Sociological ideas of M. Weber

One of the central points of Weber's theory is the allocation of an elementary particle of the individual's behavior in society - social action, which is the cause and effect of a system of complex relationships between people. “Social action”, according to Weber, is an ideal type, where “action” is the action of a person who associates subjective meaning (rationality) with him, and “social” is an action that, according to the meaning assumed by its subject, correlates with the action of other persons and is oriented on them. The scientist distinguishes four types of social action:

§ purposeful rational- the use of certain expected behavior of other people to achieve goals;

§ value-rational - understanding of behavior, action as actually value-significant, based on the norms of morality, religion;

§ affective - especially emotional, sensual;

§ traditional- based on the force of habit, the accepted norm. In a strict sense, affective and traditional actions are not social.

Society itself, according to Weber, is a collection of acting individuals, each of which seeks to achieve its own goals. Meaningful behavior resulting in the achievement of individual goals leads to the fact that a person acts as a social being, in association with others, thus ensuring significant progress in interaction with the environment.

Scheme 1. Types of social action according to M. Weber

Weber deliberately arranged the four types of social action he described in order of increasing rationality. This order, on the one hand, serves as a kind of methodological device for explaining the different nature of the subjective motivation of an individual or group, without which it is generally impossible to talk about action oriented towards others; he calls motivation "expectation", without it the action cannot be considered as social. On the other hand, and Weber was convinced of this, the rationalization of social action is at the same time a tendency of the historical process. And although this process is not without difficulties, all sorts of obstacles and deviations, the European history of the last centuries. the involvement of other, non-European civilizations on the path of industrialization is evidenced, according to Weber. that rationalization is a world-historical process. "One of the essential components of the 'rationalization' of action is the replacement of an internal adherence to habitual mores and customs by a planned adaptation to considerations of interest."

Rationalization, also according to Weber, is a form of development, or social progress, which is carried out within a certain picture of the world, which are different in history.

Weber distinguishes three most general types, three ways of relating to the world, which contain the corresponding attitudes or vectors (orientations) of people's life, their social action.

The first of them is associated with Confucianism and Taoist religious and philosophical views that have become widespread in China; the second - with Hindu and Buddhist, common in India; the third - with Judaic and Christian, which arose in the Middle East and spread in Europe and America. Weber defines the first type as adaptation to the world, the second - as an escape from the world, the third - as mastery of the world. These different types of attitude and way of life set the direction for subsequent rationalization, that is, different ways of moving along the path of social progress.

A very important aspect in Weber's work is the study of basic relations in social associations. First of all, this concerns the analysis of power relations, as well as the nature and structure of organizations, where these relations are manifested most clearly.

From the application of the concept of "social action" to the political sphere, Weber deduces three pure types of legitimate (recognized) domination:

§ legal, - in which both the ruled and the rulers are subject not to any person, but to the law;

§ traditional- due primarily to the habits and customs of a given society;

§ charismatic- based on the extraordinary abilities of the leader's personality.

Sociology, according to Weber, should be based on scientific judgments, as free as possible from all sorts of personal predilections of the scientist, from political, economic, ideological influences.

In order to enter into social relationships with each other, individuals must first of all act. It is from the specific actions and deeds of specific people that the history of society is formed.

Empirically, it seems that any human behavior is ϶ᴛᴏ and is an action: a person acts when he does something. In reality, ϶ᴛᴏ is not so, and many behaviors will not be actions. For example, when we run from danger in a panic, not understanding the road, we do not act. Here we are talking simply about behavior under the influence of affect.

Action- ϶ᴛᴏ active behavior of people based on rational goal setting and aimed at changing objects in order to preserve or change their state.

Since the action is purposeful-rational, it differs from non-purposeful behavior in that a person clearly understands what and why he is doing. Affective reactions, panic, the behavior of an aggressive crowd cannot be called actions. In the mind of a person acting clearly, the goal and means of achieving it are distinguished. Of course, in practice, it is far from always that a person immediately clearly and accurately defines the goal and correctly chooses the means to achieve it. Many actions are complex in nature and consist of elements with varying degrees of rationality.
For example, many familiar labor operations are so familiar to us due to repeated repetition that we can perform them almost automatically. Who hasn't seen women knitting and talking or watching TV at the same time? Even at the level of making responsible decisions, much is done out of habit, by analogy. It should be noted that each person has skills that he has not thought about for a long time, although during the period of learning he had a good idea of ​​their expediency and meaning.

Not every action will be social. M. Weber defines social action as follows: "Social action ... correlates in its sense with the behavior of other subjects and is focused on it." In other words, an action becomes social when, in its goal-setting, it affects other people or is conditioned by their existence and behavior. With ϶ᴛᴏm, it does not matter whether this particular action brings benefit or harm to other people, whether others know that we have performed this or that action, whether the action is successful or not (an unsuccessful, failed action can also be social) In the concept of M. Weber Sociology acts as a study of actions oriented towards the behavior of others. For example, seeing the muzzle of a gun aimed at himself and the aggressive expression on the face of the person who took aim, any person understands the meaning of his actions and the impending danger due to the fact that mentally, as it were, puts himself in his place. We use the analogy with ourselves in order to understand goals and motives.

Subject of social action denoted by the term "social actor". In the paradigm of functionalism, social actors are understood as individuals who perform social roles. In the theory of actionalism by A. Touraine, actors are ϶ᴛᴏ social groups that direct the course of events in society in ϲᴏᴏᴛʙᴇᴛϲᴛʙ and with ϲʙᴏ their interests. It is worth noting that they have an impact on social reality, developing a strategy for their actions. The strategy is to choose the goals and means to achieve them. Social strategies can be individual or come from social organizations or movements. The sphere of application of the strategy is any sphere of society.

In reality, the actions of a social actor are never wholly nor the result of the manipulation of external social

by the forces of his conscious will, neither a product of the situation, nor an absolutely free choice. Social action is the result of a complex interplay of social and individual factors. A social actor always acts within a specific situation with a limited set of possibilities and therefore cannot be absolutely free. But since his actions according to its structure will be a project, i.e. planning means in relation to a goal that has not yet been realized, then they have a probabilistic, random character. The actor can abandon the goal or reorient to another, albeit within the framework of this situation.

The structure of social action necessarily contains the following elements:

• actor
• the need of the actor, which is the direct motive of the action;
• action strategy (a conscious goal and means to achieve it);
• an individual or a social group, on which the action is oriented;
• end result (success or failure)

T. Parsons called the totality of elements of social action his system of coordinates.

The Understanding Sociology of Max Weber

For creativity Max Weber(1864-1920), a German economist, historian and outstanding sociologist, are characterized primarily by deep penetration into the subject of research, the search for initial, basic elements, with the help of which one could come to an understanding of the laws of social development.

Weber's means of generalizing the diversity of empirical reality is the concept of "ideal type". The "ideal type" is not simply extracted from empirical reality, but is constructed as a theoretical model, and only then correlated with empirical reality. For example, the concepts of "economic exchange", "capitalism", "craft", etc., are exclusively ideal-typical constructions used as a means of depicting historical formations.

Unlike history, where specific events localized in space and time are explained causally (causal-genetic types), the task of sociology is to establish general rules for the development of events, regardless of the spatio-temporal definition of these events. As a result, we get pure (general) ideal types.

Sociology, according to Weber, must be "understanding" - since the actions of the individual, the "subject" of social relations, will be meaningful. And meaningful (intended) actions, relationships contribute to the understanding (anticipation) of their consequences.

Types of social action according to M. Weber

It is important to note that one of the central points of Weber's theory is the allocation of an elementary particle of the individual's behavior in society - social action, which will be the cause and effect of a system of complex relationships between people. “Social action”, according to Weber, is an ideal type, where “action” is the action of a person who associates subjective meaning (rationality) with it, and “social” is an action that, according to the meaning assumed by its subject, correlates with the action of other persons and focuses on them. The scientist distinguishes four types of social action:

• purposeful rational- the use of certain expected behavior of other people to achieve goals;
• value-rational - understanding of behavior, action as actually value-significant, based on the norms of morality, religion;
• affective - especially emotional, sensual;
• traditional- based on the force of habit, the accepted norm. In a strict sense, affective and traditional action will not be social.

Society itself, according to the teachings of Weber, is a collection of acting individuals, each of whom strives to achieve their own goals.
It is worth noting that meaningful behavior, as a result of which individual goals are achieved, leads to the fact that a person acts as a social being, in association with others, thus ensuring significant progress in interaction with the environment.

Scheme 1. Types of social action according to M. Weber

Weber deliberately arranged the four types of social action he described in order of increasing rationality. Material published on http: // site
This order, on the one hand, serves as a kind of methodical device for explaining the different nature of the subjective motivation of an individual or group, without which it is generally impossible to speak of an action oriented towards others; he calls motivation "expectation", without it the action cannot be considered as social. On the other hand, and in ϶ᴛᴏm Weber was convinced that the rationalization of social action is at the same time a tendency of the historical process. And although this process does not proceed without difficulties, all sorts of obstacles and deviations, the European history of the last centuries. the involvement of other, non-European civilizations on the path of industrialization is evidenced, according to Weber. that rationalization is a world-historical process. "It is important to note that one of the essential components of the "rationalization" of action will be the replacement of internal adherence to habitual mores and customs by systematic adaptation to considerations of interest."

Rationalization, also according to Weber, is a form of development, or social progress, which is carried out within a certain picture of the world, which are different in history.

Weber distinguishes three most general types, three ways of relating to the world, which contain ϲᴏᴏᴛʙᴇᴛϲᴛʙ setting or vectors (directions) of people's life, their social action.

The first of them is associated with Confucianism and Taoist religious and philosophical views, which have become widespread in China; the second - with Hindu and Buddhist, widespread in India; the third - with Judaic and Christian, which arose in the Middle East and spread in Europe and America. Weber defines the first type as adaptation to the world, the second - as an escape from the world, the third - as the mastery of the world. These different types of attitude and way of life set the direction for subsequent rationalization, that is, different ways of moving along the path of social progress.

A very important aspect in Weber's work is the study of basic relations in social associations. First of all, ϶ᴛᴏ concerns the analysis of power relations, as well as the nature and structure of organizations, where these relations will be most pronounced.

From the application of the concept of "social action" to the political sphere, Weber deduces three pure types of legitimate (recognized) domination:

• legal, — in which both those who are ruled and those who manage are subject not to any person, but to the law;
• traditional- due primarily to the habits and customs of a given society;
• charismatic- based on the extraordinary abilities of the leader's personality.

Sociology, according to Weber, should be based on scientific judgments, as free as possible from all sorts of personal predilections of the scientist, from political, economic, ideological influences.

3. Social action theory

Weber identifies four types of activities, focusing on the possible real behavior of people in life:

purposeful,

value-rational,

affective,

traditional.

Let us turn to Weber himself: “Social action, like any action, can be defined:

purposefully rational, that is, through the expectation of a certain behavior of objects of the external world and other people and when using this expectation as “conditions” or as a “means” for rationally directed and regulated goals (the criterion of rationality is success);

value-rationally, that is, in a conscious belief in the ethical, aesthetic, religious, or any other understood unconditional own value (self-worth) of a certain behavior, taken simply as such and regardless of success;

affectively, especially emotionally - through actual affects and feelings;

traditionally, that is, through habit.

Ideal types of social actions

3.1 Purposeful rational behavior

In "Economy and Society" it is called differently: first "rational", later - "purposeful", which reveals two distinctive features:

1. It is “subjectively goal-oriented”, i.e. due, on the one hand, to a clearly conscious purpose of the action, which does not raise doubts about its implementation. On the other hand, it is a conscious idea that the action being carried out achieves the goal at the lowest cost.

2. This action is "right oriented". This assumes that in this case the assumption is used that the action of interest to us is consistent with its goal. It depends on the fact that the subject's ideas about this situation - let's call them conditionally "ontological" knowledge - were correct, as well as the ideas about what actions he can use to achieve the intended goal. We will conditionally call these representations “monological” knowledge. Schematically, goal-oriented action can be described using the following determinants:

1. A clear understanding of the goal is crucial here in the sense that undesirable consequences for other subjective goals that may arise in the process of its implementation are called into question. This action is carried out in a given situation with the least expensive means for its implementation.

2. Purposeful rational action can be defined indirectly, due to the existence of two special determinants:

a) through correct information about the uniqueness of the given situation and the causal relationship of various actions with the implementation of the goal pursued in this situation, i.e. through correct “ontological” or “nomological” knowledge;

b) due to the conscious calculation of the proportionality and consistency of the action taken on the basis of the information available. This involves the implementation of at least four operations:

1. Rational calculation of those actions that may be possible with a certain degree of probability. They can also be means to achieve the goal.

2. A conscious calculation of the consequences of actions that can act as means, and this involves paying attention to those costs and undesirable consequences that may arise due to the frustration of other goals.

3. Rational calculation of the desired consequences of any action, which is also considered as a means. Consideration should be given to whether it is acceptable in the face of undesirable consequences.

4. Careful comparison of these actions, considering which of them lead to the goal at the lowest cost.

This model should be applied when explaining a particular action. At the same time, M. Weber outlines two fundamental classes of deviations from the model of goal-oriented action.

1. The actor proceeds from false information about the situation and about the options for action that can lead to the realization of the goal.

2. The actor shows a value-rational, affective or traditional action, which

a) is not determined through a clear awareness of the goal, casting doubt on the frustrations of other goals that arise in its implementation. They are characterized through goals that are directly implemented, without taking into account other goals.

b) Not determined by a rational calculation of the proportionality and consistency of the action relative to the situation, carried out on the basis of available information. Such actions are seen as a limitation of rationality - the further they deviate from it, the more they reveal irrational signs. Therefore, Weber identifies the non-rational with the irrational.

So, on the one hand, a value-rational action is based on a goal, the implementation of which does not take into account the consequences that need to be foreseen. On the one hand, this action is to a certain extent consistent and systematic. It follows from the establishment of those imperatives that are responsible for the choice of action alternatives.

Purpose-rationality, according to Weber, is only a methodological, and not an ontological attitude of a sociologist, it is a means of analyzing reality, and not a characteristic of this reality itself. Weber specifically emphasizes this point: “This method,” he writes, “of course, should be understood not as a rationalistic prejudice of sociology, but only as a methodological means, and, therefore, it should not be considered, for example, as a belief in the actual predominance of the rational principle over life. For it says absolutely nothing about the extent to which rational considerations determine the actual action in reality. Choosing goal-oriented action as a methodological basis, Weber thereby dissociates himself from those sociological theories that take social “totalities” as their initial reality, such as: “people”, “society”, “state”, “economy”, etc. d. In this regard, he sharply criticizes “organic sociology”, which considers an individual as part of a certain social organism, strongly objects to considering society according to a biological model: the concept of an organism as applied to society can only be a metamorphosis - nothing more.

The organicist approach to the study of society abstracts from the fact that man is a being acting consciously. The analogy between the individual and the cell of the body is possible only on the condition that the factor of consciousness is recognized as insignificant. Weber objects to this, putting forward a model of social action that accepts this factor as essential.

It is purposeful rational action that Weber serves as a model of social action, with which all other types of action are correlated. Weber lists them in this order: “The following types of action exist:

1) more or less approximately achieved correct type;

2) (subjectively) goal-oriented type;

3) action, more or less consciously and more or less uniquely goal-oriented rationally;

4) an action that is not goal-oriented, but understandable in its meaning;

5) an action, in its meaning more or less understandably motivated, but violated - more or less strongly - by the intrusion of incomprehensible elements, and, finally,

6) an action in which completely incomprehensible mental or physical facts are connected “with” a person or “in” a person by imperceptible transitions”

3.2 Value-rational behavior

This ideal type of social action involves the performance of such actions, which are based on the belief in the self-sufficient value of the act as such, in other words, here the action itself acts as the goal. Value-rational action, according to Weber, is always subject to certain requirements, in following which the individual sees his duty. If he acts in accordance with these requirements - even if rational calculation predicts a greater likelihood of adverse consequences for him personally - then we are dealing with value-rational action. A classic example of value-rational action: the captain of a sinking ship is the last to leave, even though his life is in danger. The awareness of such an orientation of actions, their correlation with certain ideas about values ​​- about duty, dignity, beauty, morality, etc. - already speaks of a certain rationality, meaningfulness. If, moreover, we are dealing with consistency in the implementation of such behavior, and therefore with premeditation, then we can talk about an even greater degree of its rationality, which distinguishes a value-rational action, say, from an affective one. At the same time, in comparison with the goal-rational type, the “value rationality” of an action carries something irrational, since it absolutizes the value that the individual is guided by.

“Purely value-rational,” Weber writes, “one acts who, regardless of the foreseeable consequences, acts in accordance with his convictions and does what, as it seems to him, duty, dignity, beauty, religious prescription require of him, reverence or importance of some ... "case." Value-rational action ... is always an action in accordance with the commandments or requirements that the actor considers presented to himself. In the case of a value-rational action, the purpose of the action and the action itself coincide, they are not dissected, just as in the case of an affective action; side effects, both in the first and in the second, are not taken into consideration.

It seems that the difference between goal-oriented and value-rational types of social action is approximately the same as between truth And true. The first of these concepts means "that which There is in fact, "regardless of the system of ideas, beliefs, beliefs that have developed in a particular society. It is really not easy to obtain this kind of knowledge, you can simply approach it consistently, step by step, in the way that the positivist Comte suggests doing. The second means comparing what you observe or intend to do with the norms generally accepted in this society and ideas about what is proper and right.

3.3 Affective behavior

Affect- this is emotional excitement, which develops into passion, a strong spiritual impulse. The affect comes from within, under its influence a person acts unconsciously. Being a short-term emotional state, affective behavior is not oriented towards the behavior of others or the conscious choice of a goal. The state of confusion before an unexpected event, elation and enthusiasm, irritation with others, depression and melancholy - all these are affective forms of behavior.

Due to the fact that this action is based on a goal, the implementation of which is not questioned with established undesirable consequences for other goals. But this goal is not long-term, as in the value-rational action, it is short-term and not stable. An affective action also has a quality that is not subjective-rational, i.e. it is not connected with rational calculation of possible alternatives of action and selection of the best of them. This action signifies a feeling-driven devotion to a goal setting that fluctuates and changes according to the constellation of feelings and emotions. Understanding an affectively established goal in relation to other goals in terms of their compatibility, as well as their consequences, is unproductive here.

"The individual acts under the influence of passion if he seeks immediately to satisfy his need for revenge, pleasure, devotion, blissful contemplation, or to relieve the tension of any other affects, no matter how base or refined they may be"

3.4 traditional behavior

It cannot even be called conscious, because it is based on a blunted reaction to habitual stimuli. It proceeds according to the once adopted scheme. Various taboos and prohibitions, norms and rules, customs and traditions act as irritants. They are passed down from generation to generation. Such, for example, is the custom of hospitality that exists among all peoples. It is followed automatically, by virtue of the habit of behaving one way and not another.

Traditional action is associated with rules of some order, the meaning and purpose of which is unknown. With this type of action, there is a goal, for the achievement of which a certain sequence of actions is necessary. In this case, this sequence is not calculated. In the traditional orientation, the scope for rational thinking narrows due to norms prescribing in a certain case specific goals and means for their implementation.

However, actions defined through a stable tradition are preceded by an incomplete processing of information about the existing situation, containing a kind of “usual charm”, to which they react with a traditional action, and actions that lead to the goal in this situation.

As Weber himself points out,

"...purely traditional action... is on the very frontier, and often even beyond, what can be called 'meaningfully' oriented action."

Strictly speaking, only the first two types of action are fully social, because they deal with conscious meaning. So, speaking about the early types of society, the sociologist notes that they were dominated by traditional and affective actions, and in an industrial society - purposeful and value-rational with a tendency to dominate the first.

The types of social action described by Weber are not just a methodological device convenient for explanation. Weber is convinced that the rationalization of rational action is a tendency of the historical process itself.

Four of these types of action are arranged by Weber in order of increasing rationality: if traditional and affective actions can be called subjective-irrational (objectively, they can turn out to be rational), then the value-rational action already contains a subjective-rational moment, since the actor consciously correlates his actions with a certain value as a goal; however, this type of action is only relatively rational, since, first of all, the value itself is accepted without further mediation and justification, and (as a result) the side effects of the act are not taken into account. The actual flowing behavior of an individual, says Weber, is usually oriented in accordance with two or more types of action: it has both goal-oriented, and value-rational, and affective, and traditional moments. True, in different types of societies, certain types of action may be predominant: in societies that Weber called "traditional", the traditional and affective types of orientation of action predominate, of course, two more rational types of action are not excluded. On the contrary, in an industrial society, goal-oriented action acquires the greatest importance, but all other types of orientation are present to a greater or lesser extent here as well.

Finally, Weber notes that the four ideal types do not exhaust the whole variety of types of orientation of human behavior, but since they can be considered the most characteristic, then for the practical work of a sociologist they are a fairly reliable tool.

The typology of the increase in the rationality of social action expressed, according to Weber, the objective trend of the historical process, which, despite many deviations, had a worldwide character. The increasing weight of purposeful rational action, which displaces the main types, leads to the rationalization of the economy, management, the very way of thinking and the way of life of a person. Universal rationalization is accompanied by an increase in the role of science, which, being the purest manifestation of rationality, becomes the basis of economics and management. Society is gradually transforming from traditional to modern, based on formal rationalism.

Conclusion

The ideas of Max Weber are very fashionable today for the modern sociological thought of the West. They are experiencing a kind of renaissance, rebirth. This indicates that Max Weber was an outstanding scientist. His social ideas, obviously, had a leading character, if they are so in demand today by Western sociology as a science of society and the laws of its development.

In Weber's understanding, human action acquires the character social action, if there are two moments in it: the subjective motivation of the individual and the orientation towards another person. Understanding motivation and relating it to the behavior of other people are the necessary points of sociological research. Weber also identified four possible types of real behavior of people in life: goal-oriented, holistically rational, affective and traditional.

Having thus defined the meaning of social action, Weber came to the conclusion that the main provision of rationality, which is reflected in Weber's contemporary capitalist society, with its rational management and rational political power.

In all studies, Weber held the idea of ​​rationality as a defining feature of modern European culture. Rationality opposes the traditional and charismatic ways of organizing social relations. Weber's central problem is the connection between the economic life of society, the material and ideological interests of various social groups and religious consciousness. Weber viewed personality as the basis of sociological analysis.

The study of Weber's works allows us to draw the necessary conclusion that a person's behavior depends entirely on his worldview, and the interest that each person has in a particular activity is due to the value system that a person is guided by.

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Max Weber (1864-1920) is today considered the pre-eminent classic of German sociology. This prominent German sociologist, together with his compatriot K. Marx and his contemporary E. Durkheim, is considered one of the three "pillars" of modern sociology.

Unlike his predecessors, he did not consider sociology to be a separate independent science. Weber advocated a "sociological perspective", derived from other sciences, mainly from historical political economy, inseparable from them, which should become a kind of conceptual and logical basis for the sciences of culture.

Weber's fame came with The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1904).

Weber's main focus in this and other works on economic ethics was directed to the study of the cultural significance of modern capitalism, that is, he was interested in capitalism not as an economic system or the result of the class interests of the bourgeoisie, but as an everyday practice, as a methodologically rational behavior.

Weber considered the rational organization of formally free labor in the enterprise to be the only sign of modern Western capitalism. The prerequisites for this were: rational law and rational management, as well as the internationalization of the principles of methodologically rational behavior within the framework of the practical behavior of people. Therefore, he understood modern capitalism as a culture firmly rooted in value ideas and motives for actions and in the entire life practice of people of his era.

Elsewhere, he emphasizes that capitalism in the most general sense exists when the satisfaction of economic demand is carried out by the entrepreneur. This is most rationally done on the basis of capital calculation. Typical of modern capitalism is its rationality, the reasons for which lie, on the one hand, in the social structure of Western societies with their economic classes, and, on the other hand, in the rationalization of law and administration.

For Weber, the rationalization of practical behavior is increasingly becoming the main feature of modern society and culture. Rationality becomes synonymous with the methodical order of the mode of action: expedient-rational action, therefore, is a typical action in modern society. Economic rationalization involves the ability and inclination of a person to rational action in practice. Weber understood capitalism as a socio-economic system that is rooted in the general actions of people, and not in the economic actions of individuals (entrepreneurs, politicians) or specific groups.

Economic practice as a feature of the cultural life of society also testifies to the influence of religion on its development and formation. Protestant ethics, especially its ascetic variety, has made a significant contribution to the cultural understanding of modern capitalism.

M. Weber is interested in the actions and behavior of individuals. He believed that social facts, including ideas, beliefs, opinions, beliefs, should in no case be "considered as things", because they are not things. Natural phenomena and social phenomena cannot be compared to each other. Society is not nature, but something else in essence.

Highly appreciating the contribution of K. Marx to the development of social theory, M. Weber considered the main drawback of the materialistic understanding of history to be causality - the explanation of all social processes by only one reason - the differences in the economic interests of different social groups.

The basis for the comprehension of social reality for M. Weber is the concept of “ideal type” introduced by him. Just as a natural scientist constructs an ideal (in the sense that it does not really exist) model, a sociologist needs to construct some theoretical constructions - ideal types of phenomena that could serve as a means of cognition. Such concepts reflect the typical features of social phenomena occurring in reality, but the ideal type itself does not exist in it. Examples are “society”, “economic exchange”, “craft”, “medieval city”, etc. In reality, there is not an abstract “society”, but a concrete one, which has specific sets of features inherent only to it, for example, modern Russian. The wide use of comparative historical data on the phenomenon under study, the features of its course in different periods of time, in different countries, makes it possible to single out the features necessary for constructing ideal types. Sociology, according to Weber, is called upon to study the general rules of events.

An important place in the sociology of M. Weber is occupied by the theory of social action. The only real fact of social life in an empirical sense is social action. Any society is a set of actions and interactions of its constituent people. But not every act is, according to M. Weber, an action. An act becomes an action only if it involves the subjective motivation of a person.

And the action becomes social only because it contains an orientation towards other people (expectations).

Sociology considers the behavior of the individual "only insofar as the individual puts a certain meaning into his actions ...". Weber proceeded from the fact that sociology should cognize the meanings that people put into their actions, in connection with which he called his method “understanding sociology”.

To understand social action means to correlate it with the values ​​and motives that gave rise to the action. Of course, we are talking about the typical motivation of human actions.

M. Weber's classification of types of social action is widely known. He identified four main ideal types, arranged according to the degree of their meaningfulness by the individual:

• - rational goals, which is based on the expectation of a certain behavior of the outside world and the use of this expectation as a means to achieve one's goals;
• - value - rational, based on faith in the unconditional value of a certain behavior;
• - traditional, based on a long habit, tradition;
• - affective, due to the emotional state of the individual, loss of control over oneself.

It is fundamentally important that the type of social behavior is determined by the experience of the subject, not the observer.

M. Weber also owns a very popular classification of types of domination. The starting point is his remark: "all power is based on violence." In accordance with his method, he identified three types, based on three types of "internal justifications" for the legitimacy of domination. society social individual

The source of traditional domination is people's belief in the inviolability of the foundations of political life: "it has always been like that."

Charismatic domination is based on an extraordinary personal gift, the presence of the qualities of a leader in any person - "God's gift."

The legal type of domination stems from people's belief in the obligatory nature of rationally justified rules for establishing power and the presence of business competence in the bearer of power.

Max Weber saw the fate of Western civilization in the process of an all-encompassing formal rationalization. In his works, he considered the manifestations of this process both at the level of individual organizations, which was reflected in the theory of rational bureaucracy, and in society as a whole - when analyzing the causes of the emergence and development of capitalism.

Thus, Weber, in contrast to Marxism, showed the role of cultural values ​​in the very emergence and development of capitalism.

We continue to publish the book of the famous Russian sociologist Valentina Fedorovna Chesnokova "The Language of Sociology". It will be published by the OGI publishing house in early 2009. Valentina Fedorovna is a consultant to the Public Opinion Foundation and the Institute of the National Economic Model, she is the curator of FOM research on attitudes towards religion. Author of the books “In a Close Way: The Process of the Churching of the Population of Russia at the End of the 20th Century”, “On the Russian National Character”. She worked at Valery Abramkin's Criminal Justice Reform Assistance Center.

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Max Weber, who was born in 1864 in Erfurt in Germany, was a lawyer by his early education. His first works were from the field of economic history: on medieval trading companies and on the agriculture of ancient Rome. In the field of economics, Weber was always interested in the relationship between people, their mode of action, the motives of behavior, and this, ultimately, led him to the field of sociology. It should be noted that in the late XIX - early XX centuries, economists experienced a time of dissatisfaction with the state of their science. The previously popular concept of Adam Smith seemed less and less suitable for solving the practical problems of the era. The concept of "economic man", introduced by Smith to explain the market behavior of people. "Economic man" was certainly the ideal type in Smith's concept, but economists needed to introduce a richer model of behavior into their theories. For new elements, they turned to psychologists, but psychological theories also did not suit them well. The only reasonable direction seemed to be to obtain new theoretical schemes through sociology, but at that time this science was still very poorly developed. And so a number of strong political economists begin to develop sociological theories. Among them were Ferdinand Tönnies, who was a professor of political economy, the Italian scientist Vilfredo Pareto, and somewhat later Talcott Parsons and a number of other major figures. Having come to sociology, they became real professionals and greatly strengthened this science. Among them was Max Weber, one of the most remarkable scientists of his time.

It should be noted that the works of Max Weber, like many other major sociologists, are also poorly known to us. His works, with the exception of the earliest ones, were not translated into Russian before the revolution, and after it there was no longer any hope of their appearance in scientific circulation, since Max Weber criticized Karl Marx. Moreover, he expressed disagreement not with some purely scientific theses of Marx, but with his ideas about classes. And for the Marxists, striving to establish a new society on earth through the class struggle and the emancipation of the proletariat, this was an absolutely unacceptable encroachment on the most advanced teaching.

Although the concept of classes did not belong to the main area of ​​interest of M. Weber, it makes sense to start with it. Firstly, our country has been "sick" of Marxism for quite a long time, and some clichés of Marxist and near-Marxist teachings still roam in our heads, often completely unaware of us. And secondly, the concept of "class" is very indistinctly separated, especially for non-professionals, from the concept of "social class" that has become established in sociology at the moment.

Marx himself often used the concepts "class" and "classes", but did not give precise definitions to them. However, from a comparison of various texts, it is revealed that a person falls into one class or another, depending on what place he occupies in the production process and what relation he has to property. These are interconnected things: if a person is an owner, then he occupies one place in the production process, if he has nothing, another, he becomes a hired worker. And already on this depends the income of a person and his standard of living. Further, it is concluded that if a person's well-being is at a certain level, then an appropriate lifestyle must also correspond to him. And his interests, ideas and convictions, political sympathies and antipathies, and, therefore, also his behavior in politics and in other spheres already depend on the way of life. All this one follows from the other, one is superimposed on the other and forms a unity. And so the class is formed.

Max Weber agreed that the attitude to property and position in the production process determine the standard of living of a person. But if people receive approximately the same income, they do not necessarily have to spend it in a similar way. Max Weber believed that a person chooses the elements of his lifestyle relatively freely. One, for example, sits all evening in a tavern and plays backgammon, and the other reads books and attends some courses - this is what he is interested in. These two people will have completely different circles of acquaintances, spheres of communication, and there is nothing strange in the fact that they will differ in their views, likes, dislikes, etc. Moreover, not only people with the same income and standard of living can have different beliefs, but also people with the same lifestyle.

Therefore, according to M. Weber, it is much more convenient to consider these three social structures (by position in the production process, by way of life and by beliefs) as different structures. Three different groups are obtained, which he calls "class" (in relation to property and income level), "estate" (in terms of lifestyle) and "party" (in terms of beliefs and ideology). One and the same mass of people is distributed, firstly, according to classes, secondly, according to estates, and, thirdly, according to parties. Belonging to a party does not necessarily require direct membership, sympathy is enough, that is, belonging, as it is now customary to express it, to its electorate.

So, people who belong to the same Class, obviously, have approximately the same level of income, and, consequently, similar living conditions. Changing these conditions, for example, for the worse, leads to the fact that people will react in a similar way to it. M. Weber called this reaction "mass-like": people act in a similar way, but at the same time everyone makes a decision and acts (more precisely, joins the action) himself. It's like when it's raining: everyone who walks down the street opens and raises their umbrellas above them, "as if on command", but at the same time they don't orient themselves at all, but only react to the rain.

IN estates, which stands out in terms of lifestyle, people are already much more oriented towards each other. They feel like a single entity, implement similar cultural behaviors and standards. At the same time, a person chooses for himself and maintains a way of life himself, he consciously relates to it. In fact, the estate is a closed group, where "strangers" are not accepted. However, if a person implements a “correct” way of life, from the point of view of this class, he is recognized as “one of his own”.

A parties - these are completely consciously formed social formations. They do not just focus on some general ideas, but actively create them, change them, plan their activities, and so on.

This article by M. Weber remained unfinished, was extracted from his papers and became more or less widely known only in the middle of the 20th century. She is very interesting, she has a mature mind and an experienced hand. A major theoretician analyzes which variables are methodologically more convenient to separate, which to relate to each other, based on the convenience of operating with features. He does not argue with Marx at all, he simply takes a well-known theory (the concept of classes was put forward at the beginning of the 19th century by French historians) and, having worked with it, offers a completely new approach.

It is interesting to note that in the 1930s, when this article by M. Weber was still unpublished in his papers, the idea arose in the United States to conduct a study of an American city. To organize this study, William Lloyd Warner, an anthropologist by profession, who was studying the Australian Aborigines at that time, was invited. The idea interested him, he chose a small city on the east coast, and, having encrypted its name with the pseudonym "Yankee City", he interviewed all its inhabitants, asking everyone about each. At the same time, he asked each person to place all the people he knew on a scale "higher - lower." Not by any special signs, but simply by feeling - who occupies a higher position relative to each other, and who is lower. As a result of this procedure, the observed layers stood out: Warner got three of them and at the same time split each of the three into two more (upper and lower).

He called these formations social classes selected according to the specified attribute, i.e. By prestige according to the opinions of others. Initially, Warner assumed that the workers would be in one class, the entrepreneurs in another, that income and wealth would be well ordered in this scale "higher - lower." But it turned out differently: the workers turned out to be spaced from the lower - lower class to the upper - middle, some part of the entrepreneurs ended up in the lower class, and incomes were not at all ordered into such an unconditional scale. Prestige turned out to be most closely associated not with income, but with lifestyle. Thus, Warner revealed in the study the social structure that M. Weber set as "social class". It turned out to be really existing in practice - in reality, the American urban society of the 30s. XX century, where there were no estates (in the sense of medieval formations habitually associated with this name), and could not be. It turns out that a similar structure, singled out on the basis of a way of life, existed there - and, apparently, exists in all societies of this type, simply shaped and called differently. That's what it means to correctly set a structure-forming feature! But only a very big theoretician can do this.

A few words about the search for a middle class in contemporary Russia. A lot of articles have been written on the topic: do we have it or not? And how will it be formed? But the middle class has always been in Russia: both in pre-revolutionary (it appeared after the estates disintegrated and ceased to be called that), and in the Soviet one. It's just that in Soviet times there were no entrepreneurs in this class, since entrepreneurship in the country at that time did not exist at all. When it arose again, this one also began to form. sector middle class. But in the discussions of modern journalists, economists and sociologists, for some reason only This sector is considered to be the "middle class", only entrepreneurs with a certain income are considered members of this class. And where will we include teachers, doctors, middle-level officials and other categories that are distinguished by a very stable way of life? This, they say, is not the middle class, since they receive almost nothing and are very poor. And as soon as they begin to distribute the population by classes, they always go astray on income, to which is added (and even then not always) a profession. And it doesn't count behavior, according to which, after all, the way of life is evaluated in the minds of others, i.e. most members of society. Namely, this, above all, determines social prestige.

As noted above, the concept of classes is not at the center of the theoretical works of M. Weber. This is, as Robert Merton would call it, "the theory of the middle level." At the center of the general theory of M. Weber are two important concepts - "social action" And "rationalization".

"Social Action", according to Max Weber, is distinguished by two features that make it social, i.e. different from mere action. Social action: 1) has meaning for the one who performs it, and 2) is focused on other people. Meaning is a certain idea of ​​why or why this action is performed, it is some (sometimes very vague) awareness and direction of it. There is a well-known example by which M. Weber illustrates his definition of social action: if two cyclists collide on a highway, then this is not a social action (although it happens between people) - that's when they jump up and start to sort things out between themselves (swear or help a friend). friend), then the action acquires the characteristics of the social.

M. Weber's interest in social action and its meaning is quite understandable. It has already been noted that economists came to sociology (especially at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries), but this was not the only source of replenishment of our science. It has aroused great interest also among anthropologists, but not among those who measure skulls and so on, but among those who study the culture primarily of primitive societies. This direction is called social anthropology, and in Western Europe it has received great development. Social anthropologists developed such concepts as "culture", "social institutions", etc. It is clear that they showed great interest in sociology, which also dealt with social structures.

but for economists it was important to study the action of an individual: how it is formed, what motives are controlled and how these motives arise in the mind of the acting subject. This is understandable: after all, for economists, the problems of supply and demand in the markets, labor incentives, entrepreneurial motives, etc. are the subject of constant study. All this is directly related to consciousness a person acting at a certain time and under certain conditions, correlating the goals of his action with its results, and so on. These thought processes are the reasons for his behavior. The researcher is obliged to study them in order to understand and explain what is happening. In the end, to make prognostic hypotheses, without which science has no practical value.

Arthur Schopenhauer defined a cause as "an antecedent change that makes a subsequent change necessary." In the natural world, a cause is that which causes mechanical, physical, or chemical changes in the objects of experience. Here the path of transformation is direct and clear: a certain effect causes a certain effect in a direct way. In the organic world, the impact causes not a direct change, but irritation, as a result of which some changes first occur inside the organism and already, as if at the second stage, they cause changes in behavior. But these internal changes in the organism, caused by the same causes, can be of different types, and the strength of the impact does not always determine the magnitude of the changes. And in an organism that has consciousness, this path between influence and effect incomparably increases and acquires a complex structure. The resulting impact is processed by consciousness, which sets in motion entire systems of ideas. The developed concept of the "response" to the impact received is then passed through the sphere of motives, plans and goals - and only on the basis of all these elements does the conscious being finally form its behavior.

Thus, as we move from one kind of causality to another, cause and effect become more and more separated, clearly distinguished and heterogeneous, and the cause becomes less and less material and tangible. When a person reaches the ability to cognize the "non-contemplative", i.e. not visual, motives acquire independence from the real situation. They do not arise every time before starting a new action, but are thoughts that a person carries in his head and, if necessary, puts into action. Thus, the cause of the social action is not observable to its researcher. He must build it by inference.

It must be said that the need to work with such unobservable facts, using logical constructions, for a very long time aroused the strongest resistance of researchers. For a long time they were looking for some other, more "objective" methods. In particular, at the beginning of the 20th century, a trend of "behaviorism" (from English behavior - behavior) arose and developed throughout the first half of it. His methods were built on the basis of direct observation of the behavior of the person being studied: from morning to evening it was necessary to follow him, fix all his movements and actions, down to the most insignificant ones, in order to then compare, group all these facts, compare the actions of different people, apply statistics. Thus, it was supposed to reveal certain repeatability and regularities. It should be noted that the behaviorists really managed to identify some patterns, and important discoveries were made on the basis of these principles and approaches. But it is obvious that the patterns obtained in this way still need to be explained, and this is practically impossible to do without appealing to the inner motives of a person, to his consciousness. And we are again faced with unobservable phenomena, only at a new level.

M. Weber spoke in favor of introjective sociology, i.e. for sociology, the study of the human mind. To understand an event means to explain it. To know the action of a person means to bring him out of the consciousness of this person - his goals, motivations, interests and points of view. If we do not know the relationship between gravity and metabolism in the body, we will not understand why and how the person walks and breathes. And if we do not know the goals and motives of a person, then we cannot understand why he performs certain actions.

In human action, especially in social action, there is always a more or less clear awareness of its elements, primarily goals and means. When there is an idea of ​​goals and means, motivational dependencies come into play. "Motivational dependencies are dependencies that always exist and should be studied where people actually do (or think they do) something definite, i.e. strive in this way to achieve something else, also definite"

And here the difficulties begin. Firstly, a person can be partially and even completely deceived in his own motivation, even more often he is deceived in the motivation of others, his partners in social action. But a person, participating in social action, can not only be deceived in his motivation, but also consciously deceive others, presenting them not with true motives, but with so-called declarative ones. For example, a daughter wants to place her seriously ill father in a nursing home because caring for him takes a lot of time, the living space is small and the house is cramped. But, starting such an action, she will assure others that "he will be better" there, he needs professional care, which is not available at home, etc. In the same way, partners in social action can deceive the acting individual as to the true motives of their action. At the same time, the degree of openness, i.e. confidence in each other is very rarely mutually equivalent.

Thus, if we take into account all these cases of unconscious, semi-conscious, declarative motivation, and even from both sides (or from all sides, if there are several participants in the social action), an incredibly complex configuration is obtained, from which it is necessary to find out, establish causes, i.e. true motives and representations of its participants. Moreover, it should be taken into account that grade(or terminologically more correct "definition") of the situation in which you have to act, the partners may have different, or one or another definition of the situation may involve completely different sets of motives.

But that's not all. All this diversity will necessarily be superimposed by the researcher's own attitudes and assessments, who must analyze all these motives and ideas. He will like some people and their actions, ideas and motivations, while others may be antipathetic. And this creates a rather strong motivation for the researcher himself to improve something and shift "in favor" of the researcher he likes. This happens quite often, especially with inexperienced researchers who are too enthusiastic and hurried. This is what most of all feared those scientists who opposed the study of the consciousness of the acting individual in every possible way and developed, in the end, the behaviorist approach. External action, they believed, could not be distorted by biased interpretation. If it is known, for example, that a person dine in the dining room and dine at home, what can be distorted here? However, M.Be6ep could object, and there is not much sense from such data, and nothing is known about motivation at all. He himself believed that there was no other way left - only to overcome these difficulties.

It should be emphasized that it was precisely the struggle with such difficulties that forced M. Weber to resort to the help of very strong epistemological philosophers of that time. In particular, he worked extensively with Heinrich Rickert, the head of the Neo-Kantians, who was then teaching in Freiburg. Rickert became very interested in the problems that Weber presented to him. Until then, he dealt mainly with the problems of the natural sciences (the social sciences were only just getting on their feet by that time), there a lot had already been done in the field of methodology, but here there was a lot of problems. The joint work of M. Be6epa and G. Rickert began around 1895, and the result of their long-term cooperation was the laying of the foundation for the methodology of the social sciences. Naturally, two such eminent scientists had to lay a really solid and high-quality foundation of methodology in sociological science. And they really succeeded.

The most promising direction in the theory of knowledge at that time was neo-Kantianism. According to its premises, the concept of "reality" included "an infinite number of individual phenomena", regardless of whether they represent the reality of the external world. or the inner reality of human consciousness, is a mass of adjacent, successive elements. And reality is structured not by some of its own laws, but by the subject who studies it. It is the "processing" of this endless, undivided, rolling "stream of events" by categories that have been worked out and accumulated by science that gives a picture of the world. And the position always remains in force that both historical and sociological research not only finds its empirical material, but shapes and animates it, explicitly and "purely" "linking it" with the help of tools that change involuntarily from epoch to epoch, from culture to culture and from researcher to researcher. Concluding ultimately in goals, interests and points of view. To “understand” means to “explain” an event (course of action, etc.) from such goals, interests, and points of view.

For the study of social action, this means that the scientist, observing and interpreting the observed phenomena, builds a certain relationship between the observed elements and the alleged motivations. And if the course of action, its development, confirm this dependence (ie, external phenomena line up exactly in the way that was supposed in the researcher's construction), then we have before us some semantic adequacy. But even the presence of such an adequacy of meaning "to the extent of correctness causal statements means only the proof that there is some (somehow computed) opportunity that the course of action, demonstrating semantic adequacy, actually will, usually, detect (on average or quite often) this computed configuration and similarity" .

This approach did not fit in the minds of empirical sociologists for a very long time precisely because of their uncertainty in the probabilistic process of cognition of the world. The researchers needed "true reality", and they were offered some kind of constructed picture, about which it is not known whether it has at least some connection with reality. That it is not given to a person to cognize reality "as it is" - was too sad a conclusion from such a theory of knowledge, I did not want to believe in it. However, gradually this point of view prevailed, and at present the expression "this is how things stand in fact"is most often ironic among researchers. All methodologically savvy sociologists understand that "interpreted social phenomena" or "sociological laws" are nothing more than statistical patterns that correspond to the general meaning of the interpretation of these phenomena and laws. This approach has become established, finally, in sociology, giving it the opportunity to become an empirical science.We emphasize that, paradoxically, it was precisely the operation of these "semantic adequacies" and the probabilistically constructed image of reality that put sociology on empirical basis.

Weber himself constantly emphasized that he was engaged in empirical science. He was not interested in the question of what this or that social object is according to its predetermined or otherwise assigned "essence" to it. He was interested in how this or that event proceeds in the sphere he studied under such and such conditions. How do people with their supposed motivation behave in different conditions? Are certain, regular repetitions of processes, which in ordinary language are called mores, customs, conventions, law, enterprise, the state, and so on and so forth, found? However, in order to learn these statistical regularities and somehow interpret them, it is necessary to follow strict methodological principles. As little as possible of your own motivations and emotions should be introduced into these interpretations and explanations necessary in the course of the action. M. Weber outlined two main methodological principles, which, in his opinion, should be observed by any self-respecting researcher.

This is, firstly, the principle of exclusion from the analysis of value judgments. The principle is very simple in its meaning and formulation. It lies in the fact that one should not introduce one’s own assessments into the analyzed material, which, as the researcher of Weber’s works G. Baumgarten puts it, should guarantee him from “going on the road with the idea that some processes (actions, motivations), which he studies should not happen as they do, or should happen in some other way, or, on the contrary, they "do well" that they happen in this way. The researcher strives to reveal the truth, and he himself owes nothing want from this truth. Only freedom from value judgments can, as Max Weber believed, make the world of values ​​accessible. for science.

The claims to Weber in connection with this principle most often consisted in the fact that a person (and a researcher cannot stop being a person!) Is not able to free himself from his values, because this is the basis of his personality. Ultimately, it was concluded that the researcher should control their value preferences and take all measures to eliminate inclinations to evaluate the material, which comes from uncontrolled own motivation.

The second principle is aimed at eliminating all sorts of distortions in the material itself, caused by ignorance, half-knowledge, deliberate concealment of one's own motivations, no longer of the researcher, but of the respondent - this main source of information for the social scientist. This is already familiar to us from the analysis of the concept of F. Tönnies ideal type construction principle. Highlighting some of the main variables on which material will be collected makes comparable set of actions of different kinds of people in different situations. And then the imposition of all these actions on each other discards all deviations, accidents, conscious distortions. The result is a scheme of actions of typical individuals in typical circumstances. Those lines that in the real actions of real individuals can be traced only as more or less strong tendencies appear here, as it were, "cleansed" of everything. superfluous and accidental. True, without any details and signs of this very reality, as if incorporeal, but in a strict conceptual sequence) .

Curious, however, is the testimony of Baumgarten. "The skill that Weber discovered in his constructions led, apparently unconsciously, from his on the other hand, to the fact that the ideal-typical constructions, which he drew primarily on past (historical) events, acted on the imagination as a direct picture real reality. The instrumental meaning of the Weberian ideal type was easily lost sight of due to its impact on the reader as a pictorial (artistic) means." "reflects" such and such details. We will still encounter this phenomenon when we analyze the concepts of T. Parsons, who was constantly accused of portraying society too idealistically: look how many conflicts and troubles there are in society, but he has everything smoothly, everything regulates by itself! - they talked about his constructions. Indeed, since T. Parsons studied the process of homeostatic self-regulation of a social system, he also created the corresponding models. And if he studied the problem of the emergence and development of conflicts, then the typologies would be there would be others.

So, we now have to move on to Weber's ideal typology. Naturally, this will typology of social action, and will be built along the axis rationalization actions. Weber was suspicious of the concept of "progress" in its Comte-Spencerian version, but he recognized one all-encompassing, continuous and one-way process, namely: rationalization process. And in particular, this process, in his opinion, extends to human action. Here his idea coincides with Toennis's: from that undifferentiated complex of feelings, instinctive movements and value "insights" that is characteristic of the community, individual elements gradually begin to be isolated in the mind of a person, which means the ability to single out separate analytical categories in the analysis. By separating two concepts from each other - "goal" and "means", - a person-doer gets the opportunity to think through and evaluate the paths to the goal, possible results, to make a choice of means before any action. In the mind of the future performer of the action, a chain of reasoning is built according to the principle: "if - then", "means". And since all people think approximately the same way, it is precisely in the plane of these reasoning that they are all capable of more or less definitely understand each other. Why did the person choose such and such a remedy? Because he set himself a certain goal, and from the point of view of this goal, under the given conditions, such a means is convenient, and should it be chosen? Can be built as a pattern correct reasoning under the circumstances - this will be ideal type of action.

Naturally, the actual action performed by "a real person in real circumstances" very rarely corresponds to such a pure type of reasoning. It is necessarily "burdened" with a mass of incidental details, accidents, errors, and so on. "Deflecting influence" can reflect the emotional state of a person at the moment, his misconception about the situation, ignorance of many details, etc. But here the value of an ideal type construction is revealed. It makes it possible not so much to assess the rationality of an action as, in the words of Weber himself, to reveal "the degree of its irrationality". And further, already on the basis of the ratio of these two characteristics: rationality and irrationality, a typology of action on this basis begins to be developed.

"The most understandable type of semantic structure of actions are actions that are subjectively strictly rationally oriented towards means, which (subjectively) are considered as uniquely adequate for achieving (subjectively) clearly and unambiguously understood goals" . This is a clear definition of what M. Weber calls goal-oriented action. Let's pay attention to this repeated word "subjectively": a person could incorrectly determine the circumstances, draw some kind of wrong conclusion. The man reasoned purposefully rationally, but irrational moments invaded the course of his reasoning. And this is where the analytical work of the researcher begins. “It is necessary first of all to establish,” writes Weber, “the following: how would is the action in the rational ideal typical boundary case for absolute rationality of purpose And rational correctness"committing it.

The ideal type plays here, as we see, the role of a research tool, like a ruler or tape measure. And here a whole scale of real actions is built according to the degree of their goal-oriented rationality, assessed by the researcher. These can be actions: (1) very close to the "correct" (ideal) type; (2) subjectively goal-oriented; (3) more or less goal-oriented, but far from completely adhering to this principle; (4) non-purposeful, but understandable in their meaning; (5) motivated to a greater or lesser extent by an understandable semantic connection, but with elements (sometimes even defining ones) that are completely incomprehensible to the researcher; (6) finally, and completely incomprehensible, determined by some kind of mental and physical givens in a person.

Thus, relying on connections that are understandable in a semantic sense, especially, as Weber emphasizes, goal-oriented motivations, the researcher can build a causal chain that will begin with external circumstances and ultimately lead to external behavior. In this way, a path is groped inside this "black box", human consciousness - from external influence to the behavior caused by it. Of course, this chain is nothing more than a hypothesis. But all the facts empirically established by science are not something bigger. If a hypothesis is formulated, then it is up to verification.

Having created such a "measuring device" that the researcher of human consciousness can put between himself and the consciousness of the subject he is studying, thereby achieving distances, which, in his opinion, is absolutely necessary for maintaining objectivity, Weber essentially laid the foundation for the scientific methodology of sociological science. Gnoseologists before Weber studied the cognizing consciousness - purely rational and methodically "correct" in the sense of observing logical principles. Weber with his understanding sociology opened for them a whole new area - the consciousness of the acting subject, determined by specific circumstances and the specific state of this consciousness at a given moment in time.

It must be said that Rickert also worked seriously on the formation of a number of concepts that could be useful in this area, in particular, on the concept of an ideal type. He also created another way of forming concepts in the humanities: a concept obtained from public consciousness and formalized by "reference to value." He believed that in reality scientists have been working with such concepts for a long time, but they do not realize this as a special and peculiar method that should be scientifically "polished" and improved. We will return to this mode of concept formation when we examine Weber's The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Here it suffices to emphasize once again that it was created by M. Weber understanding introjective sociology very noticeably enriched epistemology, opening up a look at social phenomena from an unexpected point of view for that time. In general, the genius of M. Weber had a very strong and many-sided influence on sociology, and through it on the social sciences in general.

But back to social action. On the basis of reference to the ideal-typical goal-rational model, Weber built a typology of a more specific type - a typology of social action as it manifests itself in different historical periods and in different social structures. Here he singled out four major types of action: (a) affective; (b) traditional; (c) value-rational and (d) goal-rational.

affective action practically does not contain any chains of reasoning about ends, means or consequences. If it contains such, then it is not affective, but simply disguises itself as it. This is a pure splash of feelings and emotions.

traditional action is an action that contains very little such reasoning, since it is performed under repetitive conditions and according to a firmly established pattern. F. Tönnies calls it "habitual action". However, after we have become acquainted with the concept of Tönnies, we can assume that in repetitive actions such as rites, rituals and others, characteristic of life in the sphere of customary law, one can find not only feelings, but also value experiences. These are experiences attributed to the ideas of justice, nobility, goodness and beauty, which, perhaps, is completely uncharacteristic of habit. The habit tends to mechanically reproducible action in repeated circumstances. And since rites and rituals in communal life (which is especially characteristic of customary law) are included in almost all actions, especially collective ones (recall the mowing scene from Anna Karenina), these feelings and value experiences actually permeate the entire life of traditional society. As for the traditional action, it is often (or "quite often") aimed at value, and this is already some, although perhaps a weak element of its direction and expediency.

Value-rational action is a development and, as it were, the next stage of the traditional action understood in this way. It may already contain ideas about the choice of means, analysis of motives, and other elements characteristic of goal-oriented action. Only it is not focused on the goal, but directly on the value, therefore, the analysis of the consequences and even the result may not have any effect on the form of the act. This is an action from the category of those that are performed according to the formula "do as you must, and come what may." It can be seen from the formula itself that in the mind of the acting subject there is some idea of ​​the possible consequences, but it is consciously not taken into account by him.

Purposeful rational action we have already described above. It also resembles the solution of a problem by an algorithm, and the solution of an equation with unknowns, and other formalized procedures. It differs from the value-rational action by the rational setting of the goal and the greater development of the chains of reasoning.

In order to somewhat weaken the excessive abstractness of the reasoning, we present some examples illustrating this typology.

affective action does not carry any idea of ​​​​ends and means. An offended person can hit and even kill the offender - and only then, in hindsight, comprehend what he did. The court, when examining such an act, usually decides on beating or murder in a state of passion and applies a milder measure of punishment than that applied to a conscious or even pre-planned action, i.e. action "with premeditation".

traditional action usually also committed by a person in addition to the choice of ends and means. It happens "as usual". For example, in order to celebrate a wedding, it is necessary to perform a whole (rather long) series of actions that are predetermined and do not depend on the goals of the individual within this action, i.e. weddings. This does not mean that this action has no purpose at all. But this goal is not the individual performing the wedding. It is rooted in culture and tradition. Sociologists and social anthropologists are interested in groping for such goals in the need to bring people together and evoke common experiences. Covered by one feeling, people are aware of themselves as a single whole - society. The more holidays, ceremonies, rituals, the stronger the unity of society. But the individual himself, participating in this action, naturally does not realize such a goal. He follows tradition.

Value-rational action has a goal at the individual level, but it consists in realizing a certain value, not given by the individual. A person chooses the means for realizing this value, but the value itself is invariably given to him, as it were, from outside. An example of this kind is the most talented surgeon Luka Voyno-Yasenetsky, who, instead of making a quick and brilliant career, takes the veil as a monk and accepts the ordination offered to him as a bishop. During the period of very severe persecution of the Church, obviously, this did not promise him any benefit. On the contrary, because of this, he spent years in exile, camps and was subsequently shot. But, being a deeply religious person, he felt that the Church was in danger and needed to be protected by all means. Let us remember how many believers in difficult times performed exactly the same feat, how many people during the Great Patriotic War sacrificed themselves in the same way to save the country, and how many people perform their quiet, invisible feat in ordinary peaceful life, sacrificing their interests for the sake of near and far (sick people in trouble, etc.). So value-rational action is not uncommon in our culture.

Finally, an example goal-oriented actions can serve as a person's decision to build himself a house. Here, first of all, the goal is chosen (does a person need this house? what house? in what place? etc.). Then the means are deliberately and rationally weighed (how to build? from what? whether to hire workers or build a log house yourself? etc. etc.). Means must be correlated with the goal, selected, thought out; actions must be planned. It is clear that this is a purposeful action.

This ideal-typical classification of action is a well-established tool for empirical research. With its help, one can, for example, study the goal-setting of various types of people, the way of choosing between motives and means to achieve the goal, and motivation in general. Man, as a being acting rationally to a certain extent, can explain a lot about the process of understanding the action he takes. But we have to state with sadness that this typology seems to have been used very little. First of all, it must be, because empirical sociological research was just in its infancy at that time and had not yet developed truly effective methods of questioning. But there was another reason as well. As a result of the difficult situation in Germany after the defeat in the First World War, the post-war devastation, then the rise of fascism, and then the Second World War, a new defeat and devastation, the works of Max Weber were very slowly introduced into circulation and entered the consciousness of sociologists. Especially American, namely in America at this time, and developed mainly empirical sociology.

Apparently, the circumstance that, in parallel with the activities of M. Weber, Freud's teachings with their characteristic features were developing and capturing the attention of contemporaries: the great importance that was attached to the subconscious in the life and personality of a person, an interest in what later received a somewhat ironic name "mysterious phenomena of the human psyche." Great hopes were associated with all this for the interpretation of the deep layers of the human psyche, the discovery of new laws of nature, this time already within the very mind of man. All this was incomparably more interesting than Weber's rational-rational approach. Firstly, because in general all sorts of "mysterious phenomena", of course, attract the attention of any person, including a scientist, much more strongly (since he is also a person and nothing human is alien to him). Secondly, because when studying these “mysterious phenomena”, it becomes possible, having penetrated into the sphere of the subconscious, to learn about a person what he himself does not suspect. Having explained this “mysterious” to a person, the researcher finds himself in the position above researched, which gives him authority and a higher status, not only in the relationship “researcher - researched”, but also in society in general: he turns into an expert, laymen should reckon with his opinion. And besides, the researcher can use the knowledge of this "mysterious" for the researcher himself, and manipulate his consciousness.

In the middle of the 20th century, after a period of intense enthusiasm by psychologists and sociologists for tests designed to examine people's abilities in various fields, these tests began to enter practice, and people began to be tested when they entered the job. And not only for work that requires the employee to have specific characteristics (chauffeurs, machinists, pilots). In the absence of these qualities (or vice versa, the presence of the opposite), a person becomes simply dangerous to others. For example, a type of people was discovered with an "increased accident rate", who should not be allowed at all in the profession of a train driver or pilot, especially a test pilot, etc. Such testing raises no objections, but they began to test workers in other, completely "harmless" from this point of view, areas. Well, then reliability tests began to be developed. And then it became completely clear that these batteries of tests are becoming a tool that some people seek to direct against others, respecting their own interests and infringing on the interests of the opposite side. Then, among the scientists involved in the tests, there was an awareness that they give a dangerous tool into the hands of people whose morals are not always on top and whose actions are often very difficult to control. And then one of the most famous scientists in this field, who himself created a huge number of very ingenious and effective tests, took a decisive step: he published in the open press the keys to the tests he developed. This immediately rendered them harmless to one side, and useless to the other. Naturally, this was a blow to the interests of firms that used test methods to test people hired. There was a scandal, but the danger of manipulating people was eliminated, at least in this area and for the time being.

In general, science is not an ivory tower, especially at the present time. It has a wide field of activity both for disinterested scientists, and for figures and businessmen. As, however, in all other areas of public life. The purpose of our somewhat expanded excursion was to show that dangerous spheres and tools for manipulating people can arise and be deliberately created within science. The more valuable is the direct and honest approach to the study of human consciousness, which was proposed by M. Weber at the beginning of the 20th century - an analysis of the process of human thinking in the sphere of social action in cooperation with the subject himself, which allows the latter to maintain control over the study and its result to a certain extent.

M. Weber, with the help of his typology of social action, offered another direction - to study sustainability or the effectiveness of the social order. Social order is social institutions embodied in social life. Above, speaking of social institutions, we emphasized that these are value-normative structures that exist in the culture of society. They govern social life, and therefore, along with the institution of the family, which formulates, so to speak, "abstractly" the norms and laws of family life adopted in a given society, there are quite real families that embody these norms and rules, but, unfortunately, far not in a perfect way. And besides, every real family also embodies a number of norms and rules. others institutions, because he brings up and educates his children, is engaged in economic activities. Even more areas of activity cover a modern large enterprise, institutions that carry out management, and so on. They implement at a given period of time some normative structures fixed in the culture of society. But by no means all.

Culture is a colossal arsenal of social norms, and in any given period of time, as a rule, not all of them are implemented. Some, and a very significant part of them is stored in "stores". This is the cultural "reserve" of society. If a need arises, some of these "stored for future use" standards can be brought to light and put into circulation. Some time ago, at a meeting of some branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, a proposal was suddenly put forward to restore the "Table of Ranks" introduced by Peter I and existed until 1917. The idea was that it was not good when officials were some kind of faceless mass. Dividing them into ranks would make it possible to assign a degree of responsibility, a certain prestige to each of the ranks, and solve some more problems. Of course, they may not be called as before, but it was suggested that it would be useful to refer to a principle once developed. If this happened, it could become an example of a re- "launch into circulation", it would seem, long-established regulatory schemes.

Thus, the individual elements of the social order are in constant motion, development, and sometimes fall into decay. Their viability is determined by the clarity of collective action. This is so, because each such element is nothing but a collective action - from the family to the government office. Another criterion is the movement of personnel. High fluidity is generally a reliable indicator of "inconsistencies" in the internal functioning of the cell. For example, today, endless divorces and new marriages testify to the enormous difficulties that the institution of the family experiences, and the difficult position of the family within the social order. But there is another, perhaps the most effective "tool" for understanding not only the state of this or that sphere or cell of the social order, but also the causes of the difficulties they experience. And this is precisely the analysis of social action.

And then there is another approach to the idea of ​​all these links of the social order. What do they actually consist of? An ordinary observer will say: from people, of course, well, from all sorts of material "additives". A lawyer and an anthropologist will point out the main role of cultural-normative schemes that are of decisive importance at a given level of social organization. But Max Weber proposed his own approach: the individual elements of the social order, his theory claims, consist of social actions. This perspective at first seems unexpected, somehow difficult to fit in the mind. But really, this is how it is: at the social level It is convenient to imagine all these elements as sets of social actions, each of which combines both a social standard belonging to culture and the motivation and ideas of a person who implements this standard. And since the cultural norm for a long time, as a rule, retains its identity, then strengthening and weakening one or the other constituent parts of the social order happens most often connected precisely with the ideas and, ultimately, with the motivations of people performing actions.

A survey can reveal how people relate not only to this or that person (with the help of ratings), but also to this or that social institution. And their assessment of a given institution or institution depends on this attitude, and then their assessment of their position in it, their attitude to their duties. What sociologists call "engagement" in a given social action. It is one thing when a person is "attached" to the cell of the social order in which he lives or works. Then he experiences her difficulties, makes his own efforts to improve her shaky position. And it’s completely different - when he treats her indifferently and coolly observes that things are getting worse and the inglorious decline of this link in the social system is approaching.

Attitude but it depends on the current individual ideas and views of a person regarding legitimacy(legality, "correctness" and justice) of that the order in which he orients his behavior. It is the idea of ​​the degree of its legitimacy that determines motivation of the acting subject, prompting him to fulfill the social norm, regardless of how much it is in "his interests" at a given moment in time, in this particular action. An effective (i.e., recognized as legitimate) social order effectively prevents deviations from the existing norm.

These deviations are immanent in any social system, they can arise in any group, in any institution, in any field of activity. But there may be more, or there may be less. When there are a lot of them, or even a lot, it is already dangerous for the social system.

There are two types of deviations: 1) deviation of a person who does not want to comply with any norms or most of them. These are rebels, anarchists; or (somewhat different) individuals involved in a civil disobedience movement. 2) Deviations in the behavior of an individual in a separate action - an attempt to "circumvent the law", to avoid the implementation of an "inconvenient" norm or a norm that greatly violates his (the person's) interests. The last type of deviation is characteristic of almost all members of society, even the most law-abiding, in some extreme situations for them. In the latter case, a person usually recognizes not only the legitimacy of the social order as a whole, but even the legitimacy of the norm that he seeks to "circumvent" because it is to his advantage. Therefore, the second type of deviation is less dangerous for the stability of the social order, unless it becomes widespread. Man is a rational being, he understands that social order is needed, that it is better when it exists than when it collapses. Except for those cases when it acquires in the minds of many people the characteristics: "unfair", "oppressive", "bloody" and so on. Here we have a rejection of the very legitimacy of the social order. And this is a very dangerous moment.

Hence the need to control people's ideas about the degree of legitimacy of the existing order. And this allows you to do the scheme of social action proposed by M. Weber, which we described above. For this construct includes an element of choosing means, setting goals, motives, and all this is accompanied by the attraction representations acting person about the circumstances in which the action planned by him will take place. He can coherently state these ideas to the researcher, substantiating his action.

Of course, the respondent's declarative answers present a certain difficulty; the person says not what he really thinks and believes, but what he is "supposed" to think and count. But by now, sociologists have developed the means to verify (i.e. verify) and identify such answers, as well as ways to get more or less real ideas. For example, if you put a person in the position of an expert and ask him: how need to act in such and such a case and under such and such circumstances, he will communicate not only the norm (of course, as he understands it), but also his idea of ​​the degree of its legitimacy: what it is now and what it should be.

Purposeful rational action in this respect is a very convenient plane for the researcher, in which much can be revealed about the respondent's movement in terms of normative structures. However, both value-rational and even traditional action are very useful when it comes to the effectiveness of customary law.

Speaking about institutions, organizations and other social formations, they usually pay attention, first of all, to their legal design - to those laws, regulations, etc. that require certain behavior from members of these social formations, threatening punishment for violation of the prescribed norm. But all these well-known structures are just the tip of the iceberg. Every institution and group, down to the smallest and shortest, has at its base powerful layers of customs in the most diverse forms: rituals, mores, habits, and so on. This fact somehow eludes our consciousness when discussing the laws governing the existence of our entire social order. A custom, we assume, is something not very obligatory: for violating it, I will not be dragged to court, I will not be fined, and certainly not put in jail. It is strange how he generally manages to exist and subjugate the behavior of people, being in fact not protected by anything. At the same time, it is completely forgotten that the custom is sometimes protected stronger than the law, because it is guarded by moral sense.

In the 1950s - 60s. in one of the southern states of the United States, a movement unfolded, as they said then, "for the rights of blacks", more precisely, for the abolition of segregation. Negroes claimed to ride in the same transport with whites, shop in the same stores with them and teach children in the same schools with them. The movement was led by Pastor Martin Luther King Jr. The Negroes declared a boycott of urban transport, shops and took some other similar actions. They behaved quite peacefully, did not smash anything, did not set fire to anything, did not insult anyone. This was most similar to the civil disobedience movement that had previously unfolded in India under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi. The owners of transport and shops gave up the fastest, as the boycott hit hard on their pockets. Laws were passed to abolish the most obvious moments of segregation. It would seem that everything is in order, but this is where the real war began. The first Negroes to enter the white salons received a very strong negative reaction. There were beatings and even murders, and Martin Luther King himself died in this struggle. Children who were legally allowed to study with whites were brought to schools under police guard, and so on. and so on. It took a couple of months to change laws, and years, if not decades, to change customs. True, when the laws were changed, this struggle with customs and mores was no longer covered so widely in the press. It seemed that with the adoption of new laws, the problem was settled ...

"The stability of the custom (as such), - writes M. Weber, - is based, in essence, on the fact that an individual who does not focus on him in his behavior is outside the framework of the "accepted" in his circle, i.e. must be ready to endure all sorts of minor and major inconveniences and troubles, as long as the majority of the people around him consider the existence of this custom.

List of links to lecture 3

1. Genseinschaft und Gesellschaft. Grund-begrifte der reinen Soziologie von Ferdinand Tönnies. Auflage 6 and 7. Verlag Karl Curties. Berlin, 1926.

2. Weber Max Werk and Person. Dokumente, ansgewelt und kommentiert / von Edward Baumgarten. Tubingen, 1964.

3. Weber Max Selected works // Ed. Ph.D. Y.Davydova. M., 1990.

Class, estate and party. This article was translated by us and published in the ICSI IFSO Bulletin. However, the collection was arrested and was not sent to the mailing list. Later it was published in the collection "Social Stratification" vol. 1, but in a completely insignificant circulation. Therefore, we send those interested to the original: Baumgarten E. Max Weber.Work und Person. Tubingen. 1964.

We have not conducted such studies. Scientists who studied primitive tribes, M.M. Kovalevsky, who studied the peoples of the Caucasus, etc., were usually called ethnographers, and their activity consisted mainly in describing the rituals and customs of tribes and peoples. Although, of course, these scientists sometimes rose to broader generalizations.

For those who are interested in a very fascinating area of ​​the formation of scientific concepts, we can recommend an essay on this topic by G. Rickert: G. Rickert. The boundaries of the natural science formation of concepts. Logical introduction to the historical sciences. SPb. 1903.

It is interesting to note that Weber himself sometimes expressed the same point of view. Cm.:

In Russian: Tennis Ferdinand Generality and society. Basic concepts of pure sociology. Moscow: Vladimir Dal, 2002.