Entry of the Red Army into Poland 1939. Polish campaign of the Red Army (RKKA)

Background of the Soviet-Polish war of 1939

Russian-Polish relations over the centuries have developed very difficult. No fundamental change took place after the October Revolution, when Soviet Russia welcomed the declaration of Poland's independence. In the 20-30s. these relations did not have a stable character, old prejudices and stereotypes affected.

In 1932, a non-aggression pact was signed between the USSR and Poland, which recognized that the peace treaty of 1921 still remains the basis of their mutual relations and obligations. The parties renounced war as an instrument of national policy, pledged to refrain from aggressive actions or attacks on each other separately or jointly with other powers. Such actions recognized "any act of violence that violates the integrity and inviolability of the territory or political independence" of the other side. At the end of 1938, both governments reaffirmed that the non-aggression pact of 1932, extended in 1934 until 1945, is the basis of peaceful relations between countries.

However, the outwardly peaceful nature of Soviet policy actually covered up the notorious confrontational nature of the Soviet policy of the Soviet leadership in the 1920s–1930s. regarding Poland. Significantly exacerbated mutual distrust in these years and the failed attempt to establish a Soviet regime in Poland during the Soviet-Polish war, and the results of the Riga Peace Treaty, and the activities of the Comintern aimed at destabilizing the domestic political situation in Poland and preparing a pro-communist coup. It is impossible not to take into account the presence of insurmountable ideological contradictions.

Until 1939, the Soviet leadership considered Poland a springboard used by European states for subversive activities against the USSR and a possible military attack. The development of Polish-English, and then Polish-German relations was seen as a potential threat to the security of the USSR. However, Poland itself was perceived as an adversary. The Polish secret services, sometimes in cooperation with the British, carried out active intelligence activities to identify military potential, both in the border regions and in the deep regions of the Soviet Union. The understandable desire of the leadership of Poland, which had recently experienced a massive invasion of the Red Army, to have reliable information about possible Soviet military preparations, was perceived in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks as Yu. Pilsudski's preparation of aggressive actions against the USSR.

In our opinion, during that period, those special messages of Soviet intelligence residents from Poland were not always correctly perceived, in which the real situation was most adequately reflected. So, for example, at the beginning of 1937, S. Shpigelglas, deputy head of the Foreign Department of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR, drew the following conclusion from the report of the Othello source: “The report is undoubtedly interesting. It is replete with facts that are confirmed by other documents. The main idea of ​​the report: Poland is not an aggressor, she is eager to maintain neutrality with the help of England - maneuvering between the USSR, Germany, France - may turn out to be disinformation. This is the danger of the report.” As you can see, the Polish state was clearly seen as a potential adversary. Obviously, this is one of the main reasons for the fact that among the victims of mass repressions of the era of the Great Terror, a very significant proportion were Poles and people accused of having links with Poland.

In 1934-1935. a number of factors led to the intensification of repressions against people of Polish nationality, and, above all, against representatives of the KPP and its autonomous organizations - the Communist Party of Western Ukraine (KPZU) and the Communist Party of Western Belarus (KPZB). The repressive policy was reflected in the general change in the attitude of the USSR towards the communist movement: it was in 1935 that the 7th Congress of the Comintern staked on the creation of a united workers' front, thereby recognizing that the policy of relying only on the Communist Parties of the countries of the world, including Poland, had failed. The attitude of the Soviet leadership towards Poland and the Poles was also hardened by the successful actions of the Polish secret services to curb the subversive activities of the Comintern. The Polish-German agreement of 1934 and G. Goering's visit to Poland caused particular irritation of the Soviet leadership.

From the first months of 1936 purges began among political emigrants. In the process of preparing a special resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on political emigrants, special attention was paid to the Polish communists. Preparation for mass repressions against people of Polish nationality was manifested not only in the registration of political emigrants. In the period preceding the Great Terror, about 35% of those arrested throughout the country allegedly for espionage were accused of belonging to Polish intelligence agencies: in 1935 out of 6409 arrested - 2253, and in 1936 out of 3669 - 1275.

The change at the beginning of 1936 in the attitude towards immigrants from other countries, primarily from Poland, was reflected in the “purge” not only of the Comintern apparatus, one of the instruments of the USSR’s foreign policy, but also of the NKVD apparatus, the most important instrument for implementing domestic policy. In organizing the campaign against the Poles (in particular, employees of the NKVD bodies), the secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, chairman of the Party Control Commission N. I. Yezhov, who skillfully aroused Stalin's manic suspicion, played a huge role. Yezhov, who in September 1936 replaced Yagoda as People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, sharply intensified the campaign against Polish espionage.

On August 23, 1939, a Soviet-German non-aggression pact was concluded, on September 28, 1939, an agreement on friendship and borders, and secret protocols to them. These documents were directly related to the fate of the Polish state.

The entry of Soviet troops into the eastern provinces of Poland and their advance to the line of the Narew-Vistula-San rivers were, in principle, predetermined by the content of the secret protocol of August 23. But the German side was naturally interested in joint operations with the Red Army from the very beginning of the war against Poland.

The high command of the German army admitted the possibility of Soviet troops entering Poland, but did not know its timing. As for the commanders in the army in the field, and especially the commanders of the advanced units, they were completely unoriented in the general situation and planned their actions to the depth of the border with the Soviet Union.

Using the delay in the entry of Soviet troops into Poland, the German command from September 1 (the date of the attack of Nazi Germany on Poland) to September 16 advanced its troops up to 200 km east of the agreed Narew-Vistula-San line. The movement of German troops to the twice-changing line of "state interests" on the territory of Poland was completed only on October 14, 1939.

There was a real danger of interference in the events of the Western powers. Chamberlain and Halifax publicly announced on 24 August that Britain would fight for Poland. This position became known to the Soviet government the very next day, when the British Foreign Secretary and the Polish ambassador in London signed a pact establishing that the parties would assist each other in the event of an attack by a third country. Stalin and Molotov could not but understand the consequences if the Soviet Union intervened from the very beginning and the German-Polish conflict on the side of Germany. To Ribbentrop's inquiry, Molotov replied through Schulenburg that the Soviet Union would begin concrete actions at the appropriate time, but “we believe, however, that this time has not yet come. We may be mistaken, but it seems to us that excessive haste can harm us and help unite our enemies.

The Soviet leadership had to wait until the final clarification of the situation in Poland. Only on September 17, 1939 at 05:40 did the Soviet troops cross the Soviet-Polish border.

Military campaign of Soviet troops against Poland

A fairly large grouping of Soviet troops was created for the Polish operation.

By the evening of September 16, the troops of the Belorussian and Ukrainian fronts were deployed in the initial areas for the offensive. The Soviet group united 8 rifle, 5 cavalry and 2 tank corps, 21 rifle and 13 cavalry divisions, 16 tank, 2 motorized brigades and the Dnieper military flotilla (DVF). The air forces of the fronts, taking into account the 1st, 2nd and 3rd special-purpose aviation armies relocated to their territory on September 9-10, totaled 3,298 aircraft. In addition, about 16.5 thousand border guards of the Belarusian and Kyiv border districts served on the border.

On the eastern border of Poland, apart from 25 battalions and 7 squadrons of the border guard (about 12 thousand people, or 8 soldiers per 1 km of the border), there were practically no other troops, which was well known to Soviet intelligence. So, according to intelligence data of the 4th Army, “the border strip to the river. Shara is not busy with field wars, and the KOP battalions are weak in their combat training and combat effectiveness ... Serious resistance from the Polish army to the river. It is unlikely to expect a shchar from the Poles.” At 05:00 on September 17, the advanced and assault detachments of the Soviet armies and border troops crossed the border and defeated the Polish border guard. Crossing the border confirmed the data of Soviet intelligence about the absence of significant groupings of Polish troops, which made it possible to accelerate the offensive.

For the Polish leadership, the intervention of the USSR was completely unexpected. Polish intelligence did not record any threatening movements of the Red Army, and the information received on September 1-5 was perceived as an understandable reaction to the outbreak of war in Europe. And although on September 12 information was received from Paris about a possible action by the USSR against Poland, they were not taken seriously.

The behavior of the Soviet troops also seemed strange - they, as a rule, did not shoot first, they treated the Polish troops with demonstrative goodwill, treated them to cigarettes and said that they had come to the aid against the Germans. On the ground, they waited for the instructions of the commander-in-chief. At first, the commander-in-chief of the Polish army, Rydz-Smigly, was inclined to give the order to repel the Soviet invasion. However, a closer examination of the situation showed that there are no forces, except for the KOP battalions and a certain number of rear and spare parts of the army, in Eastern Poland. These weakly armed troops had no chance in battle with the Red Army. As a result, on September 17, the Polish leadership was faced with a fait accompli and, based on the statements of the Soviet government and its note, believed that the Red Army was introduced in order to limit the zone of German occupation. Therefore, at about 23.40 on September 17, the order of Rydz-Smigly was transmitted by radio: “The Soviets have invaded. I order to carry out a withdrawal to Romania and Hungary by the shortest routes. Do not conduct hostilities with the Soviets, only in the event of an attempt on their part to disarm our units. The task for Warsaw and Modlin, which must defend themselves against the Germans, is unchanged. The units to which the Soviets have approached must negotiate with them in order to withdraw the garrisons to Romania or Hungary. Only units of the KOP, retreating from Zbruch to the Dniester, and units covering the "Romanian suburb" were ordered to continue resistance.

Of course, the Polish command had a plan for the deployment of troops on the eastern border - "Vskhud", which was developed from 1935-1936. On the eastern border, it was planned to deploy all available forces of the Polish Army. Of course, in the real situation of the second half of September 1939, when Poland spent all the available defense potential on attempts to continue resisting Nazi Germany, which was superior to the Poles in manpower and equipment and had already practically won the war, this whole plan remained on paper.

On the right flank of the Belorussian Front of the Red Army, from the Latvian border to Begoml, the 3rd Army was deployed, which had the task of reaching the Sharkovshchina-Dunilovichi-Lake Lake by the end of the first day of the offensive. Blyada - Yablontsy, and the next day to the front, Sventsyany, Mikhalishki and then move on to Vilna. The main blow was dealt by the right wing of the army, where the troops of the 4th Rifle Corps and the mobile group as part of the 24th Cavalry Division and the 22nd Tank Brigade were concentrated under the command of the divisional commander of the 24th brigade commander P. Akhlyustin.

To the south of the 3rd Army, on the front from Begoml to Ivanets, the troops of the 11th Army were deployed, which had the task of taking Molodechno, Volozhin by the end of September 17, the next day - Oshmyany, Ivye and moving further to Grodno. Having crossed the border at 5 o'clock on September 17, the 6th tank brigade occupied Volozhin at 12 o'clock, formations of the 16th rifle corps at the same time entered Krasnoye, and by 19 o'clock they reached Molodechno, Benzovets. The formations of the 3rd Cavalry Corps had already reached the area of ​​​​Rachinety, Poryche, Marshalka by 15 o'clock, and on the morning of September 18 they moved further towards Lida, reaching the front of Rynoviche, Constanta, Voishtoviche by 10 o'clock. At this time, the 3rd Cavalry Corps and the 6th Tank Brigade were given the task of advancing on Vilna, which they were ordered to occupy.

At that time, only insignificant Polish units were in Vilna: about 16 infantry battalions (about 7 thousand soldiers and 14 thousand militia) with 14 light guns. However, the Polish command in Vilna did not have a general attitude towards the Bolshevik invasion. At 9 o'clock on September 18, the commander of the garrison, Colonel Ya. Okulich-Kozarin, gave the order: “We are not at war with the Bolsheviks, units, by additional order, will leave Vilna and cross the Lithuanian border; non-combat units can start leaving the city, combat units remain in position, but cannot fire without an order. However, since some of the officers took this order as treason, and rumors spread in the city about a coup in Germany and a declaration of war by Romania and Hungary, Colonel Okulich-Kozarin around 16.30 decided to refrain from issuing an order to retreat until 20 hours.

Around 19.10, the commander of the 2nd battalion, deployed on the southern and southwestern outskirts of the city, Lieutenant Colonel S. Shileiko reported on the appearance of Soviet tanks and asked if he could open fire. While Okulich-Kozarin gave the order to open fire, while this order was transmitted to the troops, 8 tanks had already passed the first line of defense and reserve units were sent to fight them. At about 20:00 Okulich-Kozarin ordered the troops to withdraw from the city and sent Lieutenant Colonel T. Podvysotsky to the location of the Soviet troops in order to notify them that the Polish side did not want to fight them and demand that they leave the city. After that, Okulich-Kozarin himself left Vilna, and Podvysotsky, who returned at about 21:00, decided to defend the city and at about 21:45 issued an order to suspend the withdrawal of troops. At that time, uncoordinated battles were going on in the city, in which the Vilna Polish youth played an important role. The teacher G. Osinski organized volunteer teams of gymnasium students who took up positions on the hills. The oldest ones fired, the rest delivered ammunition, organized communications, etc.

Approaching at about 19.30 on September 18 to Vilna, the 8th and 7th tank regiments started a battle for the southern part of the city. The 8th tank regiment broke into the southern part of the city at 20.30. The 7th Panzer Regiment, which ran into a stubborn defense, was able to enter the southwestern part of the city only at dawn. Due to the stubborn defense, the city was taken only the next day.

While all these turbulent events were taking place in the Vilna region, the troops of the 16th Rifle Corps of the 11th Army were turned to the northwest and moved towards Lida.

While the troops of the 3rd and 11th armies occupied the north-eastern part of Western Belarus, to the south, on the front from Fanipol to Nesvizh, units of the KMG went on the offensive, with the task of reaching Lyubcha, Kirin on the first day of the offensive, and the next day to force the river. Keep quiet and move to Volkovysk. The 15th Panzer Corps, advancing on the southern flank of the group, crossed the border at 0500 and, breaking the slight resistance of the Polish border guards, moved west. By the evening of September 17, the 27th tank brigade crossed the river. Servech, 2nd tank brigade - r. Usha, and the 20th Motorized Brigade was pulling up to the border. At about 4 p.m. on September 18, the 2nd Tank Brigade entered Slonim.

In Grodno there were insignificant forces of Polish troops: 2 improvised battalions and an assault company of the reserve center of the 29th Infantry Division, the 31st guard battalion, 5 platoons of positional artillery (5 guns), 2 anti-aircraft machine gun companies, a two-battalion detachment of Colonel Zh. Blumsky, the national defense battalion "Poctavy", the dismounted 32nd division of the Podlasie cavalry brigade, there were a lot of gendarmerie and police in the city. The commander of the "Grodno" district, Colonel B. Adamovich, was determined to evacuate units to Lithuania. On September 18, riots took place in the city in connection with the release of prisoners from the city prison and the anti-Polish speech of local "red" activists. Soviet troops were expected from the east, but they approached the city from the south, which was beneficial for the defenders, since the right bank of the Neman was steep.

Only as fuel arrived, units of the 15th Panzer Corps began to move towards Grodno in peculiar waves from 07:00 on September 20. At 1300, 50 tanks of the 27th Tank Brigade approached the southern outskirts of Grodno. The tankers attacked the enemy on the move and by the evening occupied the southern part of the city, reaching the banks of the Neman. Several tanks managed to break through the bridge to the northern bank in the city center. However, without infantry support, the tanks were attacked by soldiers, policemen and youths, who used a few guns and Molotov cocktails. As a result, some of the tanks were destroyed, and some were taken back beyond the Neman. The 27th Tank Brigade, with the support of the 119th Rifle Regiment of the 13th Rifle Division, which arrived at 18:00, occupied the southern part of the city. A group of junior lieutenant Shaikhuddinov, with the help of local workers, crossed in boats to the right bank of the Neman, 2 km east of the city. On the other side, battles began for cemeteries, where machine-gun nests were equipped. During the night battle, the 119th regiment managed to gain a foothold on the right bank and reach the approaches to the eastern outskirts of the city.

By the morning of September 21, the 101st Rifle Regiment approached, which also crossed to the right bank and deployed north of the 119th Regiment. From 6 o'clock on September 21, the regiments, reinforced by 4 guns and 2 tanks, attacked the city and by 12 o'clock, despite the counterattacks of the Poles, they reached the railway line, and by 14 o'clock they reached the center of Grodno, but by evening they were again taken to the outskirts. In these battles, the regiments were supported by a motorized group of the 16th Rifle Corps, which, after spending the night on the highway a few kilometers from Skidel, moved towards Grodno at dawn on September 21. Approaching the city, the tanks suppressed firing points on its eastern outskirts, which provided support to the 119th and 101st rifle regiments. The attack of the city from the east was successful, but after crossing the railway line, the main forces of the rifle units again retreated to the outskirts. As a result, the tanks were forced to fight alone.

In the second echelon behind KM G, the troops of the 10th Army advanced, which on September 19 crossed the border with the task of reaching the front of Novogrudok, Gorodishche and moving further to the Palace. By the end of the first day of the offensive, the troops of the 10th Army reached the line of the river. Neman and Usha. Continuing the slow advance in the second echelon of the Belorussian Front, by the end of September 20, the army troops reached the Naliboki, Derevna, Mir line, where they received the task of advancing to the Sokulka front. Bolshaya Berestovitsa, Svisloch, Novy Dvor, Pruzhany. In the evening, by order of the commander of the Belorussian Front No. 04 of the army, the troops of the 5th rifle, 6th cavalry and 15th tank corps were subordinated. However, during the negotiations between the commanders of the 10th Army, KMG and the Belorussian Front on September 21, it was decided to leave the 6th Cavalry and 15th Tank Corps as part of the KMR.

On the front of the 4th Army, which had the task of advancing on Baranovichi with access to the line of Snov, Zhilichi by the end of the first day of the operation, the offensive began at 5 o'clock in the morning on September 17. At 22:00, the 29th Tank Brigade occupied Baranovichi and the fortified area located here, which was not occupied by Polish troops. The tank battalion under the command of I. D. Chernyakhovsky was the first to enter the city. Up to 5 thousand Polish soldiers were captured in the Baranovichi region, 4 anti-tank guns and 2 food echelons became Soviet trophies.

The 29th tank brigade, which remained on the outskirts of Pruzhany, on September 20 was engaged in a technical inspection of tanks and conducted reconnaissance in the direction of Brest. Vidomlya had contact with the German units. As the brigade commander S. M. Krivoshey later recalled, “the intelligence sent forward under the command of Vladimir Yulianovich Borovitsky, secretary of the party commission of the brigade, soon returned with a dozen soldiers and officers of the German motorized corps of General Guderian, who managed to occupy the city of Brest. Having no precise instructions on how to deal with the Germans, I asked the chief of staff to contact the commander [Chuikov], and I myself engaged in a non-committal conversation with the commissar. The conversation took place in Lenin's tent, where, along with indicators of combat training and the growth of our country's industrial power, posters were hanging on folding portable stands calling for the destruction of fascism. Many Germans had cameras. After looking around, they asked permission to photograph the tent and those present in it. One of them took a picture of us with the commissar in a group of German officers against the background of an anti-fascist poster.

Having fed the Germans with rich Russian borscht and kara-style barbecue (the guests devoured all this with enviable zeal), we sent them home, instructing them to convey “warm greetings” to General Guderian. The brigade commander forgot to mention that during dinner the brigade band played several marches.

Troops of the 23rd Rifle Corps were deployed in Polesie, who were forbidden to cross the border until further notice. The appeal of the corps commander to the Military Council of the Belorussian Front with a request to go on the offensive along with the rest of the troops of the front was rejected. As a result, the corps crossed the border at 16.25 on September 18. At 11 a.m. on September 19, the advance detachment of the 52nd Infantry Division occupied Lakhva. Moving on, the Soviet troops in Kozhan-Gorodok were fired upon by a detachment of the 16th battalion of the KOP. Having turned around, the units entered the battle and soon pushed the Poles into the forest north of Kozhan-Gorodok. During the battle, the Soviet units lost 3 people killed and 4 wounded. 85 Polish soldiers were taken prisoner, 3 of them were wounded and 4 were killed. At about 5 p.m., the 205th Infantry Regiment with the 1st Battalion of the 158th Artillery Regiment occupied David-Gorodok after a small battle. At 19.30, units of the 52nd Infantry Division occupied Luninets. In the meantime, the ships of the Soviet Dnieper flotilla reached the mouth of the Goryn River, where they were forced to stop due to shallows and flooded Polish ships.

The troops of the Ukrainian Front also crossed the Polish border on September 17 and began to move deep into Poland. On the northern flank on the front from Olevsk to Yampol, the troops of the 5th Army deployed, which was tasked with "delivering a powerful and lightning strike against the Polish troops, resolutely and quickly advancing in the direction of Rovno." The 60th Infantry Division, which had the task of advancing on Sarny, concentrated in the Olevsk area. In the area of ​​​​Gorodnitsa - Korets, the troops of the 15th rifle corps deployed, which had the immediate task of reaching the river. Goryn, and by the end of September 17, take Rovno. The 8th Rifle Corps, deployed in the Ostrog-Slavuta region, was supposed to take Dubno by the end of the day. On September 18, both corps were to occupy Lutsk and move towards Vladimir-Volynsky.

By the end of September 22, the troops of the 5th Army reached the line Kovel - Rozhitsa - Vladimir-Volynsky - Ivanichi. To the south, on the Teofipol-Voitovtsy front, the troops of the 6th Army deployed, with the task of advancing on Tarnopol, Ezerna and Kozova, later reaching the Buek-Przemyshlyany front and further on Lvov.

At 04:00 on September 17, an assault group of border guards and Red Army soldiers captured the Volochinsky border bridge. At 04:30, the troops of the 17th Rifle Corps launched an artillery strike on enemy firing points and strongholds, and at 05:00 they began to force the river. Zbruch, using the captured bridge and established crossings. Forcing the river practically without any resistance from the enemy, units of the 17th Rifle Corps around 8.00 turned into marching columns and moved towards Tarnopol. Mobile formations quickly overtook the infantry and after 1800 on September 17, the 10th tank brigade entered Tarnopol. The 24th Tank Brigade advancing north of the city with the 136th Rifle Regiment of the 97th Rifle Division passed Dobrovody already at 12 o’clock and, bypassing Tarnopol from the north-west, reached its western outskirts at about 22 o’clock and began to clear it of Polish units . At 7 pm, 11 tanks of the 5th Cavalry Division of the 2nd Cavalry Corps entered the city from the north, however, not knowing the situation, the tankers decided to wait until the morning to attack. Having entered Tarnopol, the 5th division had to clean up the city from scattered groups of Polish officers, gendarmes and just the local population. During skirmishes in the city between 10.20 and 14.00 on September 18, the division lost 3 people killed and 37 wounded. At the same time at 10.30 rifle divisions of the 17th rifle corps entered the city. Up to 600 Polish soldiers were taken prisoner.

The formations of the 2nd Cavalry Corps advancing north from the morning of September 18 crossed the river. Seret and at 10.00 received an order from the command of the Ukrainian Front to move to Lvov with a forced march and capture the city.

The consolidated motorized detachment of the 2nd Cavalry Corps and the 24th Tank Brigade with 35 bales approached Lvov at about 02:00 on September 19. After stubborn fighting, the city was taken.

On September 20, the troops of the 12th Army advanced to the Nikolaev-Stryi line. In the Stryi region, at about 1700, contact was made with German troops, who on September 22 handed over the city to the Red Army. On September 23, the 26th tank brigade approached the same place. As a result of the negotiations, the Soviet troops were stopped on the reached line.

At 10.30 on September 21, the headquarters of the Byelorussian and Ukrainian fronts received an order from the People's Commissar of Defense No. 16693, demanding to stop the troops on the line reached by advanced units by 20.00 on September 20. The troops were tasked with pulling up the lagging units and rear areas, establishing stable communications, being in a state of full combat readiness, being vigilant and taking measures to protect the rear areas and headquarters. In addition, the command of the Belorussian Front was allowed to continue the offensive in the Suwalki salient. At 22.15 on September 21, the headquarters of the Belorussian and Ukrainian fronts received order No. 156 of the People's Commissar of Defense, which outlined the contents of the Soviet-German protocol and allowed to start moving west at dawn on September 23. The next day, the Military Council of the Belorussian Front issued the corresponding order No. 05. On September 25, the troops received the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 011 and the order of the Military Council of the Belorussian Front No. 06, warning that "when the army moves from the reached line of Augustow - Bialystok - Brest-Litovsk to the west in the territory left by the German army, it is possible that the Poles will crumble collect units into detachments and gangs, which, together with the Polish troops operating near Warsaw, can offer us stubborn resistance and in places deliver counterattacks.

On September 21, the 2nd tank brigade in Sokulka formed a detachment for operations in the Augustow-Suwalki area under the command of Major F.P. Chuvakin, in which there were 470 people, 252 rifles, 74 machine guns, 46 guns, 34 BT tanks - 7, 6 armored vehicles and 34 cars. Moving north, at about 5 o'clock on September 22, at Sopotskin, the detachment caught up with the Poles retreating from Grodno, who hoped to gain a foothold in. old forts of the Grodno fortress, where there were military depots. In the ensuing battle, which lasted up to 10 hours, 11 Red Army soldiers were killed and 14 wounded, 4 tanks and 5 vehicles were hit. The enemy made extensive use of Molotov cocktails, which created significant problems in the conditions of tank operations without infantry cover.

Meanwhile, a detachment of the 27th Tank Brigade of 20 BT-7 tanks and 1 armored vehicle under the command of Major Bogdanov was combing the border line with Lithuania and arrived in Suwalki at 24:00 on September 24.

The troops of the 3rd Army continued to guard the Latvian and Lithuanian borders from Drissa to Druskininkai. The 11th Army began redeployment along the Lithuanian border to Grodno. Formations of the 16th Rifle Corps continued to advance towards Grodno and on September 21 occupied Eishishki. By September 24, the troops of the corps deployed on the Lithuanian and German borders north and northwest of Grodno.

By September 26-28, the troops of the 3rd and 11th armies entrenched themselves on the border with Lithuania and East Prussia from Druskininkai to Shchuchin. Meanwhile, on September 21, at negotiations in Vaukavysk, representatives of the German command and the 6th Cavalry Corps agreed on a procedure for withdrawing the Wehrmacht from Bialystok.

To the north, the 20th motorized brigade operated, transferred to the 10th Army, which on September 25 at 15 o'clock took Osovets from the Germans, on September 26, moving along the bank of the river. Biebrzha, entered the Falcons, and by the evening of September 29 reached Zambruv. On September 27, the forward detachments of the 5th Rifle Corps occupied Nur and Chizhev, and in the Gainuyki area, parts of the corps again stumbled upon a Polish warehouse, where about 14,000 shells, 5 million rounds of ammunition, 1 tankette, 2 armored vehicles, 2 vehicles and 2 barrels of fuel.

On the southern sector of the front, the troops of the 4th Army moved to the west. At 3 p.m. on September 22, the 29th Tank Brigade entered Brest, which was occupied by the troops of the 19th Motorized Corps of the Wehrmacht. As Krivoshey later recalled, in negotiations with General G. Guderian, he proposed the following parade procedure: “At 16 o’clock, parts of your corps in a marching column, with standards in front, leave the city, my units, also in a marching column, enter the city, stop at streets where the German regiments pass, and salute the passing units with their banners. Bands perform military marches. In the end, Guderian, who insisted on holding a full-fledged parade with preliminary formation, agreed to the proposed option, "having stipulated, however, that he would stand with me on the podium and greet the passing units."

By September 29, the troops of the Belorussian Front advanced to the line Shchuchin - Staviski - Lomza - Zambruv - Tsekhanovets - Kosuv-Latski - Sokoluv-Podlaski - Siedlce - Lukow - Vohyn. On October 1, the commander of the 4th Army, Divisional Commander Chuikov, issued an order, which demanded that “with the forward detachments, there should be one commander of the headquarters and political department for negotiating with the German troops.”

By the end of September 29, the troops of the Ukrainian Front were on the line Pugachev - Piaski - Piotrkuv - Krzemen - Bilgoraj - Przemysl - the upper reaches of the river. San.

Here we should dwell on another side of the Polish campaign of the Red Army, associated with various military crimes of Soviet military personnel. Lynching, looting and robbery as manifestations of the class struggle were not only not persecuted, but even encouraged. Here are some very illustrative examples.

On September 21, having disarmed the Polish troops, units of the 14th Cavalry Division let the soldiers go home, while the officers and gendarmes were left until further notice on the scale in Sasuva. At 7 pm, the prisoners entered the basement of the school, killed a worker who was guarding weapons, and opened fire from the windows. The battalion commissar Ponomarev with the Red Army men suppressed the uprising of the officers and, having arrived at the headquarters of the 14th Cavalry Division, told about what had happened. At the same time, he expressed the idea that all officers and gendarmes are bastards that need to be destroyed. Impressed by what they heard, on September 22, in the village of Boshevitsy, 4 Red Army soldiers, under various pretexts, took 4 captured officers from the custody of the people's militia and shot them.

On September 22, during the battles for Grodno, at about 10 o'clock, the commander of the communications platoon, junior lieutenant Dubovik, received an order to escort 80-90 prisoners to the rear. Having moved 1.5-2 km from the city, Dubovik interrogated the prisoners in order to identify the officers and persons who took part in the murder of the Bolsheviks. Promising to release the prisoners, he sought confessions and shot 29 people. The rest of the prisoners were returned to Grodno. This was known to the command of the 101st Infantry Regiment of the 4th Infantry Division, but no action was taken against Dubovik. Moreover, the commander of the 3rd battalion, senior lieutenant Tolochko, gave a direct order to shoot the officers.

On September 21, the Military Council of the 6th Army, represented by Commander Commander Golikov and a member of the Military Council, Brigadier Commissar Zakharychev, while in parts of the 2nd Cavalry Corps, issued an obviously criminal decision on the production and procedure for lynching - the execution of 10 people (surnames are not indicated in the decision). On this basis, the head of the special department of the 2nd cavalry corps, Koberniuk, went to the city of Zlochow, arrested various employees of the Polish prison, police, etc., such as Klimetsky V.V., according to the position of head. prison, Kuchmirovsky K. B., pom. early prison, Lukashevsky M.S., vice city prosecutor. Plakht I. - an official of the beaten headman and others in the amount of 10 people, and all these persons, at the expense of the limit established by the Military Council of the 6th Army, was shot in the prison building. This lynching was attended by ordinary employees of the prison. This criminal decision of the Military Council on lynching was quickly passed on to the leading circles of the commanders and commissars of formations and units of the 2nd cavalry corps, and this led to grave consequences when a number of commanders, military commissars and even Red Army soldiers, following the example of their leaders, began to lynch prisoners, suspicious detainees and etc.

Noteworthy is the question of what tasks were assigned to the troops during the action in Poland. For example, Commander of the Ukrainian Front Army Commander 1st Rank Semyon Timoshenko noted in his order that "the Polish government of landlords and generals dragged the peoples of Poland into an adventuristic war." Approximately the same was said in the order of the commander of the troops of the Belorussian Front, commander of the 2nd rank Kovalev. They contained an appeal to the population to turn "their weapons against the landlords and capitalists", but said nothing about the fate of the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus. This was apparently due to the fact that after the Riga Peace Treaty of 1921, the Soviet government never raised the question of reuniting the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus. But in subsequent documents, such a task of the troops as saving the Ukrainian and Belarusian peoples from the threat of “ruin and beating” from enemies was noted, it was emphasized that Soviet troops were going to Poland not as conquerors, but as liberators of Belarusians, Ukrainians and working people of Poland.

The actions of the Red Army on the territory of Poland lasted 12 days. During this time, the troops advanced 250-300 km and occupied a territory with a total area of ​​​​over 190 thousand square meters. km with a population of more than 12 million people, including more than 6 million Ukrainians and about 3 million Belarusians.

Partition of the Polish territories by the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany

After the entry of Soviet troops into the territory of Poland, relations between England and France with the Soviet Union sharply escalated. On September 19, an Anglo-French note was received in Moscow, which demanded to stop the advance and withdraw Soviet troops from Poland. Otherwise, the note said, in accordance with the Polish-French alliance treaty, the declaration of war on the Soviet Union could happen automatically.

Stalin and his entourage could not fail to understand that the nature of Soviet-German relations and the actions of the Soviet Union in Poland could make an extremely negative impression on world public opinion. Therefore, in a joint German-Soviet communiqué, adopted at the suggestion of Ribbentrop on September 18, 1939, but published only on September 20, it was said that the goal of the German and Soviet troops was “to restore order and tranquility in Poland, disturbed by the collapse of the Polish state, and to help the population Poland to reorganize the conditions of its state existence.

The Soviet leadership went even further with regard to the “Polish question” during the negotiations and the conclusion of the friendship and border treaty of September 28, 1939. These negotiations, dedicated to clarifying the border of the “state interests” of the USSR and Germany on the territory of Poland, began at the initiative of the Soviet side. On September 20, Schulenburg informed Ribbentrop that, in Molotov's opinion, the time had come to jointly decide the fate of Poland and that Stalin was inclined to divide it along the Tissa-Narew-Vistula-San line: "The Soviet government wishes to immediately resolve this issue at negotiations in Moscow with the participation of the highest statesmen of both countries. In a reply telegram to Molotov on September 23, Ribbentrop said that "the Russian point of view on the passage of the future border along four rivers is acceptable." The atmosphere in which the negotiations took place in Moscow is testified by Ribbentrop himself, who said that in the Kremlin he "felt like he was among the old party genosses."

The adopted document established the border of the "state interests" of both states on the territory of Poland, although in the German-Soviet communique of September 22, 1939 it was also called the "demarcation line between the German and Soviet armies" and was supposed to run much east of the line agreed on August 23 1939

It is interesting to note that both texts of the treaty - in German and Russian - were recognized as authentic. But at the same time, it becomes incomprehensible why in the title of the treaty in German the word "friendship" is placed after the word "border", and in the text in Russian - on the contrary. Is this really due to the difference in style between the two languages, or is there a political implication here: that Stalin was more interested in the “friendship” he offered than Hitler?

In one confidential and two secret protocols attached to the September 28 treaty, some territorial changes were specified in the strip from the Baltic to the Black Seas. In particular, the territory of Lithuania was included in the sphere of "state interests" of the USSR, and the territory of Lublin and part of the Warsaw voivodeships fell into the sphere of "state interests" of Germany. The parties also agreed that they would stop the actions of the Polish population directed against the other side.

In the treaty of September 28 there is not a word about the right of the Polish people to state existence; the "reorganization" of Poland announced in it is considered only from the point of view of the "further development of friendly relations" between the USSR and Germany.

Some Soviet studies claim that the Soviet leadership decisively prevented the advance of German troops east of the agreed border line with the Soviet Union. However, in the light of the German documents, a different picture emerges. So, as early as September 5, 1939, Molotov informed Ribbentrop that the Soviet leadership understood that “in the course of operations, one of the parties or both parties may be forced to temporarily cross the demarcation line between their spheres of influence, but such cases should not interfere with the direct implementation of the planned plan. ". On September 15, Ribbentrop informed Molotov for the second time that Germany was bound by demarcation spheres of influence in Poland and therefore would welcome the early action of the Red Army, which "will free us from the need to destroy the remnants of the Polish army, pursuing them all the way to the Russian border."

In Berlin, at the beginning of hostilities, the idea arose of the possibility of creating a "residual Polish state" somewhere in the zone between the lines of interests of Germany and the USSR as a buffer. On this issue, General Halder wrote in his diary on September 7: “The Poles propose to start negotiations. We are ready for them on the following terms: Poland's break with England and France; the remainder of Poland will be kept; areas from Narew to Warsaw - Poland; industrial area - to us; Krakow - Poland; the northern outskirts of the Beskydy - to us; regions of Western Ukraine are independent”. As is clear from the entry dated September 10, the German leadership prepared a special appeal to the population of Western Ukraine, in which they promised them an "independent state" under the auspices of Germany.

Ribbentrop also spoke about the options for dismembering Poland on September 12. With reference to Hitler, he stated that with this version of the “solution of the Polish question”, it would be possible, if necessary, to negotiate the conclusion of an “Eastern peace”. At the same time, Ribbentrop did not rule out the option that would provide for the dismemberment of Poland into separate constituent parts, including Western Ukraine.

But Hitler did not yet know what would be the position of Stalin and Molotov on this issue. Schulenburg found this out only the next day and informed the Führer that Stalin was resolutely against the preservation of the "Polish residual state" and for the partition of Poland. On September 28, Stalin announced that the dismemberment of areas with a purely Polish population would inevitably cause his desire for national unity, which could lead to friction between the USSR and Germany.

The decision of the German and Soviet governments on September 28 to divide the territory of Poland caused serious concern among the Polish people and officials. Thus, the Polish ambassador in Paris, according to the Havas agency, protested to the French government, calling the Soviet-German treaty a violation of the rights of a sovereign state and people, international obligations and human morality.

The position of the Polish patriots was aggravated by the fact that there was a Soviet-German agreement on cooperation in the fight against Polish agitation. It was not a formal declaration; such cooperation between the military authorities of Germany and the USSR in the Polish campaign, as the German military attache in Moscow, General Kestring, declared, was a reality and proceeded flawlessly at all levels. To establish cooperation between the Gestapo and the NKVD in December 1939 in the city of Zakopane, i.e. in the Polish territory occupied by Germany, a joint training center was established.

After the delegations of the USSR and Germany delimited the border between the "spheres of interest", by mid-October 1939 it was demarcated. Thus, if earlier the border of the USSR with Poland was 1446 km long, then the border with Germany was 1952 km, i.e. 506 km more - from the village of Marinovo (the southern point of the USSR border with Latvia) to the village of Kazachuvka (the northern point on the Soviet-Romanian border). Retaining the oil-bearing region of Lvov-Drogobych, which was occupied by German troops in the first half of September, Stalin undertook to supply Germany from this region with 300,000 tons of oil annually.

On September 21, a secret protocol was signed, according to which, in particular, the German command was obliged to ensure the safety and transfer of all abandoned objects to the Soviet troops. It was also agreed that "to destroy the Polish gangs along the way, Soviet and German troops will act together."

A clear example of the interaction between the Wehrmacht and the Red Army at that time can be an agreement on the use of the Minsk radio station to direct German bombers to Polish cities. It is worth recalling that Goering, as a token of gratitude for military cooperation in the fight against a common enemy, presented the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Voroshilov with an airplane.

In the course of hostilities, the commanders of the forward units of the German and Soviet armies exchanged liaison officers. Cooperation was also established with the command of the German Navy in the Baltic. Joint parades were held in Grodno, Brest, Pinsk and a number of other cities even before the capitulation of Warsaw. For example, in Grodno, along with the German general, commander Chuikov took over the parade, in Brest - General Guderian and brigade commander Krivoshein.

The statements of high-ranking Soviet political and military leaders indicate that the actions of the Soviet Union in Poland, and later in the Baltic states and against Finland were considered mainly from the point of view of expanding the territory, increasing the population of the USSR and other military-strategic advantages. It was precisely this concept that Mekhlis formulated at the 18th Congress of the CPSU (b), referring to the opinion of Stalin: “If the second imperialist war turns its edge against the first socialist state in the world, then military operations must be transferred to enemy territory, fulfill our international duties and multiply the number of Soviet republics.

At a solemn meeting on the occasion of the anniversary of October on November 6, 1939, Molotov emphasized that after the annexation of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, the population of the USSR had grown from 170 to 183 million people. In June 1941, the draft directive of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda “On the tasks of political propaganda in the Red Army in the near future” stated: “The entire personnel of the Red Army must be imbued with the consciousness that the increased political, economic and military power of the Soviet Union allows us to carry out offensive foreign policy, resolutely eliminating the hotbeds of war at their borders, expanding their territories ... ". When discussing the project at the Main Military Council, Zhdanov said: “We have become stronger, we can set more active tasks. The war with Poland and Finland were not defensive wars. We have already embarked on the path of offensive policy.

Original taken from procol_harum September 17, 1939 - Soviet attack on Poland

Many people don't know this at all. And over time, even fewer people remain who know about it. And there are others who believe that Poland attacked Germany on September 1, 1939, unleashed World War 2, but they are silent about the USSR. In general, there is no science of history. Think the way someone likes or profitable to think.

Original taken from maxim_nm How the USSR attacked Poland (photos, facts).

Exactly 78 years ago, September 17, 1939 USSR following Nazi Germany, he attacked Poland - the Germans brought their troops from the west, this happened on September 1, 1939, and more than two weeks later, Soviet troops entered Poland from the east. The official reason for the introduction of troops was the alleged "protection of the Belarusian and Ukrainian population", which is located on the territory "of the Polish state, which revealed internal inconsistency".

A number of researchers of the events that began on September 17, 1939 are unequivocally assessed as the entry of the USSR into World War II on the side of the aggressor (Nazi Germany). Soviet and some Russian researchers consider these events as a separate episode.

So, in today's post - a large and interesting story about the events of September 1939, photos and stories of local residents. Go under the cut, it's interesting there)

02. It all started with the "Note of the Government of the USSR" handed over to the Polish ambassador in Moscow on the morning of September 17, 1939. I am quoting the text in full. Pay attention to speech turns, especially juicy of which I have highlighted in bold - to me personally, this is very reminiscent of modern events on the "annexation" of Crimea.

By the way, in history, in general, the aggressor himself very rarely called his actions actually "aggression." As a rule, these are "actions aimed at protection / prevention / non-admission" and so on. In short, they attacked a neighboring country in order to "nip aggression in the bud."

"Mr. Ambassador,

The Polish-German war revealed the internal failure of the Polish state. During ten days of military operations, Poland lost all its industrial areas and cultural centers. Warsaw as the capital of Poland no longer exists. The Polish government has collapsed and shows no signs of life. This means that the Polish state and its government actually ceased to exist. Thus, the treaties concluded between the USSR and Poland ceased to be valid. Left to itself and left without leadership, Poland has become a convenient field for all sorts of accidents and surprises that could pose a threat to the USSR. Therefore, having hitherto been neutral, the Soviet government cannot be more neutral in regard to these facts.

The Soviet government cannot also be indifferent to the fact that half-blooded Ukrainians and Belarusians living on the territory of Poland, left to the mercy of fate, remain defenseless. In view of this situation, the Soviet government ordered the High Command of the Red Army to order the troops to cross the border and take under their protection the lives and property of the population of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus.

At the same time, the Soviet government intends to take all measures to rescue the Polish people from the ill-fated war, into which they were thrown by their unreasonable leaders, and to give them the opportunity to live a peaceful life.

Please accept, Mr. Ambassador, the assurances of our highest consideration.

People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR

V. Molotov."

03. In fact, immediately after the presentation of the note, the rapid entry of Soviet troops into Poland began. The Soviet Union introduced armored and armored vehicles, cavalry, infantry and artillery into the territory. In the photo - Soviet cavalry escort an artillery battery.

04. Armored car troops cross the Soviet-Polish border, the picture was taken on September 17, 1939:

05. Infantry units of the USSR in the border area. By the way, pay attention to the helmets of the fighters - these are the SSH-36 helmets, also known as the "hulkingolka". These helmets were widely used in the initial period of the Second World War, but in films (especially of the Soviet years) they are almost never seen - perhaps because this helmet resembles the German "Stalhelm".

06. Soviet tank BT-5 on the streets of the city http://maxim-nm.livejournal.com/42391.html, the former "behind the Polish hour" border town.

07. Shortly after the "attachment" of the eastern part of Poland to the USSR in the city of Brest (then called Brest-Litovsk), a joint parade of Wehrmacht troops and units of the Red Army took place on September 22, 1939.

08. The parade was timed to coincide with the creation of a demarcation line between the USSR and Nazi Germany, as well as the establishment of a new border.

09. Many researchers call this action not a "joint parade", but a "solemn procession", but as for me, the essence of this does not change. Guderian wanted to hold a full-fledged joint parade, but in the end agreed to the proposal of the commander of the 29th armored brigade, Krivoshein, which read: "At 16 o'clock, parts of your corps in a marching column, with standards in front, leave the city, my units, also in a marching column, enter the city, stop in the streets where the German regiments pass, and salute the passing units with their banners. Bands perform military marches ". What is this if not a parade?

10. Nazi-Soviet negotiations on the "new frontier", photograph taken in Brest in September 1939:

11. New border:

12. Nazi and Soviet tankers communicate with each other:

13. German and Soviet officers:

14. Immediately after arriving on the "attached lands", the Soviet units launched agitation and propaganda. Such stands were installed on the streets with a story about the Soviet armed forces and the advantages of living in.

15. It must be admitted that at first many local residents welcomed the Red Army soldiers with joy, but later many changed their minds about the "guests from the east." "Purges" began and the export of people to Siberia, there were also cases when a person was shot simply because there were no calluses on his hands - they say, "non-working element", "exploiter".

Here is what the inhabitants of the well-known Belarusian town told about the Soviet troops in 1939 World(yes, the one where the world famous castle is), quotes from the book "The World: Historical Minion, What Iago Zhykhary Told", translation into Russian is mine:
.

“When the soldiers were walking, no one gave them anything, they didn’t treat them. We asked them how they live there, do they have everything?” The soldiers answered - "Oh, we are good! We have everything there!". In Russia they said that it was bad to live in Poland. But it was good here - people had good costumes, clothes. They didn't have anything there. They took everything from Jewish stores - even those slippers that were "for death."

"The first thing that surprised Westerners was the appearance of the Red Army soldiers, who were for them the first representatives of the" socialist paradise ". When the Soviets came, you could immediately see how people live there. The clothes were bad. When they saw the "slave" of the prince, they thought that it was the prince himself, they wanted to arrest him. That's how well he was dressed - both the suit and the hat. Goncharikova and Manya Razvodovskaya walked in long coats, the soldiers began to point at them and say that "landowner's daughters" were coming.

"Shortly after the entry of troops, "socialist changes" began. They introduced a tax system. Taxes were large, some could not pay them, and those who paid were left with nothing. Polish money depreciated one day. We sold a cow, and the next day they were able to buy only 2-3 meters of fabric and shoes. The elimination of private trade led to a shortage of almost all consumer goods. When the Soviet troops arrived, at first everyone was happy, but when the night queues for bread began, they realized that everything was bad. "

“We didn’t know how people live in Russia. When the Soviets came, that was all we knew. We were glad for the Soviets. But when we lived under the Soviets, we were horrified. The deportation of people began. They will "sew" something to a person and take it out. Men were put in prisons, and their family remained alone. All those who were taken out did not return"

September 1, 1939. This is the day of the beginning of the greatest catastrophe that claimed tens of millions of human lives, destroyed thousands of cities and villages, and eventually led to a new redivision of the world. It was on this day that the troops of Nazi Germany crossed the western border of Poland. The Second World War began.

And on September 17, 1939, Soviet troops hit the back of defending Poland from the east. Thus began the last partition of Poland, which was the result of a criminal collusion between the two greatest totalitarian regimes of the 20th century - the Nazi and the Communist. The joint parade of Soviet and Nazi troops on the streets of the occupied Polish Brest in 1939 became a shameful symbol of this collusion.

Before the storm

The end of the First World War and the Treaty of Versailles created even more contradictions and points of tension in Europe than before. And if we add to this the rapid strengthening of the communist Soviet Union, which, in fact, was turned into a giant weapons factory, it becomes clear that a new war on the European continent was almost inevitable.

After the First World War, Germany was crushed and humiliated: it was forbidden to have a normal army and navy, it lost significant territories, huge reparations caused economic collapse and poverty. Such a policy of the victorious states was extremely short-sighted: it was clear that the Germans, a talented, hardworking and energetic nation, would not tolerate such humiliation and would strive for revenge. And so it happened: in 1933, Hitler came to power in Germany.

Poland and Germany

After the end of the Great War, Poland again received its statehood. In addition, the Polish state is still seriously "grown up" with new lands. Part of Poznan and the Pomeranian lands, which had previously been part of Prussia, went to Poland. Danzig received the status of a "free city". Part of Silesia became part of Poland, the Poles seized part of Lithuania by force along with Vilnius.

Poland, together with Germany, took part in the annexation of Czechoslovakia, which in no way can be attributed to deeds that should be proud of. In 1938, the Teszyn region was annexed under the pretext of protecting the Polish population.

In 1934, a ten-year non-aggression pact was signed between the countries, and a year later, an agreement on economic cooperation. In general, it should be noted that with the advent of Hitler to power, German-Polish relations improved significantly. But it didn't last long.

In March 1939, Germany demanded that Poland return Danzig to it, join the Anti-Comintern Pact and provide a land corridor for Germany to the Baltic coast. Poland did not accept this ultimatum and early in the morning on September 1, German troops crossed the Polish border, Operation Weiss began.

Poland and the USSR

Relations between Russia and Poland have traditionally been difficult. After the end of the First World War, Poland gained independence and almost immediately the Soviet-Polish war began. Fortune was changeable: first, the Poles reached Kyiv and Minsk, and then the Soviet troops reached Warsaw. But then there was the "miracle on the Vistula" and the complete defeat of the Red Army.

According to the Riga Peace Treaty, the western parts of Belarus and Ukraine were part of the Polish state. The new eastern border of the country passed along the so-called Curzon Line. In the early 1930s, a treaty of friendship and cooperation and a non-aggression agreement were signed. But, despite this, Soviet propaganda painted Poland as one of the main enemies of the USSR.

Germany and USSR

Relations between the USSR and Germany in the period between the two world wars were contradictory. Already in 1922, an agreement was signed on cooperation between the Red Army and the Reichswehr. Germany had serious restrictions under the Treaty of Versailles. Therefore, part of the development of new weapons systems and the training of personnel was carried out by the Germans on the territory of the USSR. A flight school and a tank school were opened, among the graduates of which were the best German tank crews and pilots of the Second World War.

After Hitler came to power, relations between the two countries deteriorated, military-technical cooperation was curtailed. Germany again began to be portrayed by official Soviet propaganda as an enemy of the USSR.

On August 23, 1939, the Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the USSR was signed in Moscow. In fact, in this document, the two dictators Hitler and Stalin divided Eastern Europe between themselves. According to the secret protocol of this document, the territories of the Baltic countries, as well as Finland, parts of Romania were included in the sphere of interests of the USSR. Eastern Poland belonged to the Soviet sphere of influence, and its western part was to go to Germany.

Attack

On September 1, 1939, German aircraft began bombing Polish cities, and ground forces crossed the border. The invasion was preceded by several provocations on the border. The invasion force consisted of five army groups and a reserve. Already on September 9, the Germans reached Warsaw, and the battle for the Polish capital began, which lasted until September 20.

On September 17, practically without resistance, Soviet troops entered Poland from the east. This immediately made the position of the Polish troops almost hopeless. On September 18, the Polish high command crossed the Romanian border. Separate pockets of Polish resistance remained until the beginning of October, but it was already agony.

Part of the Polish territories, which were previously part of Prussia, went to Germany, and the rest was divided into governor-generals. Polish territories occupied by the USSR became part of Ukraine and Belarus.

Poland suffered huge losses during World War II. The invaders banned the Polish language, all national educational and cultural institutions, newspapers were closed. Representatives of the Polish intelligentsia and Jews were massively exterminated. In the territories occupied by the USSR, Soviet punitive bodies worked tirelessly. Tens of thousands of captured Polish officers were destroyed in Katyn and other similar places. Poland lost about 6 million people during the war.

Image copyright getty Image caption

On September 1, 1939, Hitler attacked Poland. After 17 days at 6 am, the Red Army with large forces (21 rifle and 13 cavalry divisions, 16 tank and 2 motorized brigades, a total of 618 thousand people and 4733 tanks) crossed the Soviet-Polish border from Polotsk to Kamenetz-Podolsk.

In the USSR, the operation was called the "liberation campaign", in modern Russia they are neutrally called the "Polish campaign". Some historians consider September 17 the date of the actual entry of the Soviet Union into World War II.

The birth of the pact

The fate of Poland was decided on August 23 in Moscow, when the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed.

For "calm confidence in the East" (an expression of Vyacheslav Molotov) and the supply of raw materials and grain, Berlin recognized half of Poland, Estonia, Latvia as "a zone of Soviet interests" (Stalin subsequently exchanged Lithuania from Hitler for part of the Polish territory due to the USSR), Finland and Bessarabia.

The opinion of these countries, as well as other world players, was not asked.

Great and not-so-great powers were constantly dividing foreign lands, openly and secretly, on a bilateral basis and at international conferences. For Poland, the German-Russian partition of 1939 was the fourth.

The world has changed quite a lot since then. The geopolitical game continues, but it is impossible to imagine that two powerful states or blocs would so cynically decide the fate of third countries behind their backs.

Has Poland gone bankrupt?

Justifying the violation of the Soviet-Polish non-aggression pact of July 25, 1932 (in 1937 its validity was extended until 1945), the Soviet side argued that the Polish state had in fact ceased to exist.

“The German-Polish war clearly showed the internal bankruptcy of the Polish state. Thus, the agreements concluded between the USSR and Poland ceased to be valid,” said the note handed to the Polish Ambassador Vaclav Grzybowski, summoned to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs on September 17, by Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vladimir Potemkin.

"The sovereignty of the state exists as long as the soldiers of the regular army are fighting. Napoleon entered Moscow, but as long as the Kutuzov army existed, it was believed that Russia exists. Where did the Slavic solidarity go?" Grzybowski answered.

The Soviet authorities wanted to arrest Grzybowski and his staff. Polish diplomats were saved by the German ambassador Werner von Schulenburg, who reminded the new allies about the Geneva Convention.

The blow of the Wehrmacht was really terrible. However, the Polish army, dissected by tank wedges, imposed on the enemy the battle on the Bzura that lasted from September 9 to 22, which even the Völkischer Beobachter recognized as "fierce".

We are expanding the front of socialist construction, this is favorable for humanity, because Lithuanians, Western Belarusians, Bessarabians consider themselves happy, whom we delivered from the oppression of landowners, capitalists, policemen and all other bastards from the speech of Joseph Stalin at a meeting in the Central Committee of the CPSU (B) on September 9 1940

An attempt to encircle and cut off from Germany the aggressor troops that had broken through was unsuccessful, but the Polish forces retreated behind the Vistula and began to regroup for a counterattack. In particular, 980 tanks remained at their disposal.

The defense of Westerplatte, Hela and Gdynia was admired by the whole world.

Ridiculing the "military backwardness" and "gentry ambition" of the Poles, Soviet propaganda picked up Goebbels's fiction that the Polish uhlans allegedly rushed at the German tanks on horseback, helplessly stabbing the armor with their sabers.

In fact, the Poles did not engage in such nonsense, and the corresponding film, shot by the German propaganda ministry, was subsequently proven to be a fake. But the Polish cavalry worried the German infantry seriously.

The Polish garrison of the Brest Fortress, led by General Konstantin Plisovsky, repulsed all attacks, and German artillery was stuck near Warsaw. Soviet heavy guns helped, shelling the citadel for two days. Then a joint parade took place, which was received from the German side by Heinz Guderian, who soon became too well known to the Soviet people, and from the Soviet side by brigade commander Semyon Krivoshein.

Surrounded Warsaw capitulated only on September 26, and finally the resistance ended on October 6.

According to military analysts, Poland was doomed, but could fight for a long time.

Diplomatic games

Already on September 3, Hitler began to urge Moscow to speak out as soon as possible - because the war did not unfold quite the way he wanted, but, most importantly, in order to encourage Britain and France to recognize the USSR as an aggressor and declare war on it along with Germany.

The Kremlin, understanding these calculations, was in no hurry.

On September 10, Schulenburg reported to Berlin: "At yesterday's meeting, I got the impression that Molotov promised a little more than one might expect from the Red Army."

According to historian Igor Bunich, diplomatic correspondence every day more and more resembled conversations in thieves' "raspberries": if you don't go for it, you will be left without a share!

The Red Army began to move two days after Ribbentrop in his next message transparently hinted at the possibility of creating an OUN state in western Ukraine.

If Russian intervention is not launched, the question will inevitably arise as to whether a political vacuum will not be created in the area lying to the east of the German zone of influence. In eastern Poland, conditions may arise for the formation of new states from Ribbentrop's telegram to Molotov of September 15, 1939.

"The question of whether the preservation of an independent Polish State is desirable in mutual interests, and what the boundaries of this state will be, can be finally clarified only in the course of further political development," paragraph 2 of the secret protocol read.

At first, Hitler was inclined to the idea of ​​keeping Poland in a truncated form, cutting it off from the west and east. The Nazi Fuhrer hoped that Britain and France would accept such a compromise and end the war.

Moscow did not want to give him a chance to slip out of the trap.

On September 25, Schulenburg reported to Berlin: "Stalin considers it wrong to leave an independent Polish state."

By that time, it was officially announced in London: the only possible condition for peace is the withdrawal of German troops to the positions that they occupied before September 1, no microscopic quasi-states will save the situation.

Divided without a trace

As a result, during Ribbentrop's second visit to Moscow on September 27-28, Poland was divided without a trace.

In the signed document, it was already about "friendship" between the USSR and Germany.

In a telegram to Hitler in response to congratulations on his own 60th birthday in December 1939, Stalin repeated and strengthened this thesis: "The friendship of the peoples of Germany and the Soviet Union, sealed by blood, has every reason to be long and strong."

New secret protocols were attached to the September 28 agreement, the main one of which stated that the contracting parties would not allow "no Polish agitation" in the territories they controlled. The corresponding map was signed not by Molotov, but by Stalin himself, and his 58-centimeter stroke, starting in Western Belarus, crossed Ukraine and drove into Romania.

At a banquet in the Kremlin, according to Gustav Hilger, an adviser to the German embassy, ​​22 toasts were raised. Further, Hilger, according to him, lost count, because he drank equally.

Stalin honored all the guests, including the SS man Schulze, who was standing behind Ribbentrop's chair. The adjutant was not supposed to drink in such a society, but the owner personally handed him a glass, proclaimed a toast "to the youngest of those present", said that he probably suits a black uniform with silver stripes, and demanded that Schulze promise to come to Sovetsky again Union, and certainly in uniform. Schulze gave his word, and kept it on June 22, 1941.

Unconvincing arguments

Official Soviet history offered four main explanations, or rather, justifications for the actions of the USSR in August-September 1939:

a) the pact made it possible to delay the war (obviously, it is understood that otherwise, the Germans, having captured Poland, would immediately go to Moscow without stopping);

b) the border moved 150-200 km to the west, which played an important role in repelling future aggression;

c) the USSR took Ukrainians and Belarusians under the protection of half-brothers, saving them from Nazi occupation;

d) the pact prevented "anti-Soviet collusion" between Germany and the West.

The first two points arose retroactively. Until June 22, 1941, Stalin and his entourage did not say anything of the sort. They did not consider the USSR as a weak defending side and were not going to fight on their territory, even if it was "old" or newly acquired.

The hypothesis of a German attack on the USSR in the autumn of 1939 does not look serious.

For aggression against Poland, the Germans were able to assemble 62 divisions, of which about 20 were undertrained and understaffed, 2,000 aircraft and 2,800 tanks, over 80% of which were light tankettes. At the same time, Kliment Voroshilov, in negotiations with the British and French military delegations in May 1939, said that Moscow was capable of deploying 136 divisions, 9-10 thousand tanks, 5 thousand aircraft.

On the former border, we had powerful fortified areas, and then only Poland was the direct enemy, which would not have dared to attack us alone, and in the event of its collusion with Germany, it would not be difficult to establish the exit of German troops to our border. Then we would have had time to mobilize and deploy. Now we are face to face with Germany, which can secretly concentrate its troops for an attack from the speech of the Chief of Staff of the Belarusian Military District Maxim Purkaev at a meeting of the district command staff in October 1939.

The extension of the border to the west in the summer of 1941 did not help the Soviet Union, because the Germans occupied this territory in the first days of the war. Moreover, thanks to the pact, Germany moved east by an average of 300 km, and most importantly, acquired a common border with the USSR, without which an attack, especially a sudden one, would have been impossible at all.

A "crusade against the USSR" might have seemed plausible to Stalin, whose worldview was shaped by the Marxist doctrine of class struggle as the main driving force of history, and also suspicious by nature.

However, not a single attempt by London and Paris to conclude an alliance with Hitler is known. Chamberlain's "appeasement" was intended not to "direct German aggression to the East," but to encourage the Nazi leader to abandon aggression altogether.

The thesis about the protection of Ukrainians and Belarusians was officially presented by the Soviet side in September 1939 as the main reason.

Through Schulenburg, Hitler expressed his strong disagreement with such an "anti-German formulation."

“The Soviet government, unfortunately, does not see any other pretext to justify its current intervention abroad. We ask, taking into account the difficult situation for the Soviet government, not to allow such trifles to stand in our way,” Molotov said in response to the German ambassador

In fact, the argument could be considered irreproachable if the Soviet authorities, in pursuance of the secret order of the NKVD No. 001223 of October 11, 1939, in a territory with a population of 13.4 million, did not arrest 107 thousand and did not deport 391 thousand people administratively. About ten thousand died during the deportation and in the settlement.

High-ranking Chekist Pavel Sudoplatov, who arrived in Lvov immediately after its occupation by the Red Army, wrote in his memoirs: “The atmosphere was strikingly different from the state of affairs in the Soviet part of Ukraine. liquidate".

special accounts

In the first two weeks of the war, the Soviet press devoted short informational messages to her under neutral headings, as if they were talking about distant and insignificant events.

On September 14, as part of information preparation for the invasion, Pravda published a long article devoted mainly to the oppression of national minorities in Poland (as if the arrival of the Nazis promised them better times), and contained the statement: "That's why no one wants to fight for such a state" .

Subsequently, the misfortune that befell Poland was commented on with undisguised gloating.

Speaking at a session of the Supreme Soviet on October 31, Molotov rejoiced that "nothing was left of this ugly offspring of the Treaty of Versailles."

Both in the open press and in confidential documents, the neighboring country was called either "former Poland" or, in the Nazi style, "governor-general."

Newspapers printed cartoons depicting a border post knocked down by a Red Army boot and a sad teacher announcing to the class: "This, children, is the end of our study of the history of the Polish state."

Through the corpse of white Poland lies the path to the world conflagration. On bayonets we will carry happiness and peace to working mankind Mikhail Tukhachevsky, 1920

When the Polish government-in-exile headed by Vladislav Sikorsky was created in Paris on October 14, Pravda responded not with informational or analytical material, but with a feuilleton: “The territory of the new government consists of six rooms, a bathroom and a toilet. In comparison with this territory, Monaco looks boundless empire."

Stalin had special scores with Poland.

During the disastrous Polish war of 1920 for Soviet Russia, he was a member of the Revolutionary Military Council (political commissar) of the Southwestern Front.

The neighboring country in the USSR was called nothing more than "pan Poland" and blamed for everything and always.

As follows from the decree signed by Stalin and Molotov on January 22, 1933 on the fight against the migration of peasants to the cities, it turns out that people did this not trying to escape from the Holodomor, but being incited by "Polish agents".

Until the mid-1930s, the Soviet military plans saw Poland as the main adversary. Mikhail Tukhachevsky, who also turned out to be among the beaten commanders at one time, according to the recollections of witnesses, simply lost his temper when the conversation turned to Poland.

Repressions against the leadership of the Polish Communist Party living in Moscow in 1937-1938 were a common practice, but the fact that it was declared "wrecking" as such and dissolved by the decision of the Comintern is a unique fact.

The NKVD discovered in the USSR also the "Polish organization of troops", allegedly created back in 1914 by Pilsudski personally. She was accused of what the Bolsheviks themselves took credit for: the decomposition of the Russian army during the First World War.

In the course of the "Polish operation", carried out on Yezhov's secret order No. 00485, 143,810 people were arrested, 139,835 of them were convicted and 111,091 were shot - one in six ethnic Poles living in the USSR.

In terms of the number of victims, even the Katyn massacre fades before these tragedies, although it was she who became known to the whole world.

easy walk

Before the start of the operation, Soviet troops were brought together in two fronts: Ukrainian under the command of the future People's Commissar of Defense Semyon Timoshenko and Belarusian General Mikhail Kovalev.

The 180-degree turn happened so rapidly that many Red Army soldiers and commanders thought they were going to fight the Nazis. The Poles also did not immediately understand that this was no help.

Another incident occurred: the political officers explained to the fighters that they had to "beat the lords", but the installation had to be urgently changed: it turned out that in the neighboring country everyone was lords and panis.

The head of the Polish state, Edward Rydz-Smigly, realizing the impossibility of a war on two fronts, ordered the troops not to resist the Red Army, but to be interned in Romania.

Some commanders did not receive the order or ignored it. The fighting took place near Grodno, Shatsk and Oran.

On September 24, near Przemysl, the lancers of General Vladislav Anders defeated two Soviet infantry regiments with a surprise attack. Timoshenko had to advance tanks to prevent the Poles from breaking through into Soviet territory.

But for the most part, the “liberation campaign,” which officially ended on September 30, was a cakewalk for the Red Army.

The territorial acquisitions of 1939–1940 turned out to be a major political loss for the USSR and international isolation. The "bridgeheads" occupied with the consent of Hitler did not strengthen the country's defense capability at all, since Vladimir Beshanov was not intended for this,
historian

The victors captured about 240 thousand prisoners, 300 combat aircraft, a lot of equipment and military equipment. Created at the beginning of the Finnish war, the "armed forces of democratic Finland", without thinking twice, dressed in trophy uniforms from warehouses in Bialystok, disputes with Polish symbols from it.

The claimed losses amounted to 737 killed and 1862 wounded (according to updated data from the site "Russia and the USSR in the wars of the XX century" - 1475 dead and 3858 wounded and sick).

In a holiday order on November 7, 1939, People's Commissar of Defense Kliment Voroshilov stated that "the Polish state at the first military clash shattered like an old rotten cart."

"Just think about how many years tsarism fought to annex Lvov, and our troops took this territory in seven days!" - Lazar Kaganovich triumphed at a meeting of the party economic activists of the People's Commissariat of Railways on October 4.

In fairness, it should be noted that in the Soviet leadership there was a person who tried to at least partially cool the euphoria.

“We were terribly damaged by the Polish campaign, it spoiled us. Our army did not immediately understand that the war in Poland was a military walk, not a war,” Joseph Stalin said at a meeting of the highest command staff on April 17, 1940.

However, on the whole, the "liberation campaign" was perceived as a model for any future war that the USSR would start whenever it wanted and end victoriously and easily.

Many participants in the Great Patriotic War noted the enormous harm inflicted by the army and society by the hatred moods.

Historian Mark Solonin called August-September 1939 the finest hour of Stalinist diplomacy. From the point of view of momentary goals, it was so: without officially entering the world war, with little bloodshed, the Kremlin achieved everything it wanted.

However, just two years later, the decisions taken then almost turned into death for the country.

In the countries of the so-called socialist camp, political crises occurred from time to time. The transfer of the Soviet economic and political system to soil saturated with the traditions of private property and democracy gave rise to chronic dissatisfaction among the population, primarily with the Soviet Union, since it was clear that it was he who was the source of troubles, and all local communists were only his satellites. Every time when internal political unrest began, local communists found themselves completely deprived of support for maintaining the pro-Soviet system and tried to find a common language with the opposition. At these critical moments, the Soviet Union intervened and, in order to maintain control over a particular country, solved the issue radically - with the help of military force, after which it brought another puppet to power, since the previous one did not cope with its task.

So it was in 1953 in the GDR, in 1956 in Hungary (where a real war went on between the regular armies of the USSR and Hungary for a whole month, as a result of which thousands died), in 1968 in Czechoslovakia (the national army abandoned armed resistance to the invasion, but without there were still many casualties). These are the most famous operations to "preserve the unity of the socialist camp."

In Poland, too, acute internal political conflicts have repeatedly arisen, as in 1956 and 1970. They were accompanied by strikes and mass demonstrations, which were suppressed by the authorities. Both times, the undividedly ruling Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) managed to resolve the situation on its own, preventing the intervention of the USSR. She simply changed leaders, and the new leader made new promises to the population. So, in 1956, two leaders of the PUWP were removed from their posts in a row (in March, B. Bierut and in October, E. Ochab). In 1970, V. Gomulka was forced to resign.

In the 1970s, Poland entered a period of economic growth. But, as you know, it does not happen that everyone wins, someone always feels left out compared to others. Most workers grew dissatisfied with their position, and strikes became more frequent. In addition, the generation that emerged as a result of the post-war baby boom entered adulthood. The post-war compensatory population explosion in Poland was so strong that the authorities even had to introduce restrictions: the marriageable age for boys was raised to 21 years.

In 1976, a wave of strikes began, which did not subside until the introduction of martial law. The center of the strike movement was Gdansk, which had already shown itself in the events of 1970 (when dozens of people were shot by the authorities). The young charismatic labor leader Lech Walesa came to the fore here, soon creating the Solidarity trade union, a consolidated anti-communist opposition that united millions of people regardless of their views - social democratic, liberal or Catholic. It turned out to be a paradoxical thing: against the state, which was broadcasting as if it was protecting the interests of the workers, the workers themselves acted as a powerful front first of all.

The most powerful protests in August-September 1980 forced Edward Gierek, the head of the PZPR, to leave the chair. But the new head of the party, Stanislav Kane, failed to stabilize the situation. The PUWP had to make concessions to Solidarity, including political ones. The regime began to blur. In Moscow, this could be regarded as the events in Hungary in 1956 or in Czechoslovakia in 1968. It smelled like the gunpowder of the Soviet invasion. It should be noted that Soviet troops stayed in Poland only a few years after the end of the war, and then were withdrawn from there. Only communications were located here that connected the Soviet Union with the Group of Soviet Forces in the GDR, and their provision within the framework of the collective security of the Warsaw Pact Organization (OVD) was entrusted to the Polish Army.

But for the Soviet Union, the desire to restore "political order" in Poland by force was complicated by two circumstances. First, the USSR got involved in a protracted war in Afghanistan. And what resistance, given the traditional bilateral relations, the Poles of the Soviet army would put up, was still unclear. This is still not Czechoslovakia, which was proved by the Second World War. Secondly, the Soviet leadership itself, headed by L.I. Brezhnev, which had practically not changed since the time when the decision was made to bring tanks into Zlata Prague, was already much decrepit.

But the most important circumstance turned out to be the presence in the PUWP of energetic military leaders who were ready to take any measures to pacify Solidarity, and thereby not give rise to Soviet intervention. In October 1981, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the PUWP removed Kani and elected General Wojciech Jaruzelski, a supporter of tough measures, as the first secretary of the Central Committee. On December 3, the Saeima, obedient to the party, banned strikes. In response, Solidarity announced an indefinite strike. At that moment, Jaruzelski did everything to convince Moscow that Warsaw itself was able to cope with the crisis. Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU M.A. Suslov called Warsaw and promised Jaruzelski that the Soviet Union would not send troops to Poland if martial law was declared in Poland.

On the night of December 12-13, 1981, a military coup took place in Poland, which eliminated even formal rule under the communist "constitution". All power was transferred to the Military Council of National Salvation that had been created. Martial law was declared in the country. At the time of its introduction, all means of communication that private individuals could use were turned off: telephone, telegraph, mail. As with the coup of General Augusto Pinochet in Chile (Jaruzelski in uniform and dark glasses was also compared to Pinochet), all known oppositionists were interned. The number of internees reached 10,000. In clashes with the troops in the first days after the introduction of martial law, dozens of civilians were killed. The task of suppressing civil protest was carried out by the Polish Army, which remained true to its command. Soviet troops, already preparing to cross the borders of Poland from the USSR, the GDR and Czechoslovakia, remained in their previous positions.