What is Russia's early warning system.

Russian early warning system - Russian missile attack warning system. Its main task is to detect a missile attack at the time of launch and transmit data about the attack to the missile defense system. Using the information received from the early warning system about the scale and source of the attack, defense systems calculate options for response. The early warning system consists of ground-based radar stations with a detection range of 6,000 km and a group of orbiting satellites capable of detecting the launch of intercontinental missiles from anywhere on the planet.

The development of early warning systems in Russia began in the middle of the twentieth century, at the height of the Cold War between America and the Soviet Union. The surge of scientific developments in the field of nuclear weapons led to the emergence of intercontinental ballistic missiles, and, as a result, the question arose of effective countermeasures in the field of air defense. In 1954, work began on the creation of an early warning radar station.

The first early warning radars were deployed at the end of the 60s along the perimeter of the border of the Soviet Union. Their task was to detect launched missiles and their warheads, as well as calculate the coordinates of the location of missiles in real time with maximum accuracy, determine the area of ​​impact and predict the expected extent of destruction. After successful tests, a unified missile attack warning system was created, combining individual radar stations, nodes, complexes and command and control posts located on the territory of the USSR.

Along with this, work was underway on a program to create a space component of early warning systems. In 1961, a project for a space surveillance system was submitted for consideration, and in 1972, after a series of tests and improvements, a satellite equipped with infrared and television-type detection devices was launched into orbit.

Thus, in 1972, the system consisted of ground-based over-the-horizon and over-the-horizon radars and early warning space satellites, whose task was to register ballistic missile launches. The infrared sensors placed on the satellites were supposed to capture the radiation of the exhaust of the rocket engine during the passage of the active part of the trajectory. Over-the-horizon radars located on the territory of the USSR could register a missile launch signal in the USA, receiving the reflection of this signal through the ionosphere. Over-the-horizon radars detected missile warheads during the passage of later sections of the ballistic trajectory.

The development of early warning systems took place until the beginning of the 90s. To the existing Dnestr-M, Dnepr and Danube radars, the Volga stations and the new Daryal radar (with a phased antenna array) were added. In the mid-1980s, space satellites of the PRN system were upgraded as part of the program for placing spacecraft in geosynchronous orbits. The new satellites could recognize rocket launches against the background of clouds or the surface of the earth. As a result, the early warning sector covered the waters of the North and Norwegian Seas, the Pacific and Indian Oceans, the North Atlantic, and also covered the territories of the United States and Europe.

After the collapse of the USSR, work on some projects was suspended, which led to delays in their implementation. Despite this, the SPRN, inherited by Russia from the Soviet Union, did not suffer any special losses and did not lose its defensive power. At the beginning of 2012, the SPNR of Russia included 9 separate radio engineering nodes (5 of them are located on the territory of Russia) and 4 spacecraft placed in highly elliptical orbits. The development of missile defense systems of the Russian Federation, after the collapse of the USSR, stopped a little due to the active intervention of the United States and NATO. In addition, control over a number of radar stations on the territory of the former Soviet Union countries was lost. Work on the restoration and development of new radar stations was suspended, but then the signed treaty on limiting missile defense systems in 1972 was violated by the United States (in 2001) and this finally marked the position of the States. If before that there was no need for the development of early warning systems, even more - this would to some extent contradict the terms of the agreement and the introduction of the radar station on combat duty could be interpreted ambiguously, then in the conditions of US activity, the restoration of all radar stations and the creation of new ones is a justified step.

WITH The state of the satellite component of the missile attack warning system (EWS) does not inspire optimism. However, a few days ago, a message flashed in the news: the early warning system is in order and the country is protected from attack from any direction. But what does the word "protected" mean if Russia does not have a global missile defense system? There is only an outdated missile defense system in Moscow, which will not be able to fend off a massive attack, although with a certain probability it will save the capital from one or two warheads (warheads). However, what mad nation would dare to strike with such forces? The United States today also does not have a reliable missile defense system, although technologically they are capable of shooting down warheads somewhere over Arctic Canada (figuratively speaking, this is more difficult than hitting a bullet with a bullet) .

There is only one defense against a nuclear attack on Russia: the threat of retaliation. A grim strategy of assured, mutual destruction, born in the era of the Great Confrontation. The state of our nuclear forces is described in the article. In the process of “getting up from their knees”, they suffered significantly, but, apparently, they are still capable of destroying the United States. The problem is, will we have time to respond if America decides to launch a disarming strike? During such an attack, it should be noted that millions of people will die from radioactive fallout, even if only nuclear infrastructure facilities are chosen as targets.

The missile, launched from the United States, will reach its target in Russia in 27-30 minutes. The ability to strike back before the silos are disabled and missile submarines are destroyed at piers or sunk by hunter submarines at sea depends critically on how quickly and reliably the fact of a nuclear attack on Russia can be established. It is highly desirable to detect missile launches in order to have the maximum margin of time. And this can only be done with the help of the early warning satellite constellation.

According to data from various sources, against 16 American early warning satellites, Russia today has only 2! The article below talks about three satellites, but one of them, apparently, has already stopped working.http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1827540.html. It remains to rely only on ground-based early warning radars. Consequently, for most of the day, the early warning system does not see the territory of the United States and almost the entire water area of ​​the World Ocean. This means that in the event of a nuclear attack, Russia would have less than 15 minutes to assess the situation and make a decision. This is too little!

Question: how did we get to this point? What did the government do in the "fat 2000s", swimming in petrodollars? Preparing for the Olympics in Sochi? Now the Defense Ministry is cheerfully reporting on plans to restore the early warning satellite constellation. Let's hope they make it.

Dmitry Zotiev

The author of the following article is Fedor Chemerev, published on the websitehttp://gazeta.eot.su/article/kosmicheskiy-eshelon-sprn.

The last spacecraft of the Russian missile attack warning system (SPRN) was launched on March 30, 2012. Shortly before this, the circumstances of its creation were discussed at the forum of the Novosti Kosmonavtiki magazine. The result of the discussion was the words of one of its participants:“Regarding this car, I would ask you not to flatter yourself, and not to mock” . Bitter as it may seem, but these words can be fully applied to the entire space industry and, undoubtedly, to the space echelon of early warning systems. And this is extremely worrisome.

By the mid-2000s, the first signs of another round of space militarization appeared. In February 2004, the US Air Force's U.S. Air Force Transformation Flight Plan-2004". Later, the main provisions of the report were reflected in the development of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, known as the "Unified Perspective 2010", which was further developed in the document "Unified Perspective 2020". It is stated that the main principle of the construction of the American armed forces is "all-encompassing domination." The US Army must be ready to conduct large-scale military operations, including in space, with the most decisive goals.

An important place in the plans for the development of technical means related to military space is given to the space echelon of early warning systems of a new generation.

From the early 1970s to the present, the United States has been in service with the IMEWS (Integrated Missile Early Warning Satellite) system with spacecraft (SC) in geostationary orbits (GSO). The task of the system is, together with ground-based radars, to detect launches of Soviet and Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) at the launch site.

Currently, nine IMEWS satellites are located over the Pacific, Atlantic, Indian Oceans and the European zone, the coverage areas of which cover the entire band along the equator. All of them are equipped with infrared radiation receivers, with the help of which missile launches are detected. The last satellite of this constellation was launched in December 2007.

The more modern SBIRS ("Space-Based Infrared System") is designed to replace the IMEWS system. This is an integrated system, which includes four geostationary satellites (GEO), two vehicles in highly elliptical orbits (HEO) and ground points for collecting and processing data and constellation control. As part of this system, it is planned to have up to 24 low-orbit Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) satellites. All SBIRS spacecraft are equipped with infrared radiation receivers.

STSS low-orbit satellites are designed to detect strategic, tactical and operational-tactical missiles and support military formations and individual units. Their task is to escort a rocket detected by high-orbit satellites SBIRS or IMEWS. The objects of detection and further tracking may be warheads and other missile fragments after they have been separated. In the future, STSS satellites will be equipped with laser radars to measure the range and determine the target state vector.

As of March 2013, the combined SBIRS-STSS constellation is represented by seven satellites: GEO-1 (USA-230, 2011), GEO-2 (USA-241, 2013), HEO-1 (USA-184, 2006), HEO- 2 (USA-200, 2008), STSS-ATRR (USA-205, 2009), STSS Demo 1 (USA-208, 2009) and STSS Demo 2 (USA-209, 2009).

What is the situation with the Russian SPRN space group? According to the Internet resource "Strategic Nuclear Weapons of Russia", as of November 2013, our early warning system included two satellites of the 74D6 type in highly elliptical orbits (VEO) - Kosmos-2422 and Kosmos-2446 (US-KS system) and one in geostationary orbit - Cosmos-2479 (type 71X6, US-KMO system). These are the last satellites manufactured at NPO. Lavochkin. Since the beginning of the 1990s, funding for work on the US-KS system has practically ceased, and by 1995, on the US-KMO system as well. The assembly of vehicles to maintain the orbital group was made from parts and assemblies left over from the Soviet era. To date, these backlogs have been exhausted.

Total - sixteen against three! Such is the quantitative ratio of the forces of the United States and Russia in the space segment of early warning systems. What about quality? What can we oppose to "all-encompassing domination"?

It is believed that a new word in the fate of the space echelon of the early warning system of Russia should be said by the project of the Unified Space System (UNS). The lead developer of the system is JSC “Corporation “Kometa”. This enterprise specializes in the creation of command posts, global information and control systems for various purposes, the development, production and operation of hardware and software for ground and aerospace control, monitoring and telecommunications systems.

Kometa has been the lead developer of the US-K, US-KS (Oko), US-KMO (Oko-1) systems since Soviet times. The lead developer of spacecraft for these systems was NPO im. Lavochkin. The All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Television (VNIIT) developed on-board television-type detection equipment, and the State Optical Institute. Vavilov (GOI) - equipment of a heat direction finding type.

In NPO them. Lavochkin always insisted on the concept laid down in the US-K system. It provided for the presence of only four satellites in highly elliptical orbits (HEO), located so that the observation areas of individual devices in the aggregate would cover all missile hazardous regions (ROR). In addition, each satellite must observe from the upper part of the orbit for 6 hours. The movement of the satellites was synchronized in such a way that at any time any point of the ROP was under observation, and the satellites also insured each other. For this purpose, an apparatus was created with a three-axis orientation system and with the ability to control along all three axes. Its delivery into orbit could be carried out by the light Molniya-M rocket, which is three times cheaper than launching it into the GEO using the heavy Proton-K rocket. Brilliant technical solution! Wasn't it the prototype for the HEO satellites of the new American SBIRS system?

However, due to problems with the detection equipment (they were eliminated only in 1984), the US-K had to be abandoned - in favor of the US-KS system with eight satellites on the HEO and one insurer on the GSO. The obvious shortcomings of the US-KS, in fact, a temporary system, caused distrust on the part of a number of Kometa specialists in the very idea of ​​using highly elliptical spacecraft. Moreover, they were not used in the American IMEWS.

Perhaps these disagreements played a role in the fact that the long-time partner of "Kometa" - NPO im. Lavochkin - outside the CEN project. But there is another explanation as well. Comet needed partners with money. And those who, by the time the tender for the development of spacecraft was held, already had sources of funding other than state ones, could have them. At NPO them. Lavochkin was not there. And they were, for example, at the GKNPTs them. Khrunichev - from commercial launches - until the supply of Protons runs out. RSC Energia, a participant in international projects with the Mir and ISS orbital stations, also had good prospects.

But could it be otherwise in the conditions of very modest funding for protracted space programs? Gazprom probably proceeded from the same logic by ordering Energia satellites of the Yamal series. And, thus, financed the development of a new direction for Energia - unmanned spacecraft of a modern type. And this intellectual and technological backlog is no less valuable than Gazprom's finances.

One way or another, today it is Energia that is the lead developer of the EKS spacecraft. The spacecraft, apparently, is being built on the basis of the Yamal universal non-hermetic platform that meets the requirements of modularity, in which the control, power supply, and thermal control systems are concentrated. The platform has been comprehensively worked out - the Yamals have been operating for more than 9 years.

According to experts, writes Gazeta.Ru, the EKS will be able to detect launches not only of ICBMs, ballistic missiles of submarines, but also operational-tactical and tactical missiles, as well as service the military communications system. Energia has the resources necessary to create a spacecraft. But how long will it take?

Unfortunately, media reports that mention CEN are not encouraging yet. Until recently, Energia had problems with the military. In November 2011, Kommersant.ru reported that the subject of proceedings in the Moscow Arbitration Court was the failure to complete work on the EKS. And this is after their transfer from June 2008 to May 2010!

From the publication in Krasnaya Zvezda dated February 3, 2014, it follows that the construction of the assembly and test building for the EKS spacecraft (it is run by Spetsstroy of Russia) is unlikely to be completed before the end of the year. The report of Interfax.ru (September 3, 2013) that the head of one of the departments of Spetsstroy, Alexander Belov, was charged with embezzling a large amount of money as part of the GLONASS program is alarming. The leadership of Roskosmos is being reshuffled, and there is talk of reorganizing the rocket and space industry.

It is reported that three-quarters of the electronics in Russian spacecraft are imported. Can't there be dangerous "special bookmarks" in it? In addition, at any time, the manufacturer of a microcircuit or processor can stop producing them - and our hardware developers and programmers will find themselves in a very difficult situation.

All this contributes little to productive, rhythmic work. And time goes by. Will the creators of the CEN at least have time to begin the first flight design tests before the last Lavochka satellites “fall in”?

The situation is reminiscent of the beginning of 1999. By that time, the orbital constellation had also “melted away”. However, then the other segments of the early warning system did not inspire optimism. Now the situation is better, the hopes of the military leadership are connected with over-the-horizon radar stations - work on their construction and putting on experimental combat duty is going according to plan.

But it is important to understand that the absence of a space-based early warning system, which means the presence of "holes" in the warning system, can devalue the entire Russian nuclear missile shield - our deterrent weapon. In addition, the unreliability of Russia's early warning system is a powerful argument for the information-psychological war against us.

After the incident with the Korean Boeing-747, shot down by a Soviet fighter in September 1983, the USSR was accused of exceeding the required level of defense and almost of cannibalism. “Burned with milk”, in May 1987, the air defense forces allowed the sports plane of 18-year-old Mathias Rust to land on Red Square. And they became the subject of ridicule from the "world community" and some compatriots. As a result, the command staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR has undergone significant changes. And then there was August 1991...

By the beginning of 1995, the orbital constellation of the early warning system of Russia consisted of 11 satellites. And still, a mistake occurred - when on January 25, 1995, the Norwegian-American, as they later said, research four-stage Black Brant XII rocket was launched, the Russian early warning system qualified it as a nuclear missile attack. It came to the "nuclear briefcase". The world has gone through some unpleasant hours.

Three years later, on March 15 and 16, 1998, the Washington Post published two articles by D. Hoffman under the unifying title "Shattered Shield" ("Leaky Shield") - about the degradation of the Russian missile defense system.

A year later, the Rossiyskiye Vesti newspaper launched a discussion about Russian missile defense. During the discussion, T. Postol, an expert from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, said: “There are many Russian military installations that can be hit from Alaska, and these installations will be destroyed, and the Russian military will not even know that there was a missile attack ... The situation is very risky, because it can initiate a decision by Russia to immediately retaliate, which will be based on unreliable information.”

So, step by step, the dominant opinion in Russian expert circles was the lack of confidence that Russia would be able to repulse the aggressor in time and reliably. Isn't that why the discussion about Russian missile defense was started?

Now our relations with the US have not improved at all. In this situation, gaps in the space echelon of the early warning system may become another reason for putting pressure on the Russian elites (they say that the statements of the Russian authorities about the power of the nuclear missile shield are a bluff, Russia will not be able to prevent a missile attack). And if the opinion that our shield is rusted and good for nothing really prevails in the elite and society, then the situation may worsen catastrophically.

There is another year, maybe two. I would like to believe that the creators of the early warning system will have time. In these minutes, only three "Lavochkin" satellites protect the borders of the Fatherland. We wish them success in their difficult service. And to all the creators of early warning systems, especially those in whose hands the fate of spacecraft is in their hands - responsibility to the country and people they are called upon to protect.

Fedor Chemerev

(KV, as part of the Aerospace Forces). The competence of the HF includes tracking the launches of ballistic missiles and warning the highest levels of command and control of the RF Armed Forces about a missile attack; protection of important infrastructure facilities and troops of the country from enemy aerospace attacks.

HF monitor space objects, identify threats to Russia in space and, if necessary, respond to them. This branch of the military is also involved in launching spacecraft into orbit and managing military and dual-use satellite systems. HF facilities are located throughout Russia, in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan.

The most important factor in ensuring Russia's national security is obtaining prompt and reliable information about ballistic missile launches. For more than 40 years, the national missile attack warning system has been successfully coping with this task.

The SPRN includes two echelons. The first (space) consists of a group of spacecraft designed to detect ballistic missile launches anywhere on the planet in real time. The second (ground) echelon includes a network of ground-based radars that detect missiles in flight at a range of up to 6,000 km. The early warning system is in service with the Main Missile Attack Warning Center, which is part of the KV VKS.

The ground echelon (in addition to the Don-2N radar) includes the Dnepr and Daryal stations, as well as the high factory readiness (VZG) radar of the Voronezh type, which should replace them. In accordance with the state armament program until 2020, it is planned to complete the re-equipment of early warning systems.

Colonel General Alexander Golovko, Commander of the Space Forces, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Aerospace Forces, said that during 2017, more than 50 launches of foreign and domestic ballistic missiles and space missiles were detected by the on-duty early warning systems, specialized means of space control systems and anti-missile defense.

"Tundra" instead of "Oko"

At the end of 2015, the newest rocket launch warning system satellite EKS-1 (Kosmos-2510) was launched into orbit, which operates in the Unified Space System (UNS) Tundra. It is being created as part of the development and improvement of the missile attack warning system.

The creation of the CEN is one of the key directions in the development of forces and means of nuclear deterrence in the Russian Federation. As a result, we will be able to detect launches of various types of ballistic missiles, including launches of prototypes from the waters of the World Ocean and from the territories of countries conducting tests

Sergei Shoigu

Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation

The EKS should replace the space echelon, which was based on satellites of the Oko-1 system. The last such device, according to open data, failed in 2014. The Oko system began to be created in Russia in 1991. In total, eight satellites manufactured by NPO named after Lavochkin were launched into orbit.

The EKS will include new generation spacecraft, as well as modernized command posts that provide control of the orbital constellation, receive and process special information in automatic mode.

"TASS/Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation"

As a source in the military-industrial complex told TASS: "Starting from 2018, two spacecraft will be launched annually. Launches will be carried out using Soyuz-2 launch vehicles from the Plesetsk cosmodrome."

The second EKS-2 satellite was launched on May 25 of this year using a Soyuz-2.1b carrier rocket from the Plesetsk cosmodrome by combat crews of the Russian Aerospace Forces. After the launch, he was assigned the serial number "Cosmos-2518".

With the launch of all vehicles into orbit, the space echelon of the early warning system will grow to ten satellites by 2022 and will be able to detect ballistic missile launches from any region of the world immediately after their launch. In addition, more than 10 new laser-optical and radio-technical systems for recognizing space objects will be deployed on the territory of the Russian Federation until 2020. The first such complex is already successfully performing tasks in the experimental combat duty mode on the territory of the Altai Territory.

With the aim of re-equipping formations and military units of KV with promising models of weapons, about 50 development and research works are currently underway to create systems and complexes of a new generation in the coming years.

Alexander Golovko

Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Aerospace Forces, Colonel General

As of March 30, 2017, during the entire period of combat duty, more than 1.5 thousand launches of foreign and domestic ballistic missiles and space missiles were detected by early warning systems.

"Voronezh"

Radars are deployed in the Leningrad, Kaliningrad, Irkutsk regions and the Krasnodar Territory. Three more stations will be put on combat duty in the Krasnoyarsk and Altai Territories and the Orenburg Region. By the end of 2019, work will be completed on the deployment of a radar station for a missile attack warning system near Murmansk and Vorkuta.

Stations of this type operate in two main ranges: decimeter and meter. The range reaches 6 thousand km. The radar is capable of detecting ballistic, space and aerodynamic objects. It can simultaneously control up to 500 such objects.

The first station of this type was deployed in the village of Lekhtusi near St. Petersburg in 2008. As a result, the military has the opportunity to see everything that is happening in the air and space from the coast of Morocco to Svalbard, and in range - to the east coast of the United States.

According to the Izvestiya newspaper, the Russian Defense Ministry is deploying a Voronezh-VP radar group capable of detecting cruise missiles at a range of several thousand kilometers. These radars are being created on the basis of the already deployed Voronezh missile attack warning stations. The main feature is that they work in the centimeter range. The first such multifunctional radar has already been deployed near Irkutsk.

By the end of this year, a new-generation VZG Voronezh-DM station in the Krasnoyarsk Territory will take up combat duty. This radar, capable of reliably detecting ballistic and hypersonic targets at ranges up to 6,000 km, was put on experimental combat duty (OBD) at the end of last year. Since that time, the operation of the radar station has been jointly provided by officers on duty shifts of the KV VKS RF and industry representatives. After being transferred to the combat duty mode, the station will completely switch to the balance of the VKS. During the OBD, the station's crews recorded six launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles. The area of ​​responsibility is the northeastern part of the Pacific Ocean and the northern direction.

The Russian Ministry of Defense notes that the construction of a network of radar stations created using VZG technology is being carried out in order to improve the capabilities of early warning systems on the territory of the Russian Federation. These stations have higher technical and tactical characteristics. The creation of a network of new high-tech VZG radars makes it possible in the shortest possible time to increase the capabilities of the domestic early warning system and ensure continuous radar control of all missile-hazardous directions from the territory of Russia.

Radar VZG "Voronezh-DM" has technical and tactical characteristics that compare favorably with the radars of the previous generation. In terms of the accuracy of measuring parameters, its capabilities are much higher, since this station operates in the decimeter range of radio waves. In addition, it has a much lower level of energy consumption and the volume of technological equipment.

In connection with the use of modern technological equipment in stations of a new generation, the process of servicing these radars has been significantly optimized, as a result of which the number of personnel involved in its daily maintenance is several times lower than on predecessor radars of the Dnepr, Volga and " Daryal".

The financial costs for the construction of the Voronezh-type radar station are immeasurably smaller amounts compared to the construction of stations of previous generations, which in modern realities is also one of the key advantages.

"Volga"

It is a ground-based stationary sector-type radar. It was put into operation in 2003. Operates in continuous duty mode.

It is intended for continuous monitoring of outer space in the western direction in order to detect enemy ballistic missiles on trajectory sections and artificial Earth satellites in a given sector, as well as to issue information about them in automatic mode to notified control points.

The decision to build it was made back in 1984: it was supposed, first of all, to use the radar to detect American Pershing II missiles that threatened the USSR from the west. The station was located 50 km from the city of Baranovichi in Belarus. Even then, this made it possible to ensure the detection of ballistic missiles launched from the waters of the Eastern and Western Atlantic.

Now Volga not only performs its main task, but also monitors the near-Earth space, daily recording more than 1 thousand objects flying in space, which are identified by the results of measurements.

"Dnieper"

Refers to the first generation of Soviet over-the-horizon radars designed for control systems of outer space and early warning of a missile attack. They were the main Soviet early warning tool until the late 1980s. In the 90s, it was planned to replace them with more advanced Daryals, but due to the collapse of the USSR, only two stations of a new type were put into operation.

The Dnepr-type radar, put into operation in 1979, is capable of detecting ballistic missiles at a distance of 1,900 km and monitoring outer space over Central and Southern Europe, as well as the Mediterranean.

Back in 2014, KV Commander Alexander Golovko (then serving as commander of the Aerospace Defense Forces) reported that the Dnepr station near Sevastopol was planned to be modernized and put on combat duty in 2016. However, in May 2016, the general director of the RTI Concern, Sergei Boev, told TASS that the final decision on the restoration of the radar station near Sevastopol had not yet been made. According to the interlocutor of the publication, in the Crimea they can build a station from scratch, which the military insists on, or modernize the existing Dnepr. "The issue has not been finally resolved, but we are familiar with this situation. When there is a decision from the main customer, we will do it all on time," Boev said.

"Daryal"

Put into operation in 1983. Operates in continuous duty mode. Refers to the second generation of Soviet radars for over-the-horizon detection of ballistic missile launches.

The need for the appearance of stations of this type appeared at the height of the Cold War. In 1972, a project was developed in Moscow and the construction of seven new radar stations began, but only four were put into operation. Now one of them is located near the city of Pechora, about 200 km from the Arctic Circle.

Under its control is Canada, most of the United States, Western Europe. Its locators are able to catch any object at a distance of 6 thousand km, whether it be a satellite or space debris.

At the heart of the radar "Daryal" ("Pechora" - Pechora, according to NATO classification) is a huge complex of equipment, consisting of more than 4 thousand units of electronic radio equipment. The high-rise buildings of the receiving (100 m) and transmitting (40 m) antennas are separated by a certain distance, adjusted to the millimeter. The power and water consumption of the station were equivalent to the needs of an average city - with a population of 100 thousand people.

Until the end of 2012, the Gabala radar station was operated. In 2013, it was transferred to Azerbaijan, the equipment was dismantled and taken to the Russian Federation. It was replaced by the Voronezh-DM station in Armavir.

In 2011, it became known that the radars of the Daryal and Dnepr types had already exhausted their calculated technical resources and they were being replaced by a new generation of radars of the Voronezh family, which are built in a year and a half (instead of five to ten years) and consume much less energy. The new station consists of only 23-30 units of technical equipment, while Daryal consists of 4070.

"Don-2N"

Stationary multifunctional centimeter-range all-round radar, created as part of the tasks of the Moscow missile defense system. It can detect an object as small as 5 cm at a distance of up to 2,000 km.

The detection range of the warhead of an intercontinental ballistic missile is 3.7 thousand km, and the target detection height is 40 thousand km.

The Don-2N station is the central and most complex element of the Moscow missile defense system. Its tasks include the detection of ballistic targets and their tracking, the measurement of coordinates and the guidance of anti-missiles on them. The radar is integrated into a unified system of additional information support for missile attack warning and space control systems.

The radar is a four-sided truncated pyramid up to 35 m high. The operation is provided by a computer complex with a capacity of up to a billion operations per second, built on the basis of four Elbrus-2 supercomputers.

The only operating station of this type is located in Sofrino near Moscow.

Roman Azanov