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In Russian historiography, the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, or, as it is called in the West, the Winter War, was actually forgotten for many years. This was facilitated by its not too successful results, and a kind of “political correctness” practiced in our country. Official Soviet propaganda was more than afraid to offend any of the "friends", and after the Great Patriotic War Finland was considered an ally of the USSR.
Over the past 15 years, the situation has changed radically. Contrary to the well-known words of A. T. Tvardovsky about the “unknown war”, today this war is very “famous”. One after another, books dedicated to her are published, not to mention the many articles in various magazines and collections. Here are just a "celebrity" this is very peculiar. The authors, who have made it their profession to denounce the Soviet "evil empire", cite in their publications an absolutely fantastic ratio of our and Finnish losses. Any reasonable reasons for the actions of the USSR are completely denied ...
By the end of the 1930s, there was a state clearly unfriendly to us near the northwestern borders of the Soviet Union. It is very significant that even before the start of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. The identification mark of the Finnish Air Force and tank troops was a blue swastika. Those who say that it was Stalin who, by his actions, pushed Finland into the Nazi camp, prefer not to remember this. As well as why peace-loving Suomi needed a network of military airfields built by the beginning of 1939 with the help of German specialists, capable of receiving 10 times more aircraft than the Finnish Air Force had. However, in Helsinki they were ready to fight against us both in alliance with Germany and Japan, and in alliance with England and France.
Seeing the approach of a new world conflict, the leadership of the USSR sought to secure the border near the second largest and most important city in the country. Back in March 1939, Soviet diplomacy probed the issue of transferring or leasing a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, but in Helsinki they answered with a categorical refusal.
The accusers of the “crimes of the Stalinist regime” like to rant about the fact that Finland is a sovereign country that controls its own territory, and therefore, they say, it was not at all obliged to agree to an exchange. In this regard, we can recall the events that took place two decades later. When Soviet missiles began to be deployed in Cuba in 1962, the Americans had no legal basis to impose a naval blockade of the Island of Freedom, much less to launch a military strike on it. Both Cuba and the USSR are sovereign countries, the deployment of Soviet nuclear weapons concerned only them and fully complied with the norms of international law. Nevertheless, the US was ready to start World War 3 if the missiles were not removed. There is such a thing as a "sphere of vital interests." For our country in 1939, such a sphere included the Gulf of Finland and the Karelian Isthmus. Even the former leader of the Kadet Party P. N. Milyukov, who was by no means sympathetic to the Soviet regime, in a letter to I. P. Demidov expressed the following attitude towards the outbreak of war with Finland: “I feel sorry for the Finns, but I am for the Vyborg province.”
On November 26, a well-known incident occurred near the village of Mainila. According to the official Soviet version, at 15:45 Finnish artillery shelled our territory, as a result of which 4 Soviet servicemen were killed and 9 wounded. Today it is considered good form to interpret this event as the work of the NKVD. The statements of the Finnish side that their artillery was deployed at such a distance that its fire could not reach the border are taken as indisputable. Meanwhile, according to Soviet documentary sources, one of the Finnish batteries was located in the Jaappinen area (5 km from Mainila). However, whoever organized the provocation at Mainila, it was used by the Soviet side as a pretext for war. On November 28, the government of the USSR denounced the Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact and recalled its diplomatic representatives from Finland. On November 30, hostilities began.
I will not describe in detail the course of the war, since there are already enough publications on this topic. Its first stage, which lasted until the end of December 1939, was generally unsuccessful for the Red Army. On the Karelian Isthmus, Soviet troops, having overcome the forefield of the Mannerheim Line, reached its main defensive zone on December 4-10. However, attempts to break it were unsuccessful. After bloody battles, the parties switched to positional struggle.
What are the reasons for the failures of the initial period of the war? First of all, in underestimating the enemy. Finland mobilized in advance, increasing the size of its Armed Forces from 37 to 337 thousand (459). Finnish troops were deployed in the border zone, the main forces occupied defensive lines on the Karelian Isthmus and even managed to carry out full-scale maneuvers at the end of October 1939.
Soviet intelligence was also not up to par, which could not reveal complete and reliable information about the Finnish fortifications.
Finally, the Soviet leadership harbored unfounded hopes for the "class solidarity of the Finnish working people." The belief was widespread that the population of the countries that had entered the war against the USSR would almost immediately "revolt and go over to the side of the Red Army", that the workers and peasants would come out to greet the Soviet soldiers with flowers.
As a result, the proper number of troops was not allocated for combat operations and, accordingly, the necessary superiority in forces was not ensured. So, on the Karelian Isthmus, which was the most important sector of the front, the Finnish side had in December 1939 6 infantry divisions, 4 infantry brigades, 1 cavalry brigade and 10 separate battalions - a total of 80 settlement battalions. On the Soviet side, they were opposed by 9 rifle divisions, 1 rifle and machine gun brigade and 6 tank brigades - a total of 84 calculated rifle battalions. If we compare the number of personnel, then the Finnish troops on the Karelian Isthmus numbered 130 thousand, the Soviet - 169 thousand people. In general, 425 thousand soldiers of the Red Army acted along the entire front against 265 thousand Finnish troops.
Defeat or victory?
So, let's sum up the results of the Soviet-Finnish conflict. As a rule, such a war is considered won, as a result of which the winner is in a better position than he was before the war. What do we see from this point of view?
As we have already seen, by the end of the 1930s, Finland was a country that was clearly unfriendly to the USSR and ready to enter into an alliance with any of our enemies. So in this regard, the situation has not worsened at all. On the other hand, it is known that an unbelted hooligan understands only the language of brute force and begins to respect the one who managed to beat him. Finland was no exception. On May 22, 1940, the Society for Peace and Friendship with the USSR was established there. Despite the persecution of the Finnish authorities, by the time it was banned in December of that year, it had 40,000 members. Such a mass character indicates that not only supporters of the communists joined the Society, but also simply sane people who believed that it was better to maintain normal relations with a great neighbor.
According to the Moscow Treaty, the USSR received new territories, as well as a naval base on the Hanko Peninsula. This is a clear plus. After the start of the Great Patriotic War, Finnish troops were able to reach the line of the old state border only by September 1941.
It should be noted that if during the negotiations in October-November 1939 the Soviet Union asked for less than 3 thousand square meters. km, and even in exchange for twice the territory, then as a result of the war he acquired about 40 thousand square meters. km without giving anything in return.
It should also be taken into account that in the pre-war negotiations, the USSR, in addition to territorial compensation, offered to reimburse the value of the property left by the Finns. According to the calculations of the Finnish side, even in the case of the transfer of a small piece of land, which she agreed to cede to us, it was about 800 million marks. If it came to the cession of the entire Karelian Isthmus, the bill would have gone to many billions.
But now, when on March 10, 1940, on the eve of the signing of the Moscow Peace Treaty, Paasikivi started talking about compensation for the transferred territory, remembering that Peter I paid Sweden 2 million thalers in the Nystadt peace, Molotov could calmly answer: “Write a letter to Peter the Great. If he orders, we will pay compensation.”.
Moreover, the USSR demanded an amount of 95 million rubles. as compensation for equipment removed from the occupied territory and damage to property. Finland also had to transfer to the USSR 350 sea and river vehicles, 76 locomotives, 2 thousand wagons, a significant number of cars.
Of course, during the hostilities, the Soviet Armed Forces suffered significantly greater losses than the enemy. According to the name lists, in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. 126,875 soldiers of the Red Army were killed, died or went missing. The losses of the Finnish troops amounted, according to official figures, to 21,396 killed and 1,434 missing. However, another figure of Finnish losses is often found in Russian literature - 48,243 killed, 43,000 wounded.
Be that as it may, Soviet losses are several times higher than Finnish ones. This ratio is not surprising. Take, for example, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. If we consider the fighting in Manchuria, the losses of both sides are approximately the same. Moreover, often the Russians lost more than the Japanese. However, during the assault on the fortress of Port Arthur, the losses of the Japanese far exceeded the Russian losses. It would seem that the same Russian and Japanese soldiers fought here and there, why is there such a difference? The answer is obvious: if in Manchuria the parties fought in an open field, then in Port Arthur our troops defended a fortress, even if it was unfinished. It is quite natural that the attackers suffered much higher losses. The same situation developed during the Soviet-Finnish war, when our troops had to storm the Mannerheim Line, and even in winter conditions.
As a result, the Soviet troops gained invaluable combat experience, and the command of the Red Army got a reason to think about shortcomings in the training of troops and about urgent measures to increase the combat capability of the army and navy.
Speaking in parliament on March 19, 1940, Daladier declared that for France “The Moscow Peace Treaty is a tragic and shameful event. For Russia, this is a great victory.”. However, do not go to extremes, as some authors do. Not very big. But still a victory.
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1. Parts of the Red Army cross the bridge to the territory of Finland. 1939
2. Soviet fighter guarding a minefield in the area of the former Finnish border outpost. 1939
3. Artillery crew at their guns in a firing position. 1939
4. Major Volin V.S. and boatswain Kapustin I.V., who landed with a landing force on the island of Seiskaari, to inspect the coast of the island. Baltic Fleet. 1939
5. The soldiers of the rifle unit are attacking from the forest. Karelian isthmus. 1939
6. Outfit of border guards on patrol. Karelian isthmus. 1939
7. Border guard Zolotukhin at the post at the outpost of the Finns Beloostrov. 1939
8. Sappers on the construction of a bridge near the Finnish border outpost Japinen. 1939
9. Fighters deliver ammunition to the front line. Karelian isthmus. 1939
10. Soldiers of the 7th Army are firing at the enemy with rifles. Karelian isthmus. 1939
11. The reconnaissance group of skiers receives the task of the commander before leaving for reconnaissance. 1939
12. Horse artillery on the march. Vyborgsky district. 1939
13. Fighters-skiers on a hike. 1940
14. Red Army soldiers in combat positions in the combat area with the Finns. Vyborgsky district. 1940
15. Fighters for cooking in the woods at the stake in between fights. 1939
16. Cooking lunch in the field at a temperature of 40 degrees below zero. 1940
17. Anti-aircraft guns in position. 1940
18. Signalers for the restoration of the telegraph line, destroyed by the Finns during the retreat. Karelian isthmus. 1939
19. Fighters - signalmen restore the telegraph line, destroyed by the Finns in Terioki. 1939
20. View of the railway bridge blown up by the Finns at Terioki station. 1939
21. Soldiers and commanders talk with the inhabitants of Terioki. 1939
22. Signalers on the negotiating front line in the area of Kemyar station. 1940
23. Rest of the Red Army after the battle in the Kemerya area. 1940
24. A group of commanders and soldiers of the Red Army is listening to a radio broadcast at a radio horn on one of the streets of Terioki. 1939
25. View of the Suoyarva station, taken by the Red Army. 1939
26. Soldiers of the Red Army are guarding a gas station in the town of Raivola. Karelian isthmus. 1939
27. General view of the destroyed Mannerheim Fortification Line. 1939
28. General view of the destroyed Mannerheim Fortification Line. 1939
29. A rally in one of the military units after the breakthrough of the "Mannerheim Line" during the Soviet-Finnish conflict. February 1940
30. General view of the destroyed Mannerheim Fortification Line. 1939
31. Sappers for the repair of the bridge in the Boboshino area. 1939
32. A Red Army soldier lowers a letter into a field mail box. 1939
33. A group of Soviet commanders and fighters inspects the banner of Shutskor recaptured from the Finns. 1939
34. Howitzer B-4 on the front line. 1939
35. General view of the Finnish fortifications at a height of 65.5. 1940
36. View of one of the streets of Koivisto, taken by the Red Army. 1939
37. View of the destroyed bridge near the town of Koivisto, taken by the Red Army. 1939
38. A group of captured Finnish soldiers. 1940
39. Red Army soldiers at the captured guns left after the battles with the Finns. Vyborgsky district. 1940
40. Trophy ammunition depot. 1940
41. Remote-controlled tank TT-26 (217th separate tank battalion of the 30th chemical tank brigade), February 1940.
42. Soviet soldiers on a pillbox taken on the Karelian Isthmus. 1940
43. Parts of the Red Army enter the liberated city of Vyborg. 1940
44. Soldiers of the Red Army on the fortifications in the city of Vyborg. 1940
45. The ruins of the city of Vyborg after the fighting. 1940
46. Soldiers of the Red Army clear the streets of the liberated city of Vyborg from snow. 1940
47. Icebreaking ship "Dezhnev" during the transfer of troops from Arkhangelsk to Kandalaksha. 1940
48. Soviet skiers move to the forefront. Winter 1939-1940.
49. Soviet attack aircraft I-15bis taxis to take off before a sortie during the Soviet-Finnish war.
50. Finnish Foreign Minister Weine Tanner speaks on the radio with a message about the end of the Soviet-Finnish war. 03/13/1940
51. The crossing of the Finnish border by Soviet units near the village of Hautavaara. November 30, 1939
52. Finnish prisoners are talking with a Soviet political worker. The picture was taken in the Gryazovets camp of the NKVD. 1939-1940
53. Soviet soldiers are talking with one of the first Finnish prisoners of war. November 30, 1939
54. Finnish aircraft Fokker C.X. shot down by Soviet fighters on the Karelian Isthmus. December 1939
55. Hero of the Soviet Union, platoon commander of the 7th pontoon-bridge battalion of the 7th Army, Junior Lieutenant Pavel Vasilyevich Usov (right) unloads a mine.
56. The calculation of the Soviet 203-mm howitzer B-4 fires at the Finnish fortifications. December 2, 1939
57. The commanders of the Red Army are considering the captured Finnish tank Vickers Mk.E. March 1940
58. Hero of the Soviet Union Senior Lieutenant Vladimir Mikhailovich Kurochkin (1913-1941) at the I-16 fighter. 1940
Soviet-Finnish war 1939-1940 or, as they say in Finland, the Winter War between Finland and the Soviet Union is one of the most significant episodes of World War II. Timo Vihavainen, professor of Russian studies at the University of Helsinki, shares his point of view on this issue.
The battles of the Soviet-Finnish war that lasted 105 days were very bloody and intense. The Soviet side lost more than 126,000 people killed and missing, 246,000 wounded and shell-shocked. If we add Finnish losses to these figures, 26,000 and 43,000 respectively, then we can safely say that in terms of its scale, the Winter War became one of the most large battlefields of World War II.
For many countries, it is quite customary to evaluate the past through the prism of what happened, without even considering other options for the possible development of events - that is, history has developed the way it has developed. As for the Winter War, its course and the peace treaty that ended the hostilities were the unexpected results of a process that all parties initially believed would lead to completely different consequences.
History of events
In the autumn of 1939, Finland and the Soviet Union held high-level negotiations on territorial issues, in which Finland was to transfer to the Soviet Union certain areas on the Karelian Isthmus and islands in the Gulf of Finland, as well as lease the city of Hanko. In return, Finland would receive twice as much but less valuable territory in Soviet Karelia.
The negotiations did not lead in the autumn of 1939 to the same acceptable results for the Soviet Union as in the case of the Baltic countries, despite the fact that Finland was ready to make some concessions. For example, the lease of Hanko was seen as a violation of Finnish sovereignty and neutrality.
Finland did not agree to territorial concessions, maintaining its neutrality along with Sweden
Earlier, in 1938 and later in the spring of 1939, the Soviet Union had already unofficially recognized the possibility of transferring the islands in the Gulf of Finland, or leasing them. In a democratic country, which was Finland, these concessions were hardly feasible in practice. The transfer of territories would mean the loss of homes for thousands of Finns. No party, for sure, would want to take on political responsibility. In relation to the Soviet Union, they also experienced fear and antipathy, caused, among other things, by the repressions of 1937-38, during which thousands of Finns were executed. In addition, by the end of 1937, the use of the Finnish language was completely discontinued in the Soviet Union. Finnish-language schools and newspapers were closed.
The Soviet Union also hinted that Finland would not be able, or perhaps would not want to, remain neutral if Germany, which had become an international troublemaker, violated the Soviet border. Such hints were not understood and accepted in Finland. To ensure neutrality, Finland and Sweden planned to jointly build fortifications on the Åland Islands, which would quite effectively protect the neutrality of the countries from a possible German or Soviet attack. Due to a protest filed by the Soviet Union, Sweden abandoned these plans.
Kuusinen's "People's Government"
After negotiations with the official Finnish government Risto Ryti stalled, the Soviet Union formed the so-called "People's Government" of Finland. The "People's Government" was headed by the communist Otto Ville Kuusinen, who had fled to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union announced its recognition of this government, which gave a reason not to negotiate with the official government.
The government asked the Soviet Union for "help" in establishing the Republic of Finland. During the war, the task of the government was to prove that Finland and the Soviet Union were not at war.
Apart from the Soviet Union, no other country recognized Kuusinen's people's government.
The Soviet Union concluded an agreement on territorial concessions with the self-formed "people's government"
Finnish communist Otto Ville Kuusinen fled to Soviet Russia after the civil war of 1918. His government was said to represent the broad masses of the Finnish people and the rebellious military units that had already formed the Finnish "People's Army". The Finnish Communist Party stated in its appeal that a revolution was underway in Finland, which, at the request of the "people's government", should be helped by the Red Army. Thus, this is not a war, and certainly not the aggression of the Soviet Union against Finland. According to the official position of the Soviet Union, this proves that the Red Army entered Finland not to take away Finnish territories, but to expand them.
On December 2, 1939, Moscow announced to the whole world that it had concluded an agreement on territorial concessions with the "people's government". Under the terms of the agreement, Finland received huge areas in Eastern Karelia, 70,000 square kilometers of old Russian land that had never belonged to Finland. For its part, Finland handed over to Russia a small area in the southern part of the Karelian Isthmus, which in the west reaches Koivisto. In addition to this, Finland will transfer to the Soviet Union some of the islands in the Gulf of Finland and lease the city of Hanko for a very decent amount.
It was not about propaganda, but about the state contract, which was announced and put into effect. It was planned to exchange documents on the ratification of the treaty in Helsinki.
The reason for the war was the struggle between Germany and the USSR for spheres of influence
After the official Finnish government did not agree to territorial concessions, the Soviet Union started the war by attacking Finland on 11/30/1939 without declaring war, and without any other ultimatum demands against Finland.
The reason for the attack was the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact concluded in 1939, in which Finland was recognized as a territory included in the zone of influence of the Soviet Union. The purpose of the attack was the implementation of the pact on this part.
Finland and Germany in 1939
Finland's foreign policy was tepid towards Germany. Relations between the countries were rather unfriendly, which was confirmed by Hitler during the Winter War. In addition, the division of spheres of influence between the Soviet Union and Germany suggests that Germany was not interested in supporting Finland.
Finland strove to maintain neutrality right up to the very beginning of the Winter War and after it for as long as possible.
Official Finland did not follow a friendly German policy
Finland in 1939 by no means pursued a policy friendly to Germany. The Finnish parliament and government were dominated by a coalition of agrarians and social democrats, which relied on an overwhelming majority. The only radical and pro-German party, the IKL, suffered a crushing defeat in the summer elections of 1939. Its representation was reduced from 18 to 8 mandates in the 200-seat parliament.
German sympathies in Finland were an old tradition, supported primarily by academia. At the political level, these sympathies began to fade in the 1930s, when Hitler's policy towards small states was widely condemned.
Sure victory?
With a great deal of confidence, we can say that in December 1939 the Red Army was the largest and best equipped army in the world. Moscow, confident in the fighting ability of its army, had no reason to expect that Finnish resistance, if any, would last for many days.
In addition, it was assumed that the powerful leftist movement in Finland would not want to resist the Red Army, which would enter the country not as an invader, but as an assistant and give Finland additional territories.
In turn, for the Finnish bourgeoisie, the war, from all sides, was extremely undesirable. There was a clear understanding that help should not be expected, at least from Germany, and the desire and ability of the Western allies to conduct military operations far from their borders raised great doubts.
How did it happen that Finland decided to repulse the offensive of the Red Army?
How is it possible that Finland dared to repulse the Red Army and was able to resist for more than three months? Moreover, the Finnish army did not capitulate at any of the stages and remained in combat capability until the last day of the war. The fighting ended only because the peace treaty came into force.
Moscow, confident in the strength of its army, had no reason to expect Finnish resistance to last for many days. Not to mention the fact that the agreement with the "people's government" of Finland will have to be cancelled. Just in case, strike units were concentrated near the borders with Finland, which, after an acceptable waiting period, could quickly defeat the Finns, who were armed mainly with infantry weapons and light artillery. The Finns had very few tanks and aircraft, and in fact, anti-tank weapons were only on paper. The Red Army had a numerical superiority and almost a tenfold advantage in technical equipment, including artillery, aviation and armored vehicles.
Therefore, there was no doubt about the final result of the war. Moscow no longer negotiated with the Helsinki government, which was said to have lost support and fled to an unknown destination.
For the leaders in Moscow, the planned outcome was finally decided: the larger Finnish Democratic Republic is an ally of the Soviet Union. They even managed to publish an article on this topic in the Brief Political Dictionary of 1940.
brave defense
Why did Finland resort to armed defense, which, soberly assessing the situation, had no chance of success? One explanation is that there were no other options than surrender. The Soviet Union recognized Kuusinen's puppet government and ignored the Helsinki government, which was not even presented with any ultimatum demands. In addition, the Finns placed their hopes on their military skills and on the advantages that the local nature provides for defensive operations.
The successful defense of the Finns is explained both by the high morale of the Finnish army and the great shortcomings of the Red Army, in whose ranks, in particular, major purges were carried out in 1937-38. The command of the Red Army troops was carried out unskilled. On top of that, military equipment did not work well. The Finnish landscape and defensive fortifications proved difficult to pass, and the Finns learned how to effectively disable enemy tanks with Molotov cocktails and propelled explosives. This, of course, added courage and courage even more.
Spirit of the Winter War
In Finland, the concept of the “spirit of the Winter War” has been established, which is understood as unanimity and willingness to sacrifice oneself for the sake of defending the Motherland.
Research confirms the assertions that in Finland, already on the eve of the Winter War, the consensus prevailed that the country must be defended in the event of aggression. Despite heavy losses, this spirit survived until the end of the war. “The spirit of the Winter War” was imbued with almost everyone, even the communists. The question arises how this became possible when in 1918 - just two decades ago - there was a bloody civil war in which the right fought against the left. People were executed en masse even after the end of the main battles. Then at the head of the victorious White Guard was Carl Gustav Emil Mannerheim, a native of Finland, a former lieutenant general of the Russian army, who now led Finnish soldiers against the Red Army.
The fact that Finland decided on armed resistance at all, purposefully and with the support of the broad masses of the people, quite likely came as a surprise to Moscow. And for Helsinki too. The "Spirit of the Winter War" is not a myth at all, and its origin requires explanation.
An important reason for the appearance of the "Spirit of the Winter War" was the false Soviet propaganda. In Finland, they treated with irony the Soviet newspapers, which wrote that the Finnish border was "menacingly" close to Leningrad. Just as absolutely unbelievable were the allegations that the Finns were organizing provocations on the border, shelling the territory of the Soviet Union and thereby starting a war. Well, when, after such a provocation, the Soviet Union tore up the non-aggression pact, which Moscow had no right to do under the pact, mistrust grew more than before.
According to some estimates of that time, the credibility of the Soviet Union was largely undermined by the fact of the formation of the Kuusinen government and the huge territories received by him as a gift. Although they were assured that Finland would remain independent, Finland itself had little illusions about the veracity of such assurances. Confidence in the Soviet Union sank further after the city bombings, which destroyed hundreds of buildings and killed hundreds of people. The Soviet Union categorically denied the bombings, although the inhabitants of Finland watched them with their own eyes.
The repressions of the 1930s in the Soviet Union were fresh in my memory. For the Finnish communists, the most offensive was to observe the development of close cooperation between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, which began after the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.
World
The outcome of the Winter War is well known. According to the peace treaty concluded in Moscow on March 12, the eastern border of Finland moved to where it is to this day. 430,000 Finns lost their homes. For the Soviet Union, the increase in territory turned out to be insignificant. For Finland, the territorial losses were enormous.
The prolongation of the war became the primary prerequisite for the peace agreement concluded in Moscow on March 12, 1940 between the Soviet Union and the bourgeois government of Finland. The Finnish army offered desperate resistance, which made it possible to stop the enemy advance in all 14 directions. Further prolongation of the conflict threatened the Soviet Union with grave international consequences. The League of Nations on December 16 deprived the Soviet Union of its membership, and England and France began to negotiate with Finland for military assistance, which was supposed to arrive in Finland through Norway and Sweden. This could lead to a full-scale war between the Soviet Union and the Western allies, who, among other things, were preparing to bomb oil fields in Baku from Turkey.
The harsh terms of the truce were accepted out of desperation.
It was not easy for the Soviet government, which had made an agreement with the Kuusinen government, to re-recognize the Helsinki government and conclude a peace treaty with it. Peace, however, was concluded and the conditions for Finland were very difficult. Territorial concessions to Finland were many times greater than those discussed in 1939. The signing of the peace agreement was a bitter ordeal. When the terms of the peace were made public, people wept in the streets and flags were flown mournfully over the houses. The Finnish government, however, agreed to sign a difficult and intolerable "dictated peace" because the military situation was very dangerous. The assistance promised by the Western countries was insignificant in terms of its volume, and it was clear that from a military point of view it could not play a decisive role.
The Winter War and the heavy peace that followed are among the most tragic periods in Finnish history. These events leave an imprint on the interpretation of the history of Finland in a broader aspect. The fact that this was an unprovoked aggression, which was vilely carried out by the eastern neighbor without declaring war, and which led to the rejection of the historical Finnish province, was deposited in the Finnish mind as a heavy burden.
Having put up military resistance, the Finns lost a large territory and tens of thousands of people, but retained their independence. This is the heavy image of the Winter War, which echoes with pain in the Finnish mind. Another option was to submit to the government of Kuusinen and expand the territories. For the Finns, however, this was tantamount to submitting to the Stalinist dictatorship. It is obvious that, despite the formality of the territorial gift, it was not taken seriously in Finland at any level. In today's Finland, if they remember that state treaty, it is only that it was one of the insidious deceitful plans that the Stalinist leadership had a habit of proposing.
The Winter War spawned the Continuation War (1941-1945)
As a direct consequence of the Winter War, Finland joined Germany in 1941 in attacking the Soviet Union. Before the Winter War, Finland adhered to the Northern European policy of neutrality, which it tried to continue after the end of the war. However, after it was the Soviet Union that prevented this, there were two ways: an alliance with Germany, or with the Soviet Union. The latter option enjoyed very little support in Finland.
Text: Timo Vihavainen, Professor of Russian Studies, University of Helsinki
(see the beginning in the previous 3 publications)
73 years ago ended one of the most undisclosed wars in which our state took part. The Soviet-Finnish war of 1940, also called the "Winter" war, cost our state very dearly. According to the lists of names compiled by the personnel apparatus of the Red Army already in 1949-1951, the total number of irretrievable losses amounted to 126,875 people. The Finnish side in this conflict lost 26,662 people. Thus, the loss ratio is 1 to 5, which clearly indicates the low quality of management, weapons and skills of the Red Army. Nevertheless, despite such a high level of losses, the Red Army completed all the tasks, albeit with a certain adjustment.
So at the initial stage of this war, the Soviet government was sure of an early victory and the complete capture of Finland. It was on the basis of such prospects that the Soviet authorities formed the "government of the Finnish Democratic Republic" headed by Otto Kuusinen, a former deputy of the Finnish Sejm, a delegate of the Second International. However, as the hostilities developed, appetites had to be reduced, and instead of the premiership of Finland, Kuusinen received the post of chairman of the presidium of the Supreme Council of the newly formed Karelian-Finnish SSR, which lasted until 1956, and remained the head of the supreme council of the Karelian ASSR.
Despite the fact that the entire territory of Finland was never conquered by Soviet troops, the USSR received significant territorial acquisitions. From the new territories and the already existing Karelian Autonomous Republic, the sixteenth republic was formed within the USSR - the Karelian-Finnish SSR.
The stumbling block and reason for starting a war - the Soviet-Finnish border in the Leningrad region was pushed back 150 kilometers. The entire northern coast of Lake Ladoga became part of the Soviet Union, and this body of water became internal to the USSR. In addition, part of Lapland and the islands in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland went to the USSR. The Hanko Peninsula, which was a kind of key to the Gulf of Finland, was leased to the USSR for 30 years. The Soviet naval base on this peninsula existed at the beginning of December 1941. On June 25, 1941, three days after the attack of Nazi Germany, Finland declared war on the USSR and on the same day Finnish troops began military operations against the Soviet garrison of Hanko. The defense of this territory continued until December 2, 1941. Currently, the Hanko peninsula belongs to Finland. During the Winter War, Soviet troops occupied the Pechenga region, which before the 1917 revolution was part of the Arkhangelsk Territory. After the transfer of this area to Finland in 1920, large reserves of nickel were discovered there. The development of deposits was carried out by French, Canadian and British companies. Largely due to the fact that the nickel mines were controlled by Western capital, in order to maintain good relations with France and Great Britain, following the Finnish war, this site was transferred back to Finland. In 1944, after the completion of the Petsamo-Kirkines operation, Pechenga was occupied by Soviet troops and subsequently became part of the Murmansk region.
The Finns fought selflessly and the result of their resistance was not only heavy losses of personnel of the Red Army, but also significant losses of military equipment. The Red Army lost 640 aircraft, the Finns knocked out 1800 tanks - and all this with the complete dominance of Soviet aviation in the air and the practical absence of anti-tank artillery among the Finns. However, no matter how exotic methods of combating Soviet tanks the Finnish troops came up with, luck was on the side of the “big battalions”.
The whole hope of the Finnish leadership was in the formula "The West will help us." However, even the closest neighbors provided Finland with rather symbolic assistance. 8,000 untrained volunteers arrived from Sweden, but at the same time, Sweden refused to allow 20,000 interned Polish soldiers who were ready to fight on the side of Finland to pass through its territory. Norway was represented by 725 volunteers, and 800 Danes also intended to fight against the USSR. Another trip was set up by Mannerheim and Hitler: the Nazi leader banned the transit of equipment and people through the territory of the Reich. A couple of thousand volunteers (albeit of advanced age) arrived from Great Britain. In total, 11.5 thousand volunteers arrived in Finland, which could not seriously affect the balance of power.
In addition, the exclusion of the USSR from the League of Nations was supposed to bring moral satisfaction to the Finnish side. However, this international organization was only a pathetic forerunner of the modern UN. In total, it included 58 states, and in different years, for various reasons, such countries as Argentina (left in the period 1921-1933), Brazil (withdrew from 1926), Romania (withdrew in 1940), Czechoslovakia (membership terminated March 15, 1939), and so on. In general, one gets the impression that the countries participating in the League of Nations were only engaged in the fact that they entered or left it. For the exclusion of the Soviet Union as an aggressor, such countries “close” to Europe as Argentina, Uruguay and Colombia were especially actively advocating, but the closest neighbors of Finland: Denmark, Sweden and Norway, on the contrary, declared that they would not support any sanctions against the USSR. Not being any serious international institution, the League of Nations was dissolved in 1946 and, ironically, the chairman of the Swedish Storing (parliament) Hambro, the one who had to read out the decision to expel the USSR, at the final assembly of the League of Nations announced a greeting to the founding countries of the UN , among which were the Soviet Union, still headed by Joseph Stalin.
The deliveries of weapons and ammunition to Filandia from European countries were paid for in hard currency, and at inflated prices, which Mannerheim himself admitted. In the Soviet-Finnish war, profits were received by the concerns of France (which at the same time managed to sell weapons to a promising Nazi ally of Romania), Great Britain, which sold frankly outdated weapons to the Finns. A clear opponent of the Anglo-French allies - Italy sold 30 aircraft and anti-aircraft guns to Finland. Hungary, which then fought on the side of the Axis, sold anti-aircraft guns, mortars and grenades, and Belgium, which after a short time fell under German attack, sold ammunition. The closest neighbor - Sweden - sold Finland 85 anti-tank guns, half a million rounds of ammunition, gasoline, 104 anti-aircraft weapons. Finnish soldiers fought in overcoats made from cloth bought in Sweden. Some of these purchases were paid for with a $30 million loan from the United States. What is most interesting is that most of the equipment arrived “before the curtain” and did not have time to take part in the hostilities during the Winter War, but, apparently, it was successfully used by Finland already during the Great Patriotic War in alliance with Nazi Germany.
In general, one gets the impression that at that time (winter 1939-1940) the leading European powers: neither France nor Great Britain had yet decided with whom they would have to fight in the next few years. In any case, the head of the British Department of the North, Lawrencollier, believed that the goals of Germany and Great Britain in this war could be common, and according to eyewitnesses, judging by the French newspapers of that winter, it seemed that France was at war with the Soviet Union, and not with Germany. On February 5, 1940, the Joint British-French War Council decided to ask the governments of Norway and Sweden to provide Norwegian territory for the landing of the British Expeditionary Force. But even the British were surprised by the statement of the French Prime Minister Daladier, who unilaterally announced that his country was ready to send 50,000 soldiers and a hundred bombers to help Finland. By the way, plans for waging war against the USSR, which at that time was estimated by the British and French as a significant supplier of strategic raw materials to Germany, developed even after the signing of peace between Finland and the USSR. As early as March 8, 1940, a few days before the end of the Soviet-Finnish war, the British Chiefs of Staff Committee developed a memorandum that described the future military operations of the British-French allies against the USSR. The fighting was planned on a wide scale: in the north in the Pechenga-Petsamo region, in the Murmansk direction, in the Arkhangelsk region, in the Far East and in the south - in the region of Baku, Grozny and Batumi. In these plans, the USSR was seen as a strategic ally of Hitler, supplying him with strategic raw materials - oil. According to the French General Weygand, the blow should have been delivered in June-July 1940. But by the end of April 1940, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain admitted that the Soviet Union adhered to strict neutrality and there was no reason to attack. In addition, already in June 1940, German tanks entered Paris, and it was then that the joint French-British plans were captured by Hitler troops.
Nevertheless, all these plans remained only on paper, and for more than a hundred days of the Soviet-Finnish won, no significant assistance was provided by the Western powers. Actually, during the war, Finland was put in a hopeless situation by its closest neighbors - Sweden and Norway. On the one hand, the Swedes and Norwegians verbally expressed all support for the Finns, allowed their volunteers to participate in hostilities on the side of the Finnish troops, and on the other hand, these countries blocked a decision that could really change the course of the war. The Swedish and Norwegian governments refused the request of the Western powers to provide their territory for the transit of military personnel and military supplies, and otherwise the Western Expeditionary Force could not have arrived at the theater of operations.
By the way, Finland's military spending in the pre-war period was calculated precisely on the basis of possible Western military assistance. Fortifications on the Mannerheim Line in the period 1932-1939 were not at all the main item of Finnish military spending. The vast majority of them were already completed by 1932, and in the subsequent period, the gigantic (in relative terms it amounted to 25 percent of the entire Finnish budget) Finnish military budget was directed, for example, to such things as the massive construction of military bases, warehouses and airfields. So the military airfields of Finland could accommodate ten times more aircraft than were at that time in service with the Finnish Air Force. Obviously, the entire Finnish military infrastructure was being prepared for foreign expeditionary forces. Tellingly, the massive filling of Finnish warehouses with British and French military equipment began after the end of the Winter War, and all this mass of goods subsequently fell into the hands of Nazi Germany in almost full volume.
Actually, the Soviet troops began combat operations only after the Soviet leadership received guarantees from Great Britain of non-interference in the future Soviet-Finnish conflict. Thus, the fate of Finland in the Winter War was predetermined by precisely this position of the Western allies. The United States has taken a similar duplicitous stance. Despite the fact that the American ambassador to the USSR, Shteingardt, literally went into hysterics, demanding sanctions against the Soviet Union, expel Soviet citizens from the United States and close the Panama Canal for the passage of our ships, US President Franklin Roosevelt limited himself only to imposing a "moral embargo".
The English historian E. Hughes generally described France and Great Britain's support for Finland at a time when these countries were already at war with Germany as a "product of a lunatic asylum." One gets the impression that the Western countries were even ready to enter into an alliance with Hitler only for the Wehrmacht to lead the Western crusade against the USSR. French Prime Minister Daladier, speaking in parliament after the end of the Soviet-Finnish war, said that the results of the Winter War were a disgrace for France, and a “great victory” for Russia.
The events and military conflicts of the late 1930s, in which the Soviet Union participated, became episodes of history in which the USSR for the first time began to act as a subject of international politics. Prior to this, our country was considered as a "terrible child", an unviable freak, a temporary misunderstanding. Nor should we overestimate the economic potential of Soviet Russia. In 1931, at a conference of industrial workers, Stalin said that the USSR was 50-100 years behind the developed countries and that this distance should be covered by our country in ten years: “Either we do it, or we will be crushed.” Even by 1941, the Soviet Union failed to completely eliminate the technological gap, but it was no longer possible to crush us. As the USSR industrialized, it gradually began to show its teeth to the Western community, starting to defend its own interests, including by armed means. Throughout the late 1930s, the USSR carried out the restoration of territorial losses resulting from the collapse of the Russian Empire. The Soviet government methodically pushed the state borders further and further beyond the West. Many acquisitions were made almost bloodlessly, mainly by diplomatic means, but the transfer of the border from Leningrad cost our army many thousands of soldiers' lives. Nevertheless, such a transfer largely predetermined the fact that during the Great Patriotic War the German army got bogged down in the Russian expanses and, in the end, Nazi Germany was defeated.
After almost half a century of constant wars, as a result of the Second World War, relations between our countries have normalized. The Finnish people and their government have realized that it is better for their country to act as an intermediary between the world of capitalism and socialism, and not be a bargaining chip in the geopolitical games of world leaders. And even more so, the Finnish society has ceased to feel like the vanguard of the Western world, designed to contain the "communist hell." This position has led to the fact that Finland has become one of the most prosperous and rapidly developing European states.
On November 30, 1939, the USSR launched a military operation against Finland, but this war became a stain of shame for the country. So, what were the grounds for unleashing the Soviet-Finnish war.
Negotiations 1937-1939
The root of the Soviet-Finnish conflict was laid back in 1936. Since that time, the Soviet and Finnish sides have been engaged in a dialogue about common cooperation and security, but Finland was categorical in its decisions and in every possible way rejected the attempts of the Soviet state to unite in order to jointly rebuff the enemy. On October 12, 1939, I.V. Stalin proposed that the Finnish state sign an agreement on mutual assistance. According to its provisions, the USSR made demands for the lease of the Hanko Peninsula and the islands on the territory of Finland, in exchange for part of the land in Karelia, which far exceeded the territory for exchange to the Finnish side. Also, one of the conditions of the USSR was the arrangement of military bases in the zone of Finnish borders. The Finns categorically refused to fulfill these points.The main reason for the military clashes was the desire of the USSR to move the borders from Leningrad to the Finnish side and further strengthen them. Finland, in turn, refused to follow the request of the USSR, since the so-called "Mannerheim Line" was located on this territory - a defensive line that was erected by Finland back in the 1920s to possibly deter the attack of the USSR. That is, when transferring these lands, Finland would lose all its fortifications for the strategic protection of the borders. The Finnish leadership could not conclude an agreement with such requirements.
In this situation, Stalin decided to start the military occupation of the Finnish territories. On November 28, 1939, the unilateral denunciation (renunciation) of the non-aggression agreements with Finland, concluded back in 1932, was announced.
The goals of the USSR participation in the war
For the Soviet leadership, the main threat was that the Finnish territories could be used as a platform for aggression against the Soviet Union by European states (most likely Germany). It was quite reasonable to move the Finnish borders further from Leningrad. However, Yu. M. Kilin (author of the book "Battles of the Winter War") believes that moving the borders deep into the Finnish side for the most part would not have prevented anything, hostilities were inevitable. In turn, obtaining military bases on the Karelian Isthmus would make the position of the Soviet Union virtually invulnerable, but at the same time it would mean the loss of Finland's independence.The goals of Finland's participation in the war
The Finnish leadership could not agree to such conditions under which they lost their independence, so their goal was to protect the sovereignty of their state. According to some historians, with the help of the Soviet-Finnish war, Western states sought a confrontation between two harsh totalitarian countries - fascist Germany and the socialist USSR, in order to ease the pressure on France and England with their help.Mainil incident
The pretext for starting the conflict was the so-called episode near the Finnish settlement of Mainila. November 26, 1939 Finnish artillery fired on Soviet soldiers. The leadership of Finland completely rejected this fact in order for the regiments of the USSR to be thrown back several kilometers from the border. The Soviet government could not allow this, and on November 29 the USSR interrupted diplomatic cooperation with Finland. In the late autumn of 1939, the parties to the conflict began large-scale combat maneuvers.From the very beginning of the war, the advantages were on the side of the USSR, the Soviet army was well equipped with military equipment (land, sea) and human resources. But the "Mannerheim Line" was impregnable for a whole 1.5 months, and only on January 15, Stalin ordered a massive counteroffensive of the army. Although the line of defense was broken through, the Finnish army was not defeated. The Finns managed to maintain their independence.
On March 13, 1940, a peace treaty was adopted in the capital of the USSR, as a result of which a significant piece of land passed to the Soviets, respectively, the western border was moved towards Finland for several kilometers. But was it a victory? Why was a huge country with a large army unable to resist the tiny Finnish army?As a result of the Soviet-Finnish war, the USSR achieved its original goals, but at what great cost? Numerous casualties, poor combat efficiency of the army, low
the level of training and leadership - all this revealed the weakness and hopelessness of the armed forces, and showed its inability to fight. The shame of defeat in this war significantly undermined the international position of the Soviet Union, especially in front of Germany, which was already following it closely. In addition, on December 14, 1939, the USSR was removed from the League of Nations for the outbreak of war with Finland.
The Soviet-Finnish military conflict, which began on November 30, 1939, cannot be considered outside the context of the historical events that took place in Europe after the Munich Agreement and the German invasion of Poland - on September 1, 1939, the Second World War began.
In an increasingly aggravated situation, the Soviet leadership simply could not help but think about the state of its borders, including in the northwestern direction, since Finland was an unconditional military supporter of Nazi Germany. Back in 1935, General Mannerheim visited Berlin, where he held talks with Goering and Ribbentrop, the result of which was an agreement on granting Germany the right to deploy its troops on Finnish territory in case of war. In exchange, the German side of Finland was promised Soviet Karelia.
In connection with the agreements reached, as a springboard for future hostilities, the Finns built an impenetrable chain of defensive structures on the Karelian Isthmus, called the "Mannerheim Line". In Finland itself, the Finnish fascist organization "Lapuan Movement" actively raised its head, the program of which included the creation of "Great Finland", which included Leningrad and all of Karelia.
Throughout the second half of the 1930s, secret contacts were made between the top Finnish generals and the leadership of the Wehrmacht; in August 1937, Finland hosted a squadron of 11 German submarines, and in 1938, direct preparations began for the introduction of the German expeditionary force into Finland. By the beginning of 1939, with the help of German specialists, a network of military airfields was built in Finland, capable of receiving 10 times more aircraft than the Finnish Air Force had. By the way, their identification mark, as well as tank troops, became a blue swastika. From Finland, on the border with the USSR, all kinds of provocations, including armed ones, were constantly organized on the ground, in the sky and at sea.
In connection with the current situation and in order to secure the northwestern borders of the USSR, the Soviet leadership began to make attempts to persuade the Finnish government to mutually beneficial cooperation.
On April 7, 1938, Boris Rybkin, resident of the INO NKVD in Helsinki, who was also the second secretary of the Soviet embassy in Finland, Yartsev, was urgently summoned to Moscow and received in the Kremlin by Stalin, Molotov and Voroshilov. Stalin said that there was a need to start secret negotiations with the Finnish side, the main goal of which should be an agreement on the transfer of the Soviet-Finnish border on the Karelian Isthmus away from Leningrad. To interest the Finns, it was proposed to transfer much larger territories in exchange, but in a different area. In addition, given that in the central part of Finland the entire forest has been cut down, and woodworking enterprises are idle, the Finns were promised additional supplies of wood from the USSR. Another goal of the negotiations was to be the conclusion of a bilateral defensive treaty in case Germany attacked the USSR through the territory of Finland. At the same time, the Soviet side will give guarantees of the independence and territorial integrity of Finland. All upcoming negotiations, Stalin emphasized, must be of an exclusively secret nature.
On April 14, 1938, Rybkin arrived in Helsinki, immediately called the Finnish Foreign Ministry and asked to be connected to Foreign Minister Holsti, whom he approached with a proposal for an immediate meeting, which took place on the same day. On it, Rybkin outlined to the minister everything Stalin had said and added that if Germany was allowed to land its troops on Finnish territory without hindrance, then the Soviet Union was not going to passively wait for the Germans to arrive in Rayek (now Sestroretsk, 32 km from Leningrad), but would abandon their armed forces deep into Finnish territory, as far as possible, after which the battles between German and Soviet troops will take place on the territory of Finland. If the Finns resist the landing of German troops, then the USSR will provide Finland with all possible economic and military assistance with the obligation to withdraw its armed forces immediately after the end of the military conflict. Rybkin stressed the need for special secrecy when considering this issue.
Holsti reported on the conversation with Rybkin to Prime Minister Cajander, but after discussing the situation, they decided to continue the negotiations, but to take a wait-and-see approach to them, without promising anything. Rybkin, on the other hand, left for Moscow with a report to Stalin, who at that time was satisfied at least with the very fact of starting negotiations with the Finnish side.
After 3 months, on July 11, at the initiative of the Finnish side, Rybkin was received by Prime Minister Cajander, but no progress in the negotiation process took place, and, moreover, by entrusting its further conduct to cabinet member Tanner, the Finnish leadership demonstrated that they were not paying due attention to to the Soviet proposals, belittling their level and finally choosing the tactics of procrastination.
Nevertheless, meetings between Rybkin and Tanner took place on August 5, 10, 11 and 18, during the last of which the Soviet proposals were finally concretized.
1. If the Finnish government does not believe that it can conclude a secret military agreement with the USSR, then Moscow would be satisfied with Finland's written commitment to be ready to repulse a possible attack and to this end accept Soviet military assistance.
2. Moscow is ready to agree to the construction of fortifications on the Aland Islands, necessary for the security of both Finland and Leningrad. But on condition that the USSR will be given the opportunity to take part in their strengthening.
3. As a reciprocal favor, Moscow hopes that the Finnish government will allow the USSR to build on the Finnish island of Sur-Sari (Gogland) a military air and naval base of a defensive character.
If the Finnish side accepts these conditions, the USSR guarantees Finland the inviolability of its borders, if necessary, will provide it with arms assistance on favorable terms and is ready to conclude an advantageous trade agreement with it that would favor the development of both agriculture and industry.
Tanner reported on the Soviet proposals to Prime Minister Kayader, and he found them unacceptable, which was reported to Rybkin on September 15: the Finnish side does not curtail the secret negotiations themselves, they are even ready to purchase some weapons, but proposals for the Aland Islands and the island of Hogland are rejected without counter offers.
Stalin recommended Rybkin to continue the negotiation process, which he did until December 1938, and only when it finally became clear that the positions of the parties were too different, it was decided to recall him to Moscow and continue negotiations at the official level.
Such negotiations with Finland began in Moscow in March 1939. However, the exchange of views proceeded sluggishly, the Finnish government was increasingly inclined towards close cooperation with Nazi Germany, and no progress was achieved.
But the aggravation of the situation in Europe in connection with the outbreak of World War II forced the Soviet leadership to once again urge the Finnish side to continue the negotiations that began in Moscow on October 12. At them, the Kremlin sharply demanded that Finland fulfill the conditions proposed earlier, and, above all, the transfer of the border from Leningrad in exchange for another territory. Stalin so bluntly stated: “We ask that the distance from Leningrad to the border line be 70 km. These are our minimum requirements, and you should not think that we will reduce them. We cannot move Leningrad, therefore the border line must be moved "(the territorial waters of Finland reached almost the outer road of the Leningrad port).
The Finnish government, and above all, President Kallio, who stands on an uncompromisingly tough pro-German position, relying on the help of Germany, who secretly supplied arms to the Finns, instructed their delegation, after its repeated departures and returns, allegedly for consultations on the chosen delaying tactics, on November 13 to break off negotiations finally and leave, rejecting all the principled Soviet proposals.
And a mutual assistance pact was already proposed at different stages; lease, purchase or exchange for the Soviet territory of the islands in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland; the exchange of Finnish territory on the Karelian Isthmus for a much larger part of Soviet territory in Eastern Karelia near Rebola and Porosozero (5,529 sq. km versus 2,761 sq. km); arrangement of a Soviet air and naval base on the Khanko Peninsula, etc.
But all in vain. Even despite the fact that the USSR had already signed a non-aggression pact with Germany and reached agreements on spheres of influence. By the way, when the Finnish delegation was crossing the border, the Finnish border guards opened fire on the Soviet border guards. After all this, Stalin declared at the military council: “We will have to fight with Finland,” and it was decided to ensure the security of the northwestern borders by force, in connection with which, until the end of November, Soviet troops were hastily drawn to the border.
On November 26 at 15.45, in the border area near the village of Mainila, an incident occurred with artillery shelling of Soviet troops, as a result of which, according to official reports, 4 Red Army soldiers were killed and 9 wounded.
On the same day, the Soviet government sent a note of protest to the Finnish side and demanded, in order to prevent similar incidents in the future, to withdraw its troops from the border line by 20-25 km.
In a note in response, the Finnish government denied the involvement of Finnish troops in the shelling of Mainila and suggested that "it is an accident that occurred during training exercises on the Soviet side ..." As for the withdrawal of troops, the note proposed "starting negotiations on the issue of about mutual withdrawal to a known distance from the border".
In a new note dated November 28, the Soviet government qualified the Finnish response as "a document reflecting the deep hostility of the Finnish government towards the Soviet Union and designed to bring the crisis in relations between the two countries to the extreme." The note stated that the proposal for a mutual withdrawal of troops was unacceptable to the USSR, since in this case the Red Army units would have to be drawn to the suburbs of Leningrad, while the Soviet troops did not threaten any of the vital centers of Finland. In this regard, the Soviet government "considers itself free from the obligations assumed by virtue of the non-aggression pact..."
On the evening of November 29, the Finnish envoy in Moscow, Irie Koskinen, was summoned to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, where Deputy People's Commissar V. Potemkin handed him a new note. It said that in view of the current situation, the responsibility for which lies entirely with the Finnish government, "the government of the USSR came to the conclusion that it could no longer maintain normal relations with the government of Finland and therefore recognized the need to immediately recall its political and economic representatives from Finland." It was a break in diplomatic relations, which meant the penultimate step that separated peace from war.
In the early morning of the next day, the last step was taken. As stated in the official report, "by order of the High Command of the Red Army, in view of new armed provocations by the Finnish military, the troops of the Leningrad Military District at 8 am on November 30 crossed the border of Finland on the Karelian Isthmus and in a number of other areas."
The war began, later called the Winter War, which at that moment promised to be simple and end in two or three weeks. But due to the underestimation of the enemy, who managed to increase the number of his armed forces from 37 to 337 thousand, his own insufficient combat readiness, unnecessary illusions about the "class solidarity of the Finnish working people", who would come out almost with flowers to meet the soldiers of the Red Army, the war lasted 105 days , can hardly be considered completely successful for the Soviet side, and ended only on March 12, 1940 with the signing of the Moscow Peace Treaty.
In general, 425 thousand soldiers of the Red Army acted along the entire front against 265 thousand Finnish military personnel, and 169 thousand soldiers of the Red Army fought against 130 thousand Finns on the impregnable "Mannerheim Line" on the Karelian Isthmus.
Losses in the war of the Finnish side: 21396 killed and 1434 missing. Our losses are much greater: 126,875 Red Army servicemen died, died or went missing.
The Soviet Union, as a result of the war, without any compensating exchange, acquired about 40 thousand square meters. km of Finnish territories (and it was proposed to give 5529 sq. km instead of only 2761 sq. km), including the naval base on the Hanko Peninsula. As a result, after the start of the Great Patriotic War, the Finnish troops were able to reach the line of the old state border only by September 1941.
The USSR also demanded an amount of 95 million rubles. as compensation, Finland had to transfer 350 sea and river vehicles, 76 locomotives, 2 thousand wagons and cars each.
And it is very important that the Soviet troops gained invaluable combat experience, and the command of the Red Army got a reason to think about the shortcomings in the training of troops and urgent measures to increase the combat capability of the army and navy. A little more than a year remained until June 22, 1941, and Stalin knew about it.
