"National State University physical education, sports and health named

P. F. Lesgaft St. Petersburg»

Faculty: "Economics, Management and Law"

Department: "History"

Abstract on discipline: "History of Russia" Topic:

"Foreign policy of the USSR in the 30s of the XX century"

Completed by: 1st year student

full-time education

Pryadko Nikita Sergeevich.

Saint Petersburg. 2009

Introduction

1.1 The global economic crisis as a cause of military conflicts

2.5 Soviet-German agreements, the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact

2.6 The beginning of the Second World War and the policy of the USSR in the conditions of the Second World War. "Winter War"

Conclusion

Bibliography

Introduction

2009 marks the 70th anniversary of the start of World War II and 68 years of the villainous attack Nazi Germany on Soviet Union beginning of the Great Patriotic War. These phrases remind us of the events that affected almost the entire world and brought him untold disasters. They force us to turn again and again to the study of the causes of the outbreak of the Second World War, because it is not possible to understand why, for which so many things were destroyed and ruined so many human lives. To understand the causes of the war, V.I. Lenin, it is necessary "to study the policy before the war, the policy leading and leading to the war." The lessons of history must not be forgotten if we want to prevent a new war, even more terrible in its consequences.

The end of the First World War (the signing of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919), the civil war and foreign intervention in Russia created new conditions in international relations. An important factor existence became Soviet state as a fundamentally new socio-political system. A confrontation developed between the Soviet state and the leading countries of the capitalist world. It was this line that prevailed in international relations in the 1920s and 1930s. At the same time, the contradictions between the largest capitalist states, as well as between them and the "awakening" countries of the East, intensified. In the 1930s, the alignment of international political forces was largely determined by the growing aggression of the militaristic states - Germany, Italy and Japan.

The foreign policy of the Soviet state, while maintaining the continuity of the policy of the Russian Empire in the implementation of geopolitical tasks, differed from it in a new nature and methods of implementation. It was characterized by the ideologization of the foreign policy course, based on two provisions formulated by V.I. Lenin.

The first is the principle of proletarian internationalism, which provided for the mutual assistance of the international working class in the struggle against the world capitalist system and the support of anti-colonial national movements. It was based on the belief of the Bolsheviks in a speedy socialist revolution on a world scale. In the development of this principle, in 1919, the Communist International (Comintern) was created in Moscow. It included many left-wing socialist parties in Europe and Asia that switched to Bolshevik (communist) positions. From the moment of its foundation, the Comintern was used by Soviet Russia to interfere in the internal affairs of many states of the world, which aggravated its relations with other countries.

The second provision - the principle of peaceful coexistence with the capitalist system - was determined by the need to strengthen the positions of the Soviet state in the international arena, get out of political and economic isolation, and ensure the security of its borders. It meant the recognition of the possibility of peaceful cooperation and, above all, the development of economic ties with the West.

The inconsistency of these two fundamental provisions caused inconsistency in the foreign policy actions of the young Soviet state.

Western policy toward Soviet Russia was no less controversial. On the one hand, he sought to strangle the new political system to isolate it politically and economically. On the other hand, the leading powers of the world set themselves the task of compensating for the loss Money and tangible property lost after October. They also pursued the goal of "reopening" Russia to gain access to its raw materials, the penetration of foreign capital and goods into it. This led to the gradual transition of Western countries from non-recognition of the USSR, to the desire to establish not only economic, but also political relations with it.

During the 1920s and 1930s, the prestige of the Soviet Union in the international arena steadily increased. However, his relationship with the West had an inconsistent, amplitude character.

The study of the features of the foreign policy of the USSR in the 30s. cannot be considered outside the context of the late 20s. XX century. In the first half of the 1920s, the economic blockade of Russia by the capitalist countries was broken. In 1920, after the fall of Soviet power in the Baltic republics, the government of the USSR concluded Peace Treaties with the new governments of Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, recognizing their independence and independence. Since 1921, the establishment of trade relations between the USSR and England, Germany, Austria, Norway, Denmark, Italy, and Czechoslovakia began. The negotiating political process with England and France reached a deadlock. Using the contradictions of the leading European powers with Germany, the Soviet representatives in the town of Rapallo (near Genoa) concluded an agreement with her. The treaty resumed diplomatic and consular relations between the countries and thereby brought Russia out of diplomatic isolation.

Germany, thus, became the main trade and military partner of the USSR, which made significant adjustments to the nature international relations for subsequent years. By 1924, Russia was de jure recognized in Europe by Great Britain, France, Italy, Norway, Austria, Greece, Sweden, in Asia by Japan, China, and in Latin America by Mexico and Uruguay. The US delayed recognition until 1933. In total for 1921-1925. Russia has concluded 40 agreements and treaties. At the same time, Soviet-British and Soviet-French relations were unstable. In 1927 there was a break in diplomatic relations with England. In 1924, diplomatic and consular relations were established with China, and in 1925 with Japan.

Russia managed to conclude a series of equal treaties with the countries of the East. In 1921, a Soviet-Iranian treaty, a Soviet-Afghan treaty and an agreement with Turkey were concluded. In the late 1920s Since the predominant development of Soviet-German relations, the efforts of Soviet diplomacy have been directed towards expanding contacts with other countries. In 1929 diplomatic relations with England were restored. 1933 became the year of recognition of the USSR by the United States of America, in 1933-1935 - by Czechoslovakia, the Spanish Republic, Romania, etc. Relations with China also aggravated, where an armed conflict broke out on the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) in 1929. Thus, at this stage, priority in foreign policy was given to the "Comintern" direction.

I. Foreign policy of the USSR in the 1920s and 1930s

1.1 The global economic crisis as a cause of military conflicts of conflicts

The deep world economic crisis that began in 1929 and lasted until 1932 caused serious internal political changes in all capitalist countries. In some (England, France, etc.), he brought to power forces that sought to carry out broad internal transformations of a democratic nature. In others (Germany, Italy), the crisis contributed to the formation of anti-democratic (fascist) regimes that used social demagogy in domestic politics at the same time as unleashing political terror, forcing chauvinism and militarism. It was these regimes that became the instigators of new military conflicts (especially after A. Hitler came to power in Germany in 1933).

Hotbeds of international tension began to form at a rapid pace. One developed in Europe because of the aggressiveness of fascist Germany and Italy. The second one is on Far East because of the hegemonic claims of the Japanese militarists.

The economic crisis caused a struggle for world markets. In 1930-1931. Western powers accused the Soviet Union of using cheap forced labor, exports its goods at dumping prices, thereby damaging the European economy. Prison labor was indeed used in the production of export commodities such as timber, but the volume of Soviet exports was too small to seriously affect the state of the world market. Nevertheless, France, followed by some other European states, banned the import of a number of Soviet goods. In response, the USSR reduced purchases in these countries, which in a crisis, when the West was especially interested in the Soviet market, was a very sensitive measure.

1.2 The policy of the USSR in Europe at the turn of the 20-30s

In 1929, French Foreign Minister Briand put forward a project to unite Europe into a "pan-Europe". According to the French project, "pan-Europe" was to become a means of maintaining peace and overcoming the economic crisis. In the USSR and in Germany, the Briand project was regarded as an attempt to ensure French hegemony in Europe. Negotiations about "pan-Europe", held in 1930-1931, had no success.

The basis of Soviet policy in Europe at the turn of the 1920s and 1930s was the course towards maintaining the friendly relations established in Rapallo with Germany. Ever since the Civil War, Stalin and his entourage had viewed Atlanta as their main enemy and Germany as a possible ally. It is no coincidence that Stalin characterized the Dawes plan as "the American-French plan to rob Germany." At the same time, the USSR was very afraid of Germany's transition to anti-Soviet positions. People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs M.M. Litvinov warned in 1929: "In Germany there are individuals, groups, organizations and even parties that set as their goal a radical change in German policy towards anti-Soviet machinations." In 1931, the USSR and Germany extended the 1926 non-aggression and neutrality pact.

The main directions of Soviet foreign policy in the late 20s - early 30s. were developed under the direct supervision of Stalin and were approved by the VI Congress of the Comintern in 1928. This congress revealed contradictions in the field of international relations between Stalin and Bukharin, who at that time was one of the leaders of the ECCI (Executive Committee of the Comintern). If Bukharin proposed to focus the attention of the communists on ensuring the unity of the labor movement, then the Stalinist point of view was that, due to the threat of a global economic crisis, international tension had reached its limit, and this situation should be used to strengthen the communist movement. Based on this, Stalin's proposals, which were approved by the congress, boiled down to the following:

Refuse any cooperation with the Social Democrats, who were seen as the main enemies of the working class;

Fight against reformist influences among the working class and create new trade unions controlled only by the communists;

Purge the communist parties of all those who disagree with the general line of the Comintern.

In the practice of the Comintern after the VI Congress, the term "social fascism" was established, which reflected Stalin's concept of rapprochement in the future between social democracy and fascism. In his speech at the 16th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in 1930, he stated that the world economic crisis was developing into a political crisis, which entailed the growing threat of a new war and the rise revolutionary movement. The degree of revolutionism of any communist party was now judged according to how unreservedly it was ready to defend the Soviet Union as the world's first state of workers and peasants, and not according to the principle of international solidarity of workers.

Taking into account these factors, in 1933 the Soviet government defined new tasks for its foreign policy:

1) refusal to participate in international conflicts, especially those of a military nature;

2) recognition of the possibility of cooperation with democratic Western countries to contain the aggressive aspirations of Germany and Japan (the policy of "appeasement");

3) the struggle for the creation of a system of collective security in Europe and the Far East.

Theses about the growing contradictions in the capitalist world and about the constant external threat to the USSR played important role in the development of the internal political situation. However, in the early 1930s the Soviet leadership sought to avoid conflicts and provocations, since the country was in the process of profound transformations. In this regard, the efforts of Soviet diplomacy were aimed at expanding and regulating relations with other states. In turn, the largest capitalist countries were interested in cooperation with the USSR, which was seen as a huge potential market. And the growth of nationalistic extremism in Germany, the purpose of which was to abandon the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, created the basis for cooperation between all European powers that sought to preserve the post-war status quo. In 1932, the Soviet Union concluded non-aggression pacts with Finland, Latvia, Estonia, and Poland. Mutual non-aggression, neutrality in the event of aggression by third powers, non-participation of the parties in coalitions and alliances directed against each other were envisaged. In November 1932, a Soviet-French non-aggression pact was signed, which marked a noticeable improvement in bilateral relations. This step of France was dictated, first of all, by the growth of revanchist and militaristic sentiments in Germany, where Hitler was eager for power.

1.3 Relations in the Far East

In the Far East, Japan occupied Manchuria in 1931 without encountering serious resistance from the Chinese army. In March, the Japanese created the puppet state of Manchuzhou-Guo on the territory of Manchuria.

In connection with the strengthening of Japanese positions in the immediate vicinity of the Soviet borders, the USSR offered Japan to conclude a non-aggression pact, but the Japanese authorities rejected this proposal. At the end of 1932, the USSR restored diplomatic relations with China, broken off in 1929 after the conflict on the CER. At the same time, the USSR supported the Chinese Communist Party led by Mao Zedong, which in 1931 proclaimed the creation of a number of southern and central provinces of the Chinese Soviet Republic and formed the Red Army.

Japan in 1937 turned to aggression against the rest of China and Mongolia. The actions of the Japanese troops also affected the territory of the USSR: in August 1938, a battle took place between the Soviet and Japanese troops in the area of ​​​​Lake Khasan. After two days of bloody fighting, units of both sides were withdrawn from the crest of the disputed height. But Soviet citizens learned from newspapers about the defeat of the invading Japanese.

The following year, due to a border dispute along the Khalkhin Gol River, a conflict arose between Japan and the Mongolian People's Republic. The USSR, bound with Mongolia by a mutual assistance treaty of 1921, threw its troops against the Japanese. Heavy fighting under the command of G.K. Zhukov began in May 1939 and lasted four months. The losses of the Japanese amounted to about 50 thousand people. True, the Soviet troops, which had great numerical and technical superiority, suffered significant losses due to the stubborn resistance of the Japanese and lack of combat experience. On September 15, 1939, an armistice was signed with the Japanese side. Japan expressed its readiness for a truce not only as a result of a military defeat, but also in connection with a fundamental improvement in relations between the USSR and Germany.

Nevertheless, tension on the Far Eastern borders of the Soviet Union was growing.

1.4 Relations with Germany. Hitler's rise to power in Germany

In January 1933, NSDAP Fuhrer Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of Germany. The Nazi dictatorship was established in Germany. The coming of the National Democrats to power is explained by a sharp drop in the standard of living as a result of the crisis and the growth of revanchist sentiments in German society. The Germans hoped political forces who sought not to improve the existing system, but to destroy it and replace it with a new one: with the extreme right - the Nazis, or the extreme left - the communists. Hitler achieved popularity by promising the Germans a quick revenge, playing on the base nationalist and chauvinistic instincts of the townsfolk.

The leftist parties in Germany - the Social Democrats and the Communists - with about 40% of the votes in the Reichstag, could not unite and prevent the Nazis from coming to power. Under the dictation of the Comitern, the KKE continued to accuse the SPD of social fascism. The Communists supported the Nazis in a referendum of no confidence in the Social Democratic government of Prussia. Some communist leaders understood that such a course was fraught with the victory of the Nazis, and proposed the creation of a united front with the Social Democrats, but Stalin resolutely suppressed such intentions. In a new draft party program prepared for 1930 on Moscow's instructions, the KKE demanded the annulment of the Treaty of Versailles and the Young Plan, and the Social Democrats were called the "treacherous party of Versailles." It is not surprising that the SPD, in turn, was oriented towards an alliance with the bourgeois centrist parties, and not with the communists. By frustrating the unification of the German left forces, Stalin actually contributed to the victory of the Nazis. Perhaps at first he simply underestimated the danger emanating from them, and then it was too late. But a number of researchers, especially in the West, believe that the Soviet leader deliberately staked on Hitler's rise to power. In 1931, Stalin told German Communist leader G. Neumann: “Don't you think that if the nationalists take power in Germany, their main concern will be the West? Then we can calmly build socialism.” German diplomats who worked in Moscow recalled that as early as 1932, “the German embassy had the impression that in order to avoid temporary difficulties in the future, the Soviet government would like to establish contact with the National Socialists right now.” At present, science is not yet in a position to definitively answer the question why, in the face of the growing influence of Nazism, Stalin demanded that the German Communists be considered the main enemy of the Social Democrats. But that the Stalinist leadership bears its share of the responsibility for Hitler's victory in Germany can hardly be disputed.

II. The foreign policy of the USSR from the second half of the 1930s to 1939

2.1 Soviet foreign policy in Europe since the second half of the 1930s

In the mid-1930s, in the foreign policy activities of the Soviet leadership, there was a departure from the principle of non-intervention in international conflicts.

Nazism in Germany came to power under chauvinistic, anti-Semitic, revanchist and anti-communist slogans. Even in his programmatic book "Mein Kampf" ("My Struggle"), written in the mid-20s, Hitler stated the need to expand the living space at the expense of other peoples and proclaimed: "Germany must increase its territory in the East - mainly at the expense of Russia.-

But, having risen to power and launched the persecution of the communists in Germany, Hitler did not immediately break with the USSR. On the contrary, in March 1933 he declared his readiness to maintain friendly relations with Moscow. The Nazi government ratified the protocol signed in 1931 on the extension of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact. In turn, the Soviet leadership made it clear that it was ready to improve relations with Germany.

In the summer of 1933, Soviet-German relations began to deteriorate rapidly. In June 1933, the USSR announced the termination of military cooperation with Germany. In October of the same year, Germany withdrew its representatives from the Geneva Disarmament Conference and then withdrew from the League of Nations. By the end of 1933, the National Socialist regime in Germany had already acquired a finished look. Gradually, the anti-Sovietism of Hitler's foreign policy became more and more evident. In January 1934, Germany signed a non-aggression pact with Poland, which the Kremlin regarded as an anti-Soviet step. In the spring of 1934, military-economic cooperation between Germany and the USSR practically ceased. Berlin refused Moscow's proposal to make a joint statement on mutual interest in the independence of the Baltic states.

Only in 1935, at the VII Congress of the Comintern, fascism was officially recognized as enemy No. 1.

2.2 New foreign policy doctrine

Under these conditions, the Soviet Union is forming a new foreign policy doctrine. Its essence was to maintain neutrality in any conflict and to participate in the creation of a collective security system, which was impossible without expanding cooperation with Western democracies. It is significant that by the mid-30s. in most European countries totalitarian or authoritarian regimes. An important role in the implementation of the new foreign policy program was played by M.M. Litvinov, who in 1930 took up the post of People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

At the end of 1933, Litvinov visited Washington, where, as a result of negotiations with the new US President F.D. Roosevelt established diplomatic relations between the USSR and the USA. In September 1934, the Soviet Union was admitted to the League of Nations and immediately became a permanent member of its Council, which meant its return to the international community as a great power. In 1935, an agreement was signed with France on mutual assistance in the event of aggression by a third country, but it was not supported by a military convention (as in 1891-1893). This treaty was ratified only nine months after its signing, in February 1936. A similar treaty was concluded between the USSR and Czechoslovakia. True, the Czechoslovak representatives insisted that the parties to the treaty were obliged to come to each other's aid only in cooperation with France. Probably, Czechoslovakia was afraid to accept unilateral Soviet aid, which threatened to turn into an export of the revolution.

2.3 The Comintern and the politics of the Popular Front. Spanish Civil War

In the mid-1930s it became obvious that fascism was trying to spread beyond Germany and Italy. In February 1934, a fascist putsch took place in Paris. It was relatively easily suppressed, but demonstrated the need to unite all anti-fascist forces. In the summer of 1935, the tactics of the anti-fascist Popular Front were officially adopted by the 7th Congress of the Comintern. In 1936, the communist, socialist and left-bourgeois parties of France and Spain united in the Popular Fronts and won the elections. Popular Front governments were established in both countries.

In Spain, the monarchy was overthrown in 1931, and in 1934 the government of the Popular Front came to power. The government was headed by the socialist L. Caballero, but the communists also played an important role in his activities, however, mainly of the Trotskyist persuasion.

In July 1936, a fascist military rebellion began in Spain, led by General F. Franco. More than 1 million Spaniards became victims of the civil war. From the very beginning of this war, Germany and Italy began to provide active assistance to the troops under the command of General F. Franco, who revolted against the government of the Popular Front. France and England remained neutral. The United States shared the same position, forbidding the Spanish government to purchase American weapons. Initially declaring a policy of non-intervention in Spanish affairs, from October 1936 the Soviet Union began to support the Spanish Republic. However, this support was very specific:

1) firstly, the republican government received military equipment and weapons from the USSR for gold, the quality of which left much to be desired, and the quantity was much smaller compared to Franco's German assistance;

2) secondly, three thousand advisers were sent to Spain, among whom were not only military specialists, but also representatives of the OGPU-NKVD.

The Spanish Civil War ended in 1939. The Spanish Republic fell. A Francoist dictatorship was established in Spain.

The Soviet leadership was extremely concerned about the spread of dissent among the left forces of Spain, against which the "competent authorities" launched a struggle. This could not contribute to the unity of the republican forces, which were defeated in the civil war.

Events in Spain made it possible to test new models in combat conditions military equipment(primarily aircraft) and show the whole world that new war will be qualitatively different, even in comparison with the First World War. By the beginning of the Second World War, Soviet propaganda had formed among the majority of the population the idea that the Soviet Union would defeat a potential enemy with little bloodshed and on foreign territory.

2.4 Anglo-French policy of "appeasement" and its collapse

The ratification of the aforementioned Soviet-French treaty served as a pretext for the remilitarization of the Rhineland by Germany, which adopted a law on universal conscription. These actions of Germany were a violation of the articles of the Treaty of Versailles and a direct challenge primarily to France and Great Britain, but these powers limited themselves to a verbal protest. The League of Nations was also powerless in this situation. These events seriously changed the military-political situation in Europe. As for the Soviet Union, by 1938 neither its new allies nor Germany was a secret of its significant weakening due to purges in various industries. National economy, and most importantly - in the Red Army. This situation, of course, was taken into account by Hitler when deciding on the annexation of Austria to Germany (March 1938) and the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, bound by an agreement with the USSR, in accordance with the Munich Agreements of 1938.

At the same time, in December 1938, France signed a non-aggression pact with Germany, which forced the Soviet leadership to think about the security of their western borders in conditions when the eastern ones were very restless.

The policy of "appeasement" pursued by the Western powers in relation to Germany, Italy and Japan did not give positive results. International tensions intensified. Seeing that the Versailles system was falling apart, Mussolini in October 1935 occupied Ethiopia, which was a member of the League of Nations. The adoption of the League of Nations sanctions against Italy did not help Ethiopia and pushed Italy away from England and France, bringing it closer to Germany.

March 7, 1936 Germany sent its troops into the demilitarized Rhineland. Hitler later admitted: "if the French then entered the Rhine zone, we would have to flee with our tails between our legs, since our military resources were insufficient to provide even weak resistance." The retreat, according to the fascist Fuhrer, "would have ended in complete collapse." Even then, in 1936, France could, with minimal effort, achieve the collapse of the Nazi dictatorship and save the world from the horrors of the Second World War, and itself from a humiliating defeat and occupation. This chance was missed. Field Marshal Keitel said at the Nuremberg trials: "After Hitler saw that he was getting away with everything, it was then that one action began to follow another."

In 1936, Germany and Japan signed an agreement directed against the Soviet Union (the Anti-Comintern Pact). Relying on the support of Germany, Japan launched in 1937 a large-scale military operation against China.

Especially dangerous for the preservation of peace and security in Europe were the territorial claims of Nazi Germany. In March 1938, Germany carried out the Anschluss (attachment) of Austria. On March 13, 1938, the law on the Anschluss was published, beginning with the words: "Austria is a province of the German Reich ...". Neither England nor France did anything to save Austria, limiting themselves to formal protests.

Following Austria came the turn of Czechoslovakia, in the west of which, in the Sudetenland, about two million Germans lived. Hitler demanded the transfer of the Sudetenland to the Reich. Therefore, the USSR came out in defense of its territorial integrity. Based on the 1935 treaty, the Soviet government offered its assistance and moved 30 divisions, aircraft and tanks to the western border. But France and England did not support Czechoslovakia, but actually put it before an ultimatum, offering to agree to the transfer to Germany of all areas in which the Germans make up more than half of the population. The government of E. Benes refused the help of the USSR and complied with the demand of A. Hitler to transfer the Sudetenland to Germany.

The Western powers pursued a policy of concessions to fascist Germany, hoping to create from it a reliable counterbalance against the USSR and direct its aggression to the east. This policy culminated in the Munich Agreement (September 1938) between Germany, Italy, Britain and France. It legally formalized the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. Feeling its strength, Germany in 1939 occupied the whole of Czechoslovakia. On March 15, Czechoslovakia was turned into the German Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. A week later, the Nazis forced Lithuania to transfer the Memel region to Germany.

In April 1939, Italian troops occupied Albania, creating a foothold against Greece and Yugoslavia. Hitler defiantly tore up the Anglo-German Naval Treaty and denounced the non-aggression pact between Germany and Poland.

2.52. Soviet-German agreements, the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact

Against the backdrop of these events, the Soviet Union had to decide on the choice of the most reliable ally. Attempts were made to conclude a tripartite agreement with Great Britain and France, the military guarantees of which would extend to the whole of Eastern Europe from Romania to the Baltic states. But at the same time, the Secretary of State of the German Foreign Ministry, von Weizsäcker, was informed of the desire of the Soviet government to improve relations with Germany, despite ideological differences. Western countries, seeking to prevent the Soviet-German rapprochement, dragged out negotiations and tried to find out the intentions of Germany (at the beginning of 1939, the last attempt was made to create a system of collective security between England, France and the Soviet Union.). In addition, Poland categorically refused to give a guarantee of a pass Soviet troops through its territory to repel the alleged fascist aggression. At the same time, Great Britain established secret contacts with Germany in order to reach an agreement on a wide range political problems (including the neutralization of the USSR in the international arena). The position of the leaders of France and Great Britain at the Munich Conference entailed wariness on the part of the USSR. Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations in the summer of 1939 reached an impasse, but the British and French agreed to discuss the military aspects of the agreement with the USSR. Their representatives arrived in Moscow on August 11, 1939, but the Soviet delegation, headed by Commissar of Defense K.E. Voroshilov and Chief of the General Staff B.M. Shaposhnikov, was not satisfied with the rank of the representatives who arrived in Moscow, who did not have clear powers. The talks were postponed to a later date.

On August 14, 1939, German Foreign Minister I. von Ribbentrop announced his readiness to come to Moscow to conclude a political agreement. It is significant that back in the spring of 1939, M.M. Litvinov (Jew by nationality) and replaced by V.M. Molotov. A year earlier, the same operation was carried out with the Soviet ambassador to Berlin J. Surits, who was replaced by A. Merekalov. Ribbentrop's arrival in Moscow, scheduled for August 26, was accelerated at Hitler's request, and late in the evening of August 23, a Soviet-German non-aggression pact was concluded, which immediately entered into force and was designed for 10 years (the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact).

Thus, Hitler achieved his goal: he made it impossible for the USSR to enter the war on the side of England and France in the event of a war between them and Germany because of its attack on Poland. The Soviet-German non-aggression pact is assessed differently by historians. THEM. Maisky, who in 1939 was the Soviet ambassador in London, wrote many years later: “Firstly, the possibility of creating a united capitalist front against Soviet country; moreover, prerequisites were created for the subsequent formation of an anti-Hitler coalition ... The non-aggression pact made it impossible to unleash the Second World War by attacking the USSR ... Secondly, thanks to the treaty with Germany, the threat of an attack on the USSR from Japan, an ally of Germany, disappeared. Without a non-aggression pact with Germany, the USSR could find itself in a difficult position when it would have to wage a war on two fronts, because. At that moment, a German attack on the USSR from the west would have meant a Japanese attack from the east.

The official Soviet publication “The Great Patriotic War. A short popular science essay” defends the same point of view: “The treaty between the Soviet Union and Germany played a positive role in strengthening the defense capability of our country. By concluding it, the Soviet government achieved an urgently needed delay, which made it possible to strengthen the defense capability of the USSR.

But there are also opposite opinions. Thus, the military historian Professor V.M. Kulish argues: “The postponement of the war is not the merit of the treaty. The German leadership carried out its war plan in Europe: first, defeat Poland, occupy or include in its coalition the states of Northern and South-Eastern Europe, deal with France and, if possible, with England, "liberate" in the West, strengthen the alliance with Italy and Japan . This took a year and a half. To attack the USSR in the autumn of 1939, when Germany had about 110 divisions, of which more than 43 were deployed in the West, would have been a gamble, although Hitler considered the USSR weakened. During the war, German armed forces were deployed in Europe. By the beginning of the war against the USSR, the German army had 208 divisions, of which 152 were thrown against our country.

Hitler probably would not have risked starting a war at all, knowing that Britain, France and the USSR were continuing negotiations on joint actions.

There are different points of view on the question of who benefited from the August 23 pact and whether its conclusion was a mistake. One can treat the fact of concluding an agreement with the fascist regime in different ways. But, of course, the non-aggression pact itself contained no violations of international law. the USSR had full right choose how to build relations with a particular country. However, the non-aggression pact was supplemented by secret protocols, which in the rudest way violated international law. That is why the Soviet state for many years denied the authenticity of the secret protocols, claiming that they were fabricated by the enemies of the USSR. Only in 1990 the authenticity of the protocols was officially recognized.

The secret protocol "On the boundaries of the spheres of interests of Germany and the USSR" indicated the delimitation of spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. The interests of the Soviet Union were recognized by Germany in the Baltic States (Latvia, Estonia, Finland) and Bessarabia. In accordance with this document, zones of influence in Eastern Europe were determined. Estonia, Latvia, Finland and Bessarabia ended up in the Soviet sphere, Lithuania - in the German one. Poland was to be divided between Germany and the USSR along the Nareva, Vistula and Sana rivers. It was assumed that the Ukrainian and Belarusian territories that became part of it under the Riga Treaty of 1921 should go to the USSR.

In his speech at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on August 31, 1939, Molotov proclaimed: “The Soviet-German non-aggression pact means a turn in the development of Europe, narrows the field of possible clashes in Europe and thus serves the cause of world peace.”

The next day, World War II began.

2.6 The beginning of the Second World War and the policy of the USSR in the conditions of the Second World War. "Winter War".

September 1, 1939 Germany attacked Poland. Poland's allies, Great Britain and France, declared war on Germany on 3 September. However, they did not provide real military assistance to the Polish government, which ensured A. Hitler a quick victory. The second World War.

The Soviet leadership unequivocally supported the German invasion of Poland. Already on September 8, 1939, the Secretariat of the Komitern, obedient to Stalin, sent a letter to the European Communist Parties, which stated: "The international working class should in no case defend fascist Poland, which rejected the help of the USSR ...". In the first days of the war, Hitler sought from the Soviet Union the fastest entry of the Red Army into Poland. However, the Soviet leadership preferred to wait for the final defeat of Poland, which would allow them to face Soviet people And foreign countries not an aggressor, but a savior of the population of the eastern regions of Poland from Hitlerism.

In the new international conditions, the leadership of the USSR began to implement the Soviet-German agreements of August 1939. On September 17, after the defeat by the Germans Polish army and the fall of the Polish government, the Red Army began liberation campaign to Poland, entered Western Belarus and Western Ukraine. In many cases, local residents greeted the Red Army soldiers with bread and salt. The German Government and the Government established a demarcation line that ran through the Polish capital, leaving the western districts of Warsaw on the German side, and the Warsaw suburb of Prague on the Soviet side.

After the Red Army entered the territory of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, the Germans, in accordance with the secret protocol of August 23, withdrew their troops to the west from the territories of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. On the eve of their departure, joint Soviet-German parades were held in Brest, Grodno, Pinsk and other cities.

After Western Ukraine and Western Belarus were occupied

Soviet troops, elections were held on their territory to the people's assemblies. At the end of October, people's assemblies proclaimed Soviet power and petitioned for the annexation of Western Belarus and Western Ukraine to the Byelorussian and Ukrainian SSR. The Polish government, which was in exile, did not recognize these decisions. Collectivization was carried out on the territory. About 10% of the population was deported to Siberia, the North and Kazakhstan. Mortality among the deportees reached 16%. The repression provoked resistance from the local population. Even before the start of the Patriotic War, a partisan movement began in the western regions of Ukraine against Soviet power, headed by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, whose leader was Stepan Bandera.

On September 28, 1939, in Moscow, representatives of the USSR and Germany signed an agreement on friendship and borders. Secret protocols and maps were attached to the agreement, according to which 48.6% of the territory of former Poland passed to Germany, and 51.4% to the USSR. According to the treaty, the western border of the Soviet Union now ran along the so-called Curzon Line, which was once recognized by England, France, the USA and Poland. But if the non-aggression pact (August 23, 1939) can be justified by specific circumstances, then the signing of this treaty was in fact a conspiracy with the aggressor and did not reflect the will of the Soviet people. Having gained freedom of action in the Baltics, the Stalinist leadership attempts to sovietize it, both through diplomatic and military measures. The governments of these countries were offered to conclude mutual assistance pacts, which were signed on September 28 with Estonia, on October 5 with Latvia and on October 10 with Lithuania. As a result, the Soviet Union received the right to station its troops in the Baltic republics and to establish naval and air bases on their territories. The parties pledged to provide each other with all kinds of assistance, including military, in the event of an attack or its threat. The clauses of the treaties were beneficial not only for the USSR. Lithuania, for example, received the territory of Vilna and the Vilna region (6,656 sq. km) with a population of about half a million people, among whom Lithuanians made up no more than 20%. At the same time, trade agreements were signed on the supply of raw materials from the USSR, which compensated for the loss of ties with the West in the context of the outbreak of the world war. The establishment of Soviet power was accompanied by mass repressions in the Baltic States - about 40 thousand people were deported from the three republics, of which 4814 survived in 1948.

According to the memoirs of I.G. Ehrenburg, after the conclusion of the “Treaty of Friendship and Border”, the word “fascism” ceased to be abusive in the official Soviet dictionary.

The participation of the Soviet Union in the division of Eastern Europe and the conclusion of an agreement with Germany, already at war, can be seen as its actual entry into World War II on the side of Hitler.

In the summer of 1940, as a result of political pressure, Romania ceded Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the Soviet Union. On August 2, 1940, the creation of the Moldavian SSR was proclaimed, which included Bessarabia and Soviet Moldavia separated from Ukraine. Northern Bukovina became the Chernivtsi region of the Ukrainian SSR. The population of Bessarabia welcomed the Red Army as their liberator. However, soon mass purges of repression unfolded on the territory of Bessarabia, covering from 67 to 89 thousand people, mainly wealthy peasants, small and medium-sized entrepreneurs, and the intelligentsia.

As a result, significant territories with a population of 14 million people were included in the USSR. The border of the country moved to the west different places at a distance of 300 to 600 km.

The foreign policy agreements of 1939 helped to delay the German attack on the Soviet Union by almost two years. The Soviet leadership made an agreement with fascist Germany, whose ideology and policy it had previously condemned. Such a turn could be made under conditions state system, All domestic funds propaganda which was aimed at justifying the actions of the government and the formation of a new attitude of Soviet society towards the Nazi regime.

If the Non-Aggression Pact, signed in August 1939, was to a certain extent a forced step for the USSR, then the secret protocol, the Friendship and Border Treaty, and other foreign policy actions of the Stalinist government carried out on the eve of the war violated the sovereignty of a number of Eastern European states.

Relations between Finland, which gained independence as a result of the collapse of the Russian Empire, and the Soviet Union did not develop easily. In 1932, the USSR and Finland signed a non-aggression pact, which was extended in 1934 for 10 years. Helsinki was concerned about the deportation of Karelians in 1935, the closure of Finnish-language publications and schools in Soviet Karelia. In turn, Finnish nationalist groups put forward claims to Soviet territory. In April 1938, the USSR, through secret channels, offered the Finns negotiations to strengthen mutual security, but the negotiations ended in vain.

Having secured his rear in the East, on October 9, 1939, Hitler signed a directive to prepare for an attack on France, and ten days later approved a plan for the strategic deployment of the German army to carry out offensive operations in the West (Gelb plan). The spread of the fire of the world war forced, in turn, I.V. Stalin to think about the security of the northwestern borders of the USSR (the border with Finland passed in the immediate vicinity of Leningrad). In addition, he was not averse to implementing the agreements set out in the secret protocol to the treaty of August 23, 1939, on possible territorial and political changes in Finland. In October, the Soviet government offered Finland to lease the Hanko Peninsula to the USSR for the establishment of a Soviet military base on it and to exchange territories on the coast of the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland for lands in Eastern Karelia. The Finnish side refused.

The concentration of Soviet troops began near the border with Finland. On November 26, 1939, in the area of ​​​​the village of Mainila, several Soviet soldiers were killed and wounded in firing practice. The Soviet side, using this incident, accused Finland of aggression and demanded to withdraw troops 20-25 kilometers from Leningrad. The refusal of the Finnish government served as a pretext for the USSR to unilaterally denounce the 1932 non-aggression pact with Finland on November 28, 1939. On the morning of November 30, the troops of the Leningrad Military District invaded Finland. The next day, in the village of Terioki, the "people's government" of the Finnish Democratic Republic (FDR) was formed, headed by O. V. Kuusinen. Despite the fact that the Soviet troops managed to reach the heavily fortified "Mannerheim Line" in early December 1939, they could not break through it. Only after almost two months of thorough training of the troops of the North-Western Front under the command of the commander of the 1st rank S.K. Timoshenko, they broke the stubborn resistance of the Finnish army and reached the approaches to Vyborg. On March 12, 1940, the Soviet-Finnish peace treaty was signed, according to which the border on the Karelian Isthmus was moved away from Leningrad by 120-130 kilometers. Several islands in the Gulf of Finland, the Finnish part of the Sredny and Rybachy peninsulas in the Barents Sea went to the USSR, and the Khanko peninsula was transferred for a lease for a period of 30 years.

This war was not popular among the Soviet people, as it had a pronounced predatory character. The famous poet A.T. Tvardovsky called it "an unfamous war." The losses of the Soviet Armed Forces amounted to almost 126.9 thousand killed, missing, died from wounds and diseases, as well as 248 thousand wounded, shell-shocked and frostbite. Finland lost 48.2 thousand people killed and 43 thousand wounded. In political terms, this war caused serious damage to the international prestige of the Soviet Union. By decision of the League of Nations for aggression against Finland in December 1939, the USSR was expelled from this organization and found itself in international isolation.

Conclusion

Researchers who study the history of Soviet-German relations have to take into account, first, the emergence of new documents that shed light on this problem. In particular, in the collection of documents "The Nazi sword was forged in the USSR" it is convincingly proved that in the 20s. the Soviet leadership helped Germany create its own armed forces, bypassing the Treaty of Versailles. Secondly, one has to take into account the influence of Western historiography, which places the main blame for the outbreak of the Second World War either on the USSR or on A. Hitler and J. Stalin at the same time. Similar views are expressed, in particular, in the recently published works of N. Werth, in which the entire foreign policy of the USSR in the 30s. is served at the angle of destabilizing the situation in Europe and condoning the aggressor, and especially the work of V. Suvorov "Icebreaker", which has a characteristic subtitle "Who started the Second World War?" and its content leads to an unambiguous answer to this question. These two circumstances influenced the work of M.I. Semiryaga. G.L. Rozanova, L.A. Nameless. O.A. Rzhemevsky, A.M. Samsonov, A.O. Chubaryan and other researchers devoted to the analysis of the foreign policy of the USSR on the eve of the Second World War. Worthy of attention are the studies of V. Petrov. A. Dongarova about the circumstances Soviet-Finnish war 1939 - 1940. V. Abarinova about the tragedy in Katyn, V.A. Parsadonova on the relationship between the USSR and the territories that went to it under the Soviet-German pact of 1939. It is this pact and the policy of the USSR after its conclusion that require a balanced analysis of researchers not on the basis of ideology, but on the basis of an objective study of the facts and steps taken by all subjects international relations. At the turn of the 20-30s. the same radical changes took place in the foreign policy of the USSR as inside the country. The leadership of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and the Comintern has completely changed, before which the main task was set - to ensure favorable conditions for building socialism in the USSR. It was necessary to prevent the threat of drawing the USSR into international conflicts, as well as to maximize the benefits of economic cooperation with the developed countries of the West. In connection with the change in priorities in foreign policy, the activities of the Comintern were considered secondary compared to the activities of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, headed by M.M. Litvinov, known for his sympathy for Western democracies. But later, the activity of the USSR in the diplomatic arena in the mid-30s was called the "policy of collective security." Its effectiveness in averting the threat of a world war was highly regarded by official Soviet historiography and questioned in contemporary literature. However, it should be taken into account that the policy of collective security depends on the position of all the parties involved in its development. It is important to determine the extent to which these parties are interested in establishing such a system in Europe. The USSR understood the threat of war approaching the world and its unpreparedness for it at that time. Therefore, the sincerity of his efforts should not be doubted. However, without the connivance of Germany on the part of the West, the remilitarization of the Rhineland, the war in Spain and the victory of fascism in it, the Anschluss of Austria and the occupation of Czechoslovakia would have been impossible. The calls of the USSR to curb the aggressor in the League of Nations can be regarded as demagogy, but one cannot but notice the formation of a bloc of aggressive states on the basis of the Anti-Comintern Pact and the signing of the Munich Agreement. Considering the collapse of its diplomatic activity, the USSR was forced to pay attention to the situation that was developing near its borders. The situation on the Far Eastern borders had to be corrected by military means in the battles with Japan on Lake Khasan and in the Khalkin-Gola region. The threat that was looming from the West had to be resolved diplomatically, first in negotiations with Western democracies, and then with the country that posed a direct threat THE USSR. The circumstances that led to the conclusion of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, as well as its impact on international relations, are now well known, and one can hardly expect any new documents on these issues. Their interpretation depends on the position taken by the researcher, characterizing the Soviet foreign policy. Opinions on this issue differ fundamentally among various researchers, and they are based on political likes and dislikes, rather than an objective analysis of the facts.

The European foreign policy of the USSR went through three stages in the 1930s: before the arrival of the Nazis in Germany, there was a predominantly pro-German orientation; from 1933 to 1939 the “pro-democratic” line prevailed: orientation towards an alliance with Britain and France, attempts to create a system of collective security; from 1939 to 1941 the pro-German line prevailed again, which attracted Stalin with the opportunity to significantly expand the territory of the USSR by dividing the world.

Bibliography

1. Kisilev A.F., “ recent history Fatherland. XX century”, M., Vlados, 2002 - 336 p.

2. L.A. Katsva, History of Russia. Soviet period. 1917-1941", M., Miros-Antikva, 2002-447 p.

3. Munchaev Sh.M., "History of Russia"

M., Norma, 2004 - 768 p.

4. Orlov A.S., History of Russia, 2nd ed.

M., Prospekt, 2004 - 520 p.

5. Ostrovsky V.P., “History of Russia. XX century"

M., Bustard, 2001 - 425 p.

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The foreign policy of the USSR in the 20-30s

In the 1920s, the Soviet Union was recognized by the leading powers of the world. In 1924, diplomatic relations were established with Great Britain, France, and Italy. In the 20s. actively developed economic cooperation with Germany. With the advent of the fascist party to power in Germany, the policy of the USSR underwent changes. At the end of 1933, a collective security plan was developed. From that time until August 1939, Soviet foreign policy had a clear anti-German orientation, which was confirmed by mutual assistance agreements with France and Czechoslovakia, concluded in 1935. At the same time, in 1935, the USSR condemned the Italian attack on Ethiopia, and in 1936 supported the Spanish Republic in the fight against General Franco.

Western countries (first of all England, France, the USA) pursued a policy of "appeasement of the aggressor" and sought to direct its predatory actions against the USSR. So, in September 1938, in Munich, England and France agreed to transfer the Sudetenland to Czechoslovakia to Germany.

The situation in the Far East was also tense. In 1928, there was a conflict between the USSR and China on the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER), which was quickly resolved. But here in the East, the Soviet Union was opposed by Japan. In August 1938, there was a major clash with Japanese troops in the area of ​​​​Lake Khasan near Vladivostok, and in the summer of 1939 on the Khalkhin-Gol River. The Japanese troops were defeated.

The aggressive actions of fascist Germany in Europe prompted Britain and France in the spring and summer of 1939 to negotiate with the USSR to counter the aggressor, but by August 1939 these negotiations reached an impasse. Then the USSR on August 23, 1939 signed a non-aggression pact with Germany (the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact) for a period of ten years. A secret protocol on the division of spheres of influence in Europe was attached to it. The Soviet sphere included part of Poland (Western Ukraine and Western Belarus), the Baltic States (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia), Bessarabia, and Finland.

Having signed the pact, fascist Germany attacked Poland on September 1, 1939. England and France, having treaties of mutual assistance with Poland, declared war on Germany. So September 1, 1939. World War II began. September 17, 1939 The Red Army crossed the border of Poland and established control over Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, which were included in the Ukrainian SSR and the BSSR. On September 28, 1939, a friendship treaty was signed between the USSR and Germany, which specified the delimitation of spheres of influence in Europe. In September-October 1939, agreements on mutual assistance were signed between the USSR, on the one hand, and Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, on the other. In August 1940, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were included in the USSR. After a difficult Soviet-Finnish war (November 1939 - March 1940), part of the territory of Finland (the entire Karelian Isthmus with the city of Vyborg) was ceded to the USSR. In June 1940, the government of the USSR demanded that Romania return Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. The Romanian authorities were forced to meet these demands.

Meanwhile, Germany, having occupied almost all the countries of Europe, was intensively preparing for an attack on the USSR.

The foreign policy of the USSR in the 20s

The Second Congress of the Comintern met in July 1920. These were the days of the successful advance of the Red Army on Warsaw. G. Guy's cavalry corps broke even into Germany. People's Commissar for Military Affairs L. Trotsky then put forward the slogan "The rear of the Red Army ahead!". It seemed that the European, and then the world revolution, was indeed a matter of the coming months or weeks.

These days the delegates adopted the famous Manifesto of the Comintern

“The Communist International,” it said, “is the party of the revolutionary uprising of the international proletariat... Soviet Germany, united with Soviet Russia, would immediately be stronger than all the capitalist states put together. The Comintern declared the cause of Soviet Russia to be its own cause. The international proletariat will not sheathe the sword until Soviet Russia is included as a link in the Federation of Soviet Republics of the whole World.”

“The German hammer and the Russian sickle will conquer the whole world!” was the official slogan at the time. However, in August, Polish troops defeated units of the Red Army near Warsaw. This defeat dealt a crushing blow to the world revolution itself, which was now at least "postponed" for several years.

But until the mid-20s. the world revolution still seemed to the Bolsheviks "task number one."

Journalist Mikhail Koltsov wrote in 1924: “Hurry up! A few more years and the Comintern will leave us. Its capital will be Berlin or Paris. Then you will eagerly look at the drawings of magazines, ask friends who came from there, and remember in a provincial way how the Comintern was “quite here, close, in Moscow, on Mokhovaya”.

After an unsuccessful attempt in the Soviet-Polish war to bring the world revolution to Europe on the bayonets of the Red Army and the suppression of the Moscow-supported uprisings in Germany in March 1921 and October 1923, instead of the strategy of a revolutionary war, Soviet leaders are developing a more flexible model of behavior of the “socialist state in capitalist environment. It rested on two contradictory foundations: the ideological principle of proletarian internationalism, according to which the USSR supported the communist and national liberation movements in the world worldwide (hoping for an inevitable world revolution in the future), and the pragmatic orientation towards the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, which implied normalization interstate relations with various countries (with the very ones whose internal political stability was called upon to undermine the Comintern).

In general, in the Soviet foreign policy of the 1920s, ideological imperatives gradually began to give way to pragmatic considerations.

The normalization of relations between Soviet Russia and the West took concrete shape in the spring of 1921, when trade agreements were signed with Britain and Germany, and then with other countries.

But a serious obstacle to the further development of relations with the West was the issue of Russian debts. In October 1921, the Brussels International Conference recommended that governments provide loans to Soviet Russia to fight hunger only if it recognized the debts of the tsarist and provisional governments and allowed a commission to control the distribution of products.

On October 28, 1921, the Soviet government expressed its readiness to negotiate mutual demands, the recognition of pre-war debts, subject to its diplomatic recognition and the cessation of actions that threaten security Soviet republics. To discuss these issues, it was proposed to convene an international economic conference.

It took place in Genoa (Italy) from April 10 to May 19, 1922. It was attended by representatives of 29 countries. The attempt of the Soviet delegation to put the problem of disarmament on the table did not meet with support. The Western powers demanded the payment by the Soviet government of all debts of the tsarist and Provisional governments (the Soviet side - compensation for damage caused by foreign intervention and blockade), the return or compensation by foreigners of nationalized property (this point was a stumbling block at the conference), as well as the virtual abolition of the monopoly of foreign trade ( what Lenin did not allow).

It was not possible to come to a mutual agreement. Negotiations continued to no avail at the Hague Arms Reduction Conference (June 15 - July 24, 1923), the USSR refused to ratify the Black Sea Straits Convention, which provided for free passage to the Black Sea for warships of any country. Thus, the Soviet Union failed to become a full-fledged subject of the system of international relations in the 1920s.

Bilateral relations developed much more successfully for Russia. Already in 1919 - 1920. there was a Soviet-German rapprochement, and in 1922, during the Genoa Conference, when the parties actually reached an impasse, an agreement was concluded between Soviet Russia and Germany on the outskirts of Genoa Rapallo. It provided for the restoration of diplomatic relations, the mutual renunciation of compensation for military expenses and losses (including reparations, old debts, nationalized property) and meant a breakthrough in the diplomatic blockade of the Soviets. In 1925, a non-aggression and neutrality pact was signed between Germany and the USSR. Soviet-German economic ties developed rapidly, as did military cooperation, which helped the Germans circumvent certain articles of the Treaty of Versailles.

Soviet-British relations were complicated. On May 8, 1924, the British side harshly accused the USSR of violating the trade agreement of 1921 and anti-British propaganda in Asia (the so-called “Curzon ultimatum”). However, the conflict was nevertheless settled, and on February 1, 1924, after the Laborites came to power, the USSR was officially recognized by Great Britain with the proviso that Great Britain sees in it the successor of the former Russian Empire. Five days later, fascist Italy also declared recognition. Over the next month, the USSR was recognized by Norway, Austria, Greece, Sweden ... Soon other countries followed suit. In August 1924, the General Treaty and the Treaty on Trade and Navigation were signed between England and the USSR. But already on October 10, British intelligence published the so-called "Zinoviev's letter", which set out recommendations to the British Communists on the development of subversive activities in the British Isles. The scandal that broke out aggravated Soviet-British relations and contributed to the defeat of the Labor Party in the elections.

During the general strike in England in 1926, the VKP(b) through the Soviet trade unions provided financial assistance miners' federation of Great Britain. The British government accused Moscow of interfering in internal affairs and violating the trade agreement. On May 27, 1927, the British government severed diplomatic relations with the USSR and annulled trade agreement 1921

In the mid-1920s, the USSR achieved diplomatic recognition from most of the developed capitalist states. Of the great powers, only the United States did not establish diplomatic relations with the USSR.

Soviet policy intensified in the East, mainly in the border states. In March 1923, in response to the request of the Chinese revolutionary leader Sun Yat-sen, a group of military and political advisers (P.A. Pavlov, V.K. Blyukher, M.M. Borodin and others) was sent to South China. In May 1923, diplomatic relations were established between the USSR and the Peking (central) government of China.

The only allies of the USSR here were only two states - Mongolia and Tuva (later annexed to the USSR). Parts of the Red Army were located on their territory. Soviet-Chinese relations in the 20s. were quite difficult, and in 1929 there was even an armed conflict between the two countries. The subject of the dispute was the Chinese Eastern Railway Railway. On July 10, 1929, Chinese troops took control of the CER by force. Then Moscow activated the Special Far Eastern Army, headed by Vasily Blyukher. In October-November, the Chinese troops were defeated, and they suffered considerable losses: more than a thousand killed, at least ten thousand prisoners. Soviet troops lost 143 people dead. Of course, these military relations cast a shadow over Sino-Soviet relations for a long time to come.

In 1924 - 1928 treaties of friendship and neutrality were concluded, as well as various economic agreements with Turkey, Afghanistan, Iran, Yemen.

Thus, during the 1920s, the USSR was able to largely overcome diplomatic isolation, although it continued to be regarded by the international community as a "foreign body."

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The foreign policy of the USSR at the beginning of its existence was contradictory. On the one side The Soviet Union sought to spread socialist ideas and help the working class end the capitalist and colonial regime. A on the other side, it was necessary to maintain relations with the capitalist powers in order to establish economic and political ties with them and increase the international prestige of the USSR.

In turn, the attitude of Western countries towards Soviet Russia was also ambiguous. On the one side, the movement of the working class against capitalism did not sympathize with them at all, and they set the isolation of the Soviet Union as one of the tasks of their foreign policy. But, on the other side, The West wanted to regain the money and property it lost after the Soviets came to power, and to this end sought to establish political and economic ties with the USSR.

20s

In 1921-1922, England, Austria, Norway and other countries signed trade agreements with Russia. Then economic ties were put in order with countries that were once part of the Russian Empire: Poland, Lithuania, Finland, Estonia and Latvia. In 1921, Soviet Russia expanded its influence in the East by concluding agreements with Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan that established the rule of mutual assistance and mutual recognition between countries. In the same 1921, Russia provided military assistance to Mongolia in the revolution, supporting the leader Sukhe-Bator.

Genoese conference.

In 1922, the Genoa Conference took place. Russia was offered formal recognition in exchange for an agreement to accept Western claims. The following requirements were put forward.

West:

• the return of the imperial debt (18 billion rubles) and property that belonged to Western capitalists before nationalization;
• the abolition of the monopoly on imports;
• allowing foreigners to invest in Russian industry;
• Stopping the spread of the “revolutionary contagion” in Western countries

Russia:

• Compensation for the damage caused by the interventionists during the Civil War (39 billion rubles)
• Guaranteed issuance of long-term loans to Russia
• Adoption of a program to limit weapons and prohibit the use of brutal weapons in war

But both sides could not find a compromise. The issues of the conference were not resolved.

But Russia managed to conclude an agreement with Germany in Rapallo, which contributed to the further development of relations in a positive way.

After the creation of the USSR, a streak of confessions followed. All states except the United States accepted the Soviet Union.

Further, in the face of the growing threat of a new world war, the USSR needed to reduce international tension and increase its authority. The Soviets put forward two proposals to resolve the escalating conflict: a declaration on general disarmament in 1927 and an arms reduction convention in 1928. None of them were accepted. But in 1928 the Union agreed with the call of the Briand-Kellogg Pact to reject war as a method of resolving international strife.

30s

In 1929, the world overcame the economic crisis, which caused a change in foreign policy in many countries. The international position grew more and more. In this regard, the USSR made the following decisions:

• Do not enter into armed international conflicts
• Maintain relations with democratic countries in the name of pacifying the aggression of Germany and Japan
• Create a system of collective security in Europe

In 1933 the USA recognized the USSR. In 1934, the League of Nations accepted the Soviet Union into its ranks. After the USSR, he agreed with France and Czechoslovakia on support in case of war (1935).

Soon the USSR violated its principle of non-interference in the circumstances of other states and in 1936 helped the Spanish Popular Front in the civil war.

International tension intensified, the countries of the West were less and less successful in restraining the aggression of Germany, Japan and Italy. From the East, the USSR was threatened by Japan in alliance with Germany. Realizing that they are not able to eliminate the fascist threat, Western countries began to look for ways to reflect it from themselves. To do this, they concluded the Munich Agreement (1938).

England and France no longer believed in the ability of the USSR to repel the onslaught of the Nazis and did not express a desire to conclude security treaties with the Union. In this regard, the USSR turned its foreign policy in the opposite direction, concluding a non-aggression pact with Germany (1939). To some extent, this agreement "untied the hands" of Nazi Germany and contributed to the outbreak of World War II (September 1, 1939).

© Anastasia Prikhodchenko 2015