major General Neverovsky took up positions behind the flushes.
The troops of Major General Duka occupied the Semyonov Heights. This area was attacked by the cavalry of Marshal Murat, the troops of Marshals Ney and Davout, and the corps of General Junot. The number of attackers reached 115 thousand people.
The course of the Battle of Borodino after the repulsed attacks of the French at 6 and 7 o'clock continued with another attempt to take flushes on the left flank. By that time, they were reinforced by the Izmailovsky and Lithuanian regiments, the Konovnitsin division and cavalry units. On the French side, it was in this sector that serious artillery forces were concentrated - 160 guns. However, subsequent attacks (at 8 and 9 in the morning) were, despite the incredible intensity of the fighting, completely unsuccessful. The French briefly managed to take possession of the flushes at 9 am. But, soon they were knocked out of the Russian fortifications by a powerful counterattack. The half-ruined flushes held on stubbornly, repelling subsequent attacks from the enemy.
Konovnitsin withdrew his troops to Semyonovskoye only after the holding of these fortifications ceased to be a necessity. Semyonovsky ravine became a new line of defense. The exhausted troops of Davout and Murat, who did not receive reinforcements (Napoleon did not dare to bring the Old Guard into battle), were unable to carry out a successful attack.
The situation was extremely difficult in other areas as well. The barrow height was attacked at the same time that the battle for the capture of flushes was in full swing on the left flank. Raevsky's battery held the height, despite the powerful onslaught of the French under the command of Eugene Beauharnais. After reinforcements arrived, the French were forced to retreat.
Actions on the right flank were no less intense. Lieutenant General Uvarov and Ataman Platov, with a cavalry raid deep into the enemy positions, made at about 10 o'clock in the morning, pulled back significant French forces. This allowed to weaken the onslaught along the entire front. Platov was able to reach the rear of the French (the Valuevo area), which suspended the offensive in the central direction. Uvarov made an equally successful maneuver in the Bezzubovo area.
The battle of Borodino lasted all day and gradually began to subside only by 6 pm. Another attempt to bypass the Russian positions was successfully repulsed by the soldiers of the Life Guards of the Finnish Regiment in the Utitsky forest. After that, Napoleon gave the order to withdraw to their original positions. The Battle of Borodino lasted more than 12 hours.
Perhaps it would not be an exaggeration to say that the tank battles of World War II are one of its main images. How are the trenches an image of the First World War or nuclear missiles of the post-war confrontation between the socialist and capitalist camps. Actually, this is not surprising, since the tank battles of World War II largely determined its nature and course.
Not the last merit in this belongs to one of the main ideologists and theorists of motorized warfare, the German General Heinz Guderian. He largely owns the initiatives of the most powerful blows with a single fist of the troops, thanks to which the Nazi forces achieved such dizzying successes on the European and African continents for more than two years. The tank battles of the Second World War especially gave brilliant results at its first stage, defeating outdated morally Polish equipment in record time. It was Guderian's divisions that ensured the breakthrough of the German armies near Sedan and the successful occupation of French and Belgian territories. Only the so-called "Dunker miracle" saved the remnants of the French and British armies from total defeat, allowing them to reorganize in the future and protect England in the sky at first and prevent the Nazis from concentrating absolutely all their military power in the east. Let's take a closer look at the three largest tank battles of this whole massacre.
Prokhorovka, tank battle
Tank battles of World War II: the battle of Senno
This episode took place at the very beginning of the German invasion of the territory of the USSR and became an integral part of the Vitebsk battle. After the capture of Minsk, the German units advanced to the confluence of the Dnieper and Dvina, intending to launch an offensive against Moscow from there. From the side of the Soviet state, two combat vehicles numbering more than 900 participated in the battle. The Wehrmacht had at its disposal three divisions and about a thousand serviceable tanks, backed up by aircraft. As a result of the battle on July 6-10, 1941, the Soviet forces lost more than eight hundred of their combat units, which opened up the opportunity for the enemy to continue their advance without changing plans and launch an offensive towards Moscow.
The largest tank battle in history
In fact, the biggest battle took place even earlier! Already in the first days of the Nazi invasion (June 23-30, 1941) between the cities of Brody - Lutsk - Dubno, in Western Ukraine, there was a clash involving more than 3200 tanks. In addition, the number of combat vehicles here was three times greater than near Prokhorovka, and the battle lasted not one day, but a whole week! As a result of the battle, the Soviet corps were literally crushed, the armies of the Southwestern Front suffered a quick and crushing defeat, which opened the way for the enemy to Kyiv, Kharkov and further occupation of Ukraine.
World War II, Great Patriotic War. It was the most brutal and bloody war in human history.
During the period of this massacre, more than 60 million citizens of various countries of the world died. Historians have calculated that every war month, an average of 27,000 tons of bombs and shells fell on the heads of military and civilians on both sides of the front!
Come on today, on Victory Day, let's remember the 10 most formidable battles of World War II.
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It was the largest air battle in history. The aim of the Germans was to gain air superiority over the British Royal Air Force in order to invade the British Isles unhindered. The battle was fought exclusively by combat aircraft of the opposing sides. Germany lost 3,000 of its pilots, England - 1,800 pilots. Over 20,000 British civilians were killed. The defeat of Germany in this battle is considered one of the decisive moments in World War II - it did not allow the elimination of the Western allies of the USSR, which later led to the opening of a second front.
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The longest long battle of World War II. During the naval battles, German submarines tried to sink Soviet and British supply ships and warships. The allies responded in kind. Everyone understood the special significance of this battle - on the one hand, Western weapons and equipment were delivered by sea to the Soviet Union, on the other hand, the UK was supplied with everything necessary mainly by sea - the British needed up to a million tons of all kinds of materials, food, in order to survive and continue the fight . The price of the victory of the members of the anti-Hitler coalition in the Atlantic was huge and terrible - about 50,000 of its sailors died, the same number of German sailors lost their lives.
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This battle began after German troops at the end of World War II made a desperate (and, as history shows, the last) attempt to turn the tide of hostilities in their favor, organizing an offensive operation against the Anglo-American troops in the mountainous and wooded terrain in Belgium under the code called Unternehmen Wacht am Rhein (Watch on the Rhine). Despite all the experience of British and American strategists, the massive German attack caught the Allies by surprise. However, the offensive ultimately failed. Germany in this operation lost more than 100 thousand of its soldiers and officers killed, the Anglo-American allies - about 20 thousand soldiers killed.
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Marshal Zhukov wrote in his memoirs: "When they ask me what I remember most from the last war, I always answer: the battle for Moscow." Hitler considered the capture of Moscow, the capital of the USSR and the largest Soviet city, as one of the main military and political goals of Operation Barbarossa. It is known in German and Western military history as "Operation Typhoon". This battle is divided into two periods: defensive (September 30 - December 4, 1941) and offensive, which consists of 2 stages: the counteroffensive (December 5-6, 1941 - January 7-8, 1942) and the general offensive of the Soviet troops (January 7-10 - April 20, 1942). The losses of the USSR - 926.2 thousand people, the losses of Germany - 581 thousand people.
LANDING OF THE ALLIES IN NORMANDY, OPENING OF THE SECOND FRONT (FROM JUNE 6, 1944 TO JULY 24, 1944)
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This battle, which became part of Operation Overlord, marked the beginning of the deployment of the strategic grouping of the Anglo-American allied forces in Normandy (France). British, American, Canadian and French units took part in the invasion. The landing of the main forces from the Allied warships was preceded by a massive bombardment of German coastal fortifications and the landing of paratroopers and gliders on the positions of selected Wehrmacht units. Allied marines landed on five beaches. Considered one of the largest amphibious operations in history. Both sides lost over 200,000 of their troops.
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The last strategic offensive operation of the armed forces of the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War turned out to be one of the bloodiest. It became possible as a result of a strategic breakthrough of the German front by units of the Red Army that carried out the Vistula-Oder offensive operation. It ended with a complete victory over Nazi Germany and the surrender of the Wehrmacht. During the battles for Berlin, the losses of our army amounted to more than 80 thousand soldiers and officers, the Nazis lost 450 thousand of their military personnel.
In Stalingrad, the course of the world made a sharp turn
In Russian military history, the battle of Stalingrad has always been considered the most outstanding and significant event of the Great Patriotic War and the entire Second World War. The highest assessment of the victory of the Soviet Union in the Battle of Stalingrad is also given by modern world historiography. “At the turn of the century, Stalingrad was recognized as the decisive battle not only of the Second World War, but of the era as a whole,” emphasizes the British historian J. Roberts.
During the Great Patriotic War, there were other equally brilliant Soviet victories - both in terms of their strategic results and in terms of the level of military art. So why does Stalingrad stand out among them? In connection with the 70th anniversary of the Battle of Stalingrad, I would like to reflect on this.
The interests of historical science and the development of cooperation between peoples require that military history be freed from the spirit of confrontation, that scholarly research be subordinated to the interests of deep, truthful and objective coverage of the history of World War II, including the Battle of Stalingrad. This is due to the fact that some people want to falsify the history of the Second World War, "re-war" the war on paper.
Much has been written about the Battle of Stalingrad. Therefore, there is no need to retell its course in detail. Historians and the military rightly wrote that its outcome was due to the increased power of the country and the Red Army by the autumn of 1942, the high level of military leadership of its command cadres, the massive heroism of Soviet soldiers, the unity and selflessness of the entire Soviet people. It was emphasized that in the course of this battle our strategy, operational art and tactics made a new major step forward in their development and were enriched with new provisions.
PLANS OF THE PARTIES FOR 1942
When discussing plans for a summer campaign at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (VGK) in March 1942, the General Staff (Boris Shaposhnikov) and Georgy Zhukov proposed that the transition to strategic defense be considered the main course of action.
Zhukov considered it possible to take private offensive actions only in the zone of the Western Front. Semyon Timoshenko proposed, in addition, to conduct an offensive operation in the Kharkov direction. To the objections of Zhukov and Shaposhnikov regarding this proposal, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Joseph Stalin stated: “We can’t sit on the defensive with our hands folded, we can’t wait until the Germans strike first! We must ourselves deliver a number of preemptive strikes on a broad front and feel the readiness of the enemy.
As a result, it was decided to undertake a number of offensive operations in the Crimea, in the Kharkov region, in the Lgovsk and Smolensk directions, in the regions of Leningrad and Demyansk.
As for the plans of the German command, at one time it was believed that it set as its main goal the capture of Moscow by a deep detour from the south. But in reality, according to the directive of the Fuhrer and the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Germany, Hitler No. 41 of April 5, 1942, the main goal of the German offensive in the summer of 1942 was to seize the Donbass, Caucasian oil and, by disrupting communications in the depths of the country, deprive the USSR of the most important resources coming from these districts.
Firstly, when striking in the south, conditions were created for achieving surprise and more favorable opportunities for achieving success, because in 1942 our Supreme High Command again expected the main enemy strike in the Moscow direction, and the main forces and reserves were concentrated here. Nor was the German disinformation plan "Kremlin" unraveled.
Secondly, when advancing in the Moscow direction, the German troops would have to break through the defenses prepared in advance, in depth with the prospect of protracted hostilities. If in 1941 near Moscow the German Wehrmacht failed to overcome the resistance of the Red Army, which was retreating with heavy losses, then in 1942 it was all the more difficult for the Germans to count on the capture of Moscow. At that time, in the south, in the Kharkov region, as a result of a major defeat of the Soviet troops, the German army was confronted by our significantly weakened forces; it was here that the most vulnerable section of the Soviet front was located.
Thirdly, when the German army delivered the main blow in the Moscow direction and even, at worst, captured Moscow (which was unlikely), the retention by the Soviet troops of economically important regions in the south created the conditions for the continuation of the war and its successful completion.
All this suggests that the strategic plans of the Hitlerite command, in the main, correctly took into account the prevailing situation. But even under this condition, the troops of Germany and its satellites would not have been able to advance so far and reach the Volga, if not for the major mistakes of the Soviet command in assessing the direction of a possible enemy strike, inconsistency and indecision in choosing a method of action. On the one hand, in principle, it was supposed to switch to strategic defense, on the other hand, a number of unprepared and unsupported offensive operations were undertaken. This led to the dispersal of forces, and our army was unprepared for either defense or offensive. Oddly enough, but the Soviet troops again found themselves in the same uncertain position as in 1941.
And in 1942, despite the defeats of 1941, the ideologized cult of the offensive doctrine continued to press so hard, the underestimation of defense, its false understanding were so deeply rooted in the minds of the Soviet command that they were embarrassed as something unworthy for the Red Army and were not resolved in full apply.
In the light of the plans of the parties discussed above, an important aspect is clearly clarified: the Stalingrad strategic operation was an interconnected part of the entire system of strategic actions of the Soviet Armed Forces in 1942. In many military-historical works, the Stalingrad operation was considered in isolation from other operations carried out in the western direction. This also applies to Operation Mars in 1942, the essence of which is most perverted, especially in American historiography.
The main remark boils down to the fact that the main, decisive strategic operation in the autumn and winter of 1942-1943 was not operations in the southwest, but offensive operations carried out in the western strategic direction. The basis for this conclusion is the fact that fewer forces and means were allocated to solve problems in the south than in the western direction. But in reality this is not entirely true, because the southern strategic direction must be taken as a whole, and not only the troops near Stalingrad, including the troops in the North Caucasus and the troops of the Voronezh direction, which were practically directed to the southern direction. In addition, we must take into account the fact that the offensive actions of our troops in the west did not allow the German command to transfer forces to the south. Our main strategic reserves were located southeast of Moscow and could be transferred to the south.
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS ON THE APPROACHES TO STALINGRAD
The second group of questions relates to the first stage of the Battle of Stalingrad (from July 17 to November 18, 1942) and stems from the need for a more objective, critical assessment of defensive battles and operations on the outskirts of Stalingrad. During this period, there were the most omissions and shortcomings in the actions of our command and troops. Military theoretical thought has yet to clarify how our army, under catastrophically difficult conditions, nevertheless managed to restore in the summer of 1942 the almost completely disrupted strategic front in the southwestern direction. It is known that only from July 17 to September 30, 1942, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command sent 50 rifle and cavalry divisions, 33 brigades, including 24 tank brigades, to reinforce the Stalingrad direction.
At the same time, the Soviet command did not plan and did not set the task for the troops to stop the advancing enemy only after retreating to the Volga. It repeatedly demanded that the enemy be stopped at a number of lines even on the distant approaches to Stalingrad. Why was it not possible, despite the large number of reserves, the courage and mass heroism of officers and soldiers, the skillful actions of a number of formations and units? There were, of course, many cases of confusion and panic, especially after the heavy defeats and heavy losses of our troops in May-June 1942. In order for a psychological turning point to occur in the troops, a serious shake-up was needed. And in this regard, the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 227 played its generally positive role, giving a sharp and truthful assessment of the situation and permeated with the main requirement - "Not a step back!" It was a very harsh and extremely rigid document, but forced and necessary in the then prevailing conditions.
Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus preferred captivity to suicide.
The main reason for the failure of a number of defensive battles on the outskirts of Stalingrad was that the Soviet command repeated the mistakes of 1941 in organizing strategic defense.
After each major breakthrough of the German army, instead of a sober assessment of the situation and making a decision on defense at one or another advantageous line, where the retreating troops would retreat with battles and fresh formations from the depths would be pulled up in advance, orders were given to hold the occupied lines at any cost, even when it was impossible . Reserve formations and incoming replenishment on the move were sent into battle, as a rule, to deliver poorly prepared counterattacks and counterattacks. Therefore, the enemy had the opportunity to beat them in parts, and the Soviet troops were deprived of the opportunity to properly gain a foothold and organize defense on new lines.
The nervous reaction to each retreat further aggravated the already difficult, difficult situation and doomed the troops to new retreats.
It should also be recognized that the German troops carried out offensive operations quite skillfully, widely maneuvering and massively using tank and motorized formations in open, tank-accessible terrain. Having met resistance in one sector or another, they quickly changed the direction of their attacks, trying to reach the flank and rear of the Soviet troops, whose maneuverability was much lower.
The setting of unrealistic tasks, the appointment of dates for the start of hostilities and operations without taking into account the minimum necessary time for preparing for their conduct, also made themselves felt when many counterattacks and counterattacks were launched in the course of defensive operations. For example, on September 3, 1942, in connection with the difficult situation in the Stalingrad Front, Stalin sent a telegram to the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters: “Demand from the commander of the troops, standing to the north and north-west of Stalingrad, to immediately strike at the enemy and come to the aid of the Stalingraders.”
There were many such telegrams and demands. It is not difficult for a person who understands at least a little about military affairs to understand their absurdity: how can troops, without minimal training and organization, take and “hit” and go on the offensive. The activity of the defense was of great importance for wearing down the enemy, disrupting and delaying his offensive actions. But counterattacks could be more effective with more careful preparation and material support.
In the course of defensive battles on the outskirts of Stalingrad, air defense was extremely weak, and therefore it was necessary to operate in conditions of significant superiority of enemy aircraft, which made it especially difficult for troops to maneuver.
If at the beginning of the war the inexperience of personnel also affected, then after heavy losses in 1941 and in the spring of 1942, the problem of personnel was even more acute, although there were many commanders who managed to harden and gain combat experience. A lot of mistakes, omissions and even cases of criminal irresponsibility were made on the part of the commanders of the fronts, armies, commanders of formations and units. In their totality, they also seriously complicated the situation, but were not as decisive as the miscalculations made by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. Not to mention the fact that the too frequent change of commanders, commanders (only in July-August 1942, three commanders of the Stalingrad Front were replaced) did not allow them to get used to the situation.
The fear of encirclement adversely affected the stability of the troops. Political distrust and repressions against servicemen who, during the retreats in 1941 and in the spring of 1942, were encircled played a detrimental role in this respect. And after the war, officers who were surrounded were not accepted to study at military academies. It seemed to the military-political bodies and the bosses of the NKVD that such an attitude towards the "encirclement" could increase the stamina of the troops. But everything was the opposite - the fear of encirclement reduced the stubbornness of the troops in the defense. At the same time, it was not taken into account that, as a rule, the most staunchly defending troops fell into the encirclement, often as a result of the retreat of their neighbors. It was this most selfless part of the military that was persecuted. No one was held responsible for this wild and criminal incompetence.
FEATURES OF THE STALINGRAD OFFENSIVE OPERATION
From the experience of the second stage of the Battle of Stalingrad (from November 19, 1942 to February 2, 1943), when the troops of the Southwestern, Don and Stalingrad fronts carried out a counteroffensive, important conclusions and lessons flow from the preparation and conduct of offensive operations to encircle and destroy the enemy.
The strategic plan of this counter-offensive was to encircle and destroy a group of German fascists from the area south of Stalingrad in the general direction to Kalach troops and their satellites (Romanian, Italian, Hungarian troops) east of Stalingrad. Long-range aviation and the Volga flotilla also took part in the operation.
Different points of view are expressed as to who owns the initial idea of a counteroffensive with encirclement and destruction of the main enemy forces. Khrushchev, Eremenko, and many others claimed this. Speaking objectively, this idea in its general form, as many participants in the war recall, literally “was in the air,” because the very configuration of the front already suggested the need to strike on the flanks of the enemy grouping under the command of Friedrich Paulus.
But the main, most difficult task was how to concretize and implement this idea, taking into account the current situation, how to gather and concentrate the necessary forces and means in time and organize their actions, where exactly to direct strikes and with what tasks. It can be considered an established fact that the main idea of this plan, of course, belongs to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, and above all to Georgy Zhukov, Alexander Vasilevsky and the General Staff. Another thing is that it was born on the basis of proposals, meetings and conversations with generals and officers of the fronts.
In general, it must be said that the level of military skill of command personnel and staffs, the combat skill of all personnel in the preparation and conduct of offensive operations at the second stage of the Battle of Stalingrad was significantly higher than in all previous offensive operations. Many methods of preparing and conducting combat operations, having appeared here for the first time (not always in their finished form), were then used with great success in the operations of 1943-1945.
Near Stalingrad, the massive use of forces and means in the directions chosen for the offensive was carried out with great success, although not yet to the same extent as in the operations of 1944-1945. So, on the Southwestern Front, in the breakthrough section of 22 km (9% of the entire width of the strip), out of 18 rifle divisions, 9 were concentrated; on the Stalingrad front on the 40 km section (9%) out of 12 divisions - 8; in addition, 80% of all tanks and up to 85% of artillery were concentrated in these areas. However, the density of artillery was only 56 guns and mortars per 1 km of the breakthrough area, while in subsequent operations it was 200–250 or more. In general, the secrecy of preparation and the suddenness of the transition to the offensive were achieved.
In essence, for the first time during the war, not only thorough planning of operations was carried out, but also painstaking work on the ground was carried out to the required extent with commanders of all levels to prepare for combat operations, organize interaction, combat, rear and technical support. The reconnaissance succeeded, albeit incompletely, in revealing the enemy's fire system, which made it possible to carry out a more reliable fire defeat than was the case in previous offensive operations.
For the first time, an artillery and air offensive was used in full, although not everything was sufficiently clearly worked out in the methods of artillery preparation and attack support.
For the first time, before an offensive on a broad front, reconnaissance in combat was carried out in the zones of all armies by forward subunits in order to clarify the location of the enemy's forward edge and system of fire. But in the bands of some armies, it was carried out two to three days, and in the 21st and 57th armies - five days before the start of the offensive, which under other circumstances could reveal the beginning of the offensive, and the obtained data on the enemy’s fire system could become significantly outdated .
Near Stalingrad, for the first time, during a major offensive operation, new infantry combat formations were used in accordance with the requirements of the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 306 - with a one-echelon construction of not only subunits, units, but also formations. Such a formation reduced the losses of troops and made it possible to more fully use infantry firepower. But at the same time, the absence of second echelons made it difficult to build up efforts in a timely manner to develop the offensive in depth. This was one of the reasons why the infantry divisions of the first echelon failed to break through the enemy defenses; already at a depth of 3–4 km, tank corps had to be brought into battle, which, under the then prevailing situation, was a necessary measure. The experience of these and subsequent offensive operations showed that in regiments and divisions, when possible, it is imperative to create second echelons.
The volume of material and technical support for the troops has increased significantly. By the beginning of the counteroffensive, 8 million artillery shells and mines were concentrated on three fronts. For example: in 1914 the entire Russian army had 7 million shells.
But if we compare it with the needs of fire damage, then the November offensive operations of 1942 were relatively insufficiently provided with ammunition - an average of 1.7-3.7 ammunition; Southwestern Front - 3.4; Don - 1.7; Stalingrad - 2. For example, in the Belorussian or Vistula-Oder operations, the supply of fronts with ammunition was up to 4.5 ammunition.
Regarding the second stage of the Battle of Stalingrad, connected with the actions of the troops to destroy the encircled enemy grouping and develop an offensive on the external front, two questions arise, on which different opinions are expressed.
Firstly, some historians and military experts believe that a serious flaw in the Soviet counter-offensive operation near Stalingrad is the fact that a large gap has formed between the encirclement of the enemy grouping and its destruction, while the classical position of military art says that the encirclement and destruction of the enemy should be one a continuous process, which was subsequently achieved in the Belarusian, Yasso-Kishinev and some other operations. But what they managed to do near Stalingrad was a great achievement for that time, especially if we remember that in the offensive near Moscow, near Demyansk and in other areas it was not even possible to encircle the enemy, and near Kharkov in the spring of 1942, the Soviet troops surrounding the enemy, they themselves were surrounded and defeated.
During the counter-offensive near Stalingrad, on the one hand, all the necessary measures were not taken to dismember and destroy the enemy during his encirclement, although one must also take into account the large size of the territory on which the encircled enemy was located, and the high density of his groupings. On the other hand, the presence of large enemy forces on the outer front, seeking to release the encircled 6th Army of Paulus, did not make it possible to concentrate sufficient forces to quickly eliminate the enemy troops encircled near Stalingrad.
In Stalingrad, the battle was for every house.
The headquarters of the Supreme High Command belatedly decided to unite the control of all troops engaged in the destruction of the encircled grouping in the hands of one front. Only in mid-December 1942, a directive was received on the transfer of all troops involved near Stalingrad to the Don Front.
Secondly, how legitimate was the decision of the Supreme Command Headquarters to send the 2nd Guards Army of Rodion Malinovsky to defeat the Erich Manstein group in the Kotelnikovsky direction. As you know, the 2nd Guards Army was originally intended to operate as part of the Southwestern Front, then, with a change in the situation, it was decided to transfer it to the Don Front to participate in the destruction of the encircled enemy grouping. But with the appearance in the Kotelnikovsky direction of the enemy army group "Don" under the command of Manstein, the Supreme Command Headquarters, at the request of General Eremenko, a new decision was made - to transfer the 2nd Guards Army to the Stalingrad Front for operations in the Kotelnikovsky direction. This proposal was also supported by Vasilevsky, who was at that time at the command post of the Don Front. Rokossovsky continued to insist on the transfer of the 2nd Guards Army to the Don Front in order to accelerate the destruction of the encircled enemy grouping. Nikolai Voronov also opposed the transfer of the 2nd Guards Army to the Stalingrad Front. After the war, he called this decision a "terrible miscalculation" of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.
But a careful analysis of the situation at that time, with the involvement of enemy documents that became known to us after the war, shows that the decision of the Supreme Command Headquarters to send the 2nd Guards Army to defeat Manstein was apparently more appropriate. There was no guarantee that with the inclusion of the 2nd Guards Army in the Don Front, it would be possible to quickly deal with the encircled Paulus group. Subsequent events confirmed how difficult the task was to destroy 22 enemy divisions, numbering up to 250 thousand people. There was a big, insufficiently justified risk that a breakthrough of the Manstein grouping and a strike against it by the Paulus army could lead to the release of the encircled enemy grouping and disruption of the further offensive of the troops of the Southwestern and Voronezh fronts.
ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BATTLE OF STALINGRAD FOR THE SECOND WORLD WAR
In world historiography, there is no common understanding of the significance of the Battle of Stalingrad for the course and outcome of World War II. After the end of the war, statements appeared in Western literature that not the Battle of Stalingrad, but the victory of the Allied forces at El Alamein was the most significant turning point in the course of World War II. Of course, for the sake of objectivity, it must be admitted that the Allies won a major victory near El Alamein, which made a significant contribution to the defeat of the common enemy. But still, the battle of El Alamein cannot be compared with the Battle of Stalingrad.
If we talk about the military-strategic side of things, the Battle of Stalingrad took place on a vast territory, almost 100 thousand square meters. km, and the operation near El Alamein - on a relatively narrow African coast.
More than 2.1 million people, over 26,000 guns and mortars, 2,100 tanks and over 2,500 warplanes took part in certain stages of the battle near Stalingrad on both sides. The German command for the battles near Stalingrad attracted 1 million 11 thousand people, 10,290 guns, 675 tanks and 1216 aircraft. While near El Alamein, Rommel's African corps had only 80 thousand people, 540 tanks, 1200 guns and 350 aircraft.
The battle of Stalingrad lasted 200 days and nights (from July 17, 1942 to February 2, 1943), and the battle of El Alamein lasted 11 days (from October 23 to November 4, 1942), not to mention the incomparability of tension and bitterness of the two these battles. If at El Alamein the fascist bloc lost 55 thousand people, 320 tanks and about 1 thousand guns, then at Stalingrad the losses of Germany and its satellites were 10-15 times greater. About 144 thousand people were taken prisoner. The 330,000th grouping of troops was destroyed. The losses of the Soviet troops were also very large - irretrievable losses amounted to 478,741 people. Many of the soldiers' lives could have been saved. Yet our sacrifices were not in vain.
The military-political significance of the events that took place is incomparable. The Battle of Stalingrad took place in the main European theater of operations, where the fate of the war was decided. The El Alamein operation took place in North Africa in a secondary theater of operations; her influence on the course of events could be indirect. The attention of the whole world was then riveted not to El Alamein, but to Stalingrad.
The victory at Stalingrad had a tremendous impact on the liberation movement of the peoples of the whole world. A mighty wave of the national liberation movement swept through all the countries that fell under the yoke of Nazism.
In turn, the major defeats and huge losses of the Wehrmacht near Stalingrad sharply worsened the military-political and economic situation in Germany, put it before the deepest crisis. The damage of enemy tanks and vehicles in the Battle of Stalingrad was equal, for example, to six months of their production by German factories, guns - four months, and mortars and small arms - two months. And in order to make up for such large losses, the German military industry was forced to work with extremely high voltage. The crisis of human reserves sharply worsened.
The catastrophe on the Volga left its noticeable imprint on the morale of the Wehrmacht. In the German army, the number of cases of desertion and disobedience to commanders increased, military crimes became more frequent. After Stalingrad, the number of death sentences handed down by Nazi justice to German servicemen increased significantly. German soldiers began to fight with less persistence, they began to be afraid of attacks from the flanks and encirclement. Among some politicians and representatives of senior officers, oppositional moods to Hitler appeared.
The victory of the Red Army at Stalingrad shook the fascist military bloc, had a depressing effect on the satellites of Germany, and caused panic and irresolvable contradictions in their camp. The ruling leaders of Italy, Romania, Hungary and Finland, in order to save themselves from the impending catastrophe, began to look for pretexts for withdrawing from the war, ignoring Hitler's orders to send troops to the Soviet-German front. Since 1943, not only individual soldiers and officers, but also entire units and units of the Romanian, Hungarian and Italian armies surrendered to the Red Army. Relations between the Wehrmacht and the Allied armies escalated.
The crushing defeat of the fascist hordes at Stalingrad had a sobering effect on the ruling circles of Japan and Turkey. They abandoned their intentions to go to war against the USSR.
Under the influence of the successes achieved by the Red Army at Stalingrad and in subsequent operations of the winter campaign of 1942-1943, Germany's isolation in the international arena increased and at the same time the international prestige of the USSR increased. In 1942-1943, the Soviet government established diplomatic relations with Austria, Canada, Holland, Cuba, Egypt, Colombia, Ethiopia, and resumed previously interrupted diplomatic relations with Luxembourg, Mexico and Uruguay. Relations with the London-based governments of Czechoslovakia and Poland improved. On the territory of the USSR, the formation of military units and formations of a number of countries of the anti-Hitler coalition began - the French aviation squadron "Normandie", the 1st Czechoslovak infantry brigade, the 1st Polish division named after Tadeusz Kosciuszko. All of them subsequently joined the fight against the Nazi troops on the Soviet-German front.
All this suggests that it was the battle of Stalingrad, and not the operation of El Alamein, that broke the back of the Wehrmacht and marked the beginning of a radical turning point in World War II in favor of the anti-Hitler coalition. More precisely, Stalingrad predetermined this radical change.
