The concept of social action is the core of M. Weber's work. He develops a fundamentally different approach to the study of social processes, which consists in understanding the "mechanics" of people's behavior. In this regard, he substantiates the concept of social action.

According to M. Weber, social action (inaction, neutrality) is an action that has a subjective "meaning" regardless of the degree of its expression. Social action is the behavior of a person who, according to the subjectively assumed meaning (goals, intentions, ideas about something) of the acting person, is correlated with the behavior of other people and, based on this meaning, can be clearly explained. In other words, social is such an action, “which, in accordance with its subjective meaning, includes in the actor the attitudes about how others will act and is oriented in their direction.” This means that social action involves the conscious orientation of the subject to the partner's response and the "expectation" of a certain behavior, although it may not follow.

In everyday life, each person, performing a certain action, expects a response from those with whom this action is associated.

Thus, two features are inherent in social action: 1) the presence of the subjective meaning of the actor and 2) orientation towards the response of the other (others). The absence of any of them means non-social action. M. Weber writes: “If on the street a lot of people open their umbrellas at the same time when it starts to rain, then (as a rule) the action of one is focused on the action of the other, and the action of all is equally caused by the need for protection from the rain.” Another example of a non-social action given by M. Weber is as follows: an accidental collision between two cyclists. Such an action would be social if one of them intended to ram the other, assuming a response from the other cyclist. In the first example, the second feature is missing, in the second, both features are missing.

In accordance with the indicated signs, M. Weber distinguishes the types of social actions.

traditional social action. Based on a long habit of people, custom, tradition.

Affective social action. Based on emotions and not always realized.

Value-rational action. Based on faith in ideals, values, fidelity to "commandments", duty, etc. M. Weber writes: “A purely value-rational person acts who, regardless of the foreseeable consequences, acts in accordance with his convictions and fulfills what, as it seems to him, duty, dignity, beauty, religious prescriptions, reverence requires him to do. or the importance of some “case” is a value-rational action ... there is always an action in accordance with the “commandments” or “requirements” that the acting subject considers to be imposed on himself. Thus, this type of social action is associated with morality, religion, and law.

Purposeful action. Based on striving for the goal, the choice of means, accounting for the results of activities. M. Weber characterizes it as follows: “The one who orients actions in accordance with the goal, means and side desires and at the same time rationally weighs both means in relation to the goal, as goals in relation to side desires, and, finally, and different possible targets in relation to each other. This type of action is not associated with any particular field of activity and therefore is considered by M. Weber to be the most developed. Understanding in its purest form takes place where we have a purposeful rational action.

The above understanding of social action has advantages and disadvantages. The advantages include the disclosure of the mechanism of human activity, the definition of the driving forces of human behavior (ideals, goals, values, desires, needs, etc.). The disadvantages are no less significant:

1) The concept of social action does not take into account random, but sometimes very significant phenomena. They are either natural (natural disasters) or social (economic crises, wars, revolutions, etc.). Random for a given society, for a given subject, they do not carry any subjective meaning and, moreover, the expectation of a reciprocal move. However, history would have a very mystical character if chance did not play any role in it.

2) The concept of social action explains only the direct actions of people, leaving out of sight of the sociologist the consequences of the second, third and other generations. After all, they do not contain the subjective meaning of the actor and there is no expectation of a reciprocal move. M. Weber underestimates the objective significance of the subjective meaning of people's behavior. Science can hardly afford such a luxury. In studying only the direct, M. Weber involuntarily approaches the positivism of Comte, who also insisted on the study of directly sensually perceived phenomena.

3 Rationalization of public life

Weber's main idea is the idea of ​​economic rationality, which has found consistent expression in contemporary capitalist society with its rational religion (Protestantism), rational law and government (rational bureaucracy), rational monetary circulation, etc. The focus of Weberian analysis is the relationship between religious beliefs, the status and structure of social groups. The idea of ​​rationality received a sociological development in his concept of rational bureaucracy as the highest embodiment of capitalist rationality. Features of Weber's method in the combination of sociological, constructive thinking with specific historical reality, which allows us to define his sociology as "empirical".

M. Weber did not accidentally arrange the four types of social actions he described in order of increasing rationality, although the first two types do not quite correspond to the criteria of social action. This order, in his opinion, expresses the trend of the historical process. History proceeds with some "hindrances" and "deviations", but still rationalization is a world-historical process. It is expressed, first of all, in the replacement of internal adherence to habitual mores and customs by a systematic adaptation to considerations of interest.

Rationalization covered all spheres of public life: economics, management, politics, law, science, life and leisure of people. All this is accompanied by a colossal strengthening of the role of science, which is a pure type of rationality. Rationalization is the result of a combination of a number of historical factors that predetermined the development of Europe over the past 300-400 years. In a certain period in a certain territory, several phenomena intersected that carried a rational beginning:

ancient science, especially mathematics, subsequently associated with technology;

Roman law, which was not known to the previous types of society and which was developed in the Middle Ages;

a way of doing business imbued with the "spirit of capitalism", that is, arising due to the separation of labor power from the means of production and giving rise to "abstract" labor accessible to quantitative measurement.

Weber viewed personality as the basis of sociological analysis. He believed that such complex concepts as capitalism, religion and the state can only be comprehended on the basis of an analysis of the behavior of individuals. By obtaining reliable knowledge about the behavior of an individual in a social context, the researcher can better understand the social behavior of various human communities. While studying religion, Weber identified the relationship between social organization and religious values. According to Weber, religious values ​​can be a powerful force influencing social change. Thus, in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Weber described how faith led the Calvinists to a life of work and frugality; both of these qualities contributed to the development of modern capitalism (capitalism, according to Weber, is the most rational type of management). In political sociology, Weber paid attention to the conflict of interests of various factions of the ruling class; the main conflict in the political life of the modern state, according to Weber, is in the struggle between political parties and the bureaucracy.

This is how M. Weber explains why, with a number of similarities between the West and the East, fundamentally different societies have developed. He calls all societies outside Western Europe traditional, since they lack the most important feature: the formal-rational principle.

Looking from the 18th century, a formally rational society would be considered the embodiment of social progress. It embodied much that the thinkers of the Enlightenment dreamed about. Indeed, in a historically short time, some two centuries, the life of society has changed beyond recognition. The way of life and leisure of people has changed, the feelings, thoughts, assessments of people of everything around them have changed. The positive significance of the triumphal procession of rationality across the planet is obvious.

But in the 20th century, the shortcomings of rationality also became noticeable. If in the past money was a means of obtaining education necessary for personal development and a good job, then in the present education becomes a means of making money. Getting money becomes one of the sports, henceforth it is a means for a different goal - prestige. Thus, the development of the personality fades into the background, and something external comes to the fore - prestige. Education has become a decorative attribute.

In other areas of public life, rationalization also began to show its disadvantages. Why walk when you have a car? Why sing "for yourself" when there is a tape recorder? The goals here are not the contemplation of the surroundings, but movement in space, not the self-expression of the soul, but the consciousness that my tape recorder and the music heard from it are “on the level”, moreover, at the level of decibels. Formal rationalization impoverishes human existence, although it advances it far in terms of expediency. And expedient benefit, abundance, comfort. Other inappropriate aspects of life are considered indicators of backwardness.

The substance of rationality is reason, not reason. Moreover, reason in rationality often contradicts reason and does not fit well with humanism. The nature of rationality lies not only in rationality, but also in what is poorly consistent with the meaning of human life. The meaning of life common to all people lies in the satisfaction with their existence, which they call happiness. Satisfaction with life does not depend on the content of activity and even on its social assessment, in satisfaction it is the limit of human activity. Rationalization eliminates this limit, it offers a person more and more new desires. One satisfied desire gives rise to another, and so on ad infinitum. The more money you have, the more you want to have. F. Bacon's motto "Knowledge is power" is replaced by the motto "Time is money". The more power you have, the more you want to have it and demonstrate it in every possible way (“Absolute power absolutely corrupts”). Satiated people languish in search of "sharp" sensations. Some pay for intimidation, others for physical torture, others seek oblivion in Eastern religions, and so on.

People also realized the danger of rationalizing life in the 20th century. Two world wars and dozens of local wars, the threat of an ecological crisis on a planetary scale gave rise to a movement of anti-scientism, whose supporters blame science for giving people sophisticated means of extermination. The study of "backward" peoples, especially those at the stage of development of the Stone Age, has gained great popularity. Tourism is developing, providing an opportunity to get acquainted with the culture of "traditional" societies.

Understanding Sociology” by M. Weber.

The non-classical type of scientific sociology was developed by the German thinker Max Weber (1858-1918). This methodology is based on the idea of ​​the fundamental opposition between the laws of nature and society and, consequently, the recognition of the need for the existence of two types of scientific knowledge: the sciences of nature (natural science) and the sciences of culture (humanitarian knowledge). Sociology, on the other hand, is a frontier science that should borrow the best from them. The natural sciences have a commitment to exact facts and a causal explanation of reality, while the humanities have a method of understanding and relating to values. Therefore, Weber's sociology is called understanding. As a subject of sociology, Weber considered not the concepts of "people", "society", etc., but only the individual, since it is he who has consciousness, motivation for his actions and rational behavior. Weber emphasized the importance of the sociologist's understanding of the subjective meaning that is put into action by the individual himself. Observing a chain of real actions of an individual, a sociologist must construct their explanation on the basis of understanding the internal motives of these actions. Weber's main tool for cognition was "ideal types", which are mental logical constructions created by the researcher. They are formed by highlighting the individual features of reality, which are the most typical. According to Weber, all social facts are explained by social types. Weber proposed a typology of social action, types of state, and rationality. Weber considered the social structure of society as a multidimensional system in which, along with classes and the property relations that give rise to them, an important place belongs to status and power. According to Weber, there are several types of state:

Legal, in which dominance is due to interests, i.e. rational considerations of those who obey. The dominance of the state Weber defined as "the chance to meet obedience to a certain order." Bureaucracy is a pure type of legal state. This type of state is represented in England, France, and the USA.

Traditional, it is determined simply by mores, habits of certain behavior. This type of domination is similar to the family, it is patriarchal, there is a master, servants personally dependent on him and a management apparatus. Traditional domination, in turn, is divided into two forms: a purely patriarchal and estate management structure. The first form appeared, for example, in Byzantium, the second - in the feudal states of Western Europe.

charismatic dominance. Charismatic qualities are special abilities, not so much acquired as bestowed from above, which distinguish a leader from his contemporaries. They were possessed, according to Weber, by Buddha, Jesus, Mohammed, Caesar, Napoleon and other great subjects. Here the role of authoritarianism is especially great, in fact, tradition, law, rationality are denied, the role of chance is great.

Ideal types of social actions by M. Weber

One of the central concepts of Weberian sociology is social action. Here is how Weber himself defines it: "Action" we call the action of a person (regardless of whether it is external or internal, whether it comes down to non-intervention or patient acceptance), if and insofar as the acting individual or individuals associate with him the subjective meaning. "Social" we call such an action, which, according to the meaning assumed by the actor or actors, correlates with the action others people and focuses on it. However, the actions and deeds of people are also studied by many other sciences, in particular, history and psychology. What is the qualitative originality of purely sociological approaches? First of all, the fact that sociology studies generalized behavior of people as if it proceeded in certain ideal conditions. At the same time, she is interested not only in the orientation of actions towards other people, but also in the degree to which they are filled with a certain meaning. The concept of meaning is derived from the ratio of ends and means. The study of various variants of this correlation leads Weber to the construction of an ideal typology of social actions. The point is that any deeds and actions performed by human beings can be "measured" using these peculiar standards, that is, they can be more or less roughly assigned to one of the four ideal types listed in the table. Let's try to look at each of them in more detail.

Purposeful rational action. This most rational type of action is characterized by clarity and awareness of the goal, and this is correlated with rationally meaningful means that ensure the achievement of this, and not some other goal. The rationality of the goal can be verified in two ways: firstly, from the point of view of its own content, and secondly, from the point of view of expediency(those. conformity with purpose) of the chosen means. As a social action (and, therefore, focused on certain expectations on the part of other people), it presupposes the rational calculation of the acting subject on the appropriate reaction from the surrounding people, on the one hand, and on the use of their behavior to achieve the set goal, on the other. Here it is necessary to remember that such a model is primarily an ideal type, which means that real human actions can be understood primarily through measuring the degree of deviation from this model. In some cases, such deviations are not too significant, and we can speak of a real act as "almost purposeful." If the deviations are more significant, then they practically lead us to other types of social behavior.

Value-rational action. This ideal type of social action involves the performance of such actions, which are based on the belief in the self-sufficient value of the act as such, in other words, here the action itself acts as the goal. Value-rational action, according to Weber, is always subject to certain requirements, in following which the individual sees his duty. If he acts in accordance with these requirements - even if rational calculation predicts a greater likelihood of adverse consequences for him personally - then we are dealing with value-rational action. A classic example of a value-rational action: the captain of a sinking ship is the last to leave him, although this threatens his life. The awareness of such an orientation of actions, their correlation with certain ideas about values ​​- about duty, dignity, beauty, morality, etc. - already speaks of a certain rationality, meaningfulness. If, moreover, we are dealing with consistency in the implementation of such behavior, and therefore with premeditation, then we can talk about an even greater degree of its rationality, which distinguishes a value-rational action, say, from an affective one. At the same time, in comparison with the goal-rational type, the “value rationality” of an action carries something irrational, since it absolutizes the value that the individual is guided by. “Purely value-rational,” Weber argues, “one acts who, regardless of the foreseeable consequences, acts in accordance with his convictions and does what, as it seems to him, duty, dignity, beauty, religious prescription require of him, reverence or importance of some ... "cause". A value-rational action ... is always an action in accordance with the "commandments" or "requirements" that the actor considers presented to himself. It seems that the difference between goal-oriented and value-rational types of social action is approximately the same as between truth And true. The first of these concepts means "that which There is in fact", regardless of the system of ideas, convictions, beliefs that have developed in a particular society (as V.I. Dal notes on this occasion: "Everything that There is, That true; not one and the same There is And truth, truth?"). To obtain this kind of knowledge is really not easy, you can simply consistently, step by step, approach - as suggested by the positivist Comte. The second means comparing what you observe or intend to do with the norms generally accepted in this society and ideas about what is proper and right.In other words, the truth is always normative. As the same Dal defines "truth": "truth in deed, truth in the image, in the good; justice, fairness."

traditional action. This type of action is formed on the basis of following tradition, that is, imitation of certain patterns of behavior that have developed in culture and are approved by it, and therefore are practically not subject to rational comprehension and criticism. Such an action is carried out largely purely automatically, according to established stereotypes, it is characterized by the desire to focus on habitual patterns of behavior that have developed on the basis of one's own experience and the experience of previous generations. Despite the fact that traditional actions do not at all imply the development of an orientation towards new opportunities (and perhaps just for this reason), perhaps it is precisely this that makes up the lion's share of all actions performed by individuals. To some extent, people's commitment to committing traditional actions (manifested in a huge number of options) serves as the basis for the stability of the existence of society and the predictability of the behavior of its members. As Weber himself points out, "...purely traditional action...is on the very frontier, and often even beyond, what can be called 'meaningfully' oriented action."

affective action. The least meaningful of the ideal types listed in the table. Its main characteristic is a certain emotional state - a flash of passion, hatred, anger, horror, etc. Affective action has its own "meaning", mainly in the speedy removal of the emotional tension that has arisen, in relaxation. In this it is directly opposed to purposeful rational action; however, there is a certain similarity with the value-rational action, which, as we have seen, also does not seek to achieve any "external" goal and sees certainty in the very performance of the action. "An individual acts under the influence of an affect if he seeks to immediately satisfy his need for revenge, pleasure, devotion, blissful contemplation, or relieve the tension of any other affects, no matter how base or subtle they may be." The above typology can serve as a good illustration for understanding the essence of what what was defined above as the "ideal type". It is unlikely that any of the real actions performed in this world by real people could be fully characterized as belonging to one or another ideal type of social action. They can only be more or less approach one of them to a lesser extent, carry the features of both, and the other, and the third.And each of the ideal types will perform the functions of a "reference meter" - an iridium bar stored in the Paris Chamber of Weights and Measures. types of social actions, strictly speaking, are not completely social - at least in the Weberian sense of the word.In fact, both traditional and especially affective types of action are in many respects close to those types of action that are also characteristic of animals. The first of them - traditional - can be largely likened to a conditioned reflex, and the second - affective - to an unconditioned reflex. It is clear that they are a product of the intellect to a much lesser extent than the second and, in particular, the first types of social action. With the above typology of ideal types of social actions, one of the core ideas of Weberian sociology, the idea of ​​consistent rationalization social life. In general, the idea of ​​strengthening the significance of rationality with the historical development of a particular society runs like a red thread through Weber's scientific work. He firmly believes that rationalization This is one of the main tendencies of the historical process itself. Rationalization finds its expression in an increase in the share of goal-oriented actions in the total volume of all possible types of social actions and in strengthening their significance from the point of view of the structure of society as a whole. This means that the way of managing the economy is being rationalized, management is being rationalized, the way of thinking is being rationalized. And all this, according to Weber, is accompanied by a colossal strengthening of the social role of scientific knowledge - this most "pure" embodiment of the principle of rationality. Formal rationality in the Weberian sense is, first of all, calculability everything that can be quantified and calculated. The type of society in which this kind of dominant appears is called by modern sociologists industrial(although Saint-Simon was the first to call it that, and then Comte used this term quite actively). All previously existing types of societies Weber (and after him - the majority of modern sociologists) calls traditional. The most important feature of traditional societies is the absence in the social actions of the majority of their members of a formally rational principle and the predominance of actions that are closest in nature to the traditional type of action. Formal-rational- this is a definition applicable to any phenomenon, process, action, which is not only amenable to quantitative accounting and calculation, but, moreover, is largely limited to its quantitative characteristics. The movement of the process of historical development itself is characterized by a tendency for the growth of formal-rational principles in the life of society and the increasing predominance of the purposeful-rational type of social actions over all others. It is clear that at the same time this should also mean an increase in the role of intelligence in the general system of motivations and decision-making by social subjects. A society dominated by formal rationality is a society where the norm is not so much the pursuit of gain as rational (i.e. prudent) behavior. All members of such a society behave in such a way as to use everything rationally and for the benefit of all - material resources, technology, and money. Luxury, for example, cannot be considered rational, since it is by no means a reasonable expenditure of resources. Rationalization as a process, as a historical trend, according to Weber, includes: 1) in the economic sphere- organization of factory production by bureaucratic means and calculation of benefits through systematic evaluation procedures; 2) in religion- the development of theological concepts by intellectuals, the gradual disappearance of the magical and the displacement of the sacraments by personal responsibility; 3) in law- erosion of specially arranged /ad hoc/ lawmaking and arbitrary judicial precedent by deductive legal reasoning on the basis of universal laws; 4) in politics- the decline of traditional norms of legalization and replacement of charismatic leadership by a regular party machine; 5) in moral conduct- greater emphasis on discipline and education; 6) in science- the gradual reduction of the role of the individual innovator and the development of research teams, coordinated experiments and government-directed science policy; 7) in society as a whole- distribution of bureaucratic methods of management, state control and administration. The concept of rationalization was thus part of Weber's view of capitalist society as a kind of "iron cage" in which the individual, devoid of religious meaning and moral values, would be increasingly subject to state supervision and bureaucratic regulation. Like Marx's concept of alienation, rationalization implies the separation of the individual from the community, the family, the church, and his subordination to legal political and economic regulation in the factory, school, and state. Thus, Weber unequivocally presented rationalization as the leading trend in Western capitalist society. Rationalization is the process by which the sphere of human relations becomes the subject of calculation and control. While Marxists recognized the leading position of calculation only in the labor process and factory discipline, Weber found rationalization in all social spheres - politics, religion, economic organization, university management, in the laboratory, and even in musical notation.

As you can see, Max Weber was a scientist with a very broad social outlook. He left a noticeable mark on the development of many aspects of social science, in particular sociology. Not being a supporter of the Marxist approach to solving the problems of society, he nevertheless never distorted or simplified this doctrine, emphasizing that “an analysis of social phenomena and cultural processes from the point of view of their economic conditionality and their influence was and - with caution, free from dogmatism, application - will remain for the foreseeable future a creative and fruitful scientific principle. In all studies, Weber held the idea of ​​rationality as a defining feature of modern European culture. Rationality opposes the traditional and charismatic ways of organizing social relations. Weber's central problem is the connection between the economic life of society, the material and ideological interests of various social groups and religious consciousness. Weber viewed personality as the basis of sociological analysis. He believed that such complex concepts as capitalism, religion and the state can only be understood on the basis of an analysis of the behavior of individuals. By obtaining reliable knowledge about the behavior of an individual in a social context, the researcher can better understand the social behavior of various human communities. While studying religion, Weber identified the relationship between social organization and religious values. According to Weber, religious values ​​can be a powerful force influencing social change. In political sociology, Weber paid attention to the conflict of interests of various factions of the ruling class; the main conflict of the political life of the modern state, according to Weber, is in the struggle between political parties and the bureaucracy. The ideas of Max Weber are very fashionable today for the modern sociological thought of the West. They are experiencing a kind of renaissance, rebirth. This indicates that Max Weber was an outstanding scientist. His social ideas, obviously, had a leading character, if they are so in demand today by Western sociology as a science of society and the laws of its development.

Similar information.

The theory of social action M. Weber.

Performed:

Introduction…………………………………………………………………………..3

1. Biography of M. Weber…………………………………………………………..4

2. The main provisions of the theory of social action………………………7

2.1 Social action……………………………………………………..7

3. Theory of social action……………………………………………..........17

3.1 Purposeful rational behavior……………………………………………………………………………….

3.2 Value-rational behavior…………………………………..22

3.3 Affective behavior………………………………………………..23

3.4 Traditional behavior……………………………………………….24

Conclusion……………………………………………………………………….28

References…………………………………………………………........29

Introduction

Relevance of the topic. The theory of social action is the "core" of M. Weber's sociology, management, political science, sociology of management and other sciences, and therefore its importance for professional training is very great, because. he created one of the most fundamental concepts of sociological science for all the time of its existence - the theory of social action as a tool for explaining the behavior of various types of people.

The interaction of a person as a person with the world around him is carried out in a system of objective relations that develop between people in their social life and, above all, in production activities. Objective relations and connections (relations of dependence, subordination, cooperation, mutual assistance, etc.) inevitably and naturally arise in any real group. Interaction and relationships are formed on the basis of human actions and behavior.

The study of the theory of social action by Max Weber, one of the main concepts of sociology, makes it possible in practice to find out the reasons for the interaction of various forces in society, human behavior, to comprehend the factors that make people act this way and not otherwise.

The purpose of this course work– study of the theory of social action by M. Weber.

Objectives of the course work:

1. Expand the definition of social action.

2. Designate the classification of social actions proposed by M. Weber.

1. Biography of M. Weber

M. Weber (1864-1920) belongs to those universally educated minds, which, unfortunately, are becoming less and less as the differentiation of the social sciences grows. Weber was the largest specialist in the field of political economy, law, sociology, and philosophy. He acted as a historian of the economy, political institutions and political theories, religion and science, and, most importantly, as a logician and methodologist who developed the principles of knowledge of the social sciences.

Max Weber was born on April 21, 1864 in Erfurt, Germany. In 1882 he graduated from the classical gymnasium in Berlin and entered the University of Heidelberg. In 1889 defended his thesis. He worked as a professor at the universities of Berlin, Freiburg, Heidelberg, and Munich.

In 1904 Weber becomes editor of the German sociological journal "Archive for Social Science and Social Policy". His most important works are published here, including the programmatic study "The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism" (1905). This study begins a series of publications by Weber on the sociology of religion, which he pursued until his death. At the same time, he dealt with the problems of logic and methodology of the social sciences. From 1916 to 1919 he published one of his main works - "Economic Ethics of World Religions". Of Weber's last speeches, the reports "Politics as a Profession" (1919) and "Science as a Profession" should be noted.

M. Weber was influenced by a number of thinkers who determined in many respects both his methodological principles and his worldview. In methodological terms, in the field of the theory of knowledge, he was greatly influenced by the ideas of neo-Kantianism, and above all by G. Rickert.

By his own admission, Weber, the works of K. Marx, which prompted him to study the problems of the emergence and development of capitalism, were of great importance in shaping his thinking. In general, he attributed Marx to those thinkers who most strongly influenced the socio-historical thought of the 19th-20th centuries.

As for the general philosophical, worldview plan, Weber experienced two different, and in many respects mutually exclusive influences: on the one hand, the philosophy of I. Kant, especially in his youth; on the other hand, almost in the same period, he was under the influence and was a great admirer of N. Machiavelli, T. Hobbes and f. Nietzsche.

To understand the meaning of his views and actions, it should be noted that Kant attracted Weber, first of all, with his ethical pathos. He remained faithful to Kant's moral requirement of honesty and conscientiousness in scientific research until the end of his life.

Hobbes and especially Machiavelli made a strong impression on him with their political realism. As the researchers note, it was precisely the attraction to these two mutually exclusive poles "(on the one hand, Kant's ethical idealism with its pathos of "truth", on the other hand, political realism with its installation of "sobriety and strength") determined the peculiar duality of M. Weber's worldview.

The first works of M. Weber - "On the history of trading societies in the Middle Ages" (1889), "Roman agrarian history and its significance for public and private law" (1891) - immediately put him in a number of prominent scientists. In them, he analyzed the relationship of state-legal formations with the economic structure of society. In these works, especially in Roman Agrarian History, the general contours of an "empirical sociology" (Weber's expression) were outlined, which was most closely associated with history. In accordance with the requirements of the historical school that dominated German political economy, he considered the evolution of ancient agriculture in connection with social and political development, and did not miss the analysis of the forms of family life, way of life, customs, religious cults.

A trip to the United States in 1904, where he was invited to give a course of lectures, had a great influence on his formation as a sociologist. In 1904, Weber became the editor of the German sociological journal "Archive of Social Science and Social Policy". Here his most important works are published, including the programmatic study "The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism" (1905). This study begins a series of publications by Weber on the sociology of religion, which he pursued until his death. At the same time, he dealt with the problems of logic and methodology of the social sciences. From 1916 to 1919 he published one of his main works - "Economic Ethics of World Religions". Of Weber's last speeches, the reports "Politics as a Profession" (1919) and "Science as a Profession" should be noted. They found their expression of Weber's mentality after the First World War. They were quite pessimistic - pessimistic, in relation to the future of industrial civilization, as well as the prospects for the implementation of socialism in Russia. He did not have any special expectations from him. He was convinced that if what is called socialism is realized, then it will only be a system of bureaucratization of society carried to the end.

Weber died in 1920, not having had time to carry out all his plans. His fundamental work "Economy and Society" (1921) was published posthumously, summarizing the results of his sociological research.

2. Basic provisions of the theory of social action

The theory of action has a stable conceptual base in sociology, the formation of which was influenced by various directions of thinking. In order to supplement or expand this theoretical foundation in order to further improve the theory, it is necessary to proceed from the current level of its development, as well as from the contributions of the classics, which today are beginning to take shape in a new way. All this is necessary in order for it to be effective and not lose relevance for the future. Regarding the contribution of M. Weber to the formation of the theory of action among sociologists today there is a complete mutual understanding. There is no doubt that the justification he undertook for sociology as a science of social action represented a radical turn against the positivism and historicism that prevailed in the social sciences at the beginning of the 20th century. However, much ambiguity and inconsistency exists over the interpretation of his views.

2.1 Social action

Weber defines action (regardless of whether it manifests itself externally, for example, in the form of aggression, or is hidden inside the subjective world of the personality, like suffering) as such behavior with which the acting individual or individuals associate a subjectively assumed meaning. only if, according to the meaning assumed by the actor or actors, it correlates with the action of other people and focuses on it. "And he declares the explanation of social action to be the central task. In its qualitative originality, it differs from reactive behavior, because in its it is based on subjective meaning. It is a preconceived plan or project of action. As social, it differs from reactive behavior in that this meaning is related to the action of another. Sociology, therefore, must devote itself to the study of the facts of social action.

This is how Weber defines social action. "Action" should be called human behavior (it makes no difference whether external or internal action, non-action and or undergoing), if and insofar as the agent or agents associate with it some subjective meaning. “But a “social action” should be called one that, in its meaning, implied by the actor or actors, is related to the behavior of others and is thus oriented in its course.” Based on this, "an action cannot be considered social if it is purely imitative, when the individual acts like an atom of the crowd, or when he is guided by some natural phenomenon."

The goal is a significant understanding and explanation of social reality, which is the result of significant social activity.

social action, according to Max Weber, is distinguished by two features that make it social, i.e. different from mere action. Social Action:

1) has a meaning for the one who does it,

2) focused on other people.

Meaning is a certain idea of ​​why or why this action is performed, it is some (sometimes very vague) awareness and direction of it. There is a well-known example by which M. Weber illustrates his definition of social action: if two cyclists collide on a highway, then this is not a social action (although it happens between people) - that's when they jump up and start to sort things out between themselves (swear or help a friend). friend), then the action acquires the characteristics of the social.

If we analyze social action as a system, the following components can be distinguished in it:

1) acting person (subject of action)
2) the object of the action (the person being acted upon)
3) a means or instrument of action
4) method of action or method of using the means of action
5) the result of the action or the reaction of the person being acted upon.

Social action should be distinguished from the concept of "behavior". Behavior is a response to action. Social action is a system of actions, means and methods by which an individual or group tries to change the behavior, attitudes or opinions of other individuals or groups.

A social action, its performance requires the subject to have a certain attitude or a strong inclination to perform a certain action.

Social action, writes Weber, is considered to be an action whose "subjective meaning refers to the behavior of other people." Based on this, an action cannot be considered social if it is purely imitative, when an individual acts like an atom of a crowd, or when he is oriented towards some natural phenomenon (for example, an action is not social when a lot of people open umbrellas during rain ).

Signs of social action:

1 . the most important sign of social action is subjective meaning - personal understanding of possible behaviors.

2 . the conscious orientation of the subject to the response of others, the expectation of this reaction, is important.

The essential components of an action are subject And an object actions.

Subject- this is the bearer of purposeful activity, the one who acts with consciousness and will.

An object- what the action is directed at.

IN functional aspect stand out action steps :

1. associated with goal setting

2. related to their operational implementation.

At these stages, organizational links are established between the subject and the object of action. The goal is an ideal image of the process and result of the action. The ability to set goals, i.e. to the ideal modeling of upcoming actions, is the most important property of a person as a subject of action.

Six types of social action by their orientation:

M. Weber identified six types of social action:

1. The correct type, in which the end and the chosen means are objectively adequate to each other and therefore strictly rational.

2. The type in which the means chosen to achieve the goal seem adequate to the subject himself. Objectively, they may not be.

3. The action is approximate, without a clearly defined goal and means, according to the principle "maybe something will work out."

4. An action that does not have an exact goal, determined by specific circumstances and understandable only in view of them.

5. An action only partially understood by its circumstances. It also includes a number of obscure elements.

6. An action that is caused by completely incomprehensible psychological or physical factors and is inexplicable from a rational position.

This classification is not contrived or speculative. It allows you to arrange all types of social action according to the degree of decreasing rationality, and, consequently, understandability. In fact, the transition from one type to another is almost imperceptible. But the accumulation of growing quantitative differences eventually turns the type of purposeful rational action into its opposite, into the type of irrational, practically incomprehensible, inexplicable action. Only the last two types need to be explained from a psychological point of view.

Not all types of action - including external ones - are "social" in the sense taken here. An external action cannot be called social if it is oriented only towards the behavior of material objects. An internal relationship is social only if it is oriented toward the behavior of others. So, for example, actions of a religious nature are not social if they do not go beyond the limits of contemplation, a prayer read in solitude, etc. Management (of an individual) is social only if and insofar as it takes into account the behavior of others. In the most general and formal terms, therefore, if such management reflects the recognition by third parties of the actual rights of a given individual to dispose of his economy at his own discretion. Not all types of human relationships are social in nature.

Social action is not identical to either:

a) the uniform behavior of many people (if many people on the street open umbrellas when it rains, then this (as a rule) does not mean that a person’s action is focused on the behavior of others; these are just the same type of actions to protect from rain);

b) one that is influenced by the behavior of others (it is known that a person’s behavior is strongly influenced simply by the fact that he is among a crowded “mass” of people (the subject of “mass psychology” studied in Le Bon’s work); such behavior is defined as behavior An individual can also be the object of mass influence by scattered masses of people if they influence him simultaneously or sequentially (for example, through the press), and he perceives their behavior as the behavior of many.Reactions of a certain type become possible only due to the fact that the individual feels himself to be part of the “mass”, other reactions, on the contrary, are hindered by this.)

M. Weber sought to show how the most important social facts - relations, order, connections - should be defined as special forms of social action. Another thing is that this aspiration was not actually realized. A systematic explanation of these social facts through the study of the single actions that constitute them has not taken place. Social action leads to social fact. This is Weber's most important thought. But in this case, attention should be paid to the fact that not all the facts that traditional sociology explores can be explained as certain joint actions, and also refuted through the explanation of the individual actions of the participants. These facts include the distribution of income, social ideas about values. Social ideas about the world and values ​​that individuals strive for, ideas that, in turn, determine various phenomena - all this is at the center of attention of social science.

In the context of Weber's theory, it is necessary to understand the principles by which the process of performing an action can be explained, which implies its reduction to the corresponding motives. It is also necessary to explain the result of an action through understanding, which involves establishing and examining those actions that preceded it. Explanation of action through understanding also allows taking into account special principles and techniques for this, i.e. how to use them in each specific case. Weber's judgments regarding the explanation of actions lead to a theory of the latter, which does not pin much hope on the principle of understanding. M. Weber moves along this path, it will become clear after checking and reconstructing those specific techniques that he uses to explain action through understanding.

In order to explain the flow of action through understanding, it is necessary to limit oneself to a set of rules and requirements. Therefore, in Weber it is useful to distinguish between two points:

1. General techniques for explaining action through understanding.

2. Specific guidance on how these techniques and methods should be used in a particular case.

For Weber, the course of action is behavior under certain external conditions. Its explanation, like the explanation of any other event, must be carried out by subsuming it under a general empirical pattern with which the conditions of action are associated. In this approach, understanding will play a twofold role.

Direct explanation is preceded by a special type of understanding aimed at identifying the type of action that needs to be explained by locking its external features to the meaning or purpose of this action, which involves the use of hypotheses regarding the connection of certain external features with the corresponding purpose of the action. Direct explanation must be made by "explaining understanding." We are talking here about reducing the meaning of the action to its subjective grounds, in order to understand why the person we are interested in acts in this way, and not in another.

To discover these subjective grounds, a peculiar representation of oneself in the place of the acting individual, in the conditions in which he is located, is supposed. It is necessary to make available reflections on the ends and means that preceded the actions to be explained. This suggests that "it is necessary to make accessible and understandable the previous connection of feelings and emotions."

Weber thus believes that an action is explained by reference to a particular causal principle. For Weber, explanation is a technique in which the general rules of experience are applied. However, he expresses the idea that the basis for interpreting behavior is one's own knowledge of everyday life. Therefore, the general rules applied in the disclosure of the grounds for action reveals "their direct connection with personal experience, substantiating everyday knowledge, and therefore they are not precisely and not quite definitely formulated." Therefore, in a general interpretation of explanatory understanding, Weber draws attention to the fact that understanding occurs in the light of the general rules of everyday knowledge.

For Weber, understanding is a means to find the most obvious and adequate explanation for a given action. But the presence of an “understandably” defined cause of an action is not a condition for an adequate explanation. The latter occurs when empirical verification reveals that the found explanation is correct. How such a check should look like - Weber does not specify. With any concrete explanation of an action, he seeks to test hypotheses regarding the causal relationship of certain external situations and the subjective grounds for the action, on the one hand, and a number of grounds for the action with the corresponding action, on the other. For Weber, it is important to establish a correspondence between adequacy in meaning and verification through experience.

This test involves some statistical methods, historical comparison and, in the extreme case, a thought experiment. In this test, Weber would like to verify the assumptions applied in explaining the action as to the existence of its determinants. For example, the assumption about what goals, assessments of the situation and ideas about the actions of the participants, consistent with the goal, were contained by the actors.

The psychological understanding of other people's mental states is, according to Weber, only an auxiliary, and not the main tool for the historian and sociologist. It can be resorted to only if the action to be explained cannot be understood according to its meaning.

“In explaining the irrational moments of action, an understanding psychology can indeed render an undoubtedly important service. But this, - he emphasizes, - does not change anything in the methodological principles.

Directly the most understandable in its semantic structure is an action oriented subjectively strictly rationally in accordance with the means that are considered uniquely adequate to achieve unambiguous and clearly perceived goals.

The most "understandable" action is meaningful, i.e. directed towards the achievement of goals clearly recognized by the acting individual himself and using to achieve these goals the means recognized as adequate by the acting individual himself. The consciousness of the acting individual is thus necessary for the action under study to act as a social reality.

When explaining an action, Weber assigns decisive importance to motives. Therefore, the typology of actions refers to the existing types of motivation. Within the framework of this approach, the individual acts as something self-evident, as an initial given. Society is a collection of people and the connections between them. Weber is interested in the formation of a certain stereotype of orientation, which is mandatory for many individuals. It presupposes the existence of corresponding values ​​of norms. Consistency arises when the interaction participants are oriented to this stereotype. Therefore, sociology explains, understanding the meaning of the action that is summed up under it. In this context, society for Weber is something that is consciously regulated.

M. Weber considers only its goal as a determinant of action and does not pay due attention to the circumstances that make it possible. He did not indicate sufficient conditions for finding out among which action alternatives one chooses. He has no judgments about what goals of the action and in what situations the actor has, and, finally, what options for action leading to this goal the subject sees, and what type of selection he makes among them.

3. Social action theory

Weber identifies four types of activities, focusing on the possible real behavior of people in life:

- purposeful,

- value-rational,

- affective,

- traditional.

Let us turn to Weber himself: “Social action, like any action, can be defined:

1) purposefully rational, that is, through the expectation of a certain behavior of objects of the external world and other people and when using this expectation as “conditions” or as a “means” for rationally directed and regulated goals (the criterion of rationality is success);

2) value-rational, that is, in a conscious belief in the ethical, aesthetic, religious, or any other understood unconditional own value (self-worth) of a certain behavior, taken simply as such and regardless of success;

3) affectively, especially emotionally - through actual affects and feelings;

4) traditionally, that is, through habit.

Ideal types of social actions

3.1 Purposeful rational behavior

In "Economy and Society" it is called differently: first "rational", later - "purposeful", which reveals two distinctive features:

1. It is “subjectively goal-oriented”, i.e. due, on the one hand, to a clearly conscious purpose of the action, which does not raise doubts about its implementation. On the other hand, it is a conscious idea that the action being carried out achieves the goal at the lowest cost.

2. This action is "right oriented". This assumes that in this case the assumption is used that the action of interest to us is consistent with its goal. It depends on the fact that the subject's ideas about this situation - let's call them conditionally "ontological" knowledge - were correct, as well as the ideas about what actions he can use to achieve the intended goal. We will conditionally call these representations “monological” knowledge. Schematically, goal-oriented action can be described using the following determinants:

1. A clear understanding of the goal is crucial here in the sense that undesirable consequences for other subjective goals that may arise in the process of its implementation are called into question. This action is carried out in a given situation with the least expensive means for its implementation.

2. Purposeful rational action can be defined indirectly, due to the existence of two special determinants:

a) through correct information about the uniqueness of the given situation and the causal relationship of various actions with the implementation of the goal pursued in this situation, i.e. through correct “ontological” or “nomological” knowledge;

b) due to the conscious calculation of the proportionality and consistency of the action taken on the basis of the information available. This involves the implementation of at least four operations:

1. Rational calculation of those actions that may be possible with a certain degree of probability. They can also be means to achieve the goal.

2. A conscious calculation of the consequences of actions that can act as means, and this involves paying attention to those costs and undesirable consequences that may arise due to the frustration of other goals.

3. Rational calculation of the desired consequences of any action, which is also considered as a means. Consideration should be given to whether it is acceptable in the face of undesirable consequences.

4. Careful comparison of these actions, considering which of them lead to the goal at the lowest cost.

This model should be applied when explaining a particular action. At the same time, M. Weber outlines two fundamental classes of deviations from the model of goal-oriented action.

1. The actor proceeds from false information about the situation and about the options for action that can lead to the realization of the goal.

2. The actor shows a value-rational, affective or traditional action, which

a) is not determined through a clear awareness of the goal, casting doubt on the frustrations of other goals that arise in its implementation. They are characterized through goals that are directly implemented, without taking into account other goals.

b) Not determined by a rational calculation of the proportionality and consistency of the action relative to the situation, carried out on the basis of available information. Such actions are seen as a limitation of rationality - the further they deviate from it, the more they reveal irrational signs. Therefore, Weber identifies the non-rational with the irrational.

So, on the one hand, a value-rational action is based on a goal, the implementation of which does not take into account the consequences that need to be foreseen. On the one hand, this action is to a certain extent consistent and systematic. It follows from the establishment of those imperatives that are responsible for the choice of action alternatives.

Purpose-rationality, according to Weber, is only a methodological, and not an ontological attitude of a sociologist, it is a means of analyzing reality, and not a characteristic of this reality itself. Weber specifically emphasizes this point: “This method,” he writes, “of course, should be understood not as a rationalistic prejudice of sociology, but only as a methodological means, and, therefore, it should not be considered, for example, as a belief in the actual predominance of the rational principle over life. For it says absolutely nothing about the extent to which rational considerations determine the actual action in reality. Choosing goal-oriented action as a methodological basis, Weber thereby dissociates himself from those sociological theories that take social “totalities” as their initial reality, such as: “people”, “society”, “state”, “economy”, etc. d. In this regard, he sharply criticizes “organic sociology”, which considers an individual as part of a certain social organism, strongly objects to considering society according to a biological model: the concept of an organism as applied to society can only be a metamorphosis - nothing more.

The organicist approach to the study of society abstracts from the fact that man is a being acting consciously. The analogy between the individual and the cell of the body is possible only on the condition that the factor of consciousness is recognized as insignificant. Weber objects to this, putting forward a model of social action that accepts this factor as essential.

It is purposeful rational action that Weber serves as a model of social action, with which all other types of action are correlated. Weber lists them in this order: “The following types of action exist:

1) more or less approximately achieved correct type;

2) (subjectively) goal-oriented type;

3) action, more or less consciously and more or less uniquely goal-oriented rationally;

4) an action that is not goal-oriented, but understandable in its meaning;

5) an action, in its meaning more or less understandably motivated, but violated - more or less strongly - by the intrusion of incomprehensible elements, and, finally,

6) an action in which completely incomprehensible mental or physical facts are connected “with” a person or “in” a person by imperceptible transitions”

3.2 Value-rational behavior

This ideal type of social action involves the performance of such actions, which are based on the belief in the self-sufficient value of the act as such, in other words, here the action itself acts as the goal. Value-rational action, according to Weber, is always subject to certain requirements, in following which the individual sees his duty. If he acts in accordance with these requirements - even if rational calculation predicts a greater likelihood of adverse consequences for him personally - then we are dealing with value-rational action. A classic example of value-rational action: the captain of a sinking ship is the last to leave, even though his life is in danger. The awareness of such an orientation of actions, their correlation with certain ideas about values ​​- about duty, dignity, beauty, morality, etc. - already speaks of a certain rationality, meaningfulness. If, moreover, we are dealing with consistency in the implementation of such behavior, and therefore with premeditation, then we can talk about an even greater degree of its rationality, which distinguishes a value-rational action, say, from an affective one. At the same time, in comparison with the goal-rational type, the “value rationality” of an action carries something irrational, since it absolutizes the value that the individual is guided by.

“Purely value-rational,” Weber writes, “one acts who, regardless of the foreseeable consequences, acts in accordance with his convictions and does what, as it seems to him, duty, dignity, beauty, religious prescription require of him, reverence or importance of some ... "case." Value-rational action ... is always an action in accordance with the commandments or requirements that the actor considers presented to himself. In the case of a value-rational action, the purpose of the action and the action itself coincide, they are not dissected, just as in the case of an affective action; side effects, both in the first and in the second, are not taken into consideration.

It seems that the difference between goal-oriented and value-rational types of social action is approximately the same as between truth And true. The first of these concepts means "that which There is in fact, "regardless of the system of ideas, beliefs, beliefs that have developed in a particular society. It is really not easy to obtain this kind of knowledge, you can simply approach it consistently, step by step, in the way that the positivist Comte suggests doing. The second means comparing what you observe or intend to do with the norms generally accepted in this society and ideas about what is proper and right.

3.3 Affective behavior

Affect- this is emotional excitement, which develops into passion, a strong spiritual impulse. The affect comes from within, under its influence a person acts unconsciously. Being a short-term emotional state, affective behavior is not oriented towards the behavior of others or the conscious choice of a goal. The state of confusion before an unexpected event, elation and enthusiasm, irritation with others, depression and melancholy - all these are affective forms of behavior.

Due to the fact that this action is based on a goal, the implementation of which is not questioned with established undesirable consequences for other goals. But this goal is not long-term, as in the value-rational action, it is short-term and not stable. An affective action also has a quality that is not subjective-rational, i.e. it is not connected with rational calculation of possible alternatives of action and selection of the best of them. This action signifies a feeling-driven devotion to a goal setting that fluctuates and changes according to the constellation of feelings and emotions. Understanding an affectively established goal in relation to other goals in terms of their compatibility, as well as their consequences, is unproductive here.

"The individual acts under the influence of passion if he seeks immediately to satisfy his need for revenge, pleasure, devotion, blissful contemplation, or to relieve the tension of any other affects, no matter how base or refined they may be"

3.4 traditional behavior

It cannot even be called conscious, because it is based on a blunted reaction to habitual stimuli. It proceeds according to the once adopted scheme. Various taboos and prohibitions, norms and rules, customs and traditions act as irritants. They are passed down from generation to generation. Such, for example, is the custom of hospitality that exists among all peoples. It is followed automatically, by virtue of the habit of behaving one way and not another.

Traditional action is associated with rules of some order, the meaning and purpose of which is unknown. With this type of action, there is a goal, for the achievement of which a certain sequence of actions is necessary. In this case, this sequence is not calculated. In the traditional orientation, the scope for rational thinking narrows due to norms prescribing in a certain case specific goals and means for their implementation.

However, actions defined through a stable tradition are preceded by an incomplete processing of information about the existing situation, containing a kind of “usual charm”, to which they react with a traditional action, and actions that lead to the goal in this situation.

As Weber himself points out,

"...purely traditional action... is on the very frontier, and often even beyond, what can be called 'meaningfully' oriented action."

Strictly speaking, only the first two types of action are fully social, because they deal with conscious meaning. So, speaking about the early types of society, the sociologist notes that they were dominated by traditional and affective actions, and in an industrial society - purposeful and value-rational with a tendency to dominate the first.

The types of social action described by Weber are not just a methodological device convenient for explanation. Weber is convinced that the rationalization of rational action is a tendency of the historical process itself.

Four of these types of action are arranged by Weber in order of increasing rationality: if traditional and affective actions can be called subjective-irrational (objectively, they can turn out to be rational), then the value-rational action already contains a subjective-rational moment, since the actor consciously correlates his actions with a certain value as a goal; however, this type of action is only relatively rational, since, first of all, the value itself is accepted without further mediation and justification, and (as a result) the side effects of the act are not taken into account. The actual flowing behavior of an individual, says Weber, is usually oriented in accordance with two or more types of action: it has both goal-oriented, and value-rational, and affective, and traditional moments. True, in different types of societies, certain types of action may be predominant: in societies that Weber called "traditional", the traditional and affective types of orientation of action predominate, of course, two more rational types of action are not excluded. On the contrary, in an industrial society, goal-oriented action acquires the greatest importance, but all other types of orientation are present to a greater or lesser extent here as well.

Finally, Weber notes that the four ideal types do not exhaust the whole variety of types of orientation of human behavior, but since they can be considered the most characteristic, then for the practical work of a sociologist they are a fairly reliable tool.

The typology of the increase in the rationality of social action expressed, according to Weber, the objective trend of the historical process, which, despite many deviations, had a worldwide character. The increasing weight of purposeful rational action, which displaces the main types, leads to the rationalization of the economy, management, the very way of thinking and the way of life of a person. Universal rationalization is accompanied by an increase in the role of science, which, being the purest manifestation of rationality, becomes the basis of economics and management. Society is gradually transforming from traditional to modern, based on formal rationalism.

Conclusion

The ideas of Max Weber are very fashionable today for the modern sociological thought of the West. They are experiencing a kind of renaissance, rebirth. This indicates that Max Weber was an outstanding scientist. His social ideas, obviously, had a leading character, if they are so in demand today by Western sociology as a science of society and the laws of its development.

In Weber's understanding, human action acquires the character social action, if there are two moments in it: the subjective motivation of the individual and the orientation towards another person. Understanding motivation and relating it to the behavior of other people are the necessary points of sociological research. Weber also identified four possible types of real behavior of people in life: goal-oriented, holistically rational, affective and traditional.

Having thus defined the meaning of social action, Weber came to the conclusion that the main provision of rationality, which is reflected in Weber's contemporary capitalist society, with its rational management and rational political power.

In all studies, Weber held the idea of ​​rationality as a defining feature of modern European culture. Rationality opposes the traditional and charismatic ways of organizing social relations. Weber's central problem is the connection between the economic life of society, the material and ideological interests of various social groups and religious consciousness. Weber viewed personality as the basis of sociological analysis.

The study of Weber's works allows us to draw the necessary conclusion that a person's behavior depends entirely on his worldview, and the interest that each person has in a particular activity is due to the value system that a person is guided by.

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It must take the behavior of an individual or a group of individuals as the starting point of its research. A separate individual and his behavior is, as it were, a "cell" of sociology, its "atom", that simplest unity, which itself is no longer subject to further decomposition and splitting.

Weber clearly connects the subject of this science with the study social actions: "Sociology ... is a science that seeks, by interpreting, to understand social action and thereby causally explain it process and influence" [Weber. 1990. p. 602]. Further, however, the scientist argues that "sociology is by no means engaged in one "social action", but it is (in any case, for the sociology that we are dealing with here) its central problem, constitutive for it as a science" [Ibid., p. 627].

The concept of "social action" in Weber's interpretation is derived from actions in general, which is understood as such human behavior, in the process of which the acting individual associates with him or, more precisely, puts into him a subjective meaning. Therefore, action is a person's understanding of his own behavior.

This judgment is immediately followed by an explanation of what a social action is: “We call “social” an action that, according to the meaning assumed by the actor or actors, correlates with the action of other people and is oriented towards it” [Ibid. S. 603]. This means that social action is not just "self-oriented", it is oriented, first of all, to others. Orientation to others Weber calls "expectation", without which the action cannot be considered social. Here it is important to clarify who should be referred to as "others". Of course, these are individuals, but not only. By "others" is meant "socially general" structures, such as the state, law, organizations, unions, etc., i.e. those to whom the individual can and really orients in his actions, counting on their certain reaction towards them.

Is every action social? No, Weber argues and cites a number of specific situations that convince the reader of the validity of his negative answer. For example, prayer is not a social action (since it is not designed for its perception by another person and his response action). If it's raining outside, gives another example of "unsocial" actions Weber, and people open their umbrellas at the same time, this does not mean at all that individuals orient their actions to actions other people, it's just that their behavior is equally driven by the need to get out of the rain. This means that an action cannot be considered social if it is determined by an orientation towards some natural phenomenon. Weber does not consider social and purely imitative action performed by an individual in the crowd as its "atom". Another example of "non-social" actions which he cites concerns actions, focused on the expectation of a certain "behavior" on the part of not other individuals, but material objects (natural phenomena, machines, etc.).

It is clear, therefore, that social action includes two points: a) the subjective motivation of the individual (individuals, groups of people); b) orientation to others (the other), which Weber calls "expectation" and without which the action cannot be considered as social. Its main subject is the individual. Sociology can consider collectives (groups) only as derivatives of their constituent and or species. They (collectives, groups) are not independent realities, but rather ways of organizing the actions of individual individuals.

Weber's social action comes in four types: goal-oriented, value-rational, affective, and traditional. A goal-oriented action is an action based on the expectation of a certain behavior of objects of the external world and other people and the use of this expectation as "conditions" or "means" to achieve one's rationally set and thought-out goal" [Weber. 1990. S. 628]. Rational in relation to the goal, goal-rational action is actions: an engineer who builds a bridge, a speculator who seeks to make money; a general who wants to win a military victory. In all these cases, goal-oriented behavior is determined by the fact that its subject sets a clear goal and uses appropriate means to achieve it.

M. Weber: the concept of social action and its types

3.2 Special types of social action according to M. Weber

In addition to six types of social action, according to their orientation, Weber identified four more special types: goal-oriented, value-rational, affective and traditional Patrushev A.I. The disenchanted world of M. Weber. p.- 103. “Social action, like any action, can be defined:

1) purposefully rational, that is, through the expectation of a certain behavior of objects of the external world and other people when using this expectation as a “condition”

Or as "means" for rationally directed and regulated ends (the criterion of rationality is success);

2) value-rationally, that is, through a conscious belief in the ethical, aesthetic, religious or otherwise understood unconditional own value (self-worth) of a certain behavior, taken simply as such and regardless of success;

3) affectively, especially emotionally - through actual affects and feelings;

4) traditionally, that is, through habit.

It is impossible not to immediately pay attention to the fact that even the last two types of action - affective and traditional - are not social actions in the strict sense of the word, because here we have nothing to do with the sense conscious and underlying the action. Weber himself notes that "strictly traditional behavior, as well as purely reactive imitation, stands entirely on the border, and often beyond what can be called in general action oriented" according to meaning "for it is very often only a blunted a reaction to habitual stimuli proceeding according to a habitual attitude once adopted. Only value-rational and purpose-rational actions are the essence of social action, in the Weberian sense of the word.

“Purely value-rational,” Weber writes, “one acts who, regardless of the foreseeable consequences, acts in accordance with his convictions and does what, as it seems to him, duty, dignity, beauty, religious prescription require of him, reverence or importance of some ... "case." Value-rational action ... is always an action in accordance with the commandments or requirements that the actor considers presented to himself. In the case of a value-rational action, the purpose of the action and the action itself coincide, they are not dissected, just as in the case of an affective action; side effects, both in the first and in the second, are not taken into consideration.

In contrast to the value-rational action, the last, fourth type - the purposeful rational action - can be dissected in all respects. “The one who orients his action in accordance with the goal, means and side effects and at the same time rationally weighs both means in relation to the goal, as goals in relation to side effects, and, finally, various possible targets in relation to each other.

Four of these types of action are arranged by Weber in order of increasing rationality: if traditional and affective actions can be called subjective-irrational (objectively, they can turn out to be rational), then the value-rational action already contains a subjective-rational moment, since the actor consciously correlates his actions with a certain value as a goal; however, this type of action is only relatively rational, since, first of all, the value itself is accepted without further mediation and justification, and (as a result) the side effects of the act are not taken into account. The actual behavior of an individual, says Weber, is oriented, as a rule, in accordance with two or more types of action: there are both goal-oriented, and value-rational, and affective, and traditional moments in it. True, in different types of societies, certain types of action may be predominant: in societies that Weber called "traditional", the traditional and affective types of orientation of action predominate, of course, two more rational types of action are not excluded. On the contrary, in an industrial society, the purposeful rational action acquires the greatest importance, but all other types of orientation are present to a greater or lesser extent here Gaidenko P.P., Davydov Yu.N. History and Rationality (Max Weber's Sociology and the Weberian Renaissance). Moscow: Politizdat, 1991. p. 74.

Finally, Weber notes that the four ideal types do not exhaust the whole variety of types of orientation of human behavior, but since they can be considered the most characteristic, then for the practical work of a sociologist they are a fairly reliable tool Patrushev A.I. The disenchanted world of M. Weber. With. 105.

The typology of the increase in the rationality of social action expressed, according to Weber, the objective trend of the historical process, which, despite many deviations, had a worldwide character. The increasing weight of purposeful rational action, which displaces the main types, leads to the rationalization of the economy, management, the very way of thinking and the way of life of a person. Universal rationalization is accompanied by an increase in the role of science, which, being the purest manifestation of rationality, becomes the basis of economics and management. Society will gradually transform from traditional to modern, based on formal rationalism.

In Weber's teaching, rationality is divided into formal and material, the difference between which is very significant.

“The formal rationality of the economy should designate the measure of the calculation that is technically possible for it and actually applied by it.” On the contrary, material rationality is characterized by the extent to which any provision of material goods with the goods of a certain group of people takes or can take on the form of an economically oriented social action in terms of certain value postulates.

Material rationality is associated with the value-rational type of action, formal - with the goal-rational, which turns it into rationality in itself.

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