Airborne troops of Russia: history, structure, weapons. Airborne Troops

Airborne troops
(VDV)

From the history of creation

The history of the Russian Airborne Forces is inextricably linked with the history of the creation and development of the Red Army. A great contribution to the theory of combat use of airborne assaults was made by Marshal of the Soviet Union M.N. Tukhachevsky. Back in the second half of the 1920s, he was the first among Soviet military figures to deeply study the role of airborne assault forces in a future war, and substantiated the prospects of the Airborne Forces.

In the work "New Questions of War" M.N. Tukhachevsky wrote: “If a country is prepared for the widespread production of airborne assault forces capable of capturing and stopping the activity of the enemy’s railways in decisive directions, paralyzing the deployment and mobilization of his troops, etc., then such a country will be able to reverse the previous methods of operational operations and give the outcome of the war much more decisive character.

A significant place in this work is given to the role of airborne assault forces in border battles. The author believed that during this period of the battle it would be more profitable to use airborne assault forces to disrupt mobilization, isolate and tie down border garrisons, defeat local enemy troops, capture airfields, landing sites and solve other important tasks.

Much attention was paid to the development of the theory of the use of the Airborne Forces by Ya.I. Alksnis, A.I. Egorov, A.I. Cork, I.P. Uborevich, I.E. Yakir and many other military leaders. They believed that the most trained soldiers should serve in the Airborne Forces, ready to complete any task, while showing determination and stamina. Airborne assault forces must deliver sudden attacks on the enemy where no one is waiting for them.

Theoretical studies led to the fact that the combat activity of the Airborne Forces should be of an offensive nature, bold to the point of insolence and extremely maneuverable in carrying out quick, concentrated strikes. Airborne assault forces, making maximum use of the suddenness of their appearance, must swiftly strike at the most sensitive points, achieve hourly success, thereby increasing panic in the enemy ranks.

Simultaneously with the development of the theory of the combat use of the Airborne Forces in the Red Army, bold experiments were carried out on the landing of airborne assault forces, an extensive program was conducted to create experimental airborne units, questions of their organization were studied, and a system of combat training was developed.

For the first time, an airborne assault was used to perform a combat mission in 1929. On April 13, 1929, the Fuzaili gang made another raid from Afghanistan to the territory of Tajikistan. The plans of the Basmachi included capturing the Garm district and in the future to ensure the invasion of the Alai and Ferghana valleys of larger bands of the Basmachi. Cavalry detachments were sent to the Basmachi invasion area with the task of destroying the gang before it captured the Garm district. However, the information received from the city testified that they would not have time to block the path of the gang, which had already defeated a detachment of Garm volunteers in the oncoming battle and threatened the city. In this critical situation, the commander of the Central Asian military district P.E. Dybenko made a bold decision: to transfer a detachment of fighters through the air and with a sudden blow to destroy the enemy on the outskirts of the city. The detachment consisted of 45 people armed with rifles and four machine guns. On the morning of April 23, two platoon commanders flew to the combat area on the first plane, followed by the commander of the cavalry brigade T.T. Shapkin, brigade commissar A.T. Fedin. The platoon commanders were supposed to capture the landing site and ensure the landing of the main forces of the detachment. The task of the brigade commander was to study the situation on the spot and then, returning back to Dushanbe, report the results to the commander. Commissar Fedin was supposed to take command of the landing force and lead the actions to destroy the gang. An hour and a half after the first plane took off, the main landing force took off. However, the detachment's plan of action planned earlier was canceled immediately after the plane landed with the commander and commissar. Half of the city was already occupied by the Basmachi, so it was impossible to delay. Having sent a plane with a report, the brigade commander decided to immediately attack the enemy with available forces, without waiting for the landing force to arrive. Having obtained horses in the nearest villages and splitting into two groups, the detachment moved to Garm. Having burst into the city, the detachment unleashed powerful machine-gun and rifle fire on the Basmachi. The bandits were confused. They knew about the size of the city's garrison, but they were armed with rifles, and where did the machine guns come from? The bandits decided that a division of the Red Army had broken into the city, and, unable to withstand the onslaught, retreated from the city, losing about 80 people in the process. The approaching cavalry units completed the defeat of the Fuzaili gang. District Commander P.E. Dybenko, during the analysis, highly appreciated the actions of the detachment.

The second experiment took place on July 26, 1930. On this day, under the leadership of military pilot L. Minov, the first training jumps were made in Voronezh. Leonid Grigoryevich Minov himself later told how the events unfolded: “I didn’t think that one jump could change a lot in life. I loved flying with all my heart. Like all my comrades, at that time I treated parachutes with distrust. and did not think. In 1928, I happened to be at a meeting of the leadership of the Air Force, where I made my report on the results of work on "blind" flights at the Borisoglebsk school of military pilots. After the meeting, Pyotr Ionovich Baranov, the head of the Air Force, called me and asked: "In your report, you said that you must fly blind without fail with a parachute. Leonid Grigorievich, what do you think, are parachutes needed in military aviation?" What could I say then! Of course, parachutes are needed. The best proof of this was the forced parachute jump of test pilot M. Gromov. Recalling this incident, I answered Pyotr Ionovich in the affirmative. Then he suggested that I go to the USA and get to know how they are doing with the rescue service in aviation. Frankly, I reluctantly agreed. I returned from the United States of America "small": with a "diploma" in my pocket and three jumps. Pyotr Ionovich Baranov put my memo in a skinny folder. When he closed it, on the cover I saw the inscription: "Parachuting business." I left Baranov's office two hours later. There was a lot of work to be done on the introduction of parachutes in aviation, on the organization of various studies and experiments aimed at improving flight safety. It was decided to hold classes in Voronezh in order to familiarize the flight crew with parachutes and the organization of jumps. Baranov suggested thinking about the possibility of training 10-15 paratroopers at the Voronezh training camp to perform a group jump. On July 26, 1930, participants in the training camp of the Air Force of the Moscow Military District gathered at the airfield near Voronezh. I had to perform a demonstration jump. Of course, everyone who was on the airfield considered me an ace in this matter. After all, I was the only person here who had already received an air parachute baptism and jumped more than once, not two, but had as many as three jumps! And the prize-winning place I took at the competitions of the strongest skydivers in the USA, apparently, seemed to be something inaccessible to those present. Together with me, the pilot Moshkovsky, who was appointed my assistant at the training camp, was preparing to jump. There were no more applicants. My jump was really successful. I landed lightly, not far from the audience, I even stood on my feet. Met with applause. A girl who came from somewhere handed me a bouquet of field daisies. - "And how is Moshkovsky?"... The plane enters the course. His figure is clearly visible in the doorway. It's time to jump. It's time! But he is still standing in the doorway, apparently not daring to rush down. Another second, second. Finally! A white plume shot up over the falling man and immediately turned into a tight canopy of a parachute. - "Hurrah-ah-ah! .." - there was a sound around. Many pilots, seeing Moshkovsky and me alive and unharmed, expressed a desire to jump too. On that day, the squadron commander A. Stoilov, his assistant K. Zatonsky, pilots I. Povalyaev and I. Mukhin made jumps. And three days later there were 30 people in the ranks of paratroopers. After listening to my report on the course of the training by phone, Baranov asked: "Tell me, is it possible to prepare, say, ten or fifteen people for a group jump in two or three days?" Having received a positive answer, Pyotr Ionovich explained his thought: "It would be very good if it were possible during the Voronezh exercise to demonstrate the dropping of a group of armed paratroopers for sabotage operations on the territory of the "enemy."

Needless to say, we accepted this original and interesting task with great enthusiasm. It was decided to launch the landing from the Farman-Goliath aircraft. In those days it was the only aircraft we had mastered for jumping. Its advantage over the TB-1 bombers available in the air brigade was that a person did not need to get out onto the wing - the paratroopers jumped directly into the open door. Moreover, all trainees were in the cockpit. The feeling of a comrade's elbow reassured everyone. In addition, the releaser could watch him, cheer him up before the jump. Ten volunteers who had already completed training jumps were selected to participate in the landing. In addition to the landing of fighters, the plan of the landing operation included the dropping of weapons and ammunition (light machine guns, grenades, cartridges) from aircraft on special cargo parachutes. For this purpose, two soft mail bags and four light-heavy boxes designed by K. Blagin were used. The landing group was divided into two detachments, since no more than seven paratroopers fit in the cockpit. After the landing of the first paratroopers, the plane returned to the airfield for the second group. During the break between jumps, it was planned to drop six cargo parachutes with weapons and ammunition from three P-1 aircraft. As a result of this experiment, I wanted to get an answer to a number of questions: to establish the degree of dispersion of a group of six people and the time of separation from the aircraft of all fighters; fix the time it will take to descend the paratroopers to the ground, receive the dropped weapons and bring the landing force into full readiness for combat operations. In order to expand the experience, the drop of the first detachment was planned from a height of 350 meters, the second - from 500 meters, dropping cargo - from 150 meters. Preparations for the landing operation were completed on 31 July. Each fighter knew his place on the plane and his task on the ground. The paratroopers' equipment, consisting of the main and reserve parachutes, was stowed and carefully fitted to the soldier's figure, weapons and ammunition were packed in hanging bags and cargo parachute boxes.

On August 2, 1930, at exactly 9 o'clock, a plane took off from the base airfield. On board is the first detachment of paratroopers. Together with us and the head of the second group Ya. Moshkovsky. He decided to see where the place of separation of our group was, so that later he could accurately parachute his guys. We were followed by three R-1 planes, under the wings of which cargo parachutes were suspended on bomb racks.

Having made a circle, our plane turned to the landing site, located about two kilometers from the airfield. The landing area is a field free from crops measuring 600 by 800 meters. She adjoined a small farm. One of the buildings, located on the outskirts of the farm, was designated as a landmark for collecting paratroopers after landing and as a starting point for the start of military operations of the landing force in the rear of the "enemy". - "Get ready!" - trying to shout over the rumble of engines, I commanded. The guys immediately got up and stood one after another, squeezing the exhaust ring in their right hand. Faces are tense, focused. As soon as they crossed the site, I gave the command: "Go!" ... - the fighters literally poured out of the plane, I dived last and immediately pulled the ring. I counted - all the domes opened normally. We landed almost in the center of the site, not far from each other. The soldiers quickly gathered their parachutes and ran up to me. In the meantime, the R-1 link passed overhead and dropped six parachutes with weapons on the edge of the farm. We rushed there, unpacked the bags, took out machine guns, cartridges. And now our "Farman" with the second group reappeared in the sky. As planned, Moshkovsky's group left the plane at an altitude of 500 meters. They landed next to us. It took only a few minutes, and 12 paratroopers, armed with two light machine guns, rifles, revolvers and grenades, were in full readiness for combat operations ... "

So the world's first parachute landing was dropped.

In the order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR dated October 24, 1930, People's Commissar K. Voroshilov noted: “Successful experiments in organizing airborne assaults should be noted as achievements. Airborne operations should be comprehensively studied from the technical and tactical side by the Headquarters of the Red Army and they were given appropriate instructions on the spot.

It is this order that is the legal evidence of the birth of the "winged infantry" in the Land of Soviets.

Organizational structure of the airborne troops

• Command of the Airborne Troops
• Airborne and air assault formations:
  • 98th Guards Airborne Svirskaya Red Banner Order of Kutuzov 2nd Class Division;
  • 106th Guards Red Banner Order of Kutuzov 2nd Class Airborne Division
  • 7th Guards Air Assault (Mountain) Red Banner Order of Kutuzov 2nd Class Division;
  • 76th Guards Air Assault Chernihiv Red Banner Division;
  • 31st Separate Guards Airborne Assault Order of Kutuzov, 2nd Class Brigade;
• Military unit of special purpose:
  • 45th Separate Guards Order of Kutuzov Order of Alexander Nevsky Special Purpose Regiment;
• Military support units:
  • 38th Separate Communications Regiment of the Airborne Troops;

Airborne Troops- a type of troops intended for combat operations behind enemy lines.

Designed for airborne landings behind enemy lines or for rapid deployment in geographically remote areas, often used as a rapid reaction force.

The main method of delivery of the Airborne Forces is parachute landing, they can also be delivered by helicopter; during World War II, glider delivery was practiced.

The Airborne Forces consist of:
• paratroopers
• tank
• artillery
• self-propelled artillery
• other units and divisions
• from units and subunits of special troops and rear.

The personnel of the Airborne Forces are parachuted along with their personal weapons.

Tanks, rocket launchers, artillery guns, self-propelled guns, ammunition and other materiel are dropped from aircraft using airborne equipment (parachutes, parachute and parachute-rocket systems, cargo containers, platforms for installing and dropping weapons and equipment) or delivered by aircraft behind enemy lines to captured airfields.

The main combat properties of the Airborne Forces:
• ability to quickly reach remote areas
• strike suddenly
• successfully conduct combined arms combat.

The Airborne Forces are armed with airborne self-propelled guns ASU-85; self-propelled artillery guns "Octopus-SD"; 122-mm D-30 howitzers; airborne combat vehicles BMD-1/2/3/4; armored personnel carriers BTR-D.

Part of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation may be part of the joint armed forces (for example, the Joint Forces of the CIS) or be under joint command in accordance with the international treaties of the Russian Federation (for example, as part of the UN peacekeeping forces or the CIS collective peacekeeping forces in zones of local military conflicts ).

The German parachute troops were used in the Second World War to solve independent tasks of an operational nature and tactical tasks as part of the operations of larger formations of the ground army. Operation Freudenthal. which was planned to be carried out during the Sudeten crisis, consisted in the fact that the German paratrooper shooters were supposed to “open” the Czechoslovak line of fortifications from the rear. It was conceived as a completely independent operation. It was followed by other independent operations of paratrooper shooters: the only partially successful capture of the "Holland Fortress" in May 1940, the capture of the island of Crete in May 1941 - the largest and truly independently conducted airborne operation, as well as a number of smaller operations carried out in eastern Mediterranean in the autumn of 1943, after Italy broke off its alliance with Germany. Planned as a major distraction, the landing of German paratroopers into Northern Ireland in the late autumn of 1940, as well as the unrealized plan to capture the island of Malta in the summer of 1942, were supposed to be independent operations of the parachute troops. The formations of the army, navy and aviation assigned to interact with the paratroopers were supposed to perform tactical tasks as part of the operations of the paratroopers.

At the heart of all the largest of these airborne operations was almost the same idea: first attack in several places from the air and create several strong points in order to crack the enemy’s defense system from the inside, prevent him from concentrating his forces on any one sector and cut the communications necessary for defense; then choose one of the created strongholds, concentrate on it all available and newly arriving forces, so that they then spread like an ink stain until the main stronghold merges with others and absorbs them. This tactic - I would call it the "ink blot" tactic - was preferred by the Germans in all airborne operations, as opposed to the "carpet" tactics used by the Allies, which consisted in the fact that paratroopers were scattered evenly over the terrain to be captured from the very beginning. The "ink blot" tactic paid off both in Holland and Crete.

Along with the use of German paratroopers to solve operational problems, the German high command during the war increasingly began to assign tactical tasks to paratroopers in the framework of combat operations of large front-line formations. At the same time, the parachute troops were used for the most part as forward detachments or as rear guards, that is, to some extent they were likened to a modernized cavalry. The actions of the parachute troops in Norway - in the Dombos area and at the Oslo airfield in April 1940 - and the attack by a sapper platoon of parachute troops on Fort Eben-Emael, the capture and maintenance of crossings over the Albert Canal and the capture of crossings across the Lower Rhine on May 10, 1940 can be considered as actions parachute troops in the role of forward detachments. In the attack on Alexandria, Rommel also planned at first to use the four battle groups of the Ramcke brigade as a forward detachment for the surprise capture and destruction of the British anti-tank barriers. The planned use of one of the formations of the parachute troops for the sudden capture of the oil region northwest of Baku before the retreating enemy destroyed it also put the parachute troops in the role of a forward detachment. Finally, the von Heidte battle group, dropped during the last major fighting of the German paratroopers in December 1944 in the mountainous region of the Eifel to secure the northern flank of the attackers and to capture mountain passes and roads, was also an advance detachment.

It goes without saying that in a major airborne operation, a small proportion of the paratroopers, parachuted or landed in gliders, perform the tasks of the forward detachment. So, for example, during the fighting in Crete, the companies of the assault regiment landed in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bMalemes and eastern Cania on cargo gliders before the paratroopers; when planning an operation to capture the island of Malta, the aforementioned battalion was supposed to, using dive cargo gliders, disable the island's anti-aircraft artillery. Much less often, it was planned to use parachute and parachute-glider landings as a rearguard. So, in August 1943, units of the 2nd Parachute Division, which landed in Sicily on the western and southern slopes of Etna with the task of equipping a cut-off position between the retreating and partially defeated Italian troops and enemy units pursuing them, and ensuring the creation of a powerful bridgehead near the Strait of Messina even before , when the troops were evacuated from Sicily, were a kind of rearguard. The use of paratroopers in the role of a rearguard is to some extent approaching another type of their combat use. In soldier jargon, it is called "putting out a fire." It consists in the fact that shooters-paratroopers are thrown into the gap that has arisen in order to restore a continuous front line. No matter how great was the number of cases when paratroopers replaced infantry units, however, I do not know of a single example when such "fire fighting" would be carried out from the air by parachute and parachute-glider landings. True, once the high command planned a similar enterprise (to establish contact with the encircled German group in the Kholm area in the spring of 1942), but it was not carried out.

If we follow the course of the major German airborne operations carried out and those few cases of tactical use of parachute troops, one inevitably gets the impression that the German high command did not know how to use parachute troops in accordance with their characteristics. It hesitantly and reluctantly accepted the proposals that came from representatives of the parachute troops themselves, and in particular from General Student. All this led to the fact that the unit, so valuable to the army, which consisted entirely of selected volunteer soldiers and had excellent equipment, weapons and expensive equipment, turned into an ordinary infantry unit.

The actions of the German parachute and parachute-glider landings indicate that the command's fear of heavy landing losses was completely unfounded. True, the losses of the parachute troops in such operations were undoubtedly heavy, since the actions of any large landing force were a fierce hard struggle. However, the use of parachute assault always gives the command the opportunity to achieve an operational or tactical goal with much less forces than in a ground operation of the ground forces, where much larger forces must be used to achieve such a goal. Even if we assume that the goals that the paratroopers faced in Holland (1940) and Crete (1941) could be achieved without the use of landings from the air, only through the actions of the ground forces, then this would take much more time and much more forces, while the absolute figures of losses would, of course, not be less. In any case, the use of paratrooper shooters always justifies itself, but for this, parachute troops must be brought into battle in the direction of the main attack. They should not be used dispersed and perform various secondary tactical tasks. It is highly doubtful whether the command of the 6th Panzer Army "SO" observed this principle during the last landing of the German parachute troops in December 1944.

When performing tactical tasks, a separate group of paratroopers must be given greater freedom of action. Nowhere is a stamp and stencil so harmful as when attacking from the air, whether it be a jump or action from a glider. Despite this, we have to admit that during the Second World War, German paratroopers and glider landings used three main types of air attack: dropping or landing directly on the object, dropping or landing near the object, and dropping or landing away from the object.

Direct ejection onto an object is possible only if the object is small in size. In such a case, this form of attack is even necessary. A typical example of this is the landing on Fort Eben-Emael on May 10, 1940. The fort was taken only thanks to the landing directly on the object. In the same way, when planning the operation to capture the island of Malta, it was planned to land troops from diving gliders directly on the position of anti-aircraft artillery. Rommel also thought about landing on anti-tank barriers when he wanted to carry out an attack on Alexandria. The first British parachute landing, dropped in February 1942 north of Le Havre, was also a drop on the target. His task was to eliminate the German Wurzburg radar installation and remove from it the details necessary for the British. The bridgehead can be captured from the air only if the landing is made directly on the bridge, as was done, for example, by German paratroopers in 1940 on the Lower Rhine and in 1941 on the Isthmus of Corinth. Ignoring this elementary rule of parachute tactics by the British at Arnhem in September 1944 cost them the loss of one of the best parachute divisions. Capturing a bridge requires disembarking or landing on both bridgeheads, and this is the undisputed rule.

A typical case of dropping or landing near an object may be the capture of an airfield. Landing directly on the object with the help of gliders or parachutes would cause completely unnecessary losses here, in open areas.

Dropping or disembarking away from the objective does not have the benefit of a surprise air attack directly on or near the objective. If the drop or landing directly on the object or near it can be compared with an attack from the move, then the landing away from the object is in essence the occupation of the starting position for the offensive. In this case, after occupying the starting position, the landing force begins the attack, guided by the general principles of infantry action. An example of such a landing far from the object is the actions of the 3rd Parachute Rifle Regiment in Crete. This regiment had the task of capturing the capital of the island - the city of Cania. To accomplish the mission, the regiment parachuted onto the Kania-Alicianu road, approximately 3 km southwest of the outskirts of Kania. Then, from the landing area cleared of the enemy, the regiment began to systematically develop an offensive in a northeasterly direction, towards the main city of the island.

The commander of a separate parachute unit will decide to drop troops far from the object only if the object has a large extent (area), and the situation with the enemy is completely unclear. As part of a major landing operation, the command of the parachute troops will use a separate unit, under certain circumstances, away from the object, also because, if necessary, it can change the task by ordering it to participate in ground combat in other sectors. In the example above, the 3rd Parachute Regiment had all of the above prerequisites.

It would be a mistake to assume that at the moment when paratroopers are on the ground - whether it be when landing directly on an object, next to it or silt and away from it - the actions of the paratrooper shooter lose their specific features, and everything that happens afterwards , takes on the character of an ordinary infantry battle conducted according to the old, tried and tested rules. Even after unloading or disembarking, the battle of paratroopers retains its special features. Combat in landing conditions, in contrast to the battle of normal infantry units, is characterized mainly by three points: the need to defend from all sides, that is, to conduct all-round defense; the lack of close reconnaissance and reconnaissance before the battle and, not least, the lack of artillery. The old truth that the essence of the offensive lies in the harmonious interaction of fire and movement loses its meaning in the conditions of airborne combat. In this case, the fire recedes into the background, freeing up its place for movement. Its overwhelming and paralyzing effect is not as effective as the stunning surprise, deliberate order, and overturning force of movement that characterize an airborne attack. After landing, the commander of the parachute regiment is no longer the conductor of a large "fire band", but to a certain extent the "commissioner for saving ammunition", who seeks to compensate for the lack of firepower with the skillful and unexpected fire maneuver of his heavy weapons. Where this art of fire maneuver was replaced by bombardment and strafing from aircraft, for example, on the island of Crete and in South Holland (September 1944), instead of a clear, complementary and successful interaction of fire and movement, only clumsy and rather useless “assistance” was obtained. ".

During the last landing of German paratroopers in the mountainous region of the Eifel in December 1944, advanced observers were included in the combat group - long-range artillery divisions (batteries) and an artillery communications team that controlled fire from deep behind enemy lines. The results of their actions showed that such use of observers is fully justified.

Landing troops are required to undergo jump training at the training stage. Then the skydiving skills are already used during military operations or demonstration performances. Jumping has special rules: requirements for parachutes, aircraft used, training of soldiers. All these requirements must be known to the landing party for a safe flight and landing.

A paratrooper cannot jump without preparation. Training is a mandatory stage before the start of real airborne jumps, during which theoretical training and jumping practice take place. All the information that future paratroopers are told during training is given below.

Aircraft for transportation and landing

What aircraft do paratroopers jump from? The Russian army currently uses several aircraft for landing troops. The main one is IL-76, but other flying machines are also used:

• AN-12;
• MI-6;
• MI-8.

The IL-76 remains the preferred choice because it is the most conveniently equipped for landing, has a large luggage compartment and retains pressure well even at high altitudes, if the landing party needs to jump there. Its body is sealed, but in case of emergency, the compartment for paratroopers is equipped with individual oxygen masks. Thus, each skydiver will not experience a lack of oxygen during the flight.

The aircraft develops speeds of approximately 300 km per hour, and this is the optimal indicator for landing in military conditions.

Jump Height

From what height do paratroopers usually jump with a parachute? The altitude of the jump depends on the type of parachute and the aircraft used for landing. The recommended optimal landing height is 800-1000 meters above the ground. This indicator is convenient in combat conditions, since at such an altitude the aircraft is less exposed to fire. At the same time, the air is not too rarefied for the paratrooper to land.

From what height do paratroopers usually jump in case of non-training actions? The opening of the D-5 or D-6 parachute during landing from the IL-76 occurs at an altitude of 600 meters. The usual distance required for full disclosure is 200 meters. That is, if the landing starts from a height of 1200, then the opening will occur at around 1000. The maximum allowable for landing is 2000 meters.

More advanced models of parachutes allow you to start landing from a mark of several thousand meters. So, the modern model D-10 allows you to land at a maximum height of no more than 4000 m above the ground. At the same time, the minimum allowable level for deployment is 200. It is recommended to start deployment earlier to reduce the likelihood of injury and a hard landing.

Types of parachutes

Since the 1990s, two main types of landing parachutes have been used in Russia: D-5 and D-6. The first is the simplest, it does not allow you to adjust the landing site. How many lines does a paratrooper's parachute have? Depends on the model. Lines in D-5 28, the ends are fixed, which is why it is impossible to adjust the direction of flight. The length of the lines is 9 meters. The weight of one set is about 15 kg.

A more advanced D-5 model is the D-6 paratrooper parachute. In it, the ends of the lines can be released and the threads can be pulled, adjusting the direction of flight. To turn left, you need to pull the lines on the left, to maneuver to the right side, pull the thread on the right. The area of ​​the parachute dome is the same as that of the D-5 (83 square meters). The weight of the kit is reduced - only 11 kilograms, it is most convenient for still being trained, but already trained paratroopers. During the training, about 5 jumps are made (with express courses), D-6 is recommended to be issued after the first or second. There are 30 rafters in the kit, four of them allow you to control the parachute.

For complete beginners, D-10 kits have been developed, this is an updated version, which has only recently been made available to the army. There are more rafters here: 26 main and 24 additional. Of the 26 feet, 4 allow you to control the system, their length is 7 meters, and the remaining 22 - 4 meters. It turns out that there are only 22 external additional lines and 24 internal additional lines. Such a number of cords (all of them are made of nylon) allow you to control the flight as much as possible, adjust the course during disembarkation. The area of ​​the dome at the D-10 is as much as 100 square meters. At the same time, the dome is made in the shape of a squash, a comfortable green color without a pattern, so that after landing a paratrooper it would be harder to detect it.

Rules for disembarking from an aircraft

The paratroopers disembark from the cabin in a certain order. In IL-76 this happens in several streams. For disembarkation, there are two side doors and a ramp. During training activities, they prefer to use exclusively side doors. Disembarkation can be carried out:

• in one stream of two doors (with a minimum of personnel);
• in two streams from two doors (with an average number of paratroopers);
• in three or four streams from two doors (with large-scale educational activities);
• in two streams and from the ramp, and from the doors (during hostilities).

The distribution into streams is done so that the jumpers do not collide with each other upon landing and cannot be hooked. A small delay is made between threads, usually several tens of seconds.

Parachute flight and deployment mechanism

After landing, the paratrooper must calculate 5 seconds. It cannot be considered a standard method: "1, 2, 3 ...". It will turn out too quickly, the real 5 seconds will not pass yet. It is better to count like this: "121, 122 ...". Now the most commonly used account is starting from 500: "501, 502, 503 ...".

Immediately after the jump, the stabilizing parachute automatically opens (the stages of its opening can be seen on the video). This is a small dome that prevents the paratrooper from starting to "circle" during the fall. Stabilization prevents flips in the air, in which a person begins to fly upside down (this position does not allow the parachute to open).

After five seconds, the stabilization is completely removed, and the main dome must be activated. This is done either with the help of a ring, or automatically. A good paratrooper should be able to adjust the opening of the parachute himself, so trained students are given kits with a ring. After activating the ring, the main dome fully opens in 200 meters of fall. The duties of a trained paratrooper paratrooper also include camouflage after landing.

Safety rules: how to protect the landing from injury

Parachutes require special treatment, care, so that jumps using them are as safe as possible. Immediately after use, the parachute must be properly folded, otherwise its service life will be drastically reduced. An improperly folded parachute may fail to deploy during landing, resulting in death.

• before landing, check the stabilization parachute;
• check other equipment;
• remember all the landing rules, calm down by using an oxygen mask;
• don't forget about the five second rule;
• ensure uniform landing in several streams to reduce the risk of collisions.

Be sure to take into account the weight of the jumper. All models of parachutes can withstand no more than 150 kg. At the same time, when jumping with a weight of up to 140, they can be used 80 times, but if the load is 150, then only 10, after which the parachute goes to waste. Weight must be calculated from the sum of the paratrooper himself and the weight of the kit. The new D-10 weighs 15 kg, like the D-5, but the D-6 weighs 11 kg.

Units similar to the Russian airborne troops exist in many countries of the world. But they are called differently: air infantry, winged infantry, airborne troops, highly mobile landing troops and even commandos.

At the beginning of 1936, the leadership of Great Britain was shown a documentary film about the world's first airborne assault, created in the USSR. Following the screening, General Alfred Knox casually remarked on the sidelines of Parliament: "I have always been convinced that the Russians are a nation of dreamers." In vain, already during the Great Patriotic War, Russian paratroopers proved that they were capable of the impossible.

Moscow is in danger. Parachutes are not needed

Soviet landing troops from the first days of their existence were used to carry out the most complex military operations. However, the feat they accomplished in the winter of 1941 can hardly be called anything other than fantasy.

During the most dramatic days of the Great Patriotic War, a pilot of the Soviet Army, who was on a reconnaissance flight, unexpectedly and with horror for himself, discovered a column of fascist armored vehicles moving towards Moscow, on the way of which there were no Soviet troops. Moscow was exposed. There was no time to think. The High Command ordered to stop the fascists rapidly advancing towards the capital with the forces of the airborne troops. At the same time, it was assumed that they would have to jump from low-level aircraft, without parachutes, into the snow and immediately engage in battle. When the command announced the conditions of the operation in front of the landing company of Siberians, emphasizing that participation in it was not an order, but a request, no one refused.

It is not difficult to imagine the feelings of the Wehrmacht soldiers when the wedges of Soviet aircraft flying at extremely low altitude appeared in front of them. When tall heroes without parachutes fell from the air cars into the snow, the Germans were completely panicked. The first planes were followed by the next. They couldn't see the end. This episode is most vividly described in the book by Yu.V. Sergeev "Prince's Island". The battle was fierce. Both sides suffered heavy losses. But as soon as the Germans, significantly outnumbered and outgunned, began to gain the upper hand, new planes of the Soviet landing force appeared from behind the forest and the battle flared up again. The victory remained with the Soviet paratroopers. German mechanized columns were destroyed. Moscow was saved. Moreover, as it was later calculated, when jumping without a parachute into the snow, about 12% of the landing force died. It is noteworthy that this was not the only case of such a landing during the defense of Moscow. A story about a similar operation can be found in the autobiographical book “From Heaven to Battle”, written by Soviet intelligence officer Ivan Starchak, one of the champions in parachuting.

Paratroopers were the first to take the North Pole

For a long time, under the heading "Top Secret" hid the feat of the Soviet paratroopers, worthy of the Guinness Book of Records. As you know, after the end of World War II, a heavy shadow of the Cold War hung over the world. Moreover, the countries participating in it had unequal conditions in the event of the outbreak of hostilities. The United States had bases in European countries where their bombers were located. And the USSR could launch a nuclear strike on the United States only through the territory of the Arctic Ocean. But in the late 1940s and early 1950s, this path was long for heavy bombers, and the country needed "jump" airfields in the Arctic, which had to be guarded. For this purpose, the command of the troops decided to organize the world's first landing of Soviet troops in full combat gear to the North Pole. Vitaly Volovich and Andrei Medvedev were assigned to carry out such a responsible mission.

They were supposed to land on the Pole on the landmark day of May 9, 1949. The parachute jump was successful. Soviet paratroopers landed exactly at the predetermined point. They set up the flag of the USSR and took pictures, although this was a violation of the instructions. When the mission was successfully completed, the paratroopers were taken by the Li-2 aircraft, which landed nearby on an ice floe. For the record set, paratroopers received the Order of the Red Banner. The most amazing thing is that the Americans were able to repeat their jump only 32 years later in 1981. Of course, it was they who got into the Guinness Book of Records: Jack Wheeler and Rocky Parsons, although the first parachute jump to the North Pole was made by Soviet paratroopers.

"9th company": in the cinema from life

One of the most famous domestic films about the airborne troops of Russia is the film by Fyodor Bondarchuk "9th Company". As you know, the plot of the blockbuster, which strikes with drama, is based on real events that took place during the infamous war in Afghanistan. The film was based on the story of the battle for the dominant height of 3234 in the Afghan city of Khost, which was supposed to be held by the 9th company of the 345th Guards Separate Airborne Regiment. The fight took place on January 7, 1988. Several hundred Mujahideen opposed 39 Soviet paratroopers. Their task was to capture the dominant height, in order to then gain control of the Gardez-Khost road. Using terraces and hidden approaches, the Mujahideen were able to approach the positions of the Soviet paratroopers at a distance of 200 meters. The battle went on for 12 hours, but unlike the film, it did not have such a dramatic ending. The Mujahideen fired mercilessly at the positions of the paratroopers with mortars, machine guns and grenade launchers. During the night, the attackers stormed the height nine times and threw them back the same number of times. True, the last attack almost led them to the goal. Fortunately, at that moment, a reconnaissance platoon of the 3rd Airborne Regiment arrived to help the paratroopers. This decided the outcome of the battle. The Mujahideen, having suffered significant losses, and not having achieved what they wanted, retreated. The most surprising thing is that the losses among ours were not as great as it was shown in the film. Six people were killed and 28 were injured of varying severity.

Russian response to NATO

It is noteworthy that it was the airborne troops that brought the first military-political victory to Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. During the tragic 1990s for the country, when the United States ceased to take into account Russian interests, the last straw that broke the cup of patience was the bombing of Serbia. The protests of Russia, which demanded an exclusively peaceful resolution of the conflict, NATO did not take into account.

As a result, more than 2,000 civilians alone died in Serbia in a few months. Moreover, in the course of preparations for the Allied Force operation in 1999, Russia not only was not mentioned as a possible participant in the resolution of the conflict, but its opinion was not taken into account at all. In this situation, the military leadership decided to conduct their own proactive operation and take the only major airport in Kosovo, forcing them to reckon with themselves. The Russian peacekeeping battalion was ordered to move out of Bosnia and Herzegovina and make a forced march 600 km long. The paratroopers of the combined battalion of the Airborne Forces were the first, before the British, to occupy the Pristina airport "Slatina", the main strategic object of the country. The fact is that it was the only airport in the region capable of receiving any type of aircraft, including military transport. It was here that it was planned to transfer the main NATO forces for ground combat operations.

The order was executed on the night of June 11-12, 1999, on the eve of the start of the NATO ground operation. Russians were greeted with flowers. As soon as NATO realized what had happened, a column of British tanks hastily advanced to the Slatina airfield. Forces, as usual, were unequal. Russia wanted to additionally deploy an airborne division to the airport, but Hungary and Bulgaria refused an air corridor. Meanwhile, British General Michael Jackson ordered the tank crews to liberate the airport from the Russians. In response, Russian servicemen took aim at NATO military equipment, showing the seriousness of their intentions. They did not allow British helicopters to land on the territory of the airport. NATO sharply demanded that Jackson kick the Russians out of Slatina. But the general said that he was not going to start the Third World War and retreated. As a result, during the daring and successful operation of the paratroopers, Russia gained zones of influence, including control over the Slatina airport.

Today, the airborne troops of Russia, as before, continue to defend the military-political interests of Russia. The main tasks of the Airborne Forces during hostilities include covering the enemy from the air, performing combat operations in his rear. The priority is to disorientate the enemy troops by violating his control, as well as to destroy ground elements of high-precision weapons. In addition, airborne troops are used as rapid reaction forces.

A branch of the Armed Forces, which is a reserve of the Supreme High Command and is specially designed to cover the enemy by air and perform tasks in his rear to disrupt command and control, capture and destroy ground elements of high-precision weapons, disrupt the advancement and deployment of reserves, disrupt the rear and communications, as well as covering (defending) certain areas, areas, open flanks, blocking and destroying airborne assault forces, enemy groupings that have broken through, and performing many other tasks.

In peacetime, the Airborne Forces perform the main tasks of maintaining combat and mobilization readiness at a level that ensures their successful use as intended.

In the Russian Armed Forces they are a separate branch of the military.

Also, the Airborne Forces are often used as rapid reaction forces.

The main method of delivery of the Airborne Forces is parachute landing, they can also be delivered by helicopter; during World War II, glider delivery was practiced.

Airborne Forces of the USSR

pre-war period

At the end of 1930, near Voronezh, in the 11th Infantry Division, a Soviet airborne unit was created - an airborne assault detachment. In December 1932, he was deployed to the 3rd Special Purpose Aviation Brigade (OsNaz), which since 1938 became known as the 201st Airborne Brigade.

The very first use of airborne assault in the history of military affairs took place in the spring of 1929. In the city of Garm besieged by the Basmachi, a group of armed Red Army soldiers was landed from the air, and with the support of local residents, they completely defeated the gang that had invaded the territory of Tajikistan from abroad. But still, the Day of the Airborne Forces in Russia and a number of other countries is considered to be August 2, in honor of the parachute landing at the military exercise of the Moscow Military District near Voronezh on August 2, 1930.

in 1931, on the basis of an order dated March 18, a non-standard, experienced aviation motorized landing detachment (airborne landing detachment) was formed in the Leningrad Military District. It was intended to study issues of operational-tactical use and the most advantageous organizational forms of airborne landing (airborne) units, units and formations. The detachment consisted of 164 personnel and consisted of:

One rifle company;
-individual platoons: sapper, communications and light vehicles;
- heavy bomber aviation squadron (air squadron) (12 aircraft - TB-1);
- one corps aviation detachment (air detachment) (10 aircraft - R-5).
The detachment was armed with:

Two 76-mm Kurchevsky dynamo-reactive cannons (DRP);
-two wedges - T-27;
-4 grenade launchers;
-3 light armored vehicles (armored vehicles);
-14 light and 4 heavy machine guns;
-10 trucks and 16 cars;
-4 motorcycles and one scooter
E. D. Lukin was appointed commander of the detachment. Subsequently, a non-standard paratrooper detachment was formed in the same air brigade.

In 1932, the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR issued a decree on the deployment of detachments into special aviation battalions (bOSNAZ). By the end of 1933, there were already 29 airborne battalions and brigades that were part of the Air Force. The LenVO (Leningrad Military District) was entrusted with the task of training airborne instructors and developing operational and tactical standards.

By the standards of that time, the airborne units were an effective means of disorganizing the control and rear of the enemy. They were to be used where other branches of the armed forces (infantry, artillery, cavalry, armored forces) could not solve this problem at the moment, and were also intended to be used by the high command in cooperation with troops advancing from the front, airborne assault forces were supposed to help encirclement and defeat of the enemy in this direction.

Staff No. 015/890 of 1936 of the "Airborne Brigade" (Adbr) of wartime and peacetime. Name of units, number of wartime personnel (number of peacetime personnel in parentheses):

Management, 49(50);
- communication company, 56 (46);
-musician platoon, 11 (11);
-3 airborne battalions, each, 521 (381);
- school of junior officers, 0 (115);
-services, 144 (135);
Total: in the brigade, 1823 (1500); Personnel:

Command staff, 107 (118);
- Commanding staff, 69 (60);
- Junior command and command staff, 330 (264);
- Privates, 1317 (1058);
-Total: 1823 (1500);

Material part:

45 mm anti-tank gun, 18 (19);
-Light machine guns, 90 (69);
-Radio stations, 20 (20);
-Automatic carbines, 1286 (1005);
-Light mortars, 27 (20);
- Cars, 6 (6);
- Trucks, 63 (51);
-Special vehicles, 14 (14);
- Cars "Pickup", 9 (8);
-Motorcycles, 31 (31);
- Tractors ChTZ, 2 (2);
- Tractor trailers, 4 (4);
In the prewar years, a lot of forces and funds were allocated for the development of airborne troops, the development of the theory of their combat use, as well as practical training. In 1934, 600 paratroopers were involved in the exercises of the Red Army. In 1935, during the maneuvers of the Kyiv Military District, 1,188 paratroopers were parachuted and a landing force consisting of 2,500 people landed along with military equipment.

In 1936, 3,000 paratroopers were parachuted into the Belarusian Military District, 8,200 people with artillery and other military equipment were landed by landing method. The invited foreign military delegations present at these exercises were amazed by the size of the landings and the skill of landing.

"31. Airborne units, as a new type of airborne infantry, are a means of disorganizing the control and rear of the enemy. They are used by the high command.
In cooperation with the troops advancing from the front, the air infantry helps encircle and defeat the enemy in a given direction.

The use of air infantry must be strictly in accordance with the conditions of the situation and requires reliable provision and observance of measures of secrecy and surprise.
- Chapter two "Organization of the troops of the Red Army" 1. Types of troops and their combat use, Field Charter of the Red Army (PU-39)

The paratroopers gained experience in real battles. In 1939, the 212th Airborne Brigade took part in the defeat of the Japanese at Khalkhin Gol. For their courage and heroism, 352 paratroopers were awarded orders and medals. In 1939-1940, during the Soviet-Finnish war, the 201st, 202nd and 214th airborne brigades fought together with rifle units.

Based on the experience gained in 1940, new staffs of brigades were approved as part of three combat groups: parachute, glider and landing.

In preparation for the operation to annex Bessarabia to the USSR, occupied by Romania, as well as Northern Bukovina, the command of the Red Army enlisted the 201st, 204th and 214th airborne brigades in the Southern Front. During the operation, combat missions were received by the 204th and 201st adbrs and landings were thrown into the area of ​​​​Bolgrad and the city of Izmail, and after the closure of the state border to organize Soviet governments in settlements.

The Great Patriotic War

By the beginning of 1941, on the basis of the existing airborne brigades, airborne corps were deployed, numbering more than 10 thousand people each.
On September 4, 1941, by order of the People's Commissar, the Office of the Airborne Forces was transformed into the Office of the Commander of the Airborne Forces of the Red Army, and the formations and units of the Airborne Forces were removed from the subordination of the commanders of the active fronts and transferred to the direct subordination of the commander of the Airborne Forces. In accordance with this order, ten airborne corps, five maneuverable airborne brigades, five reserve airborne regiments and an airborne school (Kuibyshev) were formed. At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the Airborne Forces were an independent branch of the forces (troops) of the Red Army Air Force.

In the counter-offensive near Moscow, conditions appeared for the widespread use of the Airborne Forces. In the winter of 1942, the Vyazemsky airborne operation was carried out with the participation of the 4th airborne corps. In September 1943, an airborne assault consisting of two brigades was used to help the troops of the Voronezh Front in forcing the Dnieper River. In the Manchurian strategic operation in August 1945, more than 4 thousand people of the personnel of rifle units were landed for landing operations by landing method, who quite successfully completed their tasks.

In October 1944, the Airborne Forces were transformed into a separate Guards Airborne Army, which became part of the long-range aviation. In December 1944, this army was, on the basis of the order of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command of December 18, 1944, transformed into the 9th Guards Army, on the basis of the command of the 7th Army and formations of a separate guards airborne army with direct subordination to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The airborne divisions were reorganized into rifle divisions.
At the same time, the Airborne Forces Directorate was created with direct subordination to the Air Force Commander. Three airborne brigades, a training airborne regiment, advanced training courses for officers and an aeronautical division remained in the Airborne Forces. At the end of the winter of 1945, the 9th Guards Army, consisting of the 37th, 38th, and 39th Guards Rifle Corps, was concentrated in Hungary southeast of Budapest; On February 27, she became part of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, on March 9 she was reassigned to the 3rd Ukrainian Front. In March - April 1945, the army took part in the Vienna strategic operation (March 16 - April 15), advancing in the direction of the front's main attack. In early May 1945, the army, as part of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, took part in the Prague operation (May 6-11). The 9th Guards Army ended its combat path with an exit to the Elbe. The army was disbanded on May 11, 1945. The commander of the army was Colonel General Glagolev VV (December 1944 - until the end of the war). On June 10, 1945, in accordance with the order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of May 29, 1945, the Central Group of Forces was formed, which included the 9th Guards Army. Later it was withdrawn to the Moscow District, where in 1946 its department was transformed into the Directorate of the Airborne Forces, and all its formations again became guards airborne - the 37th, 38th, 39th corps and 98, 99, 100, 103, 104 , 105, 106, 107, 114 airborne division (airborne division).

post-war period

Since 1946, they were transferred to the ground forces of the Armed Forces of the USSR, were directly subordinate to the Minister of Defense of the USSR, being the reserve of the Supreme Commander.
In 1956, two airborne divisions took part in the Hungarian events. In 1968, after the capture of two airfields near Prague and Bratislava, the 7th and 103rd Guards Airborne Divisions were landed, which ensured the successful completion of the task by formations and units of the United Armed Forces of the countries participating in the Warsaw Pact during the Czechoslovak events.

In the post-war period, a lot of work was done in the Airborne Forces to increase the firepower and mobility of personnel. Numerous samples of airborne armored vehicles (BMD, BTR-D), automotive equipment (TPK, GAZ-66), artillery systems (ASU-57, ASU-85, 2S9 Nona, 107-mm B-11 recoilless rifle) were made. Complex parachute systems were created for landing all types of weapons - "Centaur", "Reaktaur" and others. The fleet of military transport aviation, called for the mass transfer of landing formations in the event of large-scale hostilities, was also greatly increased. Large-body transport aircraft were made capable of parachute landing of military equipment (An-12, An-22, Il-76).

In the USSR, for the first time in the world, airborne troops were created, which had their own armored vehicles and self-propelled artillery. At large army exercises (like Shield-82 or Druzhba-82), personnel were landed with standard equipment numbering no more than two parachute regiments. The state of the military transport aviation of the USSR Armed Forces at the end of the 1980s allowed 75% of the personnel and standard military equipment of one airborne division to be dropped by parachute in just one general sortie.

By the fall of 1979, the 105th Guards Vienna Red Banner Airborne Division was disbanded, specially designed for combat operations in mountainous desert areas. Parts of the 105th Guards Airborne Division were deployed in the cities of Ferghana, Namangan and Chirchik of the Uzbek SSR and in the city of Osh of the Kirghiz SSR. As a result of the disbandment of the 105th Guards Airborne Division, the 4th separate airborne assault brigades (35th Guards, 38th Guards and 56th Guards), 40th (without the status of "Guards") and 345th Guards Separate Parachute Regiment.

The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, which followed the disbandment of the 105th Guards Airborne Division in 1979, showed the profound fallacy of the decision made by the leadership of the USSR Armed Forces - an airborne formation specially adapted for combat operations in mountainous desert areas was thoughtlessly and rather hastily was disbanded, and the 103rd Guards Airborne Division was eventually sent to Afghanistan, the personnel of which had no training at all for combat operations in such a theater of operations:

105th Guards Airborne Vienna Red Banner Division (mountain and desert).:
“... in 1986, the Commander of the Airborne Forces, Army General Sukhorukov D.F., arrived, he then said what fools we were, having disbanded the 105th airborne division, because it was specially designed for combat operations in mountainous desert areas. And we had to spend huge amounts of money to deliver the 103rd airborne division to Kabul by air ... "

By the mid-80s, the airborne troops of the USSR Armed Forces included 7 airborne divisions and three separate regiments with the following names and locations:

7th Guards Red Banner Order of Kutuzov II degree airborne division. Based in Kaunas, Lithuanian SSR, Baltic Military District.
-76th Guards Red Banner Order of Kutuzov II degree Chernihiv Airborne Division. It was stationed in Pskov, RSFSR, Leningrad Military District.
-98th Guards Red Banner Order of Kutuzov II degree Svir airborne division. It was based in the city of Bolgrad, Ukrainian SSR, KOdVO and in the city of Chisinau, Moldavian SSR, KOdVO.
-103rd Guards Red Banner Order of Lenin Order of Kutuzov II degree airborne division named after the 60th anniversary of the USSR. It was stationed in the city of Kabul (Afghanistan) as part of OKSVA. Until December 1979 and after February 1989, it was stationed in the city of Vitebsk, Byelorussian SSR, Belorussian Military District.
-104th Guards Red Banner Order of Kutuzov II degree airborne division, specially designed for combat operations in mountainous areas. It was stationed in the city of Kirovabad of the Azerbaijan SSR, Transcaucasian Military District.
-106th Guards Red Banner Order of Kutuzov II degree airborne division. It was stationed in the city of Tula and in the city of Ryazan of the RSFSR, Moscow Military District.
-44th Training Red Banner Order of Suvorov II degree and Bogdan Khmelnitsky II degree Ovruch airborne division. Located in the village Gayzhyunay of the Lithuanian SSR, Baltic VO.
-345th Guards Vienna Red Banner Order of Suvorov III degree parachute regiment named after the 70th anniversary of the Lenin Komsomol. It was located in the city of Bagram (Afghanistan) as part of OKSVA. Until December 1979, it was based in the city of Fergana, Uzbek SSR, after February 1989 - in Kirovabad, Azerbaijan SSR, Transcaucasian Military District.
-387th training separate parachute regiment (387th oopdp). Until 1982, he was part of the 104th Guards Airborne Division. In the period from 1982 to 1988, young recruits were trained in the 387th opdp to be sent to the airborne and airborne assault units as part of the OKSVA. In cinematography, in the film "9th Company", the training part means precisely the 387th opdp. Based in the city of Fergana, Uzbek SSR, Turkestan Military District.
-196th Separate Communications Regiment of the Airborne Troops. Settled in the village. Bear Lakes, Moscow Region, RSFSR.
Each of these divisions included: a directorate (headquarters), three airborne regiments, one self-propelled artillery regiment, and combat support and logistics support units.

In addition to parachute units and formations, the airborne troops also had air assault units and formations, but they were directly subordinate to the commanders of military districts (groups of forces), armies or corps. They practically did not differ in anything, except for tasks, subordination and OShS (organizational staff structure). Methods of combat use, combat training programs for personnel, weapons and uniforms for military personnel were the same as for paratrooper units and formations of the Airborne Forces (central subordination). Air assault formations were represented by separate air assault brigades (ODSHBR), separate air assault regiments (ODSHP) and separate air assault battalions (ODSHB).

The reason for the creation of air assault units in the late 60s was the revision of tactics in the fight against the enemy in the event of a full-scale war. The stake was placed on the concept of using massive landings in the near rear of the enemy, capable of disorganizing the defense. The technical possibility for such a landing was provided by the fleet of transport helicopters in army aviation, which had significantly increased by this time.

By the mid-80s, the USSR Armed Forces included 14 separate brigades, two separate regiments and about 20 separate battalions. The brigades were based on the territory of the USSR according to the principle - one brigade per one military district, which has land access to the State border of the USSR, one brigade in the inner Kiev Military District (23rd brigade in Kremenchug, subordinate to the High Command of the southwestern direction) and two brigades for the group Soviet troops abroad (35gv.odshbr in the GSVG in the city of Cottbus and 83odshbr in the SGV in the city of Bialogard). 56ogdshbr in OKSVA, located in the city of Gardez of the Republic of Afghanistan, belonged to the Turkestan Military District, in which it was created.

Individual air assault regiments were subordinate to the commanders of individual army corps.

The difference between the parachute and airborne assault formations of the Airborne Forces was as follows:

In the presence of standard airborne armored vehicles (BMD, BTR-D, self-propelled guns "Nona", etc.). In the airborne assault units, only a quarter of all units were equipped with it - in contrast to 100% of its staffing in the paratrooper units.
- In the subordination of the troops. Airborne assault units, operationally, were directly subordinate to the command of military districts (groups of troops), armies, and corps. The parachute units were subordinate only to the command of the Airborne Forces, whose headquarters was in Moscow.
- In assigned tasks. It was assumed that the air assault units, in the event of the start of large-scale hostilities, would be used to land in the near rear of the enemy, mainly by landing from helicopters. Parachute units were supposed to be used in a deeper rear of the enemy with a parachute landing from VTA aircraft (military transport aviation). At the same time, airborne training with planned training parachute landings of personnel and military equipment was mandatory for both types of airborne forces.
-Unlike the guards airborne units of the Airborne Forces deployed in full force, some airborne assault brigades were cadre (incomplete) and were not guards. The exception was three brigades that received the names of the Guards, created on the basis of the Guards parachute regiments, disbanded in 1979 by the 105th Vienna Red Banner Guards Airborne Division - the 35th, 38th and 56th. The 40th air assault brigade, created on the basis of the 612th separate airborne support battalion and the 100th separate reconnaissance company of the same division, did not receive the status of "guards".
In the mid-80s, the following brigades and regiments were part of the Airborne Forces of the USSR Armed Forces:

11th separate airborne assault brigade in the Trans-Baikal Military District (Chita region, Mogocha and Amazar),
-13th separate airborne assault brigade in the Far Eastern Military District (Amur Region, Magdagachi and Zavitinsk),
-21st separate airborne assault brigade in the Transcaucasian Military District (Georgian SSR, Kutaisi),
-23rd separate air assault brigade of the South-Western direction (on the territory of the Kyiv Military District), (Ukrainian SSR, Kremenchug),
-35th Separate Guards Airborne Assault Brigade in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (German Democratic Republic, Cottbus),
-36th separate airborne assault brigade in the Leningrad Military District (Leningrad region, Garbolovo village),
-37th separate airborne assault brigade in the Baltic Military District (Kaliningrad region, Chernyakhovsk),
-38th Separate Guards Airborne Assault Brigade in the Belarusian Military District (Belarusian SSR, Brest),
-39th separate airborne assault brigade in the Carpathian Military District (Ukrainian SSR, Khyriv),
-40th separate airborne assault brigade in the Odessa Military District (Ukrainian SSR, village Bolshaya Korenikha, Nikolaev region),
-56th Guards Separate Air Assault Brigade in the Turkestan Military District (created in the city of Chirchik, Uzbek SSR and introduced into Afghanistan),
-57th separate airborne assault brigade in the Central Asian Military District (Kazakh SSR, Aktogay township),
-58th separate airborne assault brigade in the Kiev Military District (Ukrainian SSR, Kremenchug),
-83rd separate airborne assault brigade in the Northern Group of Forces, (Polish People's Republic, Bialogard),
-1318th separate airborne assault regiment in the Belarusian Military District (Belarusian SSR, Polotsk) subordinate to the 5th separate army corps (5oak)
-1319th separate airborne assault regiment in the Trans-Baikal Military District (Buryat ASSR, Kyakhta) subordinate to the 48th separate army corps (48oak)
These brigades had in their composition management, 3 or 4 air assault battalions, one artillery battalion and combat support and logistics support units. The personnel of fully deployed brigades ranged from 2,500 to 3,000 troops.
For example, the regular strength of the personnel of the 56th brigade on December 1, 1986 was 2452 military personnel (261 officers, 109 ensigns, 416 sergeants, 1666 soldiers).

The regiments differed from the brigades in the presence of only two battalions: one paratrooper and one air assault (on the BMD), as well as a slightly reduced composition of the regimental units.

Participation of the Airborne Forces in the Afghan War

In the Afghan war, from the airborne and airborne assault formations of the USSR Armed Forces, one airborne division (103 guards airborne division), one separate airborne assault brigade (56gdshbr), one separate airborne regiment (345gv.opdp) and two air assault battalions as part of separate motorized rifle brigades (in the 66th brigade and in the 70th brigade). In total, for 1987, these were 18 "linear" battalions (13 paratroopers and 5 airborne assaults), which accounted for a fifth of the total number of all OKSVA "linear" battalions (which included another 18 tank and 43 motorized rifle battalions).

In virtually the entire history of the Afghan war, not a single situation has arisen that would justify the use of parachute landing for the transfer of personnel. The main reasons here were the complexity of the mountainous terrain, as well as the unjustified material costs in using such methods in the counter-guerrilla war. The delivery of the personnel of the parachute and airborne assault units to the mountainous areas of hostilities, impassable for armored vehicles, was carried out only by the landing method using helicopters. Therefore, the division of the line battalions of the Airborne Forces in OKSVA into air assault and parachute assault should be considered conditional. Both types of battalions operated in the same way.

As in all motorized rifle, tank and artillery units as part of the OKSVA, up to half of all units of the airborne and airborne assault formations were assigned to guard outposts, which made it possible to control roads, mountain passes and the vast territory of the country, significantly restricting the the very actions of the enemy. For example, battalions of the 350th Guards RAP were often based in various parts of Afghanistan (in Kunar, Girishka, Surubi), controlling the situation in these areas. The 2nd Airborne Battalion from the 345th Guards Opdp was distributed to 20 outposts in the Panjshir Gorge near the village of Anava. With this, 2pdb 345opdp (together with the 682nd motorized rifle regiment of the 108th motorized rifle division stationed in the village of Rukha) completely blocked the western exit from the gorge, which was the main transport artery of the enemy from Pakistan to the strategically important Charikar Valley.

The most massive combat airborne operation in the USSR Armed Forces, in the period after the Great Patriotic War, must be considered the 5th Panjshir Operation in May-June 1982, during which the first mass landing of the 103rd Guards Airborne Forces in Afghanistan was carried out: only during the first three days, more than 4 thousand people were parachuted from helicopters. In total, about 12 thousand military personnel of various branches of the armed forces participated in this operation. The operation took place simultaneously for all 120 km deep into the gorge. As a result of the operation, most of the Panjshir Gorge was taken under control.

In the period from 1982 to 1986, in all airborne divisions of OKSVA, a systematic replacement of regular airborne armored vehicles (BMD-1, BTR-D) with armored vehicles, standard for motorized rifle units (BMP-2D, BTR-70) was carried out. First of all, this was due to the rather low security and low motor resource of the structurally lightweight armored vehicles of the Airborne Forces, as well as the nature of the hostilities, where combat missions performed by paratroopers will not differ much from the tasks assigned to motorized rifles.

Also, to increase the firepower of the landing units, additional artillery and tank units will be introduced into their composition. For example, 345opdp, modeled on a motorized rifle regiment, will be supplemented with an artillery howitzer battalion and a tank company, in the 56th brigade the artillery battalion was deployed up to 5 fire batteries (instead of the prescribed 3 batteries), and the 103rd Guards Airborne Division will be given to reinforce the 62nd separate tank battalion, which was unusual for the organizational and staff structure of the Airborne Forces units on the territory of the USSR.

Training of officers for the airborne troops

Officers were trained by the following military educational institutions in the following military specialties:

Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School - commander of an airborne (airborne assault) platoon, commander of a reconnaissance platoon.
-Airborne Department of the Ryazan Military Automobile Institute - commander of an automobile / transport platoon.
- Landing Department of the Ryazan Higher Military Command School of Communications - commander of a communications platoon.
-Airborne faculty of the Novosibirsk Higher Military Command School - deputy company commander for political affairs (educational work).
-Airborne Department of the Kolomna Higher Artillery Command School - commander of an artillery platoon.
-Poltava Higher Anti-Aircraft Missile Command Red Banner School - commander of an anti-aircraft artillery, anti-aircraft missile platoon.
- Landing department of the Kamenetz-Podolsky Higher Military Engineering Command School - commander of an engineering platoon.
In addition to graduates of these educational institutions, the Airborne Forces often appointed platoon commanders, graduates of higher combined arms schools (VOKU) and military departments that trained motorized rifle platoon commanders. This was due to the fact that the profile Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School, which produced an average of about 300 lieutenants every year, was simply not able to fully meet the needs of the Airborne Forces (at the end of the 80s they had about 60,000 personnel) in platoon leaders. For example, the former commander of 247gv.pdp (7gv.vdd), Hero of the Russian Federation Em Yuri Pavlovich, who began his service in the Airborne Forces as a platoon commander in 111gv.pdp 105gv.vdd, graduated from the Alma-Ata Higher Combined Arms Command School.

For quite a long time, military units and units of the Special Forces (the so-called now army special forces) were erroneously and / or deliberately called paratroopers. This circumstance is connected with the fact that in the Soviet period, as now, the Russian Armed Forces did not have and do not have special forces, but there were and are units and units of the Special Forces (SpN) of the GRU of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. In the press and in the media, the phrases “special forces” or “commandos” were mentioned only in relation to the troops of a potential enemy (“Green Berets”, “Rangers”, “Commandos”).

Starting from the formation of these units in the USSR Armed Forces in 1950 until the end of the 80s, the existence of such units and units was completely denied. It got to the point that conscripts learned about their existence only when they were accepted into the personnel of these units and units. Officially, in the Soviet press and on television, units and units of the Special Forces of the GRU of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces were announced either as parts of the Airborne Forces - as in the case of the GSVG (officially there were no Special Forces units in the GDR), or as in the case of OKSVA - separate motorized rifle battalions (omsb). For example, the 173rd separate special forces detachment (173ooSpN), based near the city of Kandahar, was called the 3rd separate motorized rifle battalion (3omsb)

In everyday life, the servicemen of the units and units of the Special Forces wore the full dress and field uniforms adopted in the Airborne Forces, although they did not belong to the Airborne Forces either in terms of subordination or in terms of the assigned tasks of reconnaissance and sabotage activities. The only thing that united the Airborne Forces and units and units of the Special Forces was most of the officers - RVVDKU graduates, airborne training and possible combat use behind enemy lines.

Airborne Forces of Russia

The decisive role in the formation of the theory of combat use and the development of weapons of the airborne troops belongs to the Soviet military leader Vasily Filippovich Margelov, commander of the Airborne Forces from 1954 to 1979. The name of Margelov is also associated with the positioning of airborne formations as highly maneuverable, covered with armor and having sufficient fire efficiency units to participate in modern strategic operations in various theaters of military operations. On his initiative, the technical re-equipment of the Airborne Forces was launched: serial production of landing equipment was launched at defense production enterprises, modifications of small arms designed specifically for paratroopers were made, new military equipment was modernized and created (including the first tracked combat vehicle BMD-1), were taken to armament and new military transport aircraft entered the troops, and finally, their own symbols of the Airborne Forces were created - vests and blue berets. His personal contribution to the formation of the Airborne Forces in their modern form was formulated by General Pavel Fedoseevich Pavlenko:

"In the history of the Airborne Forces, and in the Armed Forces of Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union, his name will remain forever. He personified a whole era in the development and formation of the Airborne Forces, their authority and popularity are associated with his name not only in our country, but and abroad...
…IN. F. Margelov realized that in modern operations, only highly mobile, capable of wide maneuver landing forces would be able to successfully operate deep behind enemy lines. He categorically rejected the installation of holding the area captured by the landing until the approach of the troops advancing from the front by the method of tough defense as disastrous, because in this case the landing would be quickly destroyed.

During the Second World War, the largest operational-tactical formations of the airborne troops (forces) - the army - were formed. The Airborne Army (VDA) was specially designed to carry out major operational and strategic tasks behind enemy lines. It was first created at the end of 1943 in Nazi Germany as part of several airborne divisions. In 1944, the Anglo-American command also created such an army, consisting of two airborne corps (a total of five airborne divisions) and several military transport aviation formations. These armies never took part in hostilities in full strength.
-During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, tens of thousands of soldiers, sergeants, officers of the airborne units of the Red Army Air Force were awarded orders and medals, and 126 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
-After the end of the Great Patriotic War and for several decades, the Airborne Forces of the USSR (Russia) were and probably remain the most massive airborne troops on Earth.
-Only Soviet paratroopers in full combat gear were able to land on the North Pole, back in the late 40s
- Only Soviet paratroopers dared to jump from many kilometers in airborne combat vehicles.
- The abbreviation of the Airborne Forces is sometimes deciphered as “Two hundred options are possible”, “Uncle Vasya’s troops”, “Your girls are widows”, “I’m unlikely to return home”, “The paratrooper will withstand everything”, “Everything for you”, “Troops for the war”, etc. d.