HOW RUSSIAN MILITARY HELPED FIGHT TERRORISTS IN SYRIA
On March 14, 2016, Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the withdrawal of the main Russian forces from Syria from March 15.
At the same time, two Russian bases - Khmeimim and Tartus - will continue to operate in Syria. They will continue to monitor the ceasefire in coordination with foreign partners.
In total, the Russian operation in Syria lasted 5 months and 14 days, it involved formations of the Aerospace Forces (VKS) and the Navy (Navy) of the Russian Federation.
From September 30, 2015 to mid-February 2016, when ceasefire negotiations began (the agreement entered into force on February 27), Russian aviation made more than 7.2 thousand sorties from the Khmeimim airbase, destroying over 12.7 thousand militant objects .
The support of the Russian Aerospace Forces allowed the Syrian government forces to stop the territorial expansion of terrorist groups and launch an offensive in the provinces of Hama, Idlib and Aleppo. In addition, thanks to Russian strikes, terrorists have lost more than half of the income from oil illegally extracted on Syrian territory.
According to Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, Russian troops killed more than 2,000 Russian militants in Syria, including 17 field commanders.
Combat losses of the RF Armed Forces amounted to three people, one aircraft and one helicopter.
How did the Russian army fight and what diplomatic Efforts are being made to justify the success of the military operation, according to TASS.
The main stages of the operation
On September 30, 2015, the Federation Council of the Russian Federation unanimously approved the request of Russian President Vladimir Putin to use the country's Armed Forces outside its territory. This decision made it possible to launch an operation by the Aerospace Forces (VKS) of the Russian Federation against the terrorist groups "Islamic State" and "Dzhebhat al-Nusra" (banned in the Russian Federation) in Syria at the request of President Bashar al-Assad.
Immediately after the decision of the Federation Council, the Russian aviation group stationed at the Syrian Khmeimim airfield launched the first pinpoint airstrikes on IS targets in the Syrian provinces of Homs and Hama.
In addition to the Russian Aerospace Forces, the Russian Navy was also involved in the operation. On the night of October 6-7, ships of the Red Banner Caspian Flotilla of the Russian Navy from the Caspian Sea launched a massive strike with cruise missiles from the Kalibr sea-based complex against IS targets in Syria. 26 rockets were fired from the ships Dagestan, Grad Sviyazhsk, Veliky Ustyug and Uglich.
On November 17, 2015, Putin demanded to step up Russian air strikes in Syria. This happened after the head of the Federal Security Service, Alexander Bortnikov, reported that the cause of the crash of the Russian A321 airliner in Egypt.
On the same day, in accordance with the task set, massed air-launched cruise missiles and air bombs were inflicted on the positions of militants in Syria by the crews of Tu-160, Tu-95 and Tu-22M3 Long-Range Aviation aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces.
On November 20, Russia increased the aviation group participating in the operation to 69 aircraft. At the same time, ships of the Caspian Flotilla launched 18 cruise missiles at seven terrorist positions, successfully hitting all targets.
On December 8, the Kalibr sea-based cruise missiles were launched for the first time from the Rostov-on-Don submarine from the Mediterranean Sea. As a result of the attack, two ISIS command posts in the province of Raqqa were destroyed.
Impact on IS revenue
Only in the first two months of the operation, 32 oil-producing complexes, 11 oil refineries, 23 oil pumping stations were defeated. One thousand and eighty tank trucks carrying oil products were destroyed. This made it possible to reduce the turnover of oil illegally produced on Syrian territory by almost 50%.
According to the Russian military, the annual income of the "Islamic State" from the illegal sale of oil is about $ 2 billion a year.
Russia has also accused Turkey's top leadership and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan personally of being involved in the illegal extraction and transportation of Syrian and Iraqi oil.
In turn, the head of the main operational department of the Russian General Staff, Sergei Rudskoy, said that the Russian Defense Ministry had identified three main routes for transporting oil from Syria and Iraq to Turkey.
© Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
Combat losses
On November 24, 2015, a Su-24M front-line bomber (tail number "83 white", registration number RF-90932) of the Special Aviation Group of the Russian Aerospace Forces in Syria was shot down by an F-16 fighter of the Turkish Air Force in Syria.
The pilots managed to eject, ground fire was opened on them, the pilot Lieutenant Colonel Oleg Peshkov died.
According to the Turkish side, the bomber was shot down due to a violation of the airspace of this country. The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation denied the fact that the Su-24M crossed the Turkish border.
Helicopters of the Russian Aerospace Forces took off in search of the pilots, during the operation one of them (Mi-8AMTSh) was damaged by shelling from the ground, a marine contract soldier, sailor Alexander Pozynich, died on board. The helicopter made an emergency landing on neutral territory, the crew and personnel of the search and rescue group were evacuated, the aircraft itself was later destroyed by mortar fire from the territory controlled by the armed formations.
On February 1, 2016, a Russian military adviser was mortally wounded as a result of a mortar attack by IS terrorists on a military garrison where one of the units of the Syrian army is stationed.
Coordination in the sky
The military operation required coordination with the countries of the region, as well as with the United States, which leads the coalition against ISIS, which has been fighting in Iraq and Syria since the fall of 2014.
The only party with which Russia had problems was Türkiye.
Putin instructed Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to intensify the participation of the Russian Federation
Lavrov, in turn, reported to the President that the operation of the Aerospace Forces contributed to the creation of conditions for the political process in Syria. The Foreign Minister recalled that Russia has consistently advocated the establishment of an intra-Syrian dialogue.
It is noteworthy that the diplomatic process in Syria sharply intensified precisely with the start of the Russian military operation. Russia succeeded in getting Iran involved in the talks, which Moscow insisted on from the very beginning of the Syrian conflict in 2011. For the first time, the head of the Iranian Foreign Ministry joined the negotiations on the Syrian settlement on October 30, 2015 in Vienna.
The second meeting in Vienna took place on 14 November. Its participants agreed to facilitate a meeting between Syrian government and opposition delegations by January 1, 2016 in order to later establish a transitional governing body and begin preparations for the development of a new constitution. This process, according to the "road map" worked out in Vienna, should take about 18 months.
Peace talks were to resume in Geneva in late January/early February 2016. However, the parties once again failed to reach a compromise. The talks were "paused".
The situation changed dramatically after the conclusion of the ceasefire agreement, which was agreed upon at the initiative of Russia and the United States. The ceasefire agreements do not apply to the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra groups and other groups designated as terrorist by the UN Security Council. Russia and the United States are jointly monitoring the fulfillment of the terms of the truce.
This opened up a chance to start a new round of negotiations, which would not have been possible if not for the efforts that Russia has been making on the diplomatic and military fronts over the past months.
What weapons did the Russian Federation use
Initially, the Russian group included 48 aircraft and helicopters, including Su-34 and Su-24M bombers, Su-25 attack aircraft, Su-30SM and Su-35S fighters, Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters.
The agreement on the deployment of the Russian aviation group at the Khmeimim airfield in Syria was concluded on August 26, 2015. The presence of Russian aviation, according to the document, "is of a defensive nature and is not directed against other states." The contract is concluded for an indefinite period.
Tu-160, Tu-95 and Tu-22M3 long-range aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces and about 10 ships of the Russian Navy also participated in the military operation.
On November 26, 2015, the S-400 Triumf anti-aircraft missile system was deployed to the Khmeimim airfield to protect the Russian air group.
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Su-24M "FECHTOWER"
The main striking force of the Russian air group in Syria is the modernized Su-24M front-line bomber.
The Su-24 (according to NATO classification - Fencer-D) is a front-line bomber with a variable sweep wing, for its elongated nose was nicknamed "Fencer". Designed for delivering missile and bomb strikes in simple and difficult weather conditions, day and night, including at low altitudes. Chief designer - Evgeny Felsner.
The aircraft made its first flight in 1976. The bomber is equipped with a special computing subsystem SVP-24 "Gefest", which was put into service in 2008, which expands the aircraft's ability to search for and destroy targets. The Su-24M is capable of flying at low altitude and following the terrain. The bomber can strike both ground and surface targets using a wide range of ammunition, including high-precision weapons, including guided aerial bombs (KAB). The maximum flight speed near the ground is 1250 km / h, the ferry flight range is 2,775 km (with two external fuel tanks PTB-3000). The aircraft is equipped with two AL-21F-3A turbojet engines with a thrust of 11,200 kgf each.
Armament - a 23 mm cannon, on 8 suspension points can carry air-to-surface and air-to-air missiles, corrected and free-fall aerial bombs, as well as unguided aircraft rockets, removable cannon mounts. It can carry tactical nuclear bombs on board.
Currently, the Su-24 and its modifications are in service with the Russian Air Force, as well as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine. About 120 modified units are planned to be replaced by Su-34s by 2020.
© Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
Su-34 "DUCK"
Multifunctional fighter-bomber of the "4+" generation Su-34 (NATO classification - Fullback) is designed to deliver high-precision missile and bomb strikes, including using nuclear weapons, against land and surface targets at any time of the day. The main strike aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces.
Among the Russian military, the Su-34 was nicknamed "Duck" because of the nose of the aircraft, reminiscent of a duck's beak.
The all-weather front-line bomber is a modernization of the Su-27 fighter. Chief designer - Rollan Martirosov.
The first flight was made on April 13, 1990. Adopted by the Russian Air Force on March 20, 2014. Serially produced since 2006 at the Novosibirsk Aviation Plant named after V.P. Chkalov. Maximum speed - 1900 km / h, flight range - more than 4,000 km without refueling (7,000 km - with refueling), service ceiling - 14,650 meters. Armament - a 30 mm caliber cannon, on 12 hardpoints can carry air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles of various types, unguided rockets and bombs.
The aircraft is equipped with an in-flight refueling system. The Su-34 is equipped with two AL-31F M1 turbojet engines with a thrust of 13,300 kgf in afterburner mode each. The crew of the aircraft - 2 people.
According to information from open sources, in December 2014, the Russian Air Force was armed with 55 Su-34 units. In total, the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation intends to adopt 120 Su-34s.
© Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
Su-25SM "GRACH"
The armored subsonic attack aircraft Su-25SM (according to NATO classification - Frogfoot-A), nicknamed "Rook", is designed to directly support ground forces over the battlefield day and night with direct line of sight of the target, as well as to destroy objects with given coordinates around the clock in any weather conditions .
The aircraft differs from the basic Su-25 model by the presence of the PrNK-25SM Bars airborne sighting and navigation system and equipment for working with the GLONASS satellite navigation system. The cockpit equipment was also seriously updated - multifunctional displays (MFD) and a new indicator on the windshield (HUD) were added instead of the old sights.
The Su-25SM is capable of using a wide range of ammunition, including high-precision weapons. The aircraft is equipped with a 30-mm double-barreled aircraft gun GSh-30-2. The maximum flight speed near the ground is 975 km / h, the flight radius is 500 km. The aircraft is equipped with two RD-195 turbojet engines with a thrust of 4,500 kgf at maximum power each.
Su-25 became the most belligerent aircraft of the Russian army. He participated in many military operations (Afghanistan, Angola, South Ossetia). It is the "Rooks" that leave plumes of colored smoke in the form of the flag of the Russian Federation at each Victory parade over Red Square.
© Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
Su-27SM
Su-27SM multirole fighter (according to NATO classification - Flanker-B mod.1). Designed to gain air supremacy. The effectiveness of the aircraft compared to the baseline Su-27 has doubled when working on air targets.
The Su-27SM is equipped with new avionics systems. The aircraft cockpit is equipped with multifunctional displays (MFD). The range of used aviation weapons (ASP) has been expanded.
Su-27SM3 aircraft have two additional suspension points under the wing panels.
Su-30SM
The task of Su-30SM fighters (according to NATO classification - Flanker-H) is to cover bombers and attack aircraft that strike at the positions of Islamic State militants.
The Russian two-seat multirole heavy fighter of the "4+" generation was created on the basis of the Su-27UB through its deep modernization.
It is designed both to gain air supremacy and to strike at ground and surface targets. The design of the aircraft used front horizontal tail (PGO) and engines with thrust vector control (UVT). Due to the application of these solutions, the aircraft has super-maneuverability.
The Su-30SM is equipped with a multifunctional radar control station (RLCS) with a passive phased antenna array (PFAR) "Bars". The fighter's ammunition portfolio includes a wide range of weapons, including air-to-air missiles and air-to-surface precision guided weapons. The Su-30SM can be used as an aircraft to train pilots for advanced single-seat fighters. Since 2012, these aircraft have been under construction for the Russian Air Force.
The Su-30SM is capable of performing combat operations associated with a long range and duration of flight and effective control of a group of fighters.
The Su-30SM is equipped with an in-flight refueling system, new navigation systems, an expanded range of group action control equipment, and an improved life support system. Due to the installation of new missiles and a weapon control system, the combat effectiveness of the aircraft has been significantly increased.
© Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
Su-35S
The Russian multipurpose supersonic supermaneuverable Su-35S fighter belongs to the 4++ generation. It was developed in the 2000s by the experimental design bureau. BY. Sukhoi based on the front-line fighter Su-27. The Su-35 made its first flight in 2008.
The aerodynamic scheme of the aircraft is made in the form of a twin-engine high-wing aircraft with a tricycle retractable landing gear with a front strut. The Su-35 is equipped with turbojet engines with an afterburner and AL-41F1S thrust vector controlled in one plane.
The 117C engine is responsible for the super-maneuverability of the Su-35. It was developed on the basis of its predecessors AL-31F, mounted on Su-27 aircraft, but differs from them in increased thrust of 14.5 tons (against 12.5), a longer resource and reduced fuel consumption.
The Su-35 has 12 external hardpoints for attaching high-precision missiles and bombs. Two more - to accommodate EW containers.
The Su-35 armament includes a whole range of air-to-air and air-to-surface guided missiles, as well as unguided missiles and bombs of various calibers.
In terms of the range of bomber and unguided missile weapons, the Su-35 as a whole does not differ from today's Su-30MK, but in the future it will be able to use improved and new models of aerial bombs, including those with laser correction. The maximum payload weight is 8000 kg.
The fighter is also equipped with a GSh-30-1 30 mm cannon (ammunition - 150 rounds).
© TV channel "Star"
Long-range aviation
Tu-22M3
Long-range supersonic bomber with variable wing geometry.
Designed to destroy land and sea targets with supersonic guided missiles at any time of the day and in any weather conditions.
Chief designer - Dmitry Markov. The first flight was made on June 22, 1977, it was put into mass production in 1978, and adopted by the USSR Air Force in March 1989.
In total, about 500 Tu-22Ms of various modifications were built. The maximum speed of the aircraft is 2,300 km/h, the practical range is 5,500 km, the practical ceiling is 13,500 m. The crew is 4 people. It can carry various types of cruise missiles with conventional or nuclear warheads.
Currently, aircraft of this model, which are in service with the Russian Air Force, are being repaired and modernized.
© Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
Tu-95MS
Turboprop strategic bomber-missile carrier.
Designed to destroy important targets with nuclear and conventional weapons in remote military-geographical regions and in the deep rear of continental theaters of military operations.
Chief designer - Nikolai Bazenkov. The aircraft was created on the basis of Tu-142MK and Tu-95K-22. The first flight was made in September 1979. Adopted by the USSR Air Force in 1981.
The maximum speed is 830 km / h, the practical range is up to 10,500 km, the practical ceiling is 12,000 meters. Crew - 7 people. Armament - long-range cruise missiles, 2 guns of 23 mm caliber.
Currently, the Russian Aerospace Forces is armed with about 30 units. Modernization to the Tu-95MSM version is underway, which will extend the life of the aircraft until 2025.
© Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
Tu-160
Supersonic strategic bomber-missile carrier with variable wing geometry.
Designed to destroy the most important targets with nuclear and conventional weapons in remote military geographical areas and in the deep rear of continental theaters of military operations.
Chief designer - Valentin Bliznyuk. The machine made its first flight on December 18, 1981, adopted by the USSR Air Force in 1987.
Maximum speed - 2,230 km / h, practical range - 14,600 km, practical ceiling - 16,000 m. Crew - 4 people. Armament: up to 12 cruise missiles or up to 40 tons of air bombs. Flight duration - up to 15 hours (without refueling).
At least 15 vehicles of this type are in service with the long-range aviation of the Russian Aerospace Forces. Until 2020, ten modernized Tu-160M vehicles are expected to arrive.
© Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
Helicopters
Mi-8AMTSH "TERMINATOR"
Mi-8AMTSh "Terminator" transport and attack helicopters are deployed at the Khmeimim air base. This is the latest modification of the well-known and proven Mi-8 military transport helicopter.
"Terminator" is designed to destroy equipment, including armored, shelters and firing points, enemy manpower.
The range of ammunition used from the Mi-8AMTSh, in addition to unguided weapons, includes high-precision weapons, in particular anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM) 9M120 "Ataka" or 9M114 "Shturm". The helicopter can carry up to 37 paratroopers, up to 12 wounded on stretchers or transport up to 4 tons of cargo, perform search and rescue and evacuation operations.
The helicopter is equipped with two VK-2500 engines of increased power. Mi-8AMTSh are equipped with a complex of means of protection against damage. The cockpit of the new helicopter is equipped with multifunctional indicators that display a digital map of the area, and the latest flight and navigation equipment that works with GPS and GLONASS navigation systems. Mi-8AMTSH helicopters are also distinguished by improved resource indicators, which allow saving significant funds on helicopter maintenance during the life cycle.
Crew - 3 people. Maximum speed - 250 km / h, flight range - up to 800 km, practical ceiling - 6,000 meters.
Versatility and high flight performance have made Mi-8 helicopters one of the most popular Russian helicopters in the world.
Mi-24P
The Mi-24P attack helicopter (according to NATO classification - Hind-F) is designed for visual observation and organization of a security zone in the Khmeimim airfield area, as well as search and rescue operations. It is a modernized version of the Mi-24.
Each Mi-24P used in Syria carries four blocks of 20 rockets. The helicopter is also equipped with guided missiles and a 30-mm double-barreled automatic aircraft gun GSh-30K (ammunition load - 250 rounds), capable of reaching speeds of up to 300 km/h and climbing to a height of up to 4,500 meters. It can fly at extremely low altitudes from 5 to 10 meters.
The helicopter made its first flight in 1974, serial production began in 1981.
The Mi-24P is designed to strike at concentrations of manpower, combat equipment, including armored vehicles, and destroy low-flying low-speed air targets.
The crews of the Mi-8AMTSh and Mi-24P helicopters are equipped with night vision goggles, which allows them to fly at night.
bombs and missiles
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BETAB-500 CONCRETE BOMB
The BetAB-500 concrete-piercing bomb was developed at the Basalt National Research and Production Enterprise. Designed for the destruction of concrete structures, bridges, naval bases. The main task of the bomb is to break through the roof of a fortified object, it can be underground fuel and lubricant depots or weapons, various concrete fortifications. BetAB-500 is capable of penetrating 1 meter of concrete buried 5 meters deep into the ground. In medium-density soil, this ammunition forms a funnel with a diameter of 4-5 meters. Such parameters are achieved, firstly, due to the trajectory of the fall of the bomb - vertically down. After being dropped from the aircraft, a special braking parachute opens near the ammunition, which directs the BetAB to the ground. In addition, when the parachute fires back, a rocket booster is turned on in the tail section of the bomb, which creates an additional speed of meeting the ammunition with the target. The mass of the warhead of the bomb is 350 kg.
The BetAB has a reinforced shell compared to a conventional high explosive bomb, which helps break through concrete and other fortifications.
ROCKETS Kh-29L AND Kh-25ML
The Kh-29 missiles were developed in the USSR and put into service in 1980. Now the modernization and production of ammunition is carried out by the Tactical Missiles Corporation.
Missiles of this type are designed to destroy such ground targets as strong aircraft shelters, fixed railway and highway bridges, industrial buildings, warehouses, and concrete runways.
In the X-29L version, the missile is equipped with a laser homing head. In Syria, these missiles are used by Su-24M front-line bombers and Su-34 fighter-bombers.
The missile is equipped with a high-explosive penetrating warhead. Before launching a rocket, the pilot can set the option of firing the rocket - instantaneous, from the contact of the rocket with the target, or triggering with a delay.
The firing range of the X-29L missile is from 2 to 10 km.
The missile has a powerful warhead weighing 317 kg with an explosive mass of 116 kg.
Kh-25 is an air-to-surface guided multi-purpose missile equipped with a semi-active homing head (GOS). A laser seeker is installed on the Kh-25ML missile.
Designed to destroy small targets both on the battlefield and behind enemy lines. Able to punch up to 1 meter of concrete.
The maximum launch range is 10 km. Flight speed - 870 m / s. The mass of the warhead (warhead) - 86 kg.
KAB-500S
This adjustable bomb is designed for high-precision destruction of stationary ground targets - railway bridges, fortifications, communications nodes. The bomb has a high hit accuracy due to the inertial satellite guidance system. Ammunition can be effectively used both day and night in any weather.
The bomb can be dropped at distances from 2 to 9 km from the target and at altitudes from 500 meters to 5 km at a carrier aircraft speed of 550 to 1100 km/h. The mass of the bomb in different versions is 560 kg, the mass of the high-explosive concrete-piercing warhead is 360-380 kg.
The circular probable deviation of the bomb from the target, according to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, is 4-5 meters, according to the manufacturer - from 7 to 12 meters.
KAB-500S has a fuse with three types of deceleration.
A direct hit by two such bombs in Syria destroyed the headquarters of the Liwa al-Haq grouping, and more than 200 militants were immediately eliminated.
OFAB OF DIFFERENT WEIGHT
High-explosive free-fall aerial bomb. It is used to destroy weakly protected military facilities, armored and unarmored vehicles, and manpower. It is used from heights from 500 meters to 16 km.
In Syria, these munitions are used by Su-25SM attack aircraft.
CRUISE MISSIL X-555
Air-launched subsonic strategic cruise missile, Kh-55 modification, equipped with a conventional warhead (warhead).
The missile is equipped with an inertial-doppler guidance system that combines terrain correction with satellite navigation. X-555 can be equipped with different types of warheads: high-explosive fragmentation, penetrating or cassette with different types of elements. Compared to the X-55, the mass of the warhead was increased, which led to a decrease in the flight range to 2000 km. However, the Kh-555 can be fitted with conformal fuel tanks to increase the range of the cruise missile to 2,500 km. According to open sources, the circular probable deviation (CEP) of the rocket is from 5 to 10 m.
According to data obtained from a video recording of the Russian Ministry of Defense, Kh-555 missiles were used from Tu-160 and Tu-95MS aircraft, which carried them in the fuselage compartments.
Strategic missile carriers of these types are equipped with an MKU-6-5 drum-type launcher, which can carry 6 air-launched cruise missiles.
CRUISE ROCKET ZM-14
On October 7, 2015, 3M-14 cruise missiles of the Caliber NK complex were successfully used during the Russian military operation in Syria.
Three project 21631 small missile ships of the Caspian flotilla (Uglich, Grad Sviyazhsk and Veliky Ustyug) and a project 11661K patrol ship Dagestan fired 26 missiles at 11 ground targets located at a distance of about 1500 km. This was the first combat use of the missile system.
Projects 11661K and 21631 missile ships, which are part of the flotilla, are equipped with launchers for Caliber tactical cruise missiles (according to NATO classification - SS-N-27 Sizzler).
The Kalibr missile system was developed and manufactured by the Novator Design Bureau in Yekaterinburg on the basis of the S-10 Granat complex, and was first introduced in 1993.
On the basis of "Caliber" complexes of ground, air, surface and underwater basing, export versions were created. Currently, different types of Caliber complexes are in service with Russia, India and China.
Data on the maximum range of only the export version of the missile was officially disclosed, it is 275-300 km. In 2012, at a meeting with Dagestan President Magomedsalam Magomedov, Vice Admiral Sergei Alekminsky, who at that time held the post of commander of the Caspian Flotilla, said that the tactical version of the Caliber (3M-14) cruise missile could hit coastal targets at a distance of up to 2,600 km.
The performance characteristics of the 3M-14 rocket are classified information and are not publicly available.
2019 TASS news agency (certificate of registration mass media No. 03247 issued April 02, 1999 G government committee Russian F federation for printing)
Individual publications may contain information not intended for users under 16 years of age.
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has made it clear that he is ready to continue the war in his country to a victorious end. He did so in an interview with the state-run Russian television channel RT, describing the situation that would arise if negotiations between his representatives and the Syrian opposition represented by the Syrian Democratic Forces failed.
“If the negotiations fail, we will continue to liberate the territories by force. We simply have no other options… This is our land, and it is our right and duty to liberate it,” Bashar al-Assad said.
The Syrian leader believes that it is the United States that does not want him to remain in power in his country: "After we liberated Aleppo and Deir ez-Zor, Homs and now Damascus, there are fewer and fewer cards left in the US deck."
At the same time, Assad told RT that a direct conflict between the United States and Russia during the Syrian war was quite possible: “In fact, we have come quite close to a possible direct conflict between the forces of Russia and the United States. Fortunately, this was avoided. But not thanks to the wisdom of the American leadership, but thanks to the wisdom of the Russian.”
It is worth noting, however, that it was Russian mercenaries, as the media of various countries wrote about it, and then confirmed by US representatives, who entered into battle with the regular US military in February of this year.
Nevertheless, for many military experts it is obvious that Bashar al-Assad has begun to feel more confident in military operations in recent months, and now few world leaders are talking about his imminent departure. According to experts, this is due to the fact that after the withdrawal of the main forces from Syria announced by Putin last December, the real military support of the Assad regime from Russia continues to be very significant.
Alexander Golts: In Syria, sergeants of the Russian army are called “advisers”
Independent military expert Alexander Golts says that, as in foreign conflicts of the Soviet era, Russia calls its fighters and commanders fighting abroad military advisers: “The fact that in Syria sergeants who act as part of an artillery battery are called “advisers” , says, most likely, that some units of the Syrian armed forces are staffed by Russian contract soldiers, military personnel of the Russian army, as well as mercenaries from groups like the Wagner group.
Alexander Golts believes that it was the participation of Russians in ground operations that influenced the course of the Syrian war: “Obviously, in January-February of this year, a miracle happened: the Syrian army, which was clearly limited in its ability to act, suddenly began to undertake very energetic, deep operations , which included bypassing the enemy, landing in his rear, and so on - something that the Syrian army until recently was not at all capable of. Given that the Syrian government armed forces have very limited opportunities to replenish, the question arose: where did the suddenly appeared energy come from, the suddenly appeared ability to conduct serious military operations.
The answer to this question, as the expert says, is quite clear: “This is help from outside, and this is help from the Russians. Whether these were mercenaries from private military companies like Wagner and the Wagner PMC itself, or whether they were already contract soldiers from the Russian armed forces who participated in this kind of covert operation, one can only guess. We can talk about the number based on the volume of operations - we are talking about about three thousand military personnel.”
Alexander Golts emphasizes that the “Wagnerites” and the regular Russian army do not have a sense of camaraderie for each other, but they often fight together: “Periodically, the command of the Russian group in Syria resorts to the services of the “Wagnerites”: this was both during the second assault on Palmyra and during landings across the Euphrates. That is, the “Wagnerites” cause some irritation, but nevertheless, they cooperate with them, and they are widely used.”
According to the military analyst, the Kremlin does not yet consider that the tasks in Syria have been completed: “The first and main task of Russia’s military participation in Syria is to get out of the isolation associated with Ukraine. However, as a result of its Syrian operation, Russia has further strained its relations with the West. And now it is already impossible to leave Syria without “losing face”: to leave means to admit defeat. For Putin, with him, some will say - pride, others - an inferiority complex, this is absolutely impossible.
Michael Carpenter: Six thousand military and mercenaries is a tangible force
Michael Carpenter, senior expert at the Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center, ex-assistant to the US Deputy Secretary of Defense, believes that only Russian military personnel in Syria are under three thousand: “According to my feelings, the real presence of Russian military personnel in Syria remains approximately unchanged and consists of about three thousand military personnel. One may recall how the Russian Ministry of Defense announced in March that some 2,900 military personnel had voted in Syria in that month's Russian presidential election for Vladimir Putin. If it is a fact that all the Russian military in Syria voted for Putin, then here is the number for you, although, of course, we understand that the Russians use “disguise” all the time, and the real numbers may be different. But the figure of 3,000 troops looks plausible to me.”
At the same time, a military specialist suggests that there are no fewer Russian mercenaries in Syria: “Russia has mercenaries from the Wagner group there, and I believe that there are as many of them as Russian military personnel, that is, three thousand, and this gives us an estimated total presence of Russian military personnel in Syria of around 6,000. This, of course, is a tangible number of military personnel, especially considering that they were sent by Russia to fight abroad. I don't think they will increase that number in the coming months."
Carpenter states that the words of the Russian president about the withdrawal of most of the Russian military from Syria remained words: “Putin announced at the end of last year that he was mainly withdrawing his forces from Syria, but, as we see, he did not. And, apparently, it will be true to say that at such a rather tangible level, the presence of the Russian military in Syria will remain for the time being.”
“Putin intervened with his military force in the Syrian conflict to keep Assad alive, and he cannot allow Assad to be left defenseless on the battlefield. So he himself put himself in a situation where he needs to maintain a military presence there in order to protect Assad and further - they are now too much connected with Assad, ”the ex-assistant to the US Deputy Secretary of Defense believes.
However, the Russian military presence in Syria, says Michael Carpenter, has an impact on the overall balance of power, which should flatter Putin: “On the other hand, Russian military power in Syria does give Moscow some leverage to influence countries in the Middle East region – we saw all kinds of leaders from these countries, including Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, who came to Moscow to ask for something specific, or at least to understand what Russia's next steps in the area would be. So it gives Putin a diplomatic advantage, although it comes with increasing irreversibility in terms of how easy it will be for him to get out of there.”
There are no lulls and truces in information wars. The most striking example of this was the story of the death of Russian soldiers near El Salhiyah on February 7th. For several days now we have been witnessing a real orgy about this, and it in itself causes enormous damage to the country. What should be done to minimize this damage?
The American air strike that happened last Wednesday in Syria is still echoing throughout the Russian information field. He overshadowed both the presidential campaign and sexual-oligarchic scandals. Yesterday, on Thursday, the Russian Foreign Ministry acknowledged the death of several Russian citizens - specifying that we are talking about five people who are not members of the Russian army. But by this time, passions had been raging in the networks for a week, and this is the picture that has developed in the minds of average citizens.
On February 7, in the area of the city of El-Salkhiyah in the province of Deir ez-Zor, the Americans hit a column of a Syrian detachment advancing on the positions of groups supported by the Americans. With this detachment were our militias, employees of a private military company. People died - and here disputes-shouts begin. Given that on the very first day information about two hundred dead Russians was thrown in, many were distrustful not only of this figure, but also of the very fact of the death of their compatriots.
However, a detailed picture of what happened gradually began to emerge, the names of the dead began to emerge. Indeed, it turned out that there were more than 10 dead - but hardly more than 20. Apparently, these are both citizens of Russia and residents of Donetsk and Luhansk. If the original figure given by the Americans is correct (and they were talking about a hundred killed in the Syrian convoy), then it turns out that about one-sixth of these losses are ours.
On the very first day, the Russian Defense Ministry stated that “the incident with the shelling of the Syrian militias by the US coalition occurred due to reconnaissance and search actions of the militias that were not coordinated with Russia,” and “there are no Russian military in this area of the province of Deir ez-Zor.” In the form of the Ministry of Defense, it is absolutely right, but in fact this could not calm the agitated Russian society.
How was it necessary to behave in this situation - not only the Ministry of Defense or the Foreign Ministry, but in general our entire government?
Be honest about what you have. That is, on the very first day or two, recognize the losses among our guys, call them heroes without going into the analysis of the reasons for their death(more precisely, the one whose mistake or inconsistency led to it - this needs to be sorted out, but not publicly).
But this, after all, would mean recognizing the presence of PMCs in Syria, or rather, informal assistants to the Russian army, volunteers. Do you understand, they tell us that we cannot do this because of the conventions of the international game? It's like recognizing the actions of the special services. No one ever confesses to the work of their agents, and PMCs in the modern world are just such a form of covering up state policy with supposedly private activities. Yes, the Americans recognize their PMCs, but they have a different situation. They do not hide their global ambitions, and they have a lot of non-Americans in these companies.
This explanation of silence is understandable at the level of argumentation of our foreign policy tactics. But it is completely unsatisfactory for domestic politics, and for two reasons at once.
Firstly, the very illegality of PMCs is wrong- relatives of these volunteers have no guarantees of providing for them in case of loss or injury of the breadwinner. The fact that they exist at an unofficial level does not negate the fact that in such cases dependence on the human factor is unacceptable. Well, and the fact that relatives who do not officially have any guarantees are nervous and worried about their future - and why do they need such an additional test? This is the human dimension.
Secondly, and this is already a state scale - Silence about unofficial fighters weakens the credibility of the authorities, and hence to the Russian state itself. Because it opens up space for speculation and sabotage informational techniques: "they betray, abandon, use, do not think about people, enemies of Russia." That is, hostile propaganda (let's call a spade a spade) immediately begins to rub salt in the wound with kilograms. And the authorities cannot answer anything, because initially, even before the event, they did not recognize the very subject of the conversation.
And the damage from such “black PR” is much greater than from information about the death of our people in the Syrian war. Even if a hundred or two hundred people really died, all this could be explained to their people. And now we see that the death of a dozen guys is becoming an occasion for large-scale speculation that should have been and could have been nipped in the bud.
But in order to do so, it is necessary to seriously restructure the very format of the government’s reaction to “hot topics”. This applies not only to Syria or Ukraine, but also to various internal political scandals and events. Officials and deputies should react quickly and clearly - without looking back at the Kremlin, without waiting for what the president or his press secretary will say. There are no taboo topics (except for state secrets) and uncomfortable questions - you can and, most importantly, need to talk about everything with the people. To speak frankly, as Putin knows how to do, with all the restrictions that his post imposes on him.
Power in Russia relies primarily on trust – and people trust Putin. But in order for them to trust the government as a whole, trust in the president alone is not enough. All branches and levels of government must learn the skills of "high-speed information combat" - this is not a matter of desire, but a matter of survival. Not the authorities, but Russia as such.
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journalistSaturday, September 30 marks two years since Russia entered the war in Syria. Since then, the Russian army has been drawn deeper and deeper into this war, which, according to official data alone, claimed the lives of 38 Russian soldiers. However, the real losses are likely to be much greater. The situation allows us to assert that the Russian Federation has got involved in its own Vietnam, leaving which will be much more difficult than entering.
Two years ago, on September 30, 2015, Russia entered the Syrian war on the side of the government forces of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. By the time of the Russian intervention, the Assad regime was losing the civil war in their country, pressed by ISIS militants and the Syrian opposition militias. The Russian Federation deployed an air wing to Syria, which began to support Assad's troops from the air. According to official data, Russian aircraft bombed ISIS targets, but the Syrian opposition stated that they were not occupied by ISIS militants.
Russian President Vladimir Putin explained his participation in the Syrian events by the need to fight terrorism on the side of the international coalition. In reality, one of the reasons was the desire of the Russian side to divert the attention of the world community from the problem of Donbass and the desire to “exchange” Syria for Crimea and Donbass, having achieved the lifting of sanctions for the invasion of Ukraine.
At first, Russia's participation in Syria was limited only to an aviation group, the leadership of the Russian Federation assured that it was not going to get involved in ground battles. The Russian army began to suffer losses almost immediately. So, on October 24, 2015, 19-year-old Russian contract soldier Vadim Kostenko died at the Khmeimim airbase, where Russian aviation is based. Exactly a month after this event, Turkish Air Force fighters shot down a Russian Su-24M front-line bomber that flew into Turkey. The crew of two pilots ejected, but the bomber commander, 45-year-old Lieutenant Colonel Oleg Peshkov, died as a result of fire from the ground.
Very soon it became clear that the Russian leadership, to put it mildly, was deceiving its citizens when they said that they would not get involved in ground combat operations. The presence of Russian “ground specialists” has become increasingly clear and undeniable since the sudden retreat from Palmyra last December, when ISIS militants seized equipment and belongings belonging to members of the Russian army’s ground forces.
In recent days, in connection with an attempt to de-blockade the Syrian city of Deir ez-Zor, which the Syrian and Russian military are trying to carry out, reports of losses in the ranks of the Russian army have been coming more and more often. The loudest event was that at one time he commanded the so-called first "army corps" of the illegal "DPR", and in Syria he was the commander of the 5th army corps of the Syrian army (another evidence of the active participation of Russian "land" in the Syrian events).
According to official information, Asapov died in a mortar attack in Deir ez-Zor, but Russian blogger Anatoly Nesmiyan (el-murid), who closely follows events in the Middle East, believes that the Russian Ministry of Defense hid the true information about the place and time of Asapov's death. “I provided a link to the regional press from Bratsk, which reported on the funeral of a local resident, Sergeant Tarasyuk. He died on September 16th. His sister said that a general and a colonel died with him. There are many generals in Russia, but it is logical to assume that there are still not so many to die in such numbers in one place. It is quite possible that it was about General Asapov. But then the date of his death is different, perhaps the place and circumstances are also different. The sister of the deceased sergeant reported that he and the officers were ambushed while moving ... The name of the colonel, who was ambushed along with Tarasyuk and (presumably) Asapov, is also known: Rustem Abzalov. In other words, the Ministry of Defense, having reported the death of the general, hid information on two more dead, ”Nesmiyan said.
It turns out that by hiding the participation of the Russian military in ground operations in Syria, the Russian leadership is also hiding the true information about the losses. According to the Russian newspaper Kommersant, the Russian Federation officially recognized the death of 38 people in Syria. However, if you count the dead by name, it turns out about 50 people. Therefore, it is absolutely possible that the real losses of the RF Armed Forces in Syria are even higher.
By invading Ukraine and getting involved in the Syrian events, Russia received its Afghanistan and Vietnam at the same time.
This behavior is due to very simple reasons. Russia got involved in the war in Syria to divert attention from its actions in the Crimea and Donbass and “buy” the lifting of sanctions. This goal was not achieved, but now it will not be possible to simply leave the Middle East without “losing face”. The same applies to the Donbass. However, it is impossible to admit one’s full participation in both wars, as well as to reveal full information about the losses, since this may cause undesirable questions in society on the eve of the 2018 presidential election. After all, then it will be necessary to explain what are the goals of both wars and the reasons why Russian servicemen die in them. By invading Ukraine and getting involved in the Syrian events, Russia received its Afghanistan and Vietnam at the same time.
Denis Popovich, especially for "Word and Deed"
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TASS-DOSIER. Two years ago, on September 30, 2015, the operation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation began against the terrorist organizations "Islamic State" (IS) and "Dzhebhat al-Nusra" (since 2016 it has been called "Dzhebhat Fatah al-Sham") banned in the Russian Federation in Syrian Arab Republic.
Legal basis for the operation
On September 30, 2015, the Federation Council of the Russian Federation unanimously approved the request of Russian President Vladimir Putin to use the country's armed forces outside its territory. This decision made it possible to launch an operation in Syria on the same day at the request of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.
The situation in Syria at the time of the start of the operation
By the end of the summer of 2015, various terrorist groups controlled about 70% of the territory of Syria, IS militants captured Raqqa, Palmyra, Manbij, a number of other strategically important settlements, transport communications, oil and gas fields. Government forces could not cope with the militant offensive on their own, and air strikes by the US-led international coalition against ISIS also did not have the proper impact on terrorist groups.
In this situation, the Syrian authorities turned to Russia with a request for help. On August 26, 2015, an interstate agreement was signed on the deployment of Russian aviation in Syria.
Formation of the strike force of the Russian Aerospace Forces
In September 2015, a separate aviation group of the Aerospace Forces (VKS) of Russia was deployed to the Khmeimim airfield (Latakia province, northwestern Syria). It included Su-24M bombers, Su-25 attack aircraft, Su-30SM fighters, Mi-24 and Mi-8 helicopters, Il-20M1 reconnaissance aircraft, as well as unmanned aircraft systems. The group was formed from the crews of combat units of the Russian Aerospace Forces.
In addition, ground personnel, paratroopers and marines to guard the air base, soldiers of the Special Operations Forces, armored vehicles, Buk-M2 and Pantsir-S air defense systems were delivered to the Khmeimim base. To supply the group, the transfer of equipment, ammunition, spare parts, and personnel was organized by military transport aircraft, as well as landing and transport ships of the Russian Navy ("Syrian Express" from Russia to the 720th logistics point of the Russian Navy in port of Tartus).
The course of hostilities
On September 30, 2015, immediately after the decision of the Federation Council, Russian pilots launched the first airstrikes on IS targets in the provinces of Homs and Hama. On October 6-7, the fleet joined the operation: the ships of the Caspian flotilla from the waters of the Caspian Sea attacked IS targets with Caliber sea-based cruise missiles (they were first used in hostilities, later they were used eight more times, in total there were more than 70 missiles fired).
During the first month of the operation, 1,391 sorties were made and 1,623 terrorist targets were destroyed, including 249 various command posts and communication centers and 51 training camps. Aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces, on average, performed 50-60 sorties daily.
On November 17, 2015, when the version that the crash of the Russian Airbus A321 aircraft in Egypt was caused by a terrorist attack was confirmed, Putin ordered "to strengthen the combat work of aviation." Immediately after that, the number of sorties increased to 90-100 per day. Long-range aircraft Tu-160, Tu-95 (which was the first combat use of these bombers in history) and Tu-22M3 were involved.
The situation in Syria became even more tense after the Turkish Air Force shot down a Russian Su-24M bomber on November 24, 2015, which caused a sharp reaction from Russia. To ensure the air defense of the group, the Moskva missile cruiser was sent to the coast of Syria, and the S-400 Triumph anti-aircraft missile system was deployed to Khmeimim. The air group was reinforced with Su-30SM and Su-35S fighters, Su-34 bombers, attack helicopters.
On January 22, 2016, a new intensification of the actions of the Russian Aerospace Forces was announced, in January-February more than 500 sorties were made every week, and only on February 4-11, a record 1.8 thousand targets were hit.
On February 27, 2016, a ceasefire came into force in Syria, brokered by the Russian Federation and the United States. He was joined by part of the armed groups operating in Syria. On March 14, 2016, Putin ordered the withdrawal of the main part of the Russian military group from Syria. After that, the air group was reduced from 69 to 25 units. In the spring and summer of 2016, the Aerospace Forces continued to carry out airstrikes against terrorists, supporting the offensive of the Syrian army in the provinces of Aleppo, Latakia and Deir ez-Zor.
On March 27, 2016, Syrian government forces took control of Palmyra, but on December 11, 2016, as a result of an assault by IS militants, they were forced to leave the city. For the second time, Palmyra was freed from militants on March 2, 2017.
On December 15, 2016, Assad announced the liberation of the largest Syrian city of Aleppo, the fighting for which had been going on since July 2012.
In November 2016 - January 2017, the air group of the only aircraft carrier of the Russian Navy, the heavy aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov of the Northern Fleet, took part in the hostilities, which made a long voyage to the Mediterranean Sea. Carrier-based pilots carried out 420 sorties, including 117 night sorties, and hit 1,252 terrorist targets.
Since 2016, the infrastructure of the Russian troops in Syria has been guarded by servicemen of the military police of the RF Armed Forces, equipped with light weapons. They also patrol territories liberated from terrorists, de-escalation zones, and escort humanitarian supplies.
In 2017, the control of the Syrian authorities over long sections of the Syrian-Iraqi and Syrian-Jordanian borders was restored. On September 5, 2017, Syrian troops managed to break through the blockade of the city of Deir ez-Zor, which had been in the ring of territories controlled by ISIS for more than three years.
Losses
According to official publications of the Russian Ministry of Defense and representatives of the Russian regional authorities, 36 Russian servicemen were killed in the course of carrying out combat missions in Syria. Four of them were posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation (Lieutenant Colonel Oleg Peshkov, Senior Lieutenant Alexander Prokhorenko, Captain Marat Akhmetshin, Colonel Ryafagat Khabibullin).
The highest-ranking Russian military person to die in Syria is Lieutenant General Valery Asapov, senior of a group of Russian military advisers, who was fatally wounded in September 2017 when a mortar hit a command post. In addition, one non-combat loss was recorded (a contract serviceman committed suicide).
During the operation, the Russian Aerospace Forces lost four helicopters and one aircraft:
- November 24, 2015 Su-24M was shot down by a Turkish fighter. On the same day, the militants managed to knock out and then destroy the Mi-8AMTSh helicopter, which was part of the search and rescue group, with mortar fire.
- On April 12, 2016, a Mi-28N helicopter crashed near the city of Homs due to a pilot error.
- On August 1, 2016, the Mi-8AMTSh helicopter was destroyed in the province of Idlib as a result of shelling from the ground.
- On November 3, 2016, a helicopter (presumably a Mi-35M) was destroyed by enemy fire in the province of Hama.
As a result of the accidents, two carrier-based fighters from the Admiral Kuznetsov were also lost - MiG-29K (November 14, 2016) and Su-33 (December 5, 2016).
Command
Commanders of the grouping of Russian troops in Syria:
- Colonel General Alexander Dvornikov (September 2015 - June 2016);
- Lieutenant General Alexander Zhuravlev (July - December 2016);
- Colonel General Andrei Kartapolov (December 2016 - March 2017);
- Colonel General Sergei Surovikin (since March 2017).
The commander of the Russian air group in Syria is Major General Alexei Maksimtsev (since September 2015).
Operation results
The participation of Russia allowed the Syrian military to seize the initiative in hostilities and significantly weaken the forces of terrorists. On August 25, 2017, at the international military-technical forum "Army-2017" in the Moscow region, the head of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces, Colonel-General Sergei Rudskoy, said that since the start of the military operation, the Aerospace Forces aviation had made more than 28 thousand sorties, causing about 90 thousand . airstrikes.
During the operation, the territory controlled by government troops grew from 19 thousand to 78 thousand square meters. km. Large bandit formations in the regions of Hama and Homs were defeated, and the province of Latakia was completely cleared of terrorists. The oil and gas fields of Jizel, Shaer, Khayan, Magara and Arak have been returned under government control.
On September 12, 2017, the chief of staff of the Russian Armed Forces in Syria, Lieutenant-General Alexander Lapin, told reporters that the Syrian government forces had liberated about 85% of the country's territory from IS militants, and to completely clear Syria of IS terrorists, "it remains to free about 27,800 sq. km".
As of the end of September 2017, the main efforts of government troops and the Russian Armed Forces grouping are focused on defeating the enemy in the Deir ez-Zor area, where the most capable ISIS terrorist units have moved from Raqqa and Iraqi Mosul.
Political Settlement Process
The successes of the government troops, achieved with the support of the RF Armed Forces, made it possible to launch the process of political settlement and reconciliation of the warring parties. Since December 30, 2016, as a result of agreements between the armed opposition and the Syrian government (Russia and Turkey acted as mediators), a cessation of hostilities has been operating in Syria.
In May 2017 in Astana (Kazakhstan), the Russian Federation, Iran and Turkey signed a memorandum (entered into force on May 6, 2017) on the creation of security zones in Syria. As of September 2017, there are four de-escalation zones - in the southwest (in the provinces of Deraa, El Quneitra and Es Suwayda), in the northwest of the country (province of Idlib), in the suburbs of Damascus, East Ghouta and north of Homs; as well as the Tel Rifiyat deconflict zone in northern Aleppo province.
Safe areas have been created along the de-escalation zones to prevent direct military confrontation.
Status of Russian military bases in Syria
In January 2017, a protocol was signed between the Russian Federation and Syria to an agreement on the deployment of an aviation group of the Russian Armed Forces in Syria. The protocol states that the external protection of the places of deployment of the Russian military and the coastal borders of the logistics point in the port of Tartus is carried out by the Syrian side, and air defense, internal security and law enforcement in the places of deployment are in the zone of responsibility of the Russian side.
The protocol establishes the international legal framework governing the conditions for the presence of an aviation group of the Russian Armed Forces in Syria, which "allows it to carry out its activities in full." The term of the agreement and protocol is 49 years from the date of signing, with the possibility of subsequent extension for 25-year periods. The annual costs for the implementation of the protocol amount to about 20 million rubles at the expense of the Russian Ministry of Defense, provided for in the federal budget of the Russian Federation.
