The first monetary reforms of the Russian state. Login forgot password

During the reign of Alexei Mikhailovich (father of Peter I) in 1654, the state needed significant funds to wage war. In this regard, the first attempt at monetary reform was made, in which the face value of coins was significantly higher than the value of the metal contained.

Alexey Mikhailovich was forced to agree with the plan of the devious Fyodor Mikhailovich Rtishchev to introduce into monetary circulation a large silver coin based on the European model. First, they tried to re-mint the efimkas with stamps with Russian state symbols (on the front side - “a man on a horse”, on the back - a double-headed eagle). The rarest rubles that have reached us clearly show the reason for abandoning this method. All of them are unpresentable in appearance, have clear traces of the old image and weak stamping of the new one.

Russia, which did not have its own production of precious metals during this period, received silver and gold only as payment for the export of its goods. Payment was mainly made in Western European thalers, which were then used as raw material for minting their own coins. The merchant brought the proceeds to the mint, where they were turned into wire for making “fish scales” - pennies. One thaler yielded 64 flakes, of which the donor received 50.

The trial minting of new coins was carried out on primitive “hammer shells”, in which a heavy “woman” with an upper stamp fell onto an anvil with a lower stamp. The following year, 1655, the royal stamps began to be applied to the efimki, or pieces cut into four, and then they were released into internal circulation, but now for a ruble and half a half. The efimka contained 64 kopecks worth of silver at that time, but after branding they tried to make it into a ruble. Technical difficulties of re-minting and the non-acceptance of the new coin by the population (especially among troops abroad) led to the cessation of work in the same year.

So in 1655, to pay the salaries of troops abroad, the accumulated stock of thalers was minted with the stamp of a penny coin and a stamp with the date “1655”. The reformers of that time approached the introduction of copper coins into circulation even more roughly - they simply replaced silver wire with copper in 1656, and began to mint them in Moscow, Novgorod and Pskov with the same penny stamps and according to the same weight standard (copper half rubles, altyns and pennies planned by decree did not reach wide circulation). However, for the first three years the population takes the innovation calmly. By 1659, the copper price began to fall, but at first only by 4%. Counterfeits and rumors appear that the boyars are altering the copper that belongs to them on their own initiative. By 1662, copper was quoted at 8-12% of silver and a decree was issued to accept only silver into the treasury (it itself paid in copper). A “copper riot” immediately followed, and by decree of June 1663, the copper yards were closed. In the future, the treasury will buy back the copper produced over seven years, but at two dengas per ruble (1% of the nominal value).

The experiment to introduce new coins failed. The reasons for the failure are clear to any today's financier. Coin circulation returned to the minting of wire “scales” and continued in this form until the beginning of the 18th century, when Peter I managed to begin minting coins of large denominations and regulate coin circulation by establishing a coin foot on the model of the Western European thaler.

MONETARY REFORM BY ELENA GLINSKAYA. 1535-1538

The first monetary reform of Russia was carried out in 1535 on the initiative and under the leadership of Elena Glinskaya- Grand Duchess of Moscow, wife of Vasily ΙΙΙ and mother of Ivan the Terrible.

The need for reform was caused by the large number of counterfeit coins among the population, the prosperity of mass cutting of coins, that is, an artificial, malicious reduction in their weight.

For example, they cut off the edges of a coin with scissors or drilled a hole in a coin and filled this hole with non-precious metal. This phenomenon was typical for all countries of the world where coins made of precious metals circulated.

Before the reform, money was printed in Moscow, Pskov and Novgorod; a few coins were issued by the Tver monetary yard. Moscow money and Novgorod money differed in weight, design, and quality of silver.

Thanks to the reform, a unified monetary circulation system of the Russian state was created. Coins began to be printed from high standard silver at the sovereign mint, had a standard weight, and uniform design (minting).

The unified monetary system had a positive effect on the intensification of Russian foreign trade, primarily with European countries.

MONETARY REFORM OF ALEXEY ROMANOV. 1654-1663

During this period in Rus', the currency in circulation was silver kopecks, half rubles (half money) and denga (Moscow denga, it was also called “Moskovka” or “saber”, since it depicted a horseman with a saber. Moskovka was equal to 1/200 of a ruble Also in circulation was the Novgorod money or "novgorodka", a kopeck, which was equal to 1/100 of a ruble).

It became very inconvenient to conduct large-scale serious trading and pay with such small money. We needed large denomination coins.

Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich ordered the minting of rubles from the thalers accumulated in the treasury (a large silver coin that in the 16th-19th centuries played an important role in the monetary circulation of Europe and in international trade). The silver ruble minted from the thaler began to be called the “efimka”. The inscription “Ruble” was placed on such a coin for the first time; a double-headed eagle was minted on the obverse side, and a king on horseback was minted on the reverse side. However, such a ruble was in circulation for no more than a year, since the silver content in the coin was lower than one hundred kopecks - in fact, the new ruble coin was equal to only 64 kopecks. The ruble turned out to be inferior. Therefore, in 1655, the issue of “efimkas,” that is, an inferior ruble not backed by silver, was discontinued. Full-weight thalers with a stamp (a rider on a horse and the year 1655) returned to replace them. This silver ruble was called "efimka with signs").

Also, at the beginning of the monetary reform, by decree of the tsar, copper pennies began to be printed from copper wire to service domestic trade. So many copper coins began to be issued that they quickly began to depreciate, which led to the high cost of goods and the inability of the population to pay. Peasants refused to sell grain, and merchants refused to sell goods for copper. In 1662, the Copper Riot broke out - an uprising of the poor against increased taxes and the release of copper coins that were depreciating in value compared to silver since 1654.

The revolt was suppressed, the minting of copper coins was stopped, copper coins were withdrawn from circulation, and the minting of silver kopecks resumed.

These were the results of the second monetary reform.

For history - the ruble of Alexei Mikhailovich - the first ruble coin in Rus'.

The main reason for carrying out the monetary reform was the need to build a fleet, equip an army, and wage the Northern War (1700-1721). First, in order to obtain additional funds for the maintenance of the army and navy, Peter I began reminting foreign coins, of which a lot had accumulated from the sale of government goods to foreign states. However, the problem could not be solved in such a simple way, since much more money was required.

In the course of two previous reforms, Russia was never able to create a large coin backed by silver. The largest coin remained the silver penny. Peter I decided to resume the minting of ruble coins. Initially, these were silver coins weighing 28 grams with a pure silver content of about 25-26 grams (later, under Catherine II, the weight of silver decreased to 18 grams). The ruble became equal to 100 kopecks. But the ruble did not become a monetary unit during the reform. The penny remained the main monetary unit and its name appeared on coins for the first time.

Peter I introduced many new coins: copper change coins - money, half and half half coins, and again introduced the copper penny into circulation, which was equal to 1/100 of a silver ruble. In addition to the minting of silver rubles, they began to mint half-rules, half-half-rubles, ten-kopeck coins, five-kopek coins, and three-kopeck coins - the weight of silver in each became less and less.

During the reform, gold coins were introduced into circulation: chervonets (3 rubles), double chervonets (6 rubles), double ruble (about 4 grams). Later, the gold chervonets were abandoned in favor of a gold coin worth two rubles.

Peter I also planned to introduce a copper ruble payment according to the Swedish model in 1725, but these plans were implemented only by Catherine I.

At first, the profits from the coinage reform were enormous, but gradually declined. Spending on the army and navy continued to rise; the Northern War was not yet over. Therefore, Peter decided to switch to a strict tax policy.

In 1762, during a palace coup, Peter III was overthrown and his wife Catherine II ascended the throne. First of all, she abolished the recoining of depreciated copper money, which had forced silver money out of circulation. The silver ruble remained the basis of monetary circulation in Russia. Under Catherine II, the weight of silver began to decrease and by 1764 reached 18 grams (under Peter the content of pure silver in the ruble was about 25-26).

With the growth of commodity-money relations, silver mines began to be unable to cope with the increased demands for an increase in the volume of money in the economy. Their productivity was very low. The question of replacing heavy copper and silver coins with a new type of money supply became increasingly pressing.

Count K. Sivere, the Novgorod governor, wrote a note to the empress about the need to introduce paper money in Russia. Catherine II instructed the Prosecutor General, Prince A. A. Vyazemsky, to prepare a plan for issuing banknotes.

In 1769, the first paper banknotes were introduced into circulation, which were called “assignats” (they existed until 1843).

The notes were in denominations of 10, 25, 50, 75 and 100 rubles. They were printed on thick white paper with complex watermarks and oval embossing. Each note contained the signatures of two senators, an advisor and a bank director.

At the end of her reign, Catherine II was forced to return to the project of Peter Shuvalov, who, during the life of Peter III, the husband of Catherine II, suggested that he re-mint copper coins, that is, reduce their weight, which increased the face value of copper coins.

The death of Catherine II stopped the implementation of this plan

Par value is the nominal value established for securities upon their issue. (dictionary)

Emission is a release of money into circulation that leads to a general increase in the money supply in circulation. (dictionary)

KANKRIN MONETARY REFORM. 1839-1843
Why was reform needed?

Paper money during the reign of Catherine II had a dual character. On the one hand, they represented metallic money in circulation, on the other hand, they were an independent monetary unit that had its own spheres of circulation. This dual mechanism of the first paper money began to interfere.

By the beginning of the 19th century, copper, silver and gold coins were completely withdrawn from circulation. Cash (assignats) became the basis of the monetary system in Russia, but notes began to depreciate greatly even under Catherine II. The Patriotic War of 1812 intensified the depreciation of banknotes.

The exchange rate of the assignat ruble to the silver ruble was unstable, constantly fluctuating, which made settlements difficult both in the domestic and foreign markets. It was necessary to stop the weakening of banknotes and fix the exchange rate of the banknote ruble to the silver ruble.

The role of industry has increased. Technical progress required increased spending on the development of new technologies. More and more people filled the industrial complex, people needed to be paid. The state constantly put into circulation a new money supply, which was still not enough. Inflation “ate up” these new revenues.

The Kankrin reform is considered a transitional reform; it was carried out in 3 stages.

The first stage of reform.

In 1839, a manifesto “On the structure of the monetary system” was published, which established a system of silver monometallism in Russia - the silver ruble became the main monetary unit. All financial and trade transactions had to be carried out in rubles. Kankrin directed his efforts to fix the value of the assignat ruble - 1 silver ruble = 4 spools, 1 silver ruble = 3.5 rubles in assignats.

State banknotes were assigned the role of an auxiliary banknote.

In the same 1839, another decree was issued “On the establishment of the Deposit Office of Silver Coins at the State Commercial Bank.” Tickets from the Deposit Office became legal tender. The population could deposit silver rubles, receiving in return a Deposit ticket for an amount equal to the value of the deposited silver rubles.

That is, the deposit ticket was something like a cash receipt for opening a deposit (for storing silver money). In financial terms, the treasury had nothing to gain from this; it was a step to strengthen the population’s confidence in paper banknotes, to strengthen the role of the state financial structure. Deposit notes were convenient for the wealthy, who could store their silver outside the home, as well as for trading, when there was no need to carry heavy bags of silver coins.

The need to continue the reform was caused primarily by such economic factors as a severe crop failure in 1840. The population began to close deposits to return cash. Banks were on the verge of bankruptcy. Therefore, it was decided to issue Credit Notes of 50-ruble denomination, which circulated in parallel with the silver ruble and were exchanged for a silver coin. That is, credit notes, like deposit notes, had one hundred percent silver value.

What did this give the state?

Credit notes were supposed to help state credit institutions and the treasury, which could issue a credit note if there was a shortage of cash.

Since the treasury and the state had nothing from the Deposit Notes, it was decided to increase the issue of Credit Notes and exchange the Deposit Notes for Credit Notes. The population was informed about this by the manifesto of June 1, 1843 “On the replacement of banknotes and other monetary representatives with credit notes”

Credit notes were exchanged for silver and gold. Thus, a more or less stable monetary circulation system emerged in Russia, in which paper money was exchanged for silver and gold. Credit notes were backed by 35-40% gold and silver.

After the reform, the state budget deficit decreased, but the Crimean War, which began in 1853, again devalued banknotes.

There were two monetary units in Russia - the silver ruble and Credit notes. The new monetary reform was supposed to combine these two banknotes, which continued to depreciate.

In February 1895, Finance Minister Sergei Witte presented a report to Emperor Nicholas II on the need to introduce gold circulation in Russia. Many countries have already switched to the gold standard due to the growth of commodity-money relations between states.

The reform provided for 100% backing of the bulk of banknotes issued in circulation with gold and their free exchange for gold. The state Russian monetary unit was the gold ruble with a gold content of 17.24 shares. This period in the financial history of Russia began to be called the period of “golden monometallism.”

With the transition to the gold standard, a fairly stable and solvent monetary system was created in Russia, which contributed to the rapid integration of Russia into international business circles, expanded its sphere of influence and strengthened industrial and trade ties with other countries.

The monetary reform, broadly conceived by the government of Alexei Mikhailovich (1645-1676), was designed to solve several important problems. Formed by the middle of the 17th century. The all-Russian market was served in fact by only one monetary denomination - the silver kopeck, which was extremely inconvenient for large payments, but, on the other hand, still very expensive for the normal provision of everyday small market communications. The introduction into circulation of large denominations of coins, primarily silver ruble coins modeled on Western European thalers, was urgently needed. The political events of the mid-century, namely the beginning of the struggle for Ukraine, made it urgent to bring the Ukrainian monetary system, based at that time on the free circulation of Western European thalers and Polish change coins, into conformity with the all-Russian one. In Rus', thalers were exclusively monetary raw materials, and the attempt to turn them first into rubles, and then into “efimki with a sign” equal in price to 64 kopecks, pursued far-reaching goals of clearing the monetary circulation of Ukraine from foreign coins.

The reform began with the minting and putting into circulation of silver rubles and half-poltinas, as well as copper half-rubles. The weight of the ruble was equal to the weight of the thaler (28-29 g). Rubles were minted on thalers from which images had previously been knocked off, and half-and-a-half rubles were minted on thalers cut into four parts, also previously devoid of images. Thus, two inferior denominations were introduced into circulation at once - a ruble, actually equal to 64 kopecks (a counting ruble in old kopecks, which remained in circulation, weighed about 45 g), and a half-half, equal to 16 kopecks with a face value of 25 kopecks. In the same year, they began minting copper half coins, equal in weight to the new ruble. It should be emphasized that the new system of coin units introduced into circulation did not cancel the old one - silver wire pennies remained in circulation and their minting did not stop. Thus, coins with a forced exchange rate were introduced into circulation - copper half rubles and silver rubles and half half rubles, therefore, copper coins could not become exchangeable in relation to silver ones.

The issue of coins of large denominations required a transition from manual to machine minting, which was an insurmountable difficulty on the path of reform. For their minting, a special money court was opened, called the New Moscow English Money Court (the name “English” is explained by its location in the former courtyard of English merchants). Special machines for minting new coins - “hammer shells” - often broke down, coin stamps quickly wore out, and there was an acute shortage of qualified money craftsmen. Already at the beginning of the next year, the minting of coins of new large denominations had to be stopped. Copper altyns, after their test batch was minted on round blanks, began to be minted again on scraps of flattened wire, returning to the manual minting technique. Documents also report the minting of half-fifty rubles (quarters) and ten-kopeck coins, which, however, have not survived to this day. Very few ruble coins were minted - a little more than 50 copies are known. History has preserved the name of the master carver for making working ruble stamps - Fyodor Baikov. On one side of the ruble coins there was a traditional image of the king riding on a horse and holding a scepter in his right hand. A characteristic feature of the image is the sleeve of the royal robe, draped over the shoulders, fluttering over the horse’s croup from behind. This detail allows us to assume that the golden chervonets of Tsar Fyodor Ivanovich is the prototype of the image. The circular inscription along the edge of the coin contains the new title of the tsar: “By the grace of God, great sovereign, tsar and grand duke Alexei Mikhailovich of all Great and Little Russia.” On the other side, in the center of the coin, there is a double-headed eagle crowned with a crown. At the top there is the inscription “Summer 7162”, at the bottom - “Ruble”. The images on the copper half coins are almost no different from those placed on the ruble bills. It should be emphasized that it was on coins that the new royal title “Tsar and Grand Duke of All Great and Little Russia” was first recorded, reflecting the reunification of Ukraine with Russia.

Convinced of the impossibility of establishing coinage and introducing ruble coins into circulation, the government in 1655 issued the so-called “efimkas with a sign” into circulation. The name efimok comes from the name of the first thalers minted in the city of Joachimsthal in Bohemia. In the Czech Republic they were called Joachimsthalers or Thalers for short. In Rus', the first part of the word took root and thalers began to be called efimkas. Note that another name came from the thaler - dollar. So, “efimok with a sign” is a thaler equipped with two countermarks: one in the form of an ordinary round stamp of a penny with the image of a horseman, the other in the form of a rectangular stamp with the date “1655”, indicated in Arabic numerals. Among the “efimki with the attribute” there are thalers from most European countries - Poland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Switzerland, etc. The thalers of various German principalities, archbishoprics and cities are exceptionally fully represented.

Efimok was officially equivalent to 64 kopecks, corresponding to the average number of kopeck coins made from one thaler. The ruble notes of 1654 began to be valued in the same way, i.e. The metrological duality of coins in circulation was eliminated. The countermarking of thalers was carried out only during 1655, or at most at the beginning of the next year, but with the coinage “1655”. During this time, up to one million thalers received “sign” countermarks. In 1659, their circulation was prohibited along with rubles and half-rubles and they were redeemed with copper money. They remained in the monetary circulation of Ukraine until the 18th century. along with thalers. Now more than 1,700 copies of “efimki with the trait” are known, most of which were discovered in coin hoards in Ukraine and Belarus.

In 1655, the minting of copper wire kopecks began, equal in price to silver ones. They were minted in huge quantities at several mints at once - in Moscow, Novgorod, Pskov and Kukenoise (Tsarevichev Dmitriev town). In design, they were no different from silver kopecks. On kopecks minted in Moscow, there are two bank marks - o/M (“o” external) and MD. With the first sign, traditional for the Moscow Monetary Court, coins were minted at the Old Monetary Court, and with the “MD” sign, probably at the New (English) Monetary Court. The government was in a hurry to put copper kopecks into circulation, as convincingly evidenced by one of the orders to the Moscow Monetary Court on minting “hastily day and night.”

Copper kopecks, gradually but constantly falling in price in comparison with silver ones, were in circulation until 1663. The different rates of silver and copper coins led to a severe disorder in monetary market relations, which had the most negative impact on the situation of the population. The result of this was the Moscow uprising of 1662 - the “copper riot”, which confronted the government with the need to restore the pre-reform monetary system.

During the reign of Tsar Fyodor Alekseevich (1676-1682), the weight of a penny remained unchanged, i.e. the silver ruble still contained about 46 grams of silver. The coins of this king are distinguished by the special elegance of their stamps - the clarity of the design and inscriptions.

A new reduction in the weight of the kopeck (to 0.38 g) was probably carried out at the very beginning of the regency of Princess Sophia. During this period, silver coins (kopecks and money) were minted separately in the name of each of the co-ruler brothers - Ivan and Peter Alekseevich, which is explained by the prevailing perception of the image of the horseman as the image of a certain sovereign.

Study of the Russian monetary and weight system of the 16th-17th centuries. shows that it has become one of the important levers in the system of organizing power and management of a single state. Therefore, it seems far from accidental that it was the coin reform that was one of the very first in the transformative measures of Peter the Great.

In the middle of the 17th century, an attempt was made to improve the Russian monetary economy and adapt it to new socio-economic and political conditions. The monetary reform of 1649-1663 was supposed to solve several problems at once: change the archaic monetary system by introducing large silver and small units of exchange; use copper along with silver as coin raw materials; to orient the main Russian monetary unit - the ruble - to the Western European thaler.

In 1648, when a nationwide uprising of the Cossacks and enslaved peasantry against the political and religious oppression of Poland broke out in Ukraine, led by Bogdan Khmelnitsky, the situation required the most decisive breaking of the old order in the monetary economy. When Russia's action in support of the one-blooded and same-faith people of Ukraine became inevitable in the very near future, perhaps the experience of the recent financial disaster of Shuisky, who did not have a supply of coin material, was also taken into account. The special nature of the upcoming campaign - the march of the army into the territory of a friendly fraternal people awaiting protection and help - made the problem of the behavior and maintenance of troops there especially acute: they should not need anything.

The Russian kopeck was familiar to the population of the trading cities of Ukraine, as well as Belarus, which would not have been spared by the upcoming war, but this small coin was lost there among the various denominations of the developed monetary circulation of the Western European type, based on the thaler with its fractions and on the abundant billon, but which also knew gold; the limitless expansion of the production of kopecks for the maintenance of the army seemed to be a completely difficult task.

The idea turned to larger denominations, like the thaler, or at least to the creation of some kind of special “military” system subordinated to the goals of war. There was still time to think, but the creation of a possibly large state reserve of coin metal became urgent. In 1649, like a bolt from the blue, a decree sounded for the merchants - Arkhangelsk customs officers should buy thalers only “for the sovereign,” that is, for the treasury, without even stopping to force the merchants who had gathered to trade to buy the offered efimki for their own money - with change and settlement in Moscow, which required all transactions to be registered.

The unpreparedness of this undertaking is evidenced by the “control figures” for purchases named in the decree - “up to thirty thousand and up to forty thousand and more, or how many can be bought” - very modest at first. For the following years there are messages from the Swedish resident in Moscow I. Rhodes; if his report about the procurement of up to 600 thousand Reichstalers during the years of grain export through Arkhangelsk is doubtful, then the mentioned amount of a regular purchase of 150 thousand is confirmed by the famous work of G. Kotoshikhin, a Moscow official who fled abroad in 1663. The assignment for 1654, preserved in the document, already calls it “one hundred thousand and more, or how much you can buy.”

Having taken the purchase of silver into its own hands, the government was forced to take care of coinage; A new, unexplored area of ​​financial management was opening up. In addition to ordinary needs, kopecks were required to pay off the debt on the merchant forced purchase of 1649 and to advance further purchases, but it was also necessary to accumulate a silver reserve.

It can be assumed that by taking away the right of purchase from the merchants, and thereby the right to order the minting of coins, the government could consider itself entitled to demand that all owners of silver who had not yet converted it into coin hand it over to the treasury. If there was no such decree, then there was every reason to expect it.

Until the middle of the 17th century. The richest topography of Russian coin treasures does not know at all within the borders of Russia at that time not only treasures of thalers, but even a single thaler among the kopecks buried in masses; Meanwhile, several treasures of thalers with junior coins from the 1640s that were discovered in large cities - Moscow and its vicinity, Novgorod and Yaroslavl - indicate the anxiety that suddenly gripped their “depositors,” who clearly counted on the temporary restrictions.

The Pereyaslav Treaty, signed in early January 1654, which legitimized the return of Ukraine to the united Russian state and the new “Little Russian” title of the Tsar, predetermined the beginning of a long war with Poland (1654-1677), complicated by the unforeseen shorter Russian-Swedish war (1656-1677). 1658).

However, the implementation of the financial plan, adopted probably back in 1648-1649, was already lagging behind the deadlines and the course of events. It was possible to stockpile silver, but how much time was required to invent and organize the construction of a series of unprecedented machines - “hammer shells” for mechanical minting, by the force of falling gravity, of equally unprecedentedly large silver and copper coins, comparable to the thaler; bring them to one place, install and test these machines at the “English Yard” allocated for the new mint - the former compound of the English company and bring it into full readiness!

The new mint was launched only in June - in the sixth month of the war. The decree of May 8 prescribed the conversion of 893,620 thalers into rubles and half-and-half, as well as the minting of copper coins of various denominations, but only above the penny (it was to appear only next year). But of all the copper denominations mentioned in the documents, we know only fifty kopecks: for the rest, it is known that they tried to mint them with new machines, but immediately refused, since copper turned out to be much more capricious in business than silver, and to operate the machine by pulling a load on blocks with a stamp for the sake of making a penny or even a hryvnia was too expensive.

As indicated, the war had been going on for 6 months, and the old mint in the Kremlin was converting efimkas into kopecks batch by batch and sending bags with them “to the regiments” - to Ukraine and Belarus - when the “English Mint” issued its first products - re-minted from somehow hammered thalers, silver rubles and half-fifties - angular stumps of thalers divided into four, and the main marvel of the new coinage - copper "efimkas" - fifty-fifty thalers the size of a thaler. Immediately, several parcels with new coins went “to the shelves”, to Ukraine and Belarus. The Kremlin Mint carried out the last order to convert the last 100 poods of thalers into kopecks.

The guiding idea of ​​the initial plan of the operation is most convincingly revealed by the preserved archival “release”, that is, a draft of the August decree of 1654, addressed not to the army command, but to the entire population of Russia - on the issue and mandatory acceptance of new coins. It contains a very important phrase, although crossed out at the last moment - a promise to redeem all new coins for silver pennies at the end of the war - the ones mentioned above and a few more “failed” coppers (they are known to us only from descriptions).

Thus, relying on the obedience of its subjects, the government intended to offer its people clearly inferior coins: in the ruble-thaler there was only 64 kopecks worth of silver, and the copper fifty-kopeck piece was generally of incomprehensible value. But with such a risky operation, how could one count on the willingness to accept losses from new subjects in Ukraine, and even more so from residents of Belarusian cities who were not yet subjects at all? Although the redemption clause was not included in the final version of the decree, the temporary nature of the new money was primarily indicated by the preservation of the old penny in all rights, and in a number of cases it was even recognized as the only means of payment (in any settlements with foreigners, in the collection of arrears, and for a number of years in monetary circulation in Siberia).

From this it is clear that the new coins were conceived as a temporary “second-rate” addition to the existing circulation system, and it was impossible to conceal their inferiority.

It is not surprising that both from Ukraine and from Belarus the sent salary was immediately returned to Moscow in a new coin - with the same explanation that “the townspeople do not want to take that money.”

Having only accidentally preserved documents, one can even assume that the original plan of this issue, known in its entirety, had in mind exclusively the internal circulation of the country - as a kind of urgent internal loan from its subjects in order to free up more thalers for waging war; neither the content of the decrees known to us, nor the crossed out clause would in any way contradict this.

And the failure with new money in the army, and the technical difficulties that turned out to be completely insurmountable - the machines were falling apart, the inability to restore the stamps barbarously broken by this “technique” (there was only one cutter in all of Moscow) and so gave it - extinguished faith in the success of the operation. The tsar's increased interest in the new mint faded, and work on a series of new coins, without the previous constant prodding, was curtailed by itself - probably even before September 1, 1654, when the year ended according to the Moscow calendar.

There is no point in thinking that the almost million-dollar stock of thalers was able to be reduced in any significant way. The rubles of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich of 1654 that have reached us in several dozens constitute essentially the “first echelon” of the stock of thalers accumulated since 1649. Most of them reveal the most re-minted Dutch, Brunswick and Imperial thalers; one - the city of Thorn even retained its own date - 1638.

Almost a year was lost until a new solution to the problem crystallized - to ensure the country's internal circulation without silver at all, and to supply the army with large silver coins suitable for payments beyond the old state border.

The domestic market meekly accepted the copper kopeck, seeing no difference between it and silver for the first two years, until inflation made itself felt, forcing the no longer replenished supply of silver kopecks out of circulation.

Silver in the form of efimki, quite acceptable within the country if they accidentally returned there, was assigned the role of an “external” coin for a special purpose - for paying troops located beyond the old border. The question of choosing a denomination - the price for a branded efimka - somewhere between the profitable purchase price (50 kopecks) and the fantastic valuation of the short-lived ruble of 1654 - was resolved on the verge of a loss for the treasury: they settled on weight parity with the silver kopeck: the thaler is balanced by 64 kopecks ; so to be equal to him when calculating the salary of 64 kopecks!

In order to make up for the shortage of silver coins, which were entirely spent on government needs, the treasury actively bought them from the population for copper pennies.

At the same time, taxes and duties were paid only in silver by royal decree. But the government's fiscal policy was not limited to this. At the suggestion of the famous statesman A.L. The Ordina-Nashchokin treasury forcibly bought export goods (furs, flax, hemp, yuft, etc.) from Russian merchants for copper pennies, and then resold them on the foreign market for silver money. To purchase foreign goods, merchants put silver into circulation. But they were forced to sell them on the domestic market for copper pennies and thus found themselves “unindustrialized,” that is, the silver they spent did not return to them.

The real value of copper kopecks fell catastrophically. In September 1658, for one silver kopeck they gave three copper ones, in March of the next year they gave five, and in 1663 copper money depreciated so much that one ruble in silver was worth twelve copper ones. Of course, the fall in the value of copper kopecks was accompanied by rising prices and an increase in the minting volumes of copper kopecks. According to some estimates, over the five years of reform, copper kopecks were issued for 20 million rubles.

Minting copper kopecks turned out to be a tempting trade not only for the state, but also for counterfeiters. The last “thieves’” pennies made by the latter began to come into circulation more and more often. The “loyal heads” and kissers who were assigned to monitor the money business were selected from among the trading people known for their honesty and wealth. But even they could not resist the temptation to get rich quick. They bought copper “on the side,” brought it to the money courts and minted coins there. The counterfeiters were covered up by the Tsar's father-in-law Ilya Danilovich Miloslavsky and the Duma nobleman Matyushkin. They did this, of course, not for free: for I.D. alone. Miloslavsky’s “thieves’” money was minted for 120 thousand rubles.

Many counterfeiters paid for their passion for profit by having their arms and legs cut off and exiled to distant cities. But their high-born patrons, as one would expect, remained in the shadows. Matyushkin was only dismissed from his post, but, they say, the tsar was “angry for a long time” with Miloslavsky.

Irritation with the confusing monetary reform, as well as the government’s half-measures against counterfeiters and especially their patrons, reached a critical point in the summer of 1662. Rumors spread throughout Moscow about an impending rebellion. Appeals posted everywhere accused Miloslavsky, Rtishchev and other people close to the tsar of treason. On the morning of July 25, 1662, a crowd of five thousand, demanding that all those guilty of treason be handed over for execution, moved to the Tsar’s residence near Moscow in the village of Kolomenskoye.

The complete failure of the monetary reform forced the government to return to what it had been avoiding for so long and unsuccessfully - the complete restoration of silver circulation. This happened immediately after the failed “Copper Riot” - in 1663. Copper money, now prohibited from circulation, was poured into things or bought up by the treasury at one silver kopeck for a copper ruble.

In 1654, a monetary reform began, designed to provide a constant income to the royal treasury. Its essence was quite simple. A copper coin was introduced into circulation, which was supposed to be in circulation on a par with the silver one and at the same rate as it. The Moscow Monetary Court began minting a new coin. We opened the same enterprise in Novgorod. Prominent merchants - Moscow and non-Moscow - were placed at the head of the money courts. There was a ban on free trade in copper - the treasury needed it in large quantities.

At first, the innovation not only did not cause protest, but, on the contrary, was met with approval. Kotoshikhin noted that copper money was initially “loved by the whole state.” The country did not immediately understand what would follow. Copper money was successfully introduced into all payments, goods were willingly sold with it, they were taken and lent. But gradually they began to notice: the government collected taxes only in silver coins. In Siberia, the circulation of copper money was generally prohibited. Military men serving within Ukraine and Belarus began to experience considerable difficulties: they did not want to accept the copper coin with which they received their salaries. And the mints minted and minted copper money. Naturally, they began to depreciate.

Finally, the production of counterfeit copper money has developed on a huge scale throughout the country, fortunately this is much easier than counterfeiting silver money. The government issues the strictest decrees to combat counterfeiters, they are caught and put to death, their limbs are cut off. But this didn’t help either. In addition, a rumor spread among the people that the merchants involved in the minting of copper coins and their patrons from the royal circle (I.D. Miloslavsky and others) became quite rich by transferring not state-owned copper, but their own copper to the mints. Particular hostility was caused by the guest Vasily Shorin and the Tsar's father-in-law Ilya Danilovich Miloslavsky. And the production of copper coins continued at an increasing pace.

At first, the slight difference in the market value of silver and copper coins was not so noticeable. But over time, this threatening gap grew. The copper coin fell in price and was less and less readily accepted on the market. Meanwhile, prices began to rise, putting the population in a difficult situation. Curious evidence from Russian merchants about the fall in the exchange rate of copper money relative to silver has been preserved. So, in Novgorod, during the period 1656 - August 1658, copper and silver money “went smoothly”; from September 1, 1658 to March 1, 1659, the difference was three kopecks, in the next six months - five kopecks. Then the depreciation of the copper coin accelerated and in June-August 1661 reached forty-seven kopecks, and in September-December of this year it jumped to two rubles and fifty kopecks. By 1662-1663, ten to twelve copper rubles were already given for one silver ruble. In Moscow, even more - up to fifteen rubles. The market was in a fever. Murmurs grew everywhere and unrest broke out. The government was especially concerned about the situation in the army. Doubling the salary did not solve the problem. The tsar's decrees on the need to sell bread and fodder to military men at moderate, “mandatory” prices provoked protest from grain owners. Conflicts arose between service people and the population. The military failures of 1659-1660 further aggravated the severity of the situation in the state. Everything indicated that a powerful social explosion was approaching. The government's private measures have not been successful. It is unlikely that the Novgorodians were satisfied when the “meager” were allowed to buy bread at a fixed price, and those who did not have money were allowed to lend it.

The authorities' attempts to find a way out by convening meetings with representatives of the estates were in vain. The merchants, townspeople, and residents of the Moscow “black settlements” invited to the royal chambers could not give an intelligible answer to the question about the reasons for the current situation, first of all, the “grain road.” Some said that the whole point was the predatory behavior of grain buyers, others nodded at the large reserves of grain from the landowners, and still others shrugged their shoulders. But the most common answer was that copper money should be abolished and silver coins should be returned. The merchants, who were most knowledgeable about market conditions, complained that they “became hated” by all segments of the country’s population. At the same time, domestic merchants considered it necessary to declare to the government in 1662: “Nowadays the spiritual, military and judicial ranks own and engage in all sorts of large and best trades and trades, abandoning and despising all state government.” Such a statement expressed clear opposition to the policies of the authorities of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich and dissatisfaction with the class position of the trading people of Russia at that time. And although voices were heard from the ranks of those surveyed about the need to find a way out through the common efforts of the entire earth, the tsar did not convene the Zemsky Sobor.