Ice battle on Lake Peipus. What year was the Battle of the Ice

Secrets of the Ice Battle

In 1240 the knights Livonian Order commanded by vice master Andreas von Velven launched a great offensive against Rus'. Together with the Germans, the Pskov prince Yaroslav Vladimirovich (nephew of Prince Mstislav the Udaly), who had defected to them, sympathized with the "Latins", was also walking. The Germans took Izborsk. Pskov army came out to meet the Germans, but was defeated. The Pskov governor Gavrila Gorislavovich died. It is curious that the German chroniclers made of Gavrila Gorislavovich first Gernolt, and then Prince Yaropolk, forced him to live after death and surrender Pskov to the Germans.

In fact, the knights besieged Pskov for about a week, and then the Pskovites agreed to all the demands of the enemy and gave their children as hostages. A German garrison was sent to Pskov. However, the Germans were not satisfied with the Pskov lands, and together with the detachments of the Chukhons attacked the Novgorod volost (Votskaya Pyatina). In the Koporsky churchyard, 16 kilometers from the Gulf of Finland, the knights built a powerful fortress, and 35 kilometers from Novgorod captured the town of Tesov.

In such a situation, the Novgorodians needed a prince with his retinue. TO Grand Duke Vladimir Ambassadors were urgently sent to Yaroslav Vsevolodovich to ask him to give his son to Novgorod - Prince Alexander. However, Yaroslav Vsevolodovich gave them his other son, 20-year-old Andrei. Novgorodians thought and refused, they needed only Alexander. In the end, Yaroslav Vsevolodovich conceded and sent Alexander to them, but on more stringent conditions.

In 1241 Alexander Yaroslavovich arrived in Novgorod. To begin with, Alexander reminded the townspeople of old grievances and hung up "many seditious ones." Then Alexander laid siege to the fortress of Koporye and took it. The prince sent some of the captured Germans to Novgorod, and released some (presumably for a good ransom), but he hung all the Chud from the Koporsky garrison. However, Alexander refrained from further actions against the knights until the arrival of a strong Suzdal squad led by his younger brother Andrei.

In 1242, Alexander and Andrei Yaroslavovichi took Pskov. During the assault, 70 knights were killed. According to Livonian chronicle, Alexander ordered to "torture" six knights in Pskov.

From Pskov, Alexander moved into the possessions Livonian Order. Russian forward detachment under the command Novgorodian Domash Tverdislavovich fell into a German ambush and was defeated.

Having received news of the death of his avant-garde, Prince Alexander led the army to the ice. Lake Peipus- near the Uzmeni tract at the "Voroneya Kameni". At dawn on April 5, 1242, the German-Chukhon army formed a closed phalanx in the form of a wedge; in Europe, such a system was often called the "iron pig". At the top of the wedge were the best knights of the order.

The German wedge broke through the center of the Russian army, individual warriors fled. However, the Russians delivered strong flank counterattacks and pincered the enemy. The Germans began to retreat. The Russians drove them at a distance of about 8 kilometers to the opposite - the Sobolitsky coast. In a number of places, the ice broke under the crowded Germans, and many of them ended up in the water.

ABOUT Ice Battle of 1242 many books have been written in which the most detailed details of the battle, maps, diagrams, etc. are given. With our historians, as always, everything is clear and everything is laid out on the shelves. However, in fact, many questions still remain, among which the most important ones are: how many Germans ended up on the ice of the lake, where exactly did the battle take place, and, finally, who became the winner in the battle?

So, Novgorod First Chronicle reports that 400 knights were killed in the battle, and 50 knights were taken prisoner, while Chudi were beaten "without number". Western historians, such as John Fennel, question the authenticity of the chronicle: “If the chronicler considers these 450 people to be knights, then the figure given is undoubtedly a major exaggeration, since at the time the battle took place, two orders had a little more than a hundred knights."

The modern historian Anatoly Bakhtin claims that all chronicle information about the battle was a falsification: “There was no mind-blowing pandemonium of the warring parties there, there was also no mass exodus of people under the ice. In those days, the armor of the Teutons was comparable in weight to the weapons of Russian warriors. The same chain mail, shield, sword. Just instead of the traditional Slavic shishak defended the head of brother-knights bucket helmet. There were no plate horses in those days. In none of the existing chronicles is it possible to find a story about cracked ice on Lake Peipsi, about the participants in the battle who went under water.

Another outright hoax that did a disservice is the number of participants in the battle, Bakhtin summarizes. “In compiling the Russian chronicles of that time, “image makers” certainly took part, who, in order to recognize the significance of the victory or explain the reasons for the defeat, did not bother themselves with pedantry. The number of warriors in those days was indicated in one word "beschisla", that is, a myriad. This wording gave rise to pseudo-historians in Soviet times to increase the number of participants in the battle on Lake Peipsi by an order of magnitude.

Unrealistic and unfounded figures sounded like an anecdote: eighteen thousand from the Russians, fifteen from the order. By the end of the thirties of the XIII century, the entire population of Novgorod, including women, the elderly and children, amounted to just over fourteen thousand people. Therefore, the maximum number of militia that Alexander could call under his banner could not exceed two thousand warriors. And the Teutonic Order, most of whose members at that time shed their own and other people's blood in Palestine for the Holy Sepulcher, consisted of approximately two hundred and eighty knight brothers. No more than two dozen Teutons came out to fight directly on the ice of Lake Peipus. The rest of the thousandth mass that opposed the Russian squad were Livonians and Chuds, the ancestors of today's Estonians.

Supporters of the "main line" are still faithful to the traditions of historians of the tsarist and Stalinist times. For example, Nikolai Borisov, Doctor of Historical Sciences, prepared the textbook "History of Russia from ancient times to the end of the 17th century", in which the events are described as follows:

“With his favorite technique - a surprise attack, “exile” - Nevsky took possession of the city. After that, without wasting time, he went to Izborsk and further, "to the German land." Upon learning that a large knightly army was coming towards him, Alexander retreated to Lake Peipsi. Probably, the prince made this withdrawal intentionally. A bold idea already appeared in his head: to fight the enemy on the ice of the lake.

... On the morning of April 5, 1242, his army met the enemy, lining up on the ice Lake Peipus, "on Uzmeni, at the Raven Stone". The crusaders lined up in a triangle, the tip of which was directed at the Russians. At the ends and sides of this living triangle - the "great pig", in the ironic expression of the Russian chroniclers - horsemen clad in armor stood up, and lightly armed warriors moved inside it. Showering the enemy with a rain of arrows, Alexander's warriors parted, letting the "great pig" through, and then furiously hit its flanks. A hard and bloody battle began.

Soon, the ice, which had weakened by spring - especially thin in this part of the lake, on the channel - began to crack. In some places, unable to withstand the weight of people and war horses, he began to fail. The most noble, wealthy knights were the first to go to the bottom: their heavy armor weighed two or three pounds. Having fallen from his horse, the knight, clad in armor, could no longer get up without outside help. The surviving knights fled. Alexander's victory was complete. About 500 Germans died in the battle, and he brought 50 noble prisoners with him to Pskov "...

Based on numerous variants of the history of the battle, modern experts in the tactics and strategy of medieval wars draw far-reaching conclusions. For example, these: “Having put up long spears, the Germans attacked the center (“forehead”) of the Russian battle order. Here the banners of the brothers penetrated the ranks of the shooters (guard regiment). Swords could be heard clanging, and helmets could be seen being cut, the dead were falling on both sides.

A Russian chronicler writes about the breakthrough of the Novgorod regiments by the enemy: “The Germans also made their way through the regiments like a pig.” However, having stumbled upon the steep shore of the lake, the inactive, armored knights could not develop their success. On the contrary, the knightly cavalry crowded together, as the rear ranks of the knights pushed the front ranks, which had nowhere to turn around for battle.

The flanks of the Russian battle order ("wings") did not allow the Germans to build on the success of the operation. The German "wedge" was clamped in pincers. At this time, Alexander's squad struck from the rear and completed the encirclement of the enemy. "The brothers' army was surrounded."

Warriors who had special spears with hooks pulled the knights off their horses; warriors armed with knives - "boots" - disabled horses, after which the knights became easy prey. “And that slash of evil and great German and people and betrusk from a copy of the breaking and the sound from the sword cut, as if the lake would freeze to move, and you couldn’t see the ice, covered with blood.” The ice began to crack under the weight of the heavily armed knights, knocked together. Some knights managed to break through the encirclement and tried to flee, but many of them drowned.

And the people of Vladimir, led by Alexander Nevsky, on the one hand, and the army of the Livonian Order, on the other hand.

The opposing armies met on the morning of April 5, 1242. The Rhymed Chronicle describes the moment of the beginning of the battle as follows:

Thus, the news of the "Chronicle" about the order of battle of the Russians as a whole is combined with the reports of the Russian chronicles about the allocation of a separate rifle regiment in front of the center of the main forces (since 1185).

In the center, the Germans broke through the Russian line:

But then the troops of the Teutonic Order were surrounded by the Russians from the flanks and destroyed, and other German detachments retreated to avoid the same fate: the Russians pursued those fleeing on the ice for 7 miles. It is noteworthy that, unlike the battle of Omovzha in 1234, sources close to the time of the battle do not report that the Germans fell through the ice; according to Donald Ostrovsky, this information penetrated into later sources from the description of the 1016 battle between Yaroslav and Svyatopolk in The Tale of Bygone Years and The Tale of Boris and Gleb.

In the same year, the Teutonic Order concluded a peace treaty with Novgorod, relinquishing all their recent seizures, not only in Rus', but also in Letgol. There was also an exchange of prisoners. Only 10 years later, the Teutons tried to recapture Pskov.

Scale and significance of the battle

The Chronicle says that in the battle there were 60 Russians for every German (which is recognized as an exaggeration), and that 20 knights were killed and 6 captured in the battle. “Chronicle of the Grand Masters” (“Die jungere Hochmeisterchronik”, sometimes translated as “Chronicle of the Teutonic Order”), an official history of the Teutonic Order, written much later, speaks of the death of 70 order knights (literally “70 order gentlemen”, “seuentich Ordens Herenn” ), but unites the dead during the capture of Pskov by Alexander and on Lake Peipsi.

According to the point of view traditional in Russian historiography, this battle, together with the victories of Prince Alexander over the Swedes (July 15, 1240 on the Neva) and over the Lithuanians (in 1245 near Toropets, near Lake Zhiztsa and near Usvyat), was of great importance for Pskov and Novgorod, holding back the pressure of three serious enemies from the west - at the very time when the rest of Russia was greatly weakened by the Mongol invasion. In Novgorod, the Battle on the Ice, together with the Neva victory over the Swedes, was remembered at litanies in all Novgorod churches back in the 16th century. In Soviet historiography, the Battle of the Ice was considered one of the largest battles in the entire history of German-knightly aggression in the Baltic states, and the number of troops on Lake Peipsi was estimated at 10-12 thousand people at the Order and 15-17 thousand people from Novgorod and their allies (the last figure corresponds to the assessment by Henry of Latvia of the number of Russian troops when describing their campaigns in the Baltic states in the 1210-1220s), that is, approximately at the same level as in the Battle of Grunwald () - up to 11 thousand people at the Order and 16-17 thousand people in the Polish-Lithuanian army. The Chronicle, as a rule, reports on the small number of Germans in those battles that they lost, but even in it the Battle on the Ice is unambiguously described as a defeat of the Germans, in contrast, for example, to the Battle of Rakovor ().

As a rule, the minimum estimates of the number of troops and losses of the Order in the battle correspond to the historical role assigned by specific researchers to this battle and the figure of Alexander Nevsky as a whole (for more details, see Estimates of the activities of Alexander Nevsky). In general, V. O. Klyuchevsky and M. N. Pokrovsky did not mention the battle in their writings.

The English researcher J. Fennel believes that the significance of the Battle of the Ice (and the Battle of the Neva) is greatly exaggerated: “Alexander did only what the numerous defenders of Novgorod and Pskov did before him and what many did after him - namely, they rushed to protect the extended and vulnerable borders from invaders. Russian professor I. N. Danilevsky agrees with this opinion. He notes, in particular, that the battle was inferior in scale to the battle of Saule (1236), in which the master of the order and 48 knights were killed by the Lithuanians, and the battle of Rakovor; contemporary sources even describe the Battle of the Neva in more detail and attach more importance to it. However, in Russian historiography, it is not customary to remember the defeat at Saul, since the Pskovites took part in it on the side of the defeated knights.

German historians believe that while fighting on the western borders, Alexander Nevsky did not pursue any coherent political program, but successes in the West provided some compensation for the horrors of the Mongol invasion. Many researchers believe that the very scale of the threat that the West posed to Rus' is exaggerated. On the other hand, L. N. Gumilyov, on the contrary, believed that not the Tatar-Mongol "yoke", but precisely the Catholic Western Europe, represented by the Teutonic Order and the Archbishopric of Riga, was a mortal threat to the very existence of Rus', and therefore the role of the victories of Alexander Nevsky in Russian history is especially great.

The battle on the ice played a role in the formation of the Russian national myth, in which Alexander Nevsky was assigned the role of "defender of Orthodoxy and the Russian land" in the face of the "Western threat"; victory in battle was seen as justification for the prince's political moves in the 1250s. The cult of Nevsky was especially actualized in the Stalin era, serving as a kind of visual historical example for the cult of Stalin himself. The cornerstone of the Stalinist myth about Alexander Yaroslavich and the Battle of the Ice was a film by Sergei Eisenstein (see below) .

On the other hand, it is wrong to assume that the Battle on the Ice became popular in the scientific community and among the general public only after the appearance of Eisenstein's film. “Schlacht auf dem Eise”, “Schlacht auf dem Peipussee”, “Prœlium glaciale” [Battle on ice (us.), Battle on Lake Peipus (German), Ice battle (lat.)] - such well-established concepts are found in Western sources long before the director's work. This battle was and will forever remain in the memory of the Russian people, just like, say, the battle of Borodino, which, according to a strict view, cannot be called victorious - the Russian army left the battlefield. And for us this great battle, which played an important role in the outcome of the war.

The memory of the battle

Movies

Music

• The musical score for the Eisenstein film, composed by Sergei Prokofiev, is a cantata celebrating the events of the battle.

Literature

monuments

Monument to the squads of Alexander Nevsky on Mount Sokolikh

Monument to Alexander Nevsky and Poklonny Cross

The bronze worship cross was cast in St. Petersburg at the expense of patrons of the Baltic Steel Group (A. V. Ostapenko). The prototype was the Novgorod Alekseevsky cross. The author of the project is A. A. Seleznev. A bronze sign was cast under the direction of D. Gochiyaev by the foundry workers of ZAO NTTsKT, architects B. Kostygov and S. Kryukov. During the implementation of the project, fragments from the lost wooden cross by sculptor V. Reshchikov were used.

Commemorative cross for prince "s armed force of Alexander Nevsky (Kobylie Gorodishe).jpg

Memorial cross to the squads of Alexander Nevsky

Monument in honor of the 750th anniversary of the battle

Thumbnail creation error: File not found

Monument in honor of the 750th anniversary of the battle (fragment)

In philately and on coins

Data

In connection with the incorrect calculation of the date of the battle according to the new style, the Day of Military Glory of Russia - the Day of the victory of Russian soldiers of Prince Alexander Nevsky over the crusaders (established by Federal Law No. 32-FZ of March 13, 1995 "On the days of military glory and memorable dates of Russia") is celebrated on 18 April instead of the correct one according to the new style on April 12. The difference between the old (Julian) and the new (Gregorian, first introduced in 1582) style in the 13th century would be 7 days (counting from April 5, 1242), and the difference between them of 13 days takes place only in the period 03/14/1900-03/14 .2100 (new style). In other words, Victory Day on Lake Peipsi (April 5, old style) is celebrated on April 18, which really falls on April 5, old style, but only now (1900-2099).

At the end of the 20th century in Russia and some republics of the former USSR, many political organizations celebrated the unofficial holiday Day of the Russian Nation (April 5), designed to become the date of unity of all patriotic forces.

On April 22, 2012, on the occasion of the 770th anniversary of the Battle on the Ice in the village of Samolva, Gdov District, Pskov Region, the Museum of the History of the Expedition of the USSR Academy of Sciences to clarify the location of the Battle on the Ice of 1242 was opened.

see also

Write a review on the article "Battle on the Ice"

Notes

2. Razin E. A.
3. Uzhankov A.
6. Battle on the Ice of 1242: Proceedings of a comprehensive expedition to clarify the location of the Battle on the Ice. - M.-L., 1966. - 253 p. - S. 60-64.
7. . Its date is considered more preferable, since, in addition to the number, it also contains a link to the day of the week and church holidays (the day of memory of the martyr Claudius and praise of the Virgin). In the Pskov Chronicles, the date is April 1.
8. Donald Ostrowski(English) // Russian History/Histoire Russe. - 2006. - Vol. 33, no. 2-3-4. - P. 304-307.
9. .
10. .
11. Heinrich of Latvia. .
12. Razin E. A. .
13. Danilevsky, I.. Polit.ru. April 15, 2005.
14. Dittmar Dahlmann. Der russische Sieg über die "teutonische Ritter" auf der Peipussee 1242// Schlachtenmythen: Ereignis - Erzählung - Erinnerung. Herausgegeben von Gerd Krumeich and Susanne Brandt. (Europäische Geschichtsdarstellungen. Herausgegeben von Johannes Laudage. - Band 2.) - Wien-Köln-Weimar: Böhlau Verlag, 2003. - S. 63-76.
15. Werner Philipp. Heiligkeit und Herrschaft in der Vita Alexander Nevskijs // Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte. - Band 18. - Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1973. - S. 55-72.
16. Janet Martin. Medieval Russia 980-1584. second edition. - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. - P. 181.
17. . gumilevica.kulichki.net. Retrieved 22 September 2016.
20. // Gdovskaya dawn: newspaper. - 30.3.2007.
24. (unavailable link from 25-05-2013 (2103 days) - story , copy) //Official site of the Pskov region, July 12, 2006]
27. .
28. .
29. .

Literature

• Lipitsky S.V. Battle on the Ice. - M .: Military Publishing House, 1964. - 68 p. - (The heroic past of our Motherland).
• Mansikka V.J. Life of Alexander Nevsky: Analysis of editions and text. - St. Petersburg, 1913. - "Monuments of ancient writing." - Issue. 180.
• Life of Alexander Nevsky / Preparatory work. text, translation and comm. V. I. Okhotnikova // Monuments of literature of Ancient Rus': XIII century. - M.: Fiction, 1981.
• Begunov Yu.K. Monument of Russian literature of the XIII century: "The word about the destruction of the Russian land" - M.-L.: Nauka, 1965.
• Pashuto V. T. Alexander Nevsky - M .: Young Guard, 1974. - 160 p. - Series "Life of remarkable people".
• Karpov A. Yu. Alexander Nevsky - M.: Young Guard, 2010. - 352 p. - Series "Life of remarkable people".
• Khitrov M. Holy Blessed Grand Duke Alexander Yaroslavovich Nevsky. Detailed biography. - Minsk: Panorama, 1991. - 288 p. - Reprint ed.
• Klepinin N. A. Holy Blessed and Grand Duke Alexander Nevsky. - St. Petersburg: Aleteyya, 2004. - 288 p. - Series "Slavonic Library".
• Prince Alexander Nevsky and his era: Research and materials / Ed. Yu. K. Begunov and A. N. Kirpichnikov. - St. Petersburg: Dmitry Bulanin, 1995. - 214 p.
• Fennell J. The Crisis of Medieval Rus'. 1200-1304 - M.: Progress, 1989. - 296 p.
• Battle on the Ice of 1242: Proceedings of a comprehensive expedition to clarify the location of the Battle on the Ice / Ed. ed. G. N. Karaev. - M.-L.: Nauka, 1966. - 241 p.
• Tikhomirov M. N. About the place of the Battle of the Ice // Tikhomirov M. N. Ancient Rus': Sat. Art. / Ed. A. V. Artsikhovsky and M. T. Belyavsky, with the participation of N. B. Shelamanov. - M .: Nauka, 1975. - S. 368-374. - 432 p. - 16,000 copies.(in lane, superregional)
• Nesterenko A. N. Alexander Nevsky. Who won the Ice Battle., 2006. Olma-Press.

Links

An excerpt characterizing the Battle of the Ice

His illness followed its own physical order, but what Natasha called it happened to him, happened to him two days before Princess Mary's arrival. It was that last moral struggle between life and death in which death triumphed. It was an unexpected realization that he still cherished life, which seemed to him in love for Natasha, and the last, subdued fit of horror before the unknown.
It was in the evening. He was, as usual after dinner, in a slight feverish state, and his thoughts were extremely clear. Sonya was sitting at the table. He dozed off. Suddenly a feeling of happiness swept over him.
“Ah, she came in!” he thought.
Indeed, Natasha, who had just entered with inaudible steps, was sitting in Sonya's place.
Ever since she'd followed him, he'd always had that physical sensation of her closeness. She was sitting on an armchair, sideways to him, blocking the light of the candle from him, and knitting a stocking. (She had learned to knit stockings ever since Prince Andrei had told her that no one knows how to look after the sick as well as old nannies who knit stockings, and that there is something soothing in knitting a stocking.) Her thin fingers quickly fingered from time to time spokes colliding, and the thoughtful profile of her lowered face was clearly visible to him. She made a move - the ball rolled from her knees. She shuddered, looked back at him, and shielding the candle with her hand, with a careful, flexible and precise movement, bent over, picked up the ball and sat down in her former position.
He looked at her without moving, and saw that after her movement she needed to take a deep breath, but she did not dare to do this and carefully caught her breath.
In the Trinity Lavra they talked about the past, and he told her that if he were alive, he would thank God forever for his wound, which brought him back to her; but since then they have never talked about the future.
“Could it or couldn’t it be? he thought now, looking at her and listening to the light steely sound of the spokes. “Is it really only then that fate brought me so strangely together with her in order for me to die? .. Was it possible that the truth of life was revealed to me only so that I would live in a lie?” I love her more than anything in the world. But what should I do if I love her? he said, and he suddenly groaned involuntarily, out of a habit he had acquired during his suffering.
Hearing this sound, Natasha put down her stocking, leaned closer to him, and suddenly, noticing his luminous eyes, went up to him with a light step and bent down.
- You are not asleep?
- No, I have been looking at you for a long time; I felt when you entered. Nobody like you, but gives me that soft silence... that light. I just want to cry with joy.
Natasha moved closer to him. Her face shone with ecstatic joy.
“Natasha, I love you too much. More than anything else.
- And I? She turned away for a moment. - Why too much? - she said.
- Why too much? .. Well, what do you think, how do you feel to your heart, to your heart's content, will I be alive? What do you think?
- I'm sure, I'm sure! - Natasha almost screamed, with a passionate movement taking him by both hands.
He paused.
- How nice! And taking her hand, he kissed it.
Natasha was happy and excited; and at once she remembered that this was impossible, that he needed calmness.
"But you didn't sleep," she said, suppressing her joy. “Try to sleep…please.”
He released her, shaking her hand, she went to the candle and again sat down in her previous position. Twice she looked back at him, his eyes shining towards her. She gave herself a lesson on the stocking and told herself that until then she would not look back until she finished it.
Indeed, soon after that he closed his eyes and fell asleep. He didn't sleep long and suddenly woke up in a cold sweat.
Falling asleep, he thought about the same thing that he thought about from time to time - about life and death. And more about death. He felt closer to her.
"Love? What is love? he thought. “Love interferes with death. Love is life. Everything, everything that I understand, I understand only because I love. Everything is, everything exists only because I love. Everything is connected by her. Love is God, and to die means for me, a particle of love, to return to the common and eternal source. These thoughts seemed to him comforting. But these were only thoughts. Something was lacking in them, something that was one-sidedly personal, mental - there was no evidence. And there was the same anxiety and uncertainty. He fell asleep.
He saw in a dream that he was lying in the same room in which he actually lay, but that he was not injured, but healthy. Many different persons, insignificant, indifferent, appear before Prince Andrei. He talks to them, argues about something unnecessary. They are going to go somewhere. Prince Andrei vaguely recalls that all this is insignificant and that he has other, most important concerns, but continues to speak, surprising them, with some empty, witty words. Little by little, imperceptibly, all these faces begin to disappear, and everything is replaced by one question about the closed door. He gets up and goes to the door to slide the bolt and lock it. Everything depends on whether or not he has time to lock it up. He walks, in a hurry, his legs do not move, and he knows that he will not have time to lock the door, but all the same, he painfully strains all his strength. And a tormenting fear seizes him. And this fear is the fear of death: it stands behind the door. But at the same time as he helplessly awkwardly crawls to the door, this is something terrible, on the other hand, already, pressing, breaking into it. Something not human - death - is breaking at the door, and we must keep it. He grabs the door, exerting his last efforts - it is no longer possible to lock it - at least to keep it; but his strength is weak, clumsy, and, pressed by the terrible, the door opens and closes again.
Once again, it pressed from there. The last, supernatural efforts are in vain, and both halves opened silently. It has entered, and it is death. And Prince Andrew died.
But at the same moment he died, Prince Andrei remembered that he was sleeping, and at the same moment he died, he, having made an effort on himself, woke up.
“Yes, it was death. I died - I woke up. Yes, death is an awakening! - suddenly brightened in his soul, and the veil that had hidden the unknown until now was lifted before his spiritual gaze. He felt, as it were, the release of the previously bound strength in him and that strange lightness that had not left him since then.
When he woke up in a cold sweat, stirred on the sofa, Natasha went up to him and asked what was wrong with him. He did not answer her and, not understanding her, looked at her with a strange look.
This was what happened to him two days before Princess Mary's arrival. From that very day, as the doctor said, the debilitating fever took on a bad character, but Natasha was not interested in what the doctor said: she saw these terrible, more undoubted, moral signs for her.
From that day on, for Prince Andrei, along with the awakening from sleep, the awakening from life began. And in relation to the duration of life, it did not seem to him more slowly than awakening from sleep in relation to the duration of a dream.

There was nothing terrible and sharp in this relatively slow awakening.
His last days and hours passed in an ordinary and simple way. And Princess Marya and Natasha, who did not leave him, felt it. They did not cry, did not shudder, and lately, feeling it themselves, they no longer followed him (he was no longer there, he left them), but for the closest memory of him - for his body. The feelings of both were so strong that they were not affected by the outer, terrible side of death, and they did not find it necessary to exasperate their grief. They did not cry either with him or without him, but they never talked about him among themselves. They felt that they could not put into words what they understood.
They both saw him sinking deeper and deeper, slowly and calmly, away from them somewhere, and both knew that this was how it should be and that it was good.
He was confessed, communed; everyone came to say goodbye to him. When they brought him his son, he put his lips to him and turned away, not because he was hard or sorry (Princess Marya and Natasha understood this), but only because he believed that this was all that was required of him; but when they told him to bless him, he did what was required and looked around, as if asking if there was anything else to be done.
When the last shudders of the body left by the spirit took place, Princess Marya and Natasha were there.
- Is it over?! - said Princess Mary, after his body had been motionless for several minutes, growing cold, lying in front of them. Natasha came up, looked into the dead eyes and hurried to close them. She closed them and did not kiss them, but kissed what was the closest memory of him.
“Where did he go? Where is he now?..”

When the dressed, washed body lay in a coffin on the table, everyone came up to him to say goodbye, and everyone wept.
Nikolushka wept from the pained bewilderment that tore at his heart. The Countess and Sonya wept with pity for Natasha and that he was no more. The old count wept that soon, he felt, he was about to take the same terrible step.
Natasha and Princess Mary were weeping now too, but they were not weeping from their own personal grief; they wept from the reverent tenderness that seized their souls before the consciousness of the simple and solemn mystery of death that took place before them.

The totality of the causes of phenomena is inaccessible to the human mind. But the need to find causes is embedded in the human soul. And the human mind, not delving into the innumerability and complexity of the conditions of phenomena, each of which separately can be represented as a cause, grabs at the first, most understandable approximation and says: here is the cause. In historical events (where the subject of observation is the actions of people), the most primitive rapprochement is the will of the gods, then the will of those people who stand in the most prominent historical place - historical heroes. But one has only to delve into the essence of each historical event, that is, into the activity of the entire mass of people who participated in the event, in order to be convinced that the will of the historical hero not only does not direct the actions of the masses, but is itself constantly guided. It would seem that it is all the same to understand the meaning of a historical event one way or another. But between the man who says that the peoples of the West went to the East because Napoleon wanted it, and the man who says that it happened because it had to happen, there is the same difference that existed between people who said that the land stands firmly and the planets move around it, and those who said that they did not know what the earth was based on, but they knew that there were laws governing the movement of both her and other planets. There are no and cannot be causes of a historical event, except for the single cause of all causes. But there are laws that govern events, partly unknown, partly groping for us. The discovery of these laws is possible only when we completely renounce the search for causes in the will of one person, just as the discovery of the laws of the motion of the planets became possible only when people renounced the representation of the affirmation of the earth.

After the battle of Borodino, the occupation of Moscow by the enemy and burning it, historians recognize the movement of the Russian army from the Ryazan to the Kaluga road and to the Tarutino camp - the so-called flank march behind Krasnaya Pakhra as the most important episode of the war of 1812. Historians attribute the glory of this brilliant feat to various persons and argue about who, in fact, it belongs to. Even foreign, even French, historians recognize the genius of the Russian generals when they speak of this flank march. But why military writers, and after them all, believe that this flank march is a very thoughtful invention of some one person that saved Russia and ruined Napoleon is very difficult to understand. In the first place, it is difficult to understand what is the profoundness and genius of this movement; for in order to guess that the best position of the army (when it is not attacked) is where there is more food, no great mental effort is needed. And everyone, even a stupid thirteen-year-old boy, could easily guess that in 1812 the most advantageous position of the army, after retreating from Moscow, was on the Kaluga road. So, it is impossible to understand, firstly, by what conclusions historians reach the point of seeing something profound in this maneuver. Secondly, it is even more difficult to understand in what exactly historians see this maneuver as saving for the Russians and harmful for the French; for this flank march, under other, preceding, accompanying and subsequent circumstances, could be detrimental to the Russian and saving for the French army. If from the time this movement took place, the position of the Russian army began to improve, then it does not follow from this that this movement was the cause.
This flank march not only could not bring any benefits, but could ruin the Russian army, if other conditions did not coincide. What would have happened if Moscow had not burned down? If Murat had not lost sight of the Russians? If Napoleon had not been inactive? What if, on the advice of Bennigsen and Barclay, the Russian army had fought near Krasnaya Pakhra? What would happen if the French attacked the Russians when they were following Pakhra? What would have happened if later Napoleon, approaching Tarutin, attacked the Russians with at least one tenth of the energy with which he attacked in Smolensk? What would happen if the French went to St. Petersburg?.. With all these assumptions, the salvation of the flank march could turn into pernicious.
Thirdly, and most incomprehensibly, is that people who study history deliberately do not want to see that the flank march cannot be attributed to any one person, that no one ever foresaw it, that this maneuver, just like the retreat in Filiakh, in the present, was never presented to anyone in its integrity, but step by step, event after event, moment by moment, it followed from an innumerable number of the most diverse conditions, and only then presented itself in all its integrity when it was completed and became past.
At the council at Fili, the dominant thought of the Russian authorities was the self-evident retreat in a direct direction back, that is, along the Nizhny Novgorod road. Evidence of this is the fact that the majority of votes at the council were cast in this sense, and, most importantly, the well-known conversation after the council of the commander-in-chief with Lansky, who was in charge of the provisions department. Lanskoy reported to the commander-in-chief that food for the army was collected mainly along the Oka, in the Tula and Kaluga provinces, and that in the event of a retreat to Nizhny, the provisions would be separated from the army by the large river Oka, through which transportation in the first winter is impossible. This was the first sign of the need to deviate from the direct direction to the Lower, which had previously seemed the most natural. The army kept to the south, along the Ryazan road, and closer to the reserves. Subsequently, the inaction of the French, who even lost sight of the Russian army, concerns about the protection of the Tula plant and, most importantly, the benefits of approaching their reserves, forced the army to deviate even further south, to the Tula road. Having crossed in a desperate movement beyond Pakhra to the Tula road, the commanders of the Russian army thought to remain at Podolsk, and there was no thought of the Tarutino position; but countless circumstances and the reappearance of French troops, who had previously lost sight of the Russians, and the plans for the battle, and, most importantly, the abundance of provisions in Kaluga, forced our army to deviate even more to the south and move into the middle of their food routes, from the Tulskaya to the Kaluga road, to Tarutino. Just as it is impossible to answer the question when Moscow was abandoned, it is also impossible to answer when exactly and by whom it was decided to go over to Tarutin. Only when the troops had already arrived at Tarutino as a result of innumerable differential forces, only then did people begin to assure themselves that they wanted this and had long foreseen it.

The famous flank march consisted only in the fact that the Russian army, retreating straight back in the opposite direction of the offensive, after the French offensive had stopped, deviated from the direct direction taken at first and, not seeing persecution behind them, naturally leaned in the direction where it attracted an abundance of food.
If we imagined not brilliant commanders at the head of the Russian army, but simply one army without commanders, then this army could not do anything other than move back to Moscow, describing an arc from the side from which there was more food and the land was more abundant.
This movement from the Nizhny Novgorod to the Ryazan, Tula and Kaluga roads was so natural that the marauders of the Russian army ran off in this very direction and that in this very direction it was required from Petersburg that Kutuzov transfer his army. In Tarutino, Kutuzov almost received a reprimand from the sovereign for having withdrawn the army to the Ryazan road, and he was pointed out the very position against Kaluga in which he was already at the time he received the sovereign's letter.
Rolling back in the direction of the push given to it during the entire campaign and in the battle of Borodino, the ball of the Russian army, with the destruction of the force of the push and not receiving new shocks, took the position that was natural to it.
Kutuzov's merit did not lie in some kind of ingenious, as they call it, strategic maneuver, but in the fact that he alone understood the significance of the event taking place. He alone understood even then the significance of the inaction of the French army, he alone continued to assert that the battle of Borodino was a victory; he alone - the one who, it would seem, by his position as commander-in-chief, should have been called to the offensive - he alone used all his strength to keep the Russian army from useless battles.
The slain beast near Borodino lay somewhere where the runaway hunter had left it; but whether he was alive, whether he was strong, or whether he was only hiding, the hunter did not know this. Suddenly, the groan of this beast was heard.
The groan of this wounded beast, the French army, denouncing her death, was the sending of Loriston to Kutuzov's camp with a request for peace.
Napoleon, with his confidence that it was not good that was good, but that it was good that came to his mind, wrote Kutuzov the words that first came to his mind and did not make any sense. He wrote:

“Monsieur le prince Koutouzov,” he wrote, “j" envoie pres de vous un de mes aides de camps generaux pour vous entretenir de plusieurs objets interessants. Je desire que Votre Altesse ajoute foi a ce qu "il lui dira, surtout lorsqu" il exprimera les sentiments d "estime et de particuliere consideration que j" ai depuis longtemps pour sa personne… Cette lettre n "etant a autre fin, je prie Dieu, Monsieur le prince Koutouzov, qu" il vous ait en sa sainte et digne garde ,
Moscou, le 3 Octobre, 1812. Signe:
Napoleon.
[Prince Kutuzov, I am sending you one of my adjutant generals to negotiate with you on many important subjects. I ask Your Grace to believe everything he tells you, especially when he begins to express to you the feelings of respect and special respect that I have had for you for a long time. I pray to God to keep you under my sacred roof.
Moscow, October 3, 1812.
Napoleon. ]

"Je serais maudit par la posterite si l" on me regardait comme le premier moteur d "un accommodement quelconque. Tel est l "esprit actuel de ma nation", [I would be damned if they looked at me as the first instigator of any deal; this is the will of our people.] - answered Kutuzov and continued to use all his strength for that to keep troops from advancing.
In the month of the robbery of the French army in Moscow and the calm stationing of the Russian army near Tarutino, a change took place in relation to the strength of both troops (spirit and number), as a result of which the advantage of strength turned out to be on the side of the Russians. Despite the fact that the position of the French army and its numbers were unknown to the Russians, as soon as attitudes changed, the need for an offensive was immediately expressed in countless signs. These signs were: the sending of Loriston, and the abundance of provisions in Tarutino, and the information that came from all sides about the inaction and disorder of the French, and the recruitment of our regiments, and good weather, and the long rest of Russian soldiers, and usually arising in the troops as a result of rest impatience to do the work for which everyone is gathered, and curiosity about what was being done in the French army, so long lost sight of, and the courage with which Russian outposts were now snooping around the French stationed in Tarutino, and news of easy victories over the French peasants and the partisans, and the envy aroused by this, and the feeling of revenge that lay in the soul of every person as long as the French were in Moscow, and the (most important) vague, but arising in the soul of every soldier, the consciousness that the ratio of strength has now changed and the advantage is on our side. The essential balance of forces changed and an offensive became necessary. And immediately, just as surely as the chimes begin to beat and play in a watch, when the hand has made a full circle, in the higher spheres, in accordance with a significant change in forces, an increased movement, hissing and playing of the chimes was reflected.

The Russian army was controlled by Kutuzov with his headquarters and the sovereign from St. Petersburg. In St. Petersburg, even before the news of the abandonment of Moscow was received, a detailed plan for the entire war was drawn up and sent to Kutuzov for guidance. Despite the fact that this plan was drawn up on the assumption that Moscow was still in our hands, this plan was approved by the headquarters and accepted for execution. Kutuzov wrote only that long-range sabotage is always difficult to carry out. And to resolve the difficulties encountered, new instructions and persons were sent who were supposed to monitor his actions and report on them.
In addition, now the entire headquarters has been transformed in the Russian army. The places of the murdered Bagration and the offended, retired Barclay were replaced. They considered very seriously what would be better: to put A. in the place of B., and B. in the place of D., or, on the contrary, D. in the place of A., etc., as if something other than the pleasure of A. and B., could depend on it.
At the army headquarters, on the occasion of the hostility of Kutuzov with his chief of staff, Benigsen, and the presence of the sovereign's confidants and these movements, there was a more than usual complex game of parties: A. undermined B., D. under S., etc. ., in all possible displacements and combinations. With all these underminings, the subject of intrigues was for the most part the military business that all these people thought to direct; but this warfare proceeded independently of them, exactly as it was supposed to proceed, that is, never coinciding with what people thought up, but proceeding from the essence of mass relations. All these inventions, intercrossing, entangled, represented in the higher spheres only a true reflection of what was to be accomplished.

Battle on the Ice. Background.

But Albert, who had not yet had time to sail far, was notified in time of the betrayal of the Russian prince, returned with the knights to Riga, preparing for defense. True, the Germans did not have to defend themselves: the valiant Vyachko, having learned about the return of Albert, simply set fire to Kukenoys and fled somewhere to Rus' with his retinue. This time the Germans decided not to tempt fate and took control of Kukenois.

And then a strange thing happens: in 1210, the Germans send ambassadors to the prince of Polotsk, who were supposed to offer him peace. And Polotsk agrees to this peace on the condition that the Livs, who were subordinate to Riga, will pay tribute to Polotsk and the bishop will be responsible for this. That's amazing: Polotsk, agrees to peace with the Germans, who captured two of its specific principalities and even extend their influence to the pagans. However, on the other hand, what is strange about this: contrary to the assertions of our historians, who shout on every corner that the Russians have helped the Baltic tribes fight the Western invaders since ancient times, Polotsk did not care about these tribes from the high bell tower. The only thing that interested him was profit.

In 1216, the first clash of the Germans with Novgorod took place. And again, the Russian princes became the initiator of the conflict: at the end of the year, Novgorodians and Pskovians attacked the Estonian city of Odenpe (at that time already owned by the Germans) and plundered it. In January 1217, the Estonians, with the help of the Germans, carried out a retaliatory attack on the Novgorod lands. But there was no talk of any territorial acquisitions - the Germans, having robbed the Novgorodians, went home. In the same year, the Novgorodians again gathered for a campaign against Odempe. Novgorod troops besieged the city, but they could not take it, so the Novgorodians had to limit themselves to plundering the surroundings. A hastily assembled army hastened to help the besieged garrison of Odempe.

However, due to its small number, it failed to provide serious assistance to the Livonians in Odempe. All that the strength of this army was enough for was to break through to Odempe. As a result, the number of people in the city turned out to be quite large, and supplies were extremely small. Therefore, the Livonians were forced to ask for peace from the Russians. Those, having taken a ransom from the Germans, left Livonia. What is characteristic: the Novgorodians, if they were really afraid of the excessive activity of the Catholic Church or fought for the freedom of the Baltic tribes, quite calmly could simply starve out all the Germans in Odenpe, thereby destroying most of the Livonian army and stopping Catholic expansion for a long time.

However, the Novgorodians did not even think of doing this. The Catholics did nothing to stop them. On the contrary, they had even more money than the pagans, which means that robbing is doubly fun. So the Russians did not seek to cut the branch on which they were sitting - why kill the Germans, who in a year or two could save up money again, which could then be taken away from them in the next campaign? Actually, this is exactly what the Novgorodians did: in 1218, the Novgorod army again invades Livonia. Again, the Russians are unable to take a single Livonian castle and again, having ruined the surroundings, they return home with booty.

But in 1222, a significant event occurs: the Estonians raise a revolt against the Germans. Realizing that they will not be able to cope with the knights on their own, the Estonians turn to Novgorod for help. And Novgorodians really come, plunder the surroundings, and leave, leaving small garrisons in the castles donated by the Estonians. That is, the Novgorodians were little interested in annexing the Livonian lands. As usual, they were driven only by greed. It goes without saying that the few Russian troops left in German castles could not resist the retaliatory actions of the Livonians for a long time, and by 1224 the Germans had cleared the Estonian lands from the Russians. Interestingly, while the Germans were destroying the Russian garrisons, the Novgorodians did not blow their heads and were not even going to help their comrades.

But when the Germans, having regained the lands seized by the Russians in 1223, asked Novgorod for peace, while paying tribute, the Novgorodians happily agreed - still, a freebie after all. Yaroslav Vsevolodovich, who at that time was the Novgorod prince, decided to conduct the next campaign in 1228. However, Yaroslav was not very liked either in Novgorod or in Pskov, as a result of which, at first, the Pskovians, and then the Novgorodians, refused to participate in the campaign. But the year 1233 became, to a certain extent, significant for Russian-Livonian relations, since it was a kind of forerunner of the events of 1240-1242.

In 1233, with the help of the Livonian army, the former Pskov prince Yaroslav Vladimirovich (expelled from the city, apparently, on the initiative of the pro-Uzdal group that supported Yaroslav Vsevolodovich) captured Izborsk. Apparently, Izborsk surrendered to the prince without a fight, because if this perfectly fortified fortress decided to resist, the Germans would have taken at least a few weeks to take it, and during this time the Pskov one would have had time to approach the city, and the Novgorod militia, which would not leave a stone unturned from the "Western invaders."

But the city fell quickly, which means that the inhabitants of Izbor did not want to fight with their prince. And now the Livonians are given a great opportunity to begin the seizure of Novgorod lands, because Izborsk, a key point of the Pskov land and a beautiful fortress, has already been in their hands. However, the Germans did not want to defend Izborsk, and in the same year, the Pskovites (probably with the support of the same pro-Uzdal party inside the city) again captured Izborsk and captured Yaroslav Vladimirovich. Yaroslav Vladimirovich was sent first to Novgorod to Yaroslav Vsevolodovich, and then to Pereyaslavl, from where, after some time, he somehow managed to escape, which played an important role in the "crusader aggression" of 1240-1242.

So what conclusion can we draw? Livonia has never pursued an aggressive policy towards the Russian principalities. She just didn't have the strength to do it. Neither before nor after 1242 was Livonia able to compete with Novgorod in terms of economic and military potential. The Russian principalities, on the other hand, constantly took advantage of the weakness of their western neighbor, conducting large and not very large raids. It should be noted that the Russian principalities were never interested in destroying the bridgehead of "Western aggression" in the Baltic states, although the Russians had plenty of opportunities to crush the weak Livonia (especially in the initial period of its existence). However, the leitmotif of Rus''s relations with Livonia was not at all the fight against "foreign invaders", but making a profit from robberies.

Battle on the Ice. From the capture of Izborsk to the battle on Lake Peipsi.

So, Yaroslav Vladimirovich somehow managed to escape from Pereyaslavl. And where is he running? Again to their "sworn enemies" - the Germans. And in 1240, Yaroslav is trying to repeat what he did not succeed in 1233. An extremely accurate (albeit somewhat anachronistic) definition of the actions of the Germans in 1233 and 1240 was given by Belitsky and Satyreva: "The so-called" captures "by the troops of the Order of Izborsk and Pskov in 1233 and 1240 can be considered in the light of what has been said as a temporary entry of a limited contingent of order troops into the Pskov principality, made at the request of the legitimate ruler of Pskov, Prince Yaroslav Vladimirovich. ("Pskov and the Order in the first third of the XIII century").

Indeed, the actions of the Germans cannot be considered as an attempt to seize Russian lands, or, even more so, an attempt to conquer Novgorod (for the Livonians, this would be no less (and even more) a murderous undertaking than for the Swedes) - the Germans only sought to help Yaroslav Vladimirovich in the fight at the prince's table. Someone may have a question: why did they need it? It's simple: the Livonians wanted to see a kind of buffer state in place of the Pskov principality, which would protect the Baltic states from the constant raids of the Novgorodians. The desire is quite understandable, it should be noted. Interestingly, both Pskovians and Novgorodians were also not at all opposed to being part of the "Western civilization", fortunately, they had much more in common with the West than with the Horde, paying tribute to which they did not really smile at all.

Yes, and the power of Yaroslav Vsevolodovich and his son, our hero, Alexander Yaroslavovich, who, at every opportunity, tried to curtail Novgorod's liberties, had already got enough of them. Therefore, when in the fall of 1240, Yaroslav Vladimirovich, with the support of the Livonian army, invaded the Pskov lands and approached Izborsk, the city, apparently, again did not resist. Otherwise, how can one explain the fact that the Germans managed to take it at all? As mentioned above, Izborsk was an excellent fortress, which could only be taken as a result of a long siege. But the distance from Izborsk to Pskov is 30 km, that is, one day's march. That is, if the Germans had not been able to take Izborsk on the move, they would not have been able to take it at all, since the Pskov army that had arrived in time would simply have defeated the invaders.

Thus, it can be assumed that Izborsk surrendered without a fight. However, in Pskov, where the separatist mood, apparently, was also strong, supporters of Yaroslav Vsevolodovich make an attempt to save their power: the Pskov army is sent to Izborsk. Under the walls of Izborsk, the Germans attacked the Pskovites and defeated them, killing 800 people (according to the Livonian Rhymed Chronicle). Further, the Germans advance to Pskov and besiege it. Once again, the Russians show little desire to fight: after only a week's siege, Pskov surrenders. It is significant that Novgorod did not at all seek to help the Pskovians: instead of sending an army to help Pskov, the Novgorodians calmly wait for the Germans to take the city.

Apparently, the Novgorodians did not consider the restoration of the princely power of Yaroslav Vladimirovich to be evil in Pskov. And what do the "crusaders" do after the capture of such a large and significant center as Pskov? But nothing. According to LRH, the Germans only leave two Vogt Knights there. Based on this, one can draw a completely logical conclusion: the Germans did not at all seek to seize the Novgorod lands - their only goal was to establish the power they needed in Pskov. Only and everything. That's the whole "mortal threat hanging over Russia."

After the capture of Izborsk and Pskov, the Germans commit the next "act of aggression" - they build a "fortress" Koporye on the lands of the Vod tribe. Of course, our historians have tried to present this fact as a clear demonstration that the Germans are trying to gain a foothold in new lands. However, it is not. It’s just that the leaders, apparently, announced their intention to accept Catholicism and the patronage of the Livonian Church, after which the Germans built a small prison for them. The fact is that the Germans built fortifications for all the pagans who converted to Catholicism. Such was the tradition in the Baltics.

After the founding of this terrible stronghold of Catholic aggression, the Germans take the town of Tesov and, in fact, everything. This is where the aggression ends. Having plundered the environs of Novgorod, the Germans and Estonians leave the Novgorod lands, leaving Pskov in the possession of their old ally Yaroslav Vladimirovich. The entire German "occupation army" consisted of the two knights already mentioned above. However, our historians loudly shout that, they say, these two knights posed a terrible threat to the independence of Rus'.

As we can see, the Germans came to Rus' not at all with the aim of converting Pskov to Catholicism or, God forbid, capturing Novgorod. The Germans were just trying to protect themselves from the devastating raids of the Novgorodians. However, the theory of Catholic expansion continues to be persistently imposed on us. But, as in the case of the Swedes, there is not a single documentary evidence that the Pope called the Livonians for a crusade against Rus'. Quite the opposite: the details of this campaign tell us that it was of a completely different character.

The only hostile action of the Pope against Novgorod was that he transferred the Russian lands captured by the Germans (and some other) under the jurisdiction of the Ezel bishopric. True, it is completely incomprehensible what is special about this. Do not forget that the Russian Orthodox Church a priori supported any Russian campaigns in the same Livonia, but for some reason no one believes that these campaigns were provoked precisely by the Church. So there was no "crusade against Rus'". And it couldn't be.

Paradoxically, Novgorod felt threatened only after the Germans left the Novgorod lands. Until that moment, the pro-German party in the city hoped that Novgorod would repeat the fate of Pskov. This party also hoped that the German knights would provide at least some help to Novgorod in the fight against Yaroslav Vsevolodovich and the Tatars. However, as it turned out, the Germans were not going to take Novgorod, much less to provide any kind of support to the Russians in anything - they did not even want to leave the garrison in Pskov.

In addition, after the capture of Pskov, Novgorod, which had previously been reliably protected from the Baltic tribes by the lands of the Pskov principality, was now open to Estonian raids, and this also could not please the Novgorodians. As a result, they turn to Yaroslav Vsevolodovich with a request to send them a prince (the Novgorodians expelled Alexander a few months after the Battle of Neva). Yaroslav first sends Andrei, but he did not suit the Novgorodians for some reason, and they ask Alexander.

On the second attempt, Yaroslav satisfies their request. The very first thing Alexander does upon arrival is to destroy the opposition. What is characteristic: when the Germans took Pskov, they did not carry out any punitive measures in it - on the contrary, everyone who did not like the new government was free to leave the city, which many did. But in Rus', dissenters were always treated more abruptly, and the Russian national hero Alexander was no exception.

After the destruction of rivals within his possessions, Alexander goes over to external opponents: having gathered an army. He advances to Koporye, which he immediately takes. Many of the reins that were in prison were hanged, and the "fortress" itself was torn down. The next goal of Alexander was Pskov. But the prince did not have to storm this citadel: Pskov surrendered itself. Apparently, Yaroslav Vladimirovich felt the change in the situation in time, considered it more reasonable to remain without a principality, but with his head on his shoulders, and surrendered the city to the Novgorodians without a fight. For which, apparently, he was awarded the reign in Torzhok instead of the gallows tradition that was due to him according to the logic of things and the tradition of the gallows instituted by Alexander.

But the two knights who were in the city were less fortunate: according to LRH, they were expelled from the city. True, some of our historians are still sincerely convinced that there were not even 2 knights in the city, but some countless number. Here, for example, Yu. Ozerov writes about the capture of Pskov: "In the battle, 70 noble order brothers and many ordinary knights were killed" ("How a "pig" ran into a "regimental" row "). I wonder what sacred meaning Ozerov puts into the term "ordinary knights". But this, in general, is not so important, if only because there could not be 70 knights in Pskov by definition, since then it must be recognized that in general all the brothers of the German House of St. Mary in Livonia were sitting in Pskov (as the Order Sword-bearers after joining the Teutonic Order in 1237), and then there was simply no one to fight on Lake Peipus.

Apparently, the myth of 70 knights killed in Pskov goes back to the Chronicle of the Teutonic Order, which contains the following passage: "This Prince Alexander gathered with a large army and came to Pskov with great force and took it. Despite the fact that the Christians bravely defended , the Germans were defeated and captured and subjected to severe torture, and seventy knights of the Order were killed there.Prince Alexander was glad of his victory, and the knight brothers with their people who were killed there became martyrs in the name of God, glorified among Christians ".

However, as we see, in this chronicle the author brought together the capture of Pskov and the battle on the ice, so we should talk about 70 knights who died in both of these battles. But even this would be wrong, since the author of the CTO borrowed information about the events in the Russian lands in 1240-1242 from LRH, and all the differences between the text of the CTO and the text of LRH are exclusively a figment of the CTO chronicler's fantasy. Begunov, Kleinenberg and Shaskolsky, in their work devoted to the study of Russian and Western sources about the Battle of the Ice, wrote the following regarding late European chronicles: “From the texts cited and from the comments it is clear that all the texts of the late ., describing the German aggression against Russia in 1240-1242, date back to the corresponding part of the "Rhymed Chronicle" and are its highly abridged retellings.

In the cited texts there are several news that are missing from the Rhymed Chronicle, but, as was shown in the comments, none of these news can be traced back to any reliable additional source (written or oral); Apparently, all the discrepancies between the texts of the later chronicles and the text of the "Rhymed Chronicle" are simply the fruits of the literary work of the late chroniclers, who in some places added from themselves (and according to their own understanding) individual details in the coverage of events, entirely borrowed from the "Rhymed Chronicle" ( "Written sources about the Battle of the Ice"). That is, the only real and logical number of knights in Pskov should be the two Vogts mentioned in LRH.

The next stage of Alexander's campaign, apparently, was Izborsk. Not a single chronicle or chronicle tells about his fate. Apparently, this fortress, like Pskov, surrendered to the prince without a fight. Which, in general, is not surprising given the complete absence of Germans in this strategically important city. And after the "foreign invaders" were finally expelled from the Russian lands, the Novgorodians began their favorite pastime: looting the Livonian lands.

In the spring of 1242, Alexander's army crossed to the western shore of Lake Peipsi (the possession of Livonia) and began to plunder the property of local residents. And it was during this glorious lesson that one of the Russian detachments under the command of the brother of the Novgorod posadnik Domash Tverdislavovich was attacked by the knightly army and the Chud militia. The Novgorod detachment was defeated, many, including Domash himself, were killed, and the rest fled to Alexander's main forces. After that, the prince retreated to the eastern shore of the lake. The hastily assembled Livonian troops, apparently, decided to catch up with the Novgorodians in order to take away the loot from them. And that's when the battle on the ice took place.

From the above events, it clearly follows that there was not even a mention of any terrible "aggression of the West" and "mortal threat to Novgorod". The Germans came to the Novgorod lands with the sole purpose of creating a new state friendly to Livonia on the territory of the Pskov Principality under the rule of their longtime ally, Prince Yaroslav Vladimirovich. This state was supposed to serve as a kind of shield for the Baltic states from the devastating raids of the Novgorodians.

Having fulfilled their mission and established the power of Yaroslav in Pskov, the Germans left the Russian lands, leaving only two observers. This is where the "aggressive" actions of the Livonians ended. Of course, this state of affairs did not suit the Novgorodians, and in 1241 Alexander set off on his "liberation campaign" through Koporye, Pskov and Izborsk straight to the lands of Livonia - to rob. A reasonable question: so who threatened whom in 1242: Livonia to Novgorod or is it the other way around?

Battle on the Ice. Number of participants.

For some reason, in Russian historiography, such figures are most often taken as an axiom: 10-12 thousand Germans, 15-17 Russians. However, where these thousands came from is completely incomprehensible. Let's start with the Novgorodians: according to Tikhomirov, at the beginning of the 13th century, the population of Novgorod reached 30 thousand people. Of course, the population of the entire Novgorod land was several times larger. However, probably, by the period of interest to us, the real population of Novgorod and the Novgorod principality was lower. Than at the beginning of the century.

S.A. Nefedov in his article "On demographic cycles in the history of medieval Russia" writes: "In 1207-1230, characteristic signs of an eco-social crisis were observed in the Novgorod land: famine, epidemics, uprisings, the death of large masses of the population, which took on the character of a demographic catastrophe, the decline of crafts and trade, high prices for bread, the death of a significant number of large owners and the redistribution of property.

The famine of 1230 claimed the lives of 48 thousand people in Novgorod alone, including residents of the surrounding lands who came to Novgorod in the hope of escaping from this disaster. And how many people died in Novgorod principality? Thus, the number in the Novgorod land by 1242 had fallen significantly compared to the beginning of the 13th century. In the city itself, a third of the population perished. That is, in 1230 the population of Novgorod did not exceed 20,000 people. It is unlikely that in 10 years it will again reach the mark of 30 thousand. Thus, Novgorod itself could put up an army of 3-5 thousand people with the maximum tension of all mobilization resources.

However, this could only be in case of extreme danger for Novgorod (for example, if suddenly Batu's army did not limit itself to sacking Torzhok, but would still reach the walls of Novgorod). And as we have already established above, there was absolutely no danger to the city in 1242. Therefore, the army that Novgorod itself would have gathered did not exceed 2000 people (besides, one should not forget that in Novgorod there was a serious opposition to the prince, who would hardly have joined his army - however, the thirst for profit could make the Novgorodians forget about their enmity with the prince).

However, Alexander planned a relatively large campaign in Livonia, so the army was going from all over the principality, and not just from Novgorod. But he did not collect it for a long time - no more than a few months, therefore, apparently, the total number of the Novgorod army did not exceed 6-8 thousand people. For example: according to the Chronicle of Henry, in 1218 the number of the Russian army that invaded Livonia was 16 thousand people, and at the same time this army was gathering for two years.

So, the number of Novgorodians was 6-8 thousand. A few hundred more soldiers are Alexander's squad. And besides, Andrei Yaroslavovich also arrived from Suzdal to help his brother with some kind of army (apparently, again, several hundred). Thus, the size of the Russian army was 7-10 thousand people. There was no time to recruit more troops, and, apparently, no desire.

With the German army, everything is much more interesting: there is no talk of any 12 thousand there. Let's start in order: in 1236, an important event for Livonia took place - the battle of Saul. In this battle, the Order army was utterly defeated by the Lithuanians. 48 knights of the Order of the Sword were killed along with the master. In fact, it was the complete destruction of the Order, of which no more than 10 people remained. For the first and only time on the territory of the Baltic States, the Order of Knights was completely destroyed. It would seem that our historians should in every possible way discuss this fact, talking about how our allies in the fight against Catholic expansion - the Lithuanians - destroyed an entire order.

However, no, the ordinary Russian does not know about this battle. Why? And because, together with the army of "dog-knights" with the Lithuanians, a detachment of Pskovians numbering 200 people fought (with a total number of German troops that did not exceed 3000, the contribution is quite significant), but that's not the point. So in 1236 the Order of the Sword was destroyed, after which, with the participation of the pope, the remnants of the order in 1237 joined the Teutonic Order and became the German House of St. Mary in Livonia. In the same year, the new Landmaster of the Order, Herman Balke, arrived in Livonia along with 54 new knights.

Thus, the number of the Order increased to about 70 knights. As a result, we can say with confidence that the number of the Livonian branch of the Teutonic Order by 1242 could not exceed 100 people. Begunov, Kleinenberg and Shaskolsky write about the same thing (op. cit.). However, there could have been even fewer knights, due to their rapid decline: for example, in 1238, the knights lost more than 20 of their brothers at Dorogichin. However, even if the number of knights approached a hundred, not all of them could participate in the Battle on the Ice, since the order had other things to do: only in 1241 was the Estonian uprising on about. Saaremaa.

In 1242, an uprising of the Curonians broke out, which diverted significant forces of the Order. Dietrich von Grüningen, the master of the TO department in Livonia, did not participate in the battle on Lake Peipsi precisely because of his busyness with the affairs of Courland. As a result, we come to the conclusion that the number of order troops in the battle could not exceed 40-50 knights. Considering that there were 8 so-called half-brothers per knight in the Order, the total number of the Order's army was 350-450 people. The Bishop of Dorpat could put up a militia of a maximum of 300 people. A few hundred more people could be provided by the Danish Revel to the allies. That's all, there were no more Europeans in the army. In total, a maximum of 1000 people is obtained. In addition, there were militias from the Chud in the "German" army - about a thousand and a half more. Total: 2500 people.

This was the maximum that the Order and Dorpat were able to put up at that time and under those conditions. There can be no talk of any 12,000. There were not so many warriors in all of Livonia. The Teutonic Order was also unable to help its Livonian branch: in 1242, all its forces were directed to suppress the uprising that broke out in Prussia. Yes, and the Order was pretty battered: in 1241, his army, which was part of the army of the Silesian prince Henry II, recruited from Germans, Poles and Teutons to repel the Mongol army that was making its victorious march across Europe. On April 9, 1241, in the battle of Legnica, the horde of Khan Kaidu utterly defeated the Europeans. The united troops, including the order, suffered huge losses.

The battle was really huge in scale, unlike our dwarf "Battle on the Ice". However, our historians rarely remember her either. Apparently, this fact does not fit into another favorite Russian theory: that Rus', they say, took the brunt of the Mongol hordes and thereby saved Europe from this disaster. Like, the Mongols did not dare to go further than Rus', being afraid to leave huge and completely unconquered spaces in their rear. However, this is just another myth - the Mongols were not afraid of anything.

In fact, by the summer of 1241 they had already conquered all of Eastern Europe, occupying Hungary, Silesia, Romania, Poland, Serbia, Bulgaria, etc. defeating European armies one after another, taking Krakow and Pest, destroying European troops at Legnica and Chaillot. In a word, the Mongols quite calmly, without fear of any "attacks from the rear," subjugated all of Europe to the Adriatic Sea. By the way, in all these glorious deeds, the Mongol khans were assisted by Russian troops, who also participated in battles with Europeans (such are the "saviors of Europe").

In the summer and autumn of 1241, the Mongols crushed all pockets of resistance in the already captured part of Europe, and in the winter of 1242 they embarked on new conquests: their troops had already invaded Northern Italy and moved towards Vienna, but here an event saving for Europe occurred: the great Khan Ogedei. Therefore, all Genghisides left Europe and went home to fight for a vacant seat. Naturally, their army left Europe for the khans.

In Europe, only one tumen remained under the command of Khan Baidar - he passed through Northern Italy and Southern France, invaded the Iberian Peninsula, and, having passed through it, went out to the Atlantic Ocean, only after that he went to Karakorum. Thus, the Mongols managed to make their way through the whole of Europe, and no Russia interfered with this, and Ogedei became the true "savior of Europe".

But we digress. Let's return to the Teutonic Order. As you can see, the Teutons were not able to help the Livonians in any way. They had neither the strength nor the time for this (after all, one should not forget that militant Lithuania separated Livonia from the TO’s possessions, so it would take a lot of time to transfer at least some troops to the Baltic States, but it just didn’t exist ). What do we end up with? The number of opponents in the battle on the ice was as follows: Germans 2000 - 2500, Russians 7-10 thousand people.

Battle on the Ice. German pigs.

Of course, I would very much like to talk about the course of the Battle of Peipus, however, this is not possible. We, in fact, have practically no data on how this battle proceeded, and fantasize about a "weakened center", "reserve regiments", "falling through the ice", etc. somehow you don't want to. Let's leave it to science fiction writers from history, of which there have always been many. It only makes sense to pay attention to the most noticeable, perhaps, flaw in the description of the battle by our historians. We will talk about the knightly "wedge" (in the Russian tradition - "pig").

For some reason, the opinion has strengthened in the minds of Russian historians that the Germans, having formed a wedge, attacked the Russian troops with this wedge, thereby "pushing through the center" of Alexander's rati, who then surrounded the knights with a flank maneuver. Everything is fine, only the knights never attacked the enemy with a wedge. It would be a completely pointless and suicidal operation. If the knights really attacked the enemy with a wedge, then only three knights in the front row and flank knights would participate in the battle. The rest would be in the center of the formation, not participating in the battle in any way.

But the mounted knights are the main striking force of the army, and such an irrational use of them could lead to very serious consequences for the entire army as a whole. Therefore, the cavalry never attacked with a wedge. The wedge was used for a completely different purpose - rapprochement with the enemy. Why was a wedge used for this?

Firstly, the knightly troops were distinguished by extremely low discipline (whatever one may say, some feudal lords, what discipline for them), so if the rapprochement was carried out by a standard line, then there would be no question of any coordination of actions - the knights would simply disperse around battlefield in search of the enemy and prey. But in the wedge, the knight had nowhere to go, and he was forced to follow the three most experienced horsemen who were in the front row.

Secondly, the wedge had a narrow front, which reduced losses from archery. Thus, the knights approached the enemy with a wedge in an organized manner, and 100 meters before the enemy ranks, the wedge was rebuilt into a banal, but extremely effective line, with which the knights struck at the enemy. When attacking with a line, all horsemen participated in the battle, and thus they could inflict maximum damage on the enemy. At the same time, it should be noted that the wedge approached the enemy with a step, as Matthew Parissky wrote, "as if someone was riding, putting a bride in front of him on the saddle." I don't think it's necessary to explain what it was for.

Horses are not able to gallop at the same speed, so a cantering wedge would soon fall apart, with half of the riders falling from the saddle due to numerous collisions. The situation would have been aggravated by the falls of knights who died from enemy arrows, horses that would have fallen victim to the tools of florists (which were also in the Russian army, only now their devices were called not backs and flowers, but ragulki) and would certainly entail a fall and other knights. Thus, the wedge would have died before even reaching the enemy ranks.

Battle on the Ice. About losses.

In Russian historiography, the opinion was strengthened that 400 knights were killed in the battle, 50 were taken prisoner, and it was not known how many fighters of a lower rank were killed. However, even the NPL contains somewhat different information: "And pada Chyudi was beschisla, and N? Metz 400, and 50 with the hands of Yash and brought to Novgorod" That is, the annals say that 400 Germans fell. And now it looks like the truth. Considering that there were about 800 Germans on the lake, such losses seem quite real.

And we find data on losses among the knights in LRH, where it is said that 26 knights died in battle and 6 were taken prisoner. And again, the number of fallen knights fully corresponds to the number of brothers who participated in the battle. As for the losses of the Chud, apparently, they also amounted to several hundred people. However, given that the Chud fled from the battlefield as soon as she had such an opportunity, it must be admitted that it is unlikely that her losses exceeded 500 people. Thus, we can conclude that the total losses of the Livonian army were less than 1000 people.

It is difficult to talk about the losses of the Novgorodians due to the lack of any information on this matter.

Battle on the Ice. Consequences.

Actually, there is no need to talk about any consequences of this battle, due to its mediocrity. In 1242, the Germans made peace with the Novgorodians, which they, in general, did all the time). Novgorod after 1242 still continued to disturb the Baltic states with raids. For example, in 1262 the Novgorodians sacked Dorpat. Indeed, a fortress. Around which the city was built, they failed to take, as usual - and they didn’t need it either: the campaign somehow paid off.

In 1268, seven Russian princes again undertook a campaign in the Baltic states, this time heading for the Danish Rakovor. Only now the strengthened Livonia also remained on the sidelines, and made its raids on the Novgorod lands. For example, in 1253 the Germans besieged Pskov. In a word, relations between Livonia and Novgorod after 1242 did not undergo any changes.

Afterword.

So, having examined the history of the Neva and Peipsi battles in more detail, we can confidently speak of a significant exaggeration of their scope and significance for Russian history. In reality, these were completely ordinary battles, pale in comparison to other battles even in the same region. In the same way, theories about the exploits of Alexander, the "savior of Russia", are only myths. Alexander did not save anyone from anything (fortunately, neither the Swedes nor the Germans threatened Russia and even Novgorod at that time).

Alexander only won two relatively small victories. Against the background of the deeds of his predecessors, descendants and contemporaries (the Pskov prince Dovmont, the Russian king Daniil of Galicia, the Novgorod prince Mstislav Udaly, etc.), this seems like a trifle. In the history of Russia there were dozens of princes who did more for Russia than Alexander, and much more great battles than the two we analyzed. However, the memory of these princes and their accomplishments has been completely ousted from the people's memory by the "exploits" of Alexander Yaroslavovich.

By the "exploits" of a man who collaborated with the Tatars, a man who, for the sake of obtaining the Vladimir label, brought Nevryuyev's army to Rus', which, in terms of the scale of disasters brought to the Russian lands, is comparable to the invasion of Batu; the person who. He probably destroyed the coalition of Andrei Yaroslavovich and Daniel of Galicia, who did not want to live under the khan's oppression.

A man who was ready to sacrifice anything to satisfy his own thirst for power. And all these actions of his are presented as committed "for the good" of Rus'. It becomes a shame for Russian history, from which all the pages of its glory miraculously disappear, and in their place comes admiration for such figures.

Sutulin Pavel Ilyich

Taking advantage of the fact that after the devastation of North-Eastern Rus' by the Mongols, Novgorod and Pskov had nowhere to wait for help, the Swedish and German knights stepped up their expansion in North-Western Rus', counting on an easy victory. The Swedes were the first to make an attempt to seize Russian lands. In 1238, the Swedish king Erich Burr received permission ("blessing") from the Pope for a crusade against the Novgorodians. All who agreed to take part in the campaign were promised absolution.
In 1239, the Swedes and Germans were negotiating, outlining the plan of the campaign: the Swedes, who had captured Finland by that time, were to advance on Novgorod from the north, from the Neva River, and the Germans - through Izborsk and Pskov. Sweden allocated an army for the campaign led by Jarl (Prince) Ulf Fasi and the king's son-in-law, Jarl Birger, the future founder of Stockholm.
Novgorodians knew about the plans of the Swedes, as well as that the Swedes were going to baptize them, as if they were pagans, in the Catholic faith. Therefore, the Swedes, who went to plant an alien faith, seemed to them more terrible than the Mongols.
In the summer of 1240, the Swedish army under the command of Birger "in great strength, puffing with the spirit of the military", appeared on the Neva River on ships that stopped at the mouth of the Izhora River. The army consisted of Swedes, Norwegians, representatives of the Finnish tribes, who intended to go straight to Ladoga in order to go down to Novgorod from there. Catholic bishops were also in the conquering army. They walked with a cross in one hand and a sword in the other. Having landed on the shore, the Swedes and their allies pitched their tents and tents at the confluence of the Izhora with the Neva. Birger, confident in his victory, sent a statement to Prince Alexander: "If you can resist me, then I'm already here, fighting your land."
Novgorod borders at that time were guarded by "watchmen". They were also on the sea coast, where local tribes served. So, in the area of ​​the Neva, on both banks of the Gulf of Finland, there was a "sea watchman" of the Izhora, who guarded the routes to Novgorod from the sea. The Izhorians had already converted to Orthodoxy and were an ally of Novgorod. Once, at dawn on a July day in 1240, the elder of the Izhos land, Pelgusy, while on patrol, discovered the Swedish flotilla and hastily sent Alexander to report everything.
Having received news of the appearance of the enemy, the Novgorod prince Alexander Yaroslavovich decided to suddenly attack him. There was no time to muster the troops, and the convening of a veche (people's assembly) could drag out the matter and lead to a disruption of the suddenness of the impending operation. Therefore, Alexander did not wait until the squads sent by his father Yaroslav came, or the warriors from the Novgorod lands gathered. He decided to oppose the Swedes with his squad, reinforcing it only with Novgorod volunteers. According to the old custom, they gathered at the Cathedral of St. Sophia, prayed, received a blessing from their master Spiridon and set out on a campaign. They walked along the Volkhov River to Ladoga, where a detachment of Ladoga residents, allies of Veliky Novgorod, joined Alexander. From Ladoga, Alexander's army turned to the mouth of the Izhora River.

The Swedish camp, set up at the mouth of the Izhora, was not guarded, since the Swedes did not suspect the approach of Russian troops. The enemy ships rocked, tied to the shore; tents were white all along the coast, and between them was Birger's golden-domed tent. On July 15, at 11 am, the Novgorodians suddenly attacked the Swedes. Their attack was so unexpected that the Swedes did not have time to "gird their swords on their loins."
Birger's army was taken by surprise. Deprived of the opportunity to line up for battle, it could not offer organized resistance. With a bold onslaught, the Russian squad passed through the enemy camp and drove the Swedes to the shore. The foot militias, advancing along the banks of the Neva, not only cut down the bridges that connected the Swedish ships with land, but even captured and destroyed three enemy ships.
Novgorodians fought "in the fury of their courage." Alexander personally "beat up countless Swedes and stamp the king himself on his face with your sharp sword." The prince's lieutenant, Gavrilo Oleksich, chased Birger all the way to the ship, broke into the Swedish boat on horseback, was thrown into the water, remained alive and again entered the battle, laying down the bishop and another noble Swede named Spiridon. Another Novgorodian, Sbyslav Yakunovich, with only one ax in his hand, boldly crashed into the very thick of the enemies, mowed them right and left, clearing the path, as if in a forest thicket. Behind him, the princely hunter Yakov Polochanin brandished his long sword. These fellows were followed by other warriors. The princely youth Savva, having made his way to the center of the enemy camp, cut down the high pillar of the tent of Birger himself: the tent fell down. A detachment of Novgorod volunteers sank three Swedish ships. The remnants of the defeated Birger's troops fled on the surviving ships. The losses of the Novgorodians were insignificant, amounting to 20 people, while the Swedes loaded three ships with the bodies of only noble people, and left the rest on the shore.
The victory over the Swedes was of great political importance. She showed all the Russian people that they have not yet lost their former prowess and can stand up for themselves. The Swedes failed to cut off Novgorod from the sea, capture the coast of the Neva and the Gulf of Finland. Having repulsed the Swedish attack from the north, the Russian army disrupted the possible interaction of the Swedish and German conquerors. To combat German aggression, the right flank and rear of the Pskov theater of operations are now reliably secured.
In tactical terms, the role of the "watchman" should be noted, which discovered the enemy and promptly informed Alexander of his appearance. Of great importance was the surprise factor in the attack on Birger's camp, whose army was taken by surprise and could not offer organized resistance. The chronicler noted the extraordinary courage of Russian soldiers. For this victory, Prince Alexander Yaroslavich was called "Nevsky". At that time he was only twenty-one years old.

Battle on Lake Peipus ("Battle on the Ice") in 1242.

In the summer of 1240, German knights from the Livonian Order, created from the Orders of the Sword and the Teutonic Order, invaded the Novgorod land. Back in 1237, Pope Gregory IX blessed the German knights to conquer native Russian lands. The conquering army consisted of Germans, Medvezhans, Yuryevites and Danish knights from Revel. With them was a traitor - the Russian prince Yaroslav Vladimirovich. They appeared under the walls of Izborsk and took the city by storm. The people of Pskov rushed to help their countrymen, but their militia was defeated. Some of the killed were over 800 people, including the voivode Gavrila Gorislavich.
In the footsteps of the fugitives, the Germans approached Pskov, crossed the Velikaya River, set up their camp under the very walls of the Kremlin, set fire to the city and began to destroy churches and surrounding villages. For a whole week they kept the Kremlin under siege, preparing for an assault. But things did not come to this: a resident of Pskov, Tverdilo Ivanovich, surrendered the city. The knights took hostages and left their garrison in Pskov.
The appetite of the Germans increased. They have already said: "Let's reproach the Slovenian language ... to ourselves," that is, we will subdue the Russian people. In the winter of 1240-1241, the knights again appeared as uninvited guests in the Novgorod land. This time they seized the territory of the Vod (Vozhan) tribe, to the east of the Narva River, "they fought everything and laid tribute on them." Having captured the "Vodskaya Pyatina", the knights took possession of Tesovo (on the Oredezh River), and their patrols appeared 35 km from Novgorod. Thus, a vast territory in the region of Izborsk - Pskov - Sabel - Tesov - Koporye was in the hands of the Livonian Order.
The Germans had already considered the Russian border lands to be their property; the pope "transferred" the coast of the Neva and Karelia under the jurisdiction of the bishop of Ezel, who concluded an agreement with the knights: he negotiated for himself a tenth of everything that the land gives, and left everything else - fishing, mowing, arable land - to the knights.
Novgorodians again remembered Prince Alexander, already Nevsky, who left after a quarrel with the city boyars in his native Pereslavl-Zalessky. The Metropolitan of Novgorod himself went to ask the Grand Duke of Vladimir Yaroslav Vsevolodovich to let his son go, and Yaroslav, realizing the danger of the threat emanating from the West, agreed: the matter concerned not only Novgorod, but all of Rus'.
Alexander organized an army of Novgorodians, Ladoga, Karelians and Izhors. First of all, it was necessary to resolve the question of the method of action.

In the hands of the enemy were Pskov and Koporye. Alexander understood that the simultaneous performance in two directions would scatter forces. Therefore, having identified the Koporye direction as a priority - the enemy was approaching Novgorod - the prince decided to strike the first blow at Koporye, and then free Pskov from the invaders.
In 1241, the army under the command of Alexander set out on a campaign, reached Koporye, captured the fortress "and ejected the city from the foundation, and beat the Germans themselves, and bring others with you to Novgorod, and let others go, be more merciful than measure, and the leaders and I hanged (hung) the people of peretniks (i.e. traitors)". Vodskaya Pyatina was cleared of the Germans. The right flank and rear of the Novgorod army were now safe.
In March 1242, the Novgorodians again set out on a campaign and were soon near Pskov. Alexander, believing that he did not have enough strength to attack a strong fortress, was waiting for his brother Andrei Yaroslavich with the Suzdal squads, who soon approached. The Order did not have time to send reinforcements to their knights. Pskov was surrounded, and the knightly garrison was taken prisoner. Alexander sent the order's governors in chains to Novgorod. In the battle, 70 noble order brothers and many ordinary knights were killed.
After this defeat, the Order began to concentrate its forces within the Derpt bishopric, preparing an offensive against the Russians. The order gathered a great force: there were almost all of its knights with the master at the head, with all the bishops, a large number of local soldiers, as well as the soldiers of the Swedish king.
Alexander decided to move the war to the territory of the Order itself. The Russian army marched on Izborsk. Forward, Prince Alexander Nevsky sent several reconnaissance detachments. One of them, under the command of the mayor's brother Domash Tverdislavich and Kerbet, ran into German knights and Chuds (Ests), was defeated and retreated; while Domash died. Meanwhile, reconnaissance found out that the enemy sent insignificant forces to Izborsk, and his main forces were moving towards Lake Peipsi.
The Novgorod army turned to the lake, "the Germans and the Chud followed them." The Novgorodians tried to repel the roundabout maneuver of the German knights. Having reached Lake Peipsi, the Novgorod army found itself in the center of possible enemy movement routes to Novgorod. Now Alexander decided to give battle and stopped at Lake Peipsi to the north of the Uzmen tract, near the island of Voronii Kamen. The forces of the Novgorodians were little more than the knight's army. According to various data available, it can be concluded that the army of German knights was 10-12 thousand, and the Novgorod army - 15-17 thousand people. According to L. N. Gumilyov, the number of knights was small - only a few dozen; they were supported by foot mercenaries armed with spears, and the allies of the Order - Livs.
At dawn on April 5, 1242, the knights lined up in a "wedge" or "pig". The wedge consisted of horsemen clad in armor and its task was to crush and break through the central part of the enemy troops, and the columns following the wedge were to crush the enemy flanks with coverage. In chain mail and helmets, with long swords, they seemed invulnerable. Alexander Nevsky countered this stereotypical tactics of the knights, with the help of which they won many victories, with a new formation of Russian troops, directly opposite to the traditional Russian system. Alexander concentrated the main forces not in the center ("chela"), as the Russian troops always did, but on the flanks. Ahead was the advanced regiment of light cavalry, archers and slingers. The battle formation of the Russians was facing the rear towards the steep, steep eastern shore of the lake, and the prince's cavalry squad hid in an ambush behind the left flank. The chosen position was beneficial in that the Germans, advancing on open ice, were deprived of the opportunity to determine the location, number and composition of the Russian troops.
Putting out long spears and breaking through the archers and the advanced regiment, the Germans attacked the center ("chelo") of the Russian battle formation. The center of the Russian troops was cut, and part of the soldiers retreated back and to the flanks. However, having stumbled upon the steep shore of the lake, the inactive, armored knights could not develop their success. On the contrary, the knightly cavalry crowded together, as the rear ranks of the knights pushed the front ranks, which had nowhere to turn around for battle.
The flanks of the Russian battle order ("wings") did not allow the Germans to build on the success of the operation. The German wedge was caught in pincers. At this time, Alexander's squad struck from the rear and completed the encirclement of the enemy. Several ranks of knights covering the wedge from the rear were crushed by the blow of the Russian heavy cavalry.
Warriors who had special spears with hooks pulled the knights off their horses; warriors armed with special knives disabled horses, after which the knight became easy prey. And as it is written in The Life of Alexander Nevsky, "there was a slash of evil, and a crack from spears of breaking, and a sound from a sword cut, as if a frozen lake would move. And it was impossible to see the ice: it was covered with blood."
Chud, who made up the bulk of the infantry, seeing his army surrounded, ran to his native shore. Some knights, together with the master, managed to break through the encirclement, and they tried to flee. The Russians pursued the fleeing enemy for 7 versts to the opposite shore of Lake Peipus. Already at the western coast, the runners began to fall through the ice, since the ice is always thinner near the coast. The pursuit of the remnants of a defeated enemy outside the battlefield was a new phenomenon in the development of Russian military art. Novgorodians did not celebrate the victory "on the bones", as was customary before.
The German knights were completely defeated. The question of the losses of the parties is still controversial. It is vague about Russian losses - "many brave warriors fell." In the Russian chronicles it is written that 500 knights were killed, and countless miracles, 50 noble knights were taken prisoner. There were far fewer knights in the entire First Crusade. In the German chronicles, the figures are much more modest. Recent research suggests that about 400 German soldiers actually fell on the ice of Lake Peipus, of which 20 were knight brothers, 90 Germans (of which 6 were "real" knights) were captured.
In the summer of 1242, the Order concluded a peace treaty with Novgorod, returning all the lands it had seized from it. The prisoners on both sides were exchanged.
"Battle on the Ice" was the first time in the history of military art, when a heavy knightly cavalry was defeated in a field battle by an army consisting mostly of infantry. The new battle order of the Russian troops, invented by Alexander Nevsky, turned out to be flexible, as a result of which it was possible to encircle the enemy, whose battle order was a sedentary mass. The infantry at the same time successfully interacted with the cavalry.
The death of so many professional soldiers greatly undermined the power of the Livonian Order in the Baltics. The victory over the German army on the ice of Lake Peipsi saved the Russian people from German enslavement and was of great political and military-strategic importance, delaying the further German offensive to the East for almost several centuries, which was the main line of German policy from 1201 to 1241. This is the enormous historical significance of the Russian victory on April 5, 1242.

References.

1. Life of Alexander Nevsky.
2. 100 great battles / resp. ed. A. Agrashenkov and others - Moscow, 2000.
3. World history. Crusaders and Mongols. - Volume 8 - Minsk, 2000.
4. Venkov A.V., Derkach S.V. Great generals and their battles. - Rostov-on-Don, 1999

The battle that took place on April 5, 1242 on the ice of Lake Peipsi near the island of Voronii Kamen went down in history as one of the most important in the history of the state, as a battle that freed the lands of Rus' from any claims of the Order of the Livonian Knights. Although the course of the battle is known, many points of contention remain. So, there is no exact information about the number of soldiers who took part in the battle on Lake Peipus. Neither in the chronicles that have come down to us, nor in the "Life of Alexander Nevsky" are these data given. Presumably, from 12,000 to 15,000 soldiers participated in the battle on the part of the Novgorodians. The number of the enemy ranged from 10 thousand to 12 thousand. At the same time, there were few knights among the German soldiers, the bulk of the troops were militiamen, litas and Estonians.

Alexander's choice of the place of battle was dictated by both tactical and strategic calculations. The position occupied by the prince's troops made it possible for the attackers to block all approaches to Novgorod. Surely the prince also remembered that winter conditions give certain advantages in the confrontation with heavy knights. Consider how the Battle of the Ice took place (briefly).

If the battle order of the crusaders is well known to historians and is called a wedge, or, according to the chronicles, a “great pig” (heavy knights are on the flanks, and lighter armed warriors are inside the wedge), then there is no exact information about the construction and location of the Novgorod rati. It is possible that this was the traditional "regimental row". The knights, who had no information about the number and location of Nevsky's troops, decided to advance on open ice.

Although the chronicles do not give a detailed description of the battle on Lake Peipus, it is quite possible to restore the scheme of the Battle on the Ice. The wedge of knights crashed into the center of the Nevsky guard regiment and broke through its defenses, rushing further. Perhaps this "success" was foreseen in advance by Prince Alexander, since then the attackers met a lot of insurmountable obstacles. The knight's wedge, clamped in pincers, lost its harmony of ranks and maneuverability, which turned out to be a serious negative factor for the attackers. The attack of the ambush regiment, which until that moment had not participated in the battle, finally tipped the scales in the direction of the Novgorodians. The dismounted knights in their heavy armor on the ice became almost helpless. Only a part of the attackers managed to escape, whom the Russian warriors pursued, according to the chronicler, "to the Falcon Coast."

After the victory of the Russian prince in the Battle of Ice on Lake Peipsi, the Livonian Order was forced to make peace, completely renouncing claims to the lands of Rus'. Under the agreement, both sides returned the soldiers captured during the battle.

It is worth noting that on the ice of Lake Peipus, for the first time in the history of wars, a foot army defeated heavy cavalry, which was a formidable force for the Middle Ages. Alexander Yaroslavich, who brilliantly won the Battle of the Ice, made the most of the surprise factor and took into account the terrain.

It is difficult to overestimate the military and political significance of Alexander's victory. The prince not only defended the opportunity for the Novgorodians to conduct further trade with European countries and reach the Baltic, but also defended the north-west of Rus', because in the event of the defeat of Novgorod, the threat of the seizure of the north-west of Rus' by the Order would become quite real. In addition, the prince delayed the onslaught of the Germans on the Eastern European territories. April 5, 1242 is one of the most important dates in the history of Rus'.