Words

The desire to distinguish between two types, or methods, of knowledge - intuitive and logical - appeared already in antiquity. The beginning of this can be found in Plato's doctrine of ideas, in which there is the concept of non-discursivity (without reasoning) of their comprehension. The Epicureans fixed this phenomenon of direct knowledge or comprehension in the word επιβολή. The terms for designating the two types of knowledge appeared in Philo of Alexandria, and then in Plotinus, who distinguished between επιβολή (direct, instant comprehension (vision, insight)) and διεξοδικός λόγος (consecutive, discursive knowledge, with the help of logical conclusions).

The translation of the concept of επιβολή into Latin by the term “intuitus” (from the verb intueri, meaning “to peer”, “penetrate with a look (vision), “instantly comprehend”) was made in the 5th century by Boethius.

In the 13th century, the German monk Wilhelm of Mörbecke (1215-1286) repeated the translation of Boethius, and the term "intuition" became part of Western European philosophical terminology.

The English, French, Italians, Spaniards translate Anschauung with the term "intuition" (French, English - intuition, Italian - intuizione, Spanish - intuicion). The Kantian Anschauung is also translated into Russian by the term “contemplation” to convey the meaning of direct comprehension, non-discursiveness, instantaneous “vision”.

Intuition in terms of philosophy

In some currents of philosophy, intuition is interpreted as a divine revelation, as a completely unconscious process, incompatible with logic and life practice (intuitionism). Various interpretations of Intuition have something in common - emphasizing the moment of immediacy in the process of cognition, in contrast (or in opposition) to the mediated, discursive nature of logical thinking.

Materialistic dialectics sees the rational grain of the concept of Intuition in the characteristic of the moment of immediacy in cognition, which is the unity of the sensible and the rational.

The process of scientific knowledge, as well as various forms of artistic development of the world, are not always carried out in a detailed, logically and factually evidential form. Often the subject grasps a difficult situation in his mind, for example, during a military battle, determining the diagnosis, the guilt or innocence of the accused, etc. The role of Intuition is especially great where it is necessary to go beyond the existing methods of cognition in order to penetrate into the unknown. But Intuition is not something unreasonable or superreasonable. In the process of intuitive cognition, all the signs by which the conclusion is made, and the methods by which it is made, are not realized. Intuition does not constitute a special path of cognition that bypasses sensations, ideas and thinking. It is a peculiar type of thinking, when individual links of the process of thinking are carried in the mind more or less unconsciously, and it is the result of the thought - the truth - that is most clearly realized.

Intuition is enough to perceive the truth, but it is not enough to convince others and oneself of this truth. This requires proof.

Intuition in decision making from the point of view of psychology

The formation of an intuitive solution proceeds outside of direct conscious control.

In the psychological concept of C. Jung, intuition is considered as one of the possible leading functions of the personality, which determines the attitude of a person to himself and the world around him, the way he makes vital decisions.

Intuition - the ability of direct, immediate comprehension of the truth without preliminary logical reasoning and without evidence.

Another interpretation of intuition is a direct comprehension by the mind of the truth, not derived by logical analysis from other truths and not perceived through the senses.

Computer simulation of intuition

Adaptive AI programs and algorithms, based on learning methods for automatic systems, exhibit behavior that mimics human intuition. They produce knowledge from data without a logical formulation of the ways and conditions for obtaining it, due to which this knowledge appears to the user as a result of “direct discretion”. Elements of such intuitive analysis are built into many modern automatic systems, such as, for example, computer service systems, chess programs, etc. Teaching such systems requires the teacher to choose the optimal learning strategy and tasks.

To simulate intuitive decision-making, neural-like devices called neural networks and neurocomputers, as well as their software simulators, are convenient. M. G. Dorrer with co-authors created a non-standard for computer techniques intuitive approach to psychodiagnostics , which consists in developing recommendations with the exception of the construction of the described reality . For classical computer psychodiagnostics, it is important formalizability psychodiagnostic methods, while the experience gained by researchers in the field of neuroinformatics shows that using the apparatus of neural networks it is possible to satisfy the needs of practicing psychologists and researchers in creating psychodiagnostic methods based on their experience, bypassing the stage of formalization and building a diagnostic model.

Development of intuition

Many authors offer various trainings for the development of intuition, however, it is worth remembering that some of them have not been experimentally proven, i.e. are the "reflections" of the authors on the topic. One of the hypostases of intuition is based on life experience, so the only way to develop it is to accumulate experience in a certain field of knowledge. “Positive thoughts and the conviction that you deserve not just an answer, but the very best answer, move intuition to positive activity.” - one of these trainings based on affirmation or self-hypnosis in order to remove barriers. The discovery by D. I. Mendeleev of the periodic law of chemical elements, as well as the definition of the formula of benzene, developed by Kekule, made by them in a dream, confirm the value of life experience and knowledge for the development of intuition, for obtaining intuitive knowledge.

Sometimes trainers offer, for example, such exercises for the development of intuition, which are rather exercises for the development of clairvoyance or clairaudience. Here is one of those exercises:

“Before the start of the working day, try to introduce each of your employees. Feel what is hidden behind the words, and what is hushed up. Before you read the letter, intuitively imagine what it is about and how it will affect you. Before picking up the phone, try to intuitively guess who is calling, what and how this person will talk. ... "

An ideal way to develop intuition is the well-known game of hide and seek. The game of "blind man's buff" is less preferable. during the game, the host uses the sense of smell and hearing, i.e. 2 and 5 senses "prompt". But in "hide and seek" all 5 senses are powerless and the sixth sense turns on.

Other meanings

The term "intuition" is widely used in various occult, mystical and parascientific teachings and practices.

See also

Literature

• Intuition // Great Soviet Encyclopedia

Links

• Articles on the development of intuition on the website of Mirzakarim Norbekov

Notes

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See what "Intuitive Knowledge" is in other dictionaries:

This term has other meanings, see Knowledge (meanings). This article or section needs revision. Please improve ... Wikipedia

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Intuitively, it seems clear how science differs from other forms of human cognitive activity. However, a clear explication of the specific features of science in the form of features and definitions

turns out to be quite a difficult task. This is evidenced by the variety of definitions of science, the ongoing discussions on the problem of demarcation between it and other forms of knowledge.
Scientific knowledge, like all forms of spiritual production, is ultimately necessary in order to regulate human activity. Different types of cognition fulfill this role in different ways, and the analysis of this difference is a necessary condition for identifying the features of scientific cognition.
To reveal these features, let us turn once again to the scheme of the structural characteristics of an elementary act of activity.
The right side of this scheme depicts the subject (objective) structure of activity - the interaction of means with the subject of activity and its transformation into a product due to the implementation of certain operations. The ninth part represents the subject structure, which includes the subject of activity (with its goals, values, knowledge of operations and skills), performing expedient actions and using certain means of activity for this. Means and actions can be attributed to both the objective and the subject structure, since they can be considered in two ways. On the one hand, the means can be presented as artificial organs of human activity. On the other hand, they can be considered as natural objects that interact with other objects. Similarly, operations can be presented in different ways: both as human actions and as natural interactions of objects.
Since activity is universal, the functions of its objects can be not only fragments of nature that are transformed in practice, but also people whose “properties” change when they are included in various social subsystems, as well as these subsystems themselves, interacting within society as an integral organism. Then, in the first case, we are dealing with the “objective side” of human change in nature, and in the second case, with the “objective side” of practice aimed at changing social objects. From this point of view, a person can act both as a subject and as an object of practical action.
At the early stages of the development of society, the subjective and objective aspects of practical activity are not dissected in cognition, but are taken as a single whole. Cognition reflects the ways of practical change of objects, including in the characteristics of the latter the goals, abilities and actions of a person. Such an idea of ​​the objects of activity is transferred to the whole nature, which is viewed through the prism of the practice being carried out.
It is known, for example, that in the myths of ancient peoples, the forces of nature are always likened to human forces, and its processes are likened to human beings.
eternal action. Primitive thinking, in explaining the phenomena of the external world, invariably resorts to their comparison with human actions and motives. Only in the process of a long evolution of society does knowledge begin to exclude anthropomorphic factors from the characteristics of objective relations. An important role in this process was played by the historical development of practice, and above all by the improvement of means and tools of labor.
As the tools became more complex, those operations that were previously directly performed by a person began to “reify”, acting as a consistent impact of one tool on another and only then on the object being transformed. Thus, the properties and states of objects that arise due to these operations ceased to seem caused by the direct efforts of man, but more and more acted as the result of the interaction of the natural objects themselves. So, if in the early stages of civilization the movement of goods required muscular effort, then with the invention of the lever and block, and then the simplest machines, it was possible to replace these efforts with mechanical ones. For example, using the block system

Rice. 3.1

It was possible to balance a large load with a small one, and by adding a small weight to a small load, it was possible to raise a large load to the desired height. Here, to lift a heavy body, no human effort is needed: one load independently moves the other.
This transfer of human functions to mechanisms leads to a new understanding of the forces of nature. Previously, forces were understood only by analogy with the physical efforts of a person, but now they are beginning to be considered as mechanical forces. The above example can serve as an analogue of the process of "objectification" of the objective relations of practice, which, apparently, began already in the era of the first urban civilizations of antiquity. During this period, knowledge begins to gradually separate the objective side of practice from subjective factors and consider this side as a special, independent reality. Such consideration of practice is one of the necessary conditions for the emergence of scientific research.
Science sets itself the ultimate goal of foreseeing the process of transforming objects of practical activity (an object in its initial state) into corresponding products (an object in its final state). This transformation is always determined by the essential connections, laws of change and development of objects, and the activity itself can be successful only when it is consistent with these laws. Therefore, the main task of science is to reveal the laws in accordance with which objects change and develop.
With regard to the processes of transformation of nature, this function is performed by the natural and technical sciences. The processes of change in social objects are studied by the social sciences. Since a variety of objects can be transformed in activity - objects of nature, a person (and the state of his consciousness), subsystems of society, iconic objects that function as cultural phenomena, etc., all of them can become subjects of scientific research.
The orientation of science towards the study of objects that can be included in activity (either actually or potentially as possible objects of future transformation), and their study as obeying the objective laws of functioning and development, constitute the first main feature of scientific knowledge.
This feature distinguishes it from other forms of human cognitive activity. Thus, for example, in the process of artistic assimilation of reality, objects included in human activity are not separated from subjective factors, but are taken in a kind of "gluing" with them. Any reflection of the objects of the objective world in art simultaneously expresses the value attitude of a person to the object. An artistic image is a reflection of an object,] 5 1
containing the imprint of the human personality, its value orientations, which are fused into the characteristics of the reflected reality. To exclude this interpenetration means to destroy the artistic image. In science, however, the features of the life activity of a person who creates knowledge, its value judgments are not directly part of the generated knowledge (Newton's laws do not allow one to judge what Newton loved and hated, while, for example, Rembrandt's personality is depicted in Rembrandt's portraits, his worldview and his personal attitude to the depicted social phenomena; someone's portrait, written by a great artist, always acts as a kind of his "self-portrait").
Science is focused on the subject and objective study of reality. The foregoing, of course, does not mean that the personal moments and value orientations of a scientist do not play a role in scientific creativity and do not affect its results.
The process of scientific knowledge is determined not only by the characteristics of the object under study, but also by numerous factors of a sociocultural nature.
Considering science in its historical development, it can be found that as the type of culture changes, the standards for presenting scientific knowledge, the ways of seeing reality in science, the styles of thinking that are formed in the context of culture and are influenced by its most diverse phenomena change. This impact can be represented as the inclusion of various socio-cultural factors in the process of generating proper scientific knowledge. However, the statement of the connections between the objective and the subjective in any cognitive process and the need for a comprehensive study of science in its interaction with other forms of human spiritual activity do not remove the question of the difference between science and these forms (ordinary knowledge, artistic thinking, etc.). The first and necessary characteristic of such a difference is the sign of objectivity and objectivity of scientific knowledge.
Science in human activity singles out only its objective structure and examines everything through the prism of this structure. Like King Midas from the famous ancient legend - whatever he touched, everything turned into gold - so science, whatever it touches, is everything for it an object that lives, functions and develops according to objective laws.
Here the question immediately arises: well, what then to be with the subject of activity, with his goals, values, states of his consciousness? All this belongs to the components of the subjective structure of activity, but science is capable of investigating these components as well, because for it there are no prohibitions on the study of any really existing
existing phenomena. The answer to this question is quite simple: yes, science can explore any phenomena of human life and consciousness, it can explore activity, the human psyche, and culture, but only from one point of view - as special objects that obey objective laws. Science also studies the subjective structure of activity, but as a special object.
And where science cannot construct an object and present its "natural life" determined by its essential connections, then its claims end. Thus, science can study everything in the human world, but from a special perspective and from a special point of view. This special perspective of objectivity expresses both the infinity and the limitations of science, since a person as an independent, conscious being has free will and is not only an object, he is also a subject of activity. And in this his subjective being, not all states can be exhausted by scientific knowledge, even if we assume that such a comprehensive scientific knowledge about a person, his life activity can be obtained.
There is no anti-scientism in this statement about the limits of science. It is simply a statement of the indisputable fact that science cannot replace all forms of knowledge of the world, of all culture. And everything that escapes her field of vision is compensated by other forms of spiritual comprehension of the world - art, religion, morality, philosophy.
Studying objects that are transformed into activities, science is not limited to the knowledge of only those subject relations that can be mastered within the framework of the types of activity that have historically developed at a given stage in the development of society. The purpose of science is to foresee possible future changes in objects, including those that would correspond to future types and forms of practical change in the world.
As an expression of these goals in science, not only research is formed that serves today's practice, but also layers of research, the results of which can only find application in the practice of the future. The movement of cognition in these layers is already determined not so much by the direct demands of today's practice as by cognitive interests through which the needs of society in predicting future methods and forms of practical development of the world are manifested. For example, the formulation of intrascientific problems and their solution within the framework of fundamental theoretical research in physics led to the discovery of the laws of the electromagnetic field and the prediction of electromagnetic waves, to the discovery of the laws of fission of atomic nuclei, the quantum laws of radiation of atoms during the transition of electrons from one energy level to another, etc. All these theoretical discoveries laid the foundation for future methods \ 5 3
mass practical development of nature in production activities. A few decades later, they became the basis for applied engineering research and development, the introduction of which into production, in turn, revolutionized equipment and technology - radio-electronic equipment, nuclear power plants, laser installations, etc. appeared.
Great scientists, creators of new, original directions and discoveries, have always paid attention to this ability of theories to potentially contain many future new technologies and unexpected practical applications.
K.A. Timiryazev wrote about this. “Despite the absence of a narrowly utilitarian direction in modern science, it was in its free development, independent of the dictates of worldly sages and moralists, that it became, more than ever, a source of practical, everyday applications. That astonishing development of technology, by which superficial observers are blinded, who are ready to recognize it as the most outstanding feature of the 19th century, is only the result of the development of science, which is not visible to everyone, unprecedented in history, free from any utilitarian oppression. Striking proof of this is the development of chemistry: it was both alchemy, iatrochemistry, in the service of both mining and pharmacy, and only in the 19th century, the "century of science", becoming simply chemistry, i.e. pure science, was it a source of innumerable applications in medicine, technology, and mining, shed light both on physics and even astronomy, which are higher in the scientific hierarchy, and on younger branches of knowledge, such as physiology, one might say, that has developed only during this century" 1
Similar thoughts were expressed by one of the founders of quantum mechanics, the French physicist Louis de Broglie. “Great discoveries,” he wrote, “even those made by researchers who did not have any practical application in mind and were engaged exclusively in theoretical problem solving, then quickly found application in the technical field. Of course, Planck, when he first wrote the formula that now bears his name, did not think at all about lighting technology. But he has no doubt that the enormous efforts of thought expended by him will allow us to understand and foresee a large number of phenomena that will quickly and in ever-increasing numbers be used by lighting technology. Something similar happened to me. I was extremely surprised when I saw that the concepts developed by me very quickly find specific applications in the technique of electron diffraction and electron microscopy.

The focus of science on the study of not only objects that are transformed in today's practice, but also those objects that can become the subject of mass practical development in the future, is the second distinguishing feature of scientific knowledge. This feature makes it possible to distinguish between scientific and everyday, spontaneous-empirical knowledge and to derive a number of specific definitions that characterize the nature of science. It allows us to understand why theoretical research is a defining characteristic of developed science.

Scientific and non-scientific types of knowledge

1. Science as a specific type of knowledge

Science as a specific type of knowledge is explored by the logic and methodology of science. The main problem here is the identification and explication of those features that are necessary and sufficient to distinguish scientific knowledge from the results of other types of knowledge (various forms of extrascientific knowledge). The latter include everyday knowledge, art (including fiction), religion (including religious texts), philosophy (to a large extent), intuitive-mystical experience, existential experiences, etc. In general, if by “knowledge” we understand even only textual (discourse) information, then it is obvious that scientific texts (even in the modern era of “big science”) make up only a part (and, moreover, a smaller one) of the total volume of discourse that modern humanity uses in its adaptive survival. Despite the great efforts of philosophers of science (especially representatives of logical positivism and analytical philosophy) to clearly define and explicate the criteria of scientificity, this problem is still far from an unambiguous solution. Usually such criterial signs of scientific knowledge are called: objectivity, unambiguity, certainty, accuracy, consistency, logical evidence, testability, theoretical and empirical validity, instrumental usefulness (practical applicability). The observance of these properties should guarantee the objective truth of scientific knowledge, therefore often "scientific knowledge" is identified with "objectively true knowledge".

Of course, if we talk about "scientific knowledge" as a certain theoretical designer of the methodology of science, then one can hardly object to the criteria of scientificity listed above. But the question is precisely how this “scientific ideal” is adequate, realizable and universal in relation to the “everyday” scientific knowledge, the real history of science and its modern diverse being. Unfortunately, as an analysis of the vast literature of the positivist and postpositivist schools of philosophy, methodology, and the history of science in the second half of the 20th century and their critics shows, the answer to this question is generally negative. Actual science in its functioning does not at all obey (does not implement) uniform and “pure” methodological standards. Abstraction within the framework of the methodology of science, from the social and psychological context of its functioning does not bring us closer, but moves us away from an adequate vision of real science. The ideal of logical evidence (in its strictest, syntactic sense) is not realizable even in the simplest logical and mathematical theories. It is obvious that in relation to the mathematical, natural-scientific and social-humanitarian theories richer in content, the requirement of their logical evidence is all the more unrealizable to any significant extent. The same, with certain reservations, can be said about the possibility of any complete implementation of all other "ideal" criteria of scientific character, in particular, the absolute empirical testability or validity of scientific theories in the natural sciences, technical sciences, social sciences and the humanities. Everywhere there is a context that has not been clarified to the end, the organic element of which is always a specific scientific text; everywhere - reliance on fundamentally irremovable implicit collective and personal knowledge, always - making cognitive decisions in conditions of incomplete certainty, scientific communications with the hope of adequate understanding, expert opinions and scientific consensus. However, if the scientific ideal of knowledge is unattainable, should it be abandoned? No, for the purpose of any ideal is to indicate the desired direction of movement, moving along which we have a greater probability of achieving success than following in the opposite or random direction. Ideals make it possible to understand, evaluate and structure reality in accordance with the accepted system of goals, needs and interests. Obviously, they are a necessary and most important regulatory element in ensuring the adaptive existence of a person in any sphere of his activity.

Intuitively, it seems clear how science differs from other forms of human cognitive activity. However, a clear definition of the specific features of science in the form of signs and definitions turns out to be a rather difficult task. This is evidenced by the diversity of science, the ongoing debate on the problem of the connection between it and other forms of knowledge.

Scientific knowledge, like all forms of spiritual production, is ultimately necessary in order to regulate human activity. Different types of cognition fulfill this role in different ways, and the analysis of this difference is the first and necessary condition for identifying the features of scientific cognition.

An activity can be considered as a complexly organized network of various acts of transformation of objects, when the products of one activity pass into another and become its components. For example, iron ore, as a product of mining, becomes an object that is transformed into the activity of a steelmaker; machine tools produced at the plant from the steel mined by the steelmaker become the means of activity in another production. Even the subjects of activity - people who carry out these transformations of objects in accordance with the goals set, can to a certain extent be presented as the results of the activities of training and education, which ensure the assimilation by the subject of the necessary patterns of actions, knowledge and skills of using certain means in the activity.

Means and actions can be attributed to both objective and subjective structures, since they can be considered in two ways. On the one hand, the means can be presented as artificial organs of human activity. On the other hand, they can be considered as natural objects that interact with other objects. Similarly, operations can be presented in different ways, both as human actions and as natural interactions of objects.

Activities are always governed by certain values ​​and goals. Value answers the question: why do we need this or that activity? The goal is to answer the question: what should be obtained in the activity? The goal is the ideal image of the product. It is embodied, objectifying in the product, which is the result of the transformation of the subject of activity.

Since activity is universal, the functions of its objects can be not only fragments of nature that are transformed in practice, but also people whose “properties” change when they are included in various social subsystems, as well as these subsystems themselves, interacting within society as an integral organism. Then, in the first case, we are dealing with the “objective side” of human change in nature, and in the second case, with the “objective side” of practice aimed at changing social objects. A person, from the point of view, can act both as a subject and as an object of practical action.

At the early stage of the development of society, the subjective and objective aspects of practical activity are not dissected in cognition, but are taken as a single whole. Cognition reflects the ways of practical change of objects, including in the characteristics of the latter the goals, abilities and actions of a person. This idea of ​​the objects of activity is transferred to the whole nature, which is viewed through the prism of the practice being carried out.

It is known, for example, that in the myths of ancient peoples, the forces of nature are always likened to human forces, and its processes - to human actions. Primitive thinking, in explaining the phenomena of the external world, invariably resorts to their comparison with human actions and motives. Only in the process of the long evolution of society does knowledge begin to exclude anthropomorphic factors from the characterization of objective relations. An important role in this process was played by the historical development of practice, and, above all, the improvement of means and tools of labor.

As the tools became more complex, those operations that were previously directly performed by a person began to “reify”, acting as a consistent impact of one tool on another and only then on the object being transformed. Thus, the properties and states of objects that arise due to these operations ceased to seem caused by the direct efforts of man, but more and more acted as the result of the interaction of the natural objects themselves. So, if in the early stages of civilization the movement of goods required muscular effort, then with the invention of the lever and block, and then the simplest machines, it was possible to replace these efforts with mechanical ones. For example, using a block system, it was possible to balance a large load with a small one, and by adding a small weight to a small load, raise a large load to the desired height. Here, to lift a heavy body, no human effort is needed: one load independently moves the other.

This transfer of human functions to mechanisms leads to a new understanding of the forces of nature. Previously, forces were understood only by analogy with the physical efforts of a person, but now they are beginning to be considered as mechanical forces. The above example can serve as an analogue of the process of "objectification" of the objective relations of practice, which, apparently, began already in the era of the first urban civilizations of antiquity. During this period, knowledge begins to gradually separate the objective side of practice from subjective factors and consider this side as a special, independent reality. Such consideration of practice is one of the necessary conditions for the emergence of scientific research.

Science sets itself the ultimate goal of foreseeing the process of transforming objects of practical activity (an object in its initial state) into corresponding products (an object in its final state). This transformation is always determined by the essential connections, laws of change and development of objects, and the activity itself can be successful only when it is consistent with these laws. Therefore, the main task of science is to reveal the laws in accordance with which objects change and develop.

With regard to the processes of transformation of nature, this function is performed by the natural and technical sciences. The processes of change in social objects are studied by the social sciences. Since a variety of objects can be transformed in activity - objects of nature, a person (and the state of his consciousness), subsystems of society, sign objects that function as cultural phenomena, etc. - to the extent that all of them can become subjects of scientific research.

The orientation of science to the study of objects that can be included in activity (either actual or potentially as possible objects of its future transformation), and their study as subject to the objective laws of functioning and development, constitute the first main feature of scientific knowledge.

This feature distinguishes it from other forms of human cognitive activity. Thus, for example, in the process of artistic assimilation of reality, objects included in human activity are not separated from subjective factors, but are taken in a kind of "gluing" with them. Any reflection of objects of the objective world in art at the same time expresses the value attitude of a person to an object. An artistic image is such a reflection of an object that contains the imprint of a human personality, its value of orientation, which are fused into the characteristics of the reflected reality. To exclude this interpenetration means to destroy the artistic image. In science, the features of the life activity of a person who creates knowledge, its value judgments are not directly part of the generated knowledge (Newton's laws do not allow one to judge what and what Newton hated, while, for example, Rembrandt's portraits depict the personality of Rembrandt himself, his worldview and his personal attitude to the depicted social phenomena; a portrait painted by a great artist always acts as a self-portrait).

Science is focused on the subject and objective study of reality. The foregoing, of course, does not mean that the personal moments and value orientations of a scientist do not play a role in scientific creativity and do not affect its results.

The process of scientific knowledge is determined not only by the characteristics of the object under study, but also by numerous factors of a sociocultural nature.

Considering science in its historical development, it can be found that as the type of culture changes, the standards of presentation of scientific knowledge, ways of seeing reality in science, styles of thinking that are formed in the context of culture and are influenced by its most diverse phenomena change. This impact can be represented as the inclusion of various socio-cultural factors in the process of generating proper scientific knowledge. However, the statement of the connections between the objective and the subjective in any cognitive process and the need for a comprehensive study of science in its interaction with other forms of human spiritual activity do not remove the question of the difference between science and these forms (ordinary knowledge, artistic thinking, etc.). The first and necessary characteristic of such a difference is the sign of objectivity and objectivity of scientific knowledge.

Science in human activity singles out only its objective structure and examines everything through the prism of this structure. Like King Midas from the famous ancient legend - whatever he touches, everything turns into gold, - so science, whatever it touches, is everything for it an object that lives, functions and develops according to objective laws.

Here the question immediately arises: well, what then to be with the subject of activity, with his goals, values, states of his consciousness? All this belongs to the components of the subjective structure of activity, but science is capable of investigating these components, because for it there are no prohibitions on the study of any really existing phenomena. The answer to these questions is quite simple: yes, science can explore any phenomena of human life and consciousness, it can explore activity, the human psyche, and culture, but only from one point of view - as special objects that obey objective laws. Science also studies the subjective structure of activity, but as a special object. And where science cannot construct an object and present its "natural life" determined by its essential connections, then its claims end. Thus, science can study everything in the human world, but from a special perspective and from a special point of view. This special perspective of objectivity expresses both the infinity and limitations of science, since a person as an independent, conscious being has free will, and he is not only an object, he is also a subject of activity. And in this his subjective being, not all states can be exhausted by scientific knowledge, even if we assume that such a comprehensive scientific knowledge about a person, his life activity can be obtained.

There is no anti-scientism in this statement about the limits of science. It is simply a statement of the indisputable fact that science cannot replace all forms of knowledge of the world, of all culture. And everything that escapes her field of vision is compensated by other forms of spiritual comprehension of the world - art, religion, morality, philosophy.

Studying objects that are transformed into activities, science is not limited to the knowledge of only those subject relations that can be mastered within the framework of the types of activity that have historically developed at a given stage in the development of society.

The purpose of science is to foresee possible future changes in objects, including those that would correspond to future types and forms of practical change in the world.

As an expression of these goals in science, not only research is formed that serves today's practice, but also layers of research, the results of which can only find application in the practice of the future. The movement of cognition in these layers is already determined not so much by the direct demands of today's practice as by cognitive interests through which the needs of society in predicting future methods and forms of practical development of the world are manifested. For example, the formulation of intrascientific problems and their solution within the framework of fundamental theoretical research in physics led to the discovery of the laws of the electromagnetic field and the prediction of electromagnetic waves, to the discovery of the laws of fission of atomic nuclei, the quantum laws of atomic radiation during the transition of electrons from one energy level to another, etc. All these theoretical discoveries laid the foundation for future methods of mass practical development of nature in production. A few decades later, they became the basis for applied engineering research and development, the introduction of which into production, in turn, revolutionized equipment and technology - radio-electronic equipment, nuclear power plants, laser installations, etc. appeared.

Great scientists, creators of new, original directions and discoveries, have always paid attention to this ability of theories to potentially contain entire constellations of future new technologies and unexpected practical applications.

K.A. Timiryazev wrote about this: “Despite the absence of a narrow utilitarian direction in modern science, it was in its free development, independent of the pointer of everyday sages and moralists, that it became, more than ever, a source of practical, everyday applications. That astonishing development of technology, by which superficial observers are blinded, who are ready to recognize it as the most outstanding feature of the 19th century, is only the result of the development of science, which is not visible to everyone, unprecedented in history, free from any utilitarian oppression. Striking proof of this is the development of chemistry: it was both alchemy and iatrochemistry, in the service of both mining and pharmacy, and only in the 19th century, the "century of science", becoming simply chemistry, i.e. pure science, it was a source of innumerable applications in medicine, and in technology, and in mining, shed light both on physics and even astronomy, which are higher in the scientific hierarchy, and on younger branches of knowledge, such as physiology, for example, you can say, developed only during this century.

Similar thoughts were expressed by one of the founders of quantum mechanics, the French physicist Louis de Broglie. “Great discoveries,” he wrote, “even those made by researchers who had no practical application in mind and were engaged exclusively in theoretical problem solving, then quickly found application in the technical field. Of course, Planck, when he first wrote the formula that now bears his name, did not think at all about lighting technology. But he had no doubt that the enormous efforts of thought expended by him would allow us to understand and foresee a large number of phenomena that would quickly and in ever-increasing numbers be used by lighting technology. Something similar happened to me. I was extremely surprised when I saw that the concepts developed by me very quickly find specific applications in the technique of electron diffraction and electron microscopy.

The focus of science on the study of not only objects that are transformed in today's practice, but also those objects that can become the subject of mass practical development in the future, is the second distinguishing feature of scientific knowledge. This feature makes it possible to distinguish between scientific and everyday, spontaneous-empirical knowledge and to derive a number of specific definitions that characterize the nature of science. It allows us to understand why theoretical research is a defining characteristic of developed science.

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The main distinguishing features of science

Intuitively, it seems clear how science differs from other forms of human cognitive activity. However, a clear explication of the specific features of science in the form of signs and definitions turns out to be a rather difficult task. This is evidenced by the variety of definitions of science, the ongoing discussions on the problem of demarcation between it and other forms of knowledge.

Scientific knowledge, like all forms of spiritual production, is ultimately necessary in order to regulate human activity. Different types of cognition fulfill this role in different ways, and the analysis of this difference is the first and necessary condition for identifying the features of scientific cognition.

An activity can be considered as a complexly organized network of various acts of transformation of objects, when the products of one activity pass into another and become its components. For example, iron ore as a product of mining production becomes an object that is transformed into the activities of a steelmaker, machine tools produced at a plant from steel mined by a steelmaker become means of activity in another production. Even the subjects of activity - people who transform objects in accordance with the goals set, can to a certain extent be presented as the results of training and education, which ensures that the subject acquires the necessary patterns of actions, knowledge and skills of using certain means in the activity.

The structural characteristics of an elementary act of activity can be represented as the following scheme:

The right side of this scheme depicts the subject structure of activity - the interaction of funds with the subject of activity and its transformation into a product due to the implementation of certain operations. The left part represents the subject structure, which includes the subject of activity (with its goals, values, knowledge of operations and skills), carrying out expedient actions and using certain means of activity for this purpose. Means and actions can be attributed to both objective and subjective structures, since they can be considered in two ways. On the one hand, the means can be presented as artificial organs of human activity. On the other hand, they can be considered as natural objects that interact with other objects. In a similar way, operations can be presented in various ways both as human actions and as natural interactions of objects.

Activities are always governed by certain values ​​and goals. Value answers the question: "what is this or that activity for?" The goal is to answer the question: "what should be obtained in the activity." The goal is the ideal image of the product. It is embodied, objectified in the product, which is the result of the transformation of the subject of activity.

Since activity is universal, the functions of its objects can be not only fragments of nature that are transformed in practice, but also people whose “properties” change when they are included in various social subsystems, as well as these subsystems themselves, interacting within society as an integral organism. Then, in the first case, we are dealing with the "objective side" of man's change in nature, and in the second case, with the "objective side" of practice aimed at changing social objects. From this point of view, a person can act both as a subject and as an object of practical action.

At the early stages of the development of society, the subjective and objective aspects of practical activity are not dissected in cognition, but are taken as a single whole. Cognition reflects the ways of practical change of objects, including in the characteristics of the latter the goals, abilities and actions of a person. Such an idea of ​​the objects of activity is transferred to the whole nature, which is viewed through the prism of the practice being carried out.

It is known, for example, that in the myths of ancient peoples, the forces of nature are always likened to human forces, and its processes - to human actions. Primitive thinking, in explaining the phenomena of the external world, invariably resorts to their comparison with human actions and motives. Only in the process of the long evolution of society does knowledge begin to exclude anthropomorphic factors from the characterization of objective relations. An important role in this process was played by the historical development of practice, and above all by the improvement of means and tools of labor.

As the tools became more complex, those operations that were previously directly performed by man began to "reify", acting as a successive effect of one tool on another and only then on the object being transformed. Thus, the properties and states of objects that arise due to these operations ceased to seem caused by the direct efforts of man, but more and more acted as the result of the interaction of the natural objects themselves. So, if in the early stages of civilization the movement of goods required muscular effort, then with the invention of the lever and block, and then the simplest machines, it was possible to replace these efforts with mechanical ones. For example, using a system of blocks, it was possible to balance a large load with a small one, and by adding a small weight to a small load, raise a large load to the desired height. Here, to lift a heavy body, no human effort is needed: one load independently moves the other.

This transfer of human functions to mechanisms leads to a new understanding of the forces of nature. Previously, forces were understood only by analogy with the physical efforts of a person, but now they are beginning to be considered as mechanical forces. The above example can serve as an analogue of the process of "objectification" of the objective relations of practice, which, apparently, began already in the era of the first urban civilizations of antiquity. During this period, knowledge begins to gradually separate the objective side of practice from subjective factors and consider this side as a special, independent reality. Such consideration of practice is one of the necessary conditions for the emergence of scientific research.

Science sets itself the ultimate goal of foreseeing the process of transforming objects of practical activity (an object in its initial state) into corresponding products (an object in its final state). This transformation is always determined by the essential connections, laws of change and development of objects, and the activity itself can be successful only when it is consistent with these laws. Therefore, the main task of science is to reveal the laws in accordance with which objects change and develop.

With regard to the processes of transformation of nature, this function is performed by the natural and technical sciences. The processes of change in social objects are studied by the social sciences. Since a variety of objects can be transformed in activity - objects of nature, a person (and the state of his consciousness), subsystems of society, iconic objects that function as cultural phenomena, etc. - all of them can become subjects of scientific research.

The orientation of science to the study of objects that can be included in activity (either actual or potentially as possible objects of its future transformation), and their study as obeying the objective laws of functioning and development, constitutes the first main feature of scientific knowledge.

This feature distinguishes it from other forms of human cognitive activity. Thus, for example, in the process of artistic assimilation of reality, objects included in human activity are not separated from subjective factors, but are taken in a kind of "gluing" with them. Any reflection of objects of the objective world in art at the same time expresses the value attitude of a person to an object. An artistic image is such a reflection of an object that contains the imprint of a human personality, its value orientations, which are fused into the characteristics of the reflected reality. To exclude this interpenetration means to destroy the artistic image. In science, however, the features of the life activity of a person who creates knowledge, its value judgments are not directly part of the generated knowledge (Newton's laws do not allow one to judge what Newton loved and hated, while, for example, Rembrandt's personality is depicted in Rembrandt's portraits, his attitude and his personal attitude to the depicted social phenomena; a portrait painted by a great artist always acts as a self-portrait).

Science is focused on the subject and objective study of reality. The foregoing, of course, does not mean that the personal moments and value orientations of a scientist do not play a role in scientific creativity and do not affect its results.

The process of scientific knowledge is determined not only by the characteristics of the object under study, but also by numerous factors of a sociocultural nature.

Considering science in its historical development, it can be found that as the type of culture changes, the standards of presentation of scientific knowledge, ways of seeing reality in science, styles of thinking that are formed in the context of culture and are influenced by its most diverse phenomena change. This impact can be represented as the inclusion of various socio-cultural factors in the process of generating proper scientific knowledge. However, the statement of the connections between the objective and the subjective in any cognitive process and the need for a comprehensive study of science in its interaction with other forms of human spiritual activity do not remove the question of the difference between science and these forms (ordinary knowledge, artistic thinking, etc.). The first and necessary characteristic of such a difference is the sign of objectivity and objectivity of scientific knowledge.

Science in human activity singles out only its objective structure and examines everything through the prism of this structure. Like King Midas from the famous ancient legend - whatever he touched, everything turned into gold - so science, whatever it touches, is for it an object that lives, functions and develops according to objective laws.

Here the question immediately arises: well, what then to be with the subject of activity, with his goals, values, states of his consciousness? All this belongs to the components of the subjective structure of activity, but science is capable of investigating these components, because for it there are no prohibitions on the study of any really existing phenomena. The answer to these questions is quite simple: yes, science can explore any phenomena of human life and consciousness, it can explore activity, the human psyche, and culture, but only from one point of view - as special objects that obey objective laws. Science also studies the subjective structure of activity, but as a special object. And where science cannot construct an object and present its "natural life" determined by its essential connections, then its claims end. Thus, science can study everything in the human world, but from a special angle and from a special point of view. This special perspective of objectivity expresses both the infinity and limitations of science, since a person as an independent, conscious being has free will, and he is not only an object, he is also a subject of activity. And in this his subjective being, not all states can be exhausted by scientific knowledge, even if we assume that such a comprehensive scientific knowledge about a person, his life activity can be obtained.

There is no anti-scientism in this statement about the limits of science. It is simply a statement of the indisputable fact that science cannot replace all forms of knowledge of the world, of all culture. And everything that escapes her field of vision is compensated by other forms of spiritual comprehension of the world - art, religion, morality, philosophy.

Studying objects that are transformed into activities, science is not limited to the knowledge of only those subject relations that can be mastered within the framework of the types of activity that have historically developed at a given stage in the development of society. The purpose of science is to foresee possible future changes in objects, including those that would correspond to future types and forms of practical change in the world.

As an expression of these goals in science, not only research is formed that serves today's practice, but also layers of research, the results of which can only find application in the practice of the future. The movement of cognition in these layers is already determined not so much by the direct demands of today's practice as by cognitive interests through which the needs of society in predicting future methods and forms of practical development of the world are manifested. For example, the formulation of intrascientific problems and their solution within the framework of fundamental theoretical research in physics led to the discovery of the laws of the electromagnetic field and the prediction of electromagnetic waves, to the discovery of the laws of fission of atomic nuclei, the quantum laws of atomic radiation during the transition of electrons from one energy level to another, etc. All these theoretical discoveries laid the foundation for future methods of mass practical development of nature in production. A few decades later, they became the basis for applied engineering research and development, the introduction of which into production, in turn, revolutionized equipment and technology - radio-electronic equipment, nuclear power plants, laser installations, etc. appeared.

The focus of science on the study of not only objects that are transformed in today's practice, but also those that can become the subject of mass practical development in the future, is the second distinguishing feature of scientific knowledge. This feature makes it possible to distinguish between scientific and everyday, spontaneous-empirical knowledge and to derive a number of specific definitions that characterize the nature of science.

Scientific and everyday knowledge

The desire to study the objects of the real world and, on this basis, to foresee the results of its practical transformation is characteristic not only of science, but also of ordinary knowledge, which is woven into practice and develops on its basis. As the development of practice objectifies human functions in tools and creates conditions for the elimination of subjective and anthropomorphic layers in the study of external objects, certain types of knowledge about reality appear in ordinary cognition, in general similar to those that characterize science.

The embryonic forms of scientific knowledge arose in the depths and on the basis of these types of ordinary knowledge, and then budded from it (the science of the era of the first urban civilizations of antiquity). With the development of science and its transformation into one of the most important values ​​of civilization, its way of thinking begins to exert an ever more active influence on everyday consciousness. This influence develops the elements of an objectively objective reflection of the world contained in everyday, spontaneous-empirical knowledge.

The ability of spontaneous-empirical knowledge to generate substantive and objective knowledge about the world raises the question of the difference between it and scientific research. The characteristics that distinguish science from ordinary knowledge can be conveniently classified according to the categorical scheme in which the structure of activity is characterized (tracing the difference between science and ordinary knowledge by subject, means, product, methods and subject of activity).

The fact that science provides ultra-long-term forecasting of practice, going beyond the existing stereotypes of production and ordinary experience, means that it deals with a special set of objects of reality that are not reducible to objects of ordinary experience. If ordinary knowledge reflects only those objects that, in principle, can be transformed in the available historically established methods and types of practical action, then science is also capable of studying such fragments of reality that can become the subject of development only in the practice of the distant future. It constantly goes beyond the subject structures of existing types and methods of practical development of the world and opens up new objective worlds for humanity of its possible future activity.

These features of the objects of science make the means that are used in everyday knowledge insufficient for their development. Although science uses natural language, it cannot describe and study its objects only on its basis. Firstly, ordinary language is adapted to describe and foresee the objects woven into the actual practice of man (science goes beyond its scope); secondly, the concepts of ordinary language are fuzzy and ambiguous, their exact meaning is most often found only in the context of linguistic communication controlled by everyday experience. Science, on the other hand, cannot rely on such control, since it mainly deals with objects that are not mastered in everyday practical activity. To describe the phenomena under study, it seeks to fix its concepts and definitions as clearly as possible.

The development by science of a special language suitable for describing objects that are unusual from the point of view of common sense is a necessary condition for scientific research. The language of science is constantly evolving as it penetrates into ever new areas of the objective world. Moreover, it has the opposite effect on everyday, natural language. For example, the terms "electricity", "refrigerator" were once specific scientific concepts, and then entered everyday language.

Along with an artificial, specialized language, scientific research needs a special system of special tools that, by directly influencing the object under study, make it possible to identify its possible states under conditions controlled by the subject. The tools used in production and in everyday life are, as a rule, unsuitable for this purpose, since the objects studied by science and the objects transformed in production and everyday practice most often differ in their nature. Hence the need for special scientific equipment (measuring instruments, instrumental installations), which allow science to experimentally study new types of objects.

Scientific equipment and the language of science act as an expression of already acquired knowledge. But just as in practice its products turn into means of new types of practical activity, so in scientific research its products - scientific knowledge expressed in language or embodied in devices, become a means of further research.

Thus, from the peculiarities of the subject of science, we obtained, as a kind of consequence, differences in the means of scientific and everyday knowledge.

The specifics of the objects of scientific research can further explain the main differences between scientific knowledge as a product of scientific activity and knowledge obtained in the sphere of ordinary, spontaneous-empirical knowledge. The latter are most often not systematized; rather, it is a conglomerate of information, prescriptions, recipes for activity and behavior accumulated over the course of the historical development of everyday experience. Their reliability is established due to the direct application in cash situations of production and everyday practice. As for scientific knowledge, its reliability can no longer be substantiated only in this way, since in science, objects that have not yet been mastered in production are mainly studied. Therefore, specific ways of substantiating the truth of knowledge are needed. They are experimental control over the acquired knowledge and the derivation of some knowledge from others, the truth of which has already been proven. In turn, derivability procedures ensure the transfer of truth from one piece of knowledge to another, due to which they become interconnected, organized into a system.

Thus, we obtain the characteristics of the consistency and validity of scientific knowledge, which distinguish it from the products of everyday cognitive activity of people.

From the main characteristic of scientific research, one can also deduce such a distinctive feature of science when compared with ordinary knowledge, as a feature of the method of cognitive activity. The objects to which everyday knowledge is directed are formed in everyday practice. The devices by which each such object is singled out and fixed as an object of knowledge are woven into everyday experience. The totality of such techniques, as a rule, is not recognized by the subject as a method of cognition. The situation is different in scientific research. Here, the very discovery of the object, the properties of which are subject to further study, is a very laborious task. For example, in order to detect short-lived particles - resonances, modern physics performs experiments on the scattering of particle beams and then applies complex calculations. Ordinary particles leave traces-tracks in photographic emulsions or in a cloud chamber, but resonances do not leave such tracks. They live for a very short time (10-22 s) and during this period of time they cover a distance smaller than the size of an atom. Because of this, resonance cannot cause ionization of photoemulsion molecules (or gas in a cloud chamber) and leave an observed trace. However, when the resonance decays, the resulting particles are capable of leaving traces of the indicated type. In the photograph, they look like a set of rays-dashes emanating from one center. By the nature of these rays, using mathematical calculations, the physicist determines the presence of resonance. Thus, in order to deal with the same type of resonances, the researcher needs to know the conditions under which the corresponding object appears. He must clearly define the method by which a particle can be detected in an experiment. Outside of the method, he will not at all single out the object under study from the numerous connections and relations of objects of nature. To fix an object, a scientist must know the methods of such fixation. Therefore, in science, the study of objects, the identification of their properties and relationships is always accompanied by an awareness of the method by which the object is studied. Objects are always given to a person in the system of certain techniques and methods of his activity. But these techniques in science are no longer obvious, they are not repeatedly repeated techniques in everyday practice. And the further science moves away from the usual things of everyday experience, delving into the study of "unusual" objects, the more clearly and distinctly the need for the creation and development of special methods is manifested, in the system of which science can study objects. Along with knowledge about objects, science forms knowledge about methods. The need to develop and systematize knowledge of the second type leads at the highest stages of the development of science to the formation of methodology as a special branch of scientific research, designed to purposefully direct scientific research.

Finally, the desire of science to study objects relatively independently of their assimilation in the available forms of production and everyday experience presupposes specific characteristics of the subject of scientific activity. Engaging in science requires special training of the cognizing subject, during which he masters the historically established means of scientific research, learns the techniques and methods of operating with these means. For everyday knowledge, such training is not necessary, or rather, it is carried out automatically, in the process of socialization of the individual, when his thinking is formed and develops in the process of communicating with culture and including the individual in various fields of activity. The pursuit of science implies, along with the mastery of means and methods, the assimilation of a certain system of value orientations and goals specific to scientific knowledge. These orientations should stimulate scientific research aimed at studying more and more new objects, regardless of the current practical effect of the knowledge gained. Otherwise, science will not fulfill its main function - to go beyond the subject structures of the practice of its era, expanding the horizons of opportunities for man to master the objective world.

Two basic attitudes of science ensure the desire for such a search: the intrinsic value of truth and the value of novelty.

Any scientist accepts the search for truth as one of the main principles of scientific activity, perceiving truth as the highest value of science. This attitude is embodied in a number of ideals and norms of scientific knowledge, expressing its specificity: in certain ideals of the organization of knowledge (for example, the requirement of logical consistency of the theory and its experimental confirmation), in the search for an explanation of phenomena based on laws and principles that reflect the essential connections of the objects under study, etc.

An equally important role in scientific research is played by the focus on the constant growth of knowledge and the special value of novelty in science. This attitude is expressed in the system of ideals and normative principles of scientific creativity (for example, the prohibition of plagiarism, the permissibility of a critical review of the foundations of scientific research as a condition for the development of ever new types of objects, etc.).

The value orientations of science form the foundation of its ethos, which a scientist must master in order to successfully engage in research. Great scientists left a significant mark on culture not only because of the discoveries they made, but also because their activity was a model of innovation and service to the truth for many generations of people. Any deviation from the truth for the sake of personal, selfish goals, any manifestation of unscrupulousness in science met with an unquestioning rebuff from them.

In science, the principle is proclaimed as an ideal that all researchers are equal in the face of truth, that no past merit is taken into account when it comes to scientific evidence.

At the beginning of the century, a little-known employee of the patent bureau A. Einstein discussed with the famous scientist G. Lorentz, proving the validity of his interpretation of the transformations introduced by Lorentz. Ultimately, it was Einstein who won the argument. But Lorentz and his colleagues never resorted in this discussion to the techniques widely used in the disputes of everyday life - they did not argue, for example, that it was unacceptable to criticize Lorentz's theory on the grounds that his status at that time was incommensurable with the status not yet known to the scientific community. young physicist Einstein.

An equally important principle of scientific ethos is the requirement of scientific honesty in the presentation of research results. A scientist can make mistakes, but has no right to rig results, he can repeat a discovery already made, but has no right to plagiarize. The institution of references as a prerequisite for the design of a scientific monograph and article is intended not only to fix the authorship of certain ideas and scientific texts. It provides a clear selection of already known in science and new results. Outside of this selection, there would be no incentive to intense search for the new, endless repetitions of the past would arise in science and, ultimately, its main quality would be undermined - to constantly generate the growth of new knowledge, going beyond the usual and already known ideas about the world.

Of course, the requirement of the inadmissibility of falsifications and plagiarism acts as a kind of presumption of science, which in real life can be violated. Different scientific communities may impose different severity of sanctions for violating the ethical principles of science.

Consider one example from the life of modern science, which can serve as an example of the intransigence of the community to violations of these principles.

In the mid-1970s, the so-called case of Gallis, a young and promising biochemist who worked on the problem of intracerebral morphine in the early 1970s, gained notoriety among biochemists and neurophysiologists. He put forward an original hypothesis that plant-derived morphines and intracerebral morphines have the same effect on nervous tissue. Gallis conducted a series of laborious experiments, but was unable to convincingly confirm this hypothesis, although indirect evidence indicated its promise. Fearing that other researchers would overtake him and make this discovery, Gallis decided to falsify. He published fictitious experimental data, allegedly confirming the hypothesis.

Gallis' "discovery" aroused great interest in the community of neurophysiologists and biochemists. However, no one could confirm his results by reproducing experiments according to the method he published. Then the young and already well-known scientist was invited to publicly conduct experiments at a special symposium in 1977 in Munich, under the supervision of his colleagues. Gallis was eventually forced to confess to the falsification. The scientific community reacted to this recognition with a hard boycott. Colleagues of Gallis ceased to maintain scientific contacts with him, all his co-authors publicly refused to joint articles with him, and as a result, Gallis published a letter in which he apologized to his colleagues and announced that he was stopping his studies in science.

Ideally, the scientific community should always reject researchers who are found to be intentionally plagiarizing or deliberately falsifying scientific results for the sake of some worldly good. The communities of mathematicians and natural scientists are closest to this ideal, but for the humanities, for example, since they are under much greater pressure from ideological and political structures, the sanctions for researchers who deviate from the ideals of scientific integrity are significantly relaxed.

It is indicative that for everyday consciousness the observance of the basic principles of scientific ethos is not at all necessary, and sometimes even undesirable. A person who told a political joke in an unfamiliar company does not have to refer to the source of information, especially if he lives in a totalitarian society.

In everyday life, people exchange a wide variety of knowledge, share everyday experience, but references to the author of this experience in most situations are simply impossible, because this experience is anonymous and often broadcast in culture for centuries.

The presence of science-specific norms and goals of cognitive activity, as well as specific means and methods that ensure the comprehension of ever new objects, requires the purposeful formation of scientific specialists. This need leads to the emergence of an "academic component of science" - special organizations and institutions that provide training for scientific personnel.

In the process of such training, future researchers should learn not only special knowledge, techniques and methods of scientific work, but also the main value orientations of science, its ethical norms and principles.

So, when elucidating the nature of scientific knowledge, one can single out a system of distinguishing features of science, among which the main ones are: a) setting for the study of the laws of transformation of objects and realizing this setting, the objectivity and objectivity of scientific knowledge; b) science goes beyond the subject structures of production and everyday experience and studies objects relatively independently of today's opportunities for their production development (scientific knowledge always refers to a wide class of practical situations of the present and future, which is never predetermined). All other necessary features that distinguish science from other forms of cognitive activity can be represented as depending on these main characteristics and due to them.

Home > Educational and methodical complex

Intuitively, it seems clear how science differs from other forms of human cognitive activity. However, a clear explication of the specific features of science in the form of signs and definitions turns out to be a rather difficult task. This is evidenced by the variety of definitions of science, the ongoing discussions on the problem of demarcation between it and other forms of knowledge. Scientific knowledge, like all forms of spiritual production, is ultimately necessary in order to regulate human activity. Different types of cognition fulfill this role in different ways, and the analysis of this difference is the first and necessary condition for identifying the features of scientific cognition. An activity can be considered as a complexly organized network of various acts of transformation of objects, when the products of one activity pass into another and become its components. For example, iron ore as a product of mining production becomes an object that is transformed into the activities of a steelmaker, machine tools produced at a plant from steel mined by a steelmaker become means of activity in another production. Even the subjects of activity - people who transform objects in accordance with the goals set, can to a certain extent be presented as the results of training and education, which ensures that the subject acquires the necessary patterns of actions, knowledge and skills of using certain means in the activity. At the early stages of the development of society, the subjective and objective aspects of practical activity are not dissected in cognition, but are taken as a single whole. Cognition reflects the ways of practical change of objects, including in the characteristics of the latter the goals, abilities and actions of a person. Such an idea of ​​the objects of activity is transferred to the whole nature, which is viewed through the prism of the practice being carried out. It is known, for example, that in the myths of ancient peoples, the forces of nature are always likened to human forces, and its processes - to human actions. Primitive thinking, in explaining the phenomena of the external world, invariably resorts to their comparison with human actions and motives. Only in the process of the long evolution of society does knowledge begin to exclude anthropomorphic factors from the characterization of objective relations. An important role in this process was played by the historical development of practice, and above all by the improvement of means and tools of labor. As the tools became more complex, those operations that were previously directly performed by man began to "reify", acting as a successive effect of one tool on another and only then on the object being transformed. Thus, the properties and states of objects that arise due to these operations ceased to seem caused by the direct efforts of man, but more and more acted as the result of the interaction of the natural objects themselves. So, if in the early stages of civilization the movement of goods required muscular effort, then with the invention of the lever and block, and then the simplest machines, it was possible to replace these efforts with mechanical ones. For example, using a system of blocks, it was possible to balance a large load with a small one, and by adding a small weight to a small load, raise a large load to the desired height. Here, to lift a heavy body, no human effort is needed: one load independently moves the other. This transfer of human functions to mechanisms leads to a new understanding of the forces of nature. Previously, forces were understood only by analogy with the physical efforts of a person, but now they are beginning to be considered as mechanical forces. The above example can serve as an analogue of the process of "objectification" of the objective relations of practice, which, apparently, began already in the era of the first urban civilizations of antiquity. During this period, knowledge begins to gradually separate the objective side of practice from subjective factors and consider this side as a special, independent reality. Such consideration of practice is one of the necessary conditions for the emergence of scientific research. Science sets itself the ultimate goal of foreseeing the process of transforming objects of practical activity (an object in its initial state) into corresponding products (an object in its final state). This transformation is always determined by the essential connections, laws of change and development of objects, and the activity itself can be successful only when it is consistent with these laws. Therefore, the main task of science is to reveal the laws in accordance with which objects change and develop. With regard to the processes of transformation of nature, this function is performed by the natural and technical sciences. The processes of change in social objects are studied by the social sciences. Since a variety of objects can be transformed in activity - objects of nature, a person (and the state of his consciousness), subsystems of society, iconic objects that function as cultural phenomena, etc. - all of them can become subjects of scientific research. The orientation of science to the study of objects that can be included in activity (either actual or potentially as possible objects of its future transformation), and their study as obeying the objective laws of functioning and development, constitutes the first main feature of scientific knowledge. This feature distinguishes it from other forms of human cognitive activity. Thus, for example, in the process of artistic assimilation of reality, objects included in human activity are not separated from subjective factors, but are taken in a kind of "gluing" with them. Any reflection of objects of the objective world in art at the same time expresses the value attitude of a person to an object. An artistic image is such a reflection of an object that contains the imprint of a human personality, its value orientations, which are fused into the characteristics of the reflected reality. To exclude this interpenetration means to destroy the artistic image. In science, however, the features of the life activity of a person who creates knowledge, its value judgments are not directly part of the generated knowledge (Newton's laws do not allow one to judge what Newton loved and hated, while, for example, Rembrandt's personality is depicted in Rembrandt's portraits, his attitude and his personal attitude to the depicted social phenomena; a portrait painted by a great artist always acts as a self-portrait). Science is focused on the subject and objective study of reality. The foregoing, of course, does not mean that the personal moments and value orientations of a scientist do not play a role in scientific creativity and do not affect its results. The process of scientific knowledge is determined not only by the characteristics of the object under study, but also by numerous factors of a sociocultural nature. Considering science in its historical development, it can be found that as the type of culture changes, the standards of presentation of scientific knowledge, ways of seeing reality in science, styles of thinking that are formed in the context of culture and are influenced by its most diverse phenomena change. This impact can be represented as the inclusion of various socio-cultural factors in the process of generating proper scientific knowledge. However, the statement of the connections between the objective and the subjective in any cognitive process and the need for a comprehensive study of science in its interaction with other forms of human spiritual activity do not remove the question of the difference between science and these forms (ordinary knowledge, artistic thinking, etc.). The first and necessary characteristic of such a difference is the sign of objectivity and objectivity of scientific knowledge. Science in human activity singles out only its objective structure and examines everything through the prism of this structure. Like King Midas from the famous ancient legend - whatever he touched, everything turned into gold - so science, whatever it touches, is for it an object that lives, functions and develops according to objective laws. Here the question immediately arises: well, what then to be with the subject of activity, with his goals, values, states of his consciousness? All this belongs to the components of the subjective structure of activity, but science is capable of investigating these components, because for it there are no prohibitions on the study of any really existing phenomena. The answer to these questions is quite simple: yes, science can explore any phenomena of human life and consciousness, it can explore activity, the human psyche, and culture, but only from one point of view - as special objects that obey objective laws. Science also studies the subjective structure of activity, but as a special object. And where science cannot construct an object and present its "natural life" determined by its essential connections, then its claims end. Thus, science can study everything in the human world, but from a special angle and from a special point of view. This special perspective of objectivity expresses both the infinity and limitations of science, since a person as an independent, conscious being has free will, and he is not only an object, he is also a subject of activity. And in this his subjective being, not all states can be exhausted by scientific knowledge, even if we assume that such a comprehensive scientific knowledge about a person, his life activity can be obtained. There is no anti-scientism in this statement about the limits of science. It is simply a statement of the indisputable fact that science cannot replace all forms of knowledge of the world, of all culture. And everything that escapes her field of vision is compensated by other forms of spiritual comprehension of the world - art, religion, morality, philosophy. Studying objects that are transformed into activities, science is not limited to the knowledge of only those subject relations that can be mastered within the framework of the types of activity that have historically developed at a given stage in the development of society. The purpose of science is to foresee possible future changes in objects, including those that would correspond to future types and forms of practical change in the world. As an expression of these goals in science, not only research is formed that serves today's practice, but also layers of research, the results of which can only find application in the practice of the future. The movement of cognition in these layers is already determined not so much by the direct demands of today's practice as by cognitive interests through which the needs of society in predicting future methods and forms of practical development of the world are manifested. For example, the formulation of intrascientific problems and their solution within the framework of fundamental theoretical research in physics led to the discovery of the laws of the electromagnetic field and the prediction of electromagnetic waves, to the discovery of the laws of fission of atomic nuclei, the quantum laws of atomic radiation during the transition of electrons from one energy level to another, etc. All these theoretical discoveries laid the foundation for future methods of mass practical development of nature in production. A few decades later, they became the basis for applied engineering research and development, the introduction of which into production, in turn, revolutionized equipment and technology - radio-electronic equipment, nuclear power plants, laser installations, etc. appeared. The focus of science on the study of not only objects that are transformed in today's practice, but also those that can become the subject of mass practical development in the future, is the second distinguishing feature of scientific knowledge. This feature makes it possible to distinguish between scientific and everyday, spontaneous-empirical knowledge and to derive a number of specific definitions that characterize the nature of science. Scientific and everyday knowledge The desire to study the objects of the real world and, on this basis, to foresee the results of its practical transformation is characteristic not only of science, but also of ordinary knowledge, which is woven into practice and develops on its basis. As the development of practice objectifies human functions in tools and creates conditions for the elimination of subjective and anthropomorphic layers in the study of external objects, certain types of knowledge about reality appear in ordinary cognition, in general similar to those that characterize science. The embryonic forms of scientific knowledge arose in the depths and on the basis of these types of ordinary knowledge, and then budded from it (the science of the era of the first urban civilizations of antiquity). With the development of science and its transformation into one of the most important values ​​of civilization, its way of thinking begins to exert an ever more active influence on everyday consciousness. This influence develops the elements of an objectively objective reflection of the world contained in everyday, spontaneous-empirical knowledge. The ability of spontaneous-empirical knowledge to generate substantive and objective knowledge about the world raises the question of the difference between it and scientific research. The characteristics that distinguish science from ordinary knowledge can be conveniently classified according to the categorical scheme in which the structure of activity is characterized (tracing the difference between science and ordinary knowledge by subject, means, product, methods and subject of activity). The fact that science provides ultra-long-term forecasting of practice, going beyond the existing stereotypes of production and ordinary experience, means that it deals with a special set of objects of reality that are not reducible to objects of ordinary experience. If ordinary knowledge reflects only those objects that, in principle, can be transformed in the available historically established methods and types of practical action, then science is also capable of studying such fragments of reality that can become the subject of development only in the practice of the distant future. It constantly goes beyond the subject structures of existing types and methods of practical development of the world and opens up new objective worlds for humanity of its possible future activity. These features of the objects of science make the means that are used in everyday knowledge insufficient for their development. Although science uses natural language, it cannot describe and study its objects only on its basis. Firstly, ordinary language is adapted to describe and foresee the objects woven into the actual practice of man (science goes beyond its scope); secondly, the concepts of ordinary language are fuzzy and ambiguous, their exact meaning is most often found only in the context of linguistic communication controlled by everyday experience. Science, on the other hand, cannot rely on such control, since it mainly deals with objects that are not mastered in everyday practical activity. To describe the phenomena under study, it seeks to fix its concepts and definitions as clearly as possible. The development by science of a special language suitable for describing objects that are unusual from the point of view of common sense is a necessary condition for scientific research. The language of science is constantly evolving as it penetrates into ever new areas of the objective world. Moreover, it has the opposite effect on everyday, natural language. For example, the terms "electricity", "refrigerator" were once specific scientific concepts, and then entered everyday language. Along with an artificial, specialized language, scientific research needs a special system of special tools that, by directly influencing the object under study, make it possible to identify its possible states under conditions controlled by the subject. The tools used in production and in everyday life are, as a rule, unsuitable for this purpose, since the objects studied by science and the objects transformed in production and everyday practice most often differ in their nature. Hence the need for special scientific equipment (measuring instruments, instrumental installations), which allow science to experimentally study new types of objects. Scientific equipment and the language of science act as an expression of already acquired knowledge. But just as in practice its products turn into means of new types of practical activity, so in scientific research its products - scientific knowledge expressed in language or embodied in devices, become a means of further research. Thus, from the peculiarities of the subject of science, we obtained, as a kind of consequence, differences in the means of scientific and everyday knowledge. The specifics of the objects of scientific research can further explain the main differences between scientific knowledge as a product of scientific activity and knowledge obtained in the sphere of ordinary, spontaneous-empirical knowledge. The latter are most often not systematized; rather, it is a conglomerate of information, prescriptions, recipes for activity and behavior accumulated over the course of the historical development of everyday experience. Their reliability is established due to the direct application in cash situations of production and everyday practice. As for scientific knowledge, its reliability can no longer be substantiated only in this way, since in science, objects that have not yet been mastered in production are mainly studied. Therefore, specific ways of substantiating the truth of knowledge are needed. They are experimental control over the acquired knowledge and the derivation of some knowledge from others, the truth of which has already been proven. In turn, derivability procedures ensure the transfer of truth from one piece of knowledge to another, due to which they become interconnected, organized into a system. Thus, we obtain the characteristics of the consistency and validity of scientific knowledge, which distinguish it from the products of everyday cognitive activity of people. From the main characteristic of scientific research, one can also deduce such a distinctive feature of science when compared with ordinary knowledge, as a feature of the method of cognitive activity. The objects to which everyday knowledge is directed are formed in everyday practice. The devices by which each such object is singled out and fixed as an object of knowledge are woven into everyday experience. The totality of such techniques, as a rule, is not recognized by the subject as a method of cognition. The situation is different in scientific research. Here, the very discovery of the object, the properties of which are subject to further study, is a very laborious task. For example, in order to detect short-lived particles - resonances, modern physics performs experiments on the scattering of particle beams and then applies complex calculations. Ordinary particles leave traces-tracks in photographic emulsions or in a cloud chamber, but resonances do not leave such tracks. They live for a very short time (10-22 s) and during this period of time they cover a distance smaller than the size of an atom. Because of this, resonance cannot cause ionization of photoemulsion molecules (or gas in a cloud chamber) and leave an observed trace. However, when the resonance decays, the resulting particles are capable of leaving traces of the indicated type. In the photograph, they look like a set of rays-dashes emanating from one center. By the nature of these rays, using mathematical calculations, the physicist determines the presence of resonance. Thus, in order to deal with the same type of resonances, the researcher needs to know the conditions under which the corresponding object appears. He must clearly define the method by which a particle can be detected in an experiment. Outside of the method, he will not at all single out the object under study from the numerous connections and relations of objects of nature. To fix an object, a scientist must know the methods of such fixation. Therefore, in science, the study of objects, the identification of their properties and relationships is always accompanied by an awareness of the method by which the object is studied. Objects are always given to a person in the system of certain techniques and methods of his activity. But these techniques in science are no longer obvious, they are not repeatedly repeated techniques in everyday practice. And the further science moves away from the usual things of everyday experience, delving into the study of "unusual" objects, the more clearly and distinctly the need for the creation and development of special methods is manifested, in the system of which science can study objects. Along with knowledge about objects, science forms knowledge about methods. The need to develop and systematize knowledge of the second type leads at the highest stages of the development of science to the formation of methodology as a special branch of scientific research, designed to purposefully direct scientific research. Finally, the desire of science to study objects relatively independently of their assimilation in the available forms of production and everyday experience presupposes specific characteristics of the subject of scientific activity. Engaging in science requires special training of the cognizing subject, during which he masters the historically established means of scientific research, learns the techniques and methods of operating with these means. For everyday knowledge, such training is not necessary, or rather, it is carried out automatically, in the process of socialization of the individual, when his thinking is formed and develops in the process of communicating with culture and including the individual in various fields of activity. The pursuit of science implies, along with the mastery of means and methods, the assimilation of a certain system of value orientations and goals specific to scientific knowledge. These orientations should stimulate scientific research aimed at studying more and more new objects, regardless of the current practical effect of the knowledge gained. Otherwise, science will not fulfill its main function - to go beyond the subject structures of the practice of its era, expanding the horizons of opportunities for man to master the objective world. Two basic attitudes of science ensure the desire for such a search: the intrinsic value of truth and the value of novelty. Any scientist accepts the search for truth as one of the main principles of scientific activity, perceiving truth as the highest value of science. This attitude is embodied in a number of ideals and norms of scientific knowledge, expressing its specificity: in certain ideals of the organization of knowledge (for example, the requirement of logical consistency of the theory and its experimental confirmation), in the search for an explanation of phenomena based on laws and principles that reflect the essential connections of the objects under study, etc. An equally important role in scientific research is played by the focus on the constant growth of knowledge and the special value of novelty in science. This attitude is expressed in the system of ideals and normative principles of scientific creativity (for example, the prohibition of plagiarism, the permissibility of a critical review of the foundations of scientific research as a condition for the development of ever new types of objects, etc.). The value orientations of science form the foundation of its ethos, which a scientist must master in order to successfully engage in research. Great scientists left a significant mark on culture not only because of the discoveries they made, but also because their activity was a model of innovation and service to the truth for many generations of people. Any deviation from the truth for the sake of personal, selfish goals, any manifestation of unscrupulousness in science met with an unquestioning rebuff from them. In science, the principle is proclaimed as an ideal that all researchers are equal in the face of truth, that no past merit is taken into account when it comes to scientific evidence. At the beginning of the century, a little-known employee of the patent bureau A. Einstein discussed with the famous scientist G. Lorentz, proving the validity of his interpretation of the transformations introduced by Lorentz. Ultimately, it was Einstein who won the argument. But Lorentz and his colleagues never resorted in this discussion to the techniques widely used in the disputes of everyday life - they did not argue, for example, that it was unacceptable to criticize Lorentz's theory on the grounds that his status at that time was incommensurable with the status not yet known to the scientific community. young physicist Einstein. An equally important principle of scientific ethos is the requirement of scientific honesty in the presentation of research results. A scientist can make mistakes, but has no right to rig results, he can repeat a discovery already made, but has no right to plagiarize. The institution of references as a prerequisite for the design of a scientific monograph and article is intended not only to fix the authorship of certain ideas and scientific texts. It provides a clear selection of already known in science and new results. Outside of this selection, there would be no incentive to intense search for the new, endless repetitions of the past would arise in science and, ultimately, its main quality would be undermined - to constantly generate the growth of new knowledge, going beyond the usual and already known ideas about the world. Of course, the requirement of the inadmissibility of falsifications and plagiarism acts as a kind of presumption of science, which in real life can be violated. Different scientific communities may impose different severity of sanctions for violating the ethical principles of science. Consider one example from the life of modern science, which can serve as an example of the intransigence of the community to violations of these principles. In the mid-1970s, the so-called case of Gallis, a young and promising biochemist who worked on the problem of intracerebral morphine in the early 1970s, gained notoriety among biochemists and neurophysiologists. He put forward an original hypothesis that plant-derived morphines and intracerebral morphines have the same effect on nervous tissue. Gallis conducted a series of laborious experiments, but was unable to convincingly confirm this hypothesis, although indirect evidence indicated its promise. Fearing that other researchers would overtake him and make this discovery, Gallis decided to falsify. He published fictitious experimental data, allegedly confirming the hypothesis. Gallis' "discovery" aroused great interest in the community of neurophysiologists and biochemists. However, no one could confirm his results by reproducing experiments according to the method he published. Then the young and already well-known scientist was invited to publicly conduct experiments at a special symposium in 1977 in Munich, under the supervision of his colleagues. Gallis was eventually forced to confess to the falsification. The scientific community reacted to this recognition with a hard boycott. Colleagues of Gallis ceased to maintain scientific contacts with him, all his co-authors publicly refused to joint articles with him, and as a result, Gallis published a letter in which he apologized to his colleagues and announced that he was stopping his studies in science. Ideally, the scientific community should always reject researchers who are found to be intentionally plagiarizing or deliberately falsifying scientific results for the sake of some worldly good. The communities of mathematicians and natural scientists are closest to this ideal, but for the humanities, for example, since they are under much greater pressure from ideological and political structures, the sanctions for researchers who deviate from the ideals of scientific integrity are significantly relaxed. It is indicative that for everyday consciousness the observance of the basic principles of scientific ethos is not at all necessary, and sometimes even undesirable. A person who told a political joke in an unfamiliar company does not have to refer to the source of information, especially if he lives in a totalitarian society. In everyday life, people exchange a wide variety of knowledge, share everyday experience, but references to the author of this experience in most situations are simply impossible, because this experience is anonymous and often broadcast in culture for centuries. The presence of science-specific norms and goals of cognitive activity, as well as specific means and methods that ensure the comprehension of ever new objects, requires the purposeful formation of scientific specialists. This need leads to the emergence of an "academic component of science" - special organizations and institutions that provide training for scientific personnel. In the process of such training, future researchers should learn not only special knowledge, techniques and methods of scientific work, but also the main value orientations of science, its ethical norms and principles.

Ancient and medieval science

1. Educational and methodological complex in the discipline "concepts of modern natural science"

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   The educational and methodological complex for the discipline "Concepts of modern natural science" was developed in accordance with the requirements of the State Educational Standard of Higher Professional Education for students,

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   The educational and methodological complex for the discipline "Concepts of modern natural science" is compiled in accordance with the requirements of the State educational standard of higher professional education / Basic educational

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4. The program, guidelines and control tasks on the discipline of the concept of modern natural science for students of correspondence courses of all specialties, except

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5. Educational and methodological complex of the concept of modern natural science higher professional education specialty 030501. 65 Jurisprudence

   Training and metodology complex