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Detachments in the war. Was there a real need for them? Myth: detachments

Detachments in the war. Was there a real need for them? Myth: detachments

29.09.2019

Since the time of the Khrushchev “thaw”, a myth was born about the NKVD barrage detachments, which shot the retreating units of the Red Army from machine guns. After the collapse of the USSR, these nonsense flourished.

In addition, supporters of this lie also claim that most of the population of the USSR did not want to fight, they were forced to defend the Stalinist regime "under pain of death." By this they insult the memory of our valiant ancestors.

The concept of a detachment is rather vague - "a permanent or temporary military formation created to perform a combat or special task." It also fits the definition of "special forces".

During the Great Patriotic War, the composition, functions, departmental affiliation of barrage detachments were constantly changing. In early February 1941, the NKVD was divided into the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and the People's Commissariat for State Security (NKGB). Military counterintelligence was separated from the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and transferred to the People's Commissariat for Defense of the USSR Navy, where the Third Directorates of the NPO and the NKVMF of the USSR were created. On July 27, 1941, the Third Directorate of the NPO issued a directive on its work in wartime.

According to the directive, mobile control and barrage detachments were organized, they were supposed to detain deserters, suspicious elements at the front line. They received the right to a preliminary investigation, after which the detainees were handed over to the judicial authorities.

In July 1941, the NKVD and the NKGB were again united, the bodies of the Third Directorate of the NPO were transformed into special departments and came under the control of the NKVD. Special departments received the right to arrest deserters and, if necessary, execute them. Special departments were supposed to fight spies, traitors, deserters, saboteurs, alarmists, cowards. By order of the NKVD No. 00941 of July 19, 1941, separate rifle platoons were created at special departments of divisions and corps, and companies at special departments of the armies, battalions at the fronts, they were staffed by NKVD troops.

These units became the so-called "protective detachments." They had the right to organize a barrier service to prevent the escape of deserters, carefully check the documents of all military personnel, arrest deserters and conduct an investigation (within 12 hours) and refer the case to a military tribunal. To send stragglers to their units, in exceptional cases, for the immediate restoration of order at the front, the head of a special department received the right to execute deserters.

In addition, the barrage detachments were supposed to identify and destroy enemy agents, check those who had fled from German captivity.

Fight against bandits

Among the daily tasks of the barrage detachments was the fight against bandits. So, in June 1941, a detachment was formed at the third department of the Baltic Fleet - it was a maneuverable company on vehicles, reinforced by two armored cars. He acted on the territory of Estonia. Since there were almost no cases of desertion in the area of responsibility, a detachment with a group of operatives was sent to fight the Estonian Nazis. Their small gangs attacked individual servicemen, small units on the roads.

The actions of the detachment markedly reduced the activity of the Estonian bandits. The detachment also participated in the "cleansing" of the Virtsu Peninsula, liberated in mid-July 1941 by a counterattack of the 8th Army. On the way, the detachment met a German outpost, defeated it in battle. He carried out an operation to destroy the bandits in the m. Varla and the village. Tystamaa of the Pärnovsky district, destroyed the counter-revolutionary organization in Tallinn. In addition, the detachment participated in reconnaissance activities, throwing three agents behind enemy lines. Two returned, they found out the location of German military facilities, they were attacked by aircraft of the Baltic Fleet.

During the battle for Tallinn, the detachment not only stopped and returned the fugitives, but also held the defense itself. It was especially difficult on August 27, some units of the 8th Army fled, the detachment stopped them, a counterattack was organized, the enemy was thrown back - this played a decisive role in the successful evacuation of Tallinn. During the battles for Tallinn, more than 60% of the personnel of the detachment and almost all the commanders were killed! And these are cowardly bastards who shoot their own?

In Kronstadt, the detachment was restored, and from September 7 it continued to serve. Special departments of the Northern Front also fought the bandits.

Directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of September 5, 1941

That is, their difference from the detachments under the special departments of the NKVD, which were created to deal with deserters and suspicious elements, is that army detachments were created in order to prevent unauthorized flight of units. They were larger (a battalion per division, not a platoon), they were recruited not from NKVD fighters, but from Red Army soldiers. They had the right to shoot the initiators of panic and flight, and not to shoot those who were fleeing.

As of October 10, 1941, special departments and detachments detained 657,364 people, 25,878 of them were arrested, 10,201 of them were shot. The rest are sent back to the front.

In the defense of Moscow, barrage detachments also played a role. In parallel with the defensive divisional battalions, there were detachments of special departments. Similar units were created by the territorial bodies of the NKVD, for example, in the Kalinin region.

Battle of Stalingrad

In connection with the breakthrough of the front and the exit of the Wehrmacht to the Volga and the Caucasus, on July 28, 1942, the famous order No. 227 of the NPO was issued. According to it, it was prescribed to create 3-5 detachments in the armies (200 fighters each), put them in the immediate rear of unstable units. They also received the right to shoot alarmists and cowards in order to restore order and discipline. They were subordinate to the War Councils of the armies, through their special departments. The most experienced commanders of special departments were placed at the head of the detachments, and the detachments were provided with transport. In addition, the barrage battalions were restored in each division.

By order of the People's Commissariat of Defense No. 227, 193 army detachments were created on October 15, 1942. From August 1 to October 15, 1942, these detachments detained 140,755 Red Army soldiers. 3980 people were arrested, 1189 of them were shot, the rest were sent to the penal unit. Most arrests and detentions were on the Don and Stalingrad fronts.

The barrage detachments played an important role in restoring order, returning a significant number of servicemen to the front. For example: on August 29, 1942, the headquarters of the 29th Infantry Division was surrounded (due to the breakthrough of German tanks), the units, having lost control, retreated in a panic. The barrage detachment of Lieutenant GB Filatov stopped the fugitives and returned them to defensive positions. On another sector of the division's front, Filatov's detachment stopped the enemy's breakthrough.

On September 20, the Wehrmacht occupied part of Melikhovskaya, the consolidated brigade began an unauthorized retreat. The barrage detachment of the 47th Army of the Black Sea Group of Forces brought order to the brigade. The brigade returned to its position and, together with the detachment, drove the enemy back.

That is, detachments in critical situations did not panic, but put things in order and fought the enemy themselves. On September 13, the 112th Rifle Division lost its positions under enemy attack. The detachment of the 62nd Army under the command of lieutenant of state security Khlystov repelled enemy attacks for four days and held the line until reinforcements arrived. On September 15-16, the detachment of the 62nd Army fought for two days in the area of the Stalingrad railway station. The detachment, despite its small number, repulsed the enemy attacks and itself counterattacked and surrendered the line intact to units of the approaching 10th Infantry Division.

But there was also the use of detachments for other purposes, there were commanders who used them as linear units, because of this, some detachments lost most of their compositions and they had to be re-formed.

During the Battle of Stalingrad, there were three types of detachments: army, created by order No. 227, restored divisional barrier battalions and small detachments of special departments. As before, the vast majority of the detained fighters returned to their units.

Kursk Bulge

By decree of the Council of People's Commissars of April 19, 1943, the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD was again transferred to the NPO and the NKVMF and reorganized into the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "Smersh" ("Death to Spies") of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR and the Directorate of Counterintelligence "Smersh" of the People's Commissariat of the Navy.

On July 5, 1943, the Wehrmacht began its offensive, some of our units faltered. The detachments fulfilled their mission here as well. From July 5 to July 10, detachments of the Voronezh Front detained 1870 people, 74 people were arrested, the rest were returned to their units.

In total, the report of the head of the counterintelligence department of the Central Front, Major General A. Vadis, dated August 13, 1943, indicates that 4,501 people were detained, of which 3,303 people were sent back to units.

On October 29, 1944, by order of the People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Stalin, the detachments were disbanded due to a change in the situation at the front. The personnel replenished the rifle divisions. In the last period of their existence, they no longer acted according to their profile - there was no need. They were used in the protection of headquarters, communication lines, roads, for combing the forest, the personnel were often used for rear needs - cooks, storekeepers, clerks, and so on, although the personnel of these units were selected from the best soldiers and sergeants awarded medals and orders, with extensive combat experience.

Outcome

The detachments performed the most important function, they detained deserters, suspicious persons (among whom there were spies, saboteurs, agents of the Nazis). In critical situations, they themselves engaged in battle with the enemy. After the situation at the front changed (after the Battle of Kursk), the barrage detachments actually began to perform the functions of commandant companies. To stop the fugitives, they had the right to shoot over the heads of the retreating, to shoot the initiators and wind up in front of the formation. But these cases were not mass, only individual. There is not a single fact that the fighters of the barrage detachments fired at their own to kill. There are no such examples in the memoirs of veterans. In addition, they could prepare an additional defensive line in the rear to stop the retreating and so that they could gain a foothold on it.

The guard detachments contributed to the overall Victory by honestly fulfilling their duty.
________________________________
Lubyanka in the days of the battle for Moscow: materials of the state security agencies of the USSR from the Central archive of the FSB of Russia. Comp. A. T. Zhadobin. M., 2002.
"Arc of Fire": Battle of Kursk through the eyes of the Lubyanka. Comp. A. T. Zhadobin et al. M., 2003.
State Security Organs of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. M., 2000.
Toptygin A.V. Unknown Beria. M., St. Petersburg, 2002.

When talking about detachments of a given time, there is constantly confusion in terminology. The fact is that in different periods completely different structures were called this term. Before the war, this term was used in relation to individual units that were part of the Directorates of the NKVD troops. And it was used mainly in the border troops. "Historians" like Suvorov play on this consonance, declaring that "... in 1939 the NKVD barrage service was created ... in July 1939 barrage detachments were secretly revived." . “Losing” attention that in this context we are talking simply about the border service.

After the outbreak of hostilities, they began to call the rear guard units of the Army in action. Very often, although not necessarily, such units were created from outgoing border detachments. Here is an example of how this happened: “The border detachments - the 92nd, 93rd, 94th - after withdrawing from the border in July 1941, reached the line Zhytomyr - Kazatin - Mikhailovsky Farm and were united into one consolidated barrage detachment. ... The consolidated detachment, as it concentrated, advanced: to guard the rear of the 5th Army - the 92nd border detachment and the 16th motorized rifle regiment of the NKVD and to guard the rear of the 26th Army - the 94th border detachment and the 6th motorized rifle regiment of the NKVD. Thus, in the Kazatin-Fastov sector, the above units were put forward to carry out barrage service. The 93rd border detachment, which I continued to command at the same time, remained in Skvir and constituted the reserve of the commander of the consolidated detachment. The rear guard units were doing exactly the same thing that the military police are doing in any army in the world.

The tasks of the detachments included checking on roads, railway junctions, in forests, detaining deserters, detaining all suspicious elements that had penetrated the front line, etc. Most of the detainees were sent back to the front. But not all, some were transferred to the disposal of the Special Departments or sent to the tribunal.

"Owls. Secret
Nar. Commissar of the USSR VD.
General Commissioner of State Security
comrade Beria.
REFERENCE:

From the beginning of the war to October 10 of this year. Special departments of the NKVD and Z.O. The troops of the NKVD for the protection of the rear detained 657,364 servicemen who had fallen behind their units and fled from the front.
Of these, the operational barriers of the Special Departments detained 249,969 people and Z.O. troops of the NKVD for the protection of the rear - 407.395 military personnel.
Of the detainees, 25,878 people were arrested by the Special Departments, the remaining 632,486 people were formed into units and again sent to the front.
Among those arrested by special departments:
Spies - 1.505
Saboteurs - 308
Traitors - 2.621
Cowards and alarmists - 2.643
Deserters - 8.772
Spreaders of provocative rumors - 3.987
Crossbowmen - 1.671
Others - 4.371
Total - 25.878
According to the decisions of the Special Departments and the verdicts of the Military Tribunals, 10,201 people were shot, of which 3,321 people were shot in front of the line.
Deputy Beginning Directorate of the NGO NKVD of the USSR Commissioner of the state. security rank 3 S. Milstein (October 1941) "

But these detachments were engaged not only in the protection of the rear. “The fact that at the same time the NKVD soldiers did not hide behind other people's backs is evidenced by the losses incurred by the detachment during the battles for Tallinn - over 60% of the personnel, including almost all commanders”

Some confusion in the description of events is introduced by the fact that at the same time, completely different structures were sometimes called detachments, for example, a dedicated strike detachment that acted as a reserve. "Major General Panfilov ... create and keep in hand a strong reserve, a barrage detachment, in order to throw it into a dangerous area at any moment."

From the autumn of 1941, army detachments began to be created. Gradually, the initiative of individual commanders. Unlike the NKVD detachments, focused on detaining deserters and protecting the rear, the army detachments were tasked with serving as a barrier directly behind the combat formations of the units, preventing panic and mass exodus of military personnel from the battlefield. These detachments were not formed from the NKVD soldiers, but were ordinary Red Army soldiers and were much larger (up to a battalion). From September 12, this measure is legalized by the high command and applies to all fronts:

Directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 001919 to the commanders of the troops of the fronts, armies, division commanders, the commander-in-chief of the troops of the South-Western direction on the creation of barrage detachments in rifle divisions on September 12, 1941

“The experience of fighting German fascism has shown that in our rifle divisions there are quite a few panicked and directly hostile elements who, at the first pressure from the enemy, drop their weapons and start shouting: “We are surrounded!” and drag the rest of the fighters with them. As a result of such actions of these elements, the division takes to flight, abandons its materiel, and then, alone, begins to leave the forest. Similar phenomena take place on all fronts. If the commanders and commissars of such divisions were at the height of their task, alarmist and hostile elements could not gain the upper hand in the division. But the trouble is that we do not have so many firm and stable commanders and commissars.

In order to prevent the above undesirable phenomena at the front, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders:

1. In each rifle division, have a barrage detachment of reliable fighters, no more than a battalion in number (calculated as 1 company per rifle regiment), subordinate to the division commander and having at its disposal, in addition to conventional weapons, vehicles in the form of trucks and several tanks or armored vehicles.

2. The tasks of the barrage detachment are to be considered direct assistance to the command staff in maintaining and establishing firm discipline in the division, stopping the flight of panic-stricken military personnel without stopping before using weapons, eliminating the initiators of panic and flight, supporting honest and combat elements of the division, not subject to panic, but carried away by the general flight.

3. To oblige employees of special departments and political staff of divisions to provide all possible assistance to division commanders and barrage detachments in strengthening the order and discipline of the division.

4. To complete the creation of barrage detachments within five days from the date of receipt of this order.

5. Report on receipt and execution by the commander of the troops of the fronts and armies.

Headquarters of the Supreme High Command
I.Stalin
B. Shaposhnikov

As the situation improves, by the end of 1941, the need for army detachments disappears and they are disbanded. The detachments of the NKVD remain and continue to guard the rear.

A new stage in the history of detachments began with Order No. 227 of July 28, 1942. It was these newly created detachments that remained in the memory; modern myth-makers refer to them. So how did these detachments prove themselves, what did they do? The following documents provide the answer. Memorandum 00 of the NKVD DF to the UOO NKVD of the USSR "On the work of special agencies to combat cowards and alarmists in parts of the Don Front for the period from October 1, 1942 to February 1, 1943" dated February 17, 1943

“In total, for the period from October 1, 1942 to February 1, 1943, according to incomplete data, cowards and alarmists who fled from the battlefield were arrested by the special agencies of the front - 203 people, of which:
a) sentenced to VMN and shot before formation - 49 hours.
b) sentenced to various terms of labor camp and sent to penal companies and battalions 139 h.”

This is the general picture. Let us single out from it the following examples of the activities of detachments.

“October 2, 1942, during the offensive of our troops, separate parts of the 138th division of the division, met by powerful artillery and mortar fire of the enemy, faltered and fled back in a panic through the battle formations of the 1st battalion of the 706th joint venture, 204th SD, which were in the second echelon.

By the measures taken by the command and detachment battalion of the division, the situation was restored. 7 cowards and alarmists were shot in front of the ranks, and the rest were returned to the front line.

On October 16, 1942, during an enemy counterattack, a group of 30 Red Army soldiers of 781 and 124 divisions showed cowardice and began to flee the battlefield in a panic, dragging other servicemen with them.

The army detachment of the 21st Army, which was located in this sector, eliminated the panic by force of arms and restored the previous situation.

On November 19, 1942, during the offensive of units of the 293 division division, during an enemy counterattack, two mortar platoons of the 1306 joint venture, together with platoon commanders - ml. lieutenants Bogatyrev and Egorov - without an order from the command they left the occupied line and in a panic, throwing their weapons, began to flee from the battlefield.

The platoon of submachine gunners of the army detachment, which was located on this site, stopped the fleeing and, having shot two alarmists in front of the formation, returned the rest to their previous lines, after which they successfully moved forward.

November 20, 1942, but at the time of the enemy's counterattack, one of the companies of the 38th division division, which was at a height, without resisting the enemy, without an order from the command, began to randomly retreat from the occupied sector.

The 83rd detachment of the 64th army, serving as a barrier directly behind the battle formations of the 38th SD units, stopped the fleeing company in a panic and returned it back to the previously occupied section of the height, after which the personnel of the company showed exceptional endurance and perseverance in battles with the enemy.

Cruel? Harsh? May be. But do not forget that at that time any commander could, in order to prevent retreat and panic, shoot an alarmist on the spot. And this was normal for the functioning of any army in the world. War is beautiful only in action movies. But this is not the main thing. Something else is interesting - so where are the pictures of mass executions from machine guns of retreating units, or even simply units that did not complete their combat mission? But this is the picture that some publicists are trying to paint. There is no this.

“As for the barrage detachments, about which, due to the lack of reliable information, there were (as well as about penal units) a lot of all sorts of conjectures and tales (the troops were driven on the offensive at gunpoint, the retreating units were shot, etc.), then no one researchers have not yet been able to find in the archives a single fact that would confirm that the barrage detachments fired at their troops. Such cases are not cited in the memoirs of front-line soldiers either.

It is probably worth noting the inconsistency of the assertion that the soldiers were "driven by detachments into the attack." Yes, individual commanders used to make similar proposals. But the command did not meet such understanding.

“Memorandum of the NGO NKVD DF to the UOO NKVD of the USSR on the offensive operations of the 66th Army” October 30, 1942 “Front commander Rokossovsky, under the impression that the cause of failure was the bad actions of infantrymen, tried to use detachments to influence the infantry. Rokossovsky insisted that the detachments follow the infantry units and force the fighters to rise to the attack by force of arms.

However, the opinion of the command of the front and the army that the reason for the failures is the unpreparedness of the fighters of the infantry units does not have solid grounds.

They performed detachments and other functions. Very often they simply plugged all the holes at the front, as the last line of defense. "Reference 00 NKVD STF to the UOO NKVD of the USSR on the activities of the barrage detachments of the Stalingrad and Don fronts" Not earlier than October 15, 1942

“At critical moments, when support was needed to hold the occupied lines, the barrage detachments entered directly into battle with the enemy, successfully held back his onslaught and inflicted losses on him.

On September 13 of this year, the 112th division, under pressure from the enemy, withdrew from the occupied line. The detachment of the 62nd army, led by the head of the detachment (state security lieutenant Khlystov), took up defensive positions on the outskirts of an important height. For 4 days, the fighters and commanders of the detachment repelled the attacks of enemy submachine gunners and inflicted heavy losses on them. The detachment held the line until the approach of military units.

September 15-16 this year The detachment of the 62nd Army successfully fought for 2 days against superior enemy forces in the area of the railway. railway station in Stalingrad. Despite its small number, the detachment not only repulsed enemy attacks, but also attacked him, causing him significant losses in manpower. The detachment left its line only when units of the 10th page of the division came to replace it.
…
September 19 this year the command of the 240th division of the Voronezh Front of one of the companies of the detachment of the 38th Army gave a combat mission to clear the grove from a group of German machine gunners. In the battles for the grove, this company lost 31 people, of which 18 people were killed.

The barrage detachment of the 29th Army of the Western Front, being operationally subordinate to the commander of the 246th division division, was used as a combat unit. Taking part in one of the attacks, a detachment of 118 personnel lost 109 people killed and wounded, in connection with which it was re-formed.

According to the 6th Army of the Voronezh Front, according to the order of the Military Council of the Army, 2 barrage detachments on September 4 of this year. 174 divisions were attached and brought into battle. As a result, the detachments lost up to 70% of their personnel in battle, the remaining fighters of these detachments were transferred to the named division and thus disbanded. 3rd detachment of the same army on September 10 of this year. was placed on the defensive.

In the 1st Guards Army of the Don Front, on the orders of the army commander Chistyakov and a member of the Military Council Abramov, 2 barrage detachments were repeatedly sent into battle, like ordinary units. As a result, the detachments lost more than 65% of their personnel and were subsequently disbanded.

This practice existed, despite reproaches that “blocking detachments were used incorrectly by individual commanders of formations; a significant number of detachments were sent into battle on a par with line units, which suffered losses, as a result of which they were assigned for reorganization, and the barrier service was not carried out. This practice continued throughout the critical period in 1942-43. These detachments were also distracted from the task of blocking later, but not in such active forms.

It can be seen from Gorbatov's memoirs that detachments were often used to occupy inactive sectors of the front in order to remove units from there to strengthen the offensive grouping.

“- And who at this time will hold the defense on the seventy-kilometer front? - asked the commander.

A fortified area and two armored trains will be left against the enemy bridgehead, and to the north of the village of Shapchintsy I will place a reserve army regiment, a detachment, barriers and chemical troops ... "," ... by noon I was finally convinced how aimlessly to keep the 40th rifle corps of the three-divisional composition and even with a powerful reinforcement for the defense of the northern direction between the rivers Dnieper and Drut. ... I had to do this: today withdraw from the defense and concentrate the 129th rifle division near the village of Litovichi, replacing it with detachments; Tomorrow withdraw the 169th Rifle Division from the defense, together with the command of the 40th Corps, replacing it with a reserve regiment.

Gradually, the need for detachments disappeared. And in accordance with the order of the NPO of the USSR No. 0349 of October 29, 1944, they are disbanded by November 20, 1944.

The total number of detachments changed at different times. “In accordance with the order of NPO No. 227, in units operating in the Red Army, as of October 15, 193 barrage detachments were formed. Of these, 16 and Donskoy - 25 were formed in parts of the Stalingrad Front. Since then, their numbers have only declined.

It is worth considering that the term "protective detachment" referred to various units, including those that were allocated to the tactical reserve, created to fight enemy tanks, defend sections of the front line where a breakthrough was possible, etc. The name was created in the border troops to strengthen the protection of the border. But the article will not be about them, but about special detachments designed to prevent panic, the flight of fighters from the front line, identify deserters and saboteurs, and restore order in the nearest military rear.

Detachments began to be created in the troops already in the first days of the war on the initiative of commanders in the field. Then the NKVD had nothing to do with them. The army commanders united the border guards retreating with the troops into special detachments that performed the functions of barrage. Most of these detachments were formed from experienced soldiers and officers of ordinary combat units. Naturally, they were not tasked with shooting the retreating, but were required to take all measures to return them to battle formations, to identify deserters, saboteurs, etc.

Already at the end of June 1941, a special directive of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR was issued, according to which it was envisaged "to organize mobile control and barrage detachments on roads, railway junctions, to clear forests, etc., allocated by the command with the inclusion of operational workers in their composition bodies of the Third Directorate with the following tasks:
a) detention of deserters;
b) detaining the entire suspicious element that has penetrated the front line;
c) a preliminary investigation carried out by operatives of the bodies of the Third Directorate of the NPO (1-2 days) with the subsequent transfer of the material along with the detainees under jurisdiction.

The NKVD began to form its own detachments only on July 19, creating special rifle platoons with special divisions and corps departments, companies with special army departments, and battalions with special front departments. Already 10 days later, in the directive of the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR, it was noted that “one of the serious means of identifying German intelligence agents sent to us is organized barrage detachments, which must carefully check all military personnel, without exception, in an unorganized way from the front to the front line, as well as military personnel, groups or alone falling into other parts.
However, the available materials show that the work of the barrage detachments is still insufficiently organized, the checks of detainees are carried out superficially, often not by the operational staff, but by military personnel.”

It can be seen from these documents that it was necessary to create detachments and determine the order of their actions literally in an emergency mode, since they did not prepare in advance for the development of the situation on the fronts, when the retreat would become massive, and often unorganized.

The situation turned out to be so complicated that in early September the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command had to join in its decision. The directive that she sent to the troops noted: “Experience in the fight against German fascism has shown that in our rifle divisions there are quite a few panicked and directly hostile elements who, at the first pressure from the enemy, drop their weapons and start shouting:“ We are surrounded! ' and drag the rest of the fighters with them. As a result of such actions of these elements, the division takes to flight, abandons its materiel, and then, alone, begins to leave the forest. Similar phenomena take place on all fronts.

By decision of the Headquarters, detachments of reliable fighters, up to a battalion in number, were created in divisions. Their tasks are "to consider direct assistance to the command staff in maintaining and establishing firm discipline in the division, stopping the flight of panic-stricken military personnel, without stopping before using weapons, eliminating the initiators of panic and flight, supporting honest and combat elements of the division, not subject to panic, but carried away by the general flight" .

By the way, the procedure for the use of weapons was repeatedly explained in special documents. It was never required to use it against all those who fled from the front line. Thus, the order of the NKVD explained that “in particularly exceptional cases, when the situation requires decisive measures to be taken to immediately restore order at the front, the head of the special department is given the right to execute deserters on the spot. On each such case, the head of the special department informs the special department of the army and the front.

As a rule, shots in the air, and if necessary, shooting on the spot of one or two organizers of the panic turned out to be enough to stop those fleeing from the front line, send them back to their positions or form them into groups for transfer to combat units. According to the memoirs of front-line soldiers, the detachments almost instantly stopped the panic, after which most of the fighters returned to the front line and subsequently fought steadfastly.

From the army detachments, units were usually singled out in size from a platoon under the command of an officer, which were located behind the positions of the second echelon of the units (0.5-2 km from the front line). The detachments of the NKVD operated, as a rule, in the rear of the units, allocating small groups of military personnel to pickets, patrols, ambushes, document checkpoints, etc.

By the end of 1941, when cases of mass panic among the troops became rare, retreats in most cases were carried out in an organized manner and on orders, offensive operations began in a number of areas, a significant part of the army detachments were disbanded, and the NKVD detachments began to operate in the front line, focusing on identifying deserters, spies and saboteurs.

It was necessary to return to the mass formation of detachments in the army in the summer of 1942, when a catastrophic situation developed in the Stalingrad direction. In the then issued order No. 227 “Not a step back!” it was envisaged “to form within the army 3-5 well-armed barrage detachments (200 people each), place them in the immediate rear of unstable divisions and oblige them, in case of panic and disorderly withdrawal of parts of the division, to shoot alarmists and cowards on the spot and thereby help honest fighters divisions to fulfill their duty to the Motherland.

At that time, 193 barrage detachments were created on all fronts. The fact that they acted very effectively is evidenced by the certificate of the Special Department of the NKVD on the activities of the barrage detachments of the Stalingrad and Don fronts: “From August 1 to October 1, 1942, detachments detained 140,755 servicemen who had fled from the front line. Of the detainees:
- 3,980 people were arrested;
- 1,189 people were shot;
- 2,776 people were sent to penal companies;
- 185 people were sent to penal battalions;
- 131,094 people were returned to their units and to transit points.

As you can see, almost all the detainees were returned to the front line, less than one percent was shot. In the summer and autumn of 1941, executions were used a little more often. As of October 1, 1941, the NKVD detachments detained 657,364 servicemen who had fallen behind their units and fled from the front, of which “according to the decisions of special departments and the verdicts of military tribunals, 10,201 people were shot”, which is slightly more than 1.5 percent. Archival documents, and almost all cases of the use of weapons were documented, confirm that the allegations of mass executions of retreating fighters by detachments are nothing more than fiction. By the way, often the detachments themselves had to engage in battle with the Nazis and even fight in the environment.

In some publications, you can find information that the detachments almost without fail stood behind the positions of the penalty box and even drove them on the offensive with weapons. Front-line soldiers do not confirm this. The writer Vladimir Karpov, who fought in a penal company, reacted to such a statement in the following way: “We were indeed sent to the most difficult areas. But we did not have any detachments, as shown in the film (meaning the series "Penal Battalion"). I think if such a detachment appeared behind us, we would immediately shoot him to hell.

Since 1943, when a decisive offensive began after, the number of detachments in the army began to decrease, in 1944 the need for them disappeared completely, and by the end of the year they were disbanded.

War is always ruthless and bloody. During the fighting, it often becomes necessary to take tough and even cruel measures against their own military personnel who are prone to panic or trying to desert, and the actions of barrage detachments are an example of this. Similar units, both full-time and temporarily created, were also in the armies of other countries, including fascist Germany.

The guard detachments of the Red Army have become one of the darkest symbols of the Great Patriotic War. Songs in the spirit of "In the 43rd this company was shot by a detachment", films depicting bloody Chekists chasing soldiers into the attack, and similar cultural artifacts will easily be remembered by many fellow citizens. Meanwhile, the real history of detachments is much more dramatic ...

The first detachments were created not by the sinister People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, but by army rear services in the summer of 1941 in Belarus. Then the Soviet troops defeated near the border rolled back east from Minsk.
Confused soldiers and officers walked along the roads, often deprived of leadership and lost their weapons. It was in order to collect them and restore control that the first detachments were created. Combat groups were assembled from randomly retreating soldiers and commanders and sent to the front.
The experience of the first detachments was considered successful. In July 1941, such detachments began to be assembled centrally. The defeated army of the Red Army was haunted by the troubles that befell the vanquished at all times: panic, psychological breakdown and disorganization. The detention of deserters, the collection of scattered units is a dirty job, but it certainly had to be done.

Indicative, for example, is a report on the work of the detachment of the 310th Infantry Division in the fall of 1941 near Leningrad:
“The barrage detachment of the 310th Infantry Division during this period detained 740 soldiers and junior commanders who left the battlefield and went to the rear: 14 of them were sent to special departments of the divisions, the rest were returned to their units in an organized manner ... The barrage detachments are replenished with random people. 310 sd. Soldiers detained in the rear of the division by the same detachment were sent to replenish the detachment.
More than 600 thousand people passed through the detachments during 1941, and it is easy to guess that they were not usually shot. Of the soldiers detained by the detachments, more than 96% simply went back to their units. The rest were sent under arrest, put on trial, and about a third of them actually went under execution.
However, one should not think that the dead were sentenced to severe punishments just like that. Desertion flourished, and those who fled from the front line easily turned into robbers. The documents describe, for example, an incident that occurred in the rear of the Leningrad Front already during the blockade.
An armed deserter was captured during an attack on a grocery store. During the arrest, he actively shot back. On the Volkhov front in February 1942, they caught a deserter who left with an entrusted car and rifle. In the forest, he arranged a dugout for himself and hunted by stealing livestock, and during the arrest he killed a man.

The image of an NKVD worker chasing soldiers into an attack with a pistol is vivid, but factually incorrect. This stereotype is not devoid of real grounds: often the core of the detachment was made up of surviving, but left without work, border guards. The border troops belonged specifically to the troops of the NKVD, and so the stereotype about security officers with revolvers was born.
In reality, detachments were most often subordinated not to the NKVD, but to the army command. The People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs had its own detachments that guarded communications, but never reached - neither in numbers nor in importance - the level of the army.
It should be noted that this measure is by no means unique to the Soviet Union. Back in 1915, during the Great Retreat of the Russian army in the First World War, the order of General Brusilov saw the light, which read:
"... Behind you need to have especially reliable people and machine guns, so that, if necessary, to force the weak-hearted to go forward." An order of a similar nature was published in his army by the general of the old army Danilov: "The duty of every soldier loyal to Russia, who notices an attempt to fraternize, immediately shoot at the traitors."

In the summer of 1942, the country came close to a total military disaster. One of the measures to restore order in the military rear was the withdrawal of detachments to a new level of organization. This is how the famous Order No. 227 appeared, commonly known as "Not a step back."
The detachments, as we see, already existed and were operating, and the notorious order streamlined and widely disseminated the already established practice. Their functions remained the same: catching deserters, returning to the front line those leaving for the rear, and stopping uncontrolled retreats.
Has it ever happened that detachments opened fire on their own? Yes, in documents and memoirs, several cases were recorded when the flight of units from the battlefield was forbidden by fire, and someone really fell under this fire.
Hero of the Soviet Union, General Pyotr Lashchenko, already in the 80s, tried to clarify the issue of firing detachments at his troops. As a result, no such cases were expected to be found, although the meticulous military leader requested documents from the then closed archives.

Much more often, a detachment could be found on the front line.
Despite their formally privileged status, during the campaigns of 1941 and 1942, detachments often had to engage in battle. By itself, the structure of the detachments - mobile, well-equipped with automatic weapons and vehicles - provoked the use as a mobile reserve. For example, the commander of the legendary 316th division, Panfilov, used his detachment of 150 people precisely as his own reserve.
In general, in practice, formation commanders often considered the detachment as an extra opportunity to reinforce units on the front line. This was seen as an undesirable but necessary practice in the absence of reserves.
For example, it was the detachment of the 62nd Army in Stalingrad that fought for the station for two days at the critical moment of the first assault on the city on September 15–16. During the fighting north of Stalingrad, two detachments had to be disbanded altogether due to losses that reached 60-70% of the composition.

In the second half of the war, detachments lost their former importance. It was less and less necessary to restore the rear of the defeated units. In addition, the activities of the detachments were duplicated by other formations, such as rear guard units.
In 1944, the activities of detachments lost their meaning. Their tasks were duplicated by other formations - including the troops for the protection of the rear, belonging just to the NKVD, commandant units. In the summer of 1944, the head of the Political Directorate of the 3rd Baltic Front, spreading his arms, reported to the command:
“The detachments do not fulfill their direct functions established by the order of the people's commissar of defense. Most of the personnel of the detachments are used to protect the headquarters of the armies, the protection of communication lines, roads, combing forests, etc.
In a number of detachments, the headquarters staffs were extremely swollen. Army headquarters do not exercise control over the activities of the detachments, left them to themselves, reduced the role of detachments to the position of ordinary commandant companies. Meanwhile, the personnel of the detachments were selected from the best, proven fighters and sergeants, participants in many battles, awarded orders and medals of the Soviet Union.

The only really useful function of the detachments at this stage was to clear the rear of the remnants of the German encirclement, to capture the former policemen and officials of the occupation administration who were trying to legalize or hide.
Of course, this situation did not suit the high command. Thousands of experienced well-armed fighters would look much more appropriate on the front line. On October 29, 1944, the detachments of the Red Army were disbanded.
But the activity of the German field gendarmerie sharply increased. In the spring of 1945, in Germany, one could see hanged people with signs on their chests: “I hang here because I did not believe the Fuhrer” or “All traitors die like me.”
The most important terrible secret of the barrage detachments was that there was no terrible secret. The detachments are nothing more than the well-known military police, their functions throughout the war were just that.
Ultimately, the soldiers of the barrage detachments are ordinary soldiers of the most terrible war in the world, performing their combat missions. It is pointless to idealize them, but the demonization of these formations, all the more, does not bring any benefit and, in the end, only leads us away from the real idea of the Great Patriotic War.

Story creation of defensive detachments

The concept of a detachment is rather vague - "a permanent or temporary military formation created to perform a combat or special task." It also fits the definition of "special forces".

In July 1941, the NKVD and the NKGB were again united, the organs of the Third management NPOs were transformed into special departments and passed under the control of the NKVD. Special departments received the right to arrest deserters and, if necessary, execute them. Special departments were supposed to fight spies, traitors, deserters, saboteurs, alarmists, cowards. By order of the NKVD No. 00941 of July 19, 1941, separate rifle platoons were created at special departments of divisions and corps, and at special departments of armies - companies, at fronts - battalions, they were staffed by NKVD troops.

In addition, the barrage detachments were supposed to identify and destroy enemy agents, check those who had fled from German captivity.

Fight against bandits

Among the daily tasks of the barrage detachments was the fight against bandits. So, in June 1941, a detachment detachment was formed at the third department of the Baltic Fleet - it was a maneuverable company on vehicles, reinforced by two armored cars. He acted on the territory of Estonia. Since there were almost no cases of desertion in the area of responsibility, a detachment with a group of operatives was sent to fight the Estonian Nazis. Their small gangs attacked individual servicemen, small units on the roads.

In Kronstadt, the detachment was restored, and from September 7 it continued to serve. Special departments of the Northern Front also fought the bandits.

By the beginning of September 1941, the military situation again deteriorated sharply, so the Headquarters, at the request of the commander of the Bryansk Front, General A. I. Eremenko, allowed the creation of detachments in those divisions that had proven themselves to be unstable. A week later, this practice was extended to all fronts. The number of detachments was one battalion per division, one company per regiment. They were subordinate to the division commander and had vehicles for movement, several armored cars and tanks. Their task was to assist the commanders, maintain discipline and order in the units. They had the right to use weapons to stop the flight and eliminate the initiators of the panic.
That is, their difference from the detachments under the special departments of the NKVD, which were created to deal with deserters and suspicious elements, is that army detachments were created in order to prevent unauthorized flight of units. They were larger (a battalion per division, not a platoon), they were recruited not from NKVD fighters, but from Red Army soldiers. They had the right to shoot the initiators of panic and flight, and not to shoot those who were fleeing.

As of October 10, 1941, special departments and detachments detained 657,364 people, 25,878 of them were arrested, 10,201 of them were shot. The rest are sent back to the front.

Battle of Stalingrad

IN connections with the breakthrough of the front and the exit of the Wehrmacht to the Volga and the Caucasus, on July 28, 1942, the famous order No. 227 of the NPO was issued. According to it, it was prescribed to create 3-5 detachments in the armies (200 fighters each), put them in the immediate rear of unstable units. They also received the right to shoot alarmists and cowards in order to restore order and discipline. They were subordinate to the War Councils of the armies, through their special departments. The most experienced commanders of special departments were placed at the head of the detachments, and the detachments were provided with transport. In addition, the barrage battalions were restored in each division.

The barrage detachments played an important role in restoring order, returning a significant number of servicemen to the front. For example: on August 29, 1942, the headquarters of the 29th Infantry Division was surrounded (due to the breakthrough of German tanks), units, having lost control retreated in panic. The barrage detachment of Lieutenant GB Filatov stopped the fugitives and returned them to defensive positions. On another sector of the division's front, Filatov's detachment stopped the enemy's breakthrough.

Kursk Bulge

According to the decision of the Council of People's Commissars of April 19, 1943 Control special departments of the NKVD were again transferred to the NPO and the NKVMF and reorganized into the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "Smersh" ("Death to Spies") of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR and the Directorate of Counterintelligence "Smersh" of the People's Commissariat of the Navy.

On October 29, 1944, by order of the People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Stalin, the detachments were disbanded due to a change in the situation at the front. The personnel replenished the rifle divisions. In the last period of their existence, they no longer acted according to their profile - there was no need. They were used in the protection of headquarters, communication lines, roads, for combing the forest, the personnel were often used for rear needs - cooks, storekeepers, clerks, and so on, although the personnel of these detachments were selected from the best soldiers and sergeants awarded medals and orders, with extensive combat experience.

Let's summarize: detachments performed the most important function, they detained deserters, suspicious persons (among whom there were spies, saboteurs, agents of the Nazis). In critical situations, they themselves engaged in battle with the enemy. After the situation at the front changed (after the Battle of Kursk), the barrage detachments actually began to perform the functions of commandant companies. To stop the fugitives, they had the right to shoot over the heads of the retreating, to shoot the initiators and wind up in front of the formation. But these cases were not mass, only individual. There is not a single fact that the fighters of the barrage detachments fired at their own to kill. There are no such examples in the memoirs of veterans. In addition, they could prepare an additional defensive line in the rear to stop the retreating and so that they could gain a foothold on it.

The guard detachments contributed to the overall Victory by honestly fulfilling their duty.

Sources:
Lubyanka in the days of the battle for Moscow: materials of the state security agencies of the USSR from the Central archive of the FSB of Russia. Comp. A. T. Zhadobin. M., 2002.
"Arc of Fire": Battle of Kursk through the eyes of the Lubyanka. Comp. A. T. Zhadobin et al. M., 2003.
State Security Organs of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. M., 2000.
Toptygin A.V. Unknown Beria. M., St. Petersburg, 2002.

In the liberal media, they scream about the terrible and insidious detachments in the Red Army, which shot retreating soldiers from machine guns. This situation is depicted in some films about the war. In fact, these are nothing more than myths created to discredit the Stalinist period in Russian history. In this analytical article you will find figures and facts from state archives, video chronicles of those years, as well as the memories of the participants in past battles in the Second World War on the topic of the actions of barrage detachments in relation to their own army.

The famous NPO order No. 227 of July 27, 1942, which immediately became known among the soldiers as "Not a Step Back", among other very tough measures to strengthen order and discipline at the front, also prescribed the creation of the so-called. defensive squads. In this order, Stalin demanded:

B) to form within the army 3-5 well-armed barrage detachments (up to 200 people each), place them in the immediate rear of unstable divisions and oblige them, in case of panic and disorderly withdrawal of parts of the division, to shoot alarmists and cowards on the spot and thereby help honest fighters divisions to fulfill their duty to the Motherland; ...

And as soon as information about these detachments went into the shadows. Nothing was written about them in the press either during the war years or in the post-war years. Even at the time of the "exposure of Stalin's personality cult," they tried to bypass the topic of barrage detachments. Information about them was either simply hushed up, or they were deafly blamed on the Stalinist regime. And again, without any details.

After the fall of the communist regime in our country, a lot of speculation appeared in the democratic press on the subject of barrage detachments. Taking advantage of the fact that people do not have any information on this issue, a number of pseudo-historians, who especially prefer to receive a fee in dollars from various foreign "democracy support funds", began to prove that the people did not want to fight for the Stalinist regime, that the Red Army soldiers were driven into battle exclusively by commissars and machine guns of the detachments. That hundreds of thousands of ruined lives are on the conscience of the detachments, that, instead of fighting at the front themselves, the detachments mowed down entire divisions with machine-gun fire, which in fact only helped the Germans.

Moreover, again, without any evidence, documents, and increasingly referring to the "memoirs" of very dubious personalities.

One of the most terrible myths of World War II is associated with the existence of detachments in the Red Army. Often in modern war serials you can see scenes with gloomy personalities in the blue caps of the NKVD troops, machine-gunning wounded soldiers leaving the battlefield. By showing this, the authors take on the soul a great sin. None of the researchers managed to find a single fact in the archives to confirm this.

What happened?

Barrage detachments appeared in the Red Army from the first days of the war. Such formations were created by military counterintelligence, firstly represented by the 3rd Directorate of the NPO of the USSR, and from July 17, 1941, by the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR and subordinate bodies in the troops.

As the main tasks of the special departments for the period of the war, the decision of the State Defense Committee defined "a decisive struggle against espionage and treachery in the Red Army units and the elimination of desertion in the immediate front line." They received the right to arrest deserters, and, if necessary, to shoot them on the spot.

To ensure operational activities in special departments in accordance with the order of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs L.P. By July 25, 1941, Beria were formed: in divisions and corps - separate rifle platoons, in armies - separate rifle companies, in fronts - separate rifle battalions. Using them, special departments organized a barrier service, setting up ambushes, posts and patrols on roads, refugee routes and other communications. Each detained commander, Red Army soldier, Red Navy soldier was checked. If he was recognized as having fled from the battlefield, then he was subjected to immediate arrest, and an operational (no more than 12-hour) investigation began on him to be tried by a military tribunal as a deserter. Special departments were entrusted with the duty to carry out the sentences of military tribunals, including before the ranks. In "particularly exceptional cases, when the situation requires decisive measures to be taken to immediately restore order at the front," the head of the special department had the right to shoot deserters on the spot, which he had to immediately report to the special department of the army and front (navy). Servicemen who lagged behind the unit for an objective reason, in an organized manner, accompanied by a representative of a special department, were sent to the headquarters of the nearest division.

The flow of servicemen who lagged behind their units in a kaleidoscope of battles, when leaving numerous encirclements, or even deliberately deserted, was huge. Only from the beginning of the war until October 10, 1941, the operational barriers of special departments and barrage detachments of the NKVD troops detained more than 650 thousand soldiers and commanders. The German agents were easily dissolved in the general mass. Thus, a group of scouts neutralized in the winter-spring of 1942 had the task of physically liquidating the command of the Western and Kalinin fronts, including the commanding generals G.K. Zhukov and I.S. Konev.

Special departments could hardly cope with such a volume of cases. The situation required the creation of special units that would be directly involved in preventing unauthorized withdrawal of troops from their positions, returning stragglers to their units and subunits, and detaining deserters.

The first initiative of this kind was shown by the military command. After the appeal of the commander of the Bryansk Front, Lieutenant General A.I. Eremenko to Stalin on September 5, 1941, he was allowed to create barrage detachments in "unstable" divisions, where there were repeated cases of leaving combat positions without orders. A week later, this practice was extended to the rifle divisions of the entire Red Army.

These barrage detachments (numbering up to a battalion) had nothing to do with the NKVD troops, they acted as part of the rifle divisions of the Red Army, were recruited at the expense of their personnel and were subordinate to their commanders. At the same time, along with them, there were detachments formed either by military special departments or by territorial bodies of the NKVD. A typical example is the barrage detachments formed in October 1941 by the NKVD of the USSR, which, by order of the State Defense Committee, took under special protection the zone adjacent to Moscow from the west and south along the line Kalinin - Rzhev - Mozhaisk - Tula - Kolomna - Kashira. Already the first results showed how necessary these measures were. In just two weeks from October 15 to October 28, 1941, more than 75,000 servicemen were detained in the Moscow zone.

From the very beginning, the barrage formations, regardless of their departmental subordination, were not oriented by the leadership towards general executions and arrests. Meanwhile, today in the press one has to deal with such accusations; detachments are sometimes called punishers. But here are the numbers. Of the more than 650 thousand military personnel detained by October 10, 1941, after checking, about 26 thousand people were arrested, among which special departments were: spies - 1505, saboteurs - 308, traitors - 2621, cowards and alarmists - 2643, deserters - 8772, spreaders of provocative rumors - 3987, self-shooters - 1671, others - 4371 people. 10,201 people were shot, including 3,321 people in front of the line. The overwhelming number - more than 632 thousand people, i.e. more than 96% were returned to the front.

As the front line stabilized, the activities of the barrage formations were curtailed without permission. Order No. 227 gave her a new impetus.

The detachments of up to 200 people created in accordance with it consisted of fighters and commanders of the Red Army, who did not differ in form or weapons from the rest of the Red Army soldiers. Each of them had the status of a separate military unit and was not subordinate to the command of the division, behind the battle formations of which it was located, but to the command of the army through the NKVD OO. The detachment was led by a state security officer.

In total, by October 15, 1942, 193 barrage detachments functioned in parts of the active army. First of all, the Stalinist order was carried out, of course, on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front. Almost every fifth detachment - 41 units - were formed in the Stalingrad direction.

Initially, in accordance with the requirements of the People's Commissar of Defense, barrage detachments were charged with the duty to prevent unauthorized withdrawal of line units. However, in practice, the range of military affairs in which they were engaged turned out to be wider.

“The barrage detachments,” recalled General of the Army P. N. Lashchenko, who was deputy chief of staff of the 60th Army at the time of the publication of order No. , unfortunately, were; put things in order at the crossings, sent soldiers who had strayed from their units to assembly points.

Here is a document from the FSB archives. He is unable to illuminate the whole real picture barrage detachments, but it can lead to certain reflections. This is a summary report of the Directorate of Special Departments to the leadership of the NKVD. It is not dated, but a number of indirect signs indicate that it was written no earlier than October 15, 1942. It can be seen from this that these are only the first results of the actions of the detachments.

In accordance with the order of NPO No. 227, in units operating in the Red Army, as of October 15, 193 barrage detachments were formed.

Of these, in parts of the Stalingrad Front, 16 and the Don Front were formed - 25, and a total of 41 detachments, which are subordinate to the Special Departments of the NKVD of the armies.

From the beginning of their formation (from August 1 to October 15 of this year), barrage detachments detained 140,755 servicemen who had fled from the front line.

Of those detained: 3,980 people were arrested, 1,189 people were shot, 2,776 people were sent to penal companies, 185 people were sent to penal battalions, 131,094 people were returned to their units and transit points.

The largest number of detentions and arrests was carried out by the barrage detachments of the Don and Stalingrad fronts.

On the Don Front, 36,109 people were detained, 736 people were arrested, 433 people were shot, 1,056 people were sent to penal companies, 33 people were sent to penal battalions, 32,933 people were returned to their units and to transit points.

15,649 people were detained along the Stalingrad Front, 244 people were arrested, 278 people were shot, 218 people were sent to penal companies, 42 to penal battalions, 14,833 people were returned to their units and to transit points.

It should be noted that the barrage detachments, and especially the detachments on the Stalingrad and Don fronts (subordinate to special departments of the NKVD armies), during the period of fierce battles with the enemy, played a positive role in restoring order in the units and preventing an unorganized withdrawal from the lines they occupied, the return of a significant number soldiers on the front line.

August 29 this year the headquarters of the 29th division of the 64th Army of the Stalingrad Front was surrounded by enemy tanks that had broken through, parts of the division, having lost control in a panic, retreated to the rear. The detachment detachment operating behind the combat formations of the division's units (the chief of the detachment, lieutenant of state security Filatov), having taken drastic measures, suspended the military personnel retreating in disorder and returned them to the previously occupied defense lines.
In another section of this division, the enemy tried to break through into the depths of the defense. The detachment entered the battle and delayed the advance of the enemy.

September 14 this year the enemy launched an offensive against units of the 399th division of the 62nd army, which carried the defense of the city of Stalingrad. The fighters and commanders of the 396th and 472nd divisions of the regiments began to retreat in a panic, leaving the lines. The head of the detachment (junior lieutenant of state security Elman) ordered his detachment to open fire over the heads of the retreating. As a result, the personnel of these regiments was stopped and after 2 hours the regiments occupied the former lines of their defense.

September 20 this year the enemy occupied the eastern outskirts of Melekhovskaya. The consolidated brigade, under the onslaught of the enemy, began an unauthorized withdrawal to another line. By the actions of the detachment of the 47th Army of the Black Sea Group of Forces, order was restored in the brigade. The brigade occupied the former lines and, at the initiative of the political instructor of the company of the same detachment, Pestov, by joint actions with the brigade, the enemy was driven back from Melekhovskaya.

At critical moments, when support was needed to hold the occupied lines, the barrage detachments entered directly into battle with the enemy, successfully held back his onslaught and inflicted losses on him.
On September 13 of this year, the 112th division, under pressure from the enemy, withdrew from the occupied line. The detachment of the 62nd army, led by the head of the detachment (state security lieutenant Khlystov), took up defensive positions on the outskirts of an important height. For 4 days, the fighters and commanders of the detachment repelled the attacks of enemy submachine gunners and inflicted heavy losses on them. The detachment held the line until the approach of military units.

A number of facts were noted when barrage detachments were used incorrectly by individual commanders of formations. A significant number of detachments were sent into battle along with line units, which suffered losses, as a result of which they were assigned for reorganization and the barrier service was not carried out.
September 19 p. The command of the 240th division of the Voronezh Front of one of the companies of the detachment of the 38th Army gave a combat mission to clear the grove from a group of German machine gunners. In the battles for the grove, this company lost 31 people, of which 18 people were killed.

According to the 6th Army of the Voronezh Front, according to the order of the Military Council of the Army of the 2nd Barrage Detachment on September 4th. 174 divisions were attached to the division and put into battle. As a result, the detachments lost up to 70% of their personnel in battle, the remaining fighters of these detachments were transferred to the named division and thus disbanded.
3rd detachment of the same army on September 10 of this year. was placed on the defensive.

In the 1st Guards Army of the Don Front, on the orders of the army commander Chistyakov 59 and a member of the Military Council Abramov 60, 2 barrage detachments were repeatedly sent into battle, like ordinary units. As a result, the detachments lost more than 65% of their personnel and were subsequently disbanded. In this regard, the order of the Military Council of the front on the transfer of 5 barrage detachments to the subordination of the 24th Army was not carried out.

Signature (Kazakevich)

Army General Hero of the Soviet Union P. N. Lashchenko:
Yes, there were guards. But I do not know that any of them fired at their own, at least on our sector of the front. Already now I requested archival documents on this subject, such documents were not found. The detachments were located at a distance from the front line, they covered the troops from the rear from saboteurs and enemy landings, they detained deserters, who, unfortunately, were; put things in order at the crossings, sent soldiers who had strayed from their units to assembly points. I will say more, the front received replenishment, of course, not fired, as they say, not sniffing gunpowder, and the barrage detachments, which consisted exclusively of soldiers already fired, the most persistent and courageous, were, as it were, a reliable and strong shoulder of the elder. It often happened that the detachments found themselves face to face with the same German tanks, chains of German machine gunners and suffered heavy losses in battles. This is an irrefutable fact.

First of all, from this eloquent document it becomes clear why the topic of barrage detachments was hushed up during the Soviet era. We were all brought up on the postulates of a nationwide rebuff to the enemy, the selfless devotion of the Soviet people to their homeland, the mass heroism of Soviet soldiers.

These ideological attitudes somehow begin to be washed away when you read in this document that only within the Stalingrad Front by mid-October 1942, more than 15 thousand fugitives from the front were detained by detachments, and more than 140 thousand along the entire line of the Soviet-German front, i. e. by the number of more than ten full-blooded divisions. At the same time, it is quite clear that by no means all those who fled from the front were detained. At best, half.

One can only be surprised that such detachments were not created back in the 41st. After all, before my eyes there was an excellent example of the Wehrmacht, which had a field gendarmerie (Feldgendarmerie) in its structure, which, having professionally trained officers and soldiers, was engaged in catching fugitives, identifying simulators and crossbows, restoring order in the rear, clearing the rear units from redundant soldiers.

Getting acquainted with the figures of the report, one comes to the inevitable conclusion that the creation of detachments was a necessary and much belated measure. The liberalism of Stalin and his party entourage, instead of harsh disciplinary measures, fully justified in the conditions of war, led to attempts to use indoctrination and, in fact, to persuade soldiers with the help of an ugly bloated and extremely inefficient political apparatus, and led us to the banks of the Volga. Who knows, if instead of reviving the institution of military commissars in the summer of 1941, detachments would have been created, then Stalingrad would have remained a distant rear city on the Volga.

Note that soon after the creation of detachments, the institution of military commissars was finally abolished.

Like it or not, but associations arise: there are commissars - there are no victories, there are no commissars, but there are detachments - there are victories.

More interesting numbers. Of the 140,755 detained military personnel, only 3,980 people were arrested, 1,189 people were shot, 2,776 people (i.e. soldiers and sergeants) were sent to penal companies, 185 people (i.e. officers) were sent to penal battalions, returned to their units and to transit points 131094 person. A very soft attitude towards those who fled from the front. In total, 9.5 thousand out of 141 thousand worthy of the most severe measures were repressed.

Well, if it was necessary, then the barrage detachments themselves entered into battle with the Germans, often saving the situation.

As many participants in the war testify, detachments did not exist everywhere. According to the Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov, they were generally absent on a number of fronts operating in the northern and northwestern directions.

Do not stand up to criticism and the version that the detachments "guarded" penal units. The company commander of the 8th separate penal battalion of the 1st Belorussian Front, retired colonel A.V. Pyltsyn, who fought from 1943 until the very Victory, states: deterrent measures. Just there has never been such a need for it.”

Famous writer Hero of the Soviet Union V.V. Karpov, who fought in the 45th separate penal company on the Kalinin Front, also denies the presence of detachments behind the battle formations of their unit.

In reality, the outposts of the army detachment were located at a distance of 1.5–2 km from the front line, intercepting communications in the immediate rear. They did not specialize in fines, but checked and detained everyone whose stay outside the military unit aroused suspicion.

Did the barrage detachments use weapons to prevent unauthorized withdrawal of line units from their positions? This aspect of their combat activities is sometimes highly speculative.

The documents show how the combat practice of the barrage detachments developed in one of the most intense periods of the war, in the summer-autumn of 1942. From August 1 (the moment of formation) to October 15, they detained 140,755 servicemen who "escaped from the front line." Of these: arrested - 3980, shot - 1189, sent to penal companies - 2776, to penal battalions - 185, the vast majority of detainees - 131094 people were returned to their units and transit points. The above statistics show that to fight on without any loss of rights received opportunity the vast majority of military personnel who had previously left the front line for various reasons - more than 91%.

Participant of the war Levin Mikhail Borisovich:
The order is extremely cruel, terrible in its essence, but to be honest, in my opinion, it was necessary ...

This order “sobered up” many, forced them to come to their senses ...
And as for the detachments, I only once encountered their "activities" at the front. In one of the battles in the Kuban, our right flank faltered and ran, so the detachment opened fire, where it cut across, where it was right on the fleeing ... After that, I never saw a detachment near the advanced detachment. If a critical situation arose in battle, then in the rifle regiment the functions of the detachment guards - to stop those who were scurrying in a panic - were performed by a reserve rifle company or a regimental company of submachine gunners.

Memory book. - Infantrymen. Levin Mikhail Borisovich. WWII hero. Project I Remember

Participant of the war A. Dergaev:
Now there is a lot of talk about detachments. We were in the immediate rear. Directly behind the infantry, but I did not see them. I mean, they must have been somewhere. Maybe further behind us. But we didn't meet them. A few years ago we were invited to a Rosenbaum concert at the Oktyabrsky Concert Hall. He sings a song in which the following words: “... we dug a trench to its full height. The German hits us right in the forehead, and behind the detachment ... ". I was sitting on the balcony and, unable to stand it, I jumped up and shouted: “Shame! A shame!" And the whole audience swallowed it. During a break, I tell them: “They are bullying you, but you are silent.” He still sings these songs. In general, just as we did not see women at the front, so did the NKVD.

Memory book. - Artillerymen. Dergaev Andrey Andreevich. WWII hero

As for the criminals, the most severe measures were applied to them. This applied to deserters, defectors, imaginary patients, self-shooters. It happened - and they shot in front of the ranks. But the decision to enforce this extreme measure was made not by the commander of the detachment, but by the military tribunal of the division (not lower) or, in separate, prearranged cases, by the head of the special department of the army.

In exceptional situations, the soldiers of the barrage detachments could open fire over the heads of the retreating. We admit that individual cases of shooting at people in the heat of battle could take place: endurance could change the fighters and commanders of detachments in a difficult situation. But to assert that such was the daily practice - there are no grounds. Cowards and alarmists were shot in front of the formation on an individual basis. Punishment, as a rule, is only the initiators of panic and flight.

Here are some typical examples from the history of the battle on the Volga. On September 14, 1942, the enemy launched an offensive against units of the 399th Infantry Division of the 62nd Army. When the soldiers and commanders of the 396th and 472nd rifle regiments began to retreat in a panic, the head of the detachment, junior lieutenant of state security Elman, ordered his detachment to open fire over the heads of the retreating. This forced the personnel to stop, and two hours later the regiments occupied the former lines of defense.

On October 15, in the area of the Stalingrad Tractor Plant, the enemy managed to reach the Volga and cut off the remnants of the 112th Rifle Division, as well as three (115th, 124th and 149th) separate rifle brigades, from the main forces of the 62nd Army. Having succumbed to panic, a number of military personnel, including commanders of various degrees, tried to abandon their units and, under various pretexts, cross to the eastern bank of the Volga. In order to prevent this, the task force led by the senior detective lieutenant of state security Ignatenko, created by a special department of the 62nd Army, put up a barrier. In 15 days, up to 800 privates and officers were detained and returned to the battlefield, 15 alarmists, cowards and deserters were shot in front of the ranks. The detachments acted similarly later.

Here, as the documents testify, the detachments had to prop up the trembling, retreating units and units themselves, to intervene in the course of the battle in order to make a turn in it, as the documents show, more than once. The replenishment arriving at the front was, of course, unfired, and in this situation, the barrage detachments, formed from staunch, fired, commanders and fighters with strong front-line hardening, provided a reliable shoulder for the line units.

So, during the defense of Stalingrad on August 29, 1942, the headquarters of the 29th Infantry Division of the 64th Army was surrounded by enemy tanks that had broken through. The detachment not only stopped the military personnel departing in disorder and returned them to the previously occupied defense lines, but also entered the battle itself. The enemy was pushed back.

On September 13, when the 112th Rifle Division retreated from the line under pressure from the enemy, the 62nd Army detachment under the command of State Security Lieutenant Khlystov took up the defense. For several days, the fighters and commanders of the detachment repelled the attacks of enemy machine gunners, until the approaching units stood up for defense. So it was in other sectors of the Soviet-German front.

With the turning point in the situation that came after the victory at Stalingrad, the participation of barrage formations in battles more and more turned out to be not only spontaneous, dictated by a dynamically changing situation, but also the result of a decision made in advance by the command. The commanders tried to use the detachments left without "work" with the maximum benefit in matters not related to the barrage service.

Facts of this kind were reported to Moscow in mid-October 1942 by State Security Major V.M. Kazakevich. For example, on the Voronezh Front, by order of the military council of the 6th Army, two barrage detachments were attached to the 174th Rifle Division and put into battle. As a result, they lost up to 70% of their personnel, the soldiers remaining in the ranks were transferred to replenish the named division, and the detachments had to be disbanded. The commander of the 246th Rifle Division, in whose operational subordination the detachment was, used the blocking detachment of the 29th Army of the Western Front as a linear unit. Taking part in one of the attacks, a detachment of 118 personnel lost 109 people killed and wounded, in connection with which it had to be re-formed.

The reasons for the objections from the special departments are understandable. But, it seems, it was no coincidence that from the very beginning the barrage detachments were subordinated to the army command, and not to the military counterintelligence agencies. The People's Commissar of Defense, of course, had in mind that the barrage formations would and should be used not only as a barrier for the retreating units, but also as the most important reserve for the direct conduct of hostilities.

As the situation on the fronts changed, with the transition to the Red Army of the strategic initiative and the beginning of the mass expulsion of the occupiers from the territory of the USSR, the need for detachments began to decline sharply. Order "Not a step back!" completely lost its former meaning. On October 29, 1944, Stalin issued an order acknowledging that "due to the change in the general situation on the fronts, the need for the further maintenance of barrage detachments has disappeared." By November 15, 1944, they were disbanded, and the personnel of the detachments were sent to replenish rifle divisions.

Thus, the barrage detachments not only acted as a barrier that prevented the penetration of deserters, alarmists, German agents into the rear, not only returned to the front lines of servicemen lagging behind their units, but also conducted direct combat operations with the enemy, contributing to the achievement of victory over fascist Germany.