A Supreme Privy Council was created. Empress Anna Ivanovna dismissed the Supreme Privy Council

The idea of ​​creating an institution that stood above the Senate was in the air even under Peter the Great. However, it was not implemented by him, but by his wife Catherine I. At the same time, the idea itself changed dramatically. Peter, as you know, ruled the country himself, delving into all the details of the government mechanism, both in domestic and foreign policy. Catherine, on the other hand, was deprived of the virtues that nature generously awarded her husband.

Contemporaries and historians differently assessed the modest abilities of the empress. Field Marshal of the Russian Army Burchard Christopher Munnich did not spare words of praise addressed to Catherine: “This Empress was loved and adored by the whole nation, thanks to her innate kindness, which manifested itself whenever she could take part in persons who fell into disgrace and deserved the disgrace of the emperor. .. She was truly an intermediary between the sovereign and his subjects.”

Munnich’s enthusiastic review was not shared by the historian of the second half of the 18th century, Prince M. M. Shcherbatov: “She was weak, luxurious in the whole space of this name, the nobles were ambitious and greedy, and from this it happened: practicing in everyday feasts and luxuries, she left all power government to the nobles, of whom Prince Menshikov soon took over.

The famous 19th-century historian S. M. Solovyov, who studied the time of Catherine I from unpublished sources, gave Catherine a somewhat different assessment: affairs, especially internal ones, and their details, nor the ability to initiate and direct.

Three dissimilar opinions indicate that their authors were guided by various criteria in assessing the empress: Minich - the presence of personal virtues; Shcherbatov - such moral qualities that should be inherent in the first place to a statesman, a monarch; Solovyov - the ability to manage the state, business qualities. But the virtues listed by Minich are clearly not enough to manage a vast empire, and the craving for luxury and feasts, as well as the lack of due attention to business and the inability to assess the situation and determine ways to overcome the difficulties that have arisen, generally deprive Catherine of the reputation of a statesman.

Having neither knowledge nor experience, Catherine, of course, was interested in creating an institution capable of helping her, especially since she was oppressed by dependence on Menshikov. The nobles were also interested in the existence of an institution capable of withstanding the onslaught of Menshikov and his unlimited influence on the empress, among whom the most active and influential was Count P. A. Tolstoy, who competed with the prince in the struggle for power.

The arrogance and dismissive attitude of Menshikov towards other nobles who sat in the Senate crossed all boundaries. An episode that took place in the Senate at the end of 1725 is indicative, when Minikh, who was in charge of the construction of the Ladoga Canal, asked the Senate to allocate 15,000 soldiers to complete the work. Munnich's request was supported by P. A. Tolstoy and F. M. Apraksin. Their arguments about the expediency of completing the enterprise begun by Peter the Great did not at all convince the prince, who declared in vehemence that it was not the job of soldiers to dig the earth. Menshikov defiantly left the Senate, thereby insulting the senators. However, Menshikov himself did not object to the establishment of the Privy Council, believing that he would easily tame his rivals and, hiding behind the Privy Council, would continue to rule the government.

The idea of ​​creating a new institution was proposed by Tolstoy. The empress was to preside over the meetings of the Supreme Privy Council, and the members of the Council were given equal votes. Catherine immediately seized on this idea. If not with her mind, then with a heightened sense of self-preservation, she understood that Menshikov’s unbridled temper, his desire to command everything and everyone could cause strife and an explosion of discontent not only among the tribal nobility, but also among those who elevated her to the throne.

Campredon cites a statement by the empress relating to the time of the formation of the Supreme Privy Council. She declared "that she would show the whole world that she knew how to make people obey her and uphold the glory of her reign." The establishment of the Supreme Privy Council really allowed Catherine to strengthen her power, to force everyone to "obey herself", but under certain conditions: if she knew how to deftly weave intrigues, if she knew how to push opposing forces together with their foreheads and act as an intermediary between them, if she had a clear idea where and by what means should the highest government institution lead the country, if it finally knew how to create coalitions that would be useful to it at the right time, temporarily uniting rivals. Catherine did not possess any of the listed qualities, therefore her statement, if Campredon accurately reproduced it, hung in the air, turned out to be pure bravado. On the other hand, Catherine's consent to the creation of the Supreme Council indirectly testified to her recognition of her inability, like her husband, to rule the country. The paradox of the establishment of the Supreme Privy Council was that it combined the conflicting aspirations of those involved in its creation. Tolstoy, as mentioned above, saw in the Supreme Privy Council a means of taming Menshikov. These expectations were shared by Apraksin and Golovkin. Menshikov, in supporting the idea of ​​creating a Supreme Privy Council, was apparently guided by three considerations. Firstly, he simply missed the steps taken by Tolstoy, and upon discovering them, he considered that it was useless to oppose them. Secondly, he also intended to benefit from the new institution - to crush five members of the Supreme Privy Council, he considered, easier than a large number in the Senate. And, finally, thirdly, Alexander Danilovich connected with the Supreme Council the realization of his long-standing dream - to deprive his worst enemy of the Senate Prosecutor General P.I. Yaguzhinsky of his former influence.

The Supreme Privy Council was created on February 8, 1726 by a personal decree of the Empress. However, rumors about the possibility of the emergence of a new institution penetrated the diplomatic environment as early as May 1725, when the Saxon envoy Lefort reported that they were talking about the establishment of a "Privy Council". Similar information was sent by the French envoy Campredon, who even named the names of the members of the future institution.

Although the legislator had sufficient time to draw up a fundamental normative act, the decree read by G. I. Golovkin to the members of the Supreme Privy Council on February 10 was superficial, giving the impression that it was written hastily. The creation of a new institution was justified by the fact that it was necessary to provide an opportunity for members of the Supreme Privy Council to concentrate their efforts on solving the most important matters, freeing them from petty concerns that burdened them as senators. However, the decree does not define the place of the new institution in the current government mechanism, nor clearly define the rights and obligations of the new institution. The decree named the names of the persons obliged to be present in it: Field Marshal Prince A. D. Menshikov, General Admiral Count F. M. Apraksin, Chancellor Count G. I. Golovkin, Count P. A. Tolstoy, Prince D. M. Golitsyn and Baron A. I. Osterman.

The composition of the Supreme Privy Council reflected the balance of power of the "parties" that competed in the elevation of Catherine to the throne: five of the six members of the Supreme Council belonged to the new nobility, and the tribal aristocracy was represented by one Golitsyn. It is noteworthy, however, that it did not include the favorite of Peter the Great, the person who was number one in the bureaucratic world, the Prosecutor General of the Senate P. I. Yaguzhinsky. Pavel Ivanovich was, as noted above, the worst enemy of Menshikov, and the latter did not object to the creation of the Supreme Privy Council, in particular, in the expectation that the position of Prosecutor General of the Senate would be eliminated and the Supreme Privy Council would perform an intermediary role between the Empress and the Senate.

Another ally of Peter, also an enemy of Menshikov, turned out to be overboard of the Supreme Privy Council - Cabinet Secretary A.V. Makarov. There was no place in it for such experienced businessmen as P. P. Shafirov, I. A. Musin-Pushkin and others. All this gives reason to believe that when recruiting the Supreme Privy Council, there was a bargaining between Ekaterina, Menshikov and Tolstoy.

On February 17, Cabinet Secretary Makarov announced in the Supreme Privy Council the decree of the Empress, which extremely puzzled and alerted Menshikov, - another person was appointed to the institution - Catherine's son-in-law, Duke Karl Friedrich Holstein. It was not difficult for the prince to unravel the purpose of the appointment - he assessed it as a desire to weaken his influence, create a counterbalance to him and a more reliable support for the throne than he, Menshikov. Menshikov did not believe that Catherine could dare to do such a thing without his knowledge, and asked Makarov again: did he correctly convey the command of the empress? Having received an affirmative answer, His Serene Highness immediately went to Catherine for an explanation. The content of the conversation and its tone remained unknown, but the result is known - Catherine insisted on her own. The Duke, at a regular meeting of the Supreme Privy Council, assured the listeners that he "will not be otherwise for a member and other ministers present for a colleague and comrade." In other words, the husband of the daughter of Empress Anna Petrovna did not claim a leading role in the Supreme Privy Council, which somewhat reassured Menshikov. As for the other members of the Privy Council, they were quite satisfied with the appearance of such an influential figure who, relying on kinship with the Empress, could resist the dominance of Alexander Danilovich.

So, the composition of the new institution was approved. As for his competence, it was determined by a vague phrase: “We have reasoned and ordered from now on at our court, both for external and internal state important affairs, to establish a Supreme Privy Council, at which we ourselves will be present.”

Subsequent decrees, issued both on behalf of the Supreme Privy Council and on behalf of the Empress, clarified the range of issues that were subject to its decision, and its relationship to the Senate, Synod, colleges and supreme power.

Already on February 10, the Supreme Privy Council ordered all central institutions to turn to him with reports. However, one exception was made: the three "first", in the terminology of the time of Peter the Great, colleges (Military, Admiralty and Foreign Affairs) were removed from the jurisdiction of the Senate, communicated with it, as equals, by promemoria and became subject only to the Supreme Privy Council.

There was a reason for this decree: Menshikov, Apraksin and Golovkin were the presidents of the three collegiums mentioned above; they also sat in the Supreme Privy Council, so it was not prestigious to subordinate these colleges to the Senate, which itself was dependent on the Privy Council.

An important milestone in the history of the Supreme Privy Council is the so-called "Opinion not in a decree on a new established Privy Council", submitted to the Empress by its members. There is no need to state the contents of all thirteen points of the Opinion. Let us dwell on the most important of them, which are of fundamental importance, since they more clearly than in the founding decree defined the purpose of creating a new institution and its main task. The Supreme Privy Council, said the Opinion, "serves only to relieve Her Majesty in the heavy burden of government." Thus, formally, the Supreme Privy Council was an advisory body, consisting of several persons, which made it possible to avoid hasty and erroneous decisions. However, the paragraph following this expanded the powers of the Supreme Privy Council by entrusting it with legislative functions: “No decrees should first be issued until they are completely taken place in the Privy Council, the protocols are not fixed and Her Majesty will not be read for the most merciful approbation, and then they can be fixed and sent by Acting State Councilor Stepanov (Secretary of the Council. - N.P.)”.

"Opinion" established the schedule of work of the Supreme Privy Council: on Wednesdays it should consider internal affairs, on Fridays - foreign ones; if there was a need, then emergency meetings were convened. "Opinion not in a decree" expressed the hope for active participation in the meetings of the Council of the Empress: "Since Her Majesty herself has the presidency in the Privy Council, and there is reason to hope that she will often be personally present."

Another milestone in the history of the Supreme Privy Council is associated with the decree of January 1, 1727. He, like the decree of February 17, 1726 on the inclusion of the Duke of Holstein in the Privy Council, dealt another blow to the omnipotence of Menshikov. In his statement to the members of the Council on February 23, 1726, the duke, as we remember, promised to be an ordinary, like everyone else present, member of the new institution, urging everyone to "each his opinion freely and frankly declared." Indeed, Menshikov retained the role of the first member and continued to impose his will on the rest. By decree of January 1, 1727, Catherine I decided to officially assign this role to the duke. “We,” the decree said, “we can completely rely on his faithful zeal for us and our interests, for this reason his royal highness, as our most gracious son-in-law and in his dignity, not only over other members of the primacy and in all incidents the first vote, but we also allow His Royal Highness to demand from all institutions the statements he needs.

Fortunately for Menshikov, the duke as a person was not able to resist him. Weak in body and soul, drunk even from a small amount of strong drinks, for which he had a tender love, the duke could not compete with the prince also because he did not know the Russian language, was not aware of the state of affairs in Russia and did not have sufficient administrative experience . The Saxon ambassador Lefort gave him a derogatory characterization: "The duke's way of life has robbed him of his good name"; according to the ambassador, the prince found “the only pleasure in a glass”, and he immediately fell asleep “under the influence of wine vapors, since Bassevich inspired him that this was the only way to make yourself fall in love in Russia.” Bassevich, the duke's first minister, an experienced intriguer and braggart, who believed that Russia owed him everything that happened in it, easily controlled the duke as a puppet and represented the main danger to Menshikov.

We find a similar judgment about the duke in the Danish ambassador Westfalen. True, Westphalen spoke less harshly about the son-in-law of the Empress, finding in him some positive qualities: “The Duke does not speak Russian. But he speaks Swedish, German, French and Latin. He is well-read, especially in the field of history, loves to study, writes a lot, prone to luxury, stubborn and proud. His marriage to Anna Petrovna is unhappy. The duke has not become attached to his wife and is prone to debauchery and drinking. He wants to be like Charles XII, between whom and the duke there is no resemblance. He loves to talk, and reveals hypocrisy.

Nevertheless, this, in general, an insignificant person had a significant impact on the empress. In turn, in addition to the advice of Bassevich, the duke, presumably, used the advice of his balanced and reasonable wife.

A description of Anna Petrovna's appearance and her spiritual qualities was given by Count Bassevich. As already mentioned, Bassevich did not spare colors in order to portray her in the most attractive way: “Anna Petrovna resembled her august parent in face and character, but nature and upbringing softened everything in her. Her stature, over five feet, was not too high, with her unusually developed forms and proportion in all parts of the body, reaching perfection.

Nothing can be more majestic than her posture and physiognomy; nothing is more correct than the description of her face, and at the same time her look and smile were graceful and gentle. She had black hair and eyebrows, a complexion of dazzling whiteness, and a flush that was fresh and delicate, such as no artificiality can ever achieve; her eyes were of an indefinite color and distinguished by an unusual brilliance. In a word, the strictest exactingness in nothing could reveal any defect in it.

All this was accompanied by a penetrating mind, genuine simplicity and good nature, generosity, indulgence, an excellent education and an excellent knowledge of the languages ​​​​of the native, French, German, Italian and Swedish.

Campredon, who closely followed the balance of power at court, noted in his dispatches the growing influence of the Duke of Holstein on the empress already in the first half of 1725.

On March 3, he reported: "The queen, seeing in the duke the best support for herself, will warmly take his interests to her heart and will be largely guided by his advice." 10 March: "The influence of the duke is growing." April 7: "The Duke of Holstein is the closest attorney to the queen." April 14: “With envy and without fear, they look at the growing confidence in the Duke of Holstein, especially those who treated him with disdain and even contempt during the life of the king. Only their intrigues are useless. The queen, who wants to enthrone him on the throne of Sweden and hopes for him to receive military assistance from this power, sees in the duke her surest support. She is convinced that he can no longer have interests separate from her and her family, and that she can therefore only desire what is beneficial or honorable for her, as a result of which she, for her part, can fully rely on the conscientiousness of his advice and on the honesty of his relationship with her." April 24: “The Duke of Holstein, who during the time of the late tsar had no voice, now turns everyone around, since the tsarina is guided only by the advice of him and Prince Menshikov, our inveterate enemy.”

The duke counted on receiving from Peter as a dowry for the daughter of Livonia and Estonia, but did not receive either one or the other. But on May 6, 1725, Catherine presented the Duke of the islands of Ezel and Dago, which caused the hatred of Russian nobles.

The reader probably drew attention to the fact that the book is about the influence on the empress alternately of the Duke of Holstein, then Menshikov, then Tolstoy. At first sight, these judgments contradict one another. But, having looked closely at the personality of the empress, a weak-willed woman who strove to avoid conflicts with nobles and at the same time easily succumbed to the suggestions of one or the other, these contradictions must be recognized as seeming. Catherine used to agree with everyone, and this created the impression of the growing influence on her either of the duke and his wife and minister standing behind him, then of Menshikov, then of Tolstoy. The sources are silent about the influence of Makarov, but not because this influence did not exist, but because this influence was shadowy. In fact, the palm in influencing the empress should be given to Menshikov, not only because he played a decisive role in raising her to the throne, but also because he had the power that, having easily given Catherine the crown, with the same ease could this crown take away from her. The empress was afraid of Menshikov, and even in a critical situation for the prince, when he tried to seize the duchy of Courland, she did not dare to remove him from power.

The expansion of the son-in-law's powers did not justify Catherine's hopes - with this maneuver, she ultimately failed to create a counterbalance to Menshikov in the Supreme Privy Council. The failure was explained primarily by the fact that the weak-willed, narrow-minded, deprived of the ability to make independent decisions, the duke was opposed by the energetic, assertive, experienced not only in intrigues, but also in knowledge of the situation in the country of Menshikov.

The natural shortcomings of the duke were aggravated by the fact that he easily succumbed to third-party influence. The man, without whose knowledge the duke did not dare to take a step, was his minister Count Bassevich - a person of an adventurous temperament, an intriguer by nature, who more than once put his master in an awkward position.

The goal that Catherine aspired to was simple - not only to keep the crown on her head until the end of her days, but also to put it on the head of one of her daughters. Acting in the interests of the duke, the empress relied on family ties and rejected the services and zeal of Menshikov, to whom she owed the throne. However, the duke turned out to be so weak that he could not cope with restoring order not only in the country, but also in his own family. Here is the testimony of the French diplomat Magnan, who noted, “by the way, the coldness and disagreement that reigns between him and the duchess, his wife, and reaching the point that he has not been allowed into her bedroom for more than three months.”

As we remember, Catherine promised to chair the meetings of the Supreme Privy Council. However, she did not fulfill her promise: in the fifteen months that had passed from the time of the establishment of the Supreme Privy Council to her death, she attended the meetings fifteen times. There are frequent cases when, on the eve of the day of the meeting of the Council, she expressed a desire to attend it, but on the day when it was to be held, she instructed to announce that she was postponing her presence to the next day, after noon.

The reasons why this happened, the sources do not name. But, knowing the Empress’s daily routine, one can safely express the opinion that she was unwell because she went to bed after seven in the morning and spent the night hours at a plentiful feast.

As already mentioned, under Catherine I, Menshikov ruled the Supreme Privy Council - a man, although of a faulty reputation, but with a fairly wide range of talents: he was a talented commander and a good administrator and, being the first governor of St. Petersburg, successfully supervised the development of the new capital.

The second person who influenced both the Empress and the Supreme Privy Council was secret cabinet secretary Alexei Vasilyevich Makarov. There is reason to get to know this person better.

Like Menshikov, Devier, Kurbatov and other lesser-known associates of Peter the Great, Makarov could not boast of his pedigree - he was the son of a clerk in the Vologda Voivodship Office. The amateur historian of the second half of the 18th century, I. I. Golikov, depicted Peter's first meeting with Makarov as follows: glance at him, having penetrated into his abilities, took him to himself, appointed him as a scribe in his Cabinet and, little by little, elevating him, promoted him to the aforementioned dignity (of a secret cabinet-secretary. - N. P.), and since that time he has been inseparable from the monarch.

There are at least three inaccuracies in Golikov's report: there was no Cabinet of Peter the Great in 1693; Makarov served not in the Vologda, but in the Izhora office of Menshikov; finally, the starting date of his service in the Cabinet should be considered the year 1704, which is confirmed by a patent for the title of a secret cabinet-secretary.

Equally fantastic, but diametrically opposed information about Makarov's abilities was expressed by the German Gelbig, the author of the famous essay “Random People in Russia”. About Makarov, Gelbig wrote that he was “the son of a commoner, an intelligent fellow, but so ignorant that he could not even read and write. It seems that this ignorance made up his happiness. Peter took him as his secretary and instructed him to write off secret papers, a tedious job for Makarov, because he copied mechanically.

Even a superficial acquaintance with the documents of that time, to which Makarov was involved, is enough to be convinced of the absurdity of Gelbig's testimony: Makarov not only knew how to read and write, but also had an excellent command of the clerical language. It would be an exaggeration to consider Makarov’s pen as brilliant, similar to that owned by I. T. Pososhkov, P. P. Shafirov, F. Saltykov, but he knew how to compose letters, decrees, extracts and other business papers, understood Peter’s thoughts from a half-word and gave them an acceptable form for that time.

A huge mass of materials of national importance flocked to the Cabinet. All of them, before getting to the king, passed through the hands of the office secretary.

Among the government elite, Makarov enjoyed great prestige. Menshikov and Apraksin, Golovkin and Shafirov and other dignitaries solicited his benevolence. The archive fund of the Cabinet of Peter the Great contains thousands of letters addressed to Makarov. Taken together, they provide abundant material for the study of the characters, customs and human destinies of that time. Some turned to the tsar for mercy, others begged him from Makarov. It should be noted that petitioners bothered the tsar in rare cases: their hand was held by several decrees of Peter, who severely punished for filing petitions to him personally. Petitioners, however, learned to circumvent decrees: they turned with requests not to the tsar, but to Makarov, so that he would get the monarch to satisfy the request. The letters ended with a request to "represent" before the king and report to him the essence of the request "at a prosperous time" or "in due course." Prince Matvey Gagarin invented a slightly different formula: "Perhaps, dear sir, having seen the opportunity to inform his royal majesty." “At a prosperous time” or “over time” translated into modern language meant that the petitioner asked Makarov to report the request to the tsar at a time when he was in a good, benevolent mood, that is, Makarov had to catch the moment when the request could not cause outbursts of anger in an irritable king.

What kind of requests did not besiege Makarov! Marya Stroganova asked him to intercede with the tsar for the release of her nephew Afanasy Tatishchev from service, since there was “a need” for him in the house. Princess Arina Trubetskaya married her daughter and, in connection with this, urged Makarov to ask Catherine for permission to borrow 5-6 thousand rubles from the treasury, "to send us this wedding." Anna Sheremeteva, the widow of Field Marshal Boris Petrovich, asked to be protected "from petitioners in fugitive peasants, they are looking for great claims in their old years." The Countess asked the cabinet-secretary to report to the Tsar and Tsarina "at a favorable time" so that they "defend" her from the plaintiffs.

Many requests to Makarov came from the nobles. The President of the Admiralty Board and Senator Fyodor Matveyevich Apraksin ended his message to the cabinet secretary with the words: “If you please, hand over the letter to His Tsar’s Majesty and how it will be accepted, perhaps, if you please, leave without news.” The son of the prince-pope of the most drunken cathedral, Konon Zotov, who voluntarily volunteered to go abroad for training, complained to Makarov from Paris: “... I don’t have a date (from the king. - N.P.) neither praise nor anger.

Even the all-powerful Menshikov resorted to the mediation of Makarov. Not wanting to disturb the tsar with unimportant matters, he wrote: “About what, I didn’t want to bother your Majesty, I wrote at length to Secretary Makarov.” In a letter to Makarov, Alexander Danilovich, outlining the essence of minor matters, informed him: “But I didn’t want to bother His Majesty with these small matters, what I would expect.” Menshikov, as well as other correspondents who were in a trusting relationship with Makarov, often informed the cabinet secretary of facts and events that he considered necessary to hide from the tsar, for he knew that they would arouse his anger. So, for example, in July 1716, Menshikov wrote to Makarov, who was abroad with the tsar: “So in Peterhof and in Strelina, there are a lot of sick people among the workers and they die incessantly, from which more than a thousand people died this summer. However, I am writing to you about this poor condition of the workers in your special knowledge, about which, unless some case calls, then you can convey, moreover, to tea, that even so many non-corrections here his royal majesty is not a little troublesome. In the report to the tsar, sent on the same day, there was not a single word about the mass death of the builders. True, the prince said that he found work on the island of Kotlin "in a weak state", but he called continuous rains the reason for this.

Makarov dared to help even those who were in royal disgrace. Among the nobles, favored by him, we meet the first "profit-maker" Alexei Kurbatov, who later became the Arkhangelsk vice-governor, Moscow vice-governor Vasily Ershov, the tsar's favorite orderly, and then Admiralty Alexander Kikin. The latter was accused in 1713 of criminal fraud with contracts for the supply of bread to St. Petersburg. The threat to end his life on the gallows seemed quite real, but the former favorite of the tsar was then rescued from trouble by Ekaterina Alekseevna and Makarov.

Makarov's activity as cabinet secretary deserves such detailed coverage, primarily because he also held this position under Catherine I. Moreover, the cabinet secretary in her reign acquired an immeasurably greater influence than in the previous one. Under the reformer tsar, who held in his hands all the threads of governing the country, Alexei Vasilyevich served as a speaker; under Catherine, who did not possess management skills, he acted as an adviser to the empress and an intermediary between her and the Supreme Privy Council. Makarov was prepared for this task, having more than twenty years of training in the craft of administrator under Peter's supervision. Knowing all the intricacies of the work of the government mechanism and able to tell the empress in time the need to publish the necessary decree, Makarov, along with Menshikov, became Catherine's main assistant.

Several facts testify to the high prestige Makarov managed to give to the institution he leads and to his own person as the cabinet secretary. So, by decree of September 7, 1726, important matters were ordered to be reported first to the Cabinet of Her Imperial Majesty, and then to the Supreme Privy Council. On December 9, 1726, Catherine, who highly appreciated Makarov's services, granted him the rank of Privy Councilor.

Another evidence of Makarov's high authority was the formula for registering his presence at meetings of the Supreme Privy Council. Even about senators, not to mention nobles of a lower rank, in journal entries we read: “admitted”, “admitted” or “summoned” to the presence of the Supreme Privy Council, while the appearance of Makarov was recorded by a more respectful formula: “Then came the secret cabinet-secretary Makarov”, “Then there was a secret cabinet-secretary Makarov”, “Then the secret secretary Makarov announced the Cabinet”.

The significance of the Senate and senators in the reign of Catherine significantly weakened. This is evidenced, for example, by the journal entry of the Supreme Privy Council dated March 28, 1726, when senators Devier and Saltykov arrived at its meeting with a report: “Before the admission of those senators, his royal highness (Duke of Holstein. - N.P.) deigned to announce his opinion: that when senators come to the Supreme Privy Council with deeds, they would not read those deeds and not discuss them in front of them, so that they would not know before the time that the Supreme Privy Council would discuss.

The foreign minister in the then bureaucratic pyramid also stood below Makarov: "At that meeting, Privy Councilor von Bassevich was admitted to His Royal Highness the Duke of Holstein." Recall that the Duke of Holstein was the son-in-law of the Empress.

Communication between the Empress and the Supreme Privy Council was carried out in various ways. The simplest was that Makarov informed the members of the council about the cancellation of the empress's intention to attend a meeting of the Supreme Privy Council.

Most often, Makarov performed an intermediary role between the Empress and the Supreme Privy Council, passed on Catherine's oral orders to him or carried out instructions from the Supreme Privy Council to transfer prepared decrees to the Empress for approval. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that Alexei Vasilievich performed purely mechanical functions at the same time - in fact, during the reports, he gave advice to the Empress, who was ignorant in matters of administration and did not want to delve into the essence of the issue, with which she easily agreed. As a result, the orders of the empress actually belonged not to her, but to the cabinet-secretary, who knew how to tactfully impose his will on her. Let us give several examples, with the reservation that the sources did not preserve direct evidence that the Empress was a puppet in the hands of Menshikov and Makarov; This is where logical considerations come into play.

On March 13, 1726, the Supreme Privy Council learned that the Senate was not accepting promemoria from the first three colleges. This was reported to the Empress Makarov. Returning, he announced that the Senate from now on "will be written the High Senate, and not the Governing Senate, because this word" Governing "is obscene." It is unlikely that Catherine could have carried out such an action, which required appropriate legal training, on her own, without outside influence.

On August 8, 1726, Catherine, present at a meeting of the Supreme Privy Council, expressed a judgment that required her knowledge of diplomatic etiquette and awareness of precedents. She “deigned to have an argument” to send Prince Vasily Dolgoruky as an ambassador to Poland instead of Count Bassevich, “arguing that it is possible for him there and without a public audience and other ceremonies to manage the embassy business, following the example of how here, being the Swedish ambassador Zederhelm repaired.

A special role fell to the lot of Makarov in the appointments. This is not surprising - after the death of Peter I, no one in the country could compete with Alexei Vasilyevich in knowing the shortcomings and merits of various nobles. Personal acquaintance with each of them allowed him to know their zeal for service, and the degree of disinterestedness, and such properties of nature as a tendency to cruelty or mercy. Makarov's recommendations were of decisive importance for the empress.

So, on February 23, 1727, the Supreme Privy Council presented a list of candidates for governors, Princes Yuri Trubetskoy, Alexei Cherkassky, Alexei Dolgoruky, and Alexei Pleshcheev, president of the Preimplementation Office. Catherine agreed to appoint only Major General Y. Trubetskoy as governor; “About the others,” Makarov informed the Supreme Privy Council, “I deigned to say that they are needed here, and in order to“ choose others and present them ”. In order to “deign to say” something like that, it was necessary to have detailed information about each of the candidates and be sure “that they are needed here,” and this was hardly possible for the empress.

Makarov also stood behind Catherine's back when Major General Vasily Zotov was appointed governor in Kazan. The Supreme Privy Council considered it more expedient to appoint him President of the College of Justice, but the Empress. of course, at the suggestion of Makarov, she insisted on her own.

It is known that Alexei Bibikov, who had a brigadier rank, was patronized by Menshikov. It was him that Alexander Danilovich read for the Novgorod vice-governors, believing that Kholopov, recommended by the Empress, "because of old age and decrepitude, is not capable of any service." Ekaterina (read, Makarov) rejected Bibikov's candidacy, ordering "to elect another, older than him, Bibikov, as vice-governor."

Feedback from the Supreme Privy Council with the Empress was also carried out through Makarov. In the papers, one can find different versions of the wording, the meaning of which was that the Supreme Privy Council instructed Makarov to convey to the Empress the decrees he had adopted for their approval or for their signing.

Sometimes - though not often - Makarov's name was mentioned on a par with the members of the Supreme Privy Council present at its meetings. So, on May 16, 1726, “in the presence of four persons (Apraksin, Golovkin, Tolstoy and Golitsyn. - N.P.)... and secret cabinet-secretary Alexei Makarov, Alexei Bestuzhev's secret report, No. 17, from Copenhagen was read. On March 20, 1727, Alexei Vasilievich even took the initiative to transfer the money remaining in the Rostov diocese after the indicated expenses to the treasury. The Supreme Privy Council agreed: "Commit on that proposal."

Of course, the ruling elite knew about Makarov's influence on the empress. Makarov also made mortal enemies, among whom the most sworn were A. I. Osterman and Vice-President of the Synod Feofan Prokopovich. They gave him a lot of trouble during the reign of Anna Ioannovna, when Makarov was under investigation for many years and was kept under house arrest until his death.

However, the empress did not need prompting in all cases. At the level of domestic issues, she made independent decisions, as happened, for example, with the decree of July 21, 1726 on the procedure for holding fisticuffs in the capital. Petersburg Police Chief Devier reported that there were crowded fisticuffs on Aptekarsky Island, during which “many, taking out their knives, chase other fighters, and others, putting cannonballs, stones, and flails into their gloves, beat without mercy with death blows, from which there are battles and not without mortal slaughter, which slaughter is not imputed as a sin, they also throw sand in the eyes. The empress did not ban fistfights, but demanded honest observance of their rules: “Who ... henceforth in such fistfights for entertainment will have a desire, and they will choose sots, fifties and tenths, register with the police office, and then observe the observance of the rules of fisticuffs battle."

Another person whose influence on state affairs was undoubted, although not very noticeable, was A. I. Osterman. For the time being, he was behind the scenes of events, and came to the fore later, after the fall of Menshikov. The Spanish ambassador de Liria reported on January 10, 1728: “... after the fall of Menshikov, all the affairs of this monarchy passed into his (Osterman. - N.P.) hands ... of a person known for his qualities and abilities. According to him, Osterman was "a businessman, behind whom everything is intrigues and schemers."

Most foreign observers are unanimous in their high assessment of Andrei Ivanovich's abilities. Here is how the Prussian ambassador Mardefeld spoke of him on July 6, 1727, when Osterman was still under the patronage of Menshikov: “Osterman’s loan stems not only from the power of the prince (Menshikov. - N. P.), but is based on the great abilities of the baron, his honesty, his disinterestedness and is supported by the boundless love for him of the young emperor (Peter II. - N. P.), who has enough foresight to recognize in him the mentioned qualities and understand that the baron is quite necessary for this state for its relations with foreign powers.

It is not possible to agree with all the above assessments. Mardefeld rightly noted the rare quality of the nobleman of that time - Osterman was not convicted of either bribery or embezzlement. The statement about his mind, efficiency and role in the government is also true. Indeed, Osterman had enough physical strength and talents to not only familiarize himself with the content of the numerous reports received by the Supreme Privy Council from collegiums, governors, officials who carried out his special assignments, but also to single out the most important of them in order to form the agenda of the next meeting, to prepare the corresponding decree, for which, on his instructions, assistants sought out previous decrees on a similar occasion. The domestic nobles of that time were not accustomed to such systematic work, and the industrious Osterman was indeed indispensable. According to Mardefeld, Osterman “carries the burden that they (Russian nobles. - N. P.), due to their natural laziness, they do not want to wear it.

The indispensability of Osterman in resolving issues of everyday, routine life of the state was also noted by the observant French diplomat Magnan, who informed the court of Versailles in June 1728: “Osterman’s loan is supported only by its necessity for Russians, no Russian feels hardworking enough to take on this burden.” Manyan is wrong in extending the lack of industriousness to all "Russians". Suffice it to refer to Makarov's office secretary, who was in no way inferior to Osterman in diligence. However, Alexei Vasilyevich lacked knowledge of foreign languages ​​and awareness of foreign policy affairs.

Such were the people in whose hands the real power was and who had to look for ways to overcome the crisis that struck Russia at the beginning of the second quarter of the 18th century.

Domestic history contains many episodes in which there was a process of transfer of power from one leader to another. Sometimes these were bloody palace coups and revolutions. Sometimes the change of power occurred without bloodshed.

In the eighteenth century in the Russian Empire, as in many other countries of the civilized world, the first prerequisites for a crisis of autocratic power gradually began to appear.

In this article, the reader will be told one of such episodes of Russian history, where, albeit for a short time, a group of high-ranking officials, the Supreme Privy Council, took the reins of state government into their own hands.

Peter the Great is dead. The first emperor of the Russian Empire left behind a great legacy that needed to be properly managed. At the same time, Catherine the First, who ascended the imperial throne after the death of Peter, was rather far from state affairs.

Thus, it became necessary to form the Supreme Privy Council - a body that would carry out state administration on behalf of the autocrat. In addition, the influence of the nobility gradually increased, and it was no longer possible to ignore it. Having created a state governing body, consisting of nobles, it was possible to control this influential part of the population.

So, in February 1726, the Supreme Privy Council was established by Empress Catherine the First.

Initially, the council was conceived as a small group of people competent in matters of government. The first composition of the Supreme Privy Council included the most influential associates of Peter the Great. This decision is due to the ability to coordinate all areas of government activity. Let us consider in more detail the personalities of all members of the Supreme Privy Council.

Alexander Danilovich Menshikov

The largest Russian military and political figure, the closest associate and one of the most trusted persons of Emperor Peter the Great. Menshikov was next to Peter both in the youth of the future emperor, when he worked out the system of the future army in "amusing" regiments, and during the decisive moments of Peter's military campaigns in the first quarter of the eighteenth century. Menshikov personally influenced the outcome of many of them.

Successful military service contributed to the dizzying military and state career of Menshikov. Meekly fulfilling the decrees of the sovereign, Alexander Danilovich, a few days before the founding of St. Petersburg, was already listed as its governor-general, thus becoming the first person to hold this position.

For zeal in serving the sovereign, Menshikov received the military ranks of a general from the cavalry, and for participation in the Battle of Poltava, where the Swedish army was defeated and almost completely captured under the command of Alexander Danilovich, he was awarded the rank of field marshal.

As a result of successful service, Menshikov's wealth and influence rapidly increased. For example, for the defeat of the troops of Hetman Mazepa, the statesman was granted the village of Ivanovskoye and nearby villages.

According to historians, it was Menshikov who actually determined the domestic and foreign policy of the Russian Empire after the death of Peter the Great. Using considerable influence in the council, Menshikov remained the "grey eminence" of the Russian court until his overthrow and exile.

Fedor Matveevich Apraksin

Also a native of the inner circle of Peter the Great. This man stood at the origins of the creation of the domestic navy, heading the Admiralty Board for a long time.

Apraksin, like Menshikov, was noted for his rapid military career. The naval commander acquired a significant share of fame after a successful campaign against the Ottoman Empire and the capture of the city of Azov.

Fedor Matveyevich Apraksin occupied one of the leading positions in the state and military affairs of the Russian Empire, second only to Menshikov in the Supreme Privy Council. The official retained his influence until his death in 1728.

Gavriil Ivanovich Golovkin

The "Great Chancellor," as he was called, was a confidant of Peter the Great as president of the Collegium of Foreign Affairs. A born diplomat, Golovkin earned himself a reputation as a flexible politician and one of the wealthiest men of the era.

Contemporaries often noted that, despite all his well-being, Gavriil Ivanovich always tried to dress poorly, in many ways he denied himself. According to one version, the childhood of a politician associated with constant need affected.

Golovkin was the third most important member of the Supreme Privy Council, but was able to maintain his status and influence despite the fickleness of the era of "palace coups".

Chancellor Golovkin was also distinguished by the fact that he was at enmity with the princes Dolgoruky, who dominated the council after the change of the first composition.

Petr Andreevich Tolstoy

Count, founder of the well-known Tolstoy dynasty, from which famous writers and artists, including the author of the famous novel "War and Peace" became in the future.

At the time of the formation of the Supreme Privy Council, Count Tolstoy served as head of the Secret Chancellery - a secret service created under Peter the Great. Pyotr Andreevich Tolstoy also oversaw the judiciary of the Russian Empire.

Dmitry Mikhailovich Golitsyn

Prince, one of the best business executives of the time of Peter the Great. He had a lot of experience in modernizing fortifications and preparing them for the war with the Swedes.

At one time, Golitsyn was in charge of the Chamber Collegium, whose competence included the collection of taxes and the distribution of the treasury, various economic issues.

Looking ahead, it should be said that it was Golitsyn who was the author of the "Conditions" of the Supreme Privy Council, aimed at significantly limiting autocracy in the Russian Empire.

Heinrich Johann Friedrich Osterman

Andrei Ivanovich (in the Russian version) Osterman is one of the most important figures in Russian foreign policy in the first half of the eighteenth century.

A native of Germany, Andrei Ivanovich could easily navigate in any difficult situation and enjoyed the trust of Peter the Great. For a long time he served as Vice-Chancellor.

If we analyze the first composition of this advisory body, we can conclude that Empress Catherine the First gathered around herself really competent and knowledgeable people who are able to resolve issues in any branches of government. The council included experienced military men, skillful diplomats, and managers.

As often happens, a struggle for power began in the highest deliberative state body of that time.

The first victim of this struggle was Count Tolstoy, whose presence on the council was constantly contested by Menshikov.

After a short period of time, the unspoken leader of the council, Menshikov, is exiled to Siberia on charges of embezzling state money.

The death of Apraksin in 1728 made her own adjustments to the composition of the council.

The Council controlled all spheres of Russian society. Here the most important military decisions were made, the course of the country's foreign policy was laid, and internal issues of the state were discussed.

At its core, the council combined the best leaders of the time of Peter the Great, who were called to help the monarch in matters of state.

By its activities, the Supreme Privy Council greatly undermined the position of the Senate, placing it below the Holy Synod - the highest body of the church and state administration of the country.

The Supreme Privy Council was created after the death of Peter the Great. Catherine's accession to the throne made it necessary to organize it in order to clarify the state of affairs: the empress was not able to manage the activities of the Russian government.

Prerequisites

The establishment of the Supreme Privy Council, as many believed, was supposed to "calm the offended feelings" of the old nobility, removed from the management of unborn figures. At the same time, it was not the form that had to change, but the nature and essence of the supreme power, because, having retained its titles, it turned into a state institution.

Many historians express the opinion that the main flaw in the system of government created by the great Peter was the impossibility of combining the nature of executive power with the collegial principle, and therefore the Supreme Privy Council was founded.

It turned out that the emergence of this supreme advisory body was not so much the result of a confrontation of political interests, but rather a necessity associated with filling a gap in the inferior Petrine system at the level of top management. The results of the short activity of the Council were not very significant, since it had to act immediately after a tense and active era, when one reform replaced another, and in all spheres of state life there was a strong excitement.

Reason for creation

The creation of the Supreme Privy Council was called upon to sort out the complex tasks of the Petrine reforms that remained unresolved. His activities clearly showed what exactly of Catherine's inheritance stood the test of time, and what should be reorganized. The Supreme Council most consistently adhered to the line chosen by Peter in the policy concerning industry, although on the whole the general trend of its activity can be described as reconciling the interests of the people with the interests of the army, refusing extensive military campaigns and not accepting any reforms in relation to the Russian army. At the same time, this institution responded in its activities to those needs and matters that required an immediate solution.

February 1726 was the date of establishment of this highest deliberative state institution. Its members were General Field Marshal Menshikov, State Chancellor Golovkin, General Apraksin, Count Tolstoy, Baron Osterman and Prince Golitsyn. A month later, the Duke of Holstein, Catherine's son-in-law, the most trusted person of the Empress, was included in its composition. From the very beginning, the members of this supreme body were exclusively followers of Peter, but soon Menshikov, who was in exile under Peter the Second, supplanted Tolstoy. After some time, Apraksin died, and the Duke of Holstein stopped attending meetings altogether. Of the originally appointed members of the Supreme Privy Council, only three representatives remained in its ranks - Osterman, Golitsyn and Golovkin. The composition of this deliberative supreme body has changed a lot. Gradually, power passed into the hands of powerful princely families - the Golitsyns and Dolgoruky.

Activity

By order of the Empress, the Senate was also subordinated to the Privy Council, which at first was lowered to the point that they decided to send decrees from the Synod, which had previously equal rights with it. Under Menshikov, the newly created body tried to consolidate the power of the government for itself. The ministers, as its members were called, together with the senators swore allegiance to the empress. It was strictly forbidden to execute decrees that were not signed by the Empress and her brainchild, which was the Supreme Privy Council.

According to the testament of Catherine the Great, it was precisely this body that, during the childhood of Peter II, was given power equivalent to the power of the sovereign. However, the Privy Council did not have the right to make changes only in the order of succession to the throne.

Change in the form of government

From the first moment of the establishment of this organization, many abroad predicted the possibility of attempts to change the form of government in Rus'. And they were right. When he died and it happened on the night of January 19, 1730, despite the will of Catherine, her descendants were removed from the throne. The pretext was the youth and frivolity of Elizabeth, the youngest heiress of Peter, and the infancy of their grandson, the son of Anna Petrovna. The question of the election of the Russian monarch was decided by the influential voice of Prince Golitsyn, who stated that attention should be paid to the senior line of the Petrine family, and therefore proposed the candidacy of Anna Ioannovna. The daughter of Ivan Alekseevich, who had been living in Courland for nineteen years, suited everyone, since she had no favorites in Russia. She seemed manageable and obedient, with no inclination to despotism. In addition, such a decision was due to Golitsyn's rejection of Peter's reforms. This narrowly individual tendency was joined by the long-awaited plan of the “supreme leaders” to change the form of government, which, naturally, was easier to do under the rule of the childless Anna.

"Conditions"

Taking advantage of the situation, the "supervisors", having decided to limit the somewhat autocratic power, demanded that Anna sign certain conditions, the so-called "Conditions". According to them, it was the Supreme Privy Council that should have had real power, and the role of the sovereign was reduced to only representative functions. This form of government was new for Russia.

At the end of January 1730, the new empress signed the “Conditions” presented to her. From now on, without the approval of the Supreme Council, she could not start wars, conclude peace treaties, introduce new taxes or impose taxes. It was not in her competence to spend the treasury at her own discretion, promote to ranks higher than the rank of colonel, pay estates, deprive nobles of life or property without trial, and most importantly, appoint an heir to the throne.

The struggle for the revision of the "Conditions"

Anna Ioannovna, having entered the Mother See, went to the Assumption Cathedral, where the highest state officials and troops swore allegiance to the empress. The oath, new in form, was deprived of some of the former expressions that meant autocracy, and it did not mention the rights that were endowed with the Supreme Secret Organ. In the meantime, the struggle between the two parties - the "supreme leaders" and supporters of autocracy - intensified. P. Yaguzhinsky, Feofan Prokopovich and A. Osterman played an active role in the ranks of the latter. They were supported by broad layers of the nobility, who wanted to revise the "Conditions". Discontent was primarily due to the strengthening of a narrow circle of members of the Privy Council. In addition, in the conditions, most of the representatives of the gentry, as the nobility was called at that time, saw the intention to establish an oligarchy in Russia and the desire to assign two surnames - Dolgoruky and Golitsyn - the right to elect a monarch and change the form of government.

Cancellation of "Conditions"

In February 1730, a large group of representatives of the nobility, according to some sources, up to eight hundred people, came to the palace to give Anna Ioannovna a petition. Among them were quite a lot of guards officers. In the petition, the empress expressed herself, together with the nobility, to once again revise the form of government in order to make it pleasing to the entire Russian people. Anna, by virtue of her character, hesitated somewhat, but her older sister - - forced her to sign the petition. In it, the nobles asked to accept full autocracy and destroy the points of the "Conditions".

Anna, on new terms, secured the approval of the confused "supreme leaders": they had no choice but to nod their heads in agreement. According to a contemporary, they had no other choice, because at the slightest opposition or disapproval, the guardsmen would pounce on them. Anna publicly tore up not only the "Conditions" with pleasure, but also her own letter about the acceptance of their points.

On March 1, 1730, on the terms of full-fledged autocracy, the people once again took the oath to the Empress. And just three days later, the Manifesto of March 4 abolished the Supreme Privy Council.

The fate of its former members was different. retired, and after a while he died. His brother, as well as three of the four Dolgorukovs, were executed during Anna's reign. The repression spared only one of them - Vasily Vladimirovich, who was acquitted, returned from exile and, moreover, appointed head of the military collegium.

Osterman during the reign of Empress Anna Ioannovna was in the most important state post. Moreover, in 1740-1741 he briefly became the de facto ruler of the country, but as a result of another he was defeated and was exiled to Berezov.

Having ascended the throne, Catherine continued to shower "favors" on the guards. Behind Catherine were the nobles, who at first actually ruled for her, and then legally consolidated power in the country.

There was no unity among the main nobles. Everyone wanted power, everyone strove for enrichment, fame, honor. Everyone was afraid of the "blessed one" 11 Gordin Ya. Between slavery and freedom. P.142.. They were afraid that this “omnipotent Goliath”, as Menshikov was called, using his influence on the empress, would become at the helm of the board, and push other nobles, more knowledgeable and more prolific than him, into the background. The "omnipotent Goliath" was feared not only by the nobles, but also by the nobility and gentry. The coffin of Peter was still standing in the Peter and Paul Cathedral, and already Yaguzhinsky turned to the ashes of the emperor, loudly so that they could hear him, complaining about the “offenses” from Menshikov. The influential Golitsyns rallied, one of whom, Mikhail Mikhailovich, who commanded the troops stationed in Ukraine, seemed especially dangerous to Catherine and Menshikov. Menshikov openly disparaged the Senate, and the senators in response to this refused to meet. In such an environment, the smart and energetic Pyotr Andreevich Tolstoy acted, having obtained the consent of Menshikov, Apraksin, Golovkin, Golitsyn and Ekaterina (whose role in this matter was actually reduced to zero) to establish the Supreme Privy Council. On February 8, 1726, Catherine signed a decree on its establishment. The decree read that “for the good we judged and ordered from now on at our court, both for external and internal state important affairs, to establish a Privy Council ...”. By decree of February 8, Alexander Danilovich Menshikov, Fyodor Matveevich Apraksin, Gavrila Ivanovich Golovkin, Pyotr Andreevich Tolstoy, Dmitry Mikhailovich Golitsyn and Andrei

Ivanovich Osterman 22 Ibid.S.43..

After some time, members of the Supreme Privy Council submitted to Catherine "an opinion not in a decree on the newly established Privy Council", which established the rights and functions of this new highest government body. “Opinion not in a decree” assumed that all the most important decisions are made only by the Supreme Privy Council, any imperial decree ends with the expressive phrase “given in the Privy Council”, papers addressed to the Empress are also provided with an expressive inscription “to be submitted to the Privy Council”, foreign policy, the army and navy are under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Privy Council, as well as the boards that head them. The Senate, of course, is losing not only its former importance as the supreme body in the complex and cumbersome bureaucratic machine of the Russian Empire, but also the title of "governing". “Opinion not for a decree” 11 “Opinion not for a decree on the newly established Supreme Privy Council” p.14. became a decree for Catherine: she agreed with everything, only stipulating something. Created "at the side of the Empress", the Supreme Privy Council only graciously reckoned with her. So, in fact, all power was concentrated in the hands of the "supreme leaders", and the ruling Senate, the stronghold of the senatorial opposition to Menshikov and his entourage, having become simply "high", lost its significance for a long time, without ceasing to be the focus of opposition to the "supervisors" 22 Vyazemsky L.B. Supreme Privy Council. P.245..

Attention is drawn to the composition of the Supreme Privy Council, it fully reflects the balance of power that has developed in government circles. Most of the members of the Supreme Privy Council, namely four out of six (Menshikov, Apraksin, Golovkin and Tolstoy), belonged to that unborn nobility or adjoined it, like Golovkin, who came to the fore under Peter and thanks to him took leading positions in government ", became rich, noble, influential. The noble nobility was represented by one Dmitry Mikhailovich Golitsyn. And, finally, Heinrich Ioganovich Osterman, a German from Westphalia, who became Andrei Ivanovich in Russia, an intriguer, an unprincipled careerist, ready to serve anyone and in any way, stands apart, an energetic and active bureaucrat, a submissive executor of the royal orders under Peter and the ruler of the Russian Empire under Anna Ivanovna, "a crafty courtier" who successfully survived more than one palace coup. His appearance in the Supreme Privy Council portends the time when, following the death of Peter, whom " overseas" adventurers, who looked at Russia as a feeding trough, although they were not invited to distant Muscovy by him, were afraid and did not dare to act openly, his mediocre successors ended up on the Russian throne, and the "German attack" unfolded all over, penetrating into all the pores of the Russian state. Thus, the composition of the Supreme Privy Council under Catherine I in February 1726 reflected the victory of Peter's pupils and their supporters in January 1725 (the guards. But they were going to rule Russia in a completely different way than Peter. The Supreme Privy Council was a bunch of aristocrats (and the leaders really were a feudal aristocracy, all without exception, regardless of who their fathers and grandfathers were in the Muscovite state), striving together, a small but powerful and influential group to rule the Russian Empire in their own interests.

Of course, the inclusion of Dmitry Mikhailovich Golitsyn in the Supreme Privy Council did not at all mean his reconciliation with the idea that he, Gediminovich, had the same right and reason to rule the country as the tsar's batman Menshikov, the "thin" Apraksin and others. The time will come when and contradictions between the "supreme leaders", i.e. the same contradictions between the well-born and the unborn nobility, which resulted in the events at Peter's tomb, will also be reflected in the activities of the Supreme Privy Council itself. M 2000 p. 590.

Even in a report dated October 30, 1725, the French envoy F. Campredon reports a “secret meeting with the queen”, in connection with which he mentions the names of A. D. Menshikov, P. I. Yaguzhinsky and Karl Friedrich. A week later, he reports "two important meetings" held at Menshikov's. 1 One of his reports also mentions the name of Count P. A. Tolstoy.

Almost at the same time, the Danish envoy G. Mardefeld reports in reports about the persons who are members of the councils "collected for internal and external affairs": these are A. D. Menshikov, G. I. Golovkin, P. A., Tolstoy and A. I. Osterman.

When analyzing these reports, the following facts should be noted. First, we are talking about the most important and "secret" state affairs. Secondly, the circle of advisers is narrow, more or less constant and includes people holding key government posts and relatives of the tsar (Karl Friedrich is Anna Petrovna's husband). Further: meetings can take place with Catherine I and with her participation. Finally, most of the persons named by Campridon and Mardefeld then became members of the Supreme Privy Council. Tolstoy came up with a plan to curb Menshikov's self-will: he convinced the empress to create a new institution - the Supreme Privy Council. The empress was to preside over its meetings, and its members were given equal votes. If not with her mind, then with a heightened sense of self-preservation, Catherine understood that the unbridled disposition of her Serene Highness, his dismissive attitude towards other nobles who sat in the Senate, his desire to command everyone and everything, could cause strife and an explosion of discontent not only among the noble nobility, but also among those who put her on the throne. 22 Collection of the Russian Historical Society. P. 46. Intrigues and rivalry, of course, did not strengthen the position of the empress. But on the other hand, Catherine's consent to the creation of the Supreme Privy Council was an indirect recognition of her inability to rule the country herself, like her husband.

Was the emergence of the Supreme Privy Council a break with the Petrine principles of government? To resolve this issue, one must turn to the last years of Peter and the practice of deciding the most important issues by the Senate. Here the following is striking. The Senate may not meet in its entirety; at meetings that dealt with important issues, the emperor himself was often present. Particularly revealing was the meeting on August 12, 1724, which discussed the construction of the Ladoga Canal and the main items of state revenue. It was attended by: Peter I, Apraksin, Golovkin, Golitsyn. It is noteworthy that all Peter's advisers are future members of the Supreme Privy Council. This suggests that Peter I, and then Catherine, were inclined towards the idea of ​​reorganizing the top management by forming a body narrower than the Senate. Apparently, it is no coincidence that Lefort's report of May 1, 1725 reports on the plans being developed at the Russian court "on the establishment of a secret council", including the Empress, Duke Karl Friedrich, Menshikov, Shafirov, Makarov. 11 there. S. 409.

So, the origins of the appearance of the Supreme Privy Council should be sought not only in the "helplessness" of Catherine I. The announcement of the meeting on August 12, 1724 casts doubt on the common thesis about the emergence of the Council as some kind of compromise with the "clan's nobility", personified by Golitsyn.

The decree of February 8, 1726, which officially formalized the Supreme Privy Council under the person of the Empress, is interesting precisely not because of the traces of the struggle of individuals and groups (they can be seen there only with very great difficulty): this state act is nothing more than a legislative establishment, in principle, which boils down to the legalization of an already existing council.

Let us turn to the text of the decree: “Later, we saw that the secret real advisers, and in addition to the Senate government, have a lot of work in the following matters: 1) that they often have secret councils on political and other state affairs in their position, like first ministers, 2) some of them sit in the first collegiums, which is why in the first and very necessary business, in the Privy Council, and in the Senate, there is a stop and a continuation from the fact that, due to busy work, they can soon fix resolutions and the aforementioned state affairs. Togo, for the good, we judged and ordered from now on at our court, both for external and internal state important affairs, to establish a Supreme Privy Council, in which we ourselves will judge.

It is difficult to suspect the decree of February 8, 1726 of some kind of “understatement”, masking some kind of struggle between parties, groups, etc. state machine.

Not so long ago, the opinion was clearly formulated that over the course of a number of years, since the time of Peter I, “the lack of efficiency of the Senate began to be felt more strongly, and this could not but lead to the creation of a more flexible permanent body. It became the Supreme Privy Council, which arose on the basis of meetings of advisers systematically gathered by Catherine I. The above thesis most adequately reflects the reasons for the changes in the top management in 1726 and finds confirmation in specific material.

As early as March 16, 1726, the French envoy Campredon relied on assessments that had come down from among the Council itself. In the so-called “Opinion not in a Decree” 1 we find, in particular, such a commentary on the decree of February 8, 1726: “But how is Her Imperial Majesty now ... for the best success in reprisal of the state, the government also deigned to divide in two, and in one important, in the other, other state affairs, as everyone can see, that with the help of God, unlike before, it has become better than before ... ”The Supreme Privy Council, like the unspoken councils of the times of Peter I, is a purely absolutist body. Indeed, there is no document regulating the activities of the Council. "Opinion is not a decree" rather formulates the general principles of independence and sovereignty, rather than somehow restricts them. In charge of foreign and domestic policy, the Council is imperial, since the empress in it "governs the first presidency", "this council is only the least for a special collegium or otherwise honored, if only Her Majesty serves as relief in Her heavy government of the burden."

So, the first link: the Supreme Privy Council is the direct heir to the tacit councils of Peter I in the 20s of the 18th century, bodies with a more or less permanent composition, information about which was quite clearly reflected in the diplomatic correspondence of that time.

The fall of the Supreme Privy Council in 1730 could be seen as proof that the appearance of bodies like it was something of a ghost of the past that stood in the way of the newly born Russian absolutism. Many historians of the 18th and 19th centuries perceived this organ in this way, starting with V.N. Meanwhile, neither the events of 1730 nor their consequences give grounds for such a conclusion. It should be taken into account that by the indicated time the Council had largely lost the quality of the country's unspoken real government: if in 1726 there were 125 meetings of the Council, and in 1727 - 165, then, for example, from October 1729 after the death of Peter II in January 1730, the Council was not going to at all and things were pretty much neglected. 11 Vyazemsky B.L. Supreme Privy Council. pp. 399-413.

In addition, documents published in 1730, moreover, documents of programmatic significance, without exaggeration, cannot be reduced to the famous "Conditions". Equally noteworthy is the so-called "Oath Promise of the Members of the Supreme Privy Council." It is considered as a document drawn up by the members of the Council after getting acquainted with the position of the capital's nobility in relation to the supreme power. It says: “The integrity and well-being of every state consists of good advice ... The Supreme Privy Council consists not for any of its own assembly of power, but only for the best state crawling and management, to help their imperial majesties.” Considering the official nature of the document, this declaration cannot be perceived as a demegological device, apparently: its orientation is diametrically opposed to the provisions of the "Conditions". Most likely, this is evidence of a change in the initial position of the Supreme Privy Council, taking into account the wishes expressed in the noble projects, and the mood of the nobility itself. It is no coincidence that the program requirement of the “Oath Promise”: “See that in such a first meeting of one family name more than two persons are not multiplied, so that none of them could take the upper force for the settlement.” This is a fairly visible confirmation that, with on the one hand, the traditions of the "monarchy with the boyar duma and the boyar aristocracy" were still in memory, and on the other hand, that the political thinking of the top of the ruling class in this period directly abandoned them.

The indicated adjustment of the position of the Supreme Privy Council was the reason that in March 1730 he did not experience any cruel repressions. The decree of March 4, 1730, which abolished the Council, is sustained in a very calm form. Moreover, a significant part of the members of the Council was introduced to the restored Senate and only then, under various pretexts, was removed from state affairs. On November 18, 1731, members of the Supreme Privy Council A.I. Osterman and G.I. Golovkin were introduced to the newly established Cabinet of Ministers. Such trust on the part of the new empress to people who were, without any doubt, aware of the well-known "tricks" with the restriction of the powers of the empress, deserves to be noted. There is still a lot of obscurity in the history of the events of 1730. Even Gradovsky A. D. drew attention to a curious detail of the first steps of Anna Ioannovna's policy: while restoring the Senate, the Empress did not restore the position of Prosecutor General. As one of the options for explaining this phenomenon, the historian did not exclude the possibility that “her advisers had in mind to place some new institution between the Senate and the supreme power…” prosecutors. S. 146.

Period 20-60s. 18th century is by no means a return or an attempt to return to the old days. This is the period of “youthful maximalism”, which was experienced at that time by the strengthening Russian absolutism, interfering in everything and everyone and at the same time, apparently having no real support in the Senate of that time in the central institutions that were “harmonious system” often only on paper.

In contrast to the opinion that has taken root among many bourgeois researchers, and which has not been completely outlived in the works of Soviet historians, it was precisely the “super-senate” imperial councils that were the conductors of a new, absolutist line in management.

Let's turn to the specific material. Here are just a few quite striking and typical examples. The emergence of the Supreme Privy Council caused a rather characteristic reaction from the Senate, which we can judge by the personal order of Catherine I: “Announce in the Senate. So that now, according to the decrees sent from the Supreme Privy Council, they are executed as determined, but they are not shielded about places . For they have not yet entered into business, but they have begun to protect themselves about places” 11 Mavrodin V.V. Birth of a new Russia.S.247..

It was the Supreme Privy Council that formed a special Commission on taxes, headed by D. M. Golitsyn, which was supposed to solve one of the most painful issues - the state of the state's finances and. at the same time -- the disastrous state of the taxable population of Russia 2 . But the Commission did not even manage to break through the "information barrier" - because of the negative attitude of the lower authorities. In his report to the Council on September 17, 1727, D. M. Golitsyn reported that the commission had sent a decree to the Senate and the Military Collegium “and, moreover, points on which it was required to send statements appropriate to this commission, and then from the High Senate a statement was sent about one Kiev province, and that not for all points. And about the Smolensk province it was announced that the statements were submitted to the Senate, but no statements were sent about other provinces. And the statements of the Military Collegium have been sent, but not on all the same points ... ”etc. 22 Ibid. P.287. The council was compelled by its protocol of September 20, 1727, to threaten the colleges and offices with a fine if the statements continued to be delayed, but as far as one can assume, this had no effect. The Council was able to return to the work of the mission only on January 22, 1730, when its report was heard again, but the Commission failed to complete the work.

Many such incidents, apparently, led the members of the Supreme Council to the conclusion that it was necessary to reduce the staff of various instances. So, G. I. Golovkin categorically stated: “The state will consider it very necessary, because not only people are superfluous, the demon of which you can “stay, but the whole office is newly made, in which there is no need.” 11 Klyuchevsky V. O. Course of Russian History 191.

The position of the Senate regarding a number of requests from the Supreme Council was more than evasive. Thus, the following report was received in response to a corresponding inquiry about fiscals: “How many and where and is everyone against the indicated number of those who have fiscals, or where they don’t, and for what, there is no news in the Senate about that” 3 . Sometimes the Senate proposed too slow and archaic solutions to pressing issues. These include the proposal of the Senate in the midst of peasant uprisings in the 1920s. "Restore special orders for the investigation of robbery and murder cases." In contrast to this, the Soviet took up the peasant uprisings itself. When a rather large movement broke out in the Penza province in 1728, the Council ordered the military units to “ruin to the ground” the “thieves’ and robbers’ camps” by a special decree, moreover, about the course of the punitive expedition, the commanders appointed by M. M. Golitsyn were to report directly to the Council 22 Troitsky S.M. Russian absolutism and the nobility in the 18th century. P.224.

Summing up, we note that the analysis of the activities of the highest state institutions of Russia in the 20-60s. 18th century vividly illustrates their one-dimensionality as necessary elements of the political system of an absolute monarchy. Their continuity is clearly seen not only in the general direction of policy, but also in their very competence, positions, principles of formation, style of current work and other points, up to the design of documentation, etc.

In my opinion, all this makes it possible to supplement, to some extent, the general idea that exists in Soviet historiography regarding the political system of Russia in the 18th century. Apparently, one should more clearly understand the full depth and versatility of V.I. one group of feudal lords - another. Sometimes this characteristic receives a simplified interpretation, and the emphasis continues to be made only on the fact that all those who succeeded each other in the 18th century. governments pursued a feudal policy.

History of higher institutions in the 20-60s. 18th century visibly also shows that absolutism as a system in these years was steadily strengthening and acquiring greater maturity compared to the previous period. Meanwhile, arguments about the “insignificance” of the successors of Peter I are still very common, as opposed to the significance and scale of the political transformations of Peter himself. It seems that such a transfer of the center of gravity from a really important factor - the functioning of the top of the absolutist governments - to the personal qualities of one or another monarch at this stage in the development of historiography is simply archaic. 11 Kostomarov N.I. Russian history in the biographies of its main figures. P.147. It is especially important to realize this when writing textbooks and teaching aids, as well as publications designed for the general readership.

Obviously, a certain adjustment of the established terms is required for a more correct definition of the key problems of the history of Russia in the 18th century, as well as the most promising ways to solve them. The more facts are accumulated about the highest state bodies, the functioning of which really reflected the state of absolutism - the political superstructure at the stage of late feudalism 1, the clearer it becomes: the term “era of palace revolutions” that has been invariably used since the time of Klyuchevsky is by no means reflects the main essence of the period 20-- 60-ies. XVIII century. Considering the controversial nature of the provisions expressed in this article, it is hardly worth proposing a specific exact wording for determining this period: this would be premature in the current state of development of the problem. However, even now we can say unequivocally: such a formulation and a specific term should reflect the main trends in the socio-economic and political development of the country, and therefore, include a definition of what the given time was for the evolution of absolutism and the degree of its maturity.

Turning to the question of further ways of developing the problem, we emphasize that the thesis of S.M. Troitsky on the need to "monographically develop the history of the ruling class of feudal lords." At the same time, a well-known Soviet researcher believed that “special attention should be paid to the study of specific contradictions within the ruling class of feudal lords and the forms that the struggle between individual strata of feudal lords took in one or another period” 2 . Appeal to the history of the highest state institutions of Russia in the XVIII century. allows you to supplement and specify the general thesis of S. M. Troitsky. Apparently, the problems of "social stratification" among the state class, the factors that influenced the formation of the administrative elite, which had real influence on the country's domestic and foreign policy, are no less important. A special issue, undoubtedly worthy of attention, is the question of the political thinking of this period, the study of the socio-political views of statesmen of the 20-60s, finding out how the "program" political installations of this time took shape.

Chapter 2. Policy of the Supreme Privy Council.

2.1. Correction of Peter's reforms.

The Supreme Privy Council was created by a personal decree of February 8, 1726, consisting of A.D. Menshikov, F.M. Apraksina, G.I. Golovkina, A.I. Osterman, P.A. Tolstoy and D.M. Golitsyn". The fact that it included the presidents of the Military, Admiralty and Foreign Colleges meant that they were removed from the subordination of the Senate and their leadership was directly accountable to the empress. Thus, the top leadership of the country clearly gave to understand exactly which policy areas it perceives as priorities, and ensured the adoption of them

operational decisions, destroying the very possibility of paralysis of executive power due to collisions, such as the one that took place at the end of 1725. The minutes of the council meetings indicate that it originally discussed the issue of division into departments, i.e. on the distribution of areas of competence among its members, but this idea was not implemented. Meanwhile, in fact, such a division, due to the official duties of the leaders, as presidents of the collegiums, took place. But the decision-making in the council was carried out collectively, and consequently, the responsibility for them was also collective.

The very first decisions of the council indicate that their members were clearly aware that its creation meant a radical restructuring of the entire system of central government bodies, and sought, if possible, to give its existence a legitimate character. It is no coincidence that their first meeting was devoted to resolving questions about the functions, competence and powers of the council, about its relationship with other institutions. As a result, the well-known "opinion not in a decree" appeared, in which the position of the Senate was subordinate to the council, and the three most important colleges were actually equated with it. since they were ordered to communicate with each other by promemoria Kamensky A.B. Russian Empire in the 18th century. P. 144 .. Throughout February and the first half of March 1726, the leaders (soon in this work they were joined by Duke Karl Friedrich, included in the council at the insistence of the Empress Holstein) again and again returned to the regulation of the activities of the new body. The fruit of their efforts was a nominal decree of March 7 "on the position of the Senate", a week later a decree renaming the Senate from "governing" to "high" (June 14 of the same year from "governing" to "most holy" was renamed the Synod), and on March 28 another decree on the form of relations with the Senate).

In the historical literature, the question of whether the leaders initially had oligarchic intentions was actively discussed and whether the establishment of the Supreme Privy Council actually meant the restriction of autocracy. In this case, the point of view of Anisimov seems to me the most convincing. “In its place in the system of power and competence,” he writes, “the Supreme Privy Council has become the highest government authority in the form of a narrow controlled by the autocrat body made up of trustees. The range of its affairs was not limited - it was both the highest legislative, and the highest judicial, and the highest administrative power. "But the council" did not replace the Senate, "it was subordinate, first of all, to cases that did not fall under the existing legislative norms ". "Extremely important," notes Anisimov, "it was also the fact that the most acute state problems were discussed in the Soviet in a narrow circle, without becoming the subject of attention of the general public and thereby not damaging the prestige of autocratic power" 1 .

As for the empress, later, in a decree dated January 1, 1727, she quite clearly explained: “We made this Council supreme and by our side there is nothing else, so that in this heavy burden of government in all state de lah with his faithful advice and impartial declarations of his opinions Help and relief for us committed" 1 1 There. With. 150. Anisimov quite convincingly shows that with a number of orders that outlined the range of issues that had to be reported to her personally, bypassing the council, Catherine ensured her independence from him. This is also indicated by many other examples, such as the history of the inclusion of the Duke of Holstein in the council, the editing by the empress of some decisions of the council, etc. But how should one interpret the establishment of the Supreme Privy Council (and its appearance was undoubtedly an important pre- management education) from the point of view of the history of reforms in Russia in the 18th century?

As will be seen from the following review of the council’s activities, its creation really contributed to an increase in the level of management efficiency and essentially meant the improvement of the system of government created by Peter I. The close attention of the leaders from the first days of the council’s existence to the regulation of its activities to the fact that they acted strictly within the framework of the bureaucratic rules set by Peter and, albeit unconsciously, sought not to destroy, but precisely to supplement his system. It is worth noting that the council was created as a collegial body that acted in accordance with the General Regulations. In other words, the very creation of the council, in my opinion, meant the continuation of the Petrine reform. Let us now consider the concrete activity of the Supreme Privy Council in the most important questions of domestic policy.

Already by a decree of February 17, the first measure was carried out aimed at streamlining the collection of provisions for the army: the general-provider was subordinate to the Military Collegium with the right to inform the Supreme Privy Council about the incorrect actions of the Collegium. On February 28, the Senate ordered to buy fodder and provisions from the population at the price of the seller, without causing him any oppression.

A month later, on March 18, on behalf of the Military Collegium, an instruction was issued to officers and soldiers sent to collect a soul tax, which, apparently, according to the legislators, should have helped reduce abuses in this very patient. for the state issue. In May, the Senate implemented last year's proposal of its Attorney General and sent Senator A.A. Matveev with an audit to the Moscow province. Meanwhile, the Supreme Privy Council was concerned primarily with financial issues. The leaders tried to solve it in two directions: on the one hand, by streamlining the accounting system and monitoring the collection and spending of money, and on the other, by saving money.

The first result of the work of the leaders in streamlining the financial sphere was the subordination of the State Office of the Chamber College and the simultaneous destruction of the position of county rent masters, announced by decree of July 15. The decree noted that with the introduction of the poll tax, the functions of rentmeisters and chamberlains in the field began to be duplicated, and ordered that only chamberlains be left. Accounting for the receipt and expenditure of all financial resources, it was also considered expedient to concentrate in one place. On the same day, by another decree, the State Office was forbidden to independently issue funds for any emergency expenses without the permission of the Empress or the Supreme Privy Council.

July 15 was a turning point in the fate of not only the State Office. On the same day, on the grounds that Moscow has its own magistrate, the office of the Chief Magistrate was abolished there, which was the first step in transforming the city government, and this measure itself was one of the ways cost savings 1 . The first step was also taken on the path to judicial reform: a personal decree was issued on the appointment of a city governor to correct judicial and search cases. Moreover, the argumentation was such that the county residents suffer great inconvenience from the need to travel to provincial cities on litigious matters. At the same time, court courts are also overloaded with cases, which entails increased judicial red tape. However, it was allowed to complain about the governor to the same courts.

It is clear, however, that the reinstatement of the position of uyezd governors was related not only to legal proceedings, but also to the system of local government in general. “Because,” thought the leaders, “before that, there were only governors in all cities and all sorts of affairs, both sovereign and petitioners, so according to the decrees sent from all orders, they were sent alone and were without salary, and then the best of one reign happened, and the people were contented" 11 Ibid. It was a principled position, a very definite attitude towards the system of local government created by Peter. However, it is hardly fair to see in it nostalgia for the old. Neither Menshikov, nor Osterman, nor even the Duke of Holstein could experience such nostalgia simply because of their origin and life experience. Rather, behind this reasoning was a sober calculation, a real assessment of the current situation.

As later showed, the decrees of July 15 were only a prelude to the adoption of much more cardinal decisions. The leaders were well aware that the liquidation of the Moscow office of the Chief Magistrate alone could not solve the problem of finance. They saw the main evil in an excessively large number of institutions of various levels and overly bloated states. At the same time, as is clear from the above statement, they recalled that in pre-Petrine times, a significant part of the administrative apparatus did not receive a salary at all, but was fed "from business." Back in April, Duke Karl Friedrich filed an "opinion" in which he asserted that "the civilian staff is not so burdened by anything as by a multitude of ministers, of whom, according to reasoning, a great part can be set aside." And further, the Duke of Holstein noted that "there are many servants who, as before, here in the empire, according to the former custom, could live quite enough without burdening the staff." The duke was supported by Menshikov, who proposed to refuse to pay salaries to small employees of the Votchina and Justice Collegium, as well as local institutions. Such a measure, His Serene Highness believed, would not only save state funds, but also "things can be resolved more equitably and without continuing, because everyone will work hard for an accident" 11 Decree on the creation of the Supreme Privy Council. not to give, but to be satisfied with them from affairs, as usual, from petitioners, who will give what of their own free will "22 Ibid.

However, it is significant that in the matter of downsizing, the leaders first of all paid attention to the collegiums, i.e.

central rather than local institutions. As early as June 1726, they noted that from their swollen staffs "there is an unnecessary loss in salaries, but there is no success in business" 33 Kamensky AB Decree. Op. With. 169 .. On July 13, the members of the council submitted a report to the empress, in which, in particular, they wrote: “There can be no better success in such a plural in management, because they are all read with one ear in hearing cases, and not only that there was a better way, but because of many disagreements in business, a stop and a continuation, and in salary, an unnecessary loss occurs "44 Ibid. S. 215..

Apparently, the ground for the report was prepared in advance, because already on July 16, on its basis, a personal decree appeared, almost verbatim repeating the arguments of the leaders: in business, a stop and insanity occurs. The decree ordered to leave in each collegium only a president, vice president, two advisers and two assessors, and even those were ordered to be present in the collegium not all at the same time, but only half of them, changing annually. Accordingly, the salary was supposed to be paid only to those currently in the service. Thus, in relation to officials, a measure previously proposed for the army was implemented.

In connection with this reform, A.N. Filippov wrote that "the Council was very close to the conditions of the then reality and was keenly interested in all aspects of management ... in this case, he noted ... what he had to constantly come across in the activities of the collegiums." However, the historian considered the decision taken as a half-measure, which "could not have a future." The Supreme Leaders, he believed, did not bother to study the causes of the vice they observed, and reduced the number of collegiate members, "not daring to either renounce collegiality directly or defend Peter's reform as a whole." In that the excessive number of collegiate members was not an invention of the leaders and that it really had a negative effect on the efficiency of decision-making, Filippov is certainly right, but his assessment of the reform seems too harsh. Firstly, the fact that the leaders did not encroach on the principle of collegiality indicates, on the one hand, that they did not aim at the Petrine reform of the central administration as such, but on the other hand, it is quite clear that the rejection of this principle would mean a much more radical break, which, under the specific historical conditions of that time, could have unpredictable consequences. Secondly, I note that the actual argumentation related to the inefficiency of the work of the collegiums both in the report of the council and then in the decree was essentially only a cover, while the goal was purely financial in nature. And finally, we must not forget that, at the very least, colleges existed in Russia for more than a dozen years after that, on the whole, coping with their functions.

At the end of 1726, the leaders got rid of another superfluous, in their opinion, structure: by decree of December 30, the waldmeister offices and the positions of waldmeisters themselves were destroyed, and the supervision of the forests was entrusted to the governor. The decree noted that “among the people, the Waldmeisters and forest guards are a great burden,” and explained that the Waldmeisters live off the fines levied on the population, which naturally entails significant abuses. It is clear that the decision taken should have contributed to the easing of social tension and, apparently, as the leaders believed, to increase the solvency of the population. Meanwhile, it was about softening Peter's legislation on reserved forests, which in turn was related to the maintenance and construction of the fleet. This was another acute problem where Peter's heritage directly collided with real life. The construction of the fleet required large financial investments and the involvement of significant human resources. Both that, and another in the conditions of post-Petrine Russia were extremely difficult. It has already been said above that in the first year after Peter's death, the construction of the fleet, in spite of everything, continued. In February 1726, a personal decree was issued on the continuation of the construction of ships in Bryansk. only keep the existing ones in good condition. This happened already under Peter II, which is often associated with the young emperor's lack of interest in maritime affairs. Accordingly, the leaders are accused of neglecting the beloved brainchild of Peter the Great. However, the documents show that this measure, like others of its kind, was forced and dictated by the real economic conditions of that time, when, by the way, Russia did not wage any wars.

However, in 1726, as in the previous year, a number of legalizations were adopted aimed at maintaining Peter's

heritage. Of great importance, in particular, was the act of April 21, which confirmed Peter's decree of 1722 on the order of succession to the throne and gave force to the law "True will of the Monarchs." On May 31, a personal decree confirmed the obligation to wear a German dress and shave beards by retired people, and on August 4, by the "philistines" of St. Petersburg.

Meanwhile, the discussion in the Supreme Privy Council of the question of how to reconcile the interests of the army and the people continued. The search for palliative solutions for a year and a half did not lead to any serious results: the treasury was practically not replenished, arrears grew, social tension, expressed primarily in peasant escapes, which threatened not only the welfare of the state, but also the well-being of the nobility , did not fall. It became clear to the leaders that it was necessary to take more radical and comprehensive measures. A reflection of these sentiments was a note by Menshikov, Makarov and Osterman, filed in November 1726. It was on its basis that a draft decree was prepared and submitted to the Supreme Privy Council on January 9, 1727, which, after discussion in the council, already in February was implemented by several issued decrees.

The decree of January 9 frankly stated the critical state of state affairs. “After discussing the current state of our empire,” it said, “it is shown that almost all those affairs, both spiritual and secular, are in a bad order and require a speedy correction ... not only the peasantry, for which the maintenance of the army is laid down, it is obtained in great poverty, and from great taxes and incessant executions and other disorders, it comes to extreme and all-term ruin, but other things, like: commerce, justice and mints, are found in a very ruined state. Meanwhile, "after all, the army is so necessary that the state cannot stand without it ... for the sake of it, it is necessary to have care for the peasants, for the soldier is connected with the peasant, like the soul with the body, and when there is no peasant, then there will be no and a soldier." The decree ordered the leaders "to have diligent reasoning about both the land army and the navy, so that they would be supported without the great burden of the people," for which it was proposed to create special commissions on taxes and on the army. It was also proposed that, until a final decision was made on the size of the pillow, to postpone its payment for 1727 until September, to pay part of the tax in kind, to shift the collection of taxes and recruits to civil authorities, to transfer regiments

from the countryside to the cities, to save money, let some of the officers and soldiers from the nobility go on long-term vacations, reduce the number of institutions, streamline the conduct of business in the Estates Collegium, establish the Preimplementation Office and the Revision Collegium, consider the issue of correcting the monetary business, to increase the size of duties for the sale of villages, to eliminate the Manufactory Collegium, and the manufacturers to meet once a year in Moscow to discuss minor issues, but to decide more important ones in the Kommerz Collegium 11 Mavrodin VV The birth of a new Russia. S. 290..

As you can see, the leaders (on the basis of their own opinion) were offered a whole program of anti-crisis actions, which soon began to be implemented. Already on February 9, a decree was issued deferring payment for the May third of 1727 and returning the officers sent to collect the poll tax to the regiments. At the same time, it was reported about the establishment of a commission on the army and navy, "so that they would be supported without the great burden of the people" 22 Ibid. P. 293 .. On February 24, Yaguzhinsky's long-standing proposal was implemented, repeated in a note by Menshikov, Makarov and Osterman, "two parts of officers, and sergeants, and privates, who are from the gentry, to let go to their houses so that they can look at their villages and could put them in proper order." At the same time, it was stipulated that this rule does not apply to officers from the dispossessed nobles.

On the same day, February 24, a comprehensive decree appeared, containing a number of important measures and almost verbatim repeating the decree of January 9: dear husband and sovereign labored in establishing a good order in all matters, both spiritual and secular, and in composing decent regulations in the hope that a very proper order with the benefit of the people would follow in all that; but after discussing the current state -yaniya of Our Empire it is shown that not only the peasants, on whom the maintenance of the army is supposed, are found in great poverty, and from great taxes and incessant executions and other disorders come to extreme ruin, but also other things, like commerce, justice and mints in a very weak state, and all that requires a speedy correction. The decree prescribed that the poll tax should be collected not directly from the peasants, but from the landowners, elders and administrators, thus establishing for the serf village the same procedure that had previously been

established for the palace villages. Responsibility for the collection of the poll tax and its implementation was to be assigned to the governor, who was given one staff officer each to help. And so that there would be no disagreement between them because of seniority in ranks, it was decided to give the rank of colonel to the governors for the duration of their duties.

The decree of February 24 again repeated the norm on sending part of the military on leave, and also ordered the transfer of regiments to the cities. Moreover, the arguments that sounded even during the discussion of this issue in 1725 were repeated almost verbatim: in urban conditions, it is easier for officers to observe their subordinates, to keep them from escapes and other crimes, and they can be collected much faster if necessary; when the regiment sets out on a campaign, it will be possible to concentrate the remaining patients and property in one place, which will not require unnecessary costs for numerous guards; the deployment of regiments in cities will lead to a revival of trade, and the state will also be able to receive a duty on the goods brought here, but "most of all, the peasantry will be greatly relieved, and there will be no burden on citizenship" 11 Kurukin I.V. Shadow of Peter the Great / / On the Russian throne, p.68. .

The same decree carried out a number of measures to reorganize the bodies of both central and local government. “The multiplication of rulers and offices throughout the state,” noted the leaders, “not only serves to the great burden of the state, but also to the great burden of the people, because instead of the fact that before this, we had an addressee to one steward in all matters, we "Not to ten, and perhaps more. And all those different stewards have their own special offices and clerical servants and their own special court, and each poor people drags the poor people according to their own affairs. And all those stewards and clerical servants feed- they want their own, silent about other disorders that from unscrupulous people to the greatest burden of the people daily occur "11 Andreev E.V. Representatives of the authorities after Peter. P.47. The decree of February 24 subordinated the city magistrates to the governors and destroyed the offices and offices of the zemstvo commissars, which became unnecessary when the duties of collecting taxes were imposed on the governor. At the same time, a judicial reform was carried out: the court courts were liquidated, whose functions were transferred to the governors. The leaders realized that the reform entailed strengthening the role of the College of Justice, and took steps to strengthen it. Under the Supreme Privy Council itself, the Detention Office was established, which structurally and organizationally had a collegiate structure. By the same decree, the Revision Board was created, and the Votchina Board was transferred to Moscow, which should have made it more accessible to the landowners. About the Manufacture Collegium, the decree stated that "before it cannot make any important resolution to the Senate and our Cabinet, for that reason it receives a salary in vain." The Collegium was liquidated, and its affairs were transferred to the Collegium of Commerce. However, a month later, on March 28, it was recognized that it was “indecent” for the affairs of the Manufactory Collegium to be in the Collegium of Commerce, and therefore the Manufactory Office was established under the Senate. The decree of February 24 also contained measures to streamline the collection of fees for the issuance of documents from various institutions.

The reorganization of the administration was continued in the following month: on March 7, the Requetmeister Office was liquidated, and its functions were assigned to the chief prosecutor of the Senate, "so that there would be no vain salary." In a personal decree of March 20, the "multiplication of states" and the increase in salary costs associated with it were again criticized. The decree ordered to restore the pre-Petrine system of paying salaries - "as it were before 1700": to pay only those who were paid even then, and "where they were content with their deeds", also be satisfied with this. Where before there were no clerks in the cities, there are no secretaries to appoint there even now. It was this decree (then repeated on July 22 of the same year) that was a kind of apotheosis of criticism by the leaders of Peter's reforms. It is significant that he differed from others in the sharpness of his tone and the absence of the usual detailed argumentation. The decree, as it were, betrayed the fatigue and irritation that had accumulated among the leaders, their feeling of powerlessness to change anything radically.

In parallel with the work on the reorganization of management and taxation, the leaders paid a lot of attention to trade issues, rightly believing that its activation could quickly bring revenue to the state. Back in the autumn of 1726, the Russian ambassador to Holland, B.I. Kurakin proposed to open the Arkhangelsk port for trade, and the empress ordered the Supreme Privy Council to make inquiries about this and report their opinion. In December, the council heard a report from the Senate on free trade and decided to create a Commerce Commission headed by Osterman, which began its work by calling on merchants to submit proposals for a "correction of commerce." The question of Arkhangelsk was resolved at the beginning of the next year, when the port was opened by decree of January 9 and commanded "to allow everyone to trade freely." Later, the Commission on Commerce transferred to free trade a number of goods that had previously been farmed out, abolished a number of restrictive duties and contributed to the creation of favorable conditions for foreign merchants. But her most important deed was the revision of Peter's protectionist tariff of 1724, which, according to Anisimov, was speculative, divorced from Russian reality, and brought more harm than good.

In accordance with the February decree and the opinion of the leaders, expressed by them in numerous notes, the government decided to take urgent measures in the field of monetary circulation. The nature of the planned measures was similar to those taken under Peter: to mint a lightweight copper coin worth 2 million rubles. As A. I. Yukht noted, the government at the same time "was aware that this measure would adversely affect the general economic situation of the country," but "it did not see another way out of the financial crisis." Sent to Moscow to organize the planned A.Ya. Volkov discovered that the mints looked "like after an enemy or fire ruin", but energetically got down to business and over the next several years, about 3 million rubles of light-weight pennies.

Consideration in the council of the question of the poll tax and the maintenance of the army did not proceed smoothly. So, back in November 1726, P.A. Tolstoy proposed instead of auditing arrears, on which Menshikov, who was faithful to the interests of his department, insisted, to audit funds in the Military, Admiralty and Camercollegia. Tolstoy was surprised that in peacetime, when many officers are on vacation, the army is short of men, horses and funds, and, apparently, rightly suspected possible abuses. Back in June of the same year, a decree was issued according to which the army regiments were instructed to submit to the Revision Collegium receipt and expense books and account statements in good condition, which was again strictly confirmed at the end of December. The military collegium proposed to collect taxes in kind from the population, but on the initiative of Tolstoy, it was decided to give the payers the opportunity to choose the form of payment themselves.

It is significant that with all the difficulties and insoluble problems that the Supreme Privy Council faced, its activities were highly appreciated by foreign observers. 11 Eroshkin. History of state institutions of pre-revolutionary Russia. P.247. Now the finances of this state are no longer undermined by unnecessary buildings of harbors and houses, poorly mastered manufactories and factories, too extensive and inconvenient undertakings or feasts and pomp, and also they are now no longer forced by force of them, Russians, to such luxury and festivities, to building houses and resettling their serfs here,” wrote the Prussian envoy A. Mardefeld. - In the Supreme Privy Council, affairs are executed and sent quickly and after a mature discussion, instead of, as before, while the late sovereign was engaged in the construction of his ships and followed his other inclinations, they lingered for a whole half a year, without speaking already about countless other commendable changes" 11 Notes of Mardefeld A.S.24 ..

In May 1727, the active work of the Supreme Privy Council was interrupted by the death of Catherine I and the accession to the throne of Peter II. The disgrace of Menshikov that followed in September, according to many researchers, changed its character and led to the triumph of the counter-reformist spirit, a symbol of which was, first of all, the relocation of the court, the Senate and collegiums to Moscow. To verify these assertions, let us turn again to legislation.

Already on June 19, 1727, the order to transfer the Votchina College to Moscow was confirmed, and in August the Chief Magistrate was liquidated, which became unnecessary after the liquidation of the city magistrates. At the same time, a burgomaster and two burgomasters were appointed to the St. Petersburg Town Hall to judge the merchants. A year later, instead of city magistrates in cities, it was ordered to be town halls. In early autumn, the council considered the question of the expediency of maintaining commercial consulates in foreign countries, in particular, in France and Spain. The Senate, in turn, relying on the opinion of the Collegium of Commerce, believed that there was “no benefit to the state in this, and henceforth it is hopeless to keep them profitable, because many state-owned and merchant goods sent there were sold at a premium.” As a result, it was decided to liquidate the consulates. It is unlikely that Anisimov is right, who saw here one more evidence of the rejection by the leaders of the policy of Peter, who took care of the penetration of Russian goods into remote corners of the planet, including America, even if it was unprofitable. About three years have passed since the death of the great reformer - a period sufficient to convince oneself of the hopelessness of this undertaking. The measure taken by the leaders was purely pragmatic. They looked at things soberly and considered it necessary to encourage Russian trade where there were opportunities and prospects for development, for which they took quite serious measures. So, in May 1728, a decree was issued on the establishment of special capital in Holland for external expenses, in order to thus support the exchange rate and increase the volume of Russian exports abroad).

By the autumn of 1727, it became clear that the removal of the army from collecting the poll tax jeopardized the receipt of any money by the treasury at all, and in September 1727 the military were again sent to the districts, although they were now subordinate to governors and governors; in January 1728 this measure was confirmed by a new decree. In the same January, a stone building was allowed in Moscow, and in April it was clarified that it required some kind of special police permission. On the following February 3, 1729, stone construction was allowed in other cities as well. On February 24, on the occasion of the coronation celebrations, the emperor announced the petition for fines and easing of punishments, as well as the forgiveness of the poll tax for the May third of the current year. As before, close attention was paid to the control of income and expenses: the decree of April 11, 1728 required the immediate submission of accounts by the colleges to the Revision College, and on December 9, it was announced that the salaries of officials guilty of such delays. On May 1, the Senate recalled the need to regularly send statements to the Academy of Sciences from the institutions of the central administration for their publication. In July, the Detention Office was removed from the jurisdiction of the Supreme Privy Council and reassigned to the Senate, with the proviso that it is still required to submit information about its activities to the Council on a monthly basis. However, relieving itself of some duties, the council assumed others: “in April 1729, the Preobrazhensky office was abolished and cases “on the first two points” were ordered to be considered in the Supreme Privy Council. 11 Kurukin I.V. Shadow of Peter the Great // On the Russian Throne, p.52.

Of great importance for streamlining management was the Order issued on September 12, 1728 to governors and governors, which regulated their activities in some detail. Some researchers drew attention to the fact that Nakaz reproduced certain procedures of the pre-Petrine time, in particular, the surrender of state

sort of "according to the painted list". However, the document itself was written in the tradition of Peter the Great's regulations and contained a direct reference to the General Regulations of 1720. There were many such references to the grandfather's authority in other legislative acts of the time of Peter II.

In the legislation of this period, one can also find regulations that directly continue the policy of Peter the Great. So, on January 8, 1728, a decree was issued confirming that St. Petersburg was still the main trading port of the country, and on February 7, a decree appeared on the completion of the construction of the Peter and Paul Fortress there. In June, the tradesman Protopopov was sent to the Kursk province "to search for ores," and in August the Senate assigned surveyors to the provinces, entrusting them with compiling land maps. On June 14, it was ordered from each province to send five people from officers and nobles to participate in the work of the Legislative Commission, but, since the prospect of legislative activity, apparently, did not arouse enthusiasm, in November this order had to be repeated under threat of confiscation of estates. However, six months later, in June 1729, the assembled nobles were allowed to go home and instead of them it was ordered to recruit new ones. In January 1729, a decree was issued ordering the continuation of the construction of the Ladoga Canal to Shlisselburg, and a year later they remembered the fine canceled by Catherine for not going to confession and communion and decided to replenish the state treasury in this way.

Not entirely true is the statement often found in the literature about the complete oblivion in the reign of Peter II of the army and navy. So, on June 3, 1728, on the proposal of the Military Collegium, the Engineering Corps and the Mining Company were established, their staffs were approved. In December 1729, the office of the Life Guards of the Semenovsky and Preobrazhensky regiments was created, the decree on the annual dismissal of one third of the officers and privates from the nobles was confirmed. Measures were taken to strengthen the cities and forts of the Ufa and Solikamsk provinces for "a precaution against the Bashkirs."

changes in the system of administration and legal proceedings, financial and tax spheres, and trade. It is equally obvious that the council did not have any specific political program, a plan for reforms, and even more so, one that would have any ideological basis. All the activities of the leaders were a reaction to specific social, political and economic circumstances that developed in the country as a result of the radical reforms of Peter the Great. But this does not mean that the decisions of the new rulers of the country were taken in haste and were unsystematic. Even though the situation was really critical, all the measures implemented by the leaders went through a long stage of comprehensive discussion and the first serious steps were taken almost a year and a half after the death of Peter and six months after the establishment of the Supreme Privy Council. Moreover, in accordance with the bureaucratic procedure already established at the previous stage, almost every decision made by the council went through the stage of peer review in the relevant department. It should also be taken into account that the people who were in power were not random people. These were experienced, well-informed administrators who had gone through the school of Peter. But unlike their teacher, who, with all his rigid rationalism, was still partly a romantic who had certain ideals and dreamed of achieving them at least in the distant future, the leaders showed themselves to be frank pragmatists. However, as the events of 1730 showed, at least some of them were not deprived of the ability to think big and look far ahead. 11 Ivanov I.I. Riddles of Russian history.S.57.

However, several questions arise. Firstly, what was the real situation in the country and did the leaders, as Anisimov believes, try to exaggerate? Secondly, were the transformations carried out by the leaders really of a counter-reformist nature and, thus, were aimed at destroying what Peter had created? And even if so, does this mean a reversal of the modernization process?

As for the situation in the country, it is worth referring to the monograph by P.N. Milyukov "The State Economy of Russia in the First Quarter of the 18th Century and the Reform of Peter the Great". Even though many of his data were subsequently disputed by later researchers, on the whole the picture of the economic crisis he painted is, I think, correct. Meanwhile, such a detailed, based on numerical data, as

in Milyukov's book, the picture was not known to the leaders, who based their judgments mainly on reports from the field and information about the number of arrears. Therefore, for an example, it is advisable to refer to such a document as the reports of A.A. Matveev about his revision of the Moscow province, where, as one might assume, the situation was not the worst. “In Alexandrova Sloboda,” Matveev wrote, “all villages and villages, peasants with palace taxes, through their measure, are much imprudently taxed and burdened by the main rulers of that settlement; already a lot of fugitives and emptiness have appeared; and in the settlement, not only in villages and villages not peasant, but beggarly directs have their own courts; moreover, not without attacking burdens on their own, and not on palace profits. From Pereslavl-Zalessky, the senator reported: “Incomprehensible thefts and abductions of not only government, but also capitation fees in money from the chamberlain, commissars and clerks here, I found, under which, according to the decrees of decent income and expense books, they have not at all, except for their rotten and dishonorable notes lying around in tatters; according to their search, more than 4,000 of those stolen money from me have already been found. In Suzdal, Matveev executed a copyist of the chamberlain's office for stealing more than 1,000 rubles and, having punished many other officials, reported to St. Petersburg: "In the local city, from day to day, there is a great multiplication of peasants of poverty, 200 or more people, and from everywhere them, peasants 11 Milyukov P. N. The State Economy of Russia in the First Quarter 18 century and the reform of Peter the Great. salary". “Facilitation in the payment of per capita money, the withdrawal of military teams,” wrote S. M. Solovyov, commenting on these documents, “that’s all the government could do for the peasants at the time described. But to eradicate the main evil is the desire of every higher to feed on at the expense of the lower and at the expense of the treasury - it could not; for this, the improvement of society was necessary, and this had to be expected.

In the activities of the governments of Catherine I and Peter II, the main purpose of which, as already mentioned, was to search for funds to maintain the viability of the state, the following interrelated areas can be distinguished: 1) improving taxation, 2) transforming the administrative system, 3) measures in the field of trade and industry. Let's consider each of them separately.

As it is clear from the materials of the discussion of issues related to the poll tax in the Senate and the Supreme Privy Council, the members of the first post-Petrine governments saw the main flaw in the tax reform of Peter not in the very principle of the poll tax, but in the imperfect mechanism of tax collection, firstly, it did not give the opportunity to quickly take into account changes in the composition of payers, which led to the impoverishment of the population and an increase in arrears, and secondly, in the use of military commands, which caused protests from the population and lowered the combat effectiveness of the army. Criticism was also caused by the deployment of regiments in the countryside with the imposition on local residents of the obligation to build regimental yards, which also made their duties unbearable. The constant growth of arrears raised serious doubts about the ability of the population to pay taxes in the size established by Peter in principle, although this point of view was not shared by all the leaders. So, Menshikov, as N.I. Pavlenko, believed that the amount of the tax was not burdensome, and "this idea was firmly entrenched in the head of the prince six years ago, when the government of Peter I discussed the amount of the tax." Menshikov "remained true to the conviction that it is enough to reduce the number of clerks and messengers of all kinds, ..., to eliminate the regimental yards in the districts, which charged a per capita tax, and to place soldiers in the barracks of cities, as well-being will come among the villagers." Since it was Menshikov who was the most authoritative of the members of the council, his opinion ultimately prevailed.

At the same time, it is worth noting that, since the first experience of collecting a poll tax was carried out only in 1724 and its results could not be known to the main inspirer of the tax reform, the leaders had every reason to judge it by the first results. And as people who assumed responsibility for running the country, they were, moreover, obliged to take drastic measures to correct the situation. Anisimov believes that in reality the ruin of the country was not caused by the excessive size of the poll tax, but was the result of an overstrain of economic forces during the many years of the Northern War, an increase in the number and size of indirect taxes and duties. In this he is undoubtedly right. However, the introduction of a per capita tax, at first glance, a very moderate amount, in such conditions could turn out to be the drop after which the development of the situation passed the critical line, and the measures that the leaders began to take were really the only

but possible to save the situation. Moreover, I note that they did not agree to a radical reduction in the size of the poll tax, rightly believing that it would jeopardize the existence of the army. In general, the measures of the leaders should be recognized as quite reasonable: the withdrawal of military units from the countryside, the release of residents from the obligation to build regimental yards, the reduction in the size of the poll tax, the forgiveness of arrears, the variation in the collection of taxes in money and products with the introduction of actually free prices, shifting the collection of taxes from the peasants to landowners and managers, concentrating the collection in one hand - all this should have helped reduce social tension and gave hope for replenishing the treasury. Yes, and the Commission on taxes, at the head of which, by the way, was D.M. Golitsyn, i.e., a representative of the old aristocracy, who, according to some authors, was in opposition to the reforms of Peter the Great, after working for several years, failed to offer anything in return for poll taxation. Thus, no matter how one evaluates the criticism by the leaders of the tax reform, their real actions were aimed only at its improvement, adjustment, and adaptation to the real conditions of life.

Much more radical were the transformations

carried out by the leaders in the system of government of the country, and some of them can really be considered as counter-reformatory in relation to the Petrine institutions. First of all, this refers to the elimination of court courts, the creation of which was, as it were, the first step towards implementing the principle of separation of powers. However, this kind of theoretical reasoning was, of course, alien and unfamiliar to the leaders. For them, the court court was just one of the many institutions that appeared on the ground in the course of Peter the Great's reforms. In addition, in the absence of professional legal education in the country, and, consequently, of professional lawyers, despite the fact that the law itself has not yet emerged as a sphere of independent public activity, the existence of domestic courts will in no way ensure a valid section -Leniation of the authorities could not. Looking ahead, I note that later, when judicial institutions were made independent during the provincial reform of 1775, a true separation of powers still did not work out, because the country and society were simply not ready for it. 11 Ibid. S. 234.

As for the organization of local government, when evaluating the activities of the leaders, we must remember that the system of institutions that existed at that time on the ground was created by Peter for a long time, and if its core was created in parallel with the collegiate reform , then at the same time there remained many different institutions that had arisen earlier, often spontaneously and unsystematically! The completion of the tax reform and the start of the functioning of a new system of taxation is inevitable, even if the economic situation in the country were more favorable, should have led to changes in the structure of local authorities, and these changes, of course, should have been aimed at simplifying system as a whole and increase its efficiency. This is exactly what was done in 1726-1729. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the meaning of the measures taken was reduced to further centralization of management, to the creation of a clear vertical of executive power and, therefore, did not contradict the spirit of the Peter's reform.

It is impossible not to recognize as reasonable the desire of the leaders to reduce the cost of the apparatus by reducing it. It is another matter that the voivodship administration created or, rather, recreated on the ground, in comparison with the Petrine institutions, was more archaic in form, but now it functioned differently than in pre-Petrine Russia, if only because the voivode did not obey orders in Moscow, but to the governor, who, in turn, was accountable to the central authorities, the organization of which was fundamentally different. One should not neglect the arguments of the leaders that it was easier for the population to deal with one chief than with many. Of course, the new governors, like their predecessors of the 17th century, did not disdain anything to line their pockets, but in order to correct this evil, as Solovyov wrote, it was really necessary first of all to correct morals, which was beyond the power of the leaders.

As for the central institutions, as we have seen, all the efforts of the leaders were aimed at making them cheaper, on the one hand, and increasing their efficiency by eliminating duplication of functions, on the other. And even if we agree with those historians who see in the reasoning of the Supreme Leaders their rejection of the very principle of collegiality, they did not take any real actions to destroy it. Verkhovniki

destroyed a number of pre-existing institutions and created others, moreover, new institutions were created on the same principles of collegiality, and their functioning was based on the Petrovsky General Regulations and the Table of Ranks. As already mentioned, the Supreme Privy Council itself was a collegiate body. All that has been said is not contradicted by the reduction in the number of collegiate members, which has not fundamentally changed the procedure for making decisions in institutions. The decision of the leaders to refuse to pay part of the officials' salaries and transfer them to feeding "from work" looks somewhat different. Here one can really see a significant deviation from the Peter the Great principles of organizing the administrative apparatus, which laid the foundations of the Russian bureaucracy. Of course, those who accuse the leaders of not understanding the essence of Peter's reform are right, but they acted not on the basis of any ideological guidelines, but obeying the circumstances. To justify them, however, it must be said that in reality officials both at that time and later received their salaries extremely irregularly, with great delays and not always in full; practiced the issuance of salaries products. So to a certain extent, the leaders gave the force of law to what existed de facto. The vast state needed a branched and well-functioning administrative apparatus, but did not have the resources to maintain it.

The very fact of not only the liquidation of some Peter's institutions by the leaders, but also the creation of new ones by them testifies, in my opinion, that these actions of theirs were of a completely meaningful nature. Moreover, their reaction to the changing situation was quite fast. So, according to the decree of February 24, 1727, all duties related to the collection of taxes in the cities were assigned to the city magistrates with the personal responsibility of their members for arrears. The result was new abuses and a flood of complaints against them from the townspeople 11 Ibid. S. 69., which was one of the factors that predetermined their liquidation. In essence, this was a resolution of the contradiction between the form of Peter the Great city institutions, which was descended from foreign models, and the actually enslaved state of the population of Russian cities,

in which even insignificant elements of self-government turned out to be incapacitated.

As quite reasonable and justified, in my opinion, one can characterize the commercial and industrial policy of the Supreme Privy Council. Vsrkhovniki proceeded on the whole from the economically correct idea that it was trade that could most likely bring in much-needed funds to the state. The protectionist tariff of 1724 caused significant damage to trade and caused a lot of protests from both Russian and foreign merchants. The consequences of the closure of the Arkhangelsk port even earlier were also negative, which led to the destruction of the trade infrastructure that had been developing for centuries and the ruin of many merchants. Therefore, the measures taken by the leaders were reasonable and timely. It is significant that in these matters they were in no hurry, and the Commission on "Commerce" they created completed work on a new tariff only by 1731. It was based on, on the one hand, the Dutch tariff (which once again proves that that the churchmen were true "chicks of Petrov's nest"), and on the other hand, the opinions of merchants and trade authorities. The new bill charter, the abolition of a number of trade monopolies, permission to export goods from the Narva and Revel ports, the elimination of restrictions, played a positive role, associated with the construction of merchant ships, the introduction of deferrals for shortfalls in customs duties.Experiencing an acute shortage of funds, the leaders, however, considered it possible to provide targeted support for individual industrial enterprises by providing tax breaks and state subsidies.In general, they commercial and industrial policy was relatively more liberal and was in line with the modernization processes.

So, in the first five years after the death of Peter the Great, the process of transformation in the country did not stop and was not reversed, although its pace, of course, slowed down sharply. The content of the new transformations was connected primarily with the correction of those Peter the Great reforms that could not withstand the collision with real life. However, in general, the policy of the new rulers of the country was distinguished by continuity. Everything fundamental in Peter's reforms is the social structure of society, the principles of organizing public service and power, the regular army and navy, the tax system, the administrative-territorial division of the country, the existing property relations, the secular nature of power and society, the country's focus on active foreign policy - remained unchanged. It is apparently legitimate to draw one more conclusion: the first years of the history of post-Petrine Russia proved that Peter's reforms were basically irreversible, and irreversible precisely because, on the whole, they corresponded to the natural direction of the country's development.

Supreme Privy Council- the highest advisory state institution of Russia in 1726-1730 (7-8 people). Created by Catherine I as an advisory body, in fact, it resolved the most important state issues.

The accession to the throne of Catherine I after the death of Peter I caused the need for an institution that could explain the state of affairs to the empress and direct the direction of the government, for which Catherine did not feel capable. Such an institution was the Supreme Privy Council.

The decree establishing the Council was issued in February 1726. Field Marshal General His Serene Highness Prince Menshikov, General Admiral Count Apraksin, State Chancellor Count Golovkin, Count Tolstoy, Prince Dimitri Golitsyn, and Baron Osterman were appointed members of the Council. A month later, the son-in-law of the Empress, the Duke of Holstein, was included in the number of members of the Supreme Privy Council, on whose zeal, as the Empress officially declared, "we can fully rely." Thus, the Supreme Privy Council was originally composed almost exclusively of the chicks of Petrov's nest; but already under Catherine I, one of them, Count Tolstoy, was ousted by Menshikov; under Peter II, Menshikov himself found himself in exile; Count Apraksin died; the duke of Holstein had long ceased to be in the council; of the original members of the Council, three remained - Golitsyn, Golovkin and Osterman.

Under the influence of the Dolgoruky, the composition of the Council changed: the predominance in it passed into the hands of the princely families of Dolgoruky and Golitsyn.

The Council was subordinated to the Senate and collegiums. The Senate, which began to be called "High" (and not "Governing"), was at first belittled to such an extent that it was decided to send decrees to it not only from the Council, but even from the Holy Synod, which was formerly equal to it. The Senate was deprived of the title of governing, and then they thought of taking this title away from the Synod as well. First, the Senate was titled "highly trusted", and then simply "high."

Under Menshikov, the Soviet tried to consolidate government power; ministers, as the members of the Council were called, and senators swore allegiance to the empress or to the regulations of the Supreme Privy Council. It was forbidden to execute decrees that were not signed by the Empress and the Council.

According to the will of Catherine I, during the childhood of Peter II, the Council was given power equal to that of the sovereign; only in the question of the order of succession the Council could not make changes. But the last clause of the testament of Catherine I was left without attention by the leaders when Anna Ioannovna was elected to the throne.

In 1730, after the death of Peter II, half of the 8 members of the Council were Dolgoruky (princes Vasily Lukich, Ivan Alekseevich, Vasily Vladimirovich and Alexei Grigorievich), who were supported by the Golitsyn brothers (Dmitry and Mikhail Mikhailovich). Dmitry Golitsyn drafted a constitution.

However, most of the Russian nobility, as well as members of the Supreme Privy Council Osterman and Golovkin, opposed the Dolgoruky plans. Upon arrival in Moscow on February 15 (26), 1730, Anna Ioannovna received from the nobility, headed by Prince Cherkassky, in which they asked her "to accept autocracy such as your laudable ancestors had." Relying on the support of the guards, as well as the middle and petty nobility, Anna publicly tore up the text of the conditions and refused to comply with them; By the Manifesto of March 4 (15), 1730, the Supreme Privy Council was abolished.

The fate of its members was different: Mikhail Golitsyn was dismissed and died almost immediately, his brother and three of the four Dolgoruky were executed during the reign of Anna Ioannovna. Only Vasily Vladimirovich Dolgoruky survived the repressions, returned from exile under Elizaveta Petrovna and appointed head of the military collegium. Golovkin and Osterman during the reign of Anna Ioannovna occupied the most important government posts. Osterman in 1740-1741 briefly became the de facto ruler of the country, but after another palace coup, he was exiled to Berezov, where he died.