The Incredible Adventures of the Italians on the Eastern Front. CSIR - Italian Expeditionary Corps in Russia

Given that the ancestors of the Italians, the Romans, built a large, strong and warlike empire, the question of why the Italians fought so unconvincingly in the 20th century puzzled many. Basically, everything is reduced to psychology, they say, softened by a warm climate, wine and beautiful women, Italian men are not eager to leave such a seductive world, as a result, they panic and tear on their slippers at any nix.

There are no bad warring peoples. And there are no peoples who fight well. The Germans in the Napoleonic wars fought very badly, despite the legacy of Frederick, and despite the descendants who twice took Paris, and once hung over it with a pre-Mocles sword. Each era gives rise to its own nature of war, and the wars of the industrial age became the battlefield that belonged to the Germans.

Italians, such noisy bullies, dangerous mafiosi, brave and reckless guys. And pay attention to the Karabakh conflict, where the same noisy, expressive Armenians and Azerbaijanis fought. The armies of both sides suffered from a low level of discipline, videos circulating on the Internet showing panic, confusion and the inability of commanders to organize people and assess the situation. One comrade, like me, young and inexperienced, instructed me not to mess with the Georgians in any case, because if he gets a knife, nothing will help him to cope with it. But remember the panic of the Georgian army in 2008.

These different peoples have something in common (not only the inability to form a combat-ready regular army). They are excellent individual fighters. Breter, fearless and dexterous, does not like to obey, considers himself smarter than everyone around, and does not value himself much lower than a marshal, much less a general. It is difficult to unite people with such a temperament into an army of hundreds of thousands of people. It is also impossible to impregnate them with ideology, therefore, you cannot force these people to die for the idea, due to developed individualism.

Similar problems were in the Russian army, after the introduction of all-class military service. Even in the shameful and disastrous Crimean War, the army showed a high level of professionalism, or rather corporate ethics. A recruited warrior is a professional, to one degree or another, but a drafted one is not, he has something to lose, and it is difficult to force him to fight when households and families are at home.

Let's try to figure this out. Probably this difference is due to social origin. Let's look at the social structure of armies. Since the 50s of the 19th century, Germany has been an industrial power (well, more precisely, fragmented Germany, which has taken a course towards unification), the proletarian becomes the main resource for replenishing the mass army. The proletarian of that era is a beggar, deprived of essential property, accustomed to discipline. The peasant of that era is already a personally free person, independently building and responsible for his life. The proletarians fill the armies of the Germans, the French, the British. Peasants are armies of less industrialized Italians, Austro-Hungarians, Russians. That is why, probably, the armies of the latter in WWI turned out to be so prone to moral "decay", panic, fraternization and mass surrender or desertion. The peasant does not want to fight for nonsense or someone's ambitions, he has more important things to do at home.

The Second World War probably did not have much effect on this situation. And the Italians did not become more disciplined, and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army began a war with the Germans with giant boilers and millions of prisoners, disoriented and completely unmotivated to die. Therefore, the Westphalian steelworkers, the Saxon miners, as before, beat everyone on both fronts, but again they did not take care of their meager resource opportunities.

The Italians could not become a powerful militaristic power for the following reasons:

• Individualism, individualistic temperament is not conducive to building a disciplined army.
• A more reverent attitude towards life. Sunny Italy washed by warm seas, with fertile land and friendly nature. Try, having lived your whole life in these conditions, to get into a trench for countless months under the roar of bombs and shells.
• Lack of militaristic mentality, traditions. The absence of a cult of expansion in the minds of people for many centuries, before unification into a single and "hungry" state before conquests.

Paul, great answer, thanks. In Golovushkin's book "The Battle for Africa. View from Russia" I met the statement that one of the reasons was the huge social stratification between ordinary soldiers and the command, yesterday's peasants did not want to die for the interests of aristocrats who decided to start a redistribution of spheres of influence and restore the Roman Empire . What do you think, is it possible the influence of this factor?

Answer

Thanks for the interesting question, with which there has been a shortage for a long time.

Of course available. But you, as a historian, understand that many factors influence, to varying degrees, but many. It will not be possible to explain this by one stratification (usually it is the prerogative of learned Marxists to explain everything by stratification). Was there no stratification in the UK or in Germany? Were.

In general, it is very difficult to answer such questions. And my answer is very general. It is impossible to answer it with specific causal relationships. After all, the question why the German soldiers turned out to be so persistent, skillful, brave and enterprising on the fields of world wars, because they hadn’t shown anything like that before (well, maybe with the exception of the Prussians) is also very interesting, and it’s also unclear how to explain it objectively. You can also speculate.

Let's try to look at it anthropologically. When you are in battle (neither I nor you have such experience, but there are obvious things) and they are trying to kill you, bombs are exploding around, fragments are pouring, bullets are flying, etc., will the soldier care about why he Here. Because of the money, because of the love of the motherland, because of the awards, or he is simply forced, it does not matter, he begins to care about one thing - saving his life. What difference does it make, where you are from and what nationality. Therefore, answers must first be sought in natural factors before moving on to social factors.

Of course, ordinary Italians did not want to die for the interests of the Nazis, but even in the First World War, when they fought the Austrians (also not the toughest soldiers) for disputed lands, that is, one might say for their homeland, they did it no better than in Africa in the 30s. 40s.

Answer

Comment

Before its entry into the war, Italy had a large army; in Africa alone, the number of soldiers numbered 300-400 thousand people.

Against the small British troops in Egypt, Mussolini sent divisions, the personnel of which amounted to more than a hundred thousand people. But they were defeated, and it came to the point that the allied forces were approaching Tripoli (the capital of the colony of Italy - Libya)

For what reasons did the army of such an ambitious country suffer defeat after defeat?

1. Italy, unlike its ally Germany, did not have such a developed infrastructure and industry, many factories, plants and enterprises were located in the northern and central regions of the country. The southern part was more agrarian, the rural population predominated.

2. The state did not have enough material and natural resources to uninterruptedly supply the army and conduct major military operations. This is evidenced by such a poor supply of troops in Africa, many Italians complained about poor food, lack of ammunition, and especially medical supplies and medicines. One soldier noted that he saw Italian (not German) ambulances and vehicles only a few times.

3. The Italian army was inexperienced. A significant part of the officers were incompetent people in military affairs, and the general staff lacked experience in waging war. According to Australian and British veterans who fought in Africa, the Italians were untrained soldiers, quickly fled in the face of artillery fire or the advance of tanks. Some even noted that it was a pleasure to fight with them.

4. The country's economy was not adapted to wage such a long and exhausting war. Already after the defeat in Greece, many were sure that Italy would either lose the war or become another puppet of formidable Germany.

There are many more reasons, but I have named only the main ones.

Very interesting question, Anastasia. It is true that the Italian army was in places very ineffective and consistently not as effective as the Wehrmacht. To be honest, I am not a big connoisseur of the Italian armed forces, but I venture to point out two reasons:

1) Emphasis on the Italian Navy and not on the ground contingent. Italy had a very strong fleet (4 battleships for example).

2) Weak tactical training of infantry generals, lack of understanding of modern warfare

The result of these two factors was the lack of modern tanks, for example. And how without tanks to fight in World War II?

The one that managed to lose Abyssinia in the first Ethiopian-Italian war? Well, who knows her, knows, knows, knows

The reason is that the Italians, corny, did not need this war. Fighting in Ethiopia or the Balkans is one thing, here Italy had interests, you can understand (although the war with Greece is, of course, a disaster for the Italians), but nevertheless. Imagine that you are an Italian soldier on the eastern front. You are in a very huge, cold, unfriendly country, and you do not understand what you are doing here at all. At least, if at first the Italians joyfully went on a crusade against Bolshevism, then they ended sadly. With regards to the eastern front, it was very difficult for the Italians, pampered by the warm climate, to conduct military operations in the USSR.
And also, you can remember that in Italy, in fact, not everyone shared an alliance with Germany and believed that such a friendship would lead Italy to collapse.

There are many factors:

1. The greatness of Ancient Rome is to blame for everything.

If pasta were not equal to him, then there would be no bitterness of defeat. Azerbaijanis are also warriors, unimportant, but no one points this out to them. And the Italians are full of arrogance! A logical question arises: are the modern. Are Italians descendants of Romans?

2. Frankly bad soldiers. Of course, there was also a hero, outstanding personalities, but in general ... Knowledge of military affairs left much to be desired (confirmation of this was the conflict between Italy and Ethiopia)

Imagine - Italy enters the war in the spring of 41, fully prepared for it

The fleet is headed by a resolute and courageous admiral, the training of the fleet personnel is not inferior to the English one, the submarines have quite modern performance characteristics, the ships are prepared for night battles, the fleet has its own powerful aircraft (SM79 torpedo bombers). The army - excellent junior officers, good training of privates, enterprising generals. The 10th army (Messe), with superior forces, advances towards Cairo and Alexandria. They are supported by 10 Luftwaffe air corps! In East Africa, units of the Duke of Aosta capture British Somalia, approach Khartoum, and storm Nairobi. Thanks to effective propaganda, the East African units of the British Army do not put up proper resistance, but simply retreat. In the Balkans - Expeditionary Forces (Graziani), with the support of the Wehrmacht and Bulgaria, capture Greece. Yugoslavia joins the Axis. Supermarines, backed by the Luftwaffe, inflict huge losses on the British Navy and force it to retreat to Haifa and Gibraltar. Sunk "Barham", "Malaya", "Illustrious" and "Eagle". Airborne assault on Crete (joint German-Italian) captures the island. Next in line are Cyprus and Malta. Spain joins the Axis - the Germans, French and Italians bomb Gibraltar, making it impossible for the English fleet to stay here. The Germans and Italians create a submarine base in the Azores. And so on...

Immediately after the German invasion of the USSR, Mussolini invited Hitler to send an Italian army corps to the Eastern Front. On July 10, 1941, permission for this was received. The corps was formed and received the name "Italian Expeditionary Force in Russia" - Corpo di Spedizione Italiane in Russia (C.S.I.R). Mussolini wanted to include one armored and one motorized division. However, the Italian army did not have such an opportunity - motorized and motorized divisions with a small number of tanks went to the "Crusade to the East". The corps commander was Corps General Messe, who would later receive his share of the glory in North Africa.

The IRGC consisted of:

• Soldiers - 62 thousand.
• Submachine guns - 866
• machine guns - 581
• 81 mm mortars - 189
• 45 mm mortars - 292
• Light anti-tank guns (47/32) - 108
• wedges - 60
• guns - 256
• Light artillery pieces - 220
• Medium artillery pieces - 36
• Air defense guns - 80
• aircraft - 83
• Horses and mules - 4.600
• trucks - 5.500
• motorcycles - 1.550

The corps included three divisions: two motorized infantry - "Pasubio" and "Torino" and one mobile ("chelere") "Prince Amedeo Duke d" Aosta "(PADA) (Principe Amadeo Duca d" Aosta). The latter included two regiments of cavalry, a battalion of bicyclists, an artillery regiment, and a San Giorgio light tank group. It consisted of a headquarters with one platoon of L3 / 33 tankettes and 4 companies - each with 2 platoons of the same combat vehicles. In total - 61 wedges.

These divisions from August 1941 fought on the southern flank of the Eastern Front, and at the initial stage very successfully, having managed to occupy several small cities and a rather large territory in Ukraine. In particular, the Italians helped the German allies in the liquidation of the Soviet group near Uman, fought with the Red Army near Pavlovgrad and Dnepropetrovsk. However, after the first clashes, it became clear that tankettes did not meet the requirements of modern warfare, and anti-tank guns were useless against Soviet medium and heavy tanks. True, those Italians met quite rarely. As a result, parts of the corps could not maintain the high pace of the German offensive, which caused criticism from the German command. True, the losses were relatively small. So, from September 22 to October 1, the IRGC units lost 87 people killed and 190 wounded.

Already in October, parts of the corps carried out several independent operations - near Petrikovka, Nikitovka and Gorlovka. Losses increased - 150 people were killed and 700 wounded. On November 2, the Italians reached the city of Gorlovka.

In the winter of 1941-1942. it was the Italians who repelled several Soviet counterattacks at the turn of the Northern Donets and Mius rivers. In Italian military history, these battles became known as the "Christmas Battles". PADA and the Tagliamenti legion of blackshirts survived especially hard blows. In the battles near Novaya Orlovka, the mobile division lost 1,400 people killed, wounded and missing.

In the spring of 1942, the Italians began to strengthen their grouping in the East. Another 7 divisions were sent there, II (former IRGC) and XXXV army corps appeared in Russia. Together with the Alpine Corps, they made up the 8th Italian Army (ARMIR). The Italians took part in the German operation "Blau" - (Blau), providing the flanks of the German troops. By August 1942, the front had stabilized on the line of the Don River. The Italians fought, trying to eliminate the Soviet bridgeheads, but they did not succeed.

At that time, the 8th Italian Army - ARMIR (Armata Italiana in Russia) consisted of:

• Soldiers - 229.000
• Submachine guns - 2.657
• Machine guns - 1.742
• 81 mm mortars - 423
• 45 mm mortars - 874
• Light anti-tank guns (47/32) - 297
• Medium anti-tank guns - 90
• Light tanks - 50
• guns - 946
• Light artillery pieces - 670
• Medium artillery pieces - 276
• Air defense guns - 276
• Aircraft - 66
• Horses and mules - 25.000
• trucks - 16.700
• motorcycles - 4.470

The 8th Army still had only one "mobile division" - the already known "Principe Amadeo Duca D Aosta" - Principe Amadeo Duca D Aosta (PADA). It consisted of: 31 L 33/35 tankettes, 19 L 6/40 light tanks and 15 Semovente 47-mm assault guns. The tanks were part of the 67th Bersaglieri tank battalion (LXVII Battaglione Bersaglieri corazzato, two companies) divisions, self-propelled guns - in the 13th group of assault guns (two squadrons) (Semovente "Savalleggeri Di Alessandria"). There is no evidence that heavier Italian armored vehicles were used on the Eastern Front. In general, the “mobile” division, in addition to tanks, had 267 light machine guns, 92 heavy machine guns, 18 81-mm mortars, 38 anti-tank guns, 24 75-mm field guns, 16 20-mm anti-aircraft guns, 8 armored vehicles, 800 trucks and 539 motorcycles.
The Italian documents do not contain data on the presence of any tanks and armored vehicles in the cavalry regiments, which were directly subordinate to the headquarters of the 8th Army. We are talking about the regiments "Savoy Cavalry" and "Lancieri di Novara". There is only information about the number of horses and trucks they use. The Italian Alpine Corps, apparently, had only captured armored vehicles.

Thus, in fact, all the "legal" ARMIR armored vehicles were in the XXXV Army Corps. It is worth noting that the Italians could use their armored vehicles only with significant support from infantry and artillery - the equipment poorly met the requirements of the Soviet-German front.

True, the Italians used captured Soviet tanks and armored vehicles. These were, including the T-34 tanks of the 1941 and 1942 models. Presumably, there were up to a dozen "thirty-fours" in ARMIR. However, there are very few photographs of those times.

Until mid-August, the PADA, which was part of the 6th German army, suffered significant losses. Repulsing the Soviet tank attack (up to 30 T-34 tanks) on July 30 in the Serafimovka area, the division lost almost all of its artillery and 1,700 fighters. Already on August 14, Chelere was taken to rest.

This was reflected in the course of the Soviet offensive. The Italian army was at that time on the Don, PADA was in the second echelon. During a grandiose operation, the Red Army defeated the Italian army, inflicting huge losses on it. Of the 229 thousand people, 85 thousand died or went missing, and 30 thousand were captured. Losses in artillery exceeded 90% of its initial strength, 18.2 thousand cars and motorcycles were put out of action.

In January 1943, the surviving Italian units were withdrawn to the relatively calm Ukraine, and by March, most of them went home. Only a small number of Italians remained in the East to fight the partisans.

In early March 1943, Italian troops began to hastily leave the territory of the Soviet Union. The so-called crusade against communism ended in a rout in the Stalingrad cauldron. On the Eastern Front, Rome lost 175 thousand soldiers and officers. Before the war, Mussolini saw the victory over the USSR as a way to restore the "empire". However, as a result of the defeat on the Volga, the Duce regime was overthrown, and a few months later the Germans occupied more than half of Italian territory. About how the "Russian campaign" became fatal for fascist Italy - in the material RT.

The key ally of Nazi Germany in World War II is considered to be fascist Italy, which had an army of almost five million. However, several tangible defeats in late 1942 and early 1943 led to the collapse of the military machine and the collapse of the dictatorial regime of Prime Minister Benito Mussolini.

One of the most difficult trials for Rome was the defeat of the 8th Italian Army during the Battle of Stalingrad, which ended on February 2, 1943. On the banks of the Volga, the Italian fascists lost more than 80 thousand people (including the missing). After the surrender, up to 64,000 soldiers and officers ended up in Soviet captivity.

Mussolini had a bad feeling even at the moment when he only learned about the counter-offensive of the Red Army that had begun on November 19, 1942 as part of Operation Uranus.

“Russia will never be destroyed. Her protection in her scale. Its territory is so vast that it can neither be conquered nor held. The Russian chapter is finished. We must make peace with Stalin,” he reported in a letter to Adolf Hitler.

In February 1943, Mussolini replaced almost the entire cabinet of ministers, and in early March he ordered the withdrawal of the surviving Italian troops from the territory of the USSR. For Germany, the behavior of Rome actually meant a way out of World War II and turned into the need to start a new military operation.

"Shoulder to shoulder with the Reich"

In the Soviet press, the fascist regime in Rome was presented as a vassal and puppet of Nazi Germany. One of the widely circulated propaganda posters depicted Italy as Adolf Hitler's right boot bogged down in Soviet soil. In reality, relations between the two totalitarian powers were much more complicated.

Until 1941, the Duce (leader) of the National Fascist Party of Italy, Benito Mussolini, was a supporter of the invasion of the USSR. In May 1939, Rome and Berlin signed the "Pact of Steel" - an agreement that consolidated the military-political alliance of the two powers. Italy pledged to support the Fuhrer's military campaigns.

Mussolini understood the inevitability of an attack on the Soviet Union, but expected that aggression would begin after 1945. According to his logic, in the first half of the 1940s, Hitler had to strengthen the occupation regime in Western Europe and North Africa. By this time, as Mussolini assumed, Rome would pull up the economy and the combat effectiveness of the army. Otherwise, Italy might not be ready for a "big war".

The Fuhrer hid from the Duce the development of a plan of attack on the Soviet Union ("Barbarossa") and was not going to call on the Italians to the Eastern Front. Before the invasion of the USSR, a secret document dated December 18, 1940, which outlined the Barbarossa plan, fell into the hands of Italian intelligence. As reported in the document, Berlin counted only on the help of Finland and Romania.

Hitler intended to give the Italian army a leading role in North Africa and the Mediterranean region, where there was a confrontation with British troops. Historians believe that the Fuhrer's plans hurt Mussolini's pride. In addition, he was obsessed with the idea of ​​a crusade against communism. As a result, the Duce obtained Germany's consent to the transfer of Italian troops to the Soviet Union.

After the start of the war with Moscow, the mouthpiece of fascist propaganda - the magazine La Vita Italiana - published an article in which citizens were informed that "Italy stands on the first line shoulder to shoulder with the Reich." The dispatch of the expeditionary force "demonstrates the fraternity in arms and the Italian military power".

Mussolini himself argued that the path to the restoration of the "empire" (meaning the modern analogue of Ancient Rome) "passes through the Soviet Union." At the end of June 1941, at a meeting with the Cabinet of Ministers, the Duce announced that, having learned about the attack on the USSR, he ordered "immediately send three divisions to Russia." The dictator stressed that Italy "should actively participate in a new war."

Duce warriors

The fascist regime did not participate in the invasion of the USSR on June 22, 1941. Three Italian divisions (Pasubio, Torino, Celere) and the 63rd Legion Tagliamento, which consisted of blackshirts (members of the armed detachments of the fascist party), appeared on the Eastern Front only in August 1941.

In autumn, the Italian Expeditionary Force (CSIR), under the command of Lieutenant General Giovanni Messe, numbered 62 thousand people. The presence of Italian troops in the Soviet Union steadily increased. In total, in 1941-1942, about 280 thousand Italian soldiers and officers were thrown into the war with the USSR.

The combat effectiveness of the Italian army on the Eastern Front was significantly lower than that of the Wehrmacht. Duce soldiers were worse armed, equipped and motivated to fight the communists. The Italians experienced an acute shortage of cars, motorcycles, armored vehicles and warm clothing. Supply problems and arrogance on the part of the Germans affected their motivation and morale.

“It became clear that ... the Italian army was not adapted to the conduct of hostilities in the vast Soviet territories - primarily due to the low degree of motorization of the units and the generally poor technical support of the CSIR. The Italians did not have enough spare parts and fuel ... Even the armament of the Italians did not meet the required parameters, ”said the report of Professor Gabriel D'Annunzio Maria Teresa Giusti of the State University, dedicated to the 75th anniversary of the Battle of Stalingrad.

In the spring of 1942, Mussolini was still full of optimism. The Italian dictator, like Hitler, hoped to radically change the situation on the Eastern Front in the summer campaign of 1942.

The Duce reinforced the grouping in the USSR with people from the mountainous alpine regions (the Tridentina, Giulia and Cuneense divisions), who were considered more resilient in the harsh natural and climatic conditions of the European part of the RSFSR. The Italian Expeditionary Force was transformed into the 8th Army, named Armata Italiana in Russia (ARMIR).

After replenishment, the number of ARMIR amounted to 229 thousand soldiers and officers. The task of the group was to conduct a blitzkrieg in the Stalingrad direction. The role of the main striking force was assigned to the 6th army of General Friedrich Paulus. The Italians, Romanians and Hungarians acted mainly on the flanks, covering the German formations rushing to the Volga.

Forced evacuation

In the Stalingrad direction, the 8th Army encountered incredibly fierce resistance from the Red Army, who constantly made sensitive counterattacks. The resilience of the Soviet soldiers and logistical problems, according to Giusti, finally undermined the morale of the Italians in the second half of 1942.

“The bulk of these soldiers went to the East in a demoralized state, not wanting to fight there (many, moreover, had just returned from the inglorious Albanian and Greek campaigns). It is known that on the way to the front, they repeatedly spoke out against the war with the USSR and protested in various ways, including damage to the premises in the barracks, ”Justi noted in her report.

On November 19, 1942, the Stalingrad group of Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive (Operation Uranus). In mid-December, covering the Germans, the 8th Italian army was completely defeated. On January 31, the Soviet troops captured Friedrich Paulus, and on February 2, the Wehrmacht group finally capitulated.

In the December battles, Rome lost about 44 thousand people, and in total over 80 thousand Italians died near Stalingrad. According to various sources, from 48 to 64 thousand soldiers and officers were captured by the Red Army.

“Only during Operation Little Saturn (as part of the counter-offensive near Stalingrad), the 8th Italian Army lost over 114 thousand people killed, wounded, missing and frostbite,” Sergey Belov, candidate of historical sciences, said in an interview with RT , scientific secretary of the Victory Museum.

"Red Star" in the issue of March 14, 1943 wrote that on the Eastern Front, the Mussolini regime lost 175 thousand soldiers and officers.

According to the Soviet newspaper, the fascist units suffered heavy losses from the very first weeks after being transferred to the USSR. At the end of August 1941, the Pasubio and Torino divisions lost more than 50% of their soldiers and officers. By the winter of 1941, almost the entire personnel of the Chelere division had died.

“In subsequent battles, the decline was so great that during the year of the war on the Soviet-German front, all three divisions of the Italian expeditionary force were replenished three or four times, each time (changed. - RT) up to 60-70% of the personnel. In total, during this period, the Italians lost about 50 thousand of their soldiers and officers, ”the Red Star claimed.

“The scale of the national drama is expressed in the following statistics: 700 trains with soldiers went from Italy to the East, and only 17 returned. Other figures: 230,000 mobilized soldiers, 100,000 fallen, 80,000 prisoners of war - it is not difficult to calculate the remainder of the army. This is how Mussolini's campaign to "defend European civilization" ended deplorably," Giusti stated.

As historians suggest, Mussolini ordered the evacuation of the surviving units of the 8th Army from the territory of the USSR on March 2-3, 1943, and the process of withdrawing troops continued from March 6 to May 22. According to Giusti, there were practically no ideological fascists among the soldiers who returned to their homeland - the most ardent adherents of Mussolini's ideas "burned out" in battles with the Red Army.

The collapse of Italian fascism

According to Belov, the evacuation of Italian troops from the USSR could not save Mussolini's regime. According to the expert, a crushing blow to the ambitions of fascist Rome was dealt not only near Stalingrad, but also in North Africa.

“Italy's exit from the war in the autumn of 1943 was due to both the situation on the fronts and the situation inside the kingdom. During the three years of the war in Africa, the Savoy dynasty (formally fascist Italy was a kingdom) lost all its possessions on the Black Continent. In the sands of the Maghreb, Somalia and Ethiopia, the Italians lost about 400 thousand people killed, captured and wounded,” Belov noted.

By July 1943, the Italian war machine was in a dire situation. Of the 32 divisions that the command had on the Apennine Peninsula, only 20 were combat-ready.

At the same time, the anti-fascist movement actively developed inside the country. The leading positions within it were occupied by the communists. In March-April 1943, more than 100 thousand people took part in strikes throughout the country. Many Italian politicians, as well as the leaders of the United States and Great Britain, seriously feared the "Bolshevization" of Italy.

“The main reason for the collapse of the fascist regime was that it ceased to suit most of the Italian elite. Its representatives were determined to get out of the war as soon as possible, albeit at the cost of a separate peace, ”Belov emphasized.

At the end of July 1943, Mussolini lost his post as prime minister and lost real power in the country. On September 3, the new government of Italy concluded a truce with the United States and Great Britain, and on September 9, it announced its surrender.

In response, Hitler ordered the introduction of troops into Italy (Operation Axis). As a result of a special operation on September 12, Mussolini was released by German soldiers. The Wehrmacht also managed to defeat the British units located in the southern regions of Italy.

The Fuhrer refused to leave troops in the south of the Apennine Peninsula, believing that this region was of no strategic importance. By the end of September 1943, the Nazis occupied northern and central Italy. On the territory occupied by the Germans, a puppet state was formed - the Italian Social Republic, headed by Mussolini.

“The collapse of the alliance between Berlin and Rome as a whole had little effect on the course of events on the Eastern Front. To occupy Italy and replace the units of the former allies in France and the Balkans, the German command mainly used troops stationed in Western and Southern Europe. This made it impossible for Hitler to use them in the East. But at the same time, the exit of Italy from the war did not entail a significant transfer of Wehrmacht forces from east to south, ”said Belov.

With the support of British and American troops, southern Italy turned into a springboard for the formation of anti-fascist armed forces - the Resistance Movement and the Italian Warring Army. From September 1943 to May 1945, the country was in a civil war.

The Italian Social Republic was held together only by German military support. On April 25, 1945, this state ceased to exist, and on April 28, Mussolini and his mistress Clara Petacci were shot by partisans.

“By the death of his soldiers in the distant steppes, the Duce eventually signed his own death warrant. Until now, in the collective consciousness of Italians, Mussolini’s main and fatal mistake is considered his alliance with Nazi Germany and participation in the inglorious “crusade” against the Soviet Union, ”emphasizes Maria Teresa Giusti.

The army of Italy, like any other country, is called upon to protect the state from external and internal threats and encroachments on independence and freedom. How successful were the armed forces of the Italian Republic in this?

The Italian army arose in 1861 - simultaneously with the unification into the Italian Kingdom of the independent Italian states of the Apennine Peninsula that existed at that time: the Neapolitan and kingdoms, the Grand Duchy, the duchies and Modena. Since its inception, the army has actively participated in hostilities, including in the colonial and two world wars, local conflicts and invasions. She played a significant role in the division of Africa (1885-1914) and the formation of colonial states. To protect the conquered territories, colonial troops appeared in the Italian army, recruited mainly from the natives - the inhabitants of Eritrea and Somalia; by 1940 their number reached 256,000.

When the country joined NATO, its armed forces began to take part in the operations carried out by the Alliance. Among them: "Allied Force" (a series of air strikes on the territory of the former Yugoslavia), "Resolute Support" (assistance to the government of Afghanistan), "Allied Defender" (NATO intervention in the civil war in Libya).

Building up the military power of Italy has become a priority since the early 20s of the 20th century: Italians were called up for military service for a year and a half instead of 8 months. The coming to power in 1922 led to the popularization of fascism in the country. The result of the foreign policy pursued by the Duce, the goal of which was declared to be the restoration of the Holy Roman Empire, was the conclusion of a military alliance with Nazi Germany. So the Italian army was involved in hostilities, and later it initiated the war itself - with France and Great Britain. During the Second World War, the development of the Italian army went at an accelerated pace.

Despite the fact that the result of the aggression was the loss of colonies and capitulation in 1943, participation in the war brought Italy "dividends": a powerful fleet, which consisted, among other things, of several dozen submarines and almost two hundred warships.

In the middle of the 20th century, the development of the Italian military-industrial complex continued; this was made possible by the country's accession to NATO in 1949. Today, the military potential of Italy is significant: a lot of military equipment of its own production is in service: tanks created on the basis of the German Leopards, military aircraft (fighters, attack aircraft, transporters, etc.) and helicopters, mountain howitzers, anti-aircraft installations, as well as small arms (automatic rifles, pistols, machine guns, etc.). At the same time, the level of combat training of soldiers and officers is considered low. Even at the beginning of the last century, the Italian army repeatedly suffered defeats on the military fronts (significant losses in clashes with Austria, complete defeat by the Austro-German troops in 1917, colossal losses in North Africa), but this did not greatly affect the improvement of the professional qualities of the fighters of the Italian armed forces. strength in the future.

Structure

The army of Italy consists of land, naval and air forces. Since 2001, another type of troops has been added to them - the carabinieri. Total number of personnel: about 150,000 people.

The ground forces are formed from several divisions and brigades: mountain infantry, armored, etc. There are parachute and cavalry brigades, signalmen, air defense troops. Bersaglieri, or riflemen, deserve special mention - a special kind of troops, an infantry elite, characterized by high mobility. Since 2005, only professional soldiers and volunteers have been accepted into the infantry troops of the Italian army.

In service are Italian tanks and other armored vehicles; artillery guns and air defense systems - mostly foreign-made; more than 300 helicopters, a fifth of them are combat. More than 550 old German tanks are in storage.

Fleet

The Italian fleet has traditionally, since the beginning of World War II, overtakes other types of the country's armed forces in terms of development. Its potential, including production and scientific and technical, is very great; all used warships are built in our own shipyards. Among them are the latest submarines, destroyers and unique aircraft carriers equipped with air defense systems and anti-ship missiles.

Air Force

It is officially believed that the national aviation of Italy arose in 1923. However, at the beginning of the century, Italy used aircraft in the war with Turkey, becoming the first country in the world to use them for combat operations. Italian pilots participated in the Spanish Civil War, the Ethiopian War, and World War I. By the beginning of World War II, more than 3,000 aircraft were in service with the Italian army. Today, their number has decreased significantly, but continues to be quite impressive.

Joined the army of Italy recently. They have dual subordination - to the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Interior, since the Carabinieri also perform police functions.

The structure of the Carabinieri units includes helicopter pilots, divers, cynologists, orderlies; a special task force tasked with combating organized crime.

Carabinieri are distinguished by better training - combat and psychological - than representatives of other types of troops.

Uniform and ranks

Unlike Russia, where only two types of military ranks are established - military and naval, in the Italian army each type of troops has its own ranks. The exception is the ranks of the air force: they almost completely correspond to the names adopted for the ground forces. The main differences: the absence in the Air Force of the rank of major general (literally translated from Italian - "brigadier general"). There are also features in the designation of the highest army ranks: in the ground forces the term generale is used, in aviation - comandante.

The title "corporal" (between private and corporal) exists only in the ground forces. There are no corporals or corporals in the fleet, only sailors and junior specialists (they correspond to the rank of senior corporal in other branches of the military). Russian foremen and warrant officers correspond to sergeants.

The rank of junior officers is represented by three ranks. The captain of the ground forces and the captain of the gendarmerie correspond to the squadron commander and the naval lieutenant commander. There is no rank of "lieutenant" in the naval forces; in the navy it is replaced by "midshipman". There are also three senior officials.

It is curious that naval ranks contain the names of types of ships: for example, the title “captain of the 3rd rank” literally sounds like “corvette captain”, and the rank above is “frigate captain”.

The most original names are those of the carabinieri, or gendarmes; this is how it is customary to translate the Italian carabinière into Russian. The same ranks are worn only by junior and senior officers of the gendarmerie and ground forces. In addition, the Carabinieri lack two of the five general ranks. There are only three senior ranks: the inspector general of the district, the second commander (or acting general) and the general.

As in all the armies of the world, in the Italian army camouflage uniforms are used for field operations. The Italian military had their own colors in 1992, before that they used drawings developed for the US Department of Defense. Of the standard equipment, it is worth noting a camouflage poncho with a hood, which, if necessary, can be used as an awning. It is completed with a warm lining, also dual-purpose, as it can act as a blanket.

In cold weather, Italian military personnel may wear wool sweaters with a zip-top turtleneck.

As far as shoes are concerned, Lightweight boots for wearing in hot climates deserve special mention.. Their lower part, the actual boot, is made of durable leather; high top - soft, made of fabric and suede. Special eyelets are used for ventilation. Additional protection against sand or small stones getting into the shoes is provided by nylon gaiters, which are worn over trousers and shoes.

The full dress partially contains accessories left over from the old days; so, for the Carabinieri, these are cocked hats with a plume. Almost every unit wears its own variety of uniforms, which also differ depending on the status of the solemn event. For example, only soldiers of the Mechanized Grenadier Brigade of Sardinia, created in 1831, wear high fur hats similar to those worn by the English guards to participate in parades.

Our days: reforms

Since 2012, the Italian army has been reformed. The goal is to create a new model of the Armed Forces and balanced spending. To begin with, the personnel, including command personnel, were significantly reduced, and investments in the modernization of the army were increased. Unused weapons and property should be liquidated or sold, instead of obsolete models, modern, more efficient ones will be put into operation.

The time of change for the Italian army came back in 2007, when the leadership of the Italian Republic abolished compulsory military service. However, in the event of the country's entry into hostilities, calls may resume.

In the new army model, the focus is on professionals and those who want to join the army voluntarily. Now contractors serve 5 years, and subsequently they can renew the contract twice - each time for one or two years. At the end of the term of service, you can get a job in the police or fire departments - former military personnel are given a priority right to this.

In order to interest experienced military personnel and increase the effectiveness of the combat personnel, the government of the country has significantly increased the size of the monthly monetary reward; today the salary of the Italian military comes to 2500 Euros per month. There is a campaign to recruit women into the army; today they can hold positions at any level, with almost no restrictions.

Data

1. Troops recruited from representatives of local tribes are called "ascari" (literally "soldier");
2. The Eritrean battalions remained loyal to Italy until its surrender; the rest of the mercenaries deserted;
3. The colonial troops of the army of Italy included cavalry units that used instead of horses ... camels; they were called "mecharistii";
4. At the beginning of the last century, the Italian army fought in Abyssinia, Turkey, in Spain, Albania and Ethiopia;
5. After 1940, Italian troops invaded Greece and Yugoslavia, participated in battles in France, Africa, the USSR;
6. In recent history, the Italian army fought in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya;
7. The Italian Navy has more than 60 warships, including two unique aircraft carriers that have no analogues in Western Europe: they are equipped with short-range air defense systems and anti-ship missiles;
8. Italian military bases store 50 nuclear bombs for the US Air Force; 20 more of the same bombs are intended for use by the Italian army;
9. The duties of the carabinieri from the division of special units include: environmental protection, health and labor, the fight against counterfeiters, the protection of ancient monuments, control of food production standards;
10. In the army of Italy, there is still a cuirassier regiment, the Honorary Guard of the President of the Italian Republic. When participating in parades, they can wear historical cuirasses and helmets with feathers, and, of course, white leggings;
11. Carabinieri, as an elite branch of the military, are required to constantly improve their physical fitness and improve their professional skills, including improving fire and mountain training.

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On October 26, the Russian side handed over to Italy the remains of 121 Italian servicemen. These soldiers and officers died during the Second World War on the territory of the Belgorod and Rostov regions. Thus, to date, 10,663 Italians who died on the side of Hitler have been exhumed, the names of 2,807 of them have been established.

This event once again reminds us of the tragic events of the Second World War for both Russia and Italy. It is noteworthy that Hitler initially did not plan the participation of Italy in the attack against the USSR. Many German generals, after the extremely unsuccessful war for Italy against Greece in 1940, believed that "with such allies, there is no need for enemies."

Nevertheless, having learned about Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union, on the same day, June 22, 1941, Mussolini announced Italy's joining "the war against the communists." He sent an expeditionary force (Corpo di Spedizione Italiano in Russia, CSIR) of three divisions to help Hitler. Only 62 thousand people. The Italians participated in the offensive of the German Army Group "South" in Ukraine, in the battle for Sevastopol, in the summer battles of 1942 on the Don, as well as in the battles for Stalingrad and the Caucasus.

In August-September 1941, the corps took part in the defeat of the troops of the Soviet Southern Front. The Italians accepted the first battle with our units only on August 11. This happened in the interfluve of the Southern Bug and the Dniester. The fact is that although most of the units transferred to the Soviet front were called motorized, in reality they often did not have trucks and often got to the battlefield on foot or by bicycle, sometimes under the mocking taunts of the same Germans who drove past them comfortably in cars .

In terms of combat capability, the Italians were at the level of the Romanians or even lower. For example, in October-November, the corps commander, General Giovanni Messe, fought heavy battles on the Gorlovka-Nikitovka line in the Donbass, which cost his soldiers unreasonably large losses. And at the end of November, he tried to take the Trudovaya station, but was thrown back, losing about 5,000 people, while the elite cavalry units were defeated, which was the first serious defeat of the Italians in Russia. And at the beginning of July 1942, their losses amounted, according to various sources, from 20 to 30 thousand people.

In the summer of 1942, Mussolini increased aid to Hitler on the Eastern Front. The corps was transformed into the 8th Army (Armata Italiana in Russia, ARMIR), which consisted of 12 divisions and four brigades. It consisted of more than 235 thousand people, 2906 guns and mortars, 74 tanks and self-propelled guns, 100 aircraft. In terms of technical equipment, the 8th Army lagged behind almost all the other Nazi allies. And this subsequently played a disastrous role in her fate.

However, at the cost of heavy losses, the Italians distinguished themselves in the battle on the middle Don. In particular, in July 1942, the Bersaliers from the 3rd mobile division liquidated an important bridgehead for the Soviet troops near the town of Serafimovich and subsequently, with the help of the Germans, held the defense here. And 600 Italian cavalry allegedly put "an entire Soviet division" to flight near Izbushensk. This was the last cavalry charge in the history of the Italian army.

However, such "luck" was due mainly to German successes. Despite the large number of the Italian contingent, which at that time was in second place after the Romanian, its combat effectiveness still left much to be desired. The combat effectiveness of the Italians was noticeably weakened by the lack of good winter uniforms in many parts, which General Messe never tired of paying attention to, who opposed a further increase in the Italian contingent in the USSR until his troops were properly equipped for the winter period. However, instead of correcting this shortcoming, Mussolini and Hitler eliminated Messe himself. The "applicant" was recalled to his homeland and a more accommodating commander, General Italo Gariboldi, was appointed instead.

And disaster struck. In mid-December 1942, during the counter-offensive near Stalingrad, the Soviet troops of the Southwestern Front launched an operation against the Italians in the big bend of the Don.

At that time, she was on the left flank of the 6th German Army, which was trying to capture Stalingrad. Putting the Italians on the strategically important flank of the group fighting in Stalingrad was one of Hitler's biggest miscalculations. The length of the Italian defense sector along the northern Don was more than 250 kilometers. Their defensive positions were extremely weak, especially against tank attacks. Despite the gathering clouds, in many directions the careless Italians did not even dig trenches.

In this form, they were caught on December 11 by the beginning of Operation Little Saturn, the purpose of which was the destruction of the 8th Italian Army. Parts of the 63rd and 1st Guards Armies of the USSR especially distinguished themselves in this. By the end of December, the 8th Italian was defeated. In January 1943, the same fate befell the mountain rifle divisions of the Alpine Corps, which had hardly participated in the battle, the remnants of which broke through from the encirclement on January 26 near Nikolaevka.

By the beginning of February 1943, the 8th Italian Army was almost completely defeated. In fact, the Sforzesca, Cosseria, Celere, Torino, Posubio divisions, as well as two infantry brigades, ceased to exist. One of the main reasons for such a defeat, the Italians themselves call the fact that the Germans breaking through from the encirclement exposed them to the blow of Soviet tanks in order to ensure their withdrawal.

In total, during the counteroffensive of the Soviet troops, out of 130,000 Italians who were surrounded, only 45,000 managed to escape alive: 20,800 died, and half - 64,000 - were captured. The lion's share of prisoners (54 thousand), without warm uniforms, died in severe frosts. The survivors of these battles were for the most part frostbitten, sick and demoralized. In fact, the Italian contingent that fought in the USSR remained only on paper.

By this time, the combat effectiveness of the Italians had fallen sharply. This was also due to the fact that disappointing news reached them about the defeat of their brethren by the British in North Africa. In addition, the German allies were also irritated, increasingly hosting in their country, the economic situation of which at the beginning of 1943 was close to disaster. As a result, anti-fascist and openly communist ideas spread more and more among the soldiers. A huge role in the decomposition of the soldiers of the 8th Army was played by the agitators of the Italian Communist Party.

By the beginning of the spring of 1943, Mussolini had withdrawn the remnants of the 8th Army from the Soviet front to the deep rear. His popularity in the country fell catastrophically, as the surviving soldiers accused him of sending an unprepared army to death.

Only units of the elite 10th MAS flotilla on the Black Sea, which consisted of units of "sea devils" (combat swimmers and crews of fast boats), continued to fight against the USSR. They were able to sink two large Soviet transports and inflict heavy damage on the Molotov cruiser and the Kharkiv destroyer.

However, their successes after the defeat of Stalingrad were reduced mainly to inflicting heavy damage near Sevastopol to two Soviet patrol ships. And in the Baltic, they were not at all destined to boast of special achievements, since the command of the Soviet Baltic Fleet learned about the location of the Italian high-speed boats in 1942. It carried out a lightning-fast operation to destroy the newly arrived allies of Hitler: the Marines, who landed directly on the berths from torpedo boats, destroyed the enemy who was not expecting an attack with grenades.

Mussolini's adventure cost the Italians dearly. Their losses on the Soviet front during the war only in the dead amounted to almost 94 thousand soldiers and officers. At the same time, one cannot fail to note the fact that, compared with other allies of the Germans, the Italians were remembered by Ukrainians and Russians for their kind attitude towards the population of the occupied territories and Soviet prisoners of war. They often helped people, fed and sheltered those persecuted by the Nazis.

It is no coincidence that many thousands of Italian soldiers, including generals, were shot by the Germans for refusing to continue fighting in their ranks after Italy surrendered in September 1943. In total, at least 25 thousand people from among the Italian military who fought against the Soviet troops were destroyed.

As you know, Italy is a member of NATO, which is clearly unfriendly to us. However, relations between Italy and Russia are developing very quickly. Unlike other Western countries. The former enmity is no longer often remembered, mainly when the remains of soldiers sent to the death of Mussolini are transferred to Italy. It remains to be hoped that the lesson learned in 1941-1943 will be remembered by the Italians for a long time.