Why did Israel bomb a nuclear reactor in Syria? Israel has acknowledged the destruction of a proposed nuclear reactor in Syria.

21.09.2019

Reactor in Syria before the airstrike (צילום: דובר צה""ל)

This morning, March 21, all the Israeli mainstream media began their day by posting literally sensational material in the editorials, authorized for publication by the military command.

These are the details of the 2007 bombing and destruction by the Israeli air force of a Syrian nuclear reactor; until this day, the bombing of the reactor was only attributed to the IDF by foreign media, finding neither denial nor confirmation on our part.

According to widespread information, on the night of September 5-6, 2007, shortly after midnight, operation “Beyond the Cube” took place [the “sentenced” object itself was conventionally called the “Cube”, the purpose of which was to destroy a nuclear reactor, almost built in Deir -Ezzor (450 km north of Damascus (Eastern Syria)).

This story began 4 years before the operation, when Libya unexpectedly announced its decision to stop promoting its own nuclear program.

The announcement took Israel by surprise, and Meir Dagan, then head of Mossad foreign intelligence, ordered an urgent military intelligence reassessment. As a result, it became clear that Syria is secretly developing nuclear weapons.

Moreover, the Mossad was able to obtain information about the creation of a plutonium-producing nuclear reactor in Syria, in which North Korea actively helped this Middle Eastern country.

Aircraft crew, prime minister, defense minister, soldiers and commanders of the air force base who took part in the preparation and conduct of the operation (צילום: דובר צה""ל)

Thus, after a long and complex reconnaissance preparation, the operational decision was made to destroy the reactor by launching a series of strikes by Israeli warplanes.

As mentioned above, in the middle of the night, eight F-15 and F-16 bombers, as well as an electronics aircraft, took off from ground-based airfields, heading for Deir Ezzor.

Already in the air, the planes disabled the Syrian air defense system using a secret “electronic warfare” technique (developed by one of the leading Israeli companies in this field), which prevented them from being detected by our air force link. “We blinded the enemy,” one of the pilots who took part in the operation said simply and clearly.

As the planes approached the reactor, they dropped heavy precision-guided bombs on it (according to some reports, about 17 tons of explosives were dropped), causing irreparable damage to both the building itself and the surrounding area for many kilometers around.

After that, the planes safely returned to Israel along a pre-laid route through Turkey.

At a briefing with foreign ambassadors a few days later, Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Muallem said that three Israeli aircraft "entered our country's airspace from the Mediterranean Sea", flying over an area located about 50 km from Deir Ezzor in northeastern Syria.

According to him, the Israeli Air Force attacked "an empty plot of land belonging to the inter-Arab scientific association for the development of agriculture." Naturally, neither al-Muallem said a word about the nuclear reactor and, in general, about any "serious" damage caused by the "Zionist military."

True, Syria protested in connection with what happened, and threatened "retaliatory actions." The IDF command, well aware of the high probability of a military response from Syria, in September 2007, together with the entire army, was ready to start a war on the northern border, but there was no “answer” from Damascus.

Russia also protested against the actions of the Israeli Air Force, but the relationship that existed at the time between US President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Ehud Olmert led to America's tacit acceptance of the operation. Moreover, there is evidence that the White House "approved", albeit tacitly, the destruction of a nuclear reactor near Damascus, after evidence was presented to Bush of the existence of a strong "nuclear friendship" between Syria and North Korea.


What's left of the Syrian reactor after the attack (צילום: דובר צה"ל)

Three years later, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announced that the target bombed by Israeli warplanes was "a nuclear reactor under construction." Also, representatives of the IAEA refuted all the explanations of the official Damascus, how there could be obvious traces of uranium at the bombing site, and even accused President Bashar al-Assad of deliberately concealing information.

IDF Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi then said in connection with the destruction of the reactor that “as soon as the Prime Minister entrusted us with this operation, it became clear to me that we are preparing to eliminate the nuclear threat directed against the State of Israel and the entire region, while taking steps to to prevent entry into the war, but if it is imposed on us, we will win!

The current Chief of Staff of the IDF, Gadi Eizenkot, who led the Israel Defense Forces Northern Command during Operation Beyond the Cube, said that “the message about the 2007 attack on the reactor is that the State of Israel does not accept the construction of a facility that is an existential a threat to him. This was a message sent to the enemy in 2007, and this is a message sent to our enemies in the near and distant future."

Among other things, the IDF has declassified a laconic report of a pilot who was in the heart of enemy territory and struck a reactor, and a recording of a moment of sigh of relief at the headquarters of the operation in a bunker on the territory of the Kiriya complex in Tel Aviv. The pilot at the moment of impact says: "I'm over the target." Then he says the code word confirming the defeat: "Arizona".

On the night of September 5, 2007, Israel's top political and military leadership was in a bunker in Kiriya and watched the operation in real time.

Colonel A., deputy commander of the F-15 squadron who took part in the operation, recalls: “On the approach to the target, we gained altitude, and the main thing that I remember was the moment when the bombs hit the target. Straight to the point, between the eyes. You see that the target has been destroyed and you have completed an important task.”

At the moment the Arizona signal was received, Air Force Chief of Staff General Yochanan Loker allowed himself to throw his hands into the air, after which he hugged Air Force Commander General Eliezer Shkedi by the shoulders, who only nodded his head.

Colonel A. recalls: “But the mission is not over. We must return to base without loss. And a lot can happen on the way back. We were very focused on separating routes, on keeping the route a secret, and this flight, despite the greatness of the hour, was very professional and correct.”

General Shkedi recalls: “It was only after a relatively long period of time that we met with the Chief of the General Staff, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense. I was excited and they are very excited. He hugged me, I felt that we had succeeded in something very important and of great importance.

The Israeli Air Force bombing of the Syrian site in Al-Kibar has been shrouded in mystery for many months. The Israeli leadership did not comment on the incident. Israeli senior civil and military officials limited themselves to the phrase: "No comment!", Which was usually followed by a meaningful smirk. And official Damascus reacted to the bombing of its territory in a completely strange way: at first, the Syrians completely denied its very fact, and a few days later they accused the Israelis of violating their airspace. Moreover, the Syrians said that the Israelis destroyed "an old military facility, currently not in use."

In Israel, the secrecy stamp from the air raid on Al-Kibar has not been lifted so far. However, the American media all this time did not stop trying to get to the bottom of the truth. But still, some information can be collected on this issue:

Meetings in the living room of the presidential suite in the White House were absolutely confidential, because the issue under discussion was paramount. Only one person was authorized to write down what was said. And then one day, returning after a meeting to the office of the National Security Council, he realized with horror that all his notes were left in the presidential residence, in a briefcase under the chair on which he was sitting. “These were some of the most secret documents in the then government of the United States,” recalls in his memoir article “Bombing the Syrian Reactor: The Untold Story” published by Commentary magazine, the current member of the influential “think tank Council on Foreign Relations, Elliott Abrams, unique precautions were taken to ensure secrecy, and I simply forgot them on the floor. Pale and sweaty, I rushed back to the living quarters, where the butler graciously let me inside and escorted me to the Yellow Oval Room, where the meeting took place. Here it is, my briefcase, under the chair and untouched. Well, I thought, if the butler doesn’t spill the beans, maybe they won’t shoot me…”


On January 29, 2013, the Israeli Air Force attacked unconfirmed targets in Syria. The Israeli government declined to comment, the White House - too. According to data leaked to the American press, citing unnamed government sources, the Israelis destroyed a convoy of trucks delivering Buk-M2E anti-aircraft systems (in NATO classification - SA-17) from Syria to Hezbollah's location. Then there was an attack on supposedly warehouses of Yakhont supersonic missiles. Iran and Syria vowed to retaliate, Russia expressed serious concern, and Commentary columnist Jonathan Tobin stressed that, as in the past, the Jewish state continues to do the dirty work for the Americans in Syria.

So what was it like in 2007?


The title of the book "Israel against Iran, a secret war" published a few days ago by the Kinneret publishing house, claims to cover a wide range of events. And, indeed, Israeli journalists Yoaz Handel and Yakov Katz have done a great job collecting a lot of information about how this war is being waged. But, in my opinion, the main highlight of the book lies in the detailed description of all stages of the operation, during which the Israeli Air Force smashed the Syrian reactor to shreds.

Handel and Katz tracked all stages of the operation - from the collection of primary information to the raid of seven F-15s on the reactor building. And in the event that the journalists were unable to obtain information, they tried to recreate the situation based on descriptions of similar actions by the IDF in the past. The authors resorted to such a reconstruction when describing a covert raid by IDF special forces soldiers in Syria, during which soil and plant samples were collected in the immediate vicinity of the carefully guarded reactor.

By and large, this book did not report anything new. The whole world was already sure that it was Israel that destroyed the Syrian nuclear reactor in September 2007. And yet, it will no doubt become a bestseller. It is one thing to be sure, but quite another to know, in all details, the history of the destruction of the Syrian reactor. In addition, official Israel still refuses to make any comments or even a simple reaction on this matter. Yoaz Handel and Jacob Katz are serious people and the book they wrote is a serious study.

Handel and Katz begin their description of the Israeli operation to destroy the reactor at the end of April 2007, when the then head of the Mossad, Meir Dagan, called US national security adviser Stephen Headley on a secret line and asked for an urgent meeting. When such a request comes from the head of the Mossad, even the president's adviser - a man utterly busy - immediately finds a place in his schedule. The meeting took place on May 4, in the Counselor's Office, located in the White House, next to the Oval Office of the President of the United States.

According to an unspoken agreement between the Israeli and US intelligence agencies, their employees are not interested in the sources of information of their colleagues. But Dagan decided to break this unwritten rule and, at the very beginning of the meeting, he spoke about the successful operation of his agents, who managed to get secret information about a strange facility erected in Dir A-Zur, a mountainous region of Syria.

Dagan then laid out a row of photographs in front of Headley. The first of them captured two smiling men standing in an embrace in front of some industrial facility. One of the men was Asian. Headley looked inquiringly at Dagan, who placed two documents on the table, summarizing the results of surveillance conducted on the two men by Mossad agents.

The Asian turned out to be Chan Chibo, a leading specialist in North Korea's nuclear program. The second is Ibrahim Ottoman, head of the Syrian Atomic Energy Committee. The connection between these people spoke for itself, but Headley had not yet seen the main thing - photographs. And Dagan laid them out on the table - in chronological order of construction.

Photos of the first stages of construction left no doubt - we are talking about a nuclear reactor. Photos of the next stages showed how it was carefully disguised as an industrial facility that could produce the most innocent products.

Headley called several of his employees into the office, who were supposed to present data on the Korean atomic program. One of them showed Dagan and Headley photographs of a North Korean reactor built by Chan Chibo 30 years ago. His building and the building in Dir A-Zur were absolutely identical.

Another employee said that back in 2004, US intelligence agencies managed to intercept several telephone conversations between high-ranking officials in Pyongyang and Damascus. No special information could be extracted from the conversations, the interlocutors observed extreme caution. But nevertheless it became clear that there is cooperation between the two countries in some super-secret area.

The puzzle has been completed. Headley looked at Daganu and said - "Meir, this is a very big deal."

From Headley, Dagan went to meet with CIA Director Michael Hayden, whom he also introduced to all the information on the Syrian reactor. And Hadley immediately reported to President Bush about the Israeli discovery. Bush ordered to study in detail the information provided by Dagan, and to keep them in absolute secrecy.

From that moment on, Headley and US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice began to discuss with the Israelis ways to solve the problem. In Jerusalem, they were convinced that we are talking about a fully completed nuclear reactor, which is separated from the start of work by several months. But Washington did not rush to conclusions, but demanded additional information that would once again confirm the Israelis' claims.

Here's what Elliot Abrams says:


“In mid-May 2007, we received an urgent request to receive the head of the Mossad, Meir Dagan, at the White House. Olmert asked to be allowed to show some materials personally to Bush. We responded by suggesting that he first demonstrate what he has to National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley and me. I was then Deputy National Security Adviser in charge of the Middle East. In Hadley's office, Vice President Dick Cheney joined us for the presentation of Dugan. What we learned was amazing and shocking. Dagan showed us intelligence proving that Syria is building a nuclear reactor, the blueprint for which was provided by North Korea, and is doing so with the technical assistance of the North Koreans. And Dagan also made it clear: all Israeli politicians who have seen these materials agree that the reactor should be destroyed.”

At first, the Americans still doubted: was Bashar al-Assad really so stupid that he thought he could get away with this idea? That Israel will let him do it? However, he almost succeeded in the trick - the construction had already advanced far enough, a few more months, and the reactor would have been launched.


Anyway, the process of discussing what to do started between the Americans and the Israelis immediately and lasted 4 months. The work on Al-Kibar (as the reactor came to be called), according to Abrams, was “a model of both US-Israeli cooperation and interagency cooperation without leaks. Documents that I distributed among the participants in the discussions were returned to me immediately after the end of the meetings or were locked under lock and key; the secretaries and assistants knew nothing; the meetings themselves were referred to vaguely as "study groups".


The following options for resolving the issue were studied: open or covert, who would bomb: Israel or the United States, military or diplomatic. Technically, the military option presented no problem for the Americans: General Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assured President Bush of this. However, the diplomatic option was also considered very seriously. This scenario looked like this: first inform the IAEA and demand an immediate inspection; if Syria refuses to allow inspectors to Al-Kibar, then we turn to the UN Security Council and demand its reaction; if it does not exist, then theoretically only the military option remains.

After the US army invaded Iraq on the basis of information about Saddam's alleged possession of chemical weapons, which in the end could not be found, Bush feared a secondary failure and deadly criticism in the US media.

In Jerusalem, they understood that time was catastrophically short, and therefore the then Prime Minister Ehud Olmert decided to address Bush directly. According to high-ranking Bush administration officials, Olmert took an uncompromising position - the reactor must disappear from the face of the earth. But Bush hesitated.

His closest advisers explained to the Israelis - before we destroy the reactor, you must answer three questions. First, what is the actual purpose of the building that the Mossad provided photographs of? Second, at what stage in the implementation of its nuclear program is Syria? Third, what can be done to stop this program?

To answer these questions, the Mossad and the Israeli military intelligence agency AMAN redoubled their intelligence-gathering efforts. No expense was spared, agents were required to take the most risky steps in order to obtain additional information.

Ehud Olmert and then Israeli Defense Minister Amir Peretz held a series of secret meetings with experts, during which two options were considered - the destruction of the reactor or a complete abstraction from its existence. One of the participants in the meetings was General of the Reserve David Ivry, who commanded the Israeli Air Force during the attack on the Iraqi reactor in 1981.

During the meetings, some claimed that Bashar al-Assad was building the reactor solely to impress the leaders of other Arab countries. Its true purpose does not include the intention to pose a real threat to Israel, and therefore Israel must pretend that it does not know anything about the facility at Dir Azur.

But the vast majority of experts adhered to exactly the opposite point of view. In their opinion, Israel's disregard for the Islamic nuclear reactor in the Middle East (as happened at the first stages of the construction of Iranian reactors) would inevitably lead to the inclusion of moderate Arab countries in the nuclear race.

Olmert supported the supporters of destroying the reactor. As a result of these meetings, it was decided that the reactor in Dir A-Zur poses a threat to the existence of Israel and must be wiped off the face of the earth as soon as possible.

A senior official close to Bush said that after Headley's meeting with Dagan, an intense exchange of intelligence information about the reactor began between the Israelis and the Americans. At first, Olmert asked the Americans to solve this problem themselves. But, despite warm relations with Bush, his requests remained unanswered.

Handel and Katz argue that, according to the same American source, President Bush explained to the Israeli prime minister a few weeks later that, from his point of view, the ideal solution would be to contact the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), headed by the Egyptian Al Baradei. If this appeal fails, then it will be possible to apply to the UN Security Council with a request to impose sanctions on Damascus. And only after that, according to Bush, it was possible to weigh the military option.

To me personally Elliot Abrams says, the diplomatic option seemed "toothless and ridiculous." On the one hand, the Jewish state would never entrust its security to the UN. On the other hand, this option would not have worked: Syria's friends in the UN, especially Russia, would have covered it. As for the IAEA, we have already had enough experience of dealing with its Director General, the Egyptian Mohammed ElBaradei. He, Abrams notes, from the role of an inspector and a policeman retrained himself into a peacemaker and diplomat - therefore, instead of speaking out against Syria as a united front, he would begin to seek a deal with it. And one more thing: transferring the reactor problem to the UN and the IAEA would mean that the State Department, headed by Condoleezza Rice, would take care of it - "I thought that an issue of such significance should be in the hands of the White House." But the main thing is that as soon as the Syrians found out what we know about Al-Kibar, they would immediately build a kindergarten or some other semblance of a human shield right next to it. The effect of surprise, vital for the military option, would then be removed.

Among the participants in the meetings, the only one who spoke in favor of an American bombing was Vice President Cheney. “This would not only make the region and the world safer, but would demonstrate the seriousness with which we treat nonproliferation…” he recalled in his memoirs. But my voice was lonely. When I finished, the president asked, "Does anyone here agree with the vice president?" Not a hand went up in the room."


I apologized to the vice president at the time for leaving him in isolation, Abrams says. But I believed that the Israelis should bomb the reactor and thereby restore their power status, spoiled by the Second Lebanon War in 2006 and the Hamas seizure of Gaza in 2007. If we strike at the reactor, I thought, the Israelis will lose, because everyone will point out that they destroyed the reactor in Osirak (Iraq) in 1981, but now they were afraid to get involved with Syria - and this would dramatically increase the prestige of the latter in the region, and indeed Iran too; the latter would certainly be against American interests.


The diplomatic option was strongly advocated by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. Moreover, Gates demanded that the United States prohibit Israel from bombing Al-Kibar, under the threat of a complete review of relations between them. One possible argument was clear to me - America is already at war in two Muslim countries, it would be absolutely inappropriate, from his point of view, to get into a third one. Another thing was not clear - why Israel should not be allowed to do this, because if Syria acquired nuclear weapons, American positions in the Middle East would suffer very sensitively.


Meanwhile, Gates, in terms of preventing Israeli bombing of the reactor, was actively supported by Condoleezza Rice. In parallel, she opposed the new program of military assistance to Israel. Comparing the first and second, Abrams came to the conclusion that Rice prefers to see Israel weaker and, accordingly, more dependent on the United States - then Prime Minister Ehud Olmert will be more accommodating and easier to go to an international conference on the Middle East, and then to the creation of a Palestinian state - exactly to the end of the Bush presidency! - will agree.


And well, Bush sided with Condoleezza. It was decided that the US would contact the IAEA and Bush would call Olmert to brief him. Abrams was annoyed. In his memoirs, Bush explained his decision by saying that the CIA then expressed "high confidence" that the site in Syria was a "nuclear reactor" and "low confidence" that Assad had a nuclear weapons program, because on there was no evidence of this. If so, then it will turn out that the Americans will attack a sovereign state in the presence of a “low confidence” factor - and if this is leaked, what then? Well, okay, says Abrams, so be it, but this only explains why we do not bomb, but why should the Israelis be dissuaded from this?


To Olmert's credit, it should be noted that he resolutely rejected these proposals. Israel had a negative experience of cooperation with AlBaradei, who systematically turned a blind eye to Iran's actions to implement the Ayatollah's nuclear program. In addition, all the actions proposed by Bush no longer made sense: at that time it was clear that the reactor would become operational in a matter of weeks. And then the military option will become irrelevant, because in the event of a bombing of an operating reactor, a radioactive cloud will cover the vast territories of Syria, Turkey and Israel.

During a personal meeting with Bush, Olmert completely rejected the president's proposals. “As soon as we turn to the IAEA, it will become clear to the Syrians that we know about the existence of their reactor,” Olmert told Bush, “And no one knows how Assad will behave. He may well place a kindergarten on the roof of the reactor building.” But Bush stood his ground and, according to the testimony of the same American source, during the meeting Olmert had no doubts that the United States would not attack Syria.

In his book of memoirs, President Bush describes a telephone conversation with Olmert, during which the Israeli prime minister once again (and in vain!) tried to convince him to agree to such an attack.

I ask you to carry out bombing in Syria,” Olmert said.

I cannot explain the bombing of the territory of a sovereign state, - answered Bush, - Unless our special services convince me that we are talking about an atomic program.

Your position worries me very much, - Olmert did not let up.

Bush, whom his parents called "the first Jewish president of the United States" because of his support for Israel, hesitated. And he asked his advisers to check the possibility of a night raid by commandos. But Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was strongly opposed to any form of invasion. In the end, Bush gave up the military option. Israel was left to itself.

On June 19, 2007, Olmert again arrived in Washington. During a conversation with the president, he briefed Bush on the latest intelligence. “We will not allow the reactor to be activated,” Olmert said.

Bush later claimed that Olmert did not ask his permission or ask him to give the green light to the operation. The Israeli prime minister simply informed the president. From the point of view of the White House administration, the war between Israel and Syria, which could follow the attack on the reactor, would deal a serious blow to the "civil society" being built by the Americans in Iraq. But Bush remained silent. Which, in essence, was tantamount to agreeing ...



Abrams was thinking the day before how the Israeli leader would respond. Probably, he will say, let me think, consult with my people, and tomorrow I will call. An no. Olmert reacted, writes Abrams, "immediately and decisively." George, he said, I'm surprised and disappointed. And I don't accept it. From the very first day, when Dagan arrived in Washington, we told you that the reactor should be removed. Israel cannot live with a Syrian nuclear reactor, we cannot allow this. This will change the entire region, and our security does not accept this. You tell me that you will not act, so we will act. By the way, again, according to Bush's memoirs, Olmert first asked the United States to bomb the reactor - but Abrams says that, sorry, this did not happen.


And now, on September 6, Olmert called Bush and said that the deed was done. How did the American president react? “With anger? Pressed again? Not at all. He listened to Olmert calmly and acknowledged that Israel has the right to protect its national security. After hanging up the phone, the president said, not without admiration: “This is a guy with character.”


This, of course, was a surprise. The president accepted Olmert's decision so quickly that Abrams still wonders if Bush somewhere deep inside himself expected just such a result and, moreover, just wanted it. Yes, he supported Condi Rice, thus showing that she had the floor on the Middle East, but since the reactor was destroyed, her whole plan to “refer the issue to the UN” died for a long time. Bush did not look extremely upset. Moreover, says Abrams, he called all of us, ordered us to forget about any diplomatic initiatives and to be silent, silent, silent ...


Reference:

Former US President George W. Bush wrote in his memoirs that during his tenure he faced the possibility of a strike on Syrian suspicious objects at the request of Israel in 2007, but ultimately decided to abandon the idea.

Ultimately, Israel itself destroyed the facilities where, according to intelligence, Syria was developing nuclear weapons.In his memoir Decision Points, Bush writes that he received a report from the intelligence agencies about "suspicious, well-hidden objects in the eastern desert of Syria." He discussed this information by telephone with former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert.

"George, I ask you to bomb these fortifications," Olmert said. This quote comes from Reuters.

Bush writes that he discussed options for a possible operation with US national security services and came to the conclusion that "bombing a sovereign country without warning and justification is unacceptable and can lead to a negative result," he writes.

The covert operation was rejected and deemed too dangerous and risky.Bush received intelligence data and estimates from then-CIA director Mike Hayden, who said analysts tend to assume that nuclear weapons are indeed being developed at the sites, but that the chances of success are low.

Recall that it was George W. Bush who ordered the invasion of Iraq in 2003 based on the assumption that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction that were never found.
Olmert was disappointed with Bush's decision and his recommendation to develop a strategy for a diplomatic solution to the issue without the use of force against Syria.

Over time, the Israelis managed either to introduce an agent to the facility in Al-Kibar, or to recruit one of the employees there. It was he who gave the Israelis a video that he secretly made inside the complex. The film removed the last doubts about the nature of the object. In addition, the footage shows workers of Asian appearance, engaged in the construction and adjustment of equipment. Although, according to experts, at least four years remained before the completion of the reactor, the Israelis decided to destroy the facility, once and for all depriving Syria of the chances of developing a nuclear weapon.

Everything else was a matter of technique.

At exactly 10:45 p.m. on September 5, 2007, ten Israeli F-15 aircraft took off from one of the military airfields. Each of them carried an AGM-65 missile with a warhead weighing 500 kilograms. Near the Syrian border, three planes fell behind - they had to be in the air all the time of the operation, but over Israeli territory.

The seven continued flying in Syrian airspace. A few seconds later, the first F-15 fired a missile at the Syrian radar. The hit was direct, the Syrian air defenses were blinded. Less than 20 minutes later, the planes bombed the reactor. All AGM-65 hit the building, which turned into a pile of ruins. And twenty minutes later, ten F-15s landed safely at their base.

Near the runway, the pilots were waiting for their comrades with a bottle of champagne.

Despite the fact that Israel did not claim responsibility for the 2007 bombing, there was little doubt in the world that the secret facility located in northeastern Syria would have been destroyed by the IDF air force.

Shortly after the bombing, additional fuel tanks dropped by Israeli aircraft were found in Turkey. Western media also reported on Israeli special forces units that had been in Syria for a long time and on a spy who was planted at a nuclear facility under construction.

Speaking of spies:

An Egyptian citizen accused of spying for Israel has confessed to helping the IDF pinpoint the exact location of a Syrian nuclear reactor. The reactor was bombed in September 2007. Syria has never officially recognized the fact that the bombed site was a nuclear reactor, and Israel has not recognized the fact of the bombing itself.

The Egyptian resource EgyNews reports that the detained "spy" Tarek Abdelrazek allegedly paid Syrian security officer Saleh el-Nijm $1.5 million to provide information about the location of the reactor.

Abdelrazek himself received a $37,000 commission from Israeli bosses.

A diplomatic cable sent to US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on September 6, 2007 states: "Israel has destroyed a secretly built Syrian nuclear facility."

Abdelrazek was arrested by Egyptian authorities in early December. He was accused of recruiting agents for the Mossad in Lebanon and Syria. The Emergency State Tribunal of Egypt will consider the case of Abdulrazek on January 15.

One of the documents leaked by wikileaks says that the Syrian government ordered chemical missiles to be fired at Israel immediately after the attack that destroyed a Syrian nuclear facility in September 2007.

Olmert said that immediately after the attack, Syrian ballistic missiles with chemical warheads were put on full alert and aimed at Israel. Assad, however, decided not to do anything. Olmert respectfully commented on this: "Such a decision requires discipline."

According to rumors, North Korea transferred its secret laboratories engaged in the development of nuclear weapons to the reactor in Dir ez-Zur. After the destruction of the reactor, the Syrian general Muhammad Suleiman, who was responsible for the Syrian nuclear project and negotiations with North Korea, was eliminated. Israel has not yet claimed responsibility for the above events.

sources

That on September 6, 2007, the Israeli Air Force bombed an object in Syria that could be a nuclear reactor under construction. The Israeli General Staff emphasizes that the air strike in 2007 eliminated a serious threat to the entire region and became a "signal for others." This statement by the Israeli military is now, of course, perceived as a direct warning to Iran, which continues to build up its military presence in the regions of Syria.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly warned that his state will not allow Iran to develop nuclear weapons, build any manufacturing facility in Syria that could threaten Israel, or transfer any advanced weapons to the pro-Iranian Shiite group Hezbollah operating in Lebanon. During the seven years of the war in Syria, Israel has launched more than 100 airstrikes on Syrian territory in pursuit of the stated goals.

On February 10 of this year, the Israeli Air Force, after a military drone of the Iranian army flew into Israeli territory from Syria, struck at Assad and Iranian facilities in Syria, destroying, for example, the famous Tiyas (T-4) airbase and the entire air defense system of the government army around Damascus . During this operation, Syrian air defense systems damaged an Israeli aircraft, which subsequently crashed on Israeli territory (the pilots ejected). After that, Israeli aircraft launched new strikes on Syrian military facilities.

“What we are telling the world now about the attack on a nuclear reactor in Syria in 2007 means that the State of Israel will not allow opportunities to be created that threaten the existence of the Jewish state,” IDF Lieutenant General Gadi Eizenko said on March 21. "That was our message in 2007, that's how it will be today, and that's how it will be our message in the near and far future."

On September 6, 2007, the Israeli Air Force bombed in Syria near the city of Deir ez-Zor, near the border with Iraq, an object that, presumably, was a nuclear reactor under construction. Immediately after that attack, representatives of the US intelligence community subjected the information that it was really a reactor to considerable criticism. According to them, the Israeli military in 2007 reacted too quickly to information that a mysterious cargo from the DPRK allegedly arrived in Syria, which could be parts of equipment for building a future reactor to create weapons-grade uranium and plutonium, that is, nuclear weapons.

Today, the IDF emphasizes that for several years after the start of the war in Syria, the entire area around Deir ez-Zor was under the control of militants of the Islamic State terrorist group, who could thus gain access to materials for the creation of weapons of mass destruction. Interestingly, in the same area near the Euphrates, on February 8 this year, aircraft of the US-led coalition operating against the Islamic State group attacked up to 500 pro-Assad armed groups, during which at least several dozen Russian mercenaries were killed. PMC Wagner".

Until now, only foreign analysts and journalists have written about the Israeli air raid in 2007; in Israel itself, this topic has not been commented on by any official. On March 21, all the Israeli media devoted their main materials to this event. The IDF press service clarified that the operation to destroy the reactor, which had a name that can be translated from Hebrew as "Going beyond", was being prepared for a long time and with preliminary complex reconnaissance training, which began back in 2004. Perhaps it was initiated after the flight to the West of the former general of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Ali Reza Asgari, who began to supply information to the American and then Israeli intelligence services.

It is likely that the construction of a nuclear facility near Deir ez-Zor began at the turn of 2001-2002. The Jerusalem Post, citing Israeli journalist Ronen Bergman, an expert in the analysis of covert operations of special services, wrote that in August 2007, 12 soldiers from the super-secret Israeli special forces Sayeret Matkal" who were tasked with collecting soil samples near the object. As a result, 100% evidence was allegedly obtained that Syria was building a nuclear reactor - which, as part of the Israeli operation to destroy it, received the code name "Box". On the night of September 6, 2007, it was destroyed by four Israeli Air Force F-16 fighter-bombers (although earlier various publications wrote about a different number of aircraft of other models involved). During the attack, according to unconfirmed reports, at least 10 North Korean engineers and workers were killed.

Despite the complete success, Israel had to classify the entire operation and its results due to the very high probability of starting a full-scale war with Syria at that time. However, Bashar al-Assad himself decided to hide the destruction of his object near Deir ez-Zor, limiting himself to a formal protest due to "the invasion of Israeli aircraft into his airspace." This protest was supported in the UN only by Russia, Iran and North Korea.

The Israeli air raid of 2007, which no one officially spoke about, was subjected to both deep analysis and skepticism around the world. Washington appealed to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with an urgent request to quickly investigate the fact that testifies to a possible clandestine program for the development of nuclear weapons by Damascus. Despite all the difficulties, in the end, IAEA experts discovered "particles of uranium of artificial, that is, anthropogenic, origin" at a bombed-out facility near Deir ez-Zor. Then, in 2008, the United States stated that, judging by the information collected, North Korea was helping a clandestine nuclear project in Syria, that if the reactor under construction worked at full capacity, it could produce weapons-grade plutonium enough per year to equip one or two nuclear warheads.

Various Western publications conducted their own investigations and found out that, apparently, at the destroyed plant in Syria, built with the participation of the DPRK, weapons-grade plutonium was supposed to be produced for Iran, which was already under the deepest suspicion of speeding up its own nuclear program - and under close attention of IAEA inspectors - and therefore could not engage in such production on its own territory.



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